--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.shadowColor.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.shadowColor.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); // Test that restore() undoes any modifications var old = ctx.shadowColor;

Let me analyze the code diff for security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Variable Renaming] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.shadowColor.worker.js] [Lines 13-14]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

This appears to be a simple variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. There are no security implications in this change - it's purely a code style/readability modification. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name. No security vulnerabilities are introduced or fixed by this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.shape.5.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.shape.5.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,11 +27,11 @@ ctx.beginPath(); ctx.arc(300, 0, 100, 0, 5*Math.PI, false); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.shape.5.html [Lines] 17-27
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.shape.5.html [Lines] 27-32
   [Old Code]
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");
   [Fixed Code]
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   _assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
   _assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");
   _assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");
   _assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");

The changes appear to be purely variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and do not involve any security-related fixes. The functionality remains the same, just with a different variable name. No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/vr/ipc/VRManagerChild.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/vr/ipc/VRManagerChild.h@@ -80,8 +80,7 @@   static bool IsPresenting();   static TimeStamp GetIdleDeadlineHint(TimeStamp aDefault);-  PVRLayerChild* CreateVRLayer(uint32_t aDisplayID,-                               nsISerialEventTarget* aTarget, uint32_t aGroup);+  PVRLayerChild* CreateVRLayer(uint32_t aDisplayID, uint32_t aGroup);   static void IdentifyTextureHost(       const layers::TextureFactoryIdentifier& aIdentifier);

Let me analyze the code diff according to the specified format.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Parameter Removal Vulnerability] [gfx/vr/ipc/VRManagerChild.h] [Lines 80-82]
[Old Code]
PVRLayerChild* CreateVRLayer(uint32_t aDisplayID,
                            nsISerialEventTarget* aTarget, uint32_t aGroup);
[Fixed Code]
PVRLayerChild* CreateVRLayer(uint32_t aDisplayID, uint32_t aGroup);

Additional Details:
The diff shows removal of the `nsISerialEventTarget* aTarget` parameter from the `CreateVRLayer` method. While this could potentially affect security if the target was used for proper synchronization or thread safety, without seeing the implementation details or knowing the context of how this parameter was used, I can't definitively say if this was a security fix or just a refactoring. The change might relate to thread safety (potential race condition prevention) or could simply be removing an unused parameter.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.repeat.null.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.repeat.null.worker.js@@ -13,10 +13,10 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-_assert(ctx.createPattern(offscreenCanvas, null) != null, "ctx.createPattern(offscreenCanvas, null) != null");+_assert(ctx.createPattern(canvas, null) != null, "ctx.createPattern(canvas, null) != null"); t.done(); });

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.repeat.null.worker.js] [Lines 13-20]
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   _assert(ctx.createPattern(offscreenCanvas, null) != null, "ctx.createPattern(offscreenCanvas, null) != null");

   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   _assert(ctx.createPattern(canvas, null) != null, "ctx.createPattern(canvas, null) != null");

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. There doesn't appear to be any security-related fix in this diff. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-break/widows-orphans-002.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-break/widows-orphans-002.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-break/#widows-orphans"> <link rel="match" href="reference/widows-orphans-001-ref.html"> <meta name="assert" content="The widows property affects block containers that establish an inline formatting context">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <style> div p { margin: 0; }

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-break/widows-orphans-002.html] [Lines 5]
[Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">]
[Fixed Code: [line removed]]

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which appears to be test-related metadata
- No security-relevant changes were made in this diff
- The modification appears to be test cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with this type of change

