--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/siphasher/src/sip.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/siphasher/src/sip.rs@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@         let mut b0 = [0u8; 8];         let mut b1 = [0u8; 8];         b0.copy_from_slice(&key[0..8]);-        b1.copy_from_slice(&key[0..8]);+        b1.copy_from_slice(&key[8..16]);         let key0 = u64::from_le_bytes(b0);         let key1 = u64::from_le_bytes(b1);         Self::new_with_keys(key0, key1)@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@     pub fn key(&self) -> [u8; 16] {         let mut bytes = [0u8; 16];         bytes[0..8].copy_from_slice(&self.0.hasher.k0.to_le_bytes());-        bytes[0..16].copy_from_slice(&self.0.hasher.k1.to_le_bytes());+        bytes[8..16].copy_from_slice(&self.0.hasher.k1.to_le_bytes());         bytes     } }@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@         let mut b0 = [0u8; 8];         let mut b1 = [0u8; 8];         b0.copy_from_slice(&key[0..8]);-        b1.copy_from_slice(&key[0..8]);+        b1.copy_from_slice(&key[8..16]);         let key0 = u64::from_le_bytes(b0);         let key1 = u64::from_le_bytes(b1);         Self::new_with_keys(key0, key1)@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@     pub fn key(&self) -> [u8; 16] {         let mut bytes = [0u8; 16];         bytes[0..8].copy_from_slice(&self.hasher.k0.to_le_bytes());-        bytes[0..16].copy_from_slice(&self.hasher.k1.to_le_bytes());+        bytes[8..16].copy_from_slice(&self.hasher.k1.to_le_bytes());         bytes     } }@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@         let mut b0 = [0u8; 8];         let mut b1 = [0u8; 8];         b0.copy_from_slice(&key[0..8]);-        b1.copy_from_slice(&key[0..8]);+        b1.copy_from_slice(&key[8..16]);         let key0 = u64::from_le_bytes(b0);         let key1 = u64::from_le_bytes(b1);         Self::new_with_keys(key0, key1)@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@     pub fn key(&self) -> [u8; 16] {         let mut bytes = [0u8; 16];         bytes[0..8].copy_from_slice(&self.hasher.k0.to_le_bytes());-        bytes[0..16].copy_from_slice(&self.hasher.k1.to_le_bytes());+        bytes[8..16].copy_from_slice(&self.hasher.k1.to_le_bytes());         bytes     } }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
   Incorrect Key Handling Vulnerability [third_party/rust/siphasher/src/sip.rs] [Lines 160-161, 200-201, 240-241]  
   Old Code:  
   ```rust
   b1.copy_from_slice(&key[0..8]);
   ```  
   Fixed Code:  
   ```rust
   b1.copy_from_slice(&key[8..16]);
   ```  

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
   Incorrect Key Serialization Vulnerability [third_party/rust/siphasher/src/sip.rs] [Lines 175-176, 215-216, 255-256]  
   Old Code:  
   ```rust
   bytes[0..16].copy_from_slice(&self.0.hasher.k1.to_le_bytes());
   ```  
   Fixed Code:  
   ```rust
   bytes[8..16].copy_from_slice(&self.0.hasher.k1.to_le_bytes());
   ```  

The vulnerabilities involved:  
1. Incorrect key handling where the same portion of the key (first 8 bytes) was being used for both key parts instead of using the first 8 bytes for key0 and next 8 bytes for key1.  
2. Incorrect key serialization where k1 was being written over the entire 16-byte array instead of just the second half (bytes 8-16), which would overwrite k0's value in the output.  

Both issues could lead to security problems in cryptographic operations by producing incorrect hash values due to improper key handling.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/accessible/android/RemoteAccessibleWrap.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/accessible/android/RemoteAccessibleWrap.h@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@   virtual uint64_t State() override;-  virtual nsIntRect Bounds() const override;+  virtual LayoutDeviceIntRect Bounds() const override;   MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT   virtual void ScrollTo(uint32_t aHow) const override;

Let me analyze this code diff for potential security fixes:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Type Confusion or Memory Safety Issue] [accessible/android/RemoteAccessibleWrap.h] [Lines 41]
[Old Code]
virtual nsIntRect Bounds() const override;
[Fixed Code]
virtual LayoutDeviceIntRect Bounds() const override;

Additional Details:
- The change involves switching from nsIntRect to LayoutDeviceIntRect for the Bounds() method return type
- While this could potentially relate to memory safety (as rect types often involve memory management), there's no clear evidence of a specific vulnerability being fixed
- The change might be part of a larger architectural improvement rather than a direct security fix
- Without more context about the specific issues these rect types might cause, it's hard to determine if this was fixing a known vulnerability

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/shared/specs/node.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/shared/specs/node.js@@ -114,6 +114,18 @@         events: RetVal("json"),       },     },+    enableEventListener: {+      request: {+        eventListenerInfoId: Arg(0),+      },+      response: {},+    },+    disableEventListener: {+      request: {+        eventListenerInfoId: Arg(0),+      },+      response: {},+    },     modifyAttributes: {       request: {         modifications: Arg(0, "array:json"),

I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Missing Access Control [File] devtools/shared/specs/node.js [Lines 114-128]
[Old Code]
(none - these methods were not present)
[Fixed Code]
enableEventListener: {
  request: {
    eventListenerInfoId: Arg(0),
  },
  response: {},
},
disableEventListener: {
  request: {
    eventListenerInfoId: Arg(0),
  },
  response: {},
}

Additional Details:
The diff shows the addition of two new methods (enableEventListener and disableEventListener) for managing event listeners. While this doesn't show a direct vulnerability fix, it's worth noting that:
1. There's no visible access control or validation shown in the diff
2. The methods accept direct IDs without showing any validation
3. This could potentially be part of a security enhancement if these methods replace less secure ways of managing event listeners

However, without more context about the surrounding code or the security issue being addressed, I can't definitively identify a specific vulnerability being fixed. The changes appear to be adding new functionality rather than directly patching a security hole.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.create2.initial.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.create2.initial.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var imgdata = ctx.createImageData(10, 20); _assertSame(imgdata.data.length, imgdata.width*imgdata.height*4, "imgdata.data.length", "imgdata.width*imgdata.height*4");

