--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/libc/src/unix/bsd/freebsdlike/freebsd/mod.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/libc/src/unix/bsd/freebsdlike/freebsd/mod.rs@@ -459,33 +459,37 @@         pub kve_path: [[::c_char; 32]; 32],     }+    pub struct __c_anonymous_filestat {+        pub stqe_next: *mut filestat,+    }+     pub struct filestat {-        fs_type: ::c_int,-        fs_flags: ::c_int,-        fs_fflags: ::c_int,-        fs_uflags: ::c_int,-        fs_fd: ::c_int,-        fs_ref_count: ::c_int,-        fs_offset: ::off_t,-        fs_typedep: *mut ::c_void,-        fs_path: *mut ::c_char,-        next: *mut filestat,-        fs_cap_rights: cap_rights_t,+        pub fs_type: ::c_int,+        pub fs_flags: ::c_int,+        pub fs_fflags: ::c_int,+        pub fs_uflags: ::c_int,+        pub fs_fd: ::c_int,+        pub fs_ref_count: ::c_int,+        pub fs_offset: ::off_t,+        pub fs_typedep: *mut ::c_void,+        pub fs_path: *mut ::c_char,+        pub next: __c_anonymous_filestat,+        pub fs_cap_rights: cap_rights_t,     }     pub struct filestat_list {-        stqh_first: *mut filestat,-        stqh_last: *mut *mut filestat,+        pub stqh_first: *mut filestat,+        pub stqh_last: *mut *mut filestat,     }     pub struct procstat {-        tpe: ::c_int,-        kd: ::uintptr_t,-        vmentries: *mut ::c_void,-        files: *mut ::c_void,-        argv: *mut ::c_void,-        envv: *mut ::c_void,-        core: ::uintptr_t,+        pub tpe: ::c_int,+        pub kd: ::uintptr_t,+        pub vmentries: *mut ::c_void,+        pub files: *mut ::c_void,+        pub argv: *mut ::c_void,+        pub envv: *mut ::c_void,+        pub core: ::uintptr_t,     }     pub struct itimerspec {@@ -944,6 +948,17 @@         pub mem_ptr: *mut u8,         pub generation: ::c_long,         pub numdevs: ::c_int,+    }++    pub struct sockcred2 {+        pub sc_version: ::c_int,+        pub sc_pid: ::pid_t,+        pub sc_uid: ::uid_t,+        pub sc_euid: ::uid_t,+        pub sc_gid: ::gid_t,+        pub sc_egid: ::gid_t,+        pub sc_ngroups: ::c_int,+        pub sc_groups: [::gid_t; 1],     } }@@ -3701,6 +3716,15 @@         let (idx, offset) = (cpu / bitset_bits, cpu % bitset_bits);         0 != cpuset.__bits[idx] & (1 << offset)     }++    pub fn SOCKCRED2SIZE(ngrps: usize) -> usize {+        let ngrps = if ngrps > 0 {+            ngrps - 1+        } else {+            0+        };+        ::mem::size_of::<sockcred2>() + ::mem::size_of::<::gid_t>() * ngrps+    } } safe_f! {@@ -3840,8 +3864,6 @@         sevp: *mut sigevent,     ) -> ::c_int;-    pub fn posix_fallocate(fd: ::c_int, offset: ::off_t, len: ::off_t) -> ::c_int;-    pub fn posix_fadvise(fd: ::c_int, offset: ::off_t, len: ::off_t, advise: ::c_int) -> ::c_int;     pub fn mkostemp(template: *mut ::c_char, flags: ::c_int) -> ::c_int;     pub fn mkostemps(template: *mut ::c_char, suffixlen: ::c_int, flags: ::c_int) -> ::c_int;@@ -3975,6 +3997,16 @@         cpusetsize: ::size_t,         cpusetp: *const cpuset_t,     ) -> ::c_int;++    // sched.h linux compatibility api+    pub fn sched_getaffinity(pid: ::pid_t, cpusetsz: ::size_t, cpuset: *mut ::cpuset_t) -> ::c_int;+    // FIXME: the first argument's type might not be correct, fix later if that changes.+    pub fn sched_setaffinity(+        pid: ::c_int,+        cpusetsz: ::size_t,+        cpuset: *const ::cpuset_t,+    ) -> ::c_int;+    pub fn sched_getcpu() -> ::c_int;     pub fn pthread_mutex_consistent(mutex: *mut ::pthread_mutex_t) -> ::c_int;@@ -4027,6 +4059,10 @@     pub fn getfh(path: *const ::c_char, fhp: *mut fhandle_t) -> ::c_int;     pub fn lgetfh(path: *const ::c_char, fhp: *mut fhandle_t) -> ::c_int;     pub fn getfsstat(buf: *mut ::statfs, bufsize: ::c_long, mode: ::c_int) -> ::c_int;+    #[cfg_attr(+        all(target_os = "freebsd", freebsd11),+        link_name = "getmntinfo@FBSD_1.0"+    )]     pub fn getmntinfo(mntbufp: *mut *mut ::statfs, mode: ::c_int) -> ::c_int;     pub fn mount(         type_: *const ::c_char,@@ -4392,6 +4428,9 @@     } else if #[cfg(target_arch = "powerpc")] {         mod powerpc;         pub use self::powerpc::*;+    } else if #[cfg(target_arch = "riscv64")] {+        mod riscv64;+        pub use self::riscv64::*;     } else {         // Unknown target_arch     }

I'll analyze the code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Exposure] [third_party/rust/libc/src/unix/bsd/freebsdlike/freebsd/mod.rs] [Lines 459-494]
[Old Code]
Several struct fields were private (no 'pub' keyword)
[Fixed Code]
Fields made public by adding 'pub' keyword

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Memory Safety Issue] [third_party/rust/libc/src/unix/bsd/freebsdlike/freebsd/mod.rs] [Lines 459-494]
[Old Code]
`next: *mut filestat` in filestat struct
[Fixed Code]
`next: __c_anonymous_filestat` with proper struct definition

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Buffer Overflow] [third_party/rust/libc/src/unix/bsd/freebsdlike/freebsd/mod.rs] [Lines 944-957]
[Old Code]
No sockcred2 struct defined
[Fixed Code]
Added sockcred2 struct with proper group handling and SOCKCRED2SIZE function

4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential API Compatibility Issue] [third_party/rust/libc/src/unix/bsd/freebsdlike/freebsd/mod.rs] [Lines 3840-3845]
[Old Code]
posix_fallocate and posix_fadvise functions present
[Fixed Code]
posix_fallocate and posix_fadvise functions removed

Note: While the changes appear to improve safety and correctness by making fields public, adding proper type definitions, and removing potentially problematic functions, I cannot definitively identify specific vulnerabilities that were fixed without more context about the original issues. The changes suggest potential security improvements in memory safety and API usage.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.bezierCurveTo.shape.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.bezierCurveTo.shape.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -24,11 +24,11 @@ ctx.moveTo(-2000, 3100); ctx.bezierCurveTo(-2000, -1000, 2100, -1000, 2100, 3100); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and updating the corresponding assertions to use the new variable name. There are no security-related changes in the actual functionality or handling of sensitive data.

Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found in the diff. The changes are purely variable renaming and don't affect security.
File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.bezierCurveTo.shape.worker.js
Lines: 13-14, 24-28
Old Code: 
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
...
Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
...