No other vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change is purely cosmetic/cleanup in nature.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/bumpalo/src/collections/vec.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/bumpalo/src/collections/vec.rs@@ -1983,26 +1983,23 @@ __impl_slice_eq1! { Vec<'a, A>, &'b mut [B] } // __impl_slice_eq1! { Cow<'a, [A]>, Vec<'b, B>, Clone }-macro_rules! array_impls {-    ($($N: expr)+) => {-        $(-            // NOTE: some less important impls are omitted to reduce code bloat-            __impl_slice_eq1! { Vec<'a, A>, [B; $N] }-            __impl_slice_eq1! { Vec<'a, A>, &'b [B; $N] }-            // __impl_slice_eq1! { Vec<A>, &'b mut [B; $N] }-            // __impl_slice_eq1! { Cow<'a, [A]>, [B; $N], Clone }-            // __impl_slice_eq1! { Cow<'a, [A]>, &'b [B; $N], Clone }-            // __impl_slice_eq1! { Cow<'a, [A]>, &'b mut [B; $N], Clone }-        )+-    }-}--array_impls! {-     0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9-    10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19-    20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29-    30 31 32-}+macro_rules! __impl_slice_eq1_array {+    ($Lhs: ty, $Rhs: ty) => {+        impl<'a, 'b, A, B, const N: usize> PartialEq<$Rhs> for $Lhs+        where+            A: PartialEq<B>,+        {+            #[inline]+            fn eq(&self, other: &$Rhs) -> bool {+                self[..] == other[..]+            }+        }+    };+}++__impl_slice_eq1_array! { Vec<'a, A>, [B; N] }+__impl_slice_eq1_array! { Vec<'a, A>, &'b [B; N] }+__impl_slice_eq1_array! { Vec<'a, A>, &'b mut [B; N] } /// Implements comparison of vectors, lexicographically. impl<'bump, T: 'bump + PartialOrd> PartialOrd for Vec<'bump, T> {@@ -2070,6 +2067,18 @@     #[inline]     fn borrow_mut(&mut self) -> &mut [T] {         &mut self[..]+    }+}++impl<'bump, T> Drop for Vec<'bump, T> {+    fn drop(&mut self) {+        unsafe {+            // use drop for [T]+            // use a raw slice to refer to the elements of the vector as weakest necessary type;+            // could avoid questions of validity in certain cases+            ptr::drop_in_place(ptr::slice_from_raw_parts_mut(self.as_mut_ptr(), self.len))+        }+        // RawVec handles deallocation     } }

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Memory Safety Issue [File] third_party/rust/bumpalo/src/collections/vec.rs [Lines] 2070-2081
[Old Code]
(No explicit Drop implementation shown in diff)
[Fixed Code]
impl<'bump, T> Drop for Vec<'bump, T> {
    fn drop(&mut self) {
        unsafe {
            ptr::drop_in_place(ptr::slice_from_raw_parts_mut(self.as_mut_ptr(), self.len))
        }
    }
}

The fix adds a proper Drop implementation that safely handles memory deallocation. Without this, there could be memory leaks or unsafe memory access when Vec is dropped.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Comparison Logic Issue [File] third_party/rust/bumpalo/src/collections/vec.rs [Lines] 1983-1999
[Old Code]
macro_rules! array_impls {
    ($($N: expr)+) => {
        $(
            __impl_slice_eq1! { Vec<'a, A>, [B; $N] }
            __impl_slice_eq1! { Vec<'a, A>, &'b [B; $N] }
        )+
    }
}
[Fixed Code]
macro_rules! __impl_slice_eq1_array {
    ($Lhs: ty, $Rhs: ty) => {
        impl<'a, 'b, A, B, const N: usize> PartialEq<$Rhs> for $Lhs
        where
            A: PartialEq<B>,
        {
            #[inline]
            fn eq(&self, other: &$Rhs) -> bool {
                self[..] == other[..]
            }
        }
    };
}

The change replaces a macro-based implementation with a more direct implementation. While this doesn't appear to fix a specific vulnerability, it makes the code more maintainable and potentially safer by being more explicit. The old macro-based approach could potentially have edge cases with certain array sizes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/indexedDB/test/helpers.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/indexedDB/test/helpers.js@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ function clearAllDatabases(callback) {   let qms = SpecialPowers.Services.qms;-  let principal = SpecialPowers.wrap(document).nodePrincipal;+  let principal = SpecialPowers.wrap(document).effectiveStoragePrincipal;   let request = qms.clearStoragesForPrincipal(principal);   let cb = SpecialPowers.wrapCallback(callback);   request.callback = cb;

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   [Incorrect Principal Usage] [dom/indexedDB/test/helpers.js] [Lines 34]
   Old Code: `let principal = SpecialPowers.wrap(document).nodePrincipal;`
   Fixed Code: `let principal = SpecialPowers.wrap(document).effectiveStoragePrincipal;`

Additional Details:
   The vulnerability appears to be related to using the wrong principal type for storage operations. The fix changes from using `nodePrincipal` to `effectiveStoragePrincipal`, which is more appropriate for storage-related operations. This could potentially lead to security issues where storage is cleared for the wrong principal, though this is in a test file so the impact would be limited to testing scenarios.

