--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/workers/WorkerEventTarget.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/workers/WorkerEventTarget.h@@ -9,11 +9,10 @@ #include "nsISerialEventTarget.h" #include "mozilla/Mutex.h"+#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerPrivate.h" namespace mozilla { namespace dom {--class WorkerPrivate; class WorkerEventTarget final : public nsISerialEventTarget {  public:@@ -30,7 +29,7 @@  private:   mozilla::Mutex mMutex;-  WorkerPrivate* mWorkerPrivate;+  CheckedUnsafePtr<WorkerPrivate> mWorkerPrivate;   const Behavior mBehavior;   ~WorkerEventTarget() = default;

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   Improper Pointer Handling [dom/workers/WorkerEventTarget.h] [Lines 30]
   Old Code: `WorkerPrivate* mWorkerPrivate;`
   Fixed Code: `CheckedUnsafePtr<WorkerPrivate> mWorkerPrivate;`

Additional Details:
- The vulnerability appears to be related to raw pointer usage being replaced with a safer `CheckedUnsafePtr` wrapper. This suggests the original code might have been vulnerable to use-after-free or dangling pointer issues.
- The change from a raw pointer to `CheckedUnsafePtr` indicates a move towards safer memory management practices, particularly in a multi-threaded context (as suggested by the presence of `mMutex`).
- While not a named vulnerability like CVE, this is clearly a security improvement addressing potential memory safety issues.
- The addition of the `WorkerPrivate.h` include (which was previously just forward-declared) suggests the class definition is now needed for the `CheckedUnsafePtr` template.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/preferences/tests/browser_browser_languages_subdialog.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/preferences/tests/browser_browser_languages_subdialog.js@@ -223,8 +223,8 @@ async function openDialog(doc, search = false) {   let dialogLoaded = promiseLoadSubDialog(BROWSER_LANGUAGES_URL);   if (search) {-    doc.getElementById("defaultBrowserLanguageSearch").doCommand();-    doc.getElementById("defaultBrowserLanguage").menupopup.hidePopup();+    doc.getElementById("primaryBrowserLocaleSearch").doCommand();+    doc.getElementById("primaryBrowserLocale").menupopup.hidePopup();   } else {     doc.getElementById("manageBrowserLanguagesButton").doCommand();   }@@ -246,6 +246,8 @@     set: [       ["intl.multilingual.enabled", true],       ["intl.multilingual.downloadEnabled", true],+      ["intl.multilingual.liveReload", false],+      ["intl.multilingual.liveReloadBidirectional", false],       ["intl.locale.requested", "en-US,pl,he,de"],       ["extensions.langpacks.signatures.required", false],       ["extensions.getAddons.langpacks.url", langpacksUrl],@@ -341,6 +343,8 @@     set: [       ["intl.multilingual.enabled", true],       ["intl.multilingual.downloadEnabled", true],+      ["intl.multilingual.liveReload", false],+      ["intl.multilingual.liveReloadBidirectional", false],       ["intl.locale.requested", "en-US,pl,he,de"],       ["extensions.langpacks.signatures.required", false],     ],@@ -441,6 +445,8 @@     set: [       ["intl.multilingual.enabled", true],       ["intl.multilingual.downloadEnabled", true],+      ["intl.multilingual.liveReload", false],+      ["intl.multilingual.liveReloadBidirectional", false],       ["intl.locale.requested", "en-US"],       ["extensions.langpacks.signatures.required", false],     ],@@ -550,6 +556,8 @@     set: [       ["intl.multilingual.enabled", true],       ["intl.multilingual.downloadEnabled", true],+      ["intl.multilingual.liveReload", false],+      ["intl.multilingual.liveReloadBidirectional", false],       ["intl.locale.requested", "en-US"],       ["extensions.getAddons.langpacks.url", langpacksUrl],       ["extensions.langpacks.signatures.required", false],@@ -564,6 +572,17 @@   let doc = gBrowser.contentDocument;   let messageBar = doc.getElementById("confirmBrowserLanguage");   is(messageBar.hidden, true, "The message bar is hidden at first");++  // Verify only en-US is listed on the main pane.+  let getMainPaneLocales = () => {+    let available = doc.getElementById("primaryBrowserLocale");+    let availableLocales = Array.from(available.menupopup.children);+    return availableLocales+      .map(item => item.value)+      .sort()+      .join(",");+  };+  is(getMainPaneLocales(), "en-US,search", "Only en-US installed to start");   // Open the dialog.   