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/reducers/event-listeners.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/reducers/event-listeners.js@@ -35,20 +35,4 @@   } }-export function getActiveEventListeners(state) {-  return state.eventListenerBreakpoints.active;-}--export function getEventListenerBreakpointTypes(state) {-  return state.eventListenerBreakpoints.categories;-}--export function getEventListenerExpanded(state) {-  return state.eventListenerBreakpoints.expanded;-}--export function shouldLogEventBreakpoints(state) {-  return state.eventListenerBreakpoints.logEventBreakpoints;-}- export default update;

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Exposure] [devtools/client/debugger/src/reducers/event-listeners.js] [Lines 35-48]
[Old Code]
export function getActiveEventListeners(state) {
  return state.eventListenerBreakpoints.active;
}

export function getEventListenerBreakpointTypes(state) {
  return state.eventListenerBreakpoints.categories;
}

export function getEventListenerExpanded(state) {
  return state.eventListenerBreakpoints.expanded;
}

export function shouldLogEventBreakpoints(state) {
  return state.eventListenerBreakpoints.logEventBreakpoints;
}
[Fixed Code]
[All functions removed]

Additional Details:
The diff shows removal of several getter functions that exposed internal state properties. While not clearly a security vulnerability, exposing internal state through getters could potentially lead to information disclosure if the state contains sensitive data. The removal of these functions suggests a security-conscious design change to limit state exposure, though without more context about the state contents, we can't be certain if this was an actual vulnerability.

Note: No specific vulnerability name clearly applies here, but the change aligns with the principle of least privilege by reducing unnecessary state exposure.

Failed to fetch CVE description: 503 Server Error: Service Unavailable for url: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-26384

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/app/winlauncher/LauncherProcessWin.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/app/winlauncher/LauncherProcessWin.cpp@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ Maybe<int> LauncherMain(int& argc, wchar_t* argv[],                         const StaticXREAppData& aAppData) {   // Note: keep in sync with nsBrowserApp.-  const wchar_t* acceptableParams[] = {L"url", nullptr};+  const wchar_t* acceptableParams[] = {L"url", L"private-window", nullptr};   EnsureCommandlineSafe(argc, argv, acceptableParams);   SetLauncherErrorAppData(aAppData);

Let me analyze this code diff for potential security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: yes
Command Injection Vulnerability [browser/app/winlauncher/LauncherProcessWin.cpp] [Lines 242-244]
[Old Code]
  const wchar_t* acceptableParams[] = {L"url", nullptr};
[Fixed Code]
  const wchar_t* acceptableParams[] = {L"url", L"private-window", nullptr};

Additional Details:
- The vulnerability appears to be related to command line parameter validation
- The fix adds "private-window" to the list of acceptable parameters
- Without this addition, the system might have rejected legitimate private window launch requests or potentially allowed unsafe parameters
- This appears to be a hardening change rather than fixing an actively exploited vulnerability

Note: While this isn't fixing an actively exploited security hole, it's improving the security by properly validating an additional legitimate parameter that could be used in command line operations. The vulnerability type could also be considered a form of "Parameter Validation Vulnerability" if the missing parameter caused security issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-cascade/all-prop-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-cascade/all-prop-001.html@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@   <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css-cascade-3/#all-shorthand">   <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css-cascade-4/#all-shorthand">   <link rel="match" href="all-prop-001-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Test passes if 'all' resets properties other than 'direction' and 'unicode-bidi'.">   <style> .test {

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The change appears to be a simple removal of an empty meta tag related to test flags, which doesn't have security implications.

Answer:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found in this diff. The change is a test file cleanup removing an empty meta tag.

Additional Notes:
- The diff shows removal of `<meta name="flags" content="">` which was likely just test configuration
- No actual code changes or security fixes are present
- The file is a test case for CSS cascade functionality
- No security-related patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are modified in this change

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/dav1d/src/obu.c+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/dav1d/src/obu.c@@ -263,6 +263,11 @@         hdr->chr = hdr->ss_hor == 1 && hdr->ss_ver == 1 ?                    dav1d_get_bits(gb, 2) : DAV1D_CHR_UNKNOWN;     }+    if (c->strict_std_compliance &&+        hdr->mtrx == DAV1D_MC_IDENTITY && hdr->layout != DAV1D_PIXEL_LAYOUT_I444)+    {+        goto error;+    }     hdr->separate_uv_delta_q = !hdr->monochrome && dav1d_get_bits(gb, 1); #if DEBUG_SEQ_HDR     printf("SEQHDR: post-colorinfo: off=%u\n",@@ -1570,7 +1575,9 @@                 if (out_delayed->p.data[0]) {                     const unsigned progress = atomic_load_explicit(&out_delayed->progress[1],                                                                    memory_order_relaxed);-                    if (out_delayed->visible && progress != FRAME_ERROR) {+                    if ((out_delayed->visible || c->output_invisible_frames) &&+                        progress != FRAME_ERROR)+                    {                         dav1d_picture_ref(&c->out, &out_delayed->p);                         c->event_flags |= dav1d_picture_get_event_flags(out_delayed);                     }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Invalid Matrix/Layout Combination] [third_party/dav1d/src/obu.c] [Lines 263-267]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```c
   hdr->chr = hdr->ss_hor == 1 && hdr->ss_ver == 1 ?
              dav1d_get_bits(gb, 2) : DAV1D_CHR_UNKNOWN;
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```c
   if (c->strict_std_compliance &&
       hdr->mtrx == DAV1D_MC_IDENTITY && hdr->layout != DAV1D_PIXEL_LAYOUT_I444)
   {
       goto error;
   }
   hdr->chr = hdr->ss_hor == 1 && hdr->ss_ver == 1 ?
              dav1d_get_bits(gb, 2) : DAV1D_CHR_UNKNOWN;
   ```  
   Additional Details: This appears to add validation for matrix coefficient and pixel layout combinations when in strict compliance mode. While not clearly a security fix, it could prevent invalid combinations that might lead to undefined behavior.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Frame Visibility Check Bypass] [third_party/dav1d/src/obu.c] [Lines 1570-1575]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```c
   if (out_delayed->visible && progress != FRAME_ERROR) {
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```c
   if ((out_delayed->visible || c->output_invisible_frames) &&
       progress != FRAME_ERROR)
   ```  
   Additional Details: This change modifies the frame output logic to consider a new flag `output_invisible_frames`. While not clearly a security fix, it could relate to preventing unintended information disclosure if invisible frames contain sensitive data.

Neither change clearly fixes a known vulnerability, but both appear to be hardening changes that could prevent potential issues. The first change enforces stricter standard compliance, while the second provides more control over frame visibility handling.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsla-7.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsla-7.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(133.33333333grad, 100.0%, 50.0%)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsla-7.worker.js [Lines] 13-21
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
   ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(133.33333333grad, 100.0%, 50.0%)';
   ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
   ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(133.33333333grad, 100.0%, 50.0%)';
   ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability. There are no security-related changes in this diff. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name. No security vulnerability was fixed or introduced by this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/webrtc/third_party_build/gn-configs/x64_True_arm64_linux.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/webrtc/third_party_build/gn-configs/x64_True_arm64_linux.json@@ -27922,7 +27922,6 @@                 "-Wno-shorten-64-to-32"             ],             "defines": [-                "MULTI_MONITOR_SCREENSHARE",                 "WEBRTC_USE_PIPEWIRE",                 "USE_UDEV",                 "USE_AURA=1",

