--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/events/Clipboard.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/events/Clipboard.cpp@@ -187,7 +187,8 @@     mHolder.Reject(rv, __func__);   }-  void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override {+  void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+                        ErrorResult& aRv) override {     AssertIsOnMainThread();     nsString text;@@ -203,7 +204,8 @@     mHolder.Resolve(std::move(native), __func__);   }-  void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override {+  void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+                        ErrorResult& aRv) override {     Reject();   }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Error Handling Improvement] [dom/events/Clipboard.cpp] [Lines 187-204]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override {
   void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override {
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,
                         ErrorResult& aRv) override {
   void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,
                         ErrorResult& aRv) override {
   ```

The diff shows that both callback functions were modified to include an ErrorResult parameter. While this appears to be an improvement in error handling, I cannot determine with certainty if this was fixing a specific security vulnerability or just improving code robustness. The change suggests better error propagation capability, but without more context about how these functions are used, I can't identify a specific vulnerability being fixed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/taskcluster/ci/perftest/linux.yml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/taskcluster/ci/perftest/linux.yml@@ -245,12 +245,16 @@     attributes:         cron: false     run-on-projects: []-    run:-        command: >--            mkdir -p $MOZ_FETCHES_DIR/../artifacts &&-            cd $MOZ_FETCHES_DIR &&-            python3.8 python/mozperftest/mozperftest/runner.py-            --flavor desktop-browser+    scopes:+        - secrets:get:project/releng/gecko/build/level-{level}/conditioned-profiles+        - secrets:get:project/perftest/gecko/level-{level}/perftest-login+    run:+        command: >-+            mkdir -p $MOZ_FETCHES_DIR/../artifacts &&+            cd $MOZ_FETCHES_DIR &&+            python3.8 python/mozperftest/mozperftest/runner.py+            --flavor desktop-browser+            --verbose             --browsertime-binary ${MOZ_FETCHES_DIR}/firefox/firefox-bin             --browsertime-geckodriver ${MOZ_FETCHES_DIR}/geckodriver             --proxy

I'll analyze the code diff according to the provided format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Missing Secret Scopes [taskcluster/ci/perftest/linux.yml] [Lines 245-256]
[Old Code]
    attributes:
        cron: false
    run-on-projects: []
    run:
        command: >-
            mkdir -p $MOZ_FETCHES_DIR/../artifacts &&
            cd $MOZ_FETCHES_DIR &&
            python3.8 python/mozperftest/mozperftest/runner.py
            --flavor desktop-browser
[Fixed Code]
    attributes:
        cron: false
    run-on-projects: []
    scopes:
        - secrets:get:project/releng/gecko/build/level-{level}/conditioned-profiles
        - secrets:get:project/perftest/gecko/level-{level}/perftest-login
    run:
        command: >-
            mkdir -p $MOZ_FETCHES_DIR/../artifacts &&
            cd $MOZ_FETCHES_DIR &&
            python3.8 python/mozperftest/mozperftest/runner.py
            --flavor desktop-browser
            --verbose

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Information Disclosure [taskcluster/ci/perftest/linux.yml] [Lines 245-256]
[Old Code]
    run:
        command: >-
            mkdir -p $MOZ_FETCHES_DIR/../artifacts &&
            cd $MOZ_FETCHES_DIR &&
            python3.8 python/mozperftest/mozperftest/runner.py
            --flavor desktop-browser
[Fixed Code]
    run:
        command: >-
            mkdir -p $MOZ_FETCHES_DIR/../artifacts &&
            cd $MOZ_FETCHES_DIR &&
            python3.8 python/mozperftest/mozperftest/runner.py
            --flavor desktop-browser
            --verbose
            --browsertime-binary ${MOZ_FETCHES_DIR}/firefox/firefox-bin
            --browsertime-geckodriver ${MOZ_FETCHES_DIR}/geckodriver
            --proxy

Note: The first vulnerability is clear - the original code lacked necessary secret scopes for accessing sensitive data. The second potential issue is less certain - the added verbose flag and proxy/binary paths might expose more information than intended, but without knowing the full context of how this output is handled, I can't be certain if this constitutes a vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/proc-macro2/.cargo-checksum.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/proc-macro2/.cargo-checksum.json@@ -1 +1 @@-{"files":{"Cargo.toml":"1f6a5d25accb4449c7427a27678f58c49d0d00ed7c2f60da787dd4353abdb5ee","LICENSE-APACHE":"a60eea817514531668d7e00765731449fe14d059d3249e0bc93b36de45f759f2","LICENSE-MIT":"378f5840b258e2779c39418f3f2d7b2ba96f1c7917dd6be0713f88305dbda397","README.md":"fb633ca229c17dc9802db9b66c3b31792e9da8877856c52729e71f7412338387","build.rs":"4f6f7f8fc825a73330cb0a88faced3d435ece640ee1e6c308ab2f19fd19d2c35","src/detection.rs":"813dbaefe98a2b993ee40ec130d4f0ed58430c15aa4661a2c9d2f0d105669409","src/fallback.rs":"a34fb3f1c6f73de26af3cbd5ba446a8cf04076c8570137edc0fe216ec3e4d6ae","src/lib.rs":"452140fa8be772bde4aa89ceb8c47430ff904b864585a9d01c96a23b68b4b9af","src/marker.rs":"87fce2d0357f5b7998b6d9dfb064f4a0cbc9dabb19e33d4b514a446243ebe2e8","src/parse.rs":"a7068413b1b7873543c704b9c494f47f94a7046553a6765e99d4a1ac4ae6501f","src/wrapper.rs":"ef5648598c132e0ca6f8c0056d5b82e1b7f47ae29701860bf1fc52b89371d27b","tests/comments.rs":"065132797580744767b7a854d5467757bd3433a990957f8dbccdfa779bfb275f","tests/features.rs":"a86deb8644992a4eb64d9fd493eff16f9cf9c5cb6ade3a634ce0c990cf87d559","tests/marker.rs":"cb6d776eba6a238d726b0f531883adf41957e06f2717ee8a069821c81e7081d6","tests/test.rs":"5ca52a1eb73ebe51368c3be1ad6898aa48dc8cfb1e76d170950c475b75dac743","tests/test_fmt.rs":"9357769945784354909259084ec8b34d2aa52081dd3967cac6dae3a5e3df3bc0"},"package":"fb37d2df5df740e582f28f8560cf425f52bb267d872fe58358eadb554909f07a"}+{"files":{"Cargo.toml":"80feffc934f99fd0a988daeeed9f2920f734fbdd907e0d6d64ba043d8321a556","LICENSE-APACHE":"a60eea817514531668d7e00765731449fe14d059d3249e0bc93b36de45f759f2","LICENSE-MIT":"378f5840b258e2779c39418f3f2d7b2ba96f1c7917dd6be0713f88305dbda397","README.md":"fb633ca229c17dc9802db9b66c3b31792e9da8877856c52729e71f7412338387","build.rs":"7f6445215be24e04c91436aa57b3bbf77f3c6b28209ab1b1604dc6d8aab4bfd2","src/detection.rs":"12821bd715999c994fc1c8e1b68e52e1d64677290d803c53ad096ab17c9959fb","src/fallback.rs":"4298a271ba694c269009ef351f5a9139fd4d06ff2532be41cec35f3ac76709cf","src/lib.rs":"88ec84e0e63d5ce99e899d06da449196be2c88a8c2d3c6ce82327de146000720","src/marker.rs":"87fce2d0357f5b7998b6d9dfb064f4a0cbc9dabb19e33d4b514a446243ebe2e8","src/parse.rs":"44a6fdec0332de7b8c083530294d3dc0aadb626a0739fd07a16a1ec48473a99d","src/wrapper.rs":"0e6b3bb3204c4740cea3f83dc04c73388d8a5e1a4a644ceb28d748ec6fd6e08b","tests/comments.rs":"065132797580744767b7a854d5467757bd3433a990957f8dbccdfa779bfb275f","tests/features.rs":"a86deb8644992a4eb64d9fd493eff16f9cf9c5cb6ade3a634ce0c990cf87d559","tests/marker.rs":"cb6d776eba6a238d726b0f531883adf41957e06f2717ee8a069821c81e7081d6","tests/test.rs":"5ca52a1eb73ebe51368c3be1ad6898aa48dc8cfb1e76d170950c475b75dac743","tests/test_fmt.rs":"9357769945784354909259084ec8b34d2aa52081dd3967cac6dae3a5e3df3bc0"},"package":"c7342d5883fbccae1cc37a2353b09c87c9b0f3afd73f5fb9bba687a1f733b029"}=========testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.clip.source-atop.worker.js========--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.clip.source-atop.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.clip.source-atop.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';@@ -24,8 +24,8 @@ ctx.clip(); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 50, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

1. For the first file (third_party/rust/proc-macro2/.cargo-checksum.json):
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [No specific vulnerability identified] [third_party/rust/proc-macro2/.cargo-checksum.json] [All lines]
    [Old checksums and package hash]
    [New checksums and package hash]
    Additional Details: This appears to be a routine update of checksums for the proc-macro2 Rust crate. While checksum updates often include security fixes, we can't determine specific vulnerabilities from just the checksum changes. The package hash and all file checksums have changed, suggesting a significant update.

2. For the second file (testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.clip.source-atop.worker.js):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    [No vulnerability] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.clip.source-atop.worker.js] [Lines 13-14, 24-25]
    [Old Code using 'offscreenCanvas' variable]
    [Fixed Code using 'canvas' variable]
    Additional Details: This change appears to be a simple variable renaming from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas' for consistency or style reasons. There's no indication of a security vulnerability being fixed here. The functionality remains identical, just with a different variable name.

Note: The first case shows a significant update to a Rust dependency (proc-macro2) which often includes security fixes, but without access to the actual code changes or changelog, we can't be certain about specific vulnerabilities. The second case is clearly just a variable renaming with no security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/certverifier/NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/certverifier/NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #define NSSCertDBTrustDomain_h #include "CertVerifier.h"+#include "CRLiteTimestamp.h" #include "ScopedNSSTypes.h" #include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h" #include "mozilla/TimeStamp.h"@@ -143,7 +144,6 @@       unsigned int minRSABits, ValidityCheckingMode validityCheckingMode,       CertVerifier::SHA1Mode sha1Mode,       NetscapeStepUpPolicy netscapeStepUpPolicy, CRLiteMode crliteMode,-      uint64_t crliteCTMergeDelaySeconds,       const OriginAttributes& originAttributes,       const Vector<mozilla::pkix::Input>& thirdPartyRootInputs,       const Vector<mozilla::pkix::Input>& thirdPartyIntermediateInputs,@@ -237,11 +237,12 @@   Result CheckCRLiteStash(       const nsTArray<uint8_t>& issuerSubjectPublicKeyInfoBytes,       const nsTArray<uint8_t>& serialNumberBytes);-  Result CheckCRLite(const nsTArray<uint8_t>& issuerBytes,-                     const nsTArray<uint8_t>& issuerSubjectPublicKeyInfoBytes,-                     const nsTArray<uint8_t>& serialNumberBytes,-                     uint64_t earliestSCTTimestamp,-                     bool& filterCoversCertificate);+  Result CheckCRLite(+      const nsTArray<uint8_t>& issuerBytes,+      const nsTArray<uint8_t>& issuerSubjectPublicKeyInfoBytes,+      const nsTArray<uint8_t>& serialNumberBytes,+      const nsTArray<RefPtr<nsICRLiteTimestamp>>& crliteTimestamps,+      bool& filterCoversCertificate);   enum EncodedResponseSource {     ResponseIsFromNetwork = 1,@@ -274,7 +275,6 @@   CertVerifier::SHA1Mode mSHA1Mode;   NetscapeStepUpPolicy mNetscapeStepUpPolicy;   CRLiteMode mCRLiteMode;-  uint64_t mCRLiteCTMergeDelaySeconds;   bool mSawDistrustedCAByPolicyError;   const OriginAttributes& mOriginAttributes;   const Vector<mozilla::pkix::Input>& mThirdPartyRootInputs;  // non-owning

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Parameter Removal Vulnerability] [security/certverifier/NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h] [Lines 143-146]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```  
   unsigned int minRSABits, ValidityCheckingMode validityCheckingMode,  
   CertVerifier::SHA1Mode sha1Mode,  
   NetscapeStepUpPolicy netscapeStepUpPolicy, CRLiteMode crliteMode,  
   uint64_t crliteCTMergeDelaySeconds,  
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```  
   unsigned int minRSABits, ValidityCheckingMode validityCheckingMode,  
   CertVerifier::SHA1Mode sha1Mode,  
   NetscapeStepUpPolicy netscapeStepUpPolicy, CRLiteMode crliteMode,  
   ```  

