--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/glean-core/src/lib.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/glean-core/src/lib.rs@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@             let _scanning_thread = upload_manager.scan_pending_pings_directories();         }-        let (start_time, start_time_is_corrected) = local_now_with_offset();+        let start_time = local_now_with_offset();         let this = Self {             upload_enabled: cfg.upload_enabled,             // In the subprocess, we want to avoid accessing the database entirely.@@ -247,13 +247,6 @@             // Subprocess doesn't use "metrics" pings so has no need for a scheduler.             schedule_metrics_pings: false,         };--        // Can't use `local_now_with_offset_and_record` above, because we needed a valid `Glean` first.-        if start_time_is_corrected {-            this.additional_metrics-                .invalid_timezone_offset-                .add(&this, 1);-        }         Ok(this)     }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
Potential Timezone Offset Validation Issue [third_party/rust/glean-core/src/lib.rs] [Lines 224, 247-254]  
[Old Code]  
```rust
let (start_time, start_time_is_corrected) = local_now_with_offset();
// ...
if start_time_is_corrected {
    this.additional_metrics
        .invalid_timezone_offset
        .add(&this, 1);
}
```  
[Fixed Code]  
```rust
let start_time = local_now_with_offset();
// ... (removed the correction check and metric update)
```

Notes:
1. The vulnerability name is uncertain as the diff shows removal of timezone offset validation logic rather than a clear security fix.
2. The change simplifies time handling by removing a metric that tracked invalid timezone offsets, but it's unclear if this was a security fix or just a simplification.
3. Without more context about `local_now_with_offset()` and the purpose of tracking invalid offsets, it's hard to determine if this was addressing a security issue.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/CSS2/visudet/content-height-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/CSS2/visudet/content-height-001.html@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Florian Rivoal" href="https://florian.rivoal.net"> <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css2/visudet.html#line-height"> <link rel="match" href="reference/content-height-001-ref.html">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="The height of the content area of an inline-level box does not depend on the value of the line-height property"> <style>

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/CSS2/visudet/content-height-001.html] [Lines 4-7]
[Old Code]
<meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code]
[Removed line]

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which appears to be test-related metadata
- No security vulnerability is apparent in this change
- The modification seems to be cleanup of test file metadata rather than a security fix
- No CVE or known vulnerability pattern matches this change

No other vulnerabilities detected in the provided diff. The change appears to be purely cosmetic/test infrastructure related.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/xpcom/threads/SynchronizedEventQueue.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/xpcom/threads/SynchronizedEventQueue.h@@ -45,12 +45,12 @@   // After this method is called, no more events can be posted.   virtual void Disconnect(const MutexAutoLock& aProofOfLock) = 0;-  size_t SizeOfIncludingThis(mozilla::MallocSizeOf aMallocSizeOf) const {+  size_t SizeOfIncludingThis(mozilla::MallocSizeOf aMallocSizeOf) {     return aMallocSizeOf(this) + SizeOfExcludingThis(aMallocSizeOf);   }-  virtual size_t SizeOfExcludingThis(-      mozilla::MallocSizeOf aMallocSizeOf) const = 0;+  // Not const because overrides may need to take a lock+  virtual size_t SizeOfExcludingThis(mozilla::MallocSizeOf aMallocSizeOf) = 0;  protected:   virtual ~ThreadTargetSink() = default;@@ -80,9 +80,12 @@   void RemoveObserver(nsIThreadObserver* aObserver);   const nsTObserverArray<nsCOMPtr<nsIThreadObserver>>& EventObservers();-  size_t SizeOfExcludingThis(-      mozilla::MallocSizeOf aMallocSizeOf) const override {-    return mEventObservers.ShallowSizeOfExcludingThis(aMallocSizeOf);+  size_t SizeOfExcludingThis(mozilla::MallocSizeOf aMallocSizeOf) override {+    // Normally we'd return+    // mEventObservers.ShallowSizeOfExcludingThis(aMallocSizeOf); However,+    // mEventObservers may be being mutated on another thread, and we don't lock+    // around access, so locking here wouldn't help.  They're small, so+    return 0;   }   /**

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Thread Safety Issue] [xpcom/threads/SynchronizedEventQueue.h] [Lines 45-52]
   [Old Code]
   size_t SizeOfIncludingThis(mozilla::MallocSizeOf aMallocSizeOf) const {
     return aMallocSizeOf(this) + SizeOfExcludingThis(aMallocSizeOf);
   }

   virtual size_t SizeOfExcludingThis(
       mozilla::MallocSizeOf aMallocSizeOf) const = 0;
   
   [Fixed Code]
   size_t SizeOfIncludingThis(mozilla::MallocSizeOf aMallocSizeOf) {
     return aMallocSizeOf(this) + SizeOfExcludingThis(aMallocSizeOf);
   }

   // Not const because overrides may need to take a lock
   virtual size_t SizeOfExcludingThis(mozilla::MallocSizeOf aMallocSizeOf) = 0;

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   [Race Condition] [xpcom/threads/SynchronizedEventQueue.h] [Lines 80-86]
   [Old Code]
   size_t SizeOfExcludingThis(
       mozilla::MallocSizeOf aMallocSizeOf) const override {
     return mEventObservers.ShallowSizeOfExcludingThis(aMallocSizeOf);
   }
   
   [Fixed Code]
   size_t SizeOfExcludingThis(mozilla::MallocSizeOf aMallocSizeOf) override {
     // Normally we'd return
     // mEventObservers.ShallowSizeOfExcludingThis(aMallocSizeOf); However,
     // mEventObservers may be being mutated on another thread, and we don't lock
     // around access, so locking here wouldn't help.  They're small, so
     return 0;
   }

The main security fix appears to be addressing a potential race condition where mEventObservers could be accessed while being modified on another thread. The fix acknowledges this thread safety issue and opts to return 0 instead of attempting to measure the size, as proper locking would be difficult to implement in this context.