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed - it appears to be a simple variable renaming change. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.create2.initial.worker.js] [Lines 13-14]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

The change simply renames the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` without any security implications. The functionality remains exactly the same, and there are no security-related patterns being modified in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/ic-unit-009.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/ic-unit-009.html@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-values-4/#font-relative-lengths">   <link rel="match" href="reference/ic-unit-009-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="In this test, the ic unit is the advance height measure of the 水 (CJK water ideograph, U+6C34) glyph.">   <style>

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no  
No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/ic-unit-009.html [Lines] 8  
[Old Code]  
`<meta name="flags" content="">`  
[Fixed Code]  
(Line removed)

Additional Details:  
1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag that wasn't serving any purpose.  
2. There's no security vulnerability being fixed here - it's just a cleanup of unnecessary markup.  
3. The "flags" meta tag was commonly used in test files but isn't needed in this case.  
4. No security-related changes or vulnerabilities are addressed by this modification.

The modification appears to be part of general code maintenance rather than a security fix. The empty meta tag removal doesn't impact security in any way.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/sandbox/linux/broker/SandboxBrokerPolicyFactory.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/sandbox/linux/broker/SandboxBrokerPolicyFactory.h@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@   static UniquePtr<SandboxBroker::Policy> GetRDDPolicy(int aPid);   static UniquePtr<SandboxBroker::Policy> GetSocketProcessPolicy(int aPid);+  static UniquePtr<SandboxBroker::Policy> GetUtilityProcessPolicy(int aPid);  private:   UniquePtr<const SandboxBroker::Policy> mCommonContentPolicy;

I'll analyze the provided code diff according to the specified format.

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability - Added functionality] [security/sandbox/linux/broker/SandboxBrokerPolicyFactory.h] [Lines around 22]
[Old Code]
  static UniquePtr<SandboxBroker::Policy> GetRDDPolicy(int aPid);
  static UniquePtr<SandboxBroker::Policy> GetSocketProcessPolicy(int aPid);

[Fixed Code]
  static UniquePtr<SandboxBroker::Policy> GetRDDPolicy(int aPid);
  static UniquePtr<SandboxBroker::Policy> GetSocketProcessPolicy(int aPid);
  static UniquePtr<SandboxBroker::Policy> GetUtilityProcessPolicy(int aPid);

Additional Details:
The diff shows an addition of a new method `GetUtilityProcessPolicy` to the class. This appears to be a feature addition rather than a security fix, as it's adding new functionality (likely for handling utility processes) rather than modifying existing security-sensitive code. There's no indication of a vulnerability being fixed in this change.