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Removed Build Flag] [dom/media/webrtc/third_party_build/gn-configs/x64_True_arm64_linux.json] [Lines 27922-27926]
   [Old Code]
   "defines": [
       "MULTI_MONITOR_SCREENSHARE",
       "WEBRTC_USE_PIPEWIRE",
       "USE_UDEV",
       "USE_AURA=1",
   [Fixed Code]
   "defines": [
       "WEBRTC_USE_PIPEWIRE",
       "USE_UDEV",
       "USE_AURA=1",

Additional Notes:
- The diff shows removal of the "MULTI_MONITOR_SCREENSHARE" define flag
- Without more context about what this flag controlled, it's unclear if this was a security fix
- The removal could be related to security (if the feature had vulnerabilities), performance, or simply feature deprecation
- No specific vulnerability name can be determined from this change alone

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/java/org/mozilla/geckoview/ContentBlocking.java+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/java/org/mozilla/geckoview/ContentBlocking.java@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ package org.mozilla.geckoview;+import android.annotation.SuppressLint; import android.os.Parcel; import android.os.Parcelable; import android.text.TextUtils;@@ -518,7 +519,7 @@      *      * @return The categories of resources to be blocked.      */-    public @CBAntiTracking int getSafeBrowsingCategories() {+    public @CBSafeBrowsing int getSafeBrowsingCategories() {       return ContentBlocking.sbMalwareToSbCat(mSbMalware.get())           | ContentBlocking.sbPhishingToSbCat(mSbPhishing.get());     }@@ -528,6 +529,7 @@      *      * @return The assigned behavior, as one of {@link CookieBehavior} flags.      */+    @SuppressLint("WrongConstant")     public @CBCookieBehavior int getCookieBehavior() {       return mCookieBehavior.get();     }@@ -549,6 +551,7 @@      *      * @return The assigned behavior, as one of {@link CookieBehavior} flags.      */+    @SuppressLint("WrongConstant")     public @CBCookieBehavior int getCookieBehaviorPrivateMode() {       return mCookieBehaviorPrivateMode.get();     }@@ -570,6 +573,7 @@      *      * @return The assigned lifetime, as one of {@link CookieLifetime} flags.      */+    @SuppressLint("WrongConstant")     public @CBCookieLifetime int getCookieLifetime() {       return mCookieLifetime.get();     }@@ -1164,7 +1168,7 @@         AntiTracking.STP,         AntiTracking.NONE       })-  /* package */ @interface CBAntiTracking {}+  public @interface CBAntiTracking {}   public static class SafeBrowsing {     public static final int NONE = 0;@@ -1195,7 +1199,7 @@         SafeBrowsing.HARMFUL, SafeBrowsing.PHISHING,         SafeBrowsing.DEFAULT, SafeBrowsing.NONE       })-  /* package */ @interface CBSafeBrowsing {}+  public @interface CBSafeBrowsing {}   // Sync values with nsICookieService.idl.   public static class CookieBehavior {@@ -1238,7 +1242,7 @@     CookieBehavior.ACCEPT_NONE, CookieBehavior.ACCEPT_VISITED,     CookieBehavior.ACCEPT_NON_TRACKERS   })-  /* package */ @interface CBCookieBehavior {}+  public @interface CBCookieBehavior {}   // Sync values with nsICookieService.idl.   public static class CookieLifetime {@@ -1256,11 +1260,11 @@   @Retention(RetentionPolicy.SOURCE)   @IntDef({CookieLifetime.NORMAL, CookieLifetime.RUNTIME, CookieLifetime.DAYS})-  /* package */ @interface CBCookieLifetime {}+  public @interface CBCookieLifetime {}   @Retention(RetentionPolicy.SOURCE)   @IntDef({EtpLevel.NONE, EtpLevel.DEFAULT, EtpLevel.STRICT})-  /* package */ @interface CBEtpLevel {}+  public @interface CBEtpLevel {}   /** Possible settings for ETP. */   public static class EtpLevel {

Analyzing the provided code diff, here are the potential security-related changes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    Annotation Visibility Change [File] [Lines 1164, 1195, 1238, 1256, 1260]
    [Old Code]
    /* package */ @interface CBAntiTracking {}
    /* package */ @interface CBSafeBrowsing {}
    /* package */ @interface CBCookieBehavior {}
    /* package */ @interface CBCookieLifetime {}
    /* package */ @interface CBEtpLevel {}
    [Fixed Code]
    public @interface CBAntiTracking {}
    public @interface CBSafeBrowsing {}
    public @interface CBCookieBehavior {}
    public @interface CBCookieLifetime {}
    public @interface CBEtpLevel {}

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    WrongConstant Suppression [File] [Lines 529, 551, 573]
    [Old Code]
    public @CBCookieBehavior int getCookieBehavior() {
    public @CBCookieBehavior int getCookieBehaviorPrivateMode() {
    public @CBCookieLifetime int getCookieLifetime() {
    [Fixed Code]
    @SuppressLint("WrongConstant")
    public @CBCookieBehavior int getCookieBehavior() {
    @SuppressLint("WrongConstant")
    public @CBCookieBehavior int getCookieBehaviorPrivateMode() {
    @SuppressLint("WrongConstant")
    public @CBCookieLifetime int getCookieLifetime() {

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    Return Type Change [File] [Lines 518-519]
    [Old Code]
    public @CBAntiTracking int getSafeBrowsingCategories() {
    [Fixed Code]
    public @CBSafeBrowsing int getSafeBrowsingCategories() {

The changes appear to be more about code correctness and visibility modifications rather than direct security fixes. The most significant change is the return type correction for getSafeBrowsingCategories(), which now properly uses @CBSafeBrowsing instead of @CBAntiTracking. The addition of @SuppressLint("WrongConstant") suggests there might have been lint warnings about potential type safety issues, but it's not clear if these represented actual security vulnerabilities. The visibility changes of the annotations from package-private to public don't appear to be security-related.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/src/options/input_variant.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/src/options/input_variant.rs@@ -1,18 +1,16 @@ use std::borrow::Cow;-use syn;--use ast::Fields;-use codegen;-use options::{Core, InputField, ParseAttribute};-use {Error, FromMeta, Result};+use crate::ast::Fields;+use crate::codegen;+use crate::options::{Core, InputField, ParseAttribute};+use crate::{Error, FromMeta, Result}; #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] pub struct InputVariant {     ident: syn::Ident,     attr_name: Option<String>,     data: Fields<InputField>,-    skip: bool,+    skip: Option<bool>,     /// Whether or not unknown fields are acceptable in this     allow_unknown_fields: Option<bool>, }@@ -27,7 +25,7 @@                 .as_ref()                 .map_or_else(|| Cow::Owned(self.ident.to_string()), Cow::Borrowed),             data: self.data.as_ref().map(InputField::as_codegen_field),-            skip: self.skip,+            skip: self.skip.unwrap_or_default(),             allow_unknown_fields: self.allow_unknown_fields.unwrap_or_default(),         }     }@@ -86,13 +84,21 @@     fn parse_nested(&mut self, mi: &syn::Meta) -> Result<()> {         let path = mi.path();         if path.is_ident("rename") {+            if self.attr_name.is_some() {+                return Err(Error::duplicate_field_path(path).with_span(mi));+            }+             self.attr_name = FromMeta::from_meta(mi)?;-            Ok(())         } else if path.is_ident("skip") {+            if self.skip.is_some() {+                return Err(Error::duplicate_field_path(path).with_span(mi));+            }+             self.skip = FromMeta::from_meta(mi)?;-            Ok(())         } else {-            Err(Error::unknown_field_path(&path).with_span(mi))+            return Err(Error::unknown_field_path(path).with_span(mi));         }++        Ok(())     } }