The first change (removing const) might be related to thread safety as well, as indicated by the comment, but it's less clear if this was fixing an actual vulnerability or just being proactive about potential thread safety issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/profiling/examples/puffin/imgui_support.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/profiling/examples/puffin/imgui_support.rs@@ -173,12 +173,12 @@         window: &winit::window::Window,     ) {         let mut inner_mutex_guard = self.inner.lock().unwrap();-        let mut inner = &mut *inner_mutex_guard;+        let inner = &mut *inner_mutex_guard;         // Drop the old Ui if it exists         if inner.ui.is_some() {             log::warn!("a frame is already in progress, starting a new one");-            ImguiManager::take_ui(&mut inner);+            ImguiManager::take_ui(inner);         }         inner

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security vulnerabilities.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Race Condition] [third_party/rust/profiling/examples/puffin/imgui_support.rs] [Lines 173-179]
[Old Code]
        let mut inner_mutex_guard = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
        let mut inner = &mut *inner_mutex_guard;

        // Drop the old Ui if it exists
        if inner.ui.is_some() {
            log::warn!("a frame is already in progress, starting a new one");
            ImguiManager::take_ui(&mut inner);
[Fixed Code]
        let mut inner_mutex_guard = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
        let inner = &mut *inner_mutex_guard;

        // Drop the old Ui if it exists
        if inner.ui.is_some() {
            log::warn!("a frame is already in progress, starting a new one");
            ImguiManager::take_ui(inner);

Additional Details:
The changes involve:
1. Removing the unnecessary `mut` qualifier from the `inner` variable
2. Removing the `&mut` when passing `inner` to `take_ui`

While this doesn't appear to fix a specific known vulnerability, the changes improve code correctness by:
- Removing unnecessary mutability which could lead to accidental modifications
- Making the code clearer about which parts are actually mutable
- Potentially reducing the chance of race conditions by being more explicit about mutability

However, without more context about the surrounding code and the `take_ui` function's implementation, I can't definitively say this fixes a security vulnerability. The changes seem more like code quality improvements than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.clearRect.globalalpha.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.clearRect.globalalpha.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.globalAlpha = 0.1; ctx.clearRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-sensitive operations or patterns. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-21]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');

ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
ctx.globalAlpha = 0.1;
ctx.clearRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
ctx.globalAlpha = 0.1;
ctx.clearRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0");

The changes are:
1. Renamed variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Updated the variable name in the `_assertPixel` call
These changes don't address any security issues but rather improve code consistency or readability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/mobile/android/geckoview/src/androidTest/assets/www/inputs.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/mobile/android/geckoview/src/androidTest/assets/www/inputs.html@@ -2,6 +2,44 @@     <head>         <meta charset="utf-8">         <title>Inputs</title>+        <script>+            class CustomTextBox extends HTMLElement {+                constructor() {+                    super();++                    this.attachShadow({mode: 'open'});+                    const wrapper = document.createElement('span');+                    this.textbox = wrapper.appendChild(document.createElement("input"));+                    this.textbox.value = "adipisci";+                    this.shadowRoot.append(wrapper);+                }++                focus() {+                    this.textbox.focus();+                }++                select() {+                    this.textbox.select();+                }++                setSelectionRange(start, end) {+                    this.textbox.setSelectionRange(start, end);+                }++                get selectionStart() {+                    return this.textbox.selectionStart;+                }++                get selectionEnd() {+                    return this.textbox.selectionEnd;+                }++                get value() {+                    return this.textbox.value;+                }+            }+            customElements.define('x-input', CustomTextBox);+        </script>     </head>     <body>         <div id="text">lorem</div>@@ -10,6 +48,7 @@         <div id="contenteditable" contenteditable="true">sit</div>         <iframe id="iframe" src="selectionAction_frame.html"></iframe>         <iframe id="designmode" src="selectionAction_frame.html"></iframe>+        <x-input id="x-input"></x-input>     </body>     <script>         addEventListener("load", function() {

Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be adding functionality (a custom web component) rather than fixing security issues.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [mobile/android/geckoview/src/androidTest/assets/www/inputs.html] [Lines 2-44]
[Old Code: No custom web component implementation]
[Fixed Code: Added CustomTextBox web component implementation]

The changes include:
1. Adding a custom web component (x-input) implementation
2. Adding the component to the DOM
3. Implementing various input-related methods (focus, select, etc.)

These changes appear to be feature additions rather than security fixes. The custom component properly uses shadow DOM with open mode, which is a secure practice. The component doesn't expose any sensitive information or have obvious security issues in its implementation.

If there was a security concern being addressed here, it's not evident from the diff content provided. The changes seem focused on expanding test capabilities rather than fixing vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-21c.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-21c.xml@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/>   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body>  <p>This page should be green.</p>

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   [No specific vulnerability] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-21c.xml] [Lines 7]
   [Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="" />]
   [Fixed Code: (line removed)]

Additional details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which appears to be test-related metadata.
- There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed here.
- The modification seems to be a cleanup of test file metadata rather than a security fix.
- No known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in this change.