No vulnerability name is applicable since this is not a security fix but rather a functional addition to the sandbox policy factory.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/selectors/pause.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/selectors/pause.js@@ -2,14 +2,16 @@  * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this  * file, You can obtain one at <http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/>. */-import { getCurrentThread } from "../reducers/pause";-import { getSelectedLocation } from "../reducers/sources";+import { getThreadPauseState } from "../reducers/pause";+import { getSelectedSourceId, getSelectedLocation } from "../selectors/sources";++import { isGeneratedId } from "devtools-source-map"; // eslint-disable-next-line import { getSelectedLocation as _getSelectedLocation } from "../utils/selected-location"; import { createSelector } from "reselect";-export const getSelectedFrames = createSelector(+const getSelectedFrames = createSelector(   state => state.pause.threads,   threadPauseState => {     const selectedFrames = {};@@ -50,3 +52,227 @@     };   } );++export function getContext(state) {+  return state.pause.cx;+}++export function getThreadContext(state) {+  return state.pause.threadcx;+}++export function getPauseReason(state, thread) {+  return getThreadPauseState(state.pause, thread).why;+}++export function getPauseCommand(state, thread) {+  return getThreadPauseState(state.pause, thread).command;+}++export function isStepping(state, thread) {+  return ["stepIn", "stepOver", "stepOut"].includes(+    getPauseCommand(state, thread)+  );+}++export function getCurrentThread(state) {+  return getThreadContext(state).thread;+}++export function getIsPaused(state, thread) {+  return getThreadPauseState(state.pause, thread).isPaused;+}++export function getIsCurrentThreadPaused(state) {+  return getIsPaused(state, getCurrentThread(state));+}++export function isEvaluatingExpression(state, thread) {+  return getThreadPauseState(state.pause, thread).command === "expression";+}++export function getIsWaitingOnBreak(state, thread) {+  return getThreadPauseState(state.pause, thread).isWaitingOnBreak;+}++export function getShouldPauseOnExceptions(state) {+  return state.pause.shouldPauseOnExceptions;+}++export function getShouldPauseOnCaughtExceptions(state) {+  return state.pause.shouldPauseOnCaughtExceptions;+}++export function getFrames(state, thread) {+  const { frames, framesLoading } = getThreadPauseState(state.pause, thread);+  return framesLoading ? null : frames;+}++export function getCurrentThreadFrames(state) {+  const { frames, framesLoading } = getThreadPauseState(+    state.pause,+    getCurrentThread(state)+  );+  return framesLoading ? null : frames;+}++function getGeneratedFrameId(frameId) {+  if (frameId.includes("-originalFrame")) {+    // The mapFrames can add original stack frames -- get generated frameId.+    return frameId.substr(0, frameId.lastIndexOf("-originalFrame"));+  }+  return frameId;+}++export function getGeneratedFrameScope(state, thread, frameId) {+  if (!frameId) {+    return null;+  }++  return getFrameScopes(state, thread).generated[getGeneratedFrameId(frameId)];+}++export function getOriginalFrameScope(state, thread, sourceId, frameId) {+  if (!frameId || !sourceId) {+    return null;+  }++  const isGenerated = isGeneratedId(sourceId);+  const original = getFrameScopes(state, thread).original[+    getGeneratedFrameId(frameId)+  ];++  if (!isGenerated && original && (original.pending || original.scope)) {+    return original;+  }++  return null;+}++// This is only used by tests+export function getFrameScopes(state, thread) {+  return getThreadPauseState(state.pause, thread).frameScopes;+}++export function getSelectedFrameBindings(state, thread) {+  const scopes = getFrameScopes(state, thread);+  const selectedFrameId = getSelectedFrameId(state, thread);+  if (!scopes || !selectedFrameId) {+    return null;+  }++  const frameScope = scopes.generated[selectedFrameId];+  if (!frameScope || frameScope.pending) {+    return;+  }++  let currentScope = frameScope.scope;+  let frameBindings = [];+  while (currentScope && currentScope.type != "object") {+    if (currentScope.bindings) {+      const bindings = Object.keys(currentScope.bindings.variables);+      const args = [].concat(+        ...currentScope.bindings.arguments.map(argument =>+          Object.keys(argument)+        )+      );++      frameBindings = [...frameBindings, ...bindings, ...args];+    }+    currentScope = currentScope.parent;+  }++  return frameBindings;+}++function getFrameScope(state, thread, sourceId, frameId) {+  return (+    getOriginalFrameScope(state, thread, sourceId, frameId) ||+    getGeneratedFrameScope(state, thread, frameId)+  );+}++// This is only used by tests+export function getSelectedScope(state, thread) {+  const sourceId = getSelectedSourceId(state);+  const frameId = getSelectedFrameId(state, thread);++  const frameScope = getFrameScope(state, thread, sourceId, frameId);+  if (!frameScope) {+    return null;+  }++  return frameScope.scope || null;+}++export function getSelectedOriginalScope(state, thread) {+  const sourceId = getSelectedSourceId(state);+  const frameId = getSelectedFrameId(state, thread);+  return getOriginalFrameScope(state, thread, sourceId, frameId);+}++export function getSelectedGeneratedScope(state, thread) {+  const frameId = getSelectedFrameId(state, thread);+  return getGeneratedFrameScope(state, thread, frameId);+}++export function getSelectedScopeMappings(state, thread) {+  const frameId = getSelectedFrameId(state, thread);+  if (!frameId) {+    return null;+  }++  return getFrameScopes(state, thread).mappings[frameId];+}++export function getSelectedFrameId(state, thread) {+  return getThreadPauseState(state.pause, thread).selectedFrameId;+}++export function isTopFrameSelected(state, thread) {+  const selectedFrameId = getSelectedFrameId(state, thread);+  const topFrame = getTopFrame(state, thread);+  return selectedFrameId == topFrame?.id;+}++export function getTopFrame(state, thread) {+  const frames = getFrames(state, thread);+  return frames?.[0];+}++export function getSkipPausing(state) {+  return state.pause.skipPausing;+}++export function getHighlightedCalls(state, thread) {+  return getThreadPauseState(state.pause, thread).highlightedCalls;+}++export function isMapScopesEnabled(state) {+  return state.pause.mapScopes;+}++export function getInlinePreviews(state, thread, frameId) {+  return getThreadPauseState(state.pause, thread).inlinePreview[+    getGeneratedFrameId(frameId)+  ];+}++// This is only used by tests+export function getSelectedInlinePreviews(state) {+  const thread = getCurrentThread(state);+  const frameId = getSelectedFrameId(state, thread);+  if (!frameId) {+    return null;+  }++  return getInlinePreviews(state, thread, frameId);+}++export function getLastExpandedScopes(state, thread) {+  return getThreadPauseState(state.pause, thread).lastExpandedScopes;+}++export function getPausePreviewLocation(state) {+  return state.pause.previewLocation;+}

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't identify any clear security vulnerabilities that were fixed. The changes appear to be primarily refactoring and functional improvements rather than security fixes. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability [devtools/client/debugger/src/selectors/pause.js] [Various lines]
   [Old code structure with different imports and selector implementation]
   [New code structure with reorganized imports and additional functionality]

The main changes include:
- Import reorganization (adding getThreadPauseState and getSelectedSourceId)
- Changing getSelectedFrames from exported to internal
- Adding numerous new selector functions for pause state management
- Adding frame scope and binding related functionality
- Adding utility functions for thread and pause state management

These changes appear to be architectural improvements and feature additions rather than security fixes. The code follows good practices like input validation (checking for null/undefined values) and proper scope management.

If there were any security implications in these changes, they would be subtle and not clearly identifiable as specific vulnerabilities from the diff alone. The code maintains proper checks for null values and validates inputs before processing them.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.image.destination-over.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.image.destination-over.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 255, 0.5)';@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ promise.then(function(response) {     createImageBitmap(response).then(bitmap => {         ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 0, 0);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 109,255,146,223, "50,25", "109,255,146,223", 5);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 109,255,146,223, "50,25", "109,255,146,223", 5);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.image.destination-over.html] [Lines: 17-18, 36]
   Old Code: 
   ```
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ```
   ```
   _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 109,255,146,223, "50,25", "109,255,146,223", 5);
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ```
   ```
   _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 109,255,146,223, "50,25", "109,255,146,223", 5);
   ```

The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) with no security implications. The functionality remains identical, and there are no security-related patterns being modified. The changes are likely for code consistency or readability purposes rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-rgba-1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-rgba-1.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255.0, 0)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes (variable renaming) rather than security-related fixes. Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-rgba-1.html] [Lines 17-25]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes only involve:
1. Renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Updating the references to this variable in the `_assertPixel` call
There are no changes to the actual functionality or security-related aspects of the code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/mediaqueries/relative-units-004.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/mediaqueries/relative-units-004.html@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-mediaqueries/#units">   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/mediaqueries-4/#units">   <link rel="match" href="reference/ref-green-body.xht">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Font-relative length units (such as 'ch') in media queries should be calculated based on the initial value of 'font-size', not based on author style declarations, such as: html { font-size: 200%; }">   <style> :root {

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The change appears to be a simple removal of an empty meta tag for flags, which doesn't have any security implications.

Answer Format for Each Vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerabilities found in this diff. The change is a minor HTML cleanup removing an empty meta tag.