let { dialog, dialogDoc, available, selected } = await openDialog(doc, true);@@ -646,6 +665,9 @@   let dialogClosed = BrowserTestUtils.waitForEvent(dialog, "dialogclosing");   dialog.acceptDialog();   await dialogClosed;++  // Verify pl is now available to select.+  is(getMainPaneLocales(), "en-US,pl,search", "en-US and pl now available");   // Disable the Polish langpack.   langpack = await AddonManager.getAddonByID("[email protected]");@@ -695,6 +717,8 @@     set: [       ["intl.multilingual.enabled", true],       ["intl.multilingual.downloadEnabled", true],+      ["intl.multilingual.liveReload", false],+      ["intl.multilingual.liveReloadBidirectional", false],     ],   });@@ -703,7 +727,7 @@   });   let doc = gBrowser.contentDocument;-  let defaultMenulist = doc.getElementById("defaultBrowserLanguage");+  let defaultMenulist = doc.getElementById("primaryBrowserLocale");   ok(     hasSearchOption(defaultMenulist.menupopup),     "There's a search option in the General pane"@@ -723,6 +747,8 @@     set: [       ["intl.multilingual.enabled", true],       ["intl.multilingual.downloadEnabled", false],+      ["intl.multilingual.liveReload", false],+      ["intl.multilingual.liveReloadBidirectional", false],     ],   });@@ -731,7 +757,7 @@   });   let doc = gBrowser.contentDocument;-  let defaultMenulist = doc.getElementById("defaultBrowserLanguage");+  let defaultMenulist = doc.getElementById("primaryBrowserLocale");   ok(     !hasSearchOption(defaultMenulist.menupopup),     "There's no search option in the General pane"@@ -751,6 +777,8 @@     set: [       ["intl.multilingual.enabled", true],       ["intl.multilingual.downloadEnabled", false],+      ["intl.multilingual.liveReload", false],+      ["intl.multilingual.liveReloadBidirectional", false],       ["intl.locale.requested", "en-US"],       ["extensions.langpacks.signatures.required", false],     ],@@ -775,7 +803,7 @@   let messageBar = doc.getElementById("confirmBrowserLanguage");   is(messageBar.hidden, true, "The message bar is hidden at first");-  let available = doc.getElementById("defaultBrowserLanguage");+  let available = doc.getElementById("primaryBrowserLocale");   let availableLocales = Array.from(available.menupopup.children);   let availableCodes = availableLocales     .map(item => item.value)@@ -789,8 +817,7 @@   is(available.selectedItem.value, "en-US", "English is selected");-  let hebrew =-    availableLocales[availableLocales.findIndex(item => item.value == "he")];+  let hebrew = availableLocales.find(item => item.value == "he");   hebrew.click();   available.menupopup.hidePopup();@@ -811,3 +838,222 @@   assertTelemetryRecorded([["reorder", "main"]]); });++add_task(async function testLiveLanguageReloading() {+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({+    set: [+      ["intl.multilingual.enabled", true],+      ["intl.multilingual.downloadEnabled", true],+      ["intl.multilingual.liveReload", true],+      ["intl.multilingual.liveReloadBidirectional", false],+      ["intl.locale.requested", "en-US,fr,he,de"],+      ["extensions.langpacks.signatures.required", false],+    ],+  });++  // Clear the telemetry from other tests.+  Services.telemetry.clearEvents();++  let langpacks = await createTestLangpacks();+  let addons = await Promise.all(+    langpacks.map(async ([locale, file]) => {+      let install = await AddonTestUtils.promiseInstallFile(file);+      return install.addon;+    })+  );++  await openPreferencesViaOpenPreferencesAPI("paneGeneral", {+    leaveOpen: true,+  });++  let doc = gBrowser.contentDocument;++  let available = doc.getElementById("primaryBrowserLocale");+  let availableLocales = Array.from(available.menupopup.children);++  is(+    Services.locale.appLocaleAsBCP47,+    "en-US",+    "The app locale starts as English."+  );++  Assert.deepEqual(+    Services.locale.requestedLocales,+    ["en-US", "fr", "he", "de"],+    "The locale order starts as what was initially requested."+  );++  // French and English are both LTR languages.+  let french = availableLocales.find(item => item.value == "fr");++  french.click();+  available.menupopup.hidePopup();++  is(+    Services.locale.appLocaleAsBCP47,+    "fr",+    "The app locale was changed to French"+  );++  Assert.deepEqual(+    Services.locale.requestedLocales,+    ["fr", "en-US", "he", "de"],+    "The locale order is switched to french first."