The diff shows a minor maintenance change rather than a security fix. The removed meta tag didn't contain any sensitive information or pose any security risk.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/content/aboutTelemetry.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/content/aboutTelemetry.js@@ -47,7 +47,8 @@ const PREF_TELEMETRY_ENABLED = "toolkit.telemetry.enabled"; const PREF_DEBUG_SLOW_SQL = "toolkit.telemetry.debugSlowSql"; const PREF_SYMBOL_SERVER_URI = "profiler.symbolicationUrl";-const DEFAULT_SYMBOL_SERVER_URI = "https://symbols.mozilla.org/symbolicate/v4";+const DEFAULT_SYMBOL_SERVER_URI =+  "https://symbolication.services.mozilla.com/symbolicate/v4"; const PREF_FHR_UPLOAD_ENABLED = "datareporting.healthreport.uploadEnabled"; // ms idle before applying the filter (allow uninterrupted typing)@@ -1057,41 +1058,6 @@   this.symbolRequest.setRequestHeader("Connection", "close");   this.symbolRequest.onreadystatechange = this.handleSymbolResponse.bind(this);   this.symbolRequest.send(requestJSON);-};--var CapturedStacks = {-  symbolRequest: null,--  render: function CapturedStacks_render(payload) {-    // Retrieve captured stacks from telemetry payload.-    let capturedStacks =-      "processes" in payload && "parent" in payload.processes-        ? payload.processes.parent.capturedStacks-        : false;-    let hasData =-      capturedStacks && capturedStacks.stacks && !!capturedStacks.stacks.length;-    setHasData("captured-stacks-section", hasData);-    if (!hasData) {-      return;-    }--    let stacks = capturedStacks.stacks;-    let memoryMap = capturedStacks.memoryMap;-    let captures = capturedStacks.captures;--    StackRenderer.renderStacks("captured-stacks", stacks, memoryMap, index =>-      this.renderCaptureHeader(index, captures)-    );-  },--  renderCaptureHeader: function CaptureStacks_renderCaptureHeader(-    index,-    captures-  ) {-    let key = captures[index][0];-    let cardinality = captures[index][2];-    StackRenderer.renderHeader("captured-stacks", [key, cardinality]);-  }, }; var Histogram = {@@ -2265,31 +2231,6 @@   search.addEventListener("input", Search.searchHandler);   document-    .getElementById("captured-stacks-fetch-symbols")-    .addEventListener("click", function() {-      if (!gPingData) {-        return;-      }-      let capturedStacks = gPingData.payload.processes.parent.capturedStacks;-      let req = new SymbolicationRequest(-        "captured-stacks",-        CapturedStacks.renderCaptureHeader,-        capturedStacks.memoryMap,-        capturedStacks.stacks,-        capturedStacks.captures-      );-      req.fetchSymbols();-    });--  document-    .getElementById("captured-stacks-hide-symbols")-    .addEventListener("click", function() {-      if (gPingData) {-        CapturedStacks.render(gPingData.payload);-      }-    });--  document     .getElementById("late-writes-fetch-symbols")     .addEventListener("click", function() {       if (!gPingData) {@@ -2701,9 +2642,6 @@   // Show event data.   Events.render(payload);-  // Show captured stacks.-  CapturedStacks.render(payload);-   LateWritesSingleton.renderLateWrites(payload.lateWrites);   // Show origin telemetry.

Analyzing the provided code diff, I can identify the following security-related changes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Symbol Server URL Update] [aboutTelemetry.js] [Lines 47-48]
    Old Code: `const DEFAULT_SYMBOL_SERVER_URI = "https://symbols.mozilla.org/symbolicate/v4";`
    Fixed Code: `const DEFAULT_SYMBOL_SERVER_URI = "https://symbolication.services.mozilla.com/symbolicate/v4";`
    Additional Details: The symbol server URL was updated, which might indicate a migration to a more secure or updated service, but without more context it's unclear if this was fixing a specific vulnerability.

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
    [Removal of Captured Stacks Functionality] [aboutTelemetry.js] [Lines 1057-1089, 2265-2287, 2701-2703]
    Old Code: Entire CapturedStacks object definition and related event listeners
    Fixed Code: Removed all captured stacks functionality
    Additional Details: The removal of the captured stacks functionality suggests this feature might have had security implications, possibly exposing sensitive stack trace information or being vulnerable to information disclosure.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Removal of Captured Stacks Rendering] [aboutTelemetry.js] [Lines 2701-2703]
    Old Code: `CapturedStacks.render(payload);`
    Fixed Code: Removed line
    Additional Details: This is part of the larger captured stacks removal, but specifically removes the rendering call which might have had security implications in how it displayed stack information.

The most significant change appears to be the complete removal of the captured stacks functionality, which strongly suggests there were security concerns with this feature. The symbol server URL change might also be security-related, though less clearly so.

Failed to fetch CVE description: 503 Server Error: Service Unavailable for url: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-26384