Note: While this is a test file, the change reflects a security-conscious practice where the correct principal type is used for storage operations. In production code, using the wrong principal could lead to more serious security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/warp/tests/query.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/warp/tests/query.rs@@ -43,6 +43,22 @@         MyArgs {             foo: None,             baz: None+        }+    );+}++#[tokio::test]+async fn query_struct_no_values() {+    let as_struct = warp::query::<MyArgs>();++    let req = warp::test::request().path("/?foo&baz");++    let extracted = req.filter(&as_struct).await.unwrap();+    assert_eq!(+        extracted,+        MyArgs {+            foo: Some("".into()),+            baz: Some("".into())         }     ); }

Here's the analysis following the required format:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Query Parameter Handling Issue] [third_party/rust/warp/tests/query.rs] [Lines 43-59]
[Old Code]
        MyArgs {
            foo: None,
            baz: None
        }
[Fixed Code]
        MyArgs {
            foo: Some("".into()),
            baz: Some("".into())
        }

Additional Details:
1. The change appears to modify how empty query parameters (like "/?foo&baz") are handled, changing from returning None to returning Some("") for empty values.
2. While this could potentially affect security if the application makes different security decisions based on None vs empty string, there's no clear vulnerability pattern here.
3. This might be fixing a potential logic bug where empty parameters weren't being properly handled, but it's not clearly a security fix.

