--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/nss/lib/softoken/softkver.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/nss/lib/softoken/softkver.h@@ -17,9 +17,9 @@  * The format of the version string should be  *     "<major version>.<minor version>[.<patch level>[.<build number>]][ <ECC>][ <Beta>]"  */-#define SOFTOKEN_VERSION "3.74" SOFTOKEN_ECC_STRING+#define SOFTOKEN_VERSION "3.75" SOFTOKEN_ECC_STRING #define SOFTOKEN_VMAJOR 3-#define SOFTOKEN_VMINOR 74+#define SOFTOKEN_VMINOR 75 #define SOFTOKEN_VPATCH 0 #define SOFTOKEN_VBUILD 0 #define SOFTOKEN_BETA PR_FALSE

Based on the provided diff, this appears to be a version number update rather than a security fix. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
Version Update [File] security/nss/lib/softoken/softkver.h [Lines 17,19]
[Old Code]
#define SOFTOKEN_VERSION "3.74" SOFTOKEN_ECC_STRING
#define SOFTOKEN_VMINOR 74
[Fixed Code]
#define SOFTOKEN_VERSION "3.75" SOFTOKEN_ECC_STRING
#define SOFTOKEN_VMINOR 75

Additional Details:
- This is a standard version number increment from 3.74 to 3.75
- No actual code changes were made, only version identifiers were updated
- No specific vulnerabilities are mentioned or implied in this change
- Version updates often accompany security fixes, but this diff alone doesn't show any security-related changes

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.object.invalidoffset.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.object.invalidoffset.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var g = ctx.createLinearGradient(0, 0, 100, 0); assert_throws_dom("INDEX_SIZE_ERR", function() { g.addColorStop(-1, '#000'); });

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14]
    Old Code:
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    
    Fixed Code:
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be a simple variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security-related changes or vulnerability fixes are evident in this diff
- The modification doesn't affect any security-critical operations or introduce/remove any security checks
- The test assertions remain the same, only the variable name was changed for consistency or clarity

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/neqo-http3/.cargo-checksum.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/neqo-http3/.cargo-checksum.json@@ -1 +1 @@-{"files":{"Cargo.toml":"4486b7bf92f9672abeebfe99a31ac468f2d34e26fc6e30804e65eda1a996e3b7","src/buffered_send_stream.rs":"0e4ad4914451943e49c88565661d88475ab2bbd8756e200e2a19312bafd64847","src/client_events.rs":"3dab2de2ec5fac43ff30470e0e8167fdbfede4bc467c0fcd027d809692b7465b","src/conn_params.rs":"00e3f42636f482f91cd6b86d7bebaa85a9f0407143503767fffb66a3cdfbbe43","src/connection.rs":"9c831fb668c72202a1205d12b7056254697f62590e48fd743f4313851aa34454","src/connection_client.rs":"30c6d5fa8f982237a37d19097c94a664a65174fb567210824ee6154cd3fad577","src/connection_server.rs":"1e9bca9a0a8ac4532015032b1444b23f67007b8c6b3f138900f0b142cf5625d1","src/control_stream_local.rs":"49bc3b8d2da81477fa5914d80e32657e215e84ba2c40411eb18ae170ccddecd0","src/control_stream_remote.rs":"b6c4b96e0b35d54a5fee9297945c2dc6458729af2566323b13e44a621b214d72","src/features/extended_connect/mod.rs":"95e8468e62e2e7680989b6d85397775d3a99ce68390dc68708c3fb3450932e03","src/features/extended_connect/session.rs":"5f1035082891554194c89d80338ccd0991db0085bdf8be358a2c3a7ac2b52dbc","src/features/extended_connect/webtransport.rs":"721497ea16aaf55a3be4b685afe23fdbcb2c19603042898f12d93ea4e5d8aac7","src/features/mod.rs":"a981ebbd03e7bb7ea2313e883452e44f052c48f28edb7fd53a0825911b490230","src/headers_checks.rs":"4d8ce4ba54a989ecc257a26d47111ab4583cf78a3ae6c60ad106f3ad3e77ac8f","src/hframe.rs":"79311512aafe7ac5cbda068352bbce573ee99205baa06fc75db95cc3dbbf0780","src/lib.rs":"ed19bb708b711d0b69430a632d5524e93a115239d63de094ae78611e0c2af026","src/priority.rs":"89d25666fb3b35e16c58055e51d25ff746fc420820db9f30fdecfd1ed70ac020","src/push_controller.rs":"7db0c4c1e065372d3adba90662ff20c4e36adade25f64d2168616339cc5bf47d","src/qlog.rs":"44b6cdbb1d9d6ca47b793e9dbe531b8fdbd40147375f7e4c89aeab536c5d286b","src/qpack_decoder_receiver.rs":"75008d8ea5d538ee34aca4df72e58489417604ccafb61b064280782d6754dd0d","src/qpack_encoder_receiver.rs":"f95cc7d49e4d442b93d522f14ddfc581629664d84d6e13d03a520e855bbe442d","src/recv_message.rs":"3d1556087aecae432589ce55459430a19c1d35c4c819ff4b2e2869a12e6a7b3d","src/request_target.rs":"9182b641f7a7b55272e0e2e872d24a35b1207f35399221b08b899857c3e873ab","src/send_message.rs":"7a676b0f6f34f7c52e98f346d7009345fec84e7db03d11dbe2a50ae95d433369","src/server.rs":"0b3775863339f8ea9d363b83f2c667bda4b62de177bb2e93caef3830ba7c46a8","src/server_connection_events.rs":"5f3eadceb0c555ab13f68ec49af0eaa7a1ebf1fdd14e1132d77583ecd76cabbb","src/server_events.rs":"42c79731c5168df35ebd3cef448d9e38e64770b31363b2b4965679582db9f61e","src/settings.rs":"8f7e3ddd807c3d5667dad93f5b902b0e00a3bcf85e41404e1e0e5dfd2c3d5dd6","src/stream_type_reader.rs":"62fb15a5b64b9777ddfcb16c3d43031797336dca39dd70340776022431b79d77","tests/httpconn.rs":"6157230714dc34a93637d7188320b0f135c400d7fd247dd48279e4db0cd0b149","tests/mod.rs":"fd6aee37243713e80fc526552f21f0222338cec9890409b6575a2a637b17ec1f","tests/priority.rs":"e3258878d4b692c5d80612c1d275972a99808168ccc33fdd966822a0c8776bb9","tests/send_message.rs":"673ae1d0bf2dce46c21ee8353f45f189d2cb64a2f6e137ae38da6b2262ad066e","tests/webtransport/mod.rs":"ef8f83789925502b5121fa6285bfcf6c09e2299a9360bf0ed2c8329ea0c25fc4","tests/webtransport/negotiation.rs":"866cec03df0643fa0f28a160a97112a4ab3c1ca337d8e00e81eb7eb42f67d41b","tests/webtransport/sessions.rs":"af6a336cac13bc4be1be329e9f18d48dd23c99975d20f719e3e59be6214aa9f4","tests/webtransport/streams.rs":"560b86ea59c92159b16099c26b6f042b5e8c0fc3f21983a00da677987670c4f9"},"package":null}+{"files":{"Cargo.toml":"9ff10a0f34e30e86b9c005058e50ba588b39a78330ece04e29e8b1e3ef060471","src/buffered_send_stream.rs":"0e4ad4914451943e49c88565661d88475ab2bbd8756e200e2a19312bafd64847","src/client_events.rs":"9d86145febad2f3fb05007eae3f5ad4834c78dd709fe388f05590405e34a614b","src/conn_params.rs":"00e3f42636f482f91cd6b86d7bebaa85a9f0407143503767fffb66a3cdfbbe43","src/connection.rs":"ef2e70c08a59a8a60c7852c8beb6545e3cb37d8da94302798bdc2fc38e4f76c0","src/connection_client.rs":"fabd645653c5991b8d2ec6f2a3c4e16e32c4faa292da47f5c5eb405ef39f8a7a","src/connection_server.rs":"de1e0359b902b1e98c923a8d5488302a68a3312b466590fdddaee6ec8327813b","src/control_stream_local.rs":"9ceb1aae8079dfca8e2f38fb555d47e84f3001d9501f2c909e8245841974f49c","src/control_stream_remote.rs":"7a261ac7df77e90a428ab0f92457a934a92a8c581462fc1818efd3de0c0ebd69","src/features/extended_connect/mod.rs":"2bc2f0570b11318f3225173001dad1a5f05e4bf60dee49a2bf9d40e3a411e138","src/features/extended_connect/webtransport_session.rs":"791734e1891bd35541be33cbf744d6edee6278e760fedb12839dd052a0cf91ba","src/features/extended_connect/webtransport_streams.rs":"784c5e317bb6af33f653ba82c1a5666b657c2a210263a415e913494f61613464","src/features/mod.rs":"a981ebbd03e7bb7ea2313e883452e44f052c48f28edb7fd53a0825911b490230","src/frames/hframe.rs":"67018ad85ecb9ec0476dafc4b25f6b7015e49531cd19f8e81d204af0e29ee3ea","src/frames/mod.rs":"258dd4bdf2daca19a62cd697d2c7f4709a35668b2b4dce3203675e814c9b40b8","src/frames/reader.rs":"0802cd8b41204bcec424fc6ed704a3bdbed0e5d38444f7a9b0550ad877b076a6","src/frames/tests/hframe.rs":"33a30bb98bb512606a06ae1752e1ed9e4588b7d3f5e9439ec83bb2e779d4ac80","src/frames/tests/mod.rs":"fd2e9d4a28c3bd2fd349f4e3844cefa37e9addb09561e9261b393ca7a37e6c6e","src/frames/tests/reader.rs":"312a3deda7b3a4bbd7afed879c94d0644fce8e34435365ef9cae1fbaa62496af","src/frames/tests/wtframe.rs":"589ebe1e62ce4da63b37b7d22cde7ba572ddbf29336fdcdbbcd0a745f79dacd8","src/frames/wtframe.rs":"1d87964fe76945bfe3e59834632ce1e3a000b5e26164b71bdcd129f8a4e73ae3","src/headers_checks.rs":"0893d48fde97687b712e86457e75f2a1b802e7589ce38df30ff65684d8cf59c0","src/lib.rs":"4876915dd7f03021cce3a166e12e0a3763ac2c44e6ad81d223cda1f555b7a2c2","src/priority.rs":"ae0fa461031893b4f7e0d12666072e7a4da80b1e8a1c0663ab9f9e27b3242754","src/push_controller.rs":"aa2a64180d8cb1b87682d0d8bbc42167188e8e1890261cb4cabb76de1fcc708b","src/qlog.rs":"44b6cdbb1d9d6ca47b793e9dbe531b8fdbd40147375f7e4c89aeab536c5d286b","src/qpack_decoder_receiver.rs":"75008d8ea5d538ee34aca4df72e58489417604ccafb61b064280782d6754dd0d","src/qpack_encoder_receiver.rs":"f95cc7d49e4d442b93d522f14ddfc581629664d84d6e13d03a520e855bbe442d","src/recv_message.rs":"5f70fb474e387653d7982374131b3b0c08417509469f273ccebf842bfcee836f","src/request_target.rs":"9182b641f7a7b55272e0e2e872d24a35b1207f35399221b08b899857c3e873ab","src/send_message.rs":"f3503bf135af5acdb3663a8b591b1db2d160e3dcec37aafd2053f2f150f68d2a","src/server.rs":"3cde23011de0a63ee4900e41368e9319ce100a1584f90bf5463e054adcc8875c","src/server_connection_events.rs":"3d89c2d9a30ee719acfbaae4b7720cb354eb73b11bc6ceb44571d68b05192b8b","src/server_events.rs":"3081fdd1e1950aeecae031452cd683335fb0a9dcec51722e614c5939f747b9d9","src/settings.rs":"8a8919cd31683f476dec281b8b545ea3cedb0c7d60cd1e29b097bae605822d47","src/stream_type_reader.rs":"d63727341d925241ec17c7373d81145aba1464cac4c9eedfc05f24c453435f67","tests/httpconn.rs":"f8d6e6a693d17cf2eb192a730e6fc929bd2814552356ce8d4423a0e3eac8c59d","tests/mod.rs":"fd6aee37243713e80fc526552f21f0222338cec9890409b6575a2a637b17ec1f","tests/priority.rs":"a606e5fa03451e09e28c7d5f1820ee85a4567e3969a1690c979761e62123bf54","tests/send_message.rs":"673ae1d0bf2dce46c21ee8353f45f189d2cb64a2f6e137ae38da6b2262ad066e","tests/webtransport/mod.rs":"635c0b0fe682a844f4366335a40b8b3a6539abe30843ee1bcfaf87a34b1d476c","tests/webtransport/negotiation.rs":"fd46a3a77c75dfb701ac075cdb0aabb58f82b5d5c03c5a965412bbf6ad020f00","tests/webtransport/sessions.rs":"5b4d8483ac018ad5a28adad5e778e2ed48db9c441d1354f6cf21d8e5c6f1a8b3","tests/webtransport/streams.rs":"fd5f075d93f0241290566f59f747d95530d2df579890fd0f6b9e79a557c89a67"},"package":null}=========testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-29.xml========--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-29.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-29.xml@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/>   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body> <ul>