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/extensions/test/browser/browser_ext_menus_events.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/extensions/test/browser/browser_ext_menus_events.js@@ -19,10 +19,20 @@   return ExtensionPermissions.add(extension.id, permissions, ext); }+var someOtherTab, testTab;+ add_task(async function setup() {   await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({     set: [["extensions.manifestV3.enabled", true]],   });++  // To help diagnose an intermittent later.+  SimpleTest.requestCompleteLog();++  // Setup the test tab now, rather than for each test+  someOtherTab = gBrowser.selectedTab;+  testTab = await BrowserTestUtils.openNewForegroundTab(gBrowser, PAGE);+  registerCleanupFunction(() => BrowserTestUtils.removeTab(testTab)); }); // Registers a context menu using menus.create(menuCreateParams) and checks@@ -38,7 +48,7 @@   forceTabToBackground = false,   manifest_version = 2, }) {-  async function background() {+  async function background(menu_create_params) {     function awaitMessage(expectedId) {       return new Promise(resolve => {         browser.test.log(`Waiting for message: ${expectedId}`);@@ -56,7 +66,6 @@       });     }-    let menuCreateParams = await awaitMessage("create-params");     const [tab] = await browser.tabs.query({       active: true,       currentWindow: true,@@ -72,7 +81,7 @@         args[0].targetElementId = 13337; // = EXPECT_TARGET_ELEMENT       }       shownEvents.push(args[0]);-      if (menuCreateParams.title.includes("TEST_EXPECT_NO_TAB")) {+      if (menu_create_params.title.includes("TEST_EXPECT_NO_TAB")) {         browser.test.assertEq(undefined, args[1], "expect no tab");       } else {         browser.test.assertEq(tab.id, args[1].id, "expected tab");@@ -85,7 +94,7 @@     let menuId;     await new Promise(resolve => {-      menuId = browser.menus.create(menuCreateParams, resolve);+      menuId = browser.menus.create(menu_create_params, resolve);     });     browser.test.assertEq(0, shownEvents.length, "no onShown before menu");     browser.test.assertEq(0, hiddenEvents.length, "no onHidden before menu");@@ -106,14 +115,13 @@     browser.test.sendMessage("onShown-event-data2", shownEvents[1]);   }-  const someOtherTab = gBrowser.selectedTab;   // Tab must initially open as a foreground tab, because the test extension   // looks for the active tab.-  const tab = await BrowserTestUtils.openNewForegroundTab(gBrowser, PAGE);+  gBrowser.selectedTab = testTab;   const action = manifest_version < 3 ? "browser_action" : "action";   let extension = ExtensionTestUtils.loadExtension({-    background,+    background: `(${background})(${JSON.stringify(menuCreateParams)})`,     manifest: {       manifest_version,       page_action: {},@@ -128,14 +136,13 @@     },   });   await extension.startup();-  extension.sendMessage("create-params", menuCreateParams);   let menuId = await extension.awaitMessage("menu-registered");   if (forceTabToBackground) {     gBrowser.selectedTab = someOtherTab;   }-  await doOpenMenu(extension, tab);+  await doOpenMenu(extension, testTab);   extension.sendMessage("assert-menu-shown");   let shownEvent = await extension.awaitMessage("onShown-event-data");@@ -154,7 +161,7 @@       permissions: [],       origins: [PAGE_HOST_PATTERN],     });-    await doOpenMenu(extension, tab);+    await doOpenMenu(extension, testTab);     extension.sendMessage("optional-menu-shown-with-permissions");     let shownEvent2 = await extension.awaitMessage("onShown-event-data2");     Assert.deepEqual(@@ -166,7 +173,6 @@   }   await extension.unload();-  BrowserTestUtils.removeTab(tab); } // Make sure that we won't trigger onShown when extensions cannot add menus.

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Race Condition] [browser/components/extensions/test/browser/browser_ext_menus_events.js] [Lines 19-20, 48, 66, 94, 115]
[Old Code]
- No explicit tab management
- Background function received menu_create_params via message
[Fixed Code]
+ Global tab variables (someOtherTab, testTab) initialized
+ Background function receives menu_create_params directly
+ Explicit tab cleanup in setup
+ Complete logging requested for diagnosis

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Leak] [browser/components/extensions/test/browser/browser_ext_menus_events.js] [Lines 48, 115]
[Old Code]
- Menu parameters passed via message passing
[Fixed Code]
+ Menu parameters passed directly to background function

The changes appear to be primarily test reliability improvements rather than clear security fixes. The main modifications involve:
1. Better tab management to prevent race conditions
2. Direct parameter passing instead of message passing
3. Added logging for debugging
4. More robust cleanup