Additional Details:
    The diff shows removal of:
    - <meta name="flags" content="">
    Which appears to be test configuration cleanup rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.clearRect.path.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.clearRect.path.worker.js@@ -13,15 +13,15 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.beginPath(); ctx.rect(0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.clearRect(0, 0, 16, 16); ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where variable names were updated for consistency. Here's the analysis:

1. 
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-15]
    Old Code:
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    
    Fixed Code:
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

2. 
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No vulnerability found [File] [Line 21]
    Old Code:
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    
    Fixed Code:
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency, but don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/base/content/pageinfo/pageInfo.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/base/content/pageinfo/pageInfo.js@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@  * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file,  * You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */-/* import-globals-from ../../../../toolkit/content/globalOverlay.js */-/* import-globals-from ../../../../toolkit/content/contentAreaUtils.js */-/* import-globals-from ../../../../toolkit/content/treeUtils.js */+/* import-globals-from /toolkit/content/globalOverlay.js */+/* import-globals-from /toolkit/content/contentAreaUtils.js */+/* import-globals-from /toolkit/content/treeUtils.js */ /* import-globals-from ../utilityOverlay.js */ /* import-globals-from permissions.js */ /* import-globals-from security.js */@@ -12,6 +12,19 @@ XPCOMUtils.defineLazyModuleGetters(this, {   E10SUtils: "resource://gre/modules/E10SUtils.jsm", });++// Inherit color scheme overrides from parent window. This is to inherit the+// color scheme of dark themed PBM windows.+{+  let openerColorSchemeOverride =+    window.opener?.browsingContext?.top.prefersColorSchemeOverride;+  if (+    openerColorSchemeOverride &&+    window.browsingContext == window.browsingContext.top+  ) {+    window.browsingContext.prefersColorSchemeOverride = openerColorSchemeOverride;+  }+} // define a js object to implement nsITreeView function pageInfoTreeView(treeid, copycol) {

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes:

1. First change (import paths):
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    Path Traversal Potential [File] browser/base/content/pageinfo/pageInfo.js [Lines 2-4]
    [Old Code]
    /* import-globals-from ../../../../toolkit/content/globalOverlay.js */
    /* import-globals-from ../../../../toolkit/content/contentAreaUtils.js */
    /* import-globals-from ../../../../toolkit/content/treeUtils.js */
    [Fixed Code]
    /* import-globals-from /toolkit/content/globalOverlay.js */
    /* import-globals-from /toolkit/content/contentAreaUtils.js */
    /* import-globals-from /toolkit/content/treeUtils.js */

    Additional Details: The change from relative paths to absolute paths might be related to security, but it's unclear if this was fixing a specific vulnerability or just improving code maintainability.

2. Second change (color scheme inheritance):
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    Potential Information Leak [File] browser/base/content/pageinfo/pageInfo.js [Lines 12-19]
    [Old Code]
    (none - new code added)
    [Fixed Code]
    // Inherit color scheme overrides from parent window. This is to inherit the
    // color scheme of dark themed PBM windows.
    {
      let openerColorSchemeOverride =
        window.opener?.browsingContext?.top.prefersColorSchemeOverride;
      if (
        openerColorSchemeOverride &&
        window.browsingContext == window.browsingContext.top
      ) {
        window.browsingContext.prefersColorSchemeOverride = openerColorSchemeOverride;
      }
    }

    Additional Details: The new code handles color scheme inheritance from parent windows. While not clearly a security fix, it could potentially relate to preventing information leaks about private browsing mode through visual differences.

Note: Neither change clearly indicates a specific security vulnerability being fixed, but both could have security implications. The first change might prevent potential path traversal issues, and the second might prevent information leaks about private browsing state.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.stroke.join.3.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.stroke.join.3.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -33,10 +33,10 @@ ctx.lineTo(-150, -50); ctx.lineTo(-151, -100); // (not an exact right angle, to avoid some other bug in Firefox 3) ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 48,48, 0,255,0,255, "48,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 48,48, 0,255,0,255, "48,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-related modifications.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.stroke.join.3.html] [17-33]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
...
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
...

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and update all references to it. This appears to be a code style/readability improvement rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/style/nsCSSPseudoElementList.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/style/nsCSSPseudoElementList.h@@ -88,9 +88,8 @@ // The element that shows the autofill value. CSS_PSEUDO_ELEMENT(mozTextControlPreview, ":-moz-text-control-preview",                    CSS_PSEUDO_ELEMENT_ENABLED_IN_UA_SHEETS)-// The Show Password button for <input type=password>.-CSS_PSEUDO_ELEMENT(mozTextControlShowPasswordButton,-                   ":-moz-text-control-show-password-button",+// The Reveal Password button for <input type=password>.+CSS_PSEUDO_ELEMENT(mozReveal, ":-moz-reveal",                    CSS_PSEUDO_ELEMENT_ENABLED_IN_UA_SHEETS) CSS_PSEUDO_ELEMENT(fileSelectorButton, ":file-selector-button",

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis following the required format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Renaming/Refactoring] [layout/style/nsCSSPseudoElementList.h] [Lines 88-92]
[Old Code]
// The Show Password button for <input type=password>.
CSS_PSEUDO_ELEMENT(mozTextControlShowPasswordButton,
                   ":-moz-text-control-show-password-button",
                   CSS_PSEUDO_ELEMENT_ENABLED_IN_UA_SHEETS)
[Fixed Code]
// The Reveal Password button for <input type=password>.
CSS_PSEUDO_ELEMENT(mozReveal, ":-moz-reveal",
                   CSS_PSEUDO_ELEMENT_ENABLED_IN_UA_SHEETS)

Additional Details:
- This appears to be a simple renaming/refactoring change rather than a security fix
- The functionality remains the same (password reveal button for input fields)
- The change involves updating the naming convention and comment to be more consistent
- No actual security vulnerability is being addressed in this change

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-rgb-2.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-rgb-2.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgb(0, 255, 0, 0.2)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-rgb-2.worker.js [Lines] 13-21
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51");
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51");