+  );++  await Promise.all(addons.map(addon => addon.uninstall()));+  BrowserTestUtils.removeTab(gBrowser.selectedTab);++  assertTelemetryRecorded([["reorder", "main"]]);+});++add_task(async function testLiveLanguageReloadingBidiOff() {+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({+    set: [+      ["intl.multilingual.enabled", true],+      ["intl.multilingual.downloadEnabled", true],+      ["intl.multilingual.liveReload", true],+      ["intl.multilingual.liveReloadBidirectional", false],+      ["intl.locale.requested", "en-US,fr,he,de"],+      ["extensions.langpacks.signatures.required", false],+    ],+  });++  // Clear the telemetry from other tests.+  Services.telemetry.clearEvents();++  let langpacks = await createTestLangpacks();+  let addons = await Promise.all(+    langpacks.map(async ([locale, file]) => {+      let install = await AddonTestUtils.promiseInstallFile(file);+      return install.addon;+    })+  );++  await openPreferencesViaOpenPreferencesAPI("paneGeneral", {+    leaveOpen: true,+  });++  let doc = gBrowser.contentDocument;++  let available = doc.getElementById("primaryBrowserLocale");+  let availableLocales = Array.from(available.menupopup.children);++  is(+    Services.locale.appLocaleAsBCP47,+    "en-US",+    "The app locale starts as English."+  );++  Assert.deepEqual(+    Services.locale.requestedLocales,+    ["en-US", "fr", "he", "de"],+    "The locale order starts as what was initially requested."+  );++  let messageBar = doc.getElementById("confirmBrowserLanguage");+  is(messageBar.hidden, true, "The message bar is hidden at first");++  // English is LTR and Hebrew is RTL.+  let hebrew = availableLocales.find(item => item.value == "he");++  hebrew.click();+  available.menupopup.hidePopup();++  await BrowserTestUtils.waitForCondition(+    () => !messageBar.hidden,+    "Wait for message bar to show"+  );++  is(messageBar.hidden, false, "The message bar is now shown");++  is(+    Services.locale.appLocaleAsBCP47,+    "en-US",+    "The app locale remains in English"+  );++  Assert.deepEqual(+    Services.locale.requestedLocales,+    ["en-US", "fr", "he", "de"],+    "The locale order did not change."+  );++  await Promise.all(addons.map(addon => addon.uninstall()));+  BrowserTestUtils.removeTab(gBrowser.selectedTab);++  assertTelemetryRecorded([["reorder", "main"]]);+});++add_task(async function testLiveLanguageReloadingBidiOn() {+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({+    set: [+      ["intl.multilingual.enabled", true],+      ["intl.multilingual.downloadEnabled", true],+      ["intl.multilingual.liveReload", true],+      ["intl.multilingual.liveReloadBidirectional", true],+      ["intl.locale.requested", "en-US,fr,he,de"],+      ["extensions.langpacks.signatures.required", false],+    ],+  });++  // Clear the telemetry from other tests.+  Services.telemetry.clearEvents();++  let langpacks = await createTestLangpacks();+  let addons = await Promise.all(+    langpacks.map(async ([locale, file]) => {+      let install = await AddonTestUtils.promiseInstallFile(file);+      return install.addon;+    })+  );++  await openPreferencesViaOpenPreferencesAPI("paneGeneral", {+    leaveOpen: true,+  });++  let doc = gBrowser.contentDocument;++  let available = doc.getElementById("primaryBrowserLocale");+  let availableLocales = Array.from(available.menupopup.children);++  is(+    Services.locale.appLocaleAsBCP47,+    "en-US",+    "The app locale starts as English."+  );++  Assert.deepEqual(+    Services.locale.requestedLocales,+    ["en-US", "fr", "he", "de"],+    "The locale order starts as what was initially requested."+  );++  let messageBar = doc.getElementById("confirmBrowserLanguage");+  is(messageBar.hidden, true, "The message bar is hidden at first");++  // English is LTR and Hebrew is RTL.+  let hebrew = availableLocales.find(item => item.value == "he");++  hebrew.click();+  available.menupopup.hidePopup();++  is(messageBar.hidden, true, "The message bar is still hidden");++  is(+    Services.locale.appLocaleAsBCP47,+    "he",+    "The app locale was changed to Hebrew."+  );++  Assert.deepEqual(+    Services.locale.requestedLocales,+    ["he", "en-US", "fr", "de"],+    "The locale changed with Hebrew first."+  );++  await Promise.all(addons.map(addon => addon.uninstall()));+  BrowserTestUtils.removeTab(gBrowser.selectedTab);++  assertTelemetryRecorded([["reorder", "main"]]);+});