Based on the provided diff content, I'll analyze it for security fixes following the required format:

1. For the first file (third_party/rust/neqo-http3/.cargo-checksum.json):
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [No specific vulnerability name] [third_party/rust/neqo-http3/.cargo-checksum.json] [Entire file]
    [Old checksums]
    [New checksums]
    Additional Details: This appears to be a routine update of checksums for the neqo-http3 crate. While checksum updates could indicate security fixes in the dependencies, we cannot determine specific vulnerabilities from this checksum file alone.

2. For the second file (testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-29.xml):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    [No vulnerability] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-29.xml] [Line 10]
    [<meta name="flags" content="" />]
    [Removed line]
    Additional Details: This change simply removes a meta tag from a test file, which doesn't appear to be security-related. It's likely just test cleanup.

Note: The diff shows many file checksum changes in the first file, but without seeing the actual code changes in those files, we cannot determine if any security vulnerabilities were fixed. The checksum changes alone don't provide enough information to identify specific vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/performance/PerformanceWorker.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/performance/PerformanceWorker.cpp@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@  * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ #include "PerformanceWorker.h"-#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerPrivate.h"+#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerScope.h" #include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_dom.h" namespace mozilla::dom {

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Header Inclusion Issue] [dom/performance/PerformanceWorker.cpp] [Lines 5]
[Old Code]
#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerPrivate.h"
[Fixed Code]
#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerScope.h"

Additional Details:
- The change involves replacing an include of WorkerPrivate.h with WorkerScope.h
- Without more context about how these headers are used, it's difficult to determine if this was fixing a specific security vulnerability
- This could potentially be related to scope management in worker threads, but there's no clear evidence of a security fix
- The change might be part of a larger architectural improvement rather than a direct security fix

Note: The diff doesn't show any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed (no changes to security-sensitive operations like memory management, input validation, or access control). The header change might be related to code organization or functionality improvements rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/glean/tests/pytest/test_no_expired_metrics.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/glean/tests/pytest/test_no_expired_metrics.py@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@     path.join(path.dirname(__file__), path.pardir, path.pardir) ) sys.path.append(FOG_ROOT_PATH)-from metrics_index import metrics_yamls+from metrics_index import metrics_yamls, tags_yamls # Shenanigans to import run_glean_parser sys.path.append(path.join(FOG_ROOT_PATH, "build_scripts", "glean_parser_ext"))@@ -35,8 +35,8 @@         app_version = version_file.read().strip()     options = run_glean_parser.get_parser_options(app_version)-    metrics_paths = [Path(x) for x in metrics_yamls]-    all_objs = parser.parse_objects(metrics_paths, options)+    paths = [Path(x) for x in metrics_yamls] + [Path(x) for x in tags_yamls]+    all_objs = parser.parse_objects(paths, options)     assert not util.report_validation_errors(all_objs)     assert not lint.lint_metrics(all_objs.value, options)

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be functional enhancements to include additional YAML files (tags_yamls) in the parsing process.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 12, 35]
[Old Code]
from metrics_index import metrics_yamls
metrics_paths = [Path(x) for x in metrics_yamls]
[Fixed Code]
from metrics_index import metrics_yamls, tags_yamls
paths = [Path(x) for x in metrics_yamls] + [Path(x) for x in tags_yamls]

The changes simply:
1. Import an additional variable (tags_yamls) from metrics_index
2. Combine metrics and tags paths for parsing
3. Don't show any signs of security fixes (no input validation changes, no auth changes, no sensitive data handling changes, etc.)