The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) with no security implications. The functionality remains the same, and there are no security-related patterns being modified. The test continues to perform the same canvas operations and assertions.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/MediaManager.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/MediaManager.h@@ -265,6 +265,8 @@       MozPromise<RefPtr<DOMMediaStream>, RefPtr<MediaMgrError>, true>;   using DeviceSetPromise =       MozPromise<RefPtr<MediaDeviceSetRefCnt>, RefPtr<MediaMgrError>, true>;+  using ConstDeviceSetPromise = MozPromise<RefPtr<const MediaDeviceSetRefCnt>,+                                           RefPtr<MediaMgrError>, true>;   using LocalDevicePromise =       MozPromise<RefPtr<LocalMediaDevice>, RefPtr<MediaMgrError>, true>;   using LocalDeviceSetPromise = MozPromise<RefPtr<LocalMediaDeviceSetRefCnt>,@@ -276,21 +278,14 @@       const dom::MediaStreamConstraints& aConstraints,       dom::CallerType aCallerType);-  RefPtr<LocalDeviceSetPromise> EnumerateDevices(nsPIDOMWindowInner* aWindow);--  enum class EnumerationFlag {-    AllowPermissionRequest,-    EnumerateAudioOutputs,-    ForceFakes,-  };-  using EnumerationFlags = EnumSet<EnumerationFlag>;-  RefPtr<LocalDeviceSetPromise> EnumerateDevicesImpl(-      nsPIDOMWindowInner* aWindow, dom::MediaSourceEnum aVideoInputType,-      dom::MediaSourceEnum aAudioInputType, EnumerationFlags aFlags);-   RefPtr<LocalDevicePromise> SelectAudioOutput(       nsPIDOMWindowInner* aWindow, const dom::AudioOutputOptions& aOptions,       dom::CallerType aCallerType);++  // Return the list of microphone, camera, and speaker devices.+  // MediaDeviceSets provided on promise resolution are shared between+  // callers and so cannot be modified.+  RefPtr<ConstDeviceSetPromise> GetPhysicalDevices();   void OnNavigation(uint64_t aWindowID);   void OnCameraMute(bool aMute);@@ -323,6 +318,16 @@                                        const MediaDeviceSet& aAudios);  private:+  enum class EnumerationFlag {+    AllowPermissionRequest,+    EnumerateAudioOutputs,+    ForceFakes,+  };+  using EnumerationFlags = EnumSet<EnumerationFlag>;+  RefPtr<LocalDeviceSetPromise> EnumerateDevicesImpl(+      nsPIDOMWindowInner* aWindow, dom::MediaSourceEnum aVideoInputType,+      dom::MediaSourceEnum aAudioInputType, EnumerationFlags aFlags);+   RefPtr<DeviceSetPromise> EnumerateRawDevices(       dom::MediaSourceEnum aVideoInputType,       dom::MediaSourceEnum aAudioInputType, EnumerationFlags aFlags);@@ -347,6 +352,7 @@   void RemoveMediaDevicesCallback(uint64_t aWindowID);   void DeviceListChanged();+  void InvalidateDeviceCache();   void HandleDeviceListChanged();   // Returns the number of incomplete tasks associated with this window,@@ -367,6 +373,11 @@   nsRefPtrHashtable<nsStringHashKey, GetUserMediaTask> mActiveCallbacks;   nsClassHashtable<nsUint64HashKey, nsTArray<nsString>> mCallIds;   nsTArray<RefPtr<dom::GetUserMediaRequest>> mPendingGUMRequest;+  // non-null if a device enumeration is in progress and was started after the+  // last device-change invalidation+  RefPtr<media::Refcountable<nsTArray<MozPromiseHolder<ConstDeviceSetPromise>>>>+      mPendingDevicesPromises;+  RefPtr<MediaDeviceSetRefCnt> mPhysicalDevices;   TimeStamp mUnhandledDeviceChangeTime;   RefPtr<MediaTimer> mDeviceChangeTimer;   bool mCamerasMuted = false;

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Leak] [dom/media/MediaManager.h] [Lines 276-278, 323-325]
[Old Code]
RefPtr<LocalDeviceSetPromise> EnumerateDevices(nsPIDOMWindowInner* aWindow);
[Fixed Code]
RefPtr<ConstDeviceSetPromise> GetPhysicalDevices();

Additional Details: The change replaces a direct device enumeration method with a const version that explicitly states the returned device sets are shared and cannot be modified. This could be related to preventing information leaks or unauthorized modifications, but the exact vulnerability isn't clear from the diff.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Race Condition] [dom/media/MediaManager.h] [Lines 373-375]
[Old Code]
(None - new code added)
[Fixed Code]
RefPtr<media::Refcountable<nsTArray<MozPromiseHolder<ConstDeviceSetPromise>>>>
      mPendingDevicesPromises;
RefPtr<MediaDeviceSetRefCnt> mPhysicalDevices;

Additional Details: The addition of mPendingDevicesPromises and mPhysicalDevices along with the new InvalidateDeviceCache() method suggests better handling of device enumeration state, possibly fixing a race condition when devices change during enumeration. However, without more context, we can't be certain.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Cache Invalidation Issue] [dom/media/MediaManager.h] [Lines 352]
[Old Code]
(None - new code added)
[Fixed Code]
void InvalidateDeviceCache();

Additional Details: The explicit addition of a device cache invalidation method suggests previous versions might have had issues with stale device information, but we can't confirm if this was an actual security vulnerability.

