--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/netwerk/dns/nsDNSService2.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/netwerk/dns/nsDNSService2.cpp@@ -652,11 +652,11 @@       return nullptr;     }-    if (XRE_IsParentProcess()) {+    if (XRE_IsParentProcess() || XRE_IsSocketProcess()) {       return GetSingleton();     }-    if (XRE_IsContentProcess() || XRE_IsSocketProcess()) {+    if (XRE_IsContentProcess()) {       return ChildDNSService::GetSingleton();     }@@ -676,7 +676,6 @@ already_AddRefed<nsDNSService> nsDNSService::GetSingleton() {   MOZ_ASSERT_IF(nsIOService::UseSocketProcess(), XRE_IsSocketProcess());-  MOZ_ASSERT_IF(!nsIOService::UseSocketProcess(), XRE_IsParentProcess());   if (!gDNSService) {     if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Process Isolation Issue] [netwerk/dns/nsDNSService2.cpp] [Lines 652-658]
   [Old Code]
   if (XRE_IsParentProcess()) {
     return GetSingleton();
   }

   if (XRE_IsContentProcess() || XRE_IsSocketProcess()) {
     return ChildDNSService::GetSingleton();
   }
   
   [Fixed Code]
   if (XRE_IsParentProcess() || XRE_IsSocketProcess()) {
     return GetSingleton();
   }

   if (XRE_IsContentProcess()) {
     return ChildDNSService::GetSingleton();
   }

   Additional Details: The change modifies process isolation logic, potentially fixing an issue where the SocketProcess wasn't properly isolated from the ParentProcess. However, without more context, we can't be certain if this was an actual security vulnerability.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Assertion Removal] [netwerk/dns/nsDNSService2.cpp] [Lines 676]
   [Old Code]
   MOZ_ASSERT_IF(!nsIOService::UseSocketProcess(), XRE_IsParentProcess());
   
   [Fixed Code]
   (removed line)

   Additional Details: The removal of this assertion might indicate a relaxation of process isolation checks, but it's unclear if this was fixing a security issue or just code cleanup. The assertion might have been overly restrictive or no longer necessary.

Note: Both changes appear related to process isolation and DNS service initialization, which could have security implications, but without more context about the threat model and intended behavior, we can't definitively state these were security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/serviceworkers/FetchEventOpProxyParent.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/serviceworkers/FetchEventOpProxyParent.cpp@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ #include "mozilla/dom/FetchTypes.h" #include "mozilla/dom/ServiceWorkerOpArgs.h" #include "nsCOMPtr.h"-#include "nsContentUtils.h" #include "nsIInputStream.h" #include "mozilla/Assertions.h"@@ -50,7 +49,7 @@   aSink = Some(ParentToParentStream());   auto& uuid = aSink->uuid();-  MOZ_TRY(nsContentUtils::GenerateUUIDInPlace(uuid));+  MOZ_TRY(nsID::GenerateUUIDInPlace(uuid));   auto storageOrErr = RemoteLazyInputStreamStorage::Get();

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential UUID Generation Vulnerability] [dom/serviceworkers/FetchEventOpProxyParent.cpp] [Lines 50-53]
[Old Code]
  MOZ_TRY(nsContentUtils::GenerateUUIDInPlace(uuid));
[Fixed Code]
  MOZ_TRY(nsID::GenerateUUIDInPlace(uuid));

Additional Details:
1. The change involves switching from nsContentUtils::GenerateUUIDInPlace to nsID::GenerateUUIDInPlace for UUID generation.
2. While this could potentially be related to security (as UUID generation is often security-sensitive), there's no clear vulnerability information in the diff.
3. The change might be related to:
   - Performance optimization (more direct UUID generation)
   - Code organization (moving UUID generation to its proper class)
   - Potential security improvements in the UUID generation algorithm
4. Without more context, we can't definitively say this fixes a vulnerability, but it's worth noting as a security-relevant change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/wr/webrender/src/platform/macos/font.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/wr/webrender/src/platform/macos/font.rs@@ -507,7 +507,10 @@                 } else {                     (x_scale, y_scale / x_scale)                 };-                let extra_strikes = font.get_extra_strikes(strike_scale);+                let extra_strikes = font.get_extra_strikes(+                    FontInstanceFlags::SYNTHETIC_BOLD | FontInstanceFlags::MULTISTRIKE_BOLD,+                    strike_scale,+                );                 let metrics = get_glyph_metrics(                     &ct_font,                     transform.as_ref(),@@ -552,7 +555,7 @@     #[allow(dead_code)]     fn print_glyph_data(&mut self, data: &[u8], width: usize, height: usize) {         // Rust doesn't have step_by support on stable :(-        println!("Width is: {:?} height: {:?}", width, height);+        debug!("Width is: {:?} height: {:?}", width, height);         for i in 0 .. height {             let current_height = i * width * 4;@@ -561,9 +564,8 @@                 let g = pixel[1];                 let r = pixel[2];                 let a = pixel[3];-                print!("({}, {}, {}, {}) ", r, g, b, a);-            }-            println!();+                debug!("({}, {}, {}, {}) ", r, g, b, a);+            }         }     }@@ -674,8 +676,10 @@         } else {             (x_scale, y_scale / x_scale)         };--        let extra_strikes = font.get_extra_strikes(strike_scale);+        let extra_strikes = font.get_extra_strikes(+            FontInstanceFlags::SYNTHETIC_BOLD | FontInstanceFlags::MULTISTRIKE_BOLD,+            strike_scale,+        );         let metrics = get_glyph_metrics(             &ct_font,             transform.as_ref(),