Here's the analysis following the requested format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   Duplicate Field Check Vulnerability [third_party/rust/darling_core/src/options/input_variant.rs] [Lines 84-96]
   Old Code:
   } else if path.is_ident("skip") {
       self.skip = FromMeta::from_meta(mi)?;
       Ok(())
   } else {
       Err(Error::unknown_field_path(&path).with_span(mi))
   }
   Fixed Code:
   } else if path.is_ident("skip") {
       if self.skip.is_some() {
           return Err(Error::duplicate_field_path(path).with_span(mi));
       }
       self.skip = FromMeta::from_meta(mi)?;
   } else {
       return Err(Error::unknown_field_path(path).with_span(mi));
   }

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   Duplicate Field Check Vulnerability [third_party/rust/darling_core/src/options/input_variant.rs] [Lines 80-83]
   Old Code:
   if path.is_ident("rename") {
       self.attr_name = FromMeta::from_meta(mi)?;
       Ok(())
   Fixed Code:
   if path.is_ident("rename") {
       if self.attr_name.is_some() {
           return Err(Error::duplicate_field_path(path).with_span(mi));
       }
       self.attr_name = FromMeta::from_meta(mi)?;

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   Type Change Vulnerability [third_party/rust/darling_core/src/options/input_variant.rs] [Lines 10-11]
   Old Code:
   skip: bool,
   Fixed Code:
   skip: Option<bool>,
   Note: While this appears to be a functional change rather than a security fix, it could potentially affect security if the boolean was being used in security-sensitive contexts without proper initialization checks.

The main security fixes appear to be adding duplicate field checks for both "rename" and "skip" attributes, which could prevent potential parsing ambiguities or conflicts that might be exploited. The change from bool to Option<bool> might be related to making the default state more explicit, but its security impact is unclear.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.setTransform.nonfinite.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.setTransform.nonfinite.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ ctx.setTransform(0, 0, 0, 0, Infinity, Infinity); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(-100, -10, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 17-18, 100]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   ```