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any clear security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be primarily focused on:
1. Renaming elements from "defaultBrowserLanguage" to "primaryBrowserLocale"
2. Adding new preference settings for live reload functionality
3. Adding test cases for the new live reload features

Here's the analysis following the requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [browser_browser_languages_subdialog.js] [All lines]
[Old Code]
[Fixed Code]

The changes are largely focused on:
1. Refactoring element IDs for better clarity
2. Adding new test cases for language handling functionality
3. Implementing new preference settings for live language reloading

The modifications don't show any patterns typically associated with security fixes (such as input validation, permission checks, or security-related API changes). The changes appear to be feature enhancements and test coverage improvements rather than security patches.

If I were to speculate about potential security implications, the only area that might be relevant is the language pack handling, but there's no evidence of any vulnerability being fixed in this diff. The changes to language handling appear to be purely functional rather than security-related.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/2d.canvas.readonly.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/2d.canvas.readonly.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var d = ctx.canvas;

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 17-18]
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');

   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

   Additional Details: This appears to be a simple variable renaming from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas' for consistency or clarity. No security vulnerability is being addressed here.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No Vulnerability Found [File] [Entire Diff]
   Additional Details: The changes shown in the diff are purely cosmetic/refactoring changes involving variable naming. There are no security-related fixes in this diff. The functionality remains identical, just with different variable names.

The diff shows only variable name changes without any modifications to the security-relevant behavior of the code. The canvas operations and context handling remain the same, just with different variable names.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/extensions/test/xpcshell/test_ext_webSocket.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/extensions/test/xpcshell/test_ext_webSocket.js@@ -3,6 +3,12 @@ const HOSTS = new Set(["example.com"]); Services.prefs.setBoolPref("extensions.manifestV3.enabled", true);+// Since we're not using AOM, and MV3 forces event pages, bypass+// delayed-startup for MV3 test.  These tests do not rely on startup events.+Services.prefs.setBoolPref(+  "extensions.webextensions.background-delayed-startup",+  false+); const server = createHttpServer({ hosts: HOSTS });

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability] [toolkit/components/extensions/test/xpcshell/test_ext_webSocket.js] [Lines 3-9]
[Old Code]
Services.prefs.setBoolPref("extensions.manifestV3.enabled", true);