This appears to be a routine enhancement to support additional configuration files rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/thiserror-impl/src/lib.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/thiserror-impl/src/lib.rs@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ mod attr; mod expand; mod fmt;+mod generics; mod prop; mod valid;

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability [File: third_party/rust/thiserror-impl/src/lib.rs] [Lines: 16-16]
    Old Code: (No generics module included)
    Fixed Code: Added `mod generics;` module declaration

Additional Details:
- The diff shows only the addition of a new module (`generics`) to the Rust codebase
- There are no changes to existing code that would indicate a security fix
- The addition appears to be a feature enhancement rather than a security patch
- No specific vulnerability patterns (like unsafe code, input validation, etc.) are visible in this change

Since this is just adding a new module declaration without any actual code changes or security-related modifications, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being addressed here. The change appears to be purely architectural/functional in nature.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.scale.1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.scale.1.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -38,15 +38,15 @@ ctx.moveTo(25, 125); ctx.arc(25, 125, 24, 0, 2*Math.PI, false); ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 0,0, 0,255,0,255, "0,0", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,0, 0,255,0,255, "50,0", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 99,0, 0,255,0,255, "99,0", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 0,25, 0,255,0,255, "0,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 99,25, 0,255,0,255, "99,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 0,49, 0,255,0,255, "0,49", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,49, 0,255,0,255, "50,49", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 99,49, 0,255,0,255, "99,49", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 0,0, 0,255,0,255, "0,0", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,0, 0,255,0,255, "50,0", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 99,0, 0,255,0,255, "99,0", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 0,25, 0,255,0,255, "0,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 99,25, 0,255,0,255, "99,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 0,49, 0,255,0,255, "0,49", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,49, 0,255,0,255, "50,49", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 99,49, 0,255,0,255, "99,49", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I can identify the following potential security issues:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   The changes in the diff are purely variable name changes (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to the assertion calls. There are no security vulnerabilities being fixed here - this appears to be a simple refactoring for consistency or readability.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   The changes in the `_assertPixel` calls are simply updating them to use the new variable name `canvas` instead of `offscreenCanvas`. This doesn't represent any security fix, just a naming consistency update.

The diff shows no actual security-related changes. The modifications are:
- Variable renaming (`offscreenCanvas` → `canvas`)
- Corresponding updates to all references of the renamed variable
- No changes to the actual test logic or security-sensitive operations

No known vulnerabilities (e.g., XSS, code injection, memory safety issues) are being addressed in this diff. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/system/IOUtils.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/system/IOUtils.cpp@@ -730,6 +730,49 @@   }); }+/* static */+already_AddRefed<Promise> IOUtils::CreateUniqueFile(+    GlobalObject& aGlobal, const nsAString& aParent, const nsAString& aPrefix,+    const uint32_t aPermissions) {+  return CreateUnique(aGlobal, aParent, aPrefix, nsIFile::NORMAL_FILE_TYPE,+                      aPermissions);+}++/* static */+already_AddRefed<Promise> IOUtils::CreateUniqueDirectory(+    GlobalObject& aGlobal, const nsAString& aParent, const nsAString& aPrefix,+    const uint32_t aPermissions) {+  return CreateUnique(aGlobal, aParent, aPrefix, nsIFile::DIRECTORY_TYPE,+                      aPermissions);+}++/* static */+already_AddRefed<Promise> IOUtils::CreateUnique(GlobalObject& aGlobal,+                                                const nsAString& aParent,+                                                const nsAString& aPrefix,+                                                const uint32_t aFileType,+                                                const uint32_t aPermissions) {+  return WithPromiseAndState(aGlobal, [&](Promise* promise, auto& state) {+    nsCOMPtr<nsIFile> file = new nsLocalFile();+    REJECT_IF_INIT_PATH_FAILED(file, aParent, promise);++    if (nsresult rv = file->Append(aPrefix); NS_FAILED(rv)) {+      RejectJSPromise(+          promise,+          IOError(rv).WithMessage("Could not append prefix `%s' to parent `%s'",+                                  NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aPrefix).get(),+                                  file->HumanReadablePath().get()));+      return;+    }++    DispatchAndResolve<nsString>(+        state->mEventQueue, promise,+        [file = std::move(file), aPermissions, aFileType]() {+          return CreateUniqueSync(file, aFileType, aPermissions);+        });+  });+}+ #if defined(XP_WIN) /* static */@@ -1614,6 +1657,22 @@   return exists; }+/* static */+Result<nsString, IOUtils::IOError> IOUtils::CreateUniqueSync(+    nsIFile* aFile, const uint32_t aFileType, const uint32_t aPermissions) {+  MOZ_ASSERT(!NS_IsMainThread());++  if (nsresult rv = aFile->CreateUnique(aFileType, aPermissions);+      NS_FAILED(rv)) {+    return Err(IOError(rv).WithMessage("Could not create unique path"));+  }++  nsString path;+  MOZ_ALWAYS_SUCCEEDS(aFile->GetPath(path));++  return path;+}+ #if defined(XP_WIN) Result<uint32_t, IOUtils::IOError> IOUtils::GetWindowsAttributesSync(

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential File Creation Race Condition] [dom/system/IOUtils.cpp] [Lines 730-765]
   [Old Code: (Not present - new functionality added)]
   [Fixed Code: Adds CreateUniqueFile/CreateUniqueDirectory functions with proper error handling and permissions control]

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Permission Handling Issue] [dom/system/IOUtils.cpp] [Lines 730-765]
   [Old Code: (Not present - new functionality added)]
   [Fixed Code: Adds permission parameter (aPermissions) to control file/directory creation permissions]

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Path Traversal] [dom/system/IOUtils.cpp] [Lines 730-765]
   [Old Code: (Not present - new functionality added)]
   [Fixed Code: Uses nsIFile API which should handle path normalization, but no explicit path validation shown]

Note: The diff shows new functionality being added rather than fixing existing code. The security implications would depend on:
1. How callers use these new functions
2. Whether proper permission values are enforced
3. Whether parent paths are properly validated
4. Whether the CreateUnique operation is atomic/safe from race conditions

Without seeing the complete context of how these functions are used, it's difficult to confirm actual vulnerabilities, but the implementation appears to include basic security considerations like error handling and permission controls.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-rgb-4.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-rgb-4.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgb(0 255 0)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes (variable renaming). Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found
    File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-rgb-4.html
    Changes:
    - Renamed variable 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas'
    - Updated references to use new variable name
    - No functional or security-related changes detected

The diff shows:
1. Variable name change from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas'
2. Corresponding updates to the variable usage
3. No changes to the actual test logic or security-relevant code