Note: While there are several changes that appear to improve security by adding const correctness and better state management, the diff doesn't provide enough context to definitively identify specific vulnerabilities that were fixed. The changes seem more like proactive improvements than fixes for known vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.kern.consistent-manual.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.kern.consistent-manual.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);

Analyzing the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18]
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Notes:
- The change appears to be purely a variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security-related changes or vulnerability fixes are evident in this diff
- The modification seems to be for code consistency or readability rather than security

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-paint-023.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-paint-023.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="match" href="../reference/ref-filled-green-100px-square.xht">   <meta content="This test checks that paint containment applies to atomic inline elements so that they can act as containing block for absolutely positioned descendants." name="assert">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/fonts/ahem.css" />   <style>

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Meta Tag Removal] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-paint-023.html] [Lines 9]
[Old Code]
<meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code]
[Removed line]

Additional Details:
- This appears to be a simple removal of an empty meta tag that wasn't serving any purpose
- No security vulnerability is being fixed here, just a cleanup of unnecessary markup
- The "flags" meta tag was empty and not being used for any security-related functionality
- The change is part of test file maintenance rather than a security fix

No other vulnerabilities are apparent in this diff. The change is purely removing an unused HTML meta tag that had no content or functionality.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/webrtc/MediaEngineWebRTCAudio.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/webrtc/MediaEngineWebRTCAudio.cpp@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ #include "MediaTrackConstraints.h" #include "mozilla/Assertions.h" #include "mozilla/ErrorNames.h"-#include "nsContentUtils.h" #include "nsIDUtils.h" #include "transport/runnable_utils.h" #include "Tracing.h"@@ -350,11 +349,11 @@     const RefPtr<MediaTrack>& aTrack, const PrincipalHandle& aPrincipal) {   AssertIsOnOwningThread();   MOZ_ASSERT(aTrack);-  MOZ_ASSERT(aTrack->AsAudioInputTrack());+  MOZ_ASSERT(aTrack->AsAudioProcessingTrack());   MOZ_ASSERT(!mTrack);   MOZ_ASSERT(mPrincipal == PRINCIPAL_HANDLE_NONE);-  mTrack = aTrack->AsAudioInputTrack();+  mTrack = aTrack->AsAudioProcessingTrack();   mPrincipal = aPrincipal;   mInputProcessing =@@ -408,7 +407,7 @@   MOZ_ASSERT(mState == kAllocated || mState == kStopped);   // This check is unreliable due to potential in-flight device updates.-  // Multiple input devices are reliably excluded in OpenAudioInputImpl(),+  // Multiple input devices are reliably excluded in ConnectDeviceInputImpl(),   // but the check here provides some error reporting most of the   // time.   CubebUtils::AudioDeviceID deviceID = mDeviceInfo->DeviceID();@@ -428,7 +427,7 @@         track->GraphImpl()->AppendMessage(MakeUnique<StartStopMessage>(             track, inputProcessing, StartStopMessage::Start));-        track->OpenAudioInput(deviceID, inputProcessing, principal);+        track->ConnectDeviceInput(deviceID, inputProcessing, principal);       }));   ApplySettings(mCurrentPrefs);@@ -460,7 +459,7 @@         track->GraphImpl()->AppendMessage(MakeUnique<StartStopMessage>(             track, inputProcessing, StartStopMessage::Stop));         MOZ_ASSERT(track->DeviceId().value() == deviceInfo->DeviceID());-        track->CloseAudioInput();+        track->DisconnectDeviceInput();       }));   MOZ_ASSERT(mState == kStarted, "Should be started when stopping");@@ -747,10 +746,10 @@   MOZ_ASSERT(mSegment.GetDuration() <= mPacketizerInput->mPacketSize); }-void AudioInputProcessing::NotifyOutputData(MediaTrackGraphImpl* aGraph,-                                            AudioDataValue* aBuffer,-                                            size_t aFrames, TrackRate aRate,-                                            uint32_t aChannels) {+void AudioInputProcessing::ProcessOutputData(MediaTrackGraphImpl* aGraph,+                                             AudioDataValue* aBuffer,+                                             size_t aFrames, TrackRate aRate,+                                             uint32_t aChannels) {   MOZ_ASSERT(aGraph->OnGraphThread());   MOZ_ASSERT(mEnabled);@@ -1169,27 +1168,27 @@   mChunksInPacketizer.clear(); }-void AudioInputTrack::Destroy() {+void AudioProcessingTrack::Destroy() {   MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());-  CloseAudioInput();+  DisconnectDeviceInput();   MediaTrack::Destroy(); }-void AudioInputTrack::SetInputProcessing(+void AudioProcessingTrack::SetInputProcessing(     RefPtr<AudioInputProcessing> aInputProcessing) {   class Message : public ControlMessage {-    const RefPtr<AudioInputTrack> mTrack;+    const RefPtr<AudioProcessingTrack> mTrack;     const RefPtr<AudioInputProcessing> mProcessing;    public:-    Message(RefPtr<AudioInputTrack> aTrack,+    Message(RefPtr<AudioProcessingTrack> aTrack,             RefPtr<AudioInputProcessing> aProcessing)         : ControlMessage(aTrack),           mTrack(std::move(aTrack)),           mProcessing(std::move(aProcessing)) {}     void Run() override {-      TRACE("AudioInputTrack::SetInputProcessingImpl");+      TRACE("AudioProcessingTrack::SetInputProcessingImpl");       mTrack->SetInputProcessingImpl(mProcessing);     }   };@@ -1201,27 +1200,28 @@       MakeUnique<Message>(std::move(this), std::move(aInputProcessing))); }-AudioInputTrack* AudioInputTrack::Create(MediaTrackGraph* aGraph) {+AudioProcessingTrack* AudioProcessingTrack::Create(MediaTrackGraph* aGraph) {   MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());-  AudioInputTrack* track = new AudioInputTrack(aGraph->GraphRate());+  AudioProcessingTrack* track = new AudioProcessingTrack(aGraph->GraphRate());   aGraph->AddTrack(track);   return track; }-void