The changes in this diff appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability. There are no security-related changes or vulnerabilities being addressed in this diff. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has changed. No security vulnerabilities were fixed or introduced by this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.quadraticCurveTo.scaled.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.quadraticCurveTo.scaled.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -29,11 +29,11 @@ ctx.moveTo(-1, 1.05); ctx.quadraticCurveTo(0, -1, 1.2, 1.05); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't address any security vulnerabilities. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.quadraticCurveTo.scaled.html] [17-29]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and update all references to it. There are no security implications to this change. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been modified for consistency or clarity.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/metal/.cargo-checksum.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/metal/.cargo-checksum.json@@ -1 +1 @@-{"files":{"Cargo.lock":"60e9969354761eb8f199a916b1a4a0160dc84e59e24955f038efc33e6cf1993c","Cargo.toml":"c957d1fa388b72969447520064953b30dd095ec7c1f394f953f9bb8300c66405","LICENSE-APACHE":"a60eea817514531668d7e00765731449fe14d059d3249e0bc93b36de45f759f2","LICENSE-MIT":"0621878e61f0d0fda054bcbe02df75192c28bde1ecc8289cbd86aeba2dd72720","Makefile":"6fddc61a94f5b31a65b11c1bef8b19c92bff738716998076c5d49c2834223c75","README.md":"6817e12da257b43352f71f595dcc713adf117c734ebf656e6af2d7d04be27cd6","bors.toml":"c2733ec512a08bf76b6a1ed77270810a0edeb888ba24c2a75679e1eb1bd563a5","examples/argument-buffer/main.rs":"4c1d1d9949bc56628980f84077dafdfa68a853141d6d4dc3e6202f6c61ba11f7","examples/bind/main.rs":"a0c85aad05f08666f9b380a7146a8473a6a6fe0db5d523760373093a0af20e5f","examples/caps/main.rs":"b7be00c1cc9042140d34ea05051152a7035f316f0bdcd31ac5a660a97e0c4f70","examples/circle/README.md":"e1c97cf5252f0d1f2934ace78b5d839c5f45911f3007dbd2925eeceefb8f0af6","examples/circle/main.rs":"91d80c85a358400ceeddf1ab108a7e1052dd208c4ec72cde925d02284d3cf9d4","examples/circle/screenshot.png":"97bf07c85bf02367447b9c8a81707c124e4a3b420fa386b95ba08b21938f4f2a","examples/circle/shaders.metal":"5e4f40efca5bb386204a09e1b983cc6c634fdf1ca9dd4974227313adbf50e8b5","examples/circle/shaders.metallib":"666a9491d795ef9c0b9c122c7ada571cc2c0e8774d2d89e5b4b996f3dc47962b","examples/compute/compute-argument-buffer.metal":"6530bbd6a0101d9db2893805436f5dc877959e81ea97a27014c0fc52fc9fa77b","examples/compute/compute-argument-buffer.rs":"e3de61fd7cc2f14d9d52300e4878601dbc072bc26d9dafc66115df58f94e0470","examples/compute/embedded-lib.rs":"55f701810fa5270c27ca771e713f9f8cf09e124a997b0b03790b38435593a7ea","examples/compute/main.rs":"f16cbf57cd27dc948ff651251ce26e6bd616cb5d989b8dadb4256c73a9bfba4b","examples/compute/shaders.metal":"f2b15551bb5247b88a3029c3d8ef37c6fa04a4a6cca9f90f069894ed6822b4bf","examples/compute/shaders.metallib":"fef91643e60c0ec99ad2bd2f3916299bcc3e6a80038ea27bed59681badfea7d1","examples/events/main.rs":"9cb35381b0a3918bd7d530171de8f7cceafe3d4851c0f430b4aff1f5c2aae749","examples/fence/main.rs":"47741327e62db1d8bd344b6a9ec26ef13ffb0b56b0dd7077c5d926d43faaeff7","examples/headless-render/README.md":"b1c97b52701cfb41fc0b9e269ba7a7a454d9161746198e2f5789f2636f60842d","examples/headless-render/main.rs":"cf0180839e8d09d4bf403ae947365ac18fa17782172986311bfa04b84f88169e","examples/headless-render/screenshot.png":"01d6ea5791b63b0f01190198756446cf313fc25dc64d0138c1b4f62c9f862dd1","examples/library/main.rs":"a1420ec28a471f28a789b75b3ecf5abb699ed352b337747169914812fb98045a","examples/mps/main.rs":"51f34582bf118f171bbb81d22c11407c7a35f381dbbff2d75c6f8e90d22a2aa1","examples/mps/shaders.metal":"155922d6a4184078ae7ee29504a268e1218f07d908f921eef60e5bfa8a793bda","examples/mps/shaders.metallib":"b62451223549b1e7eb90ec3d3534c0ed4cdfdc581c7df3ffcdc4786a5fcacde4","examples/reflection/main.rs":"fa0ade08750e14c8fded19c2b57e3fc1252f4fc0292890aea1d46968a647b600","examples/shader-dylib/main.rs":"d29ab2105131b8c56a6af6453f1d973e2bda5564f84b652c01e4a4e44b7a70f2","examples/shader-dylib/test_dylib.metal":"3469de785c2c0da784e84758fc0da5a81e474ca15588485d9e04398690641cc8","examples/shader-dylib/test_shader.metal":"1a04ff8ab3288b09d14cd35440b2557e92ddedbff9d07c4144a22e9062e6e1e4","examples/window/README.md":"69655cff298e07887fe70e8a13e27d8a87efcd0cc0da4e15485134e064e1aceb","examples/window/main.rs":"09c508013223de859f33fb69410bde30e8d7f04952850504d8b1f8faf7049b1b","examples/window/screenshot.png":"da7369d7cc297c7f7f6bd773c93e7d708d72442c9c5ff5a20c2f2ee6852552dc","examples/window/shaders.metal":"90dee6c752add5c617dfdca93064b2824b44ff8c01ef63986826f6a1531e95d6","examples/window/shaders.metallib":"16fa82beb70bf16c3501970cae0d5028a747a08164337161dc9c2e8965d4c366","src/argument.rs":"78c37356b421f90bf215d435efb961d93ea040e6849790492f399ddb07ac7063","src/buffer.rs":"80c55c8703340bf0d4d1b5eface518fdf82355ccb897883639cbf7e4933a4344","src/capturedescriptor.rs":"7d90b1e7b87fa9da1e38bba9637cd8d7a18a81f8c3f408149058ed4ea20a6894","src/capturemanager.rs":"bdee9e170da371778452513a9ac363a738ea8bfd3f0870d86c6013459c5af010","src/commandbuffer.rs":"0123224dcc0552748f1c2c87385f1f6be2863887f8862fbfd8b3a1562d9f69ba","src/commandqueue.rs":"5b87621ae4495ae04a5de5ce980d0cde31b4bb0d1e31e932d34c49252240c9d9","src/constants.rs":"7be4d901da863f126d158d1042f5482a122fbcf760f7c225b0b1693a55f6bb4b","src/depthstencil.rs":"5bfa4f49940fdc9d12b2af08f7fe710c41f0b7e26bdb6f8709fe17b9a9d7d5eb","src/device.rs":"e65ad152c01065bc10233eca8c77892279cd82dec44b948cb70e55b8fa8ab0d2","src/drawable.rs":"aea0759dc9de002c660e938319dfdfd3e4e82add30ed626ea31e3270698f4b85","src/encoder.rs":"3fd70d1f0a6f151076b6bb2ed3e3e65a90665bb76b1dec03153ea7c77bb5a749","src/heap.rs":"fcbb7dfaafb1008fadd75fb2b394776c9843fe98a266e237d7a7b4d80e046b06","src/indirect_encoder.rs":"eaf7755de9438022e3908e8426a139c33d4929d7be4b5e056d959eeecd560136","src/lib.rs":"b1fc90132440c270264e575e452f1d2a47420215ca3d08f8212e91f84009e603","src/library.rs":"61d0b8313e51c48ed3f5ee88dfe42b010e4c72ca160c29f94f8e73db7a006c3e","src/mps.rs":"b415be3221754d836fd535f4b5b45ed484d4cc926bd26145e82a9e61d337da4c","src/pipeline/compute.rs":"e4bed01671a466ed460fbc9059ac72dab7cb123a964de63058f0e5aafdc5e2a0","src/pipeline/mod.rs":"5ec3cb524cc03202a3394dad5a7d0b733474f664935353253e76a49aed5513ad","src/pipeline/render.rs":"caaa3698b85ef114a54d305188717f7fb612ac3fc51aabb40dfca236e7f35b1a","src/renderpass.rs":"666ca2a35d2bb96564f105a87f03cfbf87d3fd10e6915e473e8ff4c0db49fdef","src/resource.rs":"617dc7c9b08388b406c7b178f5ff25ee46a54299213a57ab09f5039b2b1e5927","src/sampler.rs":"adabef3520a18c829bfd9b705897873d9adc37ebe88cfa6864154483dd858b9d","src/sync.rs":"4b9f6a9f9425751411c8104fe0ebbe8e1d89db2005d929ada5334962a3301b8d","src/texture.rs":"2df3003396aa8f0552b853dac33ba970a918bc73d183fe0d3dad4bc21ee37e10","src/types.rs":"5a754c8036ff4ab1ec41d01af5fba64f3085f2a9dd1d15d00e907e40b85cf163","src/vertexdescriptor.rs":"5874f54bcc5613adff613ed3e2bb08870b1115ef6d369b21612ce848796b005e"},"package":"e0514f491f4cc03632ab399ee01e2c1c1b12d3e1cf2d667c1ff5f87d6dcd2084"}+{"files":{".github/workflows/ci.yml":"08d24906a6e23f870040b1dff654a89ca915b28973c1d7f10503fd3c1d326ce6","Cargo.toml":"fe3ef7610f777a6e11c4b057560f1daf5fd612c1fb5595ee0c49e3478a37cbea","LICENSE-APACHE":"a60eea817514531668d7e00765731449fe14d059d3249e0bc93b36de45f759f2","LICENSE-MIT":"0621878e61f0d0fda054bcbe02df75192c28bde1ecc8289cbd86aeba2dd72720","Makefile":"6fddc61a94f5b31a65b11c1bef8b19c92bff738716998076c5d49c2834223c75","README.md":"6817e12da257b43352f71f595dcc713adf117c734ebf656e6af2d7d04be27cd6","bors.toml":"c2733ec512a08bf76b6a1ed77270810a0edeb888ba24c2a75679e1eb1bd563a5","examples/argument-buffer/main.rs":"4c1d1d9949bc56628980f84077dafdfa68a853141d6d4dc3e6202f6c61ba11f7","examples/bind/main.rs":"a0c85aad05f08666f9b380a7146a8473a6a6fe0db5d523760373093a0af20e5f","examples/caps/main.rs":"b7be00c1cc9042140d34ea05051152a7035f316f0bdcd31ac5a660a97e0c4f70","examples/circle/README.md":"e1c97cf5252f0d1f2934ace78b5d839c5f45911f3007dbd2925eeceefb8f0af6","examples/circle/main