Analyzing the provided code diff, I can identify two potential security-related changes:

1. First vulnerability fix:
    Vulnerability Existed: yes
    Information Exposure Through Debug Messages [File] [Lines 552-564]
    [Old Code]
    println!("Width is: {:?} height: {:?}", width, height);
    print!("({}, {}, {}, {}) ", r, g, b, a);
    println!();
    [Fixed Code]
    debug!("Width is: {:?} height: {:?}", width, height);
    debug!("({}, {}, {}, {}) ", r, g, b, a);

    The change replaces println! with debug! macros, which prevents potentially sensitive information from being printed in production builds. This mitigates information exposure through debug messages.

2. Second change (not clearly a security vulnerability):
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    Potential Font Rendering Security [File] [Lines 507-509, 674-677]
    [Old Code]
    let extra_strikes = font.get_extra_strikes(strike_scale);
    [Fixed Code]
    let extra_strikes = font.get_extra_strikes(
        FontInstanceFlags::SYNTHETIC_BOLD | FontInstanceFlags::MULTISTRIKE_BOLD,
        strike_scale,
    );

    The change adds explicit flags for font rendering. While this might relate to security (font rendering can have security implications), without more context about the threat model or previous vulnerabilities, it's unclear if this fixes a specific security issue or is just a code improvement. The change appears in two locations in the diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.negativedir.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.negativedir.html@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -36,16 +36,16 @@     createImageBitmap(response).then(bitmap => {         ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 0, 178, 50, -100, 0, 0, 50, 100);         ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 0, 78, 50, 100, 50, 100, 50, -100);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 48,1, 0,255,0,255, "48,1", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 48,48, 0,255,0,255, "48,48", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 51,1, 0,255,0,255, "51,1", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 51,48, 0,255,0,255, "51,48", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 48,1, 0,255,0,255, "48,1", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 48,48, 0,255,0,255, "48,48", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 51,1, 0,255,0,255, "51,1", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 51,48, 0,255,0,255, "51,48", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and updating the corresponding references in the assertion calls. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no  
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 18-36]  
Old Code:  
```javascript
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255", 2);
```

Fixed Code:  
```javascript
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255", 2);
```

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or clarity.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/preferences/extensionControlled.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/preferences/extensionControlled.js@@ -166,6 +166,7 @@     let image = document.createElementNS("http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml", "img");     image.setAttribute("src", src);     image.setAttribute("data-l10n-name", "icon");+    image.setAttribute("role", "presentation");     image.classList.add("extension-controlled-icon");     elem.appendChild(image);   } else if (existingImg.getAttribute("src") !== src) {@@ -231,6 +232,7 @@     let img = document.createElementNS("http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml", "img");     img.src = url;     img.setAttribute("data-l10n-name", name);+    img.setAttribute("role", "presentation");     img.className = "extension-controlled-icon";     return img;   };

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Accessibility Improvement [File] browser/components/preferences/extensionControlled.js [Lines 166, 231]
    Old Code:
    ```javascript
    let image = document.createElementNS("http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml", "img");
    image.setAttribute("src", src);
    image.setAttribute("data-l10n-name", "icon");
    ```

    Fixed Code:
    ```javascript
    let image = document.createElementNS("http://www3.org/1999/xhtml", "img");
    image.setAttribute("src", src);
    image.setAttribute("data-l10n-name", "icon");
    image.setAttribute("role", "presentation");
    ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Accessibility Improvement [File] browser/components/preferences/extensionControlled.js [Lines 231, 232]
    Old Code:
    ```javascript
    let img = document.createElementNS("http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml", "img");
    img.src = url;
    img.setAttribute("data-l10n-name", name);
    ```