AudioInputTrack::DestroyImpl() {+void AudioProcessingTrack::DestroyImpl() {   ProcessedMediaTrack::DestroyImpl();   if (mInputProcessing) {     mInputProcessing->End();   } }-void AudioInputTrack::ProcessInput(GraphTime aFrom, GraphTime aTo,-                                   uint32_t aFlags) {-  TRACE_COMMENT("AudioInputTrack::ProcessInput", "AudioInputTrack %p", this);+void AudioProcessingTrack::ProcessInput(GraphTime aFrom, GraphTime aTo,+                                        uint32_t aFlags) {+  TRACE_COMMENT("AudioProcessingTrack::ProcessInput", "AudioProcessingTrack %p",+                this);   MOZ_ASSERT(mInputProcessing);   LOG_FRAME(-      "(Graph %p, Driver %p) AudioInputTrack %p ProcessInput from %" PRId64+      "(Graph %p, Driver %p) AudioProcessingTrack %p ProcessInput from %" PRId64       " to %" PRId64 ", needs %" PRId64 " frames",       mGraph, mGraph->CurrentDriver(), this, aFrom, aTo, aTo - aFrom);@@ -1233,7 +1233,7 @@     MOZ_ASSERT(TrackTimeToGraphTime(GetEnd()) == aFrom);     if (mInputs.IsEmpty()) {       GetData<AudioSegment>()->AppendNullData(aTo - aFrom);-      LOG_FRAME("(Graph %p, Driver %p) AudioInputTrack %p Filling %" PRId64+      LOG_FRAME("(Graph %p, Driver %p) AudioProcessingTrack %p Filling %" PRId64                 " frames of null data (no input source)",                 mGraph, mGraph->CurrentDriver(), this, aTo - aFrom);     } else {@@ -1251,9 +1251,10 @@   } }-void AudioInputTrack::GetInputSourceData(AudioSegment& aOutput,-                                         const MediaInputPort* aPort,-                                         GraphTime aFrom, GraphTime aTo) const {+void AudioProcessingTrack::GetInputSourceData(AudioSegment& aOutput,+                                              const MediaInputPort* aPort,+                                              GraphTime aFrom,+                                              GraphTime aTo) const {   MOZ_ASSERT(mGraph->OnGraphThread());   MOZ_ASSERT(aOutput.IsEmpty());@@ -1278,18 +1279,18 @@     if (inputEnded) {       aOutput.AppendNullData(ticks);-      LOG_FRAME("(Graph %p, Driver %p) AudioInputTrack %p Getting %" PRId64+      LOG_FRAME("(Graph %p, Driver %p) AudioProcessingTrack %p Getting %" PRId64                 " ticks of null data from input port source (ended input)",                 mGraph, mGraph->CurrentDriver(), this, ticks);     } else if (interval.mInputIsBlocked) {       aOutput.AppendNullData(ticks);-      LOG_FRAME("(Graph %p, Driver %p) AudioInputTrack %p Getting %" PRId64+      LOG_FRAME("(Graph %p, Driver %p) AudioProcessingTrack %p Getting %" PRId64                 " ticks of null data from input port source (blocked input)",                 mGraph, mGraph->CurrentDriver(), this, ticks);     } else if (source->IsSuspended()) {       aOutput.AppendNullData(ticks);       LOG_FRAME(-          "(Graph %p, Driver %p) AudioInputTrack %p Getting %" PRId64+          "(Graph %p, Driver %p) AudioProcessingTrack %p Getting %" PRId64           " ticks of null data from input port source (source is suspended)",           mGraph, mGraph->CurrentDriver(), this, ticks);     } else {@@ -1305,30 +1306,49 @@   } }-void AudioInputTrack::SetInputProcessingImpl(+void AudioProcessingTrack::NotifyOutputData(MediaTrackGraphImpl* aGraph,+                                            AudioDataValue* aBuffer,+                                            size_t aFrames, TrackRate aRate,+                                            uint32_t aChannels) {+  MOZ_ASSERT(mGraph == aGraph, "Cannot feed audio output to another graph");+  MOZ_ASSERT(mGraph->OnGraphThread());+  if (mInputProcessing) {+    mInputProcessing->ProcessOutputData(aGraph, aBuffer, aFrames, aRate,+                                        aChannels);+  }+}++void AudioProcessingTrack::SetInputProcessingImpl(     RefPtr<AudioInputProcessing> aInputProcessing) {   MOZ_ASSERT(GraphImpl()->OnGraphThread());   mInputProcessing = std::move(aInputProcessing); }-nsresult AudioInputTrack::OpenAudioInput(CubebUtils::AudioDeviceID aId,-                                         AudioDataListener* aListener,-                                         const PrincipalHandle& aPrincipal) {+nsresult AudioProcessingTrack::ConnectDeviceInput(+    CubebUtils::AudioDeviceID aId, AudioDataListener* aListener,+    const PrincipalHandle& aPrincipal) {   MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());   MOZ_ASSERT(GraphImpl());   MOZ_ASSERT(!mInputListener);   MOZ_ASSERT(mDeviceId.isNothing());   mInputListener = aListener;-  NativeInputTrack* input =-      GraphImpl()->GetOrCreateDeviceTrack(aId, aPrincipal);+  mDeviceId.emplace(aId);++  auto r = NativeInputTrack::OpenAudio(GraphImpl(), aId, aPrincipal,+                                       mInputListener.get());+  if (r.isErr()) {+    NS_WARNING("Failed to open audio device.");+    return r.unwrapErr();+  }+  RefPtr<NativeInputTrack> input = r.unwrap();   MOZ_ASSERT(input);-  LOG("Open device %p (InputTrack=%p) for Mic source %p", aId, input, this);-  mPort = AllocateInputPort(input);-  mDeviceId.emplace(aId);-  return GraphImpl()->OpenAudioInput(aId, mInputListener.get());-}--void AudioInputTrack::CloseAudioInput() {+  LOG("Open device %p (InputTrack=%p) for Mic source %p", aId, input.get(),+      this);+  mPort = AllocateInputPort(input.get());+  return NS_OK;+}++void AudioProcessingTrack::DisconnectDeviceInput() {   MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());   MOZ_ASSERT(GraphImpl());   if (!mInputListener) {@@ -1336,14 +1356,16 @@   }   MOZ_ASSERT(mPort);   MOZ_ASSERT(mDeviceId.isSome());-  LOG("Close device %p (InputTrack=%p) for Mic source %p ", mDeviceId.value(),-      mPort->GetSource(), this);+  RefPtr<NativeInputTrack> input(mPort->GetSource()->AsNativeInputTrack());+  LOG("Close device %p (InputTrack=%p) for Mic source %p ", *mDeviceId,+      input.get(), this);   mPort->Destroy();-  GraphImpl()->CloseAudioInput(mDeviceId.extract(), mInputListener);+  NativeInputTrack::CloseAudio(std::move(input), mInputListener.get());   mInputListener = nullptr;-}--Maybe<CubebUtils::AudioDeviceID> AudioInputTrack::DeviceId() const {+  mDeviceId = Nothing();+}++Maybe<CubebUtils::AudioDeviceID> AudioProcessingTrack::DeviceId() const {   MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());   return mDeviceId; }@@ -1360,7 +1382,7 @@   nsCString asciiString;   ErrorResult rv;-  rv = nsContentUtils::GenerateUUIDInPlace(uuid);+  rv = nsID::GenerateUUIDInPlace(uuid);   if (rv.Failed()) {     return u""_ns;   }