.rs":"91d80c85a358400ceeddf1ab108a7e1052dd208c4ec72cde925d02284d3cf9d4","examples/circle/screenshot.png":"97bf07c85bf02367447b9c8a81707c124e4a3b420fa386b95ba08b21938f4f2a","examples/circle/shaders.metal":"5e4f40efca5bb386204a09e1b983cc6c634fdf1ca9dd4974227313adbf50e8b5","examples/circle/shaders.metallib":"666a9491d795ef9c0b9c122c7ada571cc2c0e8774d2d89e5b4b996f3dc47962b","examples/compute/compute-argument-buffer.metal":"6530bbd6a0101d9db2893805436f5dc877959e81ea97a27014c0fc52fc9fa77b","examples/compute/compute-argument-buffer.rs":"e3de61fd7cc2f14d9d52300e4878601dbc072bc26d9dafc66115df58f94e0470","examples/compute/embedded-lib.rs":"55f701810fa5270c27ca771e713f9f8cf09e124a997b0b03790b38435593a7ea","examples/compute/main.rs":"f16cbf57cd27dc948ff651251ce26e6bd616cb5d989b8dadb4256c73a9bfba4b","examples/compute/shaders.metal":"f2b15551bb5247b88a3029c3d8ef37c6fa04a4a6cca9f90f069894ed6822b4bf","examples/compute/shaders.metallib":"fef91643e60c0ec99ad2bd2f3916299bcc3e6a80038ea27bed59681badfea7d1","examples/events/main.rs":"9cb35381b0a3918bd7d530171de8f7cceafe3d4851c0f430b4aff1f5c2aae749","examples/fence/main.rs":"47741327e62db1d8bd344b6a9ec26ef13ffb0b56b0dd7077c5d926d43faaeff7","examples/headless-render/.gitignore":"99520a5b5abaf30fc75759f1fd9f4338b6fbd1fc49f2dcbb466b22e6f9db4f62","examples/headless-render/README.md":"b1c97b52701cfb41fc0b9e269ba7a7a454d9161746198e2f5789f2636f60842d","examples/headless-render/main.rs":"cf0180839e8d09d4bf403ae947365ac18fa17782172986311bfa04b84f88169e","examples/headless-render/screenshot.png":"01d6ea5791b63b0f01190198756446cf313fc25dc64d0138c1b4f62c9f862dd1","examples/library/main.rs":"a1420ec28a471f28a789b75b3ecf5abb699ed352b337747169914812fb98045a","examples/mps/main.rs":"51f34582bf118f171bbb81d22c11407c7a35f381dbbff2d75c6f8e90d22a2aa1","examples/mps/shaders.metal":"155922d6a4184078ae7ee29504a268e1218f07d908f921eef60e5bfa8a793bda","examples/mps/shaders.metallib":"b62451223549b1e7eb90ec3d3534c0ed4cdfdc581c7df3ffcdc4786a5fcacde4","examples/reflection/main.rs":"01b0cd95558b8c3e547b239a1b2ae7e882ab0f52346f96bcefd2e9616693a98c","examples/shader-dylib/main.rs":"d29ab2105131b8c56a6af6453f1d973e2bda5564f84b652c01e4a4e44b7a70f2","examples/shader-dylib/test_dylib.metal":"3469de785c2c0da784e84758fc0da5a81e474ca15588485d9e04398690641cc8","examples/shader-dylib/test_shader.metal":"1a04ff8ab3288b09d14cd35440b2557e92ddedbff9d07c4144a22e9062e6e1e4","examples/window/README.md":"69655cff298e07887fe70e8a13e27d8a87efcd0cc0da4e15485134e064e1aceb","examples/window/main.rs":"09c508013223de859f33fb69410bde30e8d7f04952850504d8b1f8faf7049b1b","examples/window/screenshot.png":"da7369d7cc297c7f7f6bd773c93e7d708d72442c9c5ff5a20c2f2ee6852552dc","examples/window/shaders.metal":"90dee6c752add5c617dfdca93064b2824b44ff8c01ef63986826f6a1531e95d6","examples/window/shaders.metallib":"16fa82beb70bf16c3501970cae0d5028a747a08164337161dc9c2e8965d4c366","src/argument.rs":"578ca587dfb034a7e8e4551fd93164a86595a4637e5656fc6cc429ae2de6cda2","src/buffer.rs":"80c55c8703340bf0d4d1b5eface518fdf82355ccb897883639cbf7e4933a4344","src/capturedescriptor.rs":"7d90b1e7b87fa9da1e38bba9637cd8d7a18a81f8c3f408149058ed4ea20a6894","src/capturemanager.rs":"bdee9e170da371778452513a9ac363a738ea8bfd3f0870d86c6013459c5af010","src/commandbuffer.rs":"0123224dcc0552748f1c2c87385f1f6be2863887f8862fbfd8b3a1562d9f69ba","src/commandqueue.rs":"5b87621ae4495ae04a5de5ce980d0cde31b4bb0d1e31e932d34c49252240c9d9","src/constants.rs":"7be4d901da863f126d158d1042f5482a122fbcf760f7c225b0b1693a55f6bb4b","src/depthstencil.rs":"5bfa4f49940fdc9d12b2af08f7fe710c41f0b7e26bdb6f8709fe17b9a9d7d5eb","src/device.rs":"5c5f7613e0c94ff8291c7edfba16d9981875e6ec4ea9310a1d56d46b07c13ae8","src/drawable.rs":"aea0759dc9de002c660e938319dfdfd3e4e82add30ed626ea31e3270698f4b85","src/encoder.rs":"3fd70d1f0a6f151076b6bb2ed3e3e65a90665bb76b1dec03153ea7c77bb5a749","src/heap.rs":"fcbb7dfaafb1008fadd75fb2b394776c9843fe98a266e237d7a7b4d80e046b06","src/indirect_encoder.rs":"eaf7755de9438022e3908e8426a139c33d4929d7be4b5e056d959eeecd560136","src/lib.rs":"b1fc90132440c270264e575e452f1d2a47420215ca3d08f8212e91f84009e603","src/library.rs":"61d0b8313e51c48ed3f5ee88dfe42b010e4c72ca160c29f94f8e73db7a006c3e","src/mps.rs":"b415be3221754d836fd535f4b5b45ed484d4cc926bd26145e82a9e61d337da4c","src/pipeline/compute.rs":"e4bed01671a466ed460fbc9059ac72dab7cb123a964de63058f0e5aafdc5e2a0","src/pipeline/mod.rs":"5ec3cb524cc03202a3394dad5a7d0b733474f664935353253e76a49aed5513ad","src/pipeline/render.rs":"6738931629f1944d69815622a9f3281e55df0e56dc87d3cdb885cc8c7e2c8820","src/renderpass.rs":"666ca2a35d2bb96564f105a87f03cfbf87d3fd10e6915e473e8ff4c0db49fdef","src/resource.rs":"617dc7c9b08388b406c7b178f5ff25ee46a54299213a57ab09f5039b2b1e5927","src/sampler.rs":"adabef3520a18c829bfd9b705897873d9adc37ebe88cfa6864154483dd858b9d","src/sync.rs":"4b9f6a9f9425751411c8104fe0ebbe8e1d89db2005d929ada5334962a3301b8d","src/texture.rs":"2df3003396aa8f0552b853dac33ba970a918bc73d183fe0d3dad4bc21ee37e10","src/types.rs":"5a754c8036ff4ab1ec41d01af5fba64f3085f2a9dd1d15d00e907e40b85cf163","src/vertexdescriptor.rs":"5874f54bcc5613adff613ed3e2bb08870b1115ef6d369b21612ce848796b005e"},"package":null}=========dom/ipc/ProcessPriorityManager.cpp========--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/ipc/ProcessPriorityManager.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/ipc/ProcessPriorityManager.cpp@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@   static void StaticInit();   static bool PrefsEnabled();+  static void SetProcessPriorityIfEnabled(int aPid, ProcessPriority aPriority);   static bool TestMode();   NS_DECL_ISUPPORTS@@ -366,6 +367,17 @@ } /* static */+void ProcessPriorityManagerImpl::SetProcessPriorityIfEnabled(+    int aPid, ProcessPriority aPriority) {+  // The preference doesn't disable the process priority manager, but only its+  // effect. This way the IPCs still happen and can be used to collect telemetry+  // about CPU use.+  if (PrefsEnabled()) {+    hal::SetProcessPriority(aPid, aPriority);+  }+}++/* static */ bool ProcessPriorityManagerImpl::TestMode() {   return StaticPrefs::dom_ipc_processPriorityManager_testMode(); }@@ -382,20 +394,13 @@     return;   }-  // If IPC tabs aren't enabled at startup, don't bother with any of this.-  if (!PrefsEnabled()) {-    LOG("InitProcessPriorityManager bailing due to prefs.");--    // Run StaticInit() again if the prefs change.  We don't expect this to-    // happen in normal operation, but it happens during testing.-    if (!sPrefListenersRegistered) {-      sPrefListenersRegistered = true;-      Preferences::RegisterCallback(PrefChangedCallback,-                                    "dom.ipc.processPriorityManager.enabled");-      Preferences::RegisterCallback(PrefChangedCallback,-                                    "dom.ipc.tabs.disabled");-    }-    return;+  // Run StaticInit() again if the prefs change.  We don't expect this to+  // happen in normal operation, but it happens during testing.+  if (!sPrefListenersRegistered) {+    sPrefListenersRegistered = true;+    Preferences::RegisterCallback(PrefChangedCallback,+                                  "dom.ipc.processPriorityManager.enabled");+    Preferences::RegisterCallback(PrefChangedCallback, "dom.ipc.tabs.disabled");   }   sInitialized = true;@@ -426,7 +431,7 @@   // The parent process's priority never changes; set it here and then forget   // about it. We'll manage only subprocesses' priorities using the process   // priority manager.-  hal::SetProcessPriority(getpid(), PROCESS_PRIORITY_PARENT_PROCESS);+  SetProcessPriorityIfEnabled(getpid(), PROCESS_PRIORITY_PARENT_PROCESS);   nsCOMPtr<nsIObserverService> os = services::GetObserverService();   if (os) {@@ -762,8 +767,7 @@     return;   }-  if (!ProcessPriorityManagerImpl::PrefsEnabled() || !mContentParent ||-      mPriority == aPriority) {+  if (!mContentParent || mPriority == aPriority) {     return;   }@@ -794,7 +798,7 @@         Telemetry::ScalarID::DOM_CONTENTPROCESS_OS_PRIORITY_LOWERED, 1);   }-  hal::SetProcessPriority(Pid(), mPriority);+  ProcessPriorityManagerImpl::SetProcessPriorityIfEnabled(Pid(), mPriority);   if (oldPriority != mPriority) {     ProcessPriorityManagerImpl::GetSingleton()->NotifyProcessPriorityChanged(