No CVE or vulnerability name is applicable here as this doesn't appear to be a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.zero.2.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.zero.2.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ ctx.beginPath(); ctx.roundRect(50, -100, 0, 250, [0]); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't affect security. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 13-14, 23]
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or clarity, but this doesn't represent a security fix. The functionality remains exactly the same.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/src/options/input_field.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/src/options/input_field.rs@@ -1,10 +1,8 @@ use std::borrow::Cow;-use syn;--use codegen;-use options::{Core, DefaultExpression, ParseAttribute};-use {Error, FromMeta, Result};+use crate::codegen;+use crate::options::{Core, DefaultExpression, ParseAttribute};+use crate::{Error, FromMeta, Result}; #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] pub struct InputField {@@ -16,14 +14,14 @@     /// If `true`, generated code will not look for this field in the input meta item,     /// instead always falling back to either `InputField::default` or `Default::default`.-    pub skip: bool,-    pub map: Option<syn::Path>,-    pub multiple: bool,+    pub skip: Option<bool>,+    pub post_transform: Option<codegen::PostfixTransform>,+    pub multiple: Option<bool>, } impl InputField {     /// Generate a view into this field that can be used for code generation.-    pub fn as_codegen_field<'a>(&'a self) -> codegen::Field<'a> {+    pub fn as_codegen_field(&self) -> codegen::Field<'_> {         codegen::Field {             ident: &self.ident,             name_in_attr: self@@ -36,15 +34,15 @@                 || Cow::Owned(parse_quote!(::darling::FromMeta::from_meta)),                 Cow::Borrowed,             ),-            skip: self.skip,-            map: self.map.as_ref(),-            multiple: self.multiple,+            skip: self.skip.unwrap_or_default(),+            post_transform: self.post_transform.as_ref(),+            multiple: self.multiple.unwrap_or_default(),         }     }     /// Generate a codegen::DefaultExpression for this field. This requires the field name     /// in the `Inherit` case.-    fn as_codegen_default<'a>(&'a self) -> Option<codegen::DefaultExpression<'a>> {+    fn as_codegen_default(&self) -> Option<codegen::DefaultExpression<'_>> {         self.default.as_ref().map(|expr| match *expr {             DefaultExpression::Explicit(ref path) => codegen::DefaultExpression::Explicit(path),             DefaultExpression::Inherit => codegen::DefaultExpression::Inherit(&self.ident),@@ -59,9 +57,9 @@             attr_name: None,             default: None,             with: None,-            skip: false,-            map: Default::default(),-            multiple: false,+            skip: None,+            post_transform: Default::default(),+            multiple: None,         }     }@@ -73,16 +71,16 @@         let ty = f.ty.clone();         let base = Self::new(ident, ty).parse_attributes(&f.attrs)?;-        if let Some(container) = parent {+        Ok(if let Some(container) = parent {             base.with_inherited(container)         } else {-            Ok(base)-        }+            base+        })     }     /// Apply inherited settings from the container. This is done _after_ parsing     /// to ensure deference to explicit field-level settings.-    fn with_inherited(mut self, parent: &Core) -> Result<Self> {+    fn with_inherited(mut self, parent: &Core) -> Self {         // explicit renamings take precedence over rename rules on the container,         // but in the absence of an explicit name we apply the rule.         if self.attr_name.is_none() {@@ -93,7 +91,11 @@         // 1. Will we look for this field in the attribute?         // 1. Is there a locally-defined default?         // 1. Did the parent define a default?-        self.default = match (self.skip, self.default.is_some(), parent.default.is_some()) {+        self.default = match (+            self.skip.unwrap_or_default(),+            self.default.is_some(),+            parent.default.is_some(),+        ) {             // If we have a default, use it.             (_, true, _) => self.default,@@ -109,7 +111,7 @@             (false, false, false) => None,         };-        Ok(self)+        self     } }@@ -118,19 +120,54 @@         let path = mi.path();         if path.is_ident("rename") {+            if self.attr_name.is_some() {+                return Err(Error::duplicate_field_path(path).with_span(mi));+            }+             self.attr_name = FromMeta::from_meta(mi)?;         } else if path.is_ident("default") {+            if self.default.is_some() {+                return Err(Error::duplicate_field_path(path).with_span(mi));+            }             self.default = FromMeta::from_meta(mi)?;         } else if path.is_ident("with") {+            if self.with.is_some() {+                return Err(Error::duplicate_field_path(path).with_span(mi));+            }+             self.with = Some(FromMeta::from_meta(mi)?);         } else if path.is_ident("skip") {+            if self.skip.is_some() {+                return Err(Error::duplicate_field_path(path).with_span(mi));+            }+             self.skip = FromMeta::from_meta(mi)?;-        } else if path.is_ident("map") {-            self.map = Some(FromMeta::from_meta(mi)?);+        } else if path.is_ident("map") || path.is_ident("and_then") {+            let transformer = path.get_ident().unwrap().clone();+            if let Some(post_transform) = &self.post_transform {+                if transformer == post_transform.transformer {+                    return Err(Error::duplicate_field_path(path).with_span(mi));+                } else {+                    return Err(Error::custom(format!(+                        "Options `{}` and `{}` are mutually exclusive",+                        transformer, post_transform.transformer+                    ))+                    .with_span(mi));+                }+            }++            self.post_transform = Some(codegen::PostfixTransform::new(+                transformer,+                FromMeta::from_meta(mi)?,+            ));         } else if path.is_ident("multiple") {+            if self.multiple.is_some() {+                return Err(Error::duplicate_field_path(path).with_span(mi));+            }+             self.multiple = FromMeta::from_meta(mi)?;         } else {-            return Err(Error::unknown_field_path(path).with_span(mi))+            return Err(Error::unknown_field_path(path).with_span(mi));         }         Ok(())

I'll analyze the code diff following the specified format. The changes appear to be primarily about code organization and type safety improvements rather than security fixes, but I'll examine them carefully.

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Code Organization Improvements [File] [Lines 1-5]
   [Old Code]
   use syn;
   use codegen;
   use options::{Core, DefaultExpression, ParseAttribute};
   use {Error, FromMeta, Result};
   [Fixed Code]
   use crate::codegen;
   use crate::options::{Core, DefaultExpression, ParseAttribute};
   use crate::{Error, FromMeta, Result};

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   Type Safety Improvements [File] [Lines 16-18]
   [Old Code]
   pub skip: bool,
   pub map: Option<syn::Path>,
   pub multiple: bool,
   [Fixed Code]
   pub skip: Option<bool>,
   pub post_transform: Option<codegen::PostfixTransform>,
   pub multiple: Option<bool>,

3. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Error Handling Improvements [File] [Lines 120-170]
   [Old Code]
   (No duplicate field checking)
   [Fixed Code]
   (Added duplicate field checking with proper error returns for all attributes)

4. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Return Type Simplification [File] [Lines 71-75]
   [Old Code]
   if let Some(container) = parent {
       base.with_inherited(container)
   } else {
       Ok(base)
   }
   [Fixed Code]
   Ok(if let Some(container) = parent {
       base.with_inherited(container)
   } else {
       base
   })

5. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Method Signature Simplification [File] [Lines 80-81]
   [Old Code]
   fn with_inherited(mut self, parent: &Core) -> Result<Self> {
   [Fixed Code]
   fn with_inherited(mut self, parent: &Core) -> Self {

The changes appear to be primarily focused on:
1. Better code organization (using crate-relative imports)
2. Improved type safety (making fields optional)
3. Better error handling (checking for duplicate fields)
4. Code simplification (removing unnecessary Result wrappers)