    Fixed Code:
    ```javascript
    let img = document.createElementNS("http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml", "img");
    img.src = url;
    img.setAttribute("data-l10n-name", name);
    img.setAttribute("role", "presentation");
    ```

The changes in this diff are related to accessibility improvements rather than security fixes. The addition of `role="presentation"` to image elements helps screen readers understand that these images are decorative and don't convey important information, which improves accessibility but doesn't address any security vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/wasm/jsapi/table/constructor.any.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/wasm/jsapi/table/constructor.any.js@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ test(() => {   const argument = { "element": "anyfunc", "initial": 0 };-  const table = new WebAssembly.Table(argument, {});+  const table = new WebAssembly.Table(argument, null, {});   assert_Table(table, { "length": 0 }); }, "Stray argument");

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Argument Handling Issue] [testing/web-platform/tests/wasm/jsapi/table/constructor.any.js] [Lines 89]
    [Old Code]
    const table = new WebAssembly.Table(argument, {});
    [Fixed Code]
    const table = new WebAssembly.Table(argument, null, {});

Additional Details:
- The change adds a `null` parameter between the `argument` and `{}` parameters in the WebAssembly.Table constructor call
- This appears to be fixing a potential argument handling issue, but without more context about the WebAssembly.Table constructor's expected parameters, it's unclear if this was actually a security vulnerability
- The test case name "Stray argument" suggests this might be related to proper parameter validation
- It could potentially prevent some edge case behavior where incorrect parameter counts might cause unexpected behavior, but I can't confirm this was a security vulnerability without more information

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/storage/test/browser_storage_fission_cache.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/storage/test/browser_storage_fission_cache.js@@ -6,9 +6,18 @@ "use strict";+// Bug 1746646: Make mochitests work with TCP enabled (cookieBehavior = 5)+// All instances of addPermission and removePermission set up 3rd-party storage+// access in a way that allows the test to proceed with TCP enabled.+ add_task(async function() {   // open tab   const URL = URL_ROOT_COM_SSL + "storage-cache-basic.html";+  await SpecialPowers.addPermission(+    "3rdPartyStorage^https://example.net",+    true,+    URL+  );   await openTabAndSetupStorage(URL);   const doc = gPanelWindow.document;@@ -21,6 +30,11 @@   // Check iframe   await selectTreeItem(["Cache", "https://example.net", "foo"]);   checkCacheData(URL_ROOT_NET_SSL + "storage-blank.html", "OK");++  await SpecialPowers.removePermission(+    "3rdPartyStorage^http://example.net",+    URL+  ); }); function checkCacheData(url, status) {

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) or Third-Party Storage Access Issue] [devtools/client/storage/test/browser_storage_fission_cache.js] [Lines 6-30]
    [Old Code]
    add_task(async function() {
      // open tab
      const URL = URL_ROOT_COM_SSL + "storage-cache-basic.html";
      await openTabAndSetupStorage(URL);
      const doc = gPanelWindow.document;
    
      // Check cache
      await selectTreeItem(["Cache", "https://example.com"]);
      checkCacheData(URL, "OK");
    
      // Check iframe
      await selectTreeItem(["Cache", "https://example.net", "foo"]);
      checkCacheData(URL_ROOT_NET_SSL + "storage-blank.html", "OK");
    });
    
    [Fixed Code]
    add_task(async function() {
      // open tab
      const URL = URL_ROOT_COM_SSL + "storage-cache-basic.html";
      await SpecialPowers.addPermission(
        "3rdPartyStorage^https://example.net",
        true,
        URL
      );
      await openTabAndSetupStorage(URL);
      const doc = gPanelWindow.document;
    
      // Check cache
      await selectTreeItem(["Cache", "https://example.com"]);
      checkCacheData(URL, "OK");
    
      // Check iframe
      await selectTreeItem(["Cache", "https://example.net", "foo"]);
      checkCacheData(URL_ROOT_NET_SSL + "storage-blank.html", "OK");
    
      await SpecialPowers.removePermission(
        "3rdPartyStorage^http://example.net",
        URL
      );
    });

Additional Details:
- The diff adds explicit permission handling for third-party storage access
- The comment references "Bug 1746646" and mentions making tests work with "TCP enabled (cookieBehavior = 5)"
- TCP likely refers to Total Cookie Protection, a privacy feature that isolates cookies
- The changes suggest the test was failing due to stricter cookie/storage isolation policies
- While this appears to be a test fix rather than a production security fix, it relates to important security/privacy features