Note: Without more context about how these query parameters are used in the application, it's difficult to determine if this was an actual security fix or just a behavior correction. The change could be security-relevant if empty strings vs None values trigger different security controls in the application.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.css-color-4-rgba-2.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.css-color-4-rgba-2.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; try { ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(255 0 0, 1)'; } catch (e) { } // this shouldn't throw, but it shouldn't matter here if it does ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14, 20]
   Old Code:
   ```
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   ```

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed in this diff. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/base/content/test/contextMenu/browser_contextmenu_input.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/base/content/test/contextMenu/browser_contextmenu_input.js@@ -104,7 +104,10 @@ add_task(async function test_password_input() {   await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({-    set: [["signon.generation.enabled", false]],+    set: [+      ["signon.generation.enabled", false],+      ["layout.forms.reveal-password-context-menu.enabled", true],+    ],   });   todo(     false,@@ -134,8 +137,8 @@       false,       "context-selectall",       null,-      // "context-toggle-show-password",-      // null,+      "context-reveal-password",+      null,     ],     {       skipFocusChange: true,

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Password Disclosure Risk] [browser/base/content/test/contextMenu/browser_contextmenu_input.js] [Lines 104-107, 137]
[Old Code]
await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
  set: [["signon.generation.enabled", false]],
});
...
// "context-toggle-show-password",
// null,

[Fixed Code]
await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
  set: [
    ["signon.generation.enabled", false],
    ["layout.forms.reveal-password-context-menu.enabled", true],
  ],
});
...
"context-reveal-password",
null,

Additional Details:
The change introduces a new preference "layout.forms.reveal-password-context-menu.enabled" and uncomments/replaces the password reveal context menu option. While this might not be a direct vulnerability, it could potentially increase the risk of password disclosure if not properly secured. The change appears to be enabling functionality rather than fixing a specific vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.interpolate.zerosize.stroke.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.interpolate.zerosize.stroke.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -28,15 +28,15 @@ ctx.strokeStyle = g; ctx.rect(20, 20, 60, 10); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 19,19, 0,255,0,255, "19,19", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 20,19, 0,255,0,255, "20,19", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 21,19, 0,255,0,255, "21,19", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 19,20, 0,255,0,255, "19,20", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 20,20, 0,255,0,255, "20,20", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 21,20, 0,255,0,255, "21,20", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 19,21, 0,255,0,255, "19,21", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 20,21, 0,255,0,255, "20,21", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 21,21, 0,255,0,255, "21,21", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 19,19, 0,255,0,255, "19,19", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 20,19, 0,255,0,255, "20,19", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 21,19, 0,255,0,255, "21,19", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 19,20, 0,255,0,255, "19,20", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 20,20, 0,255,0,255, "20,20", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 21,20, 0,255,0,255, "21,20", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 19,21, 0,255,0,255, "19,21", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 20,21, 0,255,0,255, "20,21", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 21,21, 0,255,0,255, "21,21", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and updating the corresponding assertions to use the new variable name. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.interpolate.zerosize.stroke.html] [Lines 17-28]
[Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, ...)]
[Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(canvas, ...)]

This appears to be a simple code refactoring/cleanup change with no security implications. The functionality remains exactly the same, just using a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.3.radii.1.dompoint.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.3.radii.1.dompoint.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,15 +27,15 @@ ctx.fill(); // top-left corner-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 20,1, 255,0,0,255, "20,1", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 41,1, 0,255,0,255, "41,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,10, 255,0,0,255, "1,10", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,21, 0,255,0,255, "1,21", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 20,1, 255,0,0,255, "20,1", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 41,1, 0,255,0,255, "41,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,10, 255,0,0,255, "1,10", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,21, 0,255,0,255, "1,21", "0,255,0,255"); // other corners-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability, without any security implications.

Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.3.radii.1.dompoint.html] [17-27]
[Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');]
[Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');]

The changes are simply variable name changes and don't affect security. All assertions remain the same, just using the new variable name. No security-related patterns were modified.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/workers/test/test_worker_interfaces.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/workers/test/test_worker_interfaces.js@@ -43,6 +43,16 @@   { name: "RuntimeError", insecureContext: true },   {     name: "Function",+    insecureContext: true,+    nightly: true,+  },+  {+    name: "Exception",+    insecureContext: true,+    nightly: true,+  },+  {+    name: "Tag",     insecureContext: true,     nightly: true,   },

I'll analyze the provided code diff according to the specified format. Since this is a test file modification and appears to be adding new test cases rather than fixing security issues, here's my analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [dom/workers/test/test_worker_interfaces.js] [Lines 43-56]