[Fixed Code]
Services.prefs.setBoolPref("extensions.manifestV3.enabled", true);
// Since we're not using AOM, and MV3 forces event pages, bypass
// delayed-startup for MV3 test.  These tests do not rely on startup events.
Services.prefs.setBoolPref(
  "extensions.webextensions.background-delayed-startup",
  false
);

Additional Details:
This change appears to be a test configuration modification rather than a security fix. The added code disables the delayed startup feature for extension background pages during testing, which is a test environment optimization rather than a security vulnerability fix. The change helps ensure consistent test behavior by preventing potential timing issues with background page initialization.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.zero.6.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.zero.6.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ ctx.beginPath(); ctx.roundRect(100, 25, 1000, 0, [0]); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes (variable renaming). Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found
File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.zero.6.worker.js
Lines: 13-25
Old Code: Used variable name 'offscreenCanvas'
Fixed Code: Changed variable name to 'canvas'

The changes are:
1. Renamed variable 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas'
2. Updated the reference in _assertPixel call to use the new variable name

These changes don't appear to address any security vulnerabilities but rather improve code consistency or readability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-021-ref.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-021-ref.html@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@       -ms-column-fill: auto;   -webkit-column-fill: auto;           column-fill: auto;-  border: 2px dashed;+  border: 2px solid salmon;   margin-bottom: 1px;   height: 150px; }

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-021-ref.html] [Lines 21]
[Old Code: border: 2px dashed;]
[Fixed Code: border: 2px solid salmon;]

Additional Details:
1. The change appears to be purely cosmetic/visual, modifying the border style from dashed to solid and adding a color (salmon)
2. This is part of a CSS grid fragmentation test reference file
3. No security implications are apparent in this change
4. The modification doesn't involve any security-sensitive operations or potentially dangerous patterns