Note: This doesn't appear to be fixing a vulnerability in production code, but rather adapting tests to work with stricter security settings. The changes demonstrate proper handling of third-party storage permissions in a testing context.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/accessible/tests/mochitest/actions/test_select.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/accessible/tests/mochitest/actions/test_select.html@@ -30,42 +30,6 @@           events: CLICK_EVENTS,           eventSeq: [             new focusChecker("lb_apple"),-          ],-        },-        {-          ID: "combobox",-          actionIndex: 0,-          actionName: "open",-          events: CLICK_EVENTS,-          eventSeq: [-            new focusChecker("cb_orange"),-          ],-        },-        {-          ID: "cb_apple",-          actionIndex: 0,-          actionName: "select",-          events: CLICK_EVENTS,-          eventSeq: [-            new focusChecker("combobox"),-          ],-        },-        {-          ID: "combobox",-          actionIndex: 0,-          actionName: "open",-          events: CLICK_EVENTS,-          eventSeq: [-            new focusChecker("cb_apple"),-          ],-        },-        {-          ID: "combobox",-          actionIndex: 0,-          actionName: "close",-          events: CLICK_EVENTS,-          eventSeq: [-            new focusChecker("combobox"),           ],         },       ];

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be removing test cases related to combobox functionality in an accessibility test file, which is more likely a test suite cleanup rather than a security fix.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 30-42]
[Old Code]
(Test cases for combobox open/select/close actions)
[Fixed Code]
(Removed test cases)

Additional notes:
1. The diff shows removal of test cases but no security-related changes
2. The changes are in a test file (test_select.html) which typically wouldn't contain security fixes
3. No CVE or vulnerability patterns are evident in the removed code
4. This appears to be test suite maintenance rather than a security patch

If this were a security fix, we would expect to see:
- Input validation changes
- Sanitization of user input
- Removal of dangerous functions
- Changes to security-sensitive operations

None of these patterns are present in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/themes/shared/global.inc.css+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/themes/shared/global.inc.css@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ @namespace html url("http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"); :root {-  --default-focusring-width: 1px;+  --default-focusring-width: 2px;   --default-focusring: var(--default-focusring-width) dotted;   --arrowpanel-background: Field;@@ -45,12 +45,6 @@   --toolbar-field-border-color: transparent; }-@media (prefers-contrast) {-  :root {-    --default-focusring-width: 2px;-  }-}- :is(menupopup, panel)[type=arrow] {   --panel-background: var(--arrowpanel-background);   --panel-color: var(--arrowpanel-color);

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   CSS Property Adjustment [File: toolkit/themes/shared/global.inc.css] [Lines: 12]  
   Old Code: `--default-focusring-width: 1px;`  
   Fixed Code: `--default-focusring-width: 2px;`  
   Note: This appears to be a visual/accessibility improvement rather than a security fix.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   Media Query Removal [File: toolkit/themes/shared/global.inc.css] [Lines: 45-49]  
   Old Code:  
   ```css
   @media (prefers-contrast) {
     :root {
       --default-focusring-width: 2px;
     }
   }
   ```  
   Fixed Code: (removed)  
   Note: This appears to be a code cleanup/optimization since the media query is no longer needed after the default value was changed to 2px.

No security vulnerabilities were identified in this CSS diff. The changes appear to be related to visual styling and accessibility improvements rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/base/nsRefreshDriver.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/base/nsRefreshDriver.cpp@@ -1814,6 +1814,7 @@   // paint the page soon enough.   if (mThrottled || mTestControllingRefreshes || !XRE_IsContentProcess() ||       !mPresContext->Document()->IsTopLevelContentDocument() ||+      mPresContext->Document()->IsInitialDocument() ||       gfxPlatform::IsInLayoutAsapMode() || mPresContext->HadContentfulPaint() ||       mPresContext->Document()->GetReadyStateEnum() ==           Document::READYSTATE_COMPLETE) {