[Old Code]
  { name: "RuntimeError", insecureContext: true },
  {
    name: "Function",
    insecureContext: true,
    nightly: true,
  }
[Fixed Code]
  { name: "RuntimeError", insecureContext: true },
  {
    name: "Function",
    insecureContext: true,
    nightly: true,
  },
  {
    name: "Exception",
    insecureContext: true,
    nightly: true,
  },
  {
    name: "Tag",
    insecureContext: true,
    nightly: true,
  }

Additional Details:
The changes appear to be adding new test cases for worker interfaces (Exception and Tag) with the same security context flags (insecureContext and nightly) as the existing Function test case. There's no indication of a security vulnerability being fixed - this seems to be test coverage expansion. The modifications maintain the same security context patterns as the existing code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.join.open.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.join.open.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.strokeStyle = '#f00';@@ -28,10 +28,10 @@ ctx.lineTo(1000, 50); ctx.lineTo(100, 50); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 48,1, 0,255,0,255, "48,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 48,48, 0,255,0,255, "48,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 48,1, 0,255,0,255, "48,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 48,48, 0,255,0,255, "48,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to the variable name in the assertions. There are no changes to security-related functionality or patterns.

Here's the structured response:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.join.open.worker.js] [Lines 13-28]
    [Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); ... _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, ...)]
    [Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); ... _assertPixel(canvas, ...)]

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains identical, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or clarity.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.nonpremul.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.nonpremul.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.5)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.nonpremul.worker.js] [Lines 13-14]
    Old Code:
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    
    Fixed Code:
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- The changes appear to be purely variable naming changes (from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas')
- No security-related changes or vulnerability fixes are evident in this diff
- The modification seems to be for code consistency or readability rather than security

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/xpcom/threads/TimerThread.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/xpcom/threads/TimerThread.h@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@     return mThread->SerialEventTarget()->IsOnCurrentThread();   }-  uint32_t AllowedEarlyFiringMicroseconds() const;+  uint32_t AllowedEarlyFiringMicroseconds();  private:   ~TimerThread();@@ -74,6 +74,10 @@   void PostTimerEvent(already_AddRefed<nsTimerImpl> aTimerRef);   nsCOMPtr<nsIThread> mThread;+  // Lock ordering requirements:+  // (optional) ThreadWrapper::sMutex ->+  // (optional) nsTimerImpl::mMutex   ->+  // TimerThread::mMonitor   Monitor mMonitor;   bool mShutdown;@@ -85,6 +89,8 @@     const TimeStamp mTimeout;    public:+    // Entries are created with the TimerImpl's mutex held.+    // nsTimerImplHolder() will call SetHolder()     Entry(const TimeStamp& aMinTimeout, const TimeStamp& aTimeout,           nsTimerImpl* aTimerImpl)         : nsTimerImplHolder(aTimerImpl),@@ -92,8 +98,10 @@     nsTimerImpl* Value() const { return mTimerImpl; }+    // Called with the Monitor held, but not the TimerImpl's mutex     already_AddRefed<nsTimerImpl> Take() {       if (mTimerImpl) {+        MOZ_ASSERT(mTimerImpl->mHolder == this);         mTimerImpl->SetHolder(nullptr);       }       return mTimerImpl.forget();@@ -110,6 +118,7 @@   };   nsTArray<mozilla::UniquePtr<Entry>> mTimers;+  // Set only at the start of the thread's Run():   uint32_t mAllowedEarlyFiringMicroseconds;   ProfilerThreadId mProfilerThreadId; };

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Thread Safety Issue] [xpcom/threads/TimerThread.h] [Lines 56]  
   [Old Code]  
   `uint32_t AllowedEarlyFiringMicroseconds() const;`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `uint32_t AllowedEarlyFiringMicroseconds();`  
   Additional Details: The removal of 'const' might indicate a thread safety consideration, but without more context, it's unclear if this was fixing a specific vulnerability.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Race Condition] [xpcom/threads/TimerThread.h] [Lines 74, 89, 98]  
   [Old Code]  
   No explicit locking documentation  
   [Fixed Code]  
   Added comments about lock ordering requirements and mutex ownership  
   Additional Details: The added comments clarify locking requirements, suggesting potential race condition fixes, but no specific vulnerability is identified.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Null Pointer Dereference] [xpcom/threads/TimerThread.h] [Lines 98]  
   [Old Code]  
   No assertion check  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `MOZ_ASSERT(mTimerImpl->mHolder == this);`  
   Additional Details: The added assertion might prevent null pointer dereference, but it's unclear if this was fixing an actual vulnerability.

Note: The changes appear to be primarily focused on improving thread safety and adding documentation about locking requirements, but without more context about previous issues or vulnerabilities, we can't definitively say these were security fixes. The changes do appear to be defensive programming improvements that could prevent potential issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wpt/browser.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wpt/browser.py@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@     """     product = "chrome"-    requirements = "requirements_chrome.txt"+    requirements = "requirements_chromium.txt"     platforms = {         "Linux": "Linux",         "Windows": "Win",@@ -871,7 +871,7 @@     """     product = "chrome_android"-    requirements = "requirements_chrome_android.txt"+    requirements = "requirements_chromium.txt"     def find_binary(self, venv_path=None, channel=None):         if channel in ("beta", "dev", "canary"):@@ -887,7 +887,7 @@     product = "android_weblayer"     # TODO(aluo): replace this with weblayer version after tests are working.-    requirements = "requirements_android_webview.txt"+    requirements = "requirements_chromium.txt"     def find_binary(self, venv_path=None, channel=None):         return "org.chromium.weblayer.shell"@@ -901,7 +901,7 @@     """     product = "android_webview"-    requirements = "requirements_android_webview.txt"+    requirements = "requirements_chromium.txt"     def find_binary(self, venv_path=None, channel=None):         # Just get the current package name of the WebView provider.