The change seems to be for test clarity or visual reference purposes rather than addressing any security concern.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.orientation.image.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.orientation.image.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -37,10 +37,10 @@         ctx.restore();         ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';         ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 25);-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable name refactoring (renaming `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) with no security implications. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found
File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.orientation.image.worker.js
Lines: 13-14, 37-40
Old Code: 
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are purely variable name changes with identical functionality and no security impact.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/anyhow/tests/test_ensure.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/anyhow/tests/test_ensure.rs@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@     clippy::items_after_statements,     clippy::let_and_return,     clippy::let_underscore_drop,+    clippy::logic_bug,     clippy::match_bool,     clippy::never_loop,     clippy::redundant_closure_call,@@ -45,13 +46,15 @@ fn assert_err<T: Debug>(result: impl FnOnce() -> Result<T>, expected: &'static str) {     let actual = result().unwrap_err().to_string();-    let mut accepted_alternatives = expected.split('\n');-    let expected = accepted_alternatives.next_back().unwrap();-    if accepted_alternatives.any(|alternative| actual == alternative) {-        return;-    }--    assert_eq!(actual, expected);+    // In general different rustc versions will format the interpolated lhs and+    // rhs $:expr fragment with insignificant differences in whitespace or+    // punctuation, so we check the message in full against nightly and do just+    // a cursory test on older toolchains.+    if rustversion::cfg!(nightly) && !cfg!(miri) {+        assert_eq!(actual, expected);+    } else {+        assert_eq!(actual.contains(" vs "), expected.contains(" vs "));+    } } #[test]@@ -98,7 +101,7 @@     let test = || Ok(ensure!(while false == true && false {} < ()));     assert_err(         test,-        "Condition failed: `while false == true && false { } < ()` (() vs ())",+        "Condition failed: `while false == true && false {} < ()` (() vs ())",     ); }@@ -145,41 +148,41 @@ fn test_if() {     #[rustfmt::skip]     let test = || Ok(ensure!(if false {}.t(1) == 2));-    assert_err(test, "Condition failed: `if false { }.t(1) == 2` (1 vs 2)");+    assert_err(test, "Condition failed: `if false {}.t(1) == 2` (1 vs 2)");     #[rustfmt::skip]     let test = || Ok(ensure!(if false {} else {}.t(1) == 2));     assert_err(         test,-        "Condition failed: `if false { } else { }.t(1) == 2` (1 vs 2)",+        "Condition failed: `if false {} else {}.t(1) == 2` (1 vs 2)",     );     #[rustfmt::skip]     let test = || Ok(ensure!(if false {} else if false {}.t(1) == 2));     assert_err(         test,-        "Condition failed: `if false { } else if false { }.t(1) == 2` (1 vs 2)",+        "Condition failed: `if false {} else if false {}.t(1) == 2` (1 vs 2)",     );     #[rustfmt::skip]     let test = || Ok(ensure!(if let 1 = 2 {}.t(1) == 2));     assert_err(         test,-        "Condition failed: `if let 1 = 2 { }.t(1) == 2` (1 vs 2)",+        "Condition failed: `if let 1 = 2 {}.t(1) == 2` (1 vs 2)",     );     #[rustfmt::skip]     let test = || Ok(ensure!(if let 1 | 2 = 2 {}.t(1) == 2));     assert_err(         test,-        "Condition failed: `if let 1 | 2 = 2 { }.t(1) == 2` (1 vs 2)",+        "Condition failed: `if let 1 | 2 = 2 {}.t(1) == 2` (1 vs 2)",     );     #[rustfmt::skip]     let test = || Ok(ensure!(if let | 1 | 2 = 2 {}.t(1) == 2));     assert_err(         test,-        "Condition failed: `if let 1 | 2 = 2 { }.t(1) == 2` (1 vs 2)",+        "Condition failed: `if let 1 | 2 = 2 {}.t(1) == 2` (1 vs 2)",     ); }@@ -189,53 +192,49 @@     let test = || Ok(ensure!(1 + loop { break 1 } == 1));     assert_err(         test,-        // 1.54 puts a double space after loop-        "Condition failed: `1 + loop  { break 1  } == 1` (2 vs 1)\n\-         Condition failed: `1 + loop { break 1  } == 1` (2 vs 1)",+        "Condition failed: `1 + loop { break 1 } == 1` (2 vs 1)",     );     #[rustfmt::skip]     let test = || Ok(ensure!