Let me analyze this code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Timing Attack Vulnerability [File] layout/base/nsRefreshDriver.cpp [Lines 1814-1821]
[Old Code]
  if (mThrottled || mTestControllingRefreshes || !XRE_IsContentProcess() ||
      !mPresContext->Document()->IsTopLevelContentDocument() ||
      gfxPlatform::IsInLayoutAsapMode() || mPresContext->HadContentfulPaint() ||
      mPresContext->Document()->GetReadyStateEnum() ==
          Document::READYSTATE_COMPLETE) {
[Fixed Code]
  if (mThrottled || mTestControllingRefreshes || !XRE_IsContentProcess() ||
      !mPresContext->Document()->IsTopLevelContentDocument() ||
      mPresContext->Document()->IsInitialDocument() ||
      gfxPlatform::IsInLayoutAsapMode() || mPresContext->HadContentfulPaint() ||
      mPresContext->Document()->GetReadyStateEnum() ==
          Document::READYSTATE_COMPLETE) {

Additional Details:
The change adds a check for `IsInitialDocument()` to the conditional. While this appears to be a functional fix rather than a direct security fix, it could potentially affect timing-related behaviors in the refresh driver. The modification might help prevent timing side-channels by ensuring initial documents are handled consistently, but without more context about the specific threat model, this is uncertain. The fix appears to be adding defense-in-depth by being more explicit about document state handling.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/gyroscope/META.yml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/gyroscope/META.yml@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@ spec: https://w3c.github.io/gyroscope/ suggested_reviewers:-  - zqzhang   - riju   - Honry   - rakuco

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/gyroscope/META.yml [Lines] 1-6
   [Old Code]
   suggested_reviewers:
     - zqzhang
     - riju
     - Honry
     - rakuco
   [Fixed Code]
   suggested_reviewers:
     - riju
     - Honry
     - rakuco

Additional Details:
- This appears to be a simple change in the list of suggested reviewers for the gyroscope test specification
- The change removes 'zqzhang' from the reviewer list, which doesn't indicate any security vulnerability
- META.yml files typically contain metadata about tests and don't usually contain security-sensitive information
- No code execution or security-related functionality is affected by this change

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.unchanged.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.unchanged.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var i = 0; for (var y = 0; y < 16; ++y) {

Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming without any security implications.

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found in this diff. The changes are purely variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`.

Additional Details:
- The change is a simple variable name refactoring
- No security-related functionality was modified
- The test logic remains identical
- No security-sensitive operations (like memory access, input validation, etc.) were affected

This appears to be a code style/readability improvement rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.cone.behind.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.cone.behind.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,15 +27,15 @@ g.addColorStop(1, '#f00'); ctx.fillStyle = g; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and updating the corresponding assertions. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found
File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.cone.behind.html
Lines: 17-48
Old Code: Used variable name 'offscreenCanvas'
Fixed Code: Changed variable name to 'canvas'

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't appear to address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or clarity.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.create2.zero.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.create2.zero.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); assert_throws_dom("INDEX_SIZE_ERR", function() { ctx.createImageData(10, 0); }); assert_throws_dom("INDEX_SIZE_ERR", function() { ctx.createImageData(0, 10); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) without any security implications.

Here's the structured response:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.create2.zero.html] [Lines 17-18]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The test behavior remains the same, only the variable name was changed for consistency or clarity.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.hsl-5.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.hsl-5.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; try { ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(0, 100.%, 50%)'; } catch (e) { } // this shouldn't throw, but it shouldn't matter here if it does ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes (variable renaming) rather than security-related fixes. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.hsl-5.html] [17-25]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and update its references. There are no security implications to this change. The test logic remains the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.order.rows.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.order.rows.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#fff'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability identified [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.order.rows.worker.js [Lines] 13-14
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   
   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Notes:
- The change appears to be a simple variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security-related changes or fixes are evident in this diff
- The modification seems to be for code consistency or readability rather than addressing any security issue

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/inset/shape-outside-inset-020.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/inset/shape-outside-inset-020.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/">   <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#supported-basic-shapes">   <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-inset-020-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Test the boxes are wrapping around the left float shape defined by the inset(10px round 0 40px/ 0 60px) border-box value under horizontal-tb writing-mode.">   <style>   .container {

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 9]
Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">
Fixed Code: (line removed)

Additional Details:
- This appears to be a simple test file modification where a metadata "flags" field was removed
- The change doesn't relate to any security-sensitive functionality
- No known vulnerability patterns are present in this change
- The modification seems to be test cleanup rather than a security fix