No clear security vulnerabilities were fixed in this diff. The changes seem to be quality improvements rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/devtools/rootAnalysis/CFG.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/devtools/rootAnalysis/CFG.js@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ // Utility code for traversing the JSON data structures produced by sixgill. "use strict";++var TRACING = false; // Find all points (positions within the code) of the body given by the list of // bodies and the blockId to match (which will specify an outer function or a@@ -33,6 +35,154 @@     }     return points;+}++// Visitor of a graph of <body, ppoint> vertexes and sixgill-generated edges,+// where the edges represent the actual computation happening.+//+// Uses the syntax `var Visitor = class { ... }` rather than `class Visitor`+// to allow reloading this file with the JS debugger.+var Visitor = class {+    constructor(bodies) {+        this.visited_bodies = new Map();+        for (const body of bodies) {+            this.visited_bodies.set(body, new Map());+        }+    }++    // Returns whether we should keep going after seeing this <body, ppoint>+    // pair. Also records it as visited.+    visit(body, ppoint, info) {+        const visited = this.visited_bodies.get(body);+        const existing = visited.get(ppoint);+        const action = this.next_action(existing, info);+        const merged = this.merge_info(existing, info);+        visited.set(ppoint, merged);+        return [action, merged];+    }++    // Default implementation does a basic "only visit nodes once" search.+    // (Whether this is BFS/DFS/other is determined by the caller.)++    // Override if you need to revisit nodes. Valid actions are "continue",+    // "prune", and "done". "continue" means continue with the search. "prune"+    // means stop at this node, only continue on other edges. "done" means the+    // whole search is complete even if unvisited nodes remain.+    next_action(prev, current) { return prev ? "prune" : "continue"; }++    // Update the info at a node. If this is the first time the node has been+    // seen, `prev` will be undefined. `current` will be the info computed by+    // `extend_path`. The node will be updated with the return value.+    merge_info(prev, current) { return true; }++    // Prepend `edge` to the info stored at the successor node, returning+    // the updated info value. This should be overridden by pretty much any+    // subclass, as a traversal's semantics are largely determined by this method.+    extend_path(edge, body, ppoint, successor_path) { return true; }+};++function findMatchingBlock(bodies, blockId) {+    for (const body of bodies) {+        if (sameBlockId(body.BlockId, blockId)) {+            return body;+        }+    }+    assert(false);+}++// Perform a mostly breadth-first search through the graph of <body, ppoints>.+// This is only mostly breadth-first because the visitor decides whether to+// stop searching when it sees an already-visited node. It can choose to+// re-visit a node in order to find "better" paths that include a node more+// than once.+//+// The return value depends on how the search finishes. If a 'done' action+// is returned by visitor.visit(), use the information returned by+// that call. If the search completes without reaching the entry point of+// the function (the "root"), return null. If the search manages to reach+// the root, return the value of the `result_if_reached_root` parameter.+//+// This allows this function to be used in different ways. If the visitor+// associates a value with each node that chains onto its successors+// (or predecessors in the "upwards" search order), then this will return+// a complete path through the graph. But this can also be used to test+// whether a condition holds (eg "the exit point is reachable after+// calling SomethingImportant()"), in which case no path is needed and the+// visitor will cause the return value to be a simple boolean (or null+// if it terminates the search before reaching the root.)+//+// The information returned by the visitor for a node is often called+// `path` in the code below, even though it may not represent a path.+//+function BFS_upwards(start_body, start_ppoint, bodies, visitor,+                     initial_successor_info={},+                     result_if_reached_root=null)+{+    const work = [[start_body, start_ppoint, null, initial_successor_info]];+    if (TRACING) {+        printErr(`BFS start at ${blockIdentifier(start_body)}:${start_ppoint}`);+    }++    let reached_root = false;+    while (work.length > 0) {+        const [body, ppoint, edgeToAdd, successor_path] = work.shift();+        if (TRACING) {+            printErr(`prepending edge from ${ppoint} to state '${successor_path}'`);+        }+        let path = visitor.extend_path(edgeToAdd, body, ppoint, successor_path);++        const [action,  merged_path] = visitor.visit(body, ppoint, path);+        if (action === "done") {+            return merged_path;+        }+        if (action === "prune") {+            // Do not push anything else to the work queue, but continue processing+            // other branches.+            continue;+        }+        assert(action == "continue");+        path = merged_path;++        const predecessors = getPredecessors(body);+        for (const edge of (predecessors[ppoint] || [])) {+            if (edge.Kind == "Loop") {+                // Propagate the search into the exit point of the loop body.+                const loopBody = findMatchingBlock(bodies, edge.BlockId);+                const loopEnd = loopBody.Index[1];+                work.push([loopBody, loopEnd, null, path]);+                // Don't continue to predecessors here without going through+                // the loop. (The points in this body that enter the loop will+                // be traversed when we reach the entry point of the loop.)+            } else {+                work.push([body, edge.Index[0], edge, path]);+            }+        }++        // Check for hitting the entry point of a loop body.+        if (ppoint == body.Index[0] && body.BlockId.Kind == "Loop") {+            // Propagate to outer body parents that enter the loop body.+            for (const parent of (body.BlockPPoint || [])) {+                const parentBody = findMatchingBlock(bodies, parent.BlockId);+                work.push([parentBody, parent.Index, null, path]);+            }++            // This point is also preceded by the *end* of this loop, for the+            // previous iteration.+            work.push([body, body.Index[1], null, path]);+        }++        // Check for reaching the root of the function.+        if (body === start_body && ppoint == body.Index[0]) {+            reached_root = true;+        }+    }++    // The search space was exhausted without finding a 'done' state. That+    // might be because all search paths were pruned before reaching the entry+    // point of the function, in which case reached_root will be false. (If+    // reached_root is true, then we may still not have visited the entire+    // graph, if some paths were pruned but at least one made it to the root.)+    return reached_root ? result_if_reached_root : null; } // Given the CFG for the constructor call of some RAII, return whether the@@ -176,6 +326,42 @@     }     return points;+}++function isImmobileValue(exp) {+    if (exp.Kind == "Int" && exp.String == "0") {+        return true;+    }+    return false;+}++function expressionIsVariableAddress(exp, variable)+{+    while (exp.Kind == "Fld")+        exp = exp.Exp[0];+    return exp.Kind == "Var" && sameVariable(exp.Variable, variable);+}++function edgeTakesVariableAddress(edge, variable, body)+{+    if (ignoreEdgeUse(edge, variable, body))+        return false;+    if (ignoreEdgeAddressTaken(edge))+        return false;+    switch (edge.Kind) {+    case "Assign":+        return expressionIsVariableAddress(edge.Exp[1], variable);+    case "Call":+        if ("PEdgeCallArguments" in edge) {+            for (var exp of edge.PEdgeCallArguments.Exp) {+                if (expressionIsVariableAddress(exp, variable))+                    return true;+            }+        }+        return false;+    default:+        return false;+    } } // Look at an invocation of a virtual method or function pointer contained in a@@ -216,6 +402,495 @@     } }+function expressionUsesVariable(exp, variable)+{+    if (exp.Kind == "Var" && sameVariable(exp.Variable, variable))+        return true;+    if (!("Exp" in exp))+        return false;+    for (var childExp of exp.Exp) {+        if (expressionUsesVariable(childExp, variable))+            return true;+    }+    return false;+}++function expressionUsesVariableContents(exp, variable)+{+    if (!("Exp" in exp))+        return false;+    for (var childExp of exp.Exp) {+        if (childExp.Kind == 'Drf') {+            if (expressionUsesVariable(childExp, variable))+                return true;+        } else if (expressionUsesVariableContents(childExp, variable)) {+            return true;+        }+    }+    return false;+}++// Detect simple |return nullptr;| statements.+function isReturningImmobileValue(edge, variable)+{+    if (variable.Kind == "Return") {+        if (edge.Exp[0].Kind == "Var" && sameVariable(edge.Exp[0].Variable, variable)) {+            if (isImmobileValue(edge.Exp[1]))+                return true;+        }+    }+    return false;+}++// If the edge uses the given variable's value, return the earliest point at+// which the use is definite. Usually, that means the source of the edge+// (anything that reaches that source point will end up using the variable, but+// there may be other ways to reach the destination of the edge.)+//+// Return values are implicitly used at the very last point in the function.+// This makes a difference: if an RAII class GCs in its destructor, we need to+// start looking at the final point in the function, not one point back from+// that, since that would skip over the GCing call.+//+// Note that this returns true only if the variable's incoming value is used.+// So this would return false for 'obj':+//+//     obj = someFunction();+//+// but these would return true:+//+//     obj = someFunction(obj);+//     obj->foo = someFunction();+//+function edgeUsesVariable(edge, variable, body)+{+    if (ignoreEdgeUse(edge, variable, body))+        return 0;++    if (variable.Kind == "Return" && body.Index[1] == edge.Index[1] && body.BlockId.Kind == "Function") {+        // The last point in the function body is treated as using the return+        // value. This is the only time the destination point is returned+        // rather than the source point.+        return edge.Index[1];+    }++    var src = edge.Index[0];++    switch (edge.Kind) {++    case "Assign": {+        // Detect `Return := nullptr`.+        if (isReturningImmobileValue(edge, variable))+            return 0;+        const [lhs, rhs] = edge.Exp;+        // Detect `lhs := ...variable...`+        if (expressionUsesVariable(rhs, variable))+            return src;+        // Detect `...variable... := rhs` but not `variable := rhs`. The latter+        // overwrites the previous value of `variable` without using it.+        if (expressionUsesVariable(lhs, variable) && !expressionIsVariable(lhs, variable))+            return src;+        return 0;+    }++    case "Assume":+        return expressionUsesVariableContents(edge.Exp[0], variable) ? src : 0;++    case "Call": {+        const callee = edge.Exp[0];+        if (expressionUsesVariable(callee, variable))+            return src;+        if ("PEdgeCallInstance" in edge) {+            if (expressionUsesVariable(edge.PEdgeCallInstance.Exp, variable)) {+                if (edgeStartsValueLiveRange(edge, variable)) {+                    // If the variable is being constructed, then the incoming+                    // value is not used here; it didn't exist before+                    // construction. (The analysis doesn't get told where+                    // variables are defined, so must infer it from+                    // construction. If the variable does not have a+                    // constructor, its live range may be larger than it really+                    // ought to be if it is defined within a loop body, but+                    // that is conservative.)+                } else {+                    return src;+                }+            }+        }+        if ("PEdgeCallArguments" in edge) {+            for (var exp of edge.PEdgeCallArguments.Exp) {+                if (expressionUsesVariable(exp, variable))+                    return src;+            }+        }+        if (edge.Exp.length == 1)+            return 0;++        // Assigning call result to a variable.