While these changes improve test reliability, I can't identify any specific security vulnerabilities that were fixed. The changes seem more focused on making the tests more deterministic rather than addressing security issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.quadraticCurveTo.ensuresubpath.2.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.quadraticCurveTo.ensuresubpath.2.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ ctx.beginPath(); ctx.quadraticCurveTo(0, 25, 100, 25); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 5,45, 0,255,0,255, "5,45", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 5,45, 0,255,0,255, "5,45", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming for better code clarity/consistency. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 13-14, 23-24]
   Old Code:
   ```javascript
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```javascript
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 23-24]
   Old Code:
   ```javascript
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 5,45, 0,255,0,255, "5,45", "0,255,0,255");
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```javascript
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   _assertPixel(canvas, 5,45, 0,255,0,255, "5,45", "0,255,0,255");
   ```

The changes are purely cosmetic, renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability. No security implications are present in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.svg-2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.svg-2.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'grey'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 128,128,128,255, "50,25", "128,128,128,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 128,128,128,255, "50,25", "128,128,128,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-25]
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
   ctx.fillStyle = 'grey';
   ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 128,128,128,255, "50,25", "128,128,128,255");
   
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
   ctx.fillStyle = 'grey';
   ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 128,128,128,255, "50,25", "128,128,128,255");

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. There are no security-related changes visible in this diff. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name. No security vulnerabilities were fixed or introduced by this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/devtools/rootAnalysis/computeGCFunctions.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/devtools/rootAnalysis/computeGCFunctions.js@@ -18,31 +18,52 @@ var start = "Time: " + new Date;-var rawcalls_filenames = [];-while (scriptArgs.length) {-  const arg = scriptArgs.shift();-  if (arg == '--outputs')-    break;-  rawcalls_filenames.push(arg);-}-if (scriptArgs.length == 0)-  usage();--var callgraph_filename            = scriptArgs[0] || "callgraph.txt";-var gcFunctions_filename          = scriptArgs[1] || "gcFunctions.txt";-var gcFunctionsList_filename      = scriptArgs[2] || "gcFunctions.lst";-var gcEdges_filename              = scriptArgs[3] || "gcEdges.txt";-var limitedFunctionsList_filename = scriptArgs[4] || "limitedFunctions.lst";+try {+  var options = parse_options([+    {+      name: 'inputs',+      dest: 'rawcalls_filenames',+      nargs: '+'+    },+    {+      name: '--outputs',+      type: 'bool'+    },+    {+      name: 'callgraph',+      type: 'string',+      default: 'callgraph.txt'+    },+    {+      name: 'gcFunctions',+      type: 'string',+      default: 'gcFunctions.txt'+    },+    {+      name: 'gcFunctionsList',+      type: 'string',+      default: 'gcFunctions.lst'+    },+    {+      name: 'limitedFunctions',+      type: 'string',+      default: 'limitedFunctions.lst'+    },+  ]);+} catch {+  printErr("Usage: computeGCFunctions.js <rawcalls1.txt> <rawcalls2.txt>... --outputs <out:callgraph.txt> <out:gcFunctions.txt> <out:gcFunctions.lst> <out:gcEdges.txt> <out:limitedFunctions.lst>");+  quit(1);+}; var {   gcFunctions,   functions,   calleesOf,   limitedFunctions-} = loadCallgraph(rawcalls_filenames);+} = loadCallgraph(options.rawcalls_filenames);-printErr("Writing " + gcFunctions_filename);-redirect(gcFunctions_filename);+printErr("Writing " + options.gcFunctions);+redirect(options.gcFunctions); for (var name in gcFunctions) {     for (let readable of (functions.readableName[name] || [name])) {@@ -62,8 +83,8 @@     } }-printErr("Writing " + gcFunctionsList_filename);-redirect(gcFunctionsList_filename);+printErr("Writing " + options.gcFunctionsList);+redirect(options.gcFunctionsList); for (var name in gcFunctions) {     if (name in functions.readableName) {         for (var readable of functions.readableName[name])@@ -73,28 +94,10 @@     } }-// gcEdges is a list of edges that can GC for more specific reasons than just-// calling a function that is in gcFunctions.txt.-//-// Right now, it is unused. It was meant for ~AutoRealm when it might-// wrap an exception, but anything held live across ~AC will have to be held-// live across the corresponding constructor (and hence the whole scope of the-// AC), and in that case it'll be held live across whatever could create an-// exception within the AC scope. So ~AC edges are redundant. I will leave the-// stub machinery here for now.-printErr("Writing " + gcEdges_filename);-redirect(gcEdges_filename);-for (var block in gcEdges) {-  for (var edge in gcEdges[block]) {-      var func = gcEdges[block][edge];-    print([ block, edge, func ].join(" || "));-  }-}--printErr("Writing " + limitedFunctionsList_filename);-redirect(limitedFunctionsList_filename);+printErr("Writing " + options.limitedFunctions);+redirect(options.limitedFunctions); print(JSON.stringify(limitedFunctions, null, 4));-printErr("Writing " + callgraph_filename);-redirect(callgraph_filename);+printErr("Writing " + options.callgraph);+redirect(options.callgraph); saveCallgraph(functions, calleesOf);

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Argument Injection/Improper Input Validation] [js/src/devtools/rootAnalysis/computeGCFunctions.js] [Lines 18-52]
    [Old Code]
    ```javascript
    var rawcalls_filenames = [];
    while (scriptArgs.length) {
      const arg = scriptArgs.shift();
      if (arg == '--outputs')
        break;
      rawcalls_filenames.push(arg);
    }
    if (scriptArgs.length == 0)
      usage();
    ```
    [Fixed Code]
    ```javascript
    try {
      var options = parse_options([
        {
          name: 'inputs',
          dest: 'rawcalls_filenames',
          nargs: '+'
        },
        {
          name: '--outputs',
          type: 'bool'
        },
        // ... other options
      ]);
    } catch {
      printErr("Usage: computeGCFunctions.js <rawcalls1.txt> <rawcalls2.txt>... --outputs <out:callgraph.txt> <out:gcFunctions.txt> <out:gcFunctions.lst> <out:gcEdges.txt> <out:limitedFunctions.lst>");
      quit(1);
    };
    ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Path Injection/File Handling] [js/src/devtools/rootAnalysis/computeGCFunctions.js] [Multiple lines]
    [Old Code]
    ```javascript
    var callgraph_filename            = scriptArgs[0] || "callgraph.txt";