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential CRLite Timestamp Handling Change] [security/certverifier/NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h] [Lines 237-242]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```  
   Result CheckCRLite(const nsTArray<uint8_t>& issuerBytes,  
                    const nsTArray<uint8_t>& issuerSubjectPublicKeyInfoBytes,  
                    const nsTArray<uint8_t>& serialNumberBytes,  
                    uint64_t earliestSCTTimestamp,  
                    bool& filterCoversCertificate);  
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```  
   Result CheckCRLite(  
       const nsTArray<uint8_t>& issuerBytes,  
       const nsTArray<uint8_t>& issuerSubjectPublicKeyInfoBytes,  
       const nsTArray<uint8_t>& serialNumberBytes,  
       const nsTArray<RefPtr<nsICRLiteTimestamp>>& crliteTimestamps,  
       bool& filterCoversCertificate);  
   ```  

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Member Variable Removal] [security/certverifier/NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h] [Lines 274-275]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```  
   CRLiteMode mCRLiteMode;  
   uint64_t mCRLiteCTMergeDelaySeconds;  
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```  
   CRLiteMode mCRLiteMode;  
   ```  

Additional Notes:
- The changes appear to be related to CRLite (Certificate Revocation List Lite) functionality
- The most significant change is the modification of CheckCRLite parameters, replacing a timestamp with a more complex timestamp object array
- The removal of crliteCTMergeDelaySeconds suggests a change in how certificate transparency merge delays are handled
- Without more context about the security implications of these changes, we can't definitively identify specific vulnerabilities
- The changes might be related to improving certificate revocation checking security

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-ui/text-overflow-004.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-ui/text-overflow-004.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Shiyou Tan" href="mailto:[email protected]"> <link rel="help" title="8.2. Overflow Ellipsis: the 'text-overflow' property" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-ui/#text-overflow"> <link rel="match" href="reference/text-overflow-002-ref.html">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="Test checks that text-overflow inherits the parent' ellipsis value when text-overflow set inherit"> <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/fonts/ahem.css" /> <style>

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The change appears to be a simple removal of an empty meta tag for flags, which doesn't have security implications.

Here's the analysis following your format:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-ui/text-overflow-004.html] [Lines 5]
    <meta name="flags" content="">
    [removed line]

The change is simply removing an empty meta tag that wasn't serving any purpose. This appears to be a cleanup change rather than a security fix. There are no known vulnerabilities associated with empty meta tags, and this particular change doesn't affect any security-related functionality.

If you'd like me to analyze a different diff that might contain security fixes, please provide that instead.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/config/gfxConfigManager.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/config/gfxConfigManager.cpp@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@       StaticPrefs::gfx_webrender_compositor_force_enabled_AtStartup();   mGPUProcessAllowSoftware =       StaticPrefs::layers_gpu_process_allow_software_AtStartup();+  mWrForcePartialPresent =+      StaticPrefs::gfx_webrender_force_partial_present_AtStartup();   mWrPartialPresent =       StaticPrefs::gfx_webrender_max_partial_present_rects_AtStartup() > 0;   EmplaceUserPref(StaticPrefs::GetPrefName_gfx_webrender_program_binary_disk(),@@ -330,23 +332,14 @@   // Initialize WebRender partial present config.   // Partial present is used only when WebRender compositor is not used.-  if (mWrPartialPresent) {-    if (mFeatureWr->IsEnabled() || mFeatureWrSoftware->IsEnabled()) {-      mFeatureWrPartial->EnableByDefault();--      nsString adapter;-      mGfxInfo->GetAdapterDeviceID(adapter);-      // Block partial present on some devices due to rendering issues.-      // On Mali-Txxx due to bug 1680087 and bug 1707815.-      // On Adreno 3xx GPUs due to bug 1695771.-      if (adapter.Find("Mali-T", /*ignoreCase*/ true) >= 0 ||-          adapter.Find("Adreno (TM) 3", /*ignoreCase*/ true) >= 0) {-        mFeatureWrPartial->Disable(-            FeatureStatus::Blocked, "Partial present blocked",-            "FEATURE_FAILURE_PARTIAL_PRESENT_BLOCKED"_ns);-      }-    }-  }+  mFeatureWrPartial->SetDefault(mWrPartialPresent, FeatureStatus::Disabled,+                                "User disabled via pref");+  if (mWrForcePartialPresent) {+    mFeatureWrPartial->UserForceEnable("Force enabled by pref");+  }++  ConfigureFromBlocklist(nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_WEBRENDER_PARTIAL_PRESENT,+                         mFeatureWrPartial);   mFeatureWrShaderCache->SetDefaultFromPref(       StaticPrefs::GetPrefName_gfx_webrender_program_binary_disk(), true,

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Blocklist Bypass] [gfx/config/gfxConfigManager.cpp] [Lines 330-346]
    [Old Code]
    if (mWrPartialPresent) {
      if (mFeatureWr->IsEnabled() || mFeatureWrSoftware->IsEnabled()) {
        mFeatureWrPartial->EnableByDefault();

        nsString adapter;
        mGfxInfo->GetAdapterDeviceID(adapter);
        // Block partial present on some devices due to rendering issues.
        // On Mali-Txxx due to bug 1680087 and bug 1707815.
        // On Adreno 3xx GPUs due to bug 1695771.
        if (adapter.Find("Mali-T", /*ignoreCase*/ true) >= 0 ||
            adapter.Find("Adreno (TM) 3", /*ignoreCase*/ true) >= 0) {
          mFeatureWrPartial->Disable(
              FeatureStatus::Blocked, "Partial present blocked",
              "FEATURE_FAILURE_PARTIAL_PRESENT_BLOCKED"_ns);
        }
      }
    }
    [Fixed Code]
    mFeatureWrPartial->SetDefault(mWrPartialPresent, FeatureStatus::Disabled,
                                "User disabled via pref");
    if (mWrForcePartialPresent) {
      mFeatureWrPartial->UserForceEnable("Force enabled by pref");
    }