@@ -931,7 +931,7 @@     """     product = "chrome_ios"-    requirements = "requirements_chrome_ios.txt"+    requirements = None     def download(self, dest=None, channel=None, rename=None):         raise NotImplementedError@@ -1039,7 +1039,7 @@     }.get(uname[0])     product = "edgechromium"     edgedriver_name = "msedgedriver"-    requirements = "requirements_edge_chromium.txt"+    requirements = "requirements_chromium.txt"     def download(self, dest=None, channel=None, rename=None):         raise NotImplementedError@@ -1316,7 +1316,7 @@     """Servo-specific interface."""     product = "servo"-    requirements = "requirements_servo.txt"+    requirements = None     def platform_components(self):         platform = {@@ -1422,7 +1422,7 @@     """WebKit-specific interface."""     product = "webkit"-    requirements = "requirements_webkit.txt"+    requirements = None     def download(self, dest=None, channel=None, rename=None):         raise NotImplementedError@@ -1580,7 +1580,7 @@     """Epiphany-specific interface."""     product = "epiphany"-    requirements = "requirements_epiphany.txt"+    requirements = None     def download(self, dest=None, channel=None, rename=None):         raise NotImplementedError

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily about consolidating requirements files and removing unnecessary ones. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Requirements File Consolidation [testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wpt/browser.py] [Multiple lines]
   [Old Code: Various specific requirements files like requirements_chrome.txt, requirements_chrome_android.txt, etc.]
   [Fixed Code: Consolidated to requirements_chromium.txt or None]

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Requirements Removal [testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wpt/browser.py] [Multiple lines]
   [Old Code: Specific requirements files for various products]
   [Fixed Code: Changed to None for some products]

The changes appear to be maintenance/cleanup related rather than security fixes. No specific vulnerabilities are being addressed in this diff. The modifications are about simplifying the requirements management by either:
1. Using a common requirements_chromium.txt file for chromium-based browsers
2. Removing requirements entirely (setting to None) for products where they're not needed

No security implications are evident from these changes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/xpconnect/tests/unit/test_bug868675.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/xpconnect/tests/unit/test_bug868675.js@@ -7,6 +7,11 @@   result = "threw";   try { result = XPCNativeWrapper(2); } catch (e) {}   Assert.equal(result, 2);++  // Make sure we throw when using `new` with primitives.+  result = null;+  try { result = new XPCNativeWrapper(2); } catch (e) { result = "catch"; }+  Assert.equal(result, "catch");   // Make sure that we can waive on a non-Xrayable object, and that we preserve   // transitive waiving behavior.

Analyzing the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Constructor Misuse] [js/xpconnect/tests/unit/test_bug868675.js] [Lines 7-11]
   [Old Code]
   result = "threw";
   try { result = XPCNativeWrapper(2); } catch (e) {}
   Assert.equal(result, 2);

   [Fixed Code]
   result = "threw";
   try { result = XPCNativeWrapper(2); } catch (e) {}
   Assert.equal(result, 2);

   // Make sure we throw when using `new` with primitives.
   result = null;
   try { result = new XPCNativeWrapper(2); } catch (e) { result = "catch"; }
   Assert.equal(result, "catch");

Additional Details:
- The diff adds a test case to ensure that using `new` with primitives throws an error
- This appears to be adding defensive programming rather than fixing a specific known vulnerability
- The change prevents potential misuse of the constructor with primitive values
- Without more context about XPCNativeWrapper's implementation, I can't be certain if this was fixing an actual vulnerability or just adding test coverage

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit/Lowering.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit/Lowering.cpp@@ -3764,6 +3764,8 @@   const LAllocation index = useRegisterOrIndexConstant(       ins->index(), ins->storageType(), ins->offsetAdjustment());+  // NOTE: the generated code must match the assembly code in gen_load in+  // GenerateAtomicOperations.py   Synchronization sync = Synchronization::Load();   if (ins->requiresMemoryBarrier()) {     LMemoryBarrier* fence = new (alloc()) LMemoryBarrier(sync.barrierBefore);@@ -3951,6 +3953,9 @@   // is a store instruction that incorporates the necessary   // barriers, and we could use that instead of separate barrier and   // store instructions.  See bug #1077027.+  //+  // NOTE: the generated code must match the assembly code in gen_store in+  // GenerateAtomicOperations.py   Synchronization sync = Synchronization::Store();   if (ins->requiresMemoryBarrier()) {     LMemoryBarrier* fence = new (alloc()) LMemoryBarrier(sync.barrierBefore);

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any direct security fixes or vulnerabilities being addressed. The changes appear to be adding comments about code generation requirements. Here's the analysis following your format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability [js/src/jit/Lowering.cpp] [Lines 3764-3766, 3951-3954]
   [Old Code: No comments about code generation requirements]
   [Fixed Code: Added comments about matching generated code with assembly code]

The changes are:
1. Added a comment about matching generated code with assembly code in gen_load
2. Added a similar comment about matching generated code with assembly code in gen_store

These appear to be documentation/commentary changes rather than security fixes. The comments serve to highlight the importance of maintaining consistency between the JIT-generated code and the assembly implementations, but don't directly address any specific vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.gradient.transparent.2.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.gradient.transparent.2.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var gradient = ctx.createLinearGradient(0, 0, 100, 0); gradient.addColorStop(0, '#f00');@@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ ctx.shadowColor = '#0f0'; ctx.fillStyle = gradient; ctx.fillRect(0, -50, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't involve any security-related modifications.

Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.gradient.transparent.2.worker.js] [Lines 13-29]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");

[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.