    var gcFunctions_filename          = scriptArgs[1] || "gcFunctions.txt";
    var gcFunctionsList_filename      = scriptArgs[2] || "gcFunctions.lst";
    var gcEdges_filename              = scriptArgs[3] || "gcEdges.txt";
    var limitedFunctionsList_filename = scriptArgs[4] || "limitedFunctions.lst";
    ```
    [Fixed Code]
    ```javascript
    {
      name: 'callgraph',
      type: 'string',
      default: 'callgraph.txt'
    },
    {
      name: 'gcFunctions',
      type: 'string',
      default: 'gcFunctions.txt'
    },
    // ... other options with defaults
    ```

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Information Exposure] [js/src/devtools/rootAnalysis/computeGCFunctions.js] [Lines 73-83]
    [Old Code]
    ```javascript
    printErr("Writing " + gcEdges_filename);
    redirect(gcEdges_filename);
    for (var block in gcEdges) {
      for (var edge in gcEdges[block]) {
          var func = gcEdges[block][edge];
        print([ block, edge, func ].join(" || "));
      }
    }
    ```
    [Fixed Code]
    (This section was removed entirely in the new version)

The changes appear to be primarily focused on improving the command-line argument parsing and file handling, but it's not clear if these were specifically security fixes. The main improvements include:
1. More structured argument parsing using a dedicated options parser
2. Better error handling with try-catch
3. Removal of unused code (gcEdges functionality)
4. More consistent file handling with defaults

While these changes improve code quality and maintainability, I can't definitively say they address specific security vulnerabilities without more context about the threat model or previous issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/executors/executorchrome.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/executors/executorchrome.py@@ -3,10 +3,9 @@ from urllib.parse import urljoin-from .base import WdspecProtocol, WdspecExecutor, get_pages+from .base import get_pages from .executorwebdriver import WebDriverProtocol, WebDriverRefTestExecutor, WebDriverRun from .protocol import PrintProtocolPart-from ..webdriver_server import ChromeDriverServer here = os.path.dirname(__file__)@@ -111,11 +110,3 @@                 screenshots[i] = screenshot.split(",", 1)[1]         return screenshots---class ChromeDriverWdspecProtocol(WdspecProtocol):-    server_cls = ChromeDriverServer---class ChromeDriverWdspecExecutor(WdspecExecutor):-    protocol_cls = ChromeDriverWdspecProtocol

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Unused Import Removal] [executorchrome.py] [Lines 3-6]
   [Old Code]
   from .base import WdspecProtocol, WdspecExecutor, get_pages
   from .executorwebdriver import WebDriverProtocol, WebDriverRefTestExecutor, WebDriverRun
   from .protocol import PrintProtocolPart
   from ..webdriver_server import ChromeDriverServer
   [Fixed Code]
   from .base import get_pages
   from .executorwebdriver import WebDriverProtocol, WebDriverRefTestExecutor, WebDriverRun
   from .protocol import PrintProtocolPart

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Dead Code Removal] [executorchrome.py] [Lines 111-116]
   [Old Code]
   class ChromeDriverWdspecProtocol(WdspecProtocol):
       server_cls = ChromeDriverServer


   class ChromeDriverWdspecExecutor(WdspecExecutor):
       protocol_cls = ChromeDriverWdspecProtocol
   [Fixed Code]
   [Entire block removed]

Additional Notes:
- The changes appear to be primarily code cleanup rather than direct security fixes
- The removed imports and classes might indicate:
  * Removal of unused code (reducing attack surface)
  * Simplification of the codebase
  * Possible refactoring of WebDriver handling
- Without more context about the removed classes' usage, it's hard to determine if there were actual security implications
- The changes could potentially be related to security if the removed code had vulnerabilities, but there's no direct evidence of this in the diff

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.zero.3.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.zero.3.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ctx.beginPath(); ctx.rect(50, 25, 0, 0); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where a variable name was changed from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or clarity. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.zero.3.html] [Lines 17-18, 27]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes don't affect any security-related functionality, input validation, or data handling. It's simply a variable rename with no security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/neqo-qpack/src/decoder.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/neqo-qpack/src/decoder.rs@@ -236,9 +236,10 @@     /// # Panics     /// When a stream has already been added.     pub fn add_send_stream(&mut self, stream_id: StreamId) {-        if self.local_stream_id.is_some() {-            panic!("Adding multiple local streams");-        }+        assert!(+            self.local_stream_id.is_none(),+            "Adding multiple local streams"+        );         self.local_stream_id = Some(stream_id);     }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
Potential Panic Handling Improvement [File] third_party/rust/neqo-qpack/src/decoder.rs [Lines] 236-240  
[Old Code]  
```rust
if self.local_stream_id.is_some() {
    panic!("Adding multiple local streams");
}
```  
[Fixed Code]  
```rust
assert!(
    self.local_stream_id.is_none(),
    "Adding multiple local streams"
);
```

Additional Details:
1. The change replaces a direct `panic!` with an `assert!` macro, which is functionally equivalent but considered more idiomatic Rust.
2. This doesn't appear to be fixing a security vulnerability, but rather improving code style and maintainability.
3. The behavior remains the same - the program will still panic if attempting to add multiple local streams.
4. No known vulnerability name is associated with this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/widget/windows/AudioSession.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/widget/windows/AudioSession.cpp@@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ #include "mozilla/RefPtr.h" #include "nsIStringBundle.h"-#include "nsIUUIDGenerator.h" //#include "AudioSession.h" #include "nsCOMPtr.h"+#include "nsID.h" #include "nsServiceManagerUtils.h" #include "nsString.h" #include "nsThreadUtils.h"@@ -193,10 +193,8 @@     mIconPath.GetMutableData(&buffer, MAX_PATH);     ::GetModuleFileNameW(nullptr, buffer, MAX_PATH);-    nsCOMPtr<nsIUUIDGenerator> uuidgen =-        do_GetService("@mozilla.org/uuid-generator;1");-    NS_ENSURE_TRUE(uuidgen, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);-    uuidgen->GenerateUUIDInPlace(&mSessionGroupingParameter);+    nsresult rv = nsID::GenerateUUIDInPlace(mSessionGroupingParameter);+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);   }   mState = FAILED;

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   UUID Generation Implementation Change [widget/windows/AudioSession.cpp] [Lines 193-197]  
   Old Code:  
   ```cpp
   nsCOMPtr<nsIUUIDGenerator> uuidgen =
       do_GetService("@mozilla.org/uuid-generator;1");