+        const lhs = edge.Exp[1];+        if (expressionUsesVariable(lhs, variable) && !expressionIsVariable(lhs, variable))+            return src;+        return 0;+    }++    case "Loop":+        return 0;++    case "Assembly":+        return 0;++    default:+        assert(false);+    }+}++function expressionIsVariable(exp, variable)+{+    return exp.Kind == "Var" && sameVariable(exp.Variable, variable);+}++function expressionIsMethodOnVariable(exp, variable)+{+    // This might be calling a method on a base class, in which case exp will+    // be an unnamed field of the variable instead of the variable itself.+    while (exp.Kind == "Fld" && exp.Field.Name[0].startsWith("field:"))+        exp = exp.Exp[0];++    return exp.Kind == "Var" && sameVariable(exp.Variable, variable);+}++// Return whether the edge starts the live range of a variable's value, by setting+// it to some new value. Examples of starting obj's live range:+//+//     obj = foo;+//     obj = foo();+//     obj = foo(obj);         // uses previous value but then sets to new value+//     SomeClass obj(true, 1); // constructor+//+function edgeStartsValueLiveRange(edge, variable)+{+    // Direct assignments start live range of lhs: var = value+    if (edge.Kind == "Assign") {+        const [lhs, rhs] = edge.Exp;+        return (expressionIsVariable(lhs, variable) &&+                !isReturningImmobileValue(edge, variable));+    }++    if (edge.Kind != "Call")+        return false;++    // Assignments of call results start live range: var = foo()+    if (1 in edge.Exp) {+        var lhs = edge.Exp[1];+        if (expressionIsVariable(lhs, variable))+            return true;+    }++    // Constructor calls start live range of instance: SomeClass var(...)+    if ("PEdgeCallInstance" in edge) {+        var instance = edge.PEdgeCallInstance.Exp;++        // Kludge around incorrect dereference on some constructor calls.+        if (instance.Kind == "Drf")+            instance = instance.Exp[0];++        if (!expressionIsVariable(instance, variable))+            return false;++        var callee = edge.Exp[0];+        if (callee.Kind != "Var")+            return false;++        assert(callee.Variable.Kind == "Func");+        var calleeName = readable(callee.Variable.Name[0]);++        // Constructor calls include the text 'Name::Name(' or 'Name<...>::Name('.+        var openParen = calleeName.indexOf('(');+        if (openParen < 0)+            return false;+        calleeName = calleeName.substring(0, openParen);++        var lastColon = calleeName.lastIndexOf('::');+        if (lastColon < 0)+            return false;+        var constructorName = calleeName.substr(lastColon + 2);+        calleeName = calleeName.substr(0, lastColon);++        var lastTemplateOpen = calleeName.lastIndexOf('<');+        if (lastTemplateOpen >= 0)+            calleeName = calleeName.substr(0, lastTemplateOpen);++        if (calleeName.endsWith(constructorName))+            return true;+    }++    return false;+}++// Return whether an edge "clears out" a variable's value. A simple example+// would be+//+//     var = nullptr;+//+// for analyses for which nullptr is a "safe" value (eg GC rooting hazards; you+// can't get in trouble by holding a nullptr live across a GC.) A more complex+// example is a Maybe<T> that gets reset:+//+//     Maybe<AutoCheckCannotGC> nogc;+//     nogc.emplace(cx);+//     nogc.reset();+//     gc();             // <-- not a problem; nogc is invalidated by prev line+//     nogc.emplace(cx);+//     foo(nogc);+//+// Yet another example is a UniquePtr being passed by value, which means the+// receiver takes ownership:+//+//     UniquePtr<JSObject*> uobj(obj);+//     foo(uobj);+//     gc();+//+function edgeEndsValueLiveRange(edge, variable, body)+{+    // var = nullptr;+    if (edge.Kind == "Assign") {+        const [lhs, rhs] = edge.Exp;+        return expressionIsVariable(lhs, variable) && isImmobileValue(rhs);+    }++    if (edge.Kind != "Call")+        return false;++    var callee = edge.Exp[0];++    if (edge.Type.Kind == 'Function' &&+        edge.Exp[0].Kind == 'Var' &&+        edge.Exp[0].Variable.Kind == 'Func' &&+        edge.Exp[0].Variable.Name[1] == 'MarkVariableAsGCSafe' &&+        edge.Exp[0].Variable.Name[0].includes("JS::detail::MarkVariableAsGCSafe") &&+        expressionIsVariable(edge.PEdgeCallArguments.Exp[0], variable))+    {+        // explicit JS_HAZ_VARIABLE_IS_GC_SAFE annotation+        return true;+    }++    if (edge.Type.Kind == 'Function' &&+        edge.Exp[0].Kind == 'Var' &&+        edge.Exp[0].Variable.Kind == 'Func' &&+        edge.Exp[0].Variable.Name[1] == 'move' &&+        edge.Exp[0].Variable.Name[0].includes('std::move(') &&+        expressionIsVariable(edge.PEdgeCallArguments.Exp[0], variable) &&+        edge.Exp[1].Kind == 'Var' &&+        edge.Exp[1].Variable.Kind == 'Temp')+    {+        // temp = std::move(var)+        //+        // If var is a UniquePtr, and we pass it into something that takes+        // ownership, then it should be considered to be invalid. Example:+        //+        //     consume(std::move(var));+        //+        // where consume takes a UniquePtr. This will compile to something like+        //+        //     UniquePtr* __temp_1 = &std::move(var);+        //     UniquePtr&& __temp_2(*temp_1); // move constructor+        //     consume(__temp_2);+        //     ~UniquePtr(__temp_2);+        //+        // The line commented with "// move constructor" is a result of passing+        // a UniquePtr as a parameter. If consume() took a UniquePtr&&+        // directly, this would just be:+        //+        //     UniquePtr* __temp_1 = &std::move(var);+        //     consume(__temp_1);+        //+        // which is not guaranteed to move from the reference. It might just+        // ignore the parameter. We can't predict what consume(UniquePtr&&)+        // will do. We do know that UniquePtr(UniquePtr&& other) moves out of+        // `other`.+        //+        // The std::move() technically is irrelevant, but because we only care+        // about bare variables, it has to be used, which is fortunate because+        // the UniquePtr&& constructor operates on a temporary, not the+        // variable we care about.++        const lhs = edge.Exp[1].Variable;+        if (basicBlockEatsVariable(lhs, body, edge.Index[1]))+          return true;+    }++    if (edge.Type.Kind == 'Function' &&+        edge.Type.TypeFunctionCSU &&+        edge.PEdgeCallInstance &&+        expressionIsMethodOnVariable(edge.PEdgeCallInstance.Exp, variable))+    {+        const typeName = edge.Type.TypeFunctionCSU.Type.Name;+        const m = typeName.match(/^(((\w|::)+?)(\w+))</);+        if (m) {+            const [, type, namespace,, classname] = m;++            // special-case: the initial constructor that doesn't provide a value.+            // Useful for things like Maybe<T>.+            const ctorName = `${namespace}${classname}<T>::${classname}()`;+            if (callee.Kind == 'Var' &&+                typesWithSafeConstructors.has(type) &&+                callee.Variable.Name[0].includes(ctorName))+            {+                return true;+            }++            // special-case: UniquePtr::reset() and similar.+            if (callee.Kind == 'Var' &&+                type in resetterMethods &&+                resetterMethods[type].has(callee.Variable.Name[1]))+            {+                return true;+            }+        }+    }++    // special-case: passing UniquePtr<T> by value.+    if (edge.Type.Kind == 'Function' &&+        edge.Type.TypeFunctionArgument &&+        edge.PEdgeCallArguments)+    {+        for (const i in edge.Type.TypeFunctionArgument) {+            const param = edge.Type.TypeFunctionArgument[i];+            if (param.Type.Kind != 'CSU')+                continue;+            if (!param.Type.Name.startsWith("mozilla::UniquePtr<"))+                continue;+            const arg = edge.PEdgeCallArguments.Exp[i];+            if (expressionIsVariable(arg, variable)) {+                return true;+            }+        }+    }++    return false;+}++function edgeMovesVariable(edge, variable)+{+    if (edge.Kind != 'Call')+        return false;+    const callee = edge.Exp[0];+    if (callee.Kind == 'Var' &&+        callee.Variable.Kind == 'Func')+    {+        const { Variable: { Name: [ fullname, shortname ] } } = callee;+        const [ mangled, unmangled ] = splitFunction(fullname);+        // Match a UniquePtr move constructor.+        if (unmangled.match(/::UniquePtr<[^>]*>::UniquePtr\((\w+::)*UniquePtr<[^>]*>&&/))+            return true;+    }++    return false;+}++// Scan forward through the basic block in 'body' starting at 'startpoint',+// looking for a call that passes 'variable' to a move constructor that+// "consumes" it (eg UniquePtr::UniquePtr(UniquePtr&&)).+function basicBlockEatsVariable(variable, body, startpoint)+{+    const successors = getSuccessors(body);+    let point = startpoint;+    while (point in successors) {+        // Only handle a single basic block. If it forks, stop looking.+        const edges = successors[point];+        if (edges.length != 1) {+            return false;+        }+        const edge = edges[0];++        if (edgeMovesVariable(edge, variable)) {+            return true;+        }++        // edgeStartsValueLiveRange will find places where 'variable' is given+        // a new value. Never observed in practice, since this function is only+        // called with a temporary resulting from std::move(), which is used+        // immediately for a call. But just to be robust to future uses:+        if (edgeStartsValueLiveRange(edge, variable)) {+            return false;+        }++        point = edge.Index[1];+    }++    return false;+}++function edgeIsNonReleasingDtor(body, edge, calleeName, functionBodies) {+    if (edge.Kind !== "Call") {+        return false;+    }+    if (!isRefcountedDtor(calleeName)) {+        return false;+    }++    let callee = edge.Exp[0];+    while (callee.Kind === "Drf") {+        callee = callee.Exp[0];+    }++    const instance = edge.PEdgeCallInstance.Exp;+    if (instance.Kind !== "Var") {+        // TODO: handle field destructors+        return false;+    }++    // Test whether the dtor call is dominated by operations on the variable+    // that mean it will not go to a zero refcount in the dtor: either because+    // it's already dead (eg r.forget() was called) or because it can be proven+    // to have a ref count of greater than 1. This is implemented by looking+    // for the reverse: find a path scanning backwards from the dtor call where+    // the variable is used in any way that does *not* ensure that it is+    // trivially destructible.++    const variable = instance.Variable;++    const visitor = new class extends Visitor {+        // Do not revisit nodes. For new nodes, relay the decision made by+        // extend_path.+        next_action(seen, current) { return seen ? "prune" : current; }++        // We don't revisit, so always use the new.+        merge_info(seen, current) { return current; }++        // Return the action to take from this node.+        extend_path(edge, body, ppoint, successor_path) {+            if (!edge) {+                // Dummy edge to join two points.+                return "continue";+            }++            if (!edgeUsesVariable(edge, variable, body)) {+                // Nothing of interest on this edge, keep searching.+                return "continue";+            }++            if (edgeEndsValueLiveRange(edge, variable, body)) {+                // This path is safe!+                return "prune";+            }++            // Unsafe. Found a use that might set the variable to a+            // nonzero refcount.+            return "done";+        }+    }(functionBodies);++    // Searching upwards from a destructor call, return the opposite of: is+    // there a path to a use or the start of the function that does NOT hit a+    // safe assignment like refptr.forget() first?+    //+    // In graph terms: return whether the destructor call is dominated by forget() calls (or similar).+    return !BFS_upwards(+        body, edge.Index[0], functionBodies, visitor, "start",+        true // Return value if we reach the root without finding a non-forget() use.+    );+}+ // gcc uses something like "__dt_del " for virtual destructors that it // generates. function isSyntheticVirtualDestructor(funcName) {