    ConfigureFromBlocklist(nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_WEBRENDER_PARTIAL_PRESENT,
                         mFeatureWrPartial);

Additional Details:
- The change moves from a hardcoded device blocklist to using a more generic ConfigureFromBlocklist function
- The old code had specific checks for Mali-T and Adreno 3xx GPUs
- The new code introduces a mWrForcePartialPresent flag that can override settings
- It's unclear if this is a security fix or just a refactoring, but it could potentially affect security if the blocklist implementation changed
- The change might be related to better handling of GPU-specific vulnerabilities (referenced bugs 1680087, 1707815, 1695771)

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/xpcom/geckoprocesstypes_generator/geckoprocesstypes/__init__.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/xpcom/geckoprocesstypes_generator/geckoprocesstypes/__init__.py@@ -4,144 +4,10 @@ from collections import namedtuple-# Besides adding a new process type to this file, a bit of extra work is-# required for places where generated code has not yet been implemented.-# TODO: Bug 1740268: Move this piece into doc and link doc from here.-#-# Basic requirements:-#  dom/chrome-webidl/ChromeUtils.webidl-#   - Add a new entry to the enum WebIDLProcType-#-#  gfx/thebes/gfxPlatform.cpp-#   - (if you need GFX related stuff ?)-#   - Add a call to your process manager init in gfxPlatform::Init()-#   - Add a call to your process manager shutdown in gfxPlatform::Shutdown()-#-#  mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml-#   - Add a new <service> entry targetting-#     org.mozilla.gecko.process.GeckoChildProcessServices$XXX-#-#  mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/java/org/mozilla/gecko/process/GeckoChildProcessServices.jinja-#   - Add matching class inheritance from GeckoChildProcessServices-#-#  mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/java/org/mozilla/gecko/process/GeckoProcessType.java-#   - Add new entry in public enum GeckoProcessType-#-#  toolkit/crashreporter/CrashAnnotations.yaml-#   - Add new Xxx*Status entry for your new process type description-#-#  toolkit/locales/en-US/toolkit/global/processTypes.ftl-#   - Add a user-facing localizable name for your process, if needed-#-#  toolkit/modules/ProcessType.jsm-#   - Hashmap from process type to user-facing string above in const ProcessType-#-#  toolkit/xre/nsAppRunner.cpp-#   - Update the static_assert call checking for boundary against-#     GeckoProcessType_End-#-#  toolkit/xre/nsEmbedFunctions.cpp-#   - Add your process to the correct MessageLoop::TYPE_x in the first-#     switch(XRE_GetProcessType()) in XRE_InitChildProcess-#   - Instantiate your child within the second switch (XRE_GetProcessType())-#     in XRE_InitChildProcess-#-#  xpcom/system/nsIXULRuntime.idl-#   - Add a new entry PROCESS_TYPE_x in nsIXULRuntime interface-#-#-# For static components:-#  modules/libpref/components.conf-#  toolkit/components/telemetry/core/components.conf-#  widget/android/components.conf-#  widget/gtk/components.conf-#  widget/windows/components.conf-#  xpcom/base/components.conf-#  xpcom/build/components.conf-#  xpcom/components/components.conf-#  xpcom/ds/components.conf-#  xpcom/threads/components.conf-#  widget/cocoa/nsWidgetFactory.mm-#  xpcom/build/XPCOMInit.cpp-#   - Update allowance in those config file to match new process selector-#     including your new process-#-#  xpcom/components/gen_static_components.py-#   - Add new definition in ProcessSelector for your new process-#     ALLOW_IN_x_PROCESS = 0x..-#   - Add new process selector masks including your new process definition-#   - Also add those into the PROCESSES structure-#-#  xpcom/components/Module.h-#   - Add new definition in enum ProcessSelector-#   - Add new process selector mask including the new definition-#   - Update kMaxProcessSelector-#-#  xpcom/components/nsComponentManager.cpp-#   - Add new selector match in ProcessSelectorMatches for your new process-#     (needed?)-#   - Add new process selector for gProcessMatchTable-#     in nsComponentManagerImpl::Init()-#  xpcom/build/XPCOMInit.cpp-#-#-# For sandbox:-#  Sandbox Linux:-#   security/sandbox/linux/Sandbox.cpp-#    - Add new SetXXXSandbox() function-#   security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp-#    - Add new helper GetXXXSandboxPolicy() called by SetXXXSandbox()-#    - Derive new class inheriting SandboxPolicyCommon or SandboxPolicyBase and-#      defining the sandboxing policy-#   security/sandbox/linux/broker/SandboxBrokerPolicyFactory.cpp-#    - Add new SandboxBrokerPolicyFactory::GetXXXProcessPolicy()-#   security/sandbox/linux/launch/SandboxLaunch.cpp-#    - Add new case handling in GetEffectiveSandboxLevel()-#   security/sandbox/linux/reporter/SandboxReporter.cpp-#    - Add new case handling in SubmitToTelemetry()-#   security/sandbox/linux/reporter/SandboxReporterCommon.h-#    - Add new entry in enum class ProcType-#   security/sandbox/linux/reporter/SandboxReporterWrappers.cpp-#    - Add new case handling in SandboxReportWrapper::GetProcType()-#-#  Sandbox Mac:-#   ipc/glue/GeckoChildProcessHost.cpp-#    - Add new case handling in GeckoChildProcessHost::StartMacSandbox()-#   security/sandbox/mac/Sandbox.h-#    - Add new entry in enum MacSandboxType-#   security/sandbox/mac/Sandbox.mm-#    - Handle the new MacSandboxType in MacSandboxInfo::AppendAsParams()-#    - Handle the new MacSandboxType in StartMacSandbox()-#    - Handle the new MacSandboxType in StartMacSandboxIfEnabled()-#   security/sandbox/mac/SandboxPolicy<XXX>.h-#    - Create this new file for your new process <XXX>, it defines the new-#      sandbox-#   security/sandbox/mac/moz.build-#    - Add the previous new file-#-#  Sandbox Win:-#   ipc/glue/GeckoChildProcessHost.cpp-#    - Add new case handling in WindowsProcessLauncher::DoSetup() calling-#      SandboxBroker::SetSecurityLevelForXXXProcess()-#   security/sandbox/win/src/remotesandboxbroker/remoteSandboxBroker.cpp-#    - Introduce a new SandboxBroker::SetSecurityLevelForXXXProcess()-#   security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxbroker/sandboxBroker.cpp-#    - Introduce a new SandboxBroker::SetSecurityLevelForXXXProcess() that-#      defines the new sandbox-#-#  Sandbox tests:-#   - Your new process needs to implement PSandboxTesting.ipdl-#   security/sandbox/test/browser_sandbox_test.js-#    - Add your new process string_name in the processTypes list-#   security/sandbox/common/test/SandboxTest.cpp-#    - Add a new case in SandboxTest::StartTests() to handle your new process-#   security/sandbox/common/test/SandboxTestingChild.cpp-#    - Add a new if branch for your new process in SandboxTestingChild::Bind()-#   security/sandbox/common/test/SandboxTestingChildTests.h-#    - Add a new RunTestsXXX function for your new process (called by Bind() above)-#-# ~~~~~-#+# Please make sure you follow ipc/docs/processes.rst and keep updating all+# places that might depend on a new process type and that are not covered (yet)+# by that code.+ # The entries in this file define support functions for each of the process # types present in Gecko. #@@ -323,4 +189,15 @@         "FORKSERVER",         False,     ),+    GeckoProcessType(+        11,+        "Utility",+        "utility",+        "Utility",+        "Self",+        "Utility",+        "Utility",+        "UTILITY",+        True,+    ), ]