   NS_ENSURE_TRUE(uuidgen, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
   uuidgen->GenerateUUIDInPlace(&mSessionGroupingParameter);
   ```  
   Fixed Code:  
   ```cpp
   nsresult rv = nsID::GenerateUUIDInPlace(mSessionGroupingParameter);
   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
   ```  
   Additional Details: The change replaces a service-based UUID generation with a direct function call. While not clearly a security fix, it could potentially address issues related to service availability or UUID generation quality, but this is uncertain.

Note: The diff shows a change in UUID generation implementation but doesn't clearly indicate a security vulnerability being fixed. The change might be for code simplification, performance improvement, or maintenance rather than security. No specific vulnerability name can be identified from this change alone.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/naga/src/lib.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/naga/src/lib.rs@@ -885,6 +885,8 @@     Asinh,     Acosh,     Atanh,+    Radians,+    Degrees,     // decomposition     Ceil,     Floor,@@ -926,6 +928,8 @@     ReverseBits,     ExtractBits,     InsertBits,+    FindLsb,+    FindMsb,     // data packing     Pack4x8snorm,     Pack4x8unorm,@@ -975,7 +979,7 @@ /// Component selection for a vector swizzle. #[repr(u8)]-#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)]+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd)] #[cfg_attr(feature = "serialize", derive(Serialize))] #[cfg_attr(feature = "deserialize", derive(Deserialize))] pub enum SwizzleComponent {@@ -1128,6 +1132,9 @@     ImageSample {         image: Handle<Expression>,         sampler: Handle<Expression>,+        /// If Some(), this operation is a gather operation+        /// on the selected component.+        gather: Option<SwizzleComponent>,         coordinate: Handle<Expression>,         array_index: Option<Handle<Expression>>,         offset: Option<Handle<Constant>>,

I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Added Math Operations [third_party/rust/naga/src/lib.rs] [Lines 885-886, 928-929]
   [Old Code]
   Asinh,
   Acosh,
   Atanh,
   // decomposition
   [Fixed Code]
   Asinh,
   Acosh,
   Atanh,
   Radians,
   Degrees,
   // decomposition

   [Old Code]
   ExtractBits,
   InsertBits,
   // data packing
   [Fixed Code]
   ExtractBits,
   InsertBits,
   FindLsb,
   FindMsb,
   // data packing

   Details: This appears to be adding new math operations (Radians, Degrees) and bit manipulation functions (FindLsb, FindMsb) to the enum. No security vulnerability is being fixed here, just functionality expansion.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   SwizzleComponent PartialOrd Derive [third_party/rust/naga/src/lib.rs] [Lines 975-979]
   [Old Code]
   #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)]
   [Fixed Code]
   #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd)]

   Details: Adding PartialOrd derivation to SwizzleComponent enum might have security implications if the ordering is used for security-sensitive operations, but without more context about how this enum is used, I can't be certain.

3. Vulnerability Existed: no
   ImageSample Gather Operation [third_party/rust/naga/src/lib.rs] [Lines 1128-1135]
   [Old Code]
   ImageSample {
       image: Handle<Expression>,
       sampler: Handle<Expression>,
       coordinate: Handle<Expression>,
   [Fixed Code]
   ImageSample {
       image: Handle<Expression>,
       sampler: Handle<Expression>,
       /// If Some(), this operation is a gather operation
       /// on the selected component.
       gather: Option<SwizzleComponent>,
       coordinate: Handle<Expression>,

   Details: This change adds a gather operation capability to ImageSample. While this modifies the structure, it doesn't appear to be fixing a security vulnerability, rather adding new functionality for texture gathering operations.

No clear security vulnerabilities are being fixed in this diff. The changes appear to be primarily feature additions and minor enhancements.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/frontend/BytecodeCompiler.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/frontend/BytecodeCompiler.cpp@@ -1001,6 +1001,105 @@   return CompileModuleImpl(cx, options, srcBuf); }+static bool InstantiateLazyFunction(JSContext* cx, CompilationInput& input,+                                    CompilationStencil& stencil,+                                    BytecodeCompilerOutput& output) {+  // We do check the type, but do not write anything to it as this is not+  // necessary for lazy function, as the script is patched inside the+  // JSFunction when instantiating.+  MOZ_ASSERT(output.is<CompilationGCOutput*>());+  MOZ_ASSERT(!output.as<CompilationGCOutput*>());++  mozilla::DebugOnly<uint32_t> lazyFlags =+      static_cast<uint32_t>(input.immutableFlags());++  Rooted<CompilationGCOutput> gcOutput(cx);++  if (input.source->hasEncoder()) {+    if (!input.source->addDelazificationToIncrementalEncoding(cx, stencil)) {+      return false;+    }+  }++  if (!CompilationStencil::instantiateStencils(cx, input, stencil,+                                               gcOutput.get())) {+    return false;+  }++  // NOTE: After instantiation succeeds and bytecode is attached, the rest of+  //       this operation should be infallible. Any failure during+  //       delazification should restore the function back to a consistent+  //       lazy state.++  MOZ_ASSERT(lazyFlags == gcOutput.get().script->immutableFlags());+  MOZ_ASSERT(gcOutput.get().script->outermostScope()->hasOnChain(+                 ScopeKind::NonSyntactic) ==+             gcOutput.get().script->immutableFlags().hasFlag(+                 JSScript::ImmutableFlags::HasNonSyntacticScope));++  return true;+}++enum class GetCachedResult {+  // Similar to return false.+  Error,++  // We have not found any entry.+  NotFound,++  // We have found an entry, and set everything according to the desired+  // BytecodeCompilerOutput out-param.+  Found+};++// When we have a cache hit, the addPtr out-param would evaluate to a true-ish+// value.+static GetCachedResult GetCachedLazyFunctionStencilMaybeInstantiate(+    JSContext* cx, CompilationInput& input, BytecodeCompilerOutput& output) {+  RefPtr<CompilationStencil> stencil;+  {+    StencilCache& cache = cx->runtime()->caches().delazificationCache;+    auto guard = cache.isSourceCached(input.source);+    if (!guard) {+      return GetCachedResult::NotFound;+    }++    // Before releasing the guard, which is locking the cache, we increment the+    // reference counter such that we do not reclaim the CompilationStencil+    // while we are instantiating it.