I'll analyze the code diff for security vulnerabilities. Here's my analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Leak] [js/src/devtools/rootAnalysis/CFG.js] [Lines 7]
Old Code: 
"use strict";

Fixed Code:
"use strict";

var TRACING = false;

Analysis: The addition of a TRACING flag could potentially expose debug information if not properly controlled, but there's no clear vulnerability here.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Path Traversal] [js/src/devtools/rootAnalysis/CFG.js] [Lines 33-154]
Old Code: (No visitor class implementation)
Fixed Code: (Added Visitor class with graph traversal capabilities)

Analysis: The new Visitor class implements graph traversal functionality which could potentially be abused if input validation is insufficient, but no clear vulnerability is evident.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Type Confusion] [js/src/devtools/rootAnalysis/CFG.js] [Lines 176-326]
Old Code: (No edge analysis functions)
Fixed Code: (Added multiple edge analysis functions like edgeUsesVariable, edgeEndsValueLiveRange, etc.)

Analysis: The new edge analysis functions perform complex type checking and could potentially be vulnerable to type confusion attacks if not properly validating inputs, but the code appears robust.

4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Race Condition] [js/src/devtools/rootAnalysis/CFG.js] [Lines 402-495]
Old Code: (No edgeIsNonReleasingDtor function)
Fixed Code: (Added edgeIsNonReleasingDtor function)

Analysis: The new function analyzes destructor calls and reference counting which could potentially lead to race conditions if not properly synchronized, but the context suggests this is static analysis code.

Note: The diff shows significant additions of static analysis capabilities rather than clear security vulnerabilities. The code appears to be adding more sophisticated analysis for detecting potential issues (like GC hazards), rather than fixing vulnerabilities itself. Without more context about how this code is used and what inputs it processes, it's difficult to identify specific vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/browsers/chrome_ios.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/browsers/chrome_ios.py@@ -1,16 +1,14 @@-from .base import Browser, ExecutorBrowser, require_arg-from .base import NullBrowser, get_timeout_multiplier   # noqa: F401-from ..webdriver_server import CWTChromeDriverServer+from .base import WebDriverBrowser, require_arg+from .base import get_timeout_multiplier   # noqa: F401 from ..executors import executor_kwargs as base_executor_kwargs+from ..executors.base import WdspecExecutor  # noqa: F401 from ..executors.executorwebdriver import (WebDriverTestharnessExecutor,  # noqa: F401                                            WebDriverRefTestExecutor)  # noqa: F401-from ..executors.executorchrome import ChromeDriverWdspecExecutor  # noqa: F401 __wptrunner__ = {"product": "chrome_ios",                  "check_args": "check_args",-                 "browser": {None: "ChromeiOSBrowser",-                             "wdspec": "NullBrowser"},+                 "browser": "ChromeiOSBrowser",                  "executor": {"testharness": "WebDriverTestharnessExecutor",                               "reftest": "WebDriverRefTestExecutor"},                  "browser_kwargs": "browser_kwargs",@@ -45,37 +43,12 @@     return {}-class ChromeiOSBrowser(Browser):+class ChromeiOSBrowser(WebDriverBrowser):     """ChromeiOS is backed by CWTChromeDriver, which is supplied through     ``wptrunner.webdriver.CWTChromeDriverServer``.     """     init_timeout = 120-    def __init__(self, logger, webdriver_binary, webdriver_args=None, **kwargs):-        """Creates a new representation of Chrome."""-        Browser.__init__(self, logger)-        self.server = CWTChromeDriverServer(self.logger,-                                            binary=webdriver_binary,-                                            args=webdriver_args)--    def start(self, **kwargs):-        self.server.start(block=False)--    def stop(self, force=False):-        self.server.stop(force=force)--    def pid(self):-        return self.server.pid--    def is_alive(self):-        # TODO(ato): This only indicates the driver is alive,-        # and doesn't say anything about whether a browser session-        # is active.-        return self.server.is_alive()--    def cleanup(self):-        self.stop()--    def executor_browser(self):-        return ExecutorBrowser, {"webdriver_url": self.server.url}+    def make_command(self):+        return [self.binary, f"--port={self.port}"] + self.webdriver_args

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Improper Inheritance] [testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/browsers/chrome_ios.py] [Lines 1-3, 45-]
[Old Code]
from .base import Browser, ExecutorBrowser, require_arg
from .base import NullBrowser, get_timeout_multiplier   # noqa: F401
from ..webdriver_server import CWTChromeDriverServer
...
class ChromeiOSBrowser(Browser):

[Fixed Code]
from .base import WebDriverBrowser, require_arg
from .base import get_timeout_multiplier   # noqa: F401
...
class ChromeiOSBrowser(WebDriverBrowser):

Additional Details: The class now inherits from WebDriverBrowser instead of Browser, which might provide better security through more specific parent class functionality, but I can't determine if this fixes a specific vulnerability.

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
[Potential Insecure Direct Object Reference] [testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/browsers/chrome_ios.py] [Lines 45-]
[Old Code]
class ChromeiOSBrowser(Browser):
    """ChromeiOS is backed by CWTChromeDriver..."""
    ...
    def executor_browser(self):
        return ExecutorBrowser, {"webdriver_url": self.server.url}

[Fixed Code]
class ChromeiOSBrowser(WebDriverBrowser):
    ...
    def make_command(self):
        return [self.binary, f"--port={self.port}"] + self.webdriver_args

Additional Details: The old implementation exposed the server URL directly, which could potentially be a security risk if not properly validated. The new implementation uses a more controlled command construction approach.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Removal of NullBrowser] [testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/browsers/chrome_ios.py] [Lines 7-9]
[Old Code]
                 "browser": {None: "ChromeiOSBrowser",
                             "wdspec": "NullBrowser"},

[Fixed Code]
                 "browser": "ChromeiOSBrowser",

Additional Details: The removal of NullBrowser might indicate it was a potential security risk if used incorrectly, but I can't confirm this was specifically a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.range.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.range.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#000'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);

Analyzing the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No identified vulnerability [File] [Lines 13-14]
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   
   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- This appears to be a simple variable renaming change (offscreenCanvas → canvas)
- No security implications or vulnerabilities are apparent in this change
- The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive operations or data handling
- The change is likely for code consistency or readability purposes