No other vulnerabilities were detected in this diff. The change is purely related to test metadata and doesn't affect any security-relevant code paths.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.interpolate.colouralpha.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.interpolate.colouralpha.html@@ -17,17 +17,17 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var g = ctx.createLinearGradient(0, 0, 100, 0); g.addColorStop(0, 'rgba(255,255,0, 0)'); g.addColorStop(1, 'rgba(0,0,255, 1)'); ctx.fillStyle = g; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 190,190,65,65, "25,25", "190,190,65,65", 3);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 126,126,128,128, "50,25", "126,126,128,128", 3);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 62,62,192,192, "75,25", "62,62,192,192", 3);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 25,25, 190,190,65,65, "25,25", "190,190,65,65", 3);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 126,126,128,128, "50,25", "126,126,128,128", 3);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 75,25, 62,62,192,192, "75,25", "62,62,192,192", 3); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   - The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't relate to any security fixes. No known vulnerability is being addressed here.
   - File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.interpolate.colouralpha.html
   - Lines: 17-30
   - Old Code: Using `offscreenCanvas` variable name
   - Fixed Code: Using `canvas` variable name

The changes are cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't appear to address any security issues. The test functionality remains identical, only the variable naming has changed. No security-related vulnerabilities are being fixed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/media/libwebp/src/enc/quant_enc.c+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/media/libwebp/src/enc/quant_enc.c@@ -585,6 +585,9 @@   return rate * lambda + RD_DISTO_MULT * distortion; }+// Coefficient type.+enum { TYPE_I16_AC = 0, TYPE_I16_DC = 1, TYPE_CHROMA_A = 2, TYPE_I4_AC = 3 };+ static int TrellisQuantizeBlock(const VP8Encoder* const enc,                                 int16_t in[16], int16_t out[16],                                 int ctx0, int coeff_type,@@ -593,7 +596,7 @@   const ProbaArray* const probas = enc->proba_.coeffs_[coeff_type];   CostArrayPtr const costs =       (CostArrayPtr)enc->proba_.remapped_costs_[coeff_type];-  const int first = (coeff_type == 0) ? 1 : 0;+  const int first = (coeff_type == TYPE_I16_AC) ? 1 : 0;   Node nodes[16][NUM_NODES];   ScoreState score_states[2][NUM_NODES];   ScoreState* ss_cur = &SCORE_STATE(0, MIN_DELTA);@@ -657,16 +660,17 @@     // test all alternate level values around level0.     for (m = -MIN_DELTA; m <= MAX_DELTA; ++m) {       Node* const cur = &NODE(n, m);-      int level = level0 + m;+      const int level = level0 + m;       const int ctx = (level > 2) ? 2 : level;       const int band = VP8EncBands[n + 1];       score_t base_score;-      score_t best_cur_score = MAX_COST;-      int best_prev = 0;   // default, in case--      ss_cur[m].score = MAX_COST;+      score_t best_cur_score;+      int best_prev;+      score_t cost, score;+       ss_cur[m].costs = costs[n + 1][ctx];       if (level < 0 || level > thresh_level) {+        ss_cur[m].score = MAX_COST;         // Node is dead.         continue;       }@@ -682,18 +686,24 @@       }       // Inspect all possible non-dead predecessors. Retain only the best one.-      for (p = -MIN_DELTA; p <= MAX_DELTA; ++p) {+      // The base_score is added to all scores so it is only added for the final+      // value after the loop.+      cost = VP8LevelCost(ss_prev[-MIN_DELTA].costs, level);+      best_cur_score =+          ss_prev[-MIN_DELTA].score + RDScoreTrellis(lambda, cost, 0);+      best_prev = -MIN_DELTA;+      for (p = -MIN_DELTA + 1; p <= MAX_DELTA; ++p) {         // Dead nodes (with ss_prev[p].score >= MAX_COST) are automatically         // eliminated since their score can't be better than the current best.