(1 + 'a: loop { break 'a 1 } == 1));     assert_err(         test,-        // 1.54 puts a double space after loop-        "Condition failed: `1 + 'a: loop  { break 'a 1  } == 1` (2 vs 1)\n\-         Condition failed: `1 + 'a: loop { break 'a 1  } == 1` (2 vs 1)",+        "Condition failed: `1 + 'a: loop { break 'a 1 } == 1` (2 vs 1)",     );     #[rustfmt::skip]     let test = || Ok(ensure!(while false {}.t(1) == 2));     assert_err(         test,-        "Condition failed: `while false { }.t(1) == 2` (1 vs 2)",+        "Condition failed: `while false {}.t(1) == 2` (1 vs 2)",     );     #[rustfmt::skip]     let test = || Ok(ensure!(while let None = Some(1) {}.t(1) == 2));     assert_err(         test,-        "Condition failed: `while let None = Some(1) { }.t(1) == 2` (1 vs 2)",+        "Condition failed: `while let None = Some(1) {}.t(1) == 2` (1 vs 2)",     );     #[rustfmt::skip]     let test = || Ok(ensure!(for _x in iter::once(0) {}.t(1) == 2));     assert_err(         test,-        "Condition failed: `for _x in iter::once(0) { }.t(1) == 2` (1 vs 2)",+        "Condition failed: `for _x in iter::once(0) {}.t(1) == 2` (1 vs 2)",     );     #[rustfmt::skip]     let test = || Ok(ensure!(for | _x in iter::once(0) {}.t(1) == 2));     assert_err(         test,-        "Condition failed: `for _x in iter::once(0) { }.t(1) == 2` (1 vs 2)",+        "Condition failed: `for _x in iter::once(0) {}.t(1) == 2` (1 vs 2)",     );     #[rustfmt::skip]     let test = || Ok(ensure!(for true | false in iter::empty() {}.t(1) == 2));     assert_err(         test,-        "Condition failed: `for true | false in iter::empty() { }.t(1) == 2` (1 vs 2)",+        "Condition failed: `for true | false in iter::empty() {}.t(1) == 2` (1 vs 2)",     ); }@@ -264,13 +263,13 @@     let test = || Ok(ensure!(S + async { 1 } == true));     assert_err(         test,-        "Condition failed: `S + async  { 1 } == true` (false vs true)",+        "Condition failed: `S + async { 1 } == true` (false vs true)",     );     let test = || Ok(ensure!(S + async move { 1 } == true));     assert_err(         test,-        "Condition failed: `S + async move  { 1 } == true` (false vs true)",+        "Condition failed: `S + async move { 1 } == true` (false vs true)",     );     let x = &1;@@ -381,7 +380,7 @@     let test = || Ok(ensure!(stringify! {} != ""));     assert_err(         test,-        "Condition failed: `stringify! { } != \"\"` (\"\" vs \"\")",+        "Condition failed: `stringify! {} != \"\"` (\"\" vs \"\")",     ); }@@ -529,7 +528,7 @@     let test = || Ok(ensure!(f as for<'a> fn() as usize * 0 != 0));     assert_err(         test,-        "Condition failed: `f as for<'a>fn() as usize * 0 != 0` (0 vs 0)",+        "Condition failed: `f as for<'a>fn() as usize * 0 != 0` (0 vs 0)", // FIXME     );     let test = || Ok(ensure!(f as unsafe fn() as usize * 0 != 0));@@ -614,7 +613,7 @@     let test = || Ok(ensure!(if let -1..=1 = 0 { 0 } else { 1 } == 1));     assert_err(         test,-        "Condition failed: `if let -1 ..=1 = 0 { 0 } else { 1 } == 1` (0 vs 1)",+        "Condition failed: `if let -1 ..=1 = 0 { 0 } else { 1 } == 1` (0 vs 1)", // FIXME     );     let test = || Ok(ensure!(if let &0 = &0 { 0 } else { 1 } == 1));@@ -657,13 +656,13 @@     let test = || Ok(ensure!(if let P::<u8> {} = p { 0 } else { 1 } == 1));     assert_err(         test,-        "Condition failed: `if let P::<u8> {  } = p { 0 } else { 1 } == 1` (0 vs 1)",+        "Condition failed: `if let P::<u8> {  } = p { 0 } else { 1 } == 1` (0 vs 1)", // FIXME     );     let test = || Ok(ensure!(if let ::std::marker::PhantomData = p {} != ()));     assert_err(         test,-        "Condition failed: `if let ::std::marker::PhantomData = p { } != ()` (() vs ())",+        "Condition failed: `if let ::std::marker::PhantomData = p {} != ()` (() vs ())",     );     let test = || Ok(ensure!(if let <S as Trait>::V = 0 { 0 } else { 1 } == 1));@@ -675,7 +674,7 @@     let test = || Ok(ensure!(for _ in iter::once(()) {} != ()));     assert_err(         test,-        "Condition failed: `for _ in iter::once(()) { } != ()` (() vs ())",+        "Condition failed: `for _ in iter::once(()) {} != ()` (() vs ())",     );     let test = || Ok(ensure!(if let stringify!(x) = "x" { 0 } else { 1 } == 1));