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/media/libwebp/src/dsp/lossless.c+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/media/libwebp/src/dsp/lossless.c@@ -107,63 +107,77 @@ //------------------------------------------------------------------------------ // Predictors-uint32_t VP8LPredictor0_C(uint32_t left, const uint32_t* const top) {+uint32_t VP8LPredictor0_C(const uint32_t* const left,+                          const uint32_t* const top) {   (void)top;   (void)left;   return ARGB_BLACK; }-uint32_t VP8LPredictor1_C(uint32_t left, const uint32_t* const top) {+uint32_t VP8LPredictor1_C(const uint32_t* const left,+                          const uint32_t* const top) {   (void)top;-  return left;-}-uint32_t VP8LPredictor2_C(uint32_t left, const uint32_t* const top) {+  return *left;+}+uint32_t VP8LPredictor2_C(const uint32_t* const left,+                          const uint32_t* const top) {   (void)left;   return top[0]; }-uint32_t VP8LPredictor3_C(uint32_t left, const uint32_t* const top) {+uint32_t VP8LPredictor3_C(const uint32_t* const left,+                          const uint32_t* const top) {   (void)left;   return top[1]; }-uint32_t VP8LPredictor4_C(uint32_t left, const uint32_t* const top) {+uint32_t VP8LPredictor4_C(const uint32_t* const left,+                          const uint32_t* const top) {   (void)left;   return top[-1]; }-uint32_t VP8LPredictor5_C(uint32_t left, const uint32_t* const top) {-  const uint32_t pred = Average3(left, top[0], top[1]);-  return pred;-}-uint32_t VP8LPredictor6_C(uint32_t left, const uint32_t* const top) {-  const uint32_t pred = Average2(left, top[-1]);-  return pred;-}-uint32_t VP8LPredictor7_C(uint32_t left, const uint32_t* const top) {-  const uint32_t pred = Average2(left, top[0]);-  return pred;-}-uint32_t VP8LPredictor8_C(uint32_t left, const uint32_t* const top) {+uint32_t VP8LPredictor5_C(const uint32_t* const left,+                          const uint32_t* const top) {+  const uint32_t pred = Average3(*left, top[0], top[1]);+  return pred;+}+uint32_t VP8LPredictor6_C(const uint32_t* const left,+                          const uint32_t* const top) {+  const uint32_t pred = Average2(*left, top[-1]);+  return pred;+}+uint32_t VP8LPredictor7_C(const uint32_t* const left,+                          const uint32_t* const top) {+  const uint32_t pred = Average2(*left, top[0]);+  return pred;+}+uint32_t VP8LPredictor8_C(const uint32_t* const left,+                          const uint32_t* const top) {   const uint32_t pred = Average2(top[-1], top[0]);   (void)left;   return pred; }-uint32_t VP8LPredictor9_C(uint32_t left, const uint32_t* const top) {+uint32_t VP8LPredictor9_C(const uint32_t* const left,+                          const uint32_t* const top) {   const uint32_t pred = Average2(top[0], top[1]);   (void)left;   return pred; }-uint32_t VP8LPredictor10_C(uint32_t left, const uint32_t* const top) {-  const uint32_t pred = Average4(left, top[-1], top[0], top[1]);-  return pred;-}-uint32_t VP8LPredictor11_C(uint32_t left, const uint32_t* const top) {-  const uint32_t pred = Select(top[0], left, top[-1]);-  return pred;-}-uint32_t VP8LPredictor12_C(uint32_t left, const uint32_t* const top) {-  const uint32_t pred = ClampedAddSubtractFull(left, top[0], top[-1]);-  return pred;-}-uint32_t VP8LPredictor13_C(uint32_t left, const uint32_t* const top) {-  const uint32_t pred = ClampedAddSubtractHalf(left, top[0], top[-1]);+uint32_t VP8LPredictor10_C(const uint32_t* const left,+                           const uint32_t* const top) {+  const uint32_t pred = Average4(*left, top[-1], top[0], top[1]);+  return pred;+}+uint32_t VP8LPredictor11_C(const uint32_t* const left,+                           const uint32_t* const top) {+  const uint32_t pred = Select(top[0], *left, top[-1]);+  return pred;+}+uint32_t VP8LPredictor12_C(const uint32_t* const left,+                           const uint32_t* const top) {+  const uint32_t pred = ClampedAddSubtractFull(*left, top[0], top[-1]);+  return pred;+}+uint32_t VP8LPredictor13_C(const uint32_t* const left,+                           const uint32_t* const top) {+  const uint32_t pred = ClampedAddSubtractHalf(*left, top[0], top[-1]);   return pred; }

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Pointer Dereference Issues [File: media/libwebp/src/dsp/lossless.c] [Lines: Multiple]
Old Code: Functions took `uint32_t left` as direct value
Fixed Code: Functions now take `const uint32_t* const left` as pointer
The change from passing values directly to passing pointers could potentially prevent issues if the original implementation could have led to incorrect value handling, but this doesn't appear to be a clear security vulnerability.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Null Pointer Dereference [File: media/libwebp/src/dsp/lossless.c] [Lines: Multiple]
Old Code: Direct value access
Fixed Code: Pointer dereferencing (*left) in multiple functions
The new code now dereferences pointers, which could potentially lead to null pointer dereferences if the input pointers are null, though the context doesn't show any null checks being added.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Array Bounds Issues [File: media/libwebp/src/dsp/lossless.c] [Lines: Multiple]
Old Code: Array access without context (top[-1], top[0], top[1])
Fixed Code: Same array access patterns but with pointer parameters
The code continues to use array accesses (top[-1], top[0], etc.) without visible bounds checking, which could potentially lead to out-of-bounds accesses if the input arrays are too small.

Note: While these changes modify the function signatures and access patterns, there isn't a clear, specific vulnerability being fixed here. The changes appear to be more about consistency and potential future safety rather than fixing an identified security issue. The modifications make the functions work with pointers rather than direct values, which might be part of a larger architectural change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.rgb-3.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.rgb-3.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; try { ctx.fillStyle = 'rgb(255, - 1, 0)'; } catch (e) { } // this shouldn't throw, but it shouldn't matter here if it does ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-related modifications. Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14,21]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and update all references to it. There are no changes to the actual security-related functionality or handling of potentially malicious inputs. The test case remains the same, checking how invalid RGB values are handled, but this appears to be part of normal functionality testing rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/examples/fibonacci.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/examples/fibonacci.rs@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@     while sender.send(x).is_ok() {         let tmp = x;         x = y;-        y = tmp + y;+        y += tmp;     } }

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/examples/fibonacci.rs] [Lines 10-13]
[Old Code]
        let tmp = x;
        x = y;
        y = tmp + y;
[Fixed Code]
        let tmp = x;
        x = y;
        y += tmp;

The change appears to be a simple optimization/refactoring of the Fibonacci sequence calculation, where `y = tmp + y` is replaced with the equivalent but slightly more concise `y += tmp`. There's no indication of a security vulnerability being fixed here - this seems to be purely a code style/readability improvement.

No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change is purely algorithmic and doesn't affect any security-related functionality.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.repeaty.outside.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.repeaty.outside.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@         ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);         ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';         ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 16, 50);-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14, 34-37]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
   ```
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
   ```

Additional Details:  
The changes appear to be purely variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability. There are no security-related fixes in this diff - it's simply a refactoring of variable names. The functionality remains exactly the same, just using a different variable name. No security vulnerabilities are addressed or introduced by these changes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-backgrounds/background-size-044.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-backgrounds/background-size-044.html@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@   <link rel="match" href="reference/background-size-043-ref.html">-  <meta content="" name="flags">   <meta content="This test checks that when one 'background-size' is 'auto' and the image has no intrinsic size and no intrinsic ratio, then it should use 100%. In this test, the 'auto' value should use 100% of the height of the background positioning area of the div, which is 400px." name="assert">   <style>

Analyzing the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-backgrounds/background-size-044.html [Lines] 27
   Old Code: <meta content="" name="flags">
   Fixed Code: (line removed)
   Additional Details: This appears to be a test file modification removing an empty meta tag. No security implications are evident.

The change simply removes an unused/empty meta tag from a test HTML file. This doesn't appear to be a security fix but rather a cleanup or maintenance change. There are no visible security vulnerabilities being addressed in this diff.

Note: The file appears to be part of web platform tests (WPT) for CSS background sizing functionality, and the change doesn't affect any security-related functionality or introduce any security concerns.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/docs/contributor/tests/README.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/docs/contributor/tests/README.md@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ * [Chrome mochitests](mochitest-chrome.md): Unit-test style of tests, but with a browser window. Mostly testing APIs that interact with the DOM. * [DevTools mochitests](mochitest-devtools.md): Integration style of tests. Fires up a whole browser window with every test and you can test clicking on buttons, etc.-More information about the different types of tests can be found on the [automated testing page](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/QA/Automated_testing) at MDN. To run all DevTools tests, regardless of suite type:

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] devtools/docs/contributor/tests/README.md [Lines] 12
    Old Code: More information about the different types of tests can be found on the [automated testing page](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/QA/Automated_testing) at MDN.
    Fixed Code: (line removed)

Additional Notes:
- The change simply removes a documentation link to MDN about automated testing.
- This appears to be a documentation cleanup rather than a security fix.
- No security vulnerabilities are apparent in this change.
- The removed link was pointing to a trusted Mozilla domain (developer.mozilla.org).

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.