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze the security fixes following the specified format:

1. First vulnerability analysis:
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Privilege Escalation or Priority Manipulation] [dom/ipc/ProcessPriorityManager.cpp] [Lines 172-798]
    [Old Code]
    The old code directly called hal::SetProcessPriority() without checking PrefsEnabled() in all cases
    [Fixed Code]
    The new code introduces SetProcessPriorityIfEnabled() which consistently checks PrefsEnabled() before setting priority

2. Second vulnerability analysis:
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Race Condition in Preference Handling] [dom/ipc/ProcessPriorityManager.cpp] [Lines 382-431]
    [Old Code]
    The old code would early return if PrefsEnabled() was false, potentially missing pref listener registration
    [Fixed Code]
    The new code ensures pref listeners are always registered, regardless of initial PrefsEnabled() state

3. Third vulnerability analysis:
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Inconsistent Process Priority Management] [dom/ipc/ProcessPriorityManager.cpp] [Lines 762-798]
    [Old Code]
    The old code had inconsistent PrefsEnabled() checks in different parts of the priority setting logic
    [Fixed Code]
    The new code centralizes the preference check in SetProcessPriorityIfEnabled()

For the rust/metal/.cargo-checksum.json changes, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities in the diff - it appears to be routine dependency updates and file checksum changes. The changes in the checksum file are expected when dependencies are updated between releases.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/filter-effects/filters-test-brightness-003.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/filter-effects/filters-test-brightness-003.html@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@     <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/filter-effects-1/#FilterProperty">     <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/filter-effects-1/#funcdef-filter-brightness">     <link rel="match" href="filters-ref-brightness-003.html">-    <meta name="flags" content="">     <meta name="assert" content="This test verifies that the brightness shorthand works. Green rectangle must shown,     when brightness is not set.">     <style type="text/css">

Analyzing the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/filter-effects/filters-test-brightness-003.html [Lines] 7  
   [Old Code] `<meta name="flags" content="">`  
   [Fixed Code] (line removed)  

Additional Details:  
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which appears to be test-related metadata  
- No security implications or vulnerabilities are apparent in this change  
- The modification seems to be cleanup of test code rather than a security fix  

No other vulnerabilities or suspicious changes were found in the provided diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.hsl-clamp-1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.hsl-clamp-1.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(120, 200%, 50%)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-sensitive modifications. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found]
[File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.hsl-clamp-1.html
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are:
1. Renamed variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Updated the variable name in the `_assertPixel` call
These are cosmetic changes with no security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit/arm64/MacroAssembler-arm64.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit/arm64/MacroAssembler-arm64.cpp@@ -474,6 +474,8 @@     instructionsExpected++;   }+  // NOTE: the generated code must match the assembly code in gen_load in+  // GenerateAtomicOperations.py   asMasm().memoryBarrierBefore(access.sync());   {@@ -625,6 +627,8 @@ void MacroAssemblerCompat::wasmStoreImpl(const wasm::MemoryAccessDesc& access,                                          MemOperand dstAddr, AnyRegister valany,                                          Register64 val64) {+  // NOTE: the generated code must match the assembly code in gen_store in+  // GenerateAtomicOperations.py   asMasm().memoryBarrierBefore(access.sync());   {@@ -2334,6 +2338,8 @@   MOZ_ASSERT(ptr.base().asUnsized() != output);+  // NOTE: the generated code must match the assembly code in gen_cmpxchg in+  // GenerateAtomicOperations.py   masm.memoryBarrierBefore(sync);   Register scratch = temps.AcquireX().asUnsized();@@ -2365,6 +2371,8 @@   Register scratch2 = temps.AcquireX().asUnsized();   MemOperand ptr = ComputePointerForAtomic(masm, mem, scratch2);+  // NOTE: the generated code must match the assembly code in gen_exchange in+  // GenerateAtomicOperations.py   masm.memoryBarrierBefore(sync);   Register scratch = temps.AcquireX().asUnsized();@@ -2395,6 +2403,8 @@   Register scratch2 = temps.AcquireX().asUnsized();   MemOperand ptr = ComputePointerForAtomic(masm, mem, scratch2);+  // NOTE: the generated code must match the assembly code in gen_fetchop in+  // GenerateAtomicOperations.py   masm.memoryBarrierBefore(sync);   Register scratch = temps.AcquireX().asUnsized();

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes consist entirely of adding comments about code generation requirements for atomic operations. Here's my analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No vulnerability found [File] js/src/jit/arm64/MacroAssembler-arm64.cpp [Lines] Various
   [Old Code] (No comments about code generation matching)
   [Fixed Code] Added comments about matching generated code with assembly code in GenerateAtomicOperations.py

The changes appear to be documentation improvements rather than security fixes. The added comments ensure that developers are aware that the generated code must match specific assembly patterns, which is important for correctness but doesn't represent a security vulnerability being fixed.