After analyzing the provided code diff, I can identify the following changes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
The diff shows a removal of extensive documentation comments and the addition of a new process type "Utility". This appears to be a code cleanup and feature addition rather than a security fix.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
The addition of a new process type "Utility" might have security implications if not properly implemented across all systems (sandboxing, permissions, etc.), but the diff itself doesn't show any security vulnerabilities.

The main changes are:
- Removal of detailed documentation about adding new process types (moved to ipc/docs/processes.rst)
- Addition of a new Utility process type with its configuration:
    GeckoProcessType(
        11,
        "Utility",
        "utility",
        "Self",
        "Utility",
        "Utility",
        "UTILITY",
        True,
    )

No specific vulnerabilities are shown in this diff, but proper implementation of the new Utility process type would need to follow all the security considerations mentioned in the removed documentation (sandboxing, permissions, etc.).

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/netwerk/base/nsInputStreamPump.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/netwerk/base/nsInputStreamPump.h@@ -12,6 +12,11 @@ #include "nsCOMPtr.h" #include "mozilla/Attributes.h" #include "mozilla/RecursiveMutex.h"++#ifdef DEBUG+#  include "MainThreadUtils.h"+#  include "nsIEventTarget.h"+#endif class nsIInputStream; class nsILoadGroup;@@ -53,7 +58,7 @@    * The callback will be called at most once.    *    * The data from the stream will not be consumed, i.e. the pump's listener-   * can still read all the data.+   * can still read all the data    *    * Do not call before asyncRead. Do not call after onStopRequest.    */@@ -74,6 +79,15 @@   uint32_t OnStateStop();   nsresult CreateBufferedStreamIfNeeded();+  // This should optimize away in non-DEBUG builds+  MOZ_ALWAYS_INLINE void AssertOnThread() const {+    if (mOffMainThread) {+      MOZ_ASSERT(mTargetThread->IsOnCurrentThread());+    } else {+      MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());+    }+  }+   uint32_t mState{STATE_IDLE};   nsCOMPtr<nsILoadGroup> mLoadGroup;   nsCOMPtr<nsIStreamListener> mListener;@@ -89,6 +103,11 @@   uint32_t mSuspendCount{0};   uint32_t mLoadFlags{LOAD_NORMAL};   bool mIsPending{false};+  // mListener is written on a single thread (either MainThread or an+  // off-MainThread thread), read from that thread and perhaps others (in+  // RetargetDeliveryTo)+  // mAsyncStream is written on a single thread (either MainThread or an+  // off-MainThread thread), and lives from AsyncRead() to OnStateStop().   // True while in OnInputStreamReady, calling OnStateStart, OnStateTransfer   // and OnStateStop. Used to prevent calls to AsyncWait during callbacks.   bool mProcessingCallbacks{false};@@ -98,8 +117,8 @@   bool mRetargeting{false};   bool mAsyncStreamIsBuffered{false};   // Indicate whether nsInputStreamPump is used completely off main thread.-  // If true, OnStateStop() is executed off main thread.   bool mOffMainThread;+  // If true, OnStateStop() is executed off main thread. Set at creation.   // Protects state/member var accesses across multiple threads.   mozilla::RecursiveMutex mMutex{"nsInputStreamPump"}; };

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   Thread Safety Issue [File] netwerk/base/nsInputStreamPump.h [Lines] 89-117  
   [Old Code]  
   No explicit thread safety assertions or documentation about thread usage for mListener and mAsyncStream  
   [Fixed Code]  
   Added comments clarifying thread usage for mListener and mAsyncStream, and added AssertOnThread() method for DEBUG builds  

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   Potential Race Condition [File] netwerk/base/nsInputStreamPump.h [Lines] 117-118  
   [Old Code]  
   mOffMainThread variable without clear documentation about when it's set  
   [Fixed Code]  
   Added comment clarifying that mOffMainThread is "Set at creation"  

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   Documentation Improvement [File] netwerk/base/nsInputStreamPump.h [Lines] 56-58  
   [Old Code]  
   "The data from the stream will not be consumed, i.e. the pump's listener can still read all the data."  
   [Fixed Code]  
   "The data from the stream will not be consumed, i.e. the pump's listener can still read all the data"  
   (Minor documentation change, no security impact identified)

Note: While no clear security vulnerabilities were fixed, the changes appear to improve thread safety documentation and add debugging assertions, which could help prevent future thread-related issues. The main changes involve:
1. Adding thread safety assertions in DEBUG builds
2. Clarifying thread usage through comments
3. Adding DEBUG-only includes for thread utilities
4. Minor documentation improvements

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/gl/SharedSurfaceEGL.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/gl/SharedSurfaceEGL.h@@ -107,6 +107,8 @@   virtual void WaitForBufferOwnership() override;   virtual bool IsBufferAvailable() const override;++  bool IsValid() const override; }; class SurfaceFactory_SurfaceTexture final : public SurfaceFactory {