-        const score_t cost = VP8LevelCost(ss_prev[p].costs, level);+        cost = VP8LevelCost(ss_prev[p].costs, level);         // Examine node assuming it's a non-terminal one.-        const score_t score =-            base_score + ss_prev[p].score + RDScoreTrellis(lambda, cost, 0);+        score = ss_prev[p].score + RDScoreTrellis(lambda, cost, 0);         if (score < best_cur_score) {           best_cur_score = score;           best_prev = p;         }       }+      best_cur_score += base_score;       // Store best finding in current node.       cur->sign = sign;       cur->level = level;@@ -701,11 +711,11 @@       ss_cur[m].score = best_cur_score;       // Now, record best terminal node (and thus best entry in the graph).-      if (level != 0) {+      if (level != 0 && best_cur_score < best_score) {         const score_t last_pos_cost =             (n < 15) ? VP8BitCost(0, probas[band][ctx][0]) : 0;         const score_t last_pos_score = RDScoreTrellis(lambda, last_pos_cost, 0);-        const score_t score = best_cur_score + last_pos_score;+        score = best_cur_score + last_pos_score;         if (score < best_score) {           best_score = score;           best_path[0] = n;                     // best eob position@@ -717,10 +727,16 @@   }   // Fresh start-  memset(in + first, 0, (16 - first) * sizeof(*in));-  memset(out + first, 0, (16 - first) * sizeof(*out));+  // Beware! We must preserve in[0]/out[0] value for TYPE_I16_AC case.+  if (coeff_type == TYPE_I16_AC) {+    memset(in + 1, 0, 15 * sizeof(*in));+    memset(out + 1, 0, 15 * sizeof(*out));+  } else {+    memset(in, 0, 16 * sizeof(*in));+    memset(out, 0, 16 * sizeof(*out));+  }   if (best_path[0] == -1) {-    return 0;   // skip!+    return 0;  // skip!   }   {@@ -775,9 +791,9 @@     for (y = 0, n = 0; y < 4; ++y) {       for (x = 0; x < 4; ++x, ++n) {         const int ctx = it->top_nz_[x] + it->left_nz_[y];-        const int non_zero =-            TrellisQuantizeBlock(enc, tmp[n], rd->y_ac_levels[n], ctx, 0,-                                 &dqm->y1_, dqm->lambda_trellis_i16_);+        const int non_zero = TrellisQuantizeBlock(+            enc, tmp[n], rd->y_ac_levels[n], ctx, TYPE_I16_AC, &dqm->y1_,+            dqm->lambda_trellis_i16_);         it->top_nz_[x] = it->left_nz_[y] = non_zero;         rd->y_ac_levels[n][0] = 0;         nz |= non_zero << n;@@ -818,7 +834,7 @@   if (DO_TRELLIS_I4 && it->do_trellis_) {     const int x = it->i4_ & 3, y = it->i4_ >> 2;     const int ctx = it->top_nz_[x] + it->left_nz_[y];-    nz = TrellisQuantizeBlock(enc, tmp, levels, ctx, 3, &dqm->y1_,+    nz = TrellisQuantizeBlock(enc, tmp, levels, ctx, TYPE_I4_AC, &dqm->y1_,                               dqm->lambda_trellis_i4_);   } else {     nz = VP8EncQuantizeBlock(tmp, levels, &dqm->y1_);@@ -927,9 +943,9 @@       for (y = 0; y < 2; ++y) {         for (x = 0; x < 2; ++x, ++n) {           const int ctx = it->top_nz_[4 + ch + x] + it->left_nz_[4 + ch + y];-          const int non_zero =-              TrellisQuantizeBlock(enc, tmp[n], rd->uv_levels[n], ctx, 2,-                                   &dqm->uv_, dqm->lambda_trellis_uv_);+          const int non_zero = TrellisQuantizeBlock(+              enc, tmp[n], rd->uv_levels[n], ctx, TYPE_CHROMA_A, &dqm->uv_,+              dqm->lambda_trellis_uv_);           it->top_nz_[4 + ch + x] = it->left_nz_[4 + ch + y] = non_zero;           nz |= non_zero << n;         }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Integer Overflow/Underflow Vulnerability [File: media/libwebp/src/enc/quant_enc.c] [Lines: ~593-596]
Old Code:
  const int first = (coeff_type == 0) ? 1 : 0;
Fixed Code:
  const int first = (coeff_type == TYPE_I16_AC) ? 1 : 0;
Additional Details: The change replaces a magic number (0) with a named constant (TYPE_I16_AC) for better type safety and to prevent potential integer-related vulnerabilities.