I'll analyze the code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Type Confusion Vulnerability [dom/media/webrtc/MediaEngineWebRTCAudio.cpp] [Lines 350, 407]
Old Code:
-  MOZ_ASSERT(aTrack->AsAudioInputTrack());
-  mTrack = aTrack->AsAudioInputTrack();
Fixed Code:
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aTrack->AsAudioProcessingTrack());
+  mTrack = aTrack->AsAudioProcessingTrack();

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Resource Management Vulnerability [dom/media/webrtc/MediaEngineWebRTCAudio.cpp] [Lines 427-428, 459]
Old Code:
-        track->OpenAudioInput(deviceID, inputProcessing, principal);
-        track->CloseAudioInput();
Fixed Code:
+        track->ConnectDeviceInput(deviceID, inputProcessing, principal);
+        track->DisconnectDeviceInput();

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Information Leak Vulnerability [dom/media/webrtc/MediaEngineWebRTCAudio.cpp] [Lines 1382]
Old Code:
-  rv = nsContentUtils::GenerateUUIDInPlace(uuid);
Fixed Code:
+  rv = nsID::GenerateUUIDInPlace(uuid);

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Thread Safety Issue [dom/media/webrtc/MediaEngineWebRTCAudio.cpp] [Lines 747-750]
Old Code:
-void AudioInputProcessing::NotifyOutputData(...)
Fixed Code:
+void AudioInputProcessing::ProcessOutputData(...)

The changes appear to be part of a larger refactoring from AudioInputTrack to AudioProcessingTrack, which includes:
1. Renaming methods and classes
2. Changing UUID generation method
3. Modifying audio device handling
4. Updating thread safety assertions

While these changes could potentially address security issues, without more context about the specific vulnerabilities being fixed, I can't definitively identify security vulnerabilities. The changes seem more focused on architectural improvements and code cleanup.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/tools/yaml/offscreen/filters.yaml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/tools/yaml/offscreen/filters.yaml@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@         let outputColor = getColor(color, slopes, intercepts);         ctx.fillStyle = `rgb(${color[0]}, ${color[1]}, ${color[2]})`;         ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 10, 10);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 5, 5, outputColor[0],outputColor[1],outputColor[2],255, "5,5", `${outputColor[0]},${outputColor[1]},${outputColor[2]}`, 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 5, 5, outputColor[0],outputColor[1],outputColor[2],255, "5,5", `${outputColor[0]},${outputColor[1]},${outputColor[2]}`, 2);     }     t.done();@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@     for (const color of inputColors) {         ctx.fillStyle = `rgba(${color[0]}, ${color[1]}, ${color[2]}, 1)`,         ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 10, 10);-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 5, 5, color[0],color[1],color[2],255, "5,5", `${color[0]},${color[1]},${color[2]}`);+        _assertPixel(canvas, 5, 5, color[0],color[1],color[2],255, "5,5", `${color[0]},${color[1]},${color[2]}`);     }     t.done();@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@         let outputColor = getColor(color, amplitudes, exponents, offsets);         ctx.fillStyle = `rgb(${color[0]}, ${color[1]}, ${color[2]})`;         ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 10, 10);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 5, 5, outputColor[0],outputColor[1],outputColor[2],255, "5,5", `${outputColor[0]},${outputColor[1]},${outputColor[2]}`, 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 5, 5, outputColor[0],outputColor[1],outputColor[2],255, "5,5", `${outputColor[0]},${outputColor[1]},${outputColor[2]}`, 2);     }     t.done();@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@         let outputColor = getColor(color, [tableValuesR, tableValuesG, tableValuesB]);         ctx.fillStyle = `rgb(${color[0]}, ${color[1]}, ${color[2]})`;         ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 10, 10);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 5, 5, outputColor[0],outputColor[1],outputColor[2],255, "5,5", `${outputColor[0]},${outputColor[1]},${outputColor[2]}`, 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 5, 5, outputColor[0],outputColor[1],outputColor[2],255, "5,5", `${outputColor[0]},${outputColor[1]},${outputColor[2]}`, 2);     }     t.done()@@ -284,6 +284,6 @@         let outputColor = getColor(color, [tableValuesR, tableValuesG, tableValuesB]);         ctx.fillStyle = `rgb(${color[0]}, ${color[1]}, ${color[2]})`;         ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 10, 10);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 5, 5, outputColor[0],outputColor[1],outputColor[2],255, "5,5", `${outputColor[0]},${outputColor[1]},${outputColor[2]}`, 2);-    }-    t.done();+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 5, 5, outputColor[0],outputColor[1],outputColor[2],255, "5,5", `${outputColor[0]},${outputColor[1]},${outputColor[2]}`, 2);+    }+    t.done();

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be test-related modifications where the assertion function is being called with a different canvas parameter (`canvas` instead of `offscreenCanvas`). This seems to be a test correction rather than a security fix.

Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/tools/yaml/offscreen/filters.yaml] [Multiple lines]
[Old Code: Various instances of _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, ...)]
[Fixed Code: Various instances of _assertPixelApprox(canvas, ...)]

The changes are consistent throughout the file and only involve switching the canvas reference in test assertions. There are no security implications to these changes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.