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Missing Override Implementation] [gfx/gl/SharedSurfaceEGL.h] [Lines 107-110]
    [Old Code]
    virtual bool IsBufferAvailable() const override;
    
    [Fixed Code]
    virtual bool IsBufferAvailable() const override;
    
    bool IsValid() const override;

Additional Details:
- The diff shows the addition of a new pure virtual function `IsValid() const override`
- While this isn't a direct security vulnerability, missing override implementations could lead to undefined behavior
- The change appears to be adding proper interface implementation which could prevent potential bugs
- Without seeing the implementation details, we can't be certain if this fixes a specific vulnerability

Note: The diff doesn't show any obvious security vulnerabilities like buffer overflows, memory leaks, or injection issues. The change appears to be adding a new method to ensure proper interface implementation.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/debugger/package.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/debugger/package.json@@ -24,8 +24,6 @@   "dependencies": {     "codemirror": "^5.28.0",     "fuzzaldrin-plus": "^0.6.0",-    "lodash": "^4.17.4",-    "lodash-move": "^1.1.1",     "parse-script-tags": "github:loganfsmyth/parse-script-tags#d771732ca47e1b3554fe67d609fd18cc785c5f26",     "pretty-fast": "^0.2.7",     "react": "16.8.6",

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential outdated dependencies] [devtools/client/debugger/package.json] [Lines 24-26]  
   [Old Code]  
   "lodash": "^4.17.4",  
   "lodash-move": "^1.1.1",  
   [Fixed Code]  
   (removed)  

   Additional Details:  
   While the removal of lodash and lodash-move might indicate security concerns, we cannot confirm without more context. Older versions of lodash have had known vulnerabilities in the past (e.g., prototype pollution), but the specific version being removed (4.17.4) doesn't have any currently known critical vulnerabilities. The removal could be for security, performance, or other maintenance reasons.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Dependency cleanup] [devtools/client/debugger/package.json] [Lines 24-26]  
   [Old Code]  
   "lodash": "^4.17.4",  
   "lodash-move": "^1.1.1",  
   [Fixed Code]  
   (removed)  

   Additional Details:  
   The removal could simply be dependency cleanup if these packages were no longer needed, rather than a direct security fix. Without commit messages or additional context, we cannot be certain.

Note: The diff shows removal of two dependencies but doesn't provide enough context to definitively determine if this was a security fix or general maintenance. The removal could be motivated by various factors including security, performance, or code simplification.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.uncovered.nocontext.copy.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.uncovered.nocontext.copy.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 255, 0.5)';@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'copy'; var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); ctx.drawImage(offscreenCanvas2, 0, 0);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5); t.done(); });

Analysis of the code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18, 26]
   Old Code: 
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   
   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

   Additional Details:
   This appears to be a simple variable renaming from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas' for consistency or readability. No security implications are evident.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Line 26]
   Old Code:
   _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);
   
   Fixed Code:
   _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);

   Additional Details:
   This change simply updates the variable name in the assertion to match the renamed variable from the previous change. No security impact.

Summary:
The changes in this diff appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes involving variable renaming. No security vulnerabilities were identified or fixed in this particular diff. The modifications maintain the same functionality while improving code consistency.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/docshell/shistory/SessionHistoryEntry.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/docshell/shistory/SessionHistoryEntry.h@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #ifndef mozilla_dom_SessionHistoryEntry_h #define mozilla_dom_SessionHistoryEntry_h+#include "mozilla/dom/DocumentBinding.h" #include "mozilla/Maybe.h" #include "mozilla/UniquePtr.h" #include "nsILayoutHistoryState.h"@@ -390,6 +391,8 @@   void SetIsDynamicallyAdded(bool aDynamic);+  void SetWireframe(const Maybe<Wireframe>& aWireframe);+   // Get an entry based on LoadingSessionHistoryInfo's mLoadId. Parent process   // only.   static SessionHistoryEntry* GetByLoadId(uint64_t aLoadId);@@ -406,6 +409,7 @@   nsISHEntry* mParent = nullptr;   uint32_t mID;   nsTArray<RefPtr<SessionHistoryEntry>> mChildren;+  Maybe<Wireframe> mWireframe;   bool mForInitialLoad = false;@@ -449,6 +453,15 @@                    IProtocol* aActor, RefPtr<nsILayoutHistoryState>* aResult); };+// Allow sending dom::Wireframe objects over IPC.+template <>+struct IPDLParamTraits<mozilla::dom::Wireframe> {+  static void Write(IPC::Message* aMsg, IProtocol* aActor,+                    const mozilla::dom::Wireframe& aParam);+  static bool Read(const IPC::Message* aMsg, PickleIterator* aIter,+                   IProtocol* aActor, mozilla::dom::Wireframe* aResult);+};+ }  // namespace ipc }  // namespace mozilla

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Missing Serialization/Deserialization Security Checks] [docshell/shistory/SessionHistoryEntry.h] [Lines 453-460]
   [Old Code] (Not present in old version)
   [Fixed Code] 
   template <>
   struct IPDLParamTraits<mozilla::dom::Wireframe> {
     static void Write(IPC::Message* aMsg, IProtocol* aActor,
                     const mozilla::dom::Wireframe& aParam);
     static bool Read(const IPC::Message* aMsg, PickleIterator* aIter,
                    IProtocol* aActor, mozilla::dom::Wireframe* aResult);
   };

   Additional Details: The diff adds IPC serialization for Wireframe objects. While not necessarily a vulnerability, IPC serialization/deserialization can be security-sensitive if not properly implemented (e.g., missing validation checks). Without seeing the implementation details, I can't be certain if proper security measures are in place.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   [New Feature Addition] [docshell/shistory/SessionHistoryEntry.h] [Lines 391, 409]
   [Old Code] (Not present in old version)
   [Fixed Code]
   void SetWireframe(const Maybe<Wireframe>& aWireframe);
   Maybe<Wireframe> mWireframe;

   Additional Details: This appears to be a new feature addition (wireframe support) rather than a security fix. The changes include adding a new member variable and setter method, but don't show any security-related modifications.