+    StencilContext key(input.source, input.extent());+    stencil = cache.lookup(guard, key);+    if (!stencil) {+      return GetCachedResult::NotFound;+    }+  }++  if (output.is<RefPtr<CompilationStencil>>()) {+    output.as<RefPtr<CompilationStencil>>() = stencil;+    return GetCachedResult::Found;+  }++  if (output.is<UniquePtr<ExtensibleCompilationStencil>>()) {+    auto extensible = cx->make_unique<ExtensibleCompilationStencil>(cx, input);+    if (!extensible) {+      return GetCachedResult::Error;+    }+    if (!extensible->cloneFrom(cx, *stencil)) {+      return GetCachedResult::Error;+    }++    output.as<UniquePtr<ExtensibleCompilationStencil>>() =+        std::move(extensible);+    return GetCachedResult::Found;+  }++  if (!InstantiateLazyFunction(cx, input, *stencil, output)) {+    return GetCachedResult::Error;+  }++  return GetCachedResult::Found;+}+ template <typename Unit> static bool CompileLazyFunctionToStencilMaybeInstantiate(     JSContext* cx, CompilationInput& input, const Unit* units, size_t length,@@ -1008,6 +1107,16 @@   MOZ_ASSERT(input.source);   AutoAssertReportedException assertException(cx);+  auto res = GetCachedLazyFunctionStencilMaybeInstantiate(cx, input, output);+  switch (res) {+    case GetCachedResult::Error:+      return false;+    case GetCachedResult::Found:+      assertException.reset();+      return true;+    case GetCachedResult::NotFound:+      break;+  }   InheritThis inheritThis =       input.functionFlags().isArrow() ? InheritThis::Yes : InheritThis::No;@@ -1080,40 +1189,10 @@     output.as<RefPtr<CompilationStencil>>() = std::move(stencil);   } else {-    // We do check the type, but do not write anything to it as this is not-    // necessary for lazy function, as the script is patched inside the-    // JSFunction when instantiating.-    MOZ_ASSERT(output.is<CompilationGCOutput*>());-    MOZ_ASSERT(!output.as<CompilationGCOutput*>());--    mozilla::DebugOnly<uint32_t> lazyFlags =-        static_cast<uint32_t>(input.immutableFlags());--    Rooted<CompilationGCOutput> gcOutput(cx);     BorrowingCompilationStencil borrowingStencil(compilationState);--    if (input.source->hasEncoder()) {-      if (!input.source->addDelazificationToIncrementalEncoding(-              cx, borrowingStencil)) {-        return false;-      }-    }--    if (!CompilationStencil::instantiateStencils(cx, input, borrowingStencil,-                                                 gcOutput.get())) {-      return false;-    }--    // NOTE: After instantiation succeeds and bytecode is attached, the rest of-    //       this operation should be infallible. Any failure during-    //       delazification should restore the function back to a consistent-    //       lazy state.--    MOZ_ASSERT(lazyFlags == gcOutput.get().script->immutableFlags());-    MOZ_ASSERT(gcOutput.get().script->outermostScope()->hasOnChain(-                   ScopeKind::NonSyntactic) ==-               gcOutput.get().script->immutableFlags().hasFlag(-                   JSScript::ImmutableFlags::HasNonSyntacticScope));+    if (!InstantiateLazyFunction(cx, input, borrowingStencil, output)) {+      return false;+    }   }   assertException.reset();@@ -1198,7 +1277,10 @@   MOZ_DIAGNOSTIC_ASSERT(!data.isGhost()); #endif-  AutoIncrementalTimer timer(cx->realm()->timers.delazificationTime);+  Maybe<AutoIncrementalTimer> timer;+  if (cx->realm()) {+    timer.emplace(cx->realm()->timers.delazificationTime);+  }   size_t sourceStart = extra.extent.sourceStart;   size_t sourceLength = extra.extent.sourceEnd - sourceStart;

I'll analyze the code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Race Condition in Cache Handling [js/src/frontend/BytecodeCompiler.cpp] [Lines 1054-1075]
[Old Code]
(No equivalent code existed before)
[Fixed Code]
The new code introduces a cache lookup mechanism with proper locking (via `guard`) and reference counting to prevent race conditions during stencil instantiation.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Null Pointer Dereference Protection [js/src/frontend/BytecodeCompiler.cpp] [Lines 1277-1279]
[Old Code]
`AutoIncrementalTimer timer(cx->realm()->timers.delazificationTime);`
[Fixed Code]
`Maybe<AutoIncrementalTimer> timer;
if (cx->realm()) {
    timer.emplace(cx->realm()->timers.delazificationTime);
}`

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Code Organization for Safety [js/src/frontend/BytecodeCompiler.cpp] [Lines 1001-1189]
[Old Code]
The lazy function instantiation code was inline within CompileLazyFunctionToStencilMaybeInstantiate
[Fixed Code]
The code has been refactored into separate functions (InstantiateLazyFunction and GetCachedLazyFunctionStencilMaybeInstantiate) with clearer error handling and state management

The changes appear to improve code safety by:
1. Adding proper cache synchronization
2. Preventing potential null pointer dereferences
3. Better organizing code to handle errors consistently
4. Adding more assertions and debug checks

While these don't correspond to specific named vulnerabilities, they represent security-conscious improvements to the codebase.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/webdriver/tests/support/helpers.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/webdriver/tests/support/helpers.py@@ -58,7 +58,8 @@         This also includes bringing it out of maximized, minimized,         or fullscreened state.         """-        session.window.size = defaults.WINDOW_SIZE+        if session.capabilities.get("setWindowRect"):+            session.window.size = defaults.WINDOW_SIZE     @ignore_exceptions     def _restore_windows(session):

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
   Potential Window State Manipulation Vulnerability [File] [Lines 58-59]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```python
   session.window.size = defaults.WINDOW_SIZE
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```python
   if session.capabilities.get("setWindowRect"):
       session.window.size = defaults.WINDOW_SIZE
   ```  
   Additional Details: The fix adds a capability check before attempting to modify window size. This prevents potential unauthorized window state manipulation when the "setWindowRect" capability isn't supported or allowed, which could be used in clickjacking or other UI redressing attacks. The vulnerability could allow malicious scripts to manipulate window sizes without proper capability checks.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   Potential Privilege Escalation [File] [Lines 58-59]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```python
   session.window.size = defaults.WINDOW_SIZE
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```python
   if session.capabilities.get("setWindowRect"):
       session.window.size = defaults.WINDOW_SIZE
   ```  
   Additional Details: While not clearly a security vulnerability, the change could potentially prevent privilege escalation scenarios where window manipulation might be used to bypass security controls. However, this is speculative as we don't have full context of the capabilities system.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.modified.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.modified.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50)@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@     imgdata.data[i+1] = 255; } ctx.putImageData(imgdata, 45, 20);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability purposes. Here's the analysis following your format:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13,14,27]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);

The changes don't affect any security-related functionality, input validation, or data handling. It's simply a variable name refactoring.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.