No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The modifications are purely for documentation and code maintainability purposes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.interpolate.zerosize.strokeRect.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.interpolate.zerosize.strokeRect.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,15 +27,15 @@ g.addColorStop(1, '#f00'); ctx.strokeStyle = g; ctx.strokeRect(20, 20, 60, 10);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 19,19, 0,255,0,255, "19,19", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 20,19, 0,255,0,255, "20,19", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 21,19, 0,255,0,255, "21,19", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 19,20, 0,255,0,255, "19,20", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 20,20, 0,255,0,255, "20,20", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 21,20, 0,255,0,255, "21,20", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 19,21, 0,255,0,255, "19,21", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 20,21, 0,255,0,255, "20,21", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 21,21, 0,255,0,255, "21,21", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 19,19, 0,255,0,255, "19,19", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 20,19, 0,255,0,255, "20,19", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 21,19, 0,255,0,255, "21,19", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 19,20, 0,255,0,255, "19,20", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 20,20, 0,255,0,255, "20,20", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 21,20, 0,255,0,255, "21,20", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 19,21, 0,255,0,255, "19,21", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 20,21, 0,255,0,255, "20,21", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 21,21, 0,255,0,255, "21,21", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 17-18, 27-35]
   Old Code:
   ```javascript
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```javascript
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Variable Reference Updates [File] [Lines 27-35]
   Old Code:
   ```javascript
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 19,19, 0,255,0,255, "19,19", "0,255,0,255");
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```javascript
   _assertPixel(canvas, 19,19, 0,255,0,255, "19,19", "0,255,0,255");
   ```

The changes in this diff appear to be purely cosmetic, involving variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating all references to this variable. There are no security-related changes or vulnerabilities being fixed in this diff. The modifications are likely for code consistency or readability purposes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/mediaqueries/aspect-ratio-006.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/mediaqueries/aspect-ratio-006.html@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Joel Olsson" href="mailto:[email protected]"> <link rel="help" title="aspect-ratio" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/mediaqueries-4/#aspect-ratio"> <link rel="match" href="../reference/ref-filled-green-100px-square.xht">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="The 'aspect-ratio' property with prefix 'min' set '0.7' means that the minimum of ratio is '0.7', only and only if the value of the 'width' to the value of the 'height' is greater than value of 'min-aspect-ratio', the style sheet will be applied. The test runner will run this test in a 800/600 viewport (https://github.com/web-platform-tests/wpt/pull/12695)">

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 4]
[Old Code]
<meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code]
(removed line)

Additional Details:
1. The change simply removes an empty meta "flags" tag which appears to be unused in the test file.
2. This doesn't appear to be a security-related fix but rather a cleanup of test metadata.
3. No actual security vulnerability was addressed in this change.
4. The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive functionality or introduce/remove any security controls.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/webgpu/ipc/WebGPUParent.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/webgpu/ipc/WebGPUParent.cpp@@ -281,12 +281,17 @@ } ipc::IPCResult WebGPUParent::RecvAdapterRequestDevice(-    RawId aSelfId, const ipc::ByteBuf& aByteBuf, RawId aNewId) {+    RawId aSelfId, const ipc::ByteBuf& aByteBuf, RawId aNewId,+    AdapterRequestDeviceResolver&& resolver) {   ErrorBuffer error;   ffi::wgpu_server_adapter_request_device(mContext, aSelfId, ToFFI(&aByteBuf),                                           aNewId, error.ToFFI());-  mErrorScopeMap.insert({aSelfId, ErrorScopeStack()});-  ForwardError(0, error);+  if (ForwardError(0, error)) {+    resolver(false);+  } else {+    mErrorScopeMap.insert({aSelfId, ErrorScopeStack()});+    resolver(true);+  }   return IPC_OK(); }@@ -733,7 +738,7 @@   return IPC_OK(); }-ipc::IPCResult WebGPUParent::RecvShutdown() {+void WebGPUParent::ActorDestroy(ActorDestroyReason aWhy) {   mTimer.Stop();   for (const auto& p : mCanvasMap) {     const wr::ExternalImageId extId = {p.first};@@ -742,7 +747,6 @@   mCanvasMap.clear();   ffi::wgpu_server_poll_all_devices(mContext, true);   ffi::wgpu_server_delete(const_cast<ffi::WGPUGlobal*>(mContext));-  return IPC_OK(); } ipc::IPCResult WebGPUParent::RecvDeviceAction(RawId aSelf,@@ -752,6 +756,18 @@                                  error.ToFFI());   ForwardError(aSelf, error);+  return IPC_OK();+}++ipc::IPCResult WebGPUParent::RecvDeviceActionWithAck(+    RawId aSelf, const ipc::ByteBuf& aByteBuf,+    DeviceActionWithAckResolver&& aResolver) {+  ErrorBuffer error;+  ffi::wgpu_server_device_action(mContext, aSelf, ToFFI(&aByteBuf),+                                 error.ToFFI());++  ForwardError(aSelf, error);+  aResolver(true);   return IPC_OK(); }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   Missing Error Handling [dom/webgpu/ipc/WebGPUParent.cpp] [Lines 281-292]
   Old Code:
   ```cpp
   ErrorBuffer error;
   ffi::wgpu_server_adapter_request_device(mContext, aSelfId, ToFFI(&aByteBuf),
                                           aNewId, error.ToFFI());
   mErrorScopeMap.insert({aSelfId, ErrorScopeStack()});
   ForwardError(0, error);
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```cpp
   ErrorBuffer error;
   ffi::wgpu_server_adapter_request_device(mContext, aSelfId, ToFFI(&aByteBuf),
                                           aNewId, error.ToFFI());
   if (ForwardError(0, error)) {
     resolver(false);
   } else {
     mErrorScopeMap.insert({aSelfId, ErrorScopeStack()});
     resolver(true);
   }
   ```
   Details: The fix adds proper error handling and response resolution for device requests, preventing potential silent failures.

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   Resource Cleanup on Shutdown [dom/webgpu/ipc/WebGPUParent.cpp] [Lines 733-747]
   Old Code:
   ```cpp
   ipc::IPCResult WebGPUParent::RecvShutdown() {
     mTimer.Stop();
     for (const auto& p : mCanvasMap) {
       const wr::ExternalImageId extId = {p.first};
       mTextureMapHolder->UnregisterExternalImage(extId);
     }
     mCanvasMap.clear();
     ffi::wgpu_server_poll_all_devices(mContext, true);
     ffi::wgpu_server_delete(const_cast<ffi::WGPUGlobal*>(mContext));
     return IPC_OK();
   }
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```cpp
   void WebGPUParent::ActorDestroy(ActorDestroyReason aWhy) {
     mTimer.Stop();
     for (const auto& p : mCanvasMap) {
       const wr::ExternalImageId extId = {p.first};
       mTextureMapHolder->UnregisterExternalImage(extId);
     }
     mCanvasMap.clear();
     ffi::wgpu_server_poll_all_devices(mContext, true);
     ffi::wgpu_server_delete(const_cast<ffi::WGPUGlobal*>(mContext));
   }
   ```
   Details: The change moves cleanup to ActorDestroy which is more reliable for resource cleanup during shutdown, preventing potential resource leaks.

3. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   Missing Acknowledgment Mechanism [dom/webgpu/ipc/WebGPUParent.cpp] [Lines 752-768]
   Old Code: (No equivalent functionality existed)
   Fixed Code:
   ```cpp
   ipc::IPCResult WebGPUParent::RecvDeviceActionWithAck(
       RawId aSelf, const ipc::ByteBuf& aByteBuf,
       DeviceActionWithAckResolver&& aResolver) {
     ErrorBuffer error;
     ffi::wgpu_server_device_action(mContext, aSelf, ToFFI(&aByteBuf),
                                    error.ToFFI());
   
     ForwardError(aSelf, error);
     aResolver(true);
     return IPC_OK();
   }
   ```
   Details: Added new function with acknowledgment mechanism for device actions, ensuring proper synchronization and error handling.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/shape-box/shape-outside-margin-box-border-radius-006.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/shape-box/shape-outside-margin-box-border-radius-006.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/">   <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#shapes-from-box-values">   <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-margin-box-border-radius-006-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Test the boxes are wrapping around the left float shape defined by the margin-box and border-bottom-right-radius value.">   <style>   .container {

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/shape-box/shape-outside-margin-box-border-radius-006.html] [Lines 9]
   Old Code: `<meta name="flags" content="">`
   Fixed Code: (removed line)

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta "flags" tag from the HTML file
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No actual security vulnerability was addressed in this change
- The modification doesn't relate to any known security issues (XSS, injection, etc.)

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.