The diff primarily shows the addition of wireframe-related functionality and IPC serialization support. While the IPC changes could potentially have security implications, there's no clear evidence of a security vulnerability being fixed in this particular diff. The changes appear to be feature additions rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/async-task/tests/waker_pending.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/async-task/tests/waker_pending.rs@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@             let guard = Guard(Box::new(0));             let sched = move |runnable: Runnable| {-                &guard;+                let _ = &guard;                 $sched.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);                 s.send(runnable).unwrap();             };

Let me analyze the code diff for security vulnerabilities.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Resource Leak] [third_party/rust/async-task/tests/waker_pending.rs] [Lines 77-80]
[Old Code]
            let guard = Guard(Box::new(0));
            let sched = move |runnable: Runnable| {
                &guard;
                $sched.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
                s.send(runnable).unwrap();
            };
[Fixed Code]
            let guard = Guard(Box::new(0));
            let sched = move |runnable: Runnable| {
                let _ = &guard;
                $sched.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
                s.send(runnable).unwrap();
            };

Additional Details:
The change involves how a guard reference is handled in a closure. The old code had a bare reference `&guard` which might be optimized away by the compiler, potentially causing the guard to be dropped earlier than intended. The new code explicitly binds the reference to `_` to ensure it's kept alive. While this doesn't appear to be a direct security vulnerability, it could potentially lead to resource management issues if the guard's lifetime was critical for safety. However, without more context about what `Guard` does, I can't be certain if this was actually a security issue.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/first-letter-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/first-letter-001.html@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Florian Rivoal" href="mailto:[email protected]">   <link rel="match" href="first-letter-001-ref.html">   <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-pseudo-4/#first-letter-styling">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Test checks that a floated ::first-letter follows the usual formating rules for floats.">   <style>   div {

Analysis of the code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/first-letter-001.html [Lines] 6  
[Old Code] `<meta name="flags" content="">`  
[Fixed Code] (line removed)  

Additional Details:  
The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which appears to be test-related metadata. There's no indication this was related to a security vulnerability, but rather a cleanup of unnecessary markup in a test file. The empty meta tag served no purpose and its removal doesn't indicate any security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-layout-baseline-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-layout-baseline-001.html@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@   <meta name=assert content="With contain:layout, for the purpose of the vertical-align property, the containing element is treated as having no baseline.">   <link rel="match" href="../reference/ref-filled-green-100px-square.xht">   <link rel=help href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-contain-1/#containment-layout">-  <meta name="flags" content=""> <style> #red {

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related changes. The modification appears to be a simple removal of an empty meta tag for flags, which doesn't have any security implications.

Answer Format for Each Vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found in the diff. This appears to be a minor cleanup change removing an unused meta tag.

Additional Details:
    The change removes:
    - <meta name="flags" content="">
    This was likely removed because it served no purpose with an empty content value. There are no security implications to this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.clearRect.shadow.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.clearRect.shadow.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ ctx.shadowOffsetX = 0; ctx.shadowOffsetY = 50; ctx.clearRect(0, -50, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

I'll analyze the provided code diff according to the specified format. In this case, the changes appear to be primarily variable renaming rather than security fixes, but I'll examine them carefully.

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Variable Renaming Consistency [File] [Lines 13-14, 23]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

Additional Details:
- The changes involve renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency
- No actual security vulnerabilities were fixed in this diff
- The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name was changed
- This appears to be a code style/consistency improvement rather than a security fix

No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The changes are purely cosmetic, improving variable naming consistency without affecting the security or functionality of the code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/inset/shape-outside-inset-017.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/inset/shape-outside-inset-017.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/">   <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#supported-basic-shapes">   <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-inset-017-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Test the boxes are wrapping around the right float shape defined by the inset(20px) border-box value.">   <style>   .container {

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 9]
   [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="">
   [Fixed Code] (line removed)

Additional Notes:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta "flags" tag, which doesn't appear to have any security implications
- This appears to be a minor cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with this change
- The file is a test file for CSS shape-outside functionality, which typically doesn't involve security-sensitive operations

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/generic/nsImageMap.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/generic/nsImageMap.h@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include "nsTArray.h" #include "nsStubMutationObserver.h" #include "nsIDOMEventListener.h"+#include "Units.h" class Area; class nsImageFrame;@@ -40,10 +41,10 @@   void Init(nsImageFrame* aImageFrame, nsIContent* aMap);   /**-   * Return the first area element (in content order) for the given aX,aY pixel-   * coordinate or nullptr if the coordinate is outside all areas.+   * Return the first area element (in content order) for the given point in+   * CSS pixel coordinate or nullptr if the coordinate is outside all areas.    */-  mozilla::dom::HTMLAreaElement* GetArea(nscoord aX, nscoord aY) const;+  mozilla::dom::HTMLAreaElement* GetArea(const mozilla::CSSIntPoint& aPt) const;   /**    * Return area elements count associated with the image map.

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Coordinate Handling Vulnerability [File] nsImageMap.h [Lines 40-43]
[Old Code]
  mozilla::dom::HTMLAreaElement* GetArea(nscoord aX, nscoord aY) const;
[Fixed Code]
  mozilla::dom::HTMLAreaElement* GetArea(const mozilla::CSSIntPoint& aPt) const;

Additional Details:
- The change involves modifying how coordinates are handled in the GetArea function
- The old version took raw coordinates (aX, aY) while the new version uses CSSIntPoint
- This could potentially be related to security if the old coordinate handling was vulnerable to integer overflows or other numerical issues
- However, without more context about how these coordinates are used, we can't be certain if this was actually fixing a security vulnerability or just improving code quality
- The comment change suggests this might be related to better handling of CSS pixel coordinates versus raw coordinates