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Memory Initialization Vulnerability [File: media/libwebp/src/enc/quant_enc.c] [Lines: ~717-727]
Old Code:
  memset(in + first, 0, (16 - first) * sizeof(*in));
  memset(out + first, 0, (16 - first) * sizeof(*out));
Fixed Code:
  if (coeff_type == TYPE_I16_AC) {
    memset(in + 1, 0, 15 * sizeof(*in));
    memset(out + 1, 0, 15 * sizeof(*out));
  } else {
    memset(in, 0, 16 * sizeof(*in));
    memset(out, 0, 16 * sizeof(*out));
  }
Additional Details: The fix properly handles memory initialization based on coefficient type, preventing potential memory corruption issues that could occur with the previous more generic approach.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Logic Error [File: media/libwebp/src/enc/quant_enc.c] [Lines: ~711]
Old Code:
  if (level != 0) {
Fixed Code:
  if (level != 0 && best_cur_score < best_score) {
Additional Details: The additional condition (best_cur_score < best_score) might prevent some edge cases of incorrect path selection, but it's unclear if this was actually exploitable.

4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Code Quality Improvement [File: media/libwebp/src/enc/quant_enc.c] [Lines: ~660-686]
Old Code:
  score_t best_cur_score = MAX_COST;
  int best_prev = 0;
Fixed Code:
  score_t best_cur_score;
  int best_prev;
  score_t cost, score;
Additional Details: The changes in variable initialization and scope might prevent some edge cases of incorrect calculations, but it's not clear if this was security-relevant.

The most significant security-related changes appear to be the proper handling of coefficient types and memory initialization, which could prevent memory corruption vulnerabilities. The other changes appear to be more about code quality and correctness improvements.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/audioipc2-server/.cargo-checksum.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/audioipc2-server/.cargo-checksum.json@@ -1 +1 @@-{"files":{"Cargo.toml":"d06fa544ba9c0f2ff3ab418b63764b3e395bf326ffef129d6952ae1ae92213f1","cbindgen.toml":"ee9642e39a46b8a7275c4b18319c7a0208ef71e04de868898cd7838b277163d8","src/lib.rs":"e81af6b9577cfb421bdef50ad097b631ae5378784d0da93694abb7e3f26bfb52","src/server.rs":"c745bc7bbc1207c1cc642b8da95ff72e6e56d6ed0a3f56e755f27e9b79871e38"},"package":null}+{"files":{"Cargo.toml":"d06fa544ba9c0f2ff3ab418b63764b3e395bf326ffef129d6952ae1ae92213f1","cbindgen.toml":"fb6abe1671497f432a06e40b1db7ed7cd2cceecbd9a2382193ad7534e8855e34","src/lib.rs":"06aff4fd1326aeabb16b01f81a6f3c59c1717ebe96285a063724830cdf30303a","src/server.rs":"c745bc7bbc1207c1cc642b8da95ff72e6e56d6ed0a3f56e755f27e9b79871e38"},"package":null}=========security/nss/lib/ssl/sslsock.c========--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslsock.c+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslsock.c@@ -94,7 +94,8 @@     .enablePostHandshakeAuth = PR_FALSE,     .suppressEndOfEarlyData = PR_FALSE,     .enableTls13GreaseEch = PR_FALSE,-    .enableTls13BackendEch = PR_FALSE+    .enableTls13BackendEch = PR_FALSE,+    .callExtensionWriterOnEchInner = PR_FALSE, }; /*@@ -4304,6 +4305,7 @@     EXP(AddExternalPsk0Rtt),     EXP(AeadDecrypt),     EXP(AeadEncrypt),+    EXP(CallExtensionWriterOnEchInner),     EXP(CipherSuiteOrderGet),     EXP(CipherSuiteOrderSet),     EXP(CreateAntiReplayContext),@@ -4405,6 +4407,17 @@ } SECStatus+SSLExp_CallExtensionWriterOnEchInner(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool enabled)+{+    sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);+    if (!ss) {+        return SECFailure;+    }+    ss->opt.callExtensionWriterOnEchInner = enabled;+    return SECSuccess;+}++SECStatus SSLExp_SetDtls13VersionWorkaround(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool enabled) {     sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze the changes for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. For the first file (audioipc2-server/.cargo-checksum.json):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    This is just a checksum file update showing changes to hash values of various files. There's no actual code change here that would indicate a security vulnerability.

2. For the second file (security/nss/lib/ssl/sslsock.c):
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    TLS/SSL Extension Handling [security/nss/lib/ssl/sslsock.c] [Lines 94, 4304-4305, 4405-4417]
    [Old Code]
    No mention of callExtensionWriterOnEchInner in the default options
    No EXP(CallExtensionWriterOnEchInner) in the exported functions
    No SSLExp_CallExtensionWriterOnEchInner function
    
    [Fixed Code]
    Added callExtensionWriterOnEchInner = PR_FALSE to default options
    Added EXP(CallExtensionWriterOnEchInner) to exported functions
    Added new function SSLExp_CallExtensionWriterOnEchInner

Additional Details:
The changes appear to add functionality for handling extensions during ECH (Encrypted Client Hello) operations. While I can't determine if this specifically fixes a vulnerability, changes to TLS/SSL extension handling often relate to security. The addition could be:
1. A new feature addition
2. A fix for potential improper extension handling during ECH
3. A security hardening measure

Without more context about the ECH implementation, I can't definitively say if this fixes a specific vulnerability, but it's related to security-sensitive TLS functionality.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.