No other obvious security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The other changes appear to be header additions and comment updates that don't have clear security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/extensions/parent/ext-scripting.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/extensions/parent/ext-scripting.js@@ -8,66 +8,117 @@ var { ExtensionError } = ExtensionUtils;+/**+ * Inserts a script or style in the given tab, and returns a promise which+ * resolves when the operation has completed.+ *+ * @param {BaseContext} context+ *        The extension context for which to perform the injection.+ * @param {Object} details+ *        The details object, specifying what to inject, where, and when.+ *        Derived from the ScriptInjection or CSSInjection types.+ * @param {string} kind+ *        The kind of data being injected. Possible choices: "js" or "css".+ * @param {string} method+ *        The name of the method which was called to trigger the injection.+ *        Used to generate appropriate error messages on failure.+ *+ * @returns {Promise}+ *        Resolves to the result of the execution, once it has completed.+ */+const execute = (context, details, kind, method) => {+  const { tabManager } = context.extension;++  let options = {+    jsPaths: [],+    cssPaths: [],+    removeCSS: method == "removeCSS",+    extensionId: context.extension.id,+  };++  const { tabId, frameIds, allFrames } = details.target;+  const tab = tabManager.get(tabId);++  // TODO: Bug 1750765 - Add test coverage for this option.+  options.hasActiveTabPermission = tab.hasActiveTabPermission;+  options.matches = tab.extension.allowedOrigins.patterns.map(+    host => host.pattern+  );++  const codeKey = kind === "js" ? "func" : "css";+  if ((details.files === null) == (details[codeKey] === null)) {+    throw new ExtensionError(+      `Exactly one of files and ${codeKey} must be specified.`+    );+  }++  if (details[codeKey]) {+    options[`${kind}Code`] = details[codeKey];+  }++  if (details.files) {+    for (const file of details.files) {+      let url = context.uri.resolve(file);+      if (!tab.extension.isExtensionURL(url)) {+        throw new ExtensionError(+          "Files to be injected must be within the extension"+        );+      }+      options[`${kind}Paths`].push(url);+    }+  }++  if (allFrames && frameIds) {+    throw new ExtensionError("Cannot specify both 'allFrames' and 'frameIds'.");+  }++  if (allFrames) {+    options.allFrames = allFrames;+  } else if (frameIds) {+    options.frameIds = frameIds;+  } else {+    options.frameIds = [0];+  }++  options.runAt = "document_idle";+  options.matchAboutBlank = true;+  options.wantReturnValue = true;+  // With this option set to `true`, we'll receive executeScript() results with+  // `frameId/result` properties and an `error` property will also be returned+  // in case of an error.+  options.returnResultsWithFrameIds = kind === "js";++  if (details.origin) {+    options.cssOrigin = details.origin.toLowerCase();+  } else {+    options.cssOrigin = "author";+  }++  // There is no need to execute anything when we have an empty list of frame+  // IDs because (1) it isn't invalid and (2) nothing will get executed.+  if (options.frameIds && options.frameIds.length === 0) {+    return [];+  }++  // This function is derived from `_execute()` in `parent/ext-tabs-base.js`,+  // make sure to keep both in sync when relevant.+  return tab.queryContent("Execute", options);+};+ this.scripting = class extends ExtensionAPI {   getAPI(context) {-    const { extension } = context;-    const { tabManager } = extension;-     return {       scripting: {         executeScriptInternal: async details => {-          let { tabId, frameIds } = details.target;+          return execute(context, details, "js", "executeScript");+        },-          let tab = tabManager.get(tabId);+        insertCSS: async details => {+          return execute(context, details, "css", "insertCSS").then(() => {});+        },-          let executeScriptDetails = {-            code: null,-            file: null,-            runAt: "document_idle",-          };--          if (details.files) {-            // TODO bug 1736576: Support more than one file.-            executeScriptDetails.file = details.files[0];-          } else {-            // Defined in `child/ext-scripting.js`.-            executeScriptDetails.code = details.codeToExecute;-          }--          const promises = [];--          if (!frameIds) {-            // We use the top-level frame by default.-            frameIds = [0];-          }--          for (const frameId of frameIds) {-            promises.push(-              tab-                .executeScript(context, { ...executeScriptDetails, frameId })-                // We return `null` when the result value is falsey.-                .then(results => ({ frameId, result: results[0] || null }))-                .catch(error => ({ frameId, result: null, error }))-            );-          }--          const results = await Promise.all(promises);--          return results.map(({ frameId, result, error }) => {-            if (error) {-              // TODO Bug 1740608: we re-throw extension errors coming from-              // `tab.executeScript()` and only log runtime errors, but this-              // might change because error handling needs to be more-              // well-defined.-              if (error instanceof ExtensionError) {-                throw error;-              }--              Cu.reportError(error.message || error);-            }--            return { frameId, result };-          });+        removeCSS: async details => {+          return execute(context, details, "css", "removeCSS").then(() => {});         },       },     };

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
   Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Script Injection [File] toolkit/components/extensions/parent/ext-scripting.js [Lines] Entire diff  
   [Old Code]  
   The old code had minimal validation for script injection, allowing potentially unsafe execution without proper origin checks or file validation.  
   [Fixed Code]  
   The new code implements several security improvements:  
   - Validates that injected files must be within the extension (isExtensionURL check)  
   - Implements proper origin checks (allowedOrigins.patterns)  
   - Adds input validation for conflicting parameters (allFrames vs frameIds)  
   - Implements proper error handling for invalid inputs  

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
   Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) [File] toolkit/components/extensions/parent/ext-scripting.js [Lines] Entire diff  
   [Old Code]  
   The old code didn't properly verify frame/tab permissions before execution  
   [Fixed Code]  
   The new code adds:  
   - Explicit permission checking (hasActiveTabPermission)  
   - Proper frame/tab validation before execution  
   - Empty frame ID handling to prevent invalid executions  

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   Potential Information Disclosure [File] toolkit/components/extensions/parent/ext-scripting.js [Lines] Options handling  
   [Old Code]  
   No clear handling of sensitive information in execution options  
   [Fixed Code]  
   New code shows more structured option handling but it's unclear if this addresses any specific information disclosure issues  

The main security improvements in this diff are:
1. Proper validation of script/CSS sources (must be extension-local)
2. Better permission checking
3. More robust input validation
4. Clearer error handling
5. Structured execution options with security considerations

The changes appear to address several potential security issues that could arise from uncontrolled script/CSS injection in extension contexts.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.interpolate.zerosize.fill.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.interpolate.zerosize.fill.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ ctx.fillStyle = g; ctx.rect(0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 40,20, 0,255,0,255, "40,20", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 40,20, 0,255,0,255, "40,20", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 17-18, 28]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 40,20, 0,255,0,255, "40,20", "0,255,0,255");
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixel(canvas, 40,20, 0,255,0,255, "40,20", "0,255,0,255");

Additional Details:
- This appears to be a simple variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability
- No security implications are evident in this change
- The functionality remains identical, only the variable name was modified
- The change affects both the canvas creation and the assertion call, but doesn't impact security

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.