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily focused on:

1. Adding a new clippy lint check (`clippy::logic_bug`)
2. Modifying test assertions to handle different Rust compiler versions
3. Cleaning up whitespace and formatting in test strings
4. Removing redundant test cases

Here's the analysis following the requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerabilities found in the diff. The changes are test-related improvements and formatting adjustments.

The changes include:
1. Adding a new clippy lint check
2. Modifying test assertion logic to handle different Rust compiler versions
3. Normalizing whitespace in test strings
4. Removing redundant test cases that were handling older Rust versions

The most significant change is in the `assert_err` function where the test logic was modified to handle different Rust compiler versions, but this doesn't represent a security fix - just a test improvement.

All other changes are minor formatting adjustments to test strings (removing extra spaces in `{}` blocks, normalizing error message formats) that don't affect security.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/lmdb-rkv-sys/lmdb/libraries/liblmdb/mdb.c+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/lmdb-rkv-sys/lmdb/libraries/liblmdb/mdb.c@@ -196,13 +196,10 @@ # error "Two's complement, reasonably sized integer types, please" #endif-#ifdef __GNUC__-/** Put infrequently used env functions in separate section */-# ifdef __APPLE__-#  define	ESECT	__attribute__ ((section("__TEXT,text_env")))-# else-#  define	ESECT	__attribute__ ((section("text_env")))-# endif+#if __clang_major__ > 3 || (__clang_major__ == 3 && __clang_minor__ >= 2) || __GNUC__ > 4 || (__GNUC__ == 4 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 3)+/** Mark infrequently used env functions as cold. This puts them in a separate+ *  section, and optimizes them for size */+#define ESECT __attribute__ ((cold)) #else #define ESECT #endif

Let me analyze this code diff for security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Compiler Optimization Improvement] [third_party/rust/lmdb-rkv-sys/lmdb/libraries/liblmdb/mdb.c] [196-204]
[Old Code]
#ifdef __GNUC__
/** Put infrequently used env functions in separate section */
# ifdef __APPLE__
#  define	ESECT	__attribute__ ((section("__TEXT,text_env")))
# else
#  define	ESECT	__attribute__ ((section("text_env")))
# endif
[Fixed Code]
#if __clang_major__ > 3 || (__clang_major__ == 3 && __clang_minor__ >= 2) || __GNUC__ > 4 || (__GNUC__ == 4 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 3)
/** Mark infrequently used env functions as cold. This puts them in a separate
 *  section, and optimizes them for size */
#define ESECT __attribute__ ((cold))
#else
#define ESECT
#endif

Explanation:
This change appears to be a compiler optimization improvement rather than a security fix. The modification:
1. Expands the compiler version checks to include more versions of clang and GCC
2. Changes from manual section placement to using the 'cold' attribute
3. Adds better documentation about the optimization purpose
4. Maintains backward compatibility with older compilers

No specific security vulnerability is being addressed here - this is purely a code optimization change. The 'cold' attribute helps with better code organization and potentially improved performance, but doesn't relate to any security issue.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/ppv-lite86/src/generic.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/ppv-lite86/src/generic.rs@@ -67,6 +67,14 @@         let [a, b]: [u64; 2] = q.v128[0].into();         let [c, d]: [u64; 2] = q.v128[1].into();         [a, b, c, d]+    }+}+impl From<[u64; 4]> for vec256_storage {+    #[inline(always)]+    fn from([a, b, c, d]: [u64; 4]) -> Self {+        Self {+            v128: [[a, b].into(), [c, d].into()],+        }     } } #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Default)]@@ -623,10 +631,10 @@         let c = c.0;         let d = d.0;         [-            a[0], a[1], a[2], a[3],-            b[0], b[1], b[2], b[3],-            c[0], c[1], c[2], c[3],-            d[0], d[1], d[2], d[3],+            a[0], a[1], a[2], a[3], //+            b[0], b[1], b[2], b[3], //+            c[0], c[1], c[2], c[3], //+            d[0], d[1], d[2], d[3], //         ]     } }

Analyzing the provided code diff, here are the potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Memory Safety Issue] [third_party/rust/ppv-lite86/src/generic.rs] [Lines 67-74]  
   [Old Code]  
   (No previous implementation of From<[u64; 4]> for vec256_storage)  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```rust
   impl From<[u64; 4]> for vec256_storage {
       #[inline(always)]
       fn from([a, b, c, d]: [u64; 4]) -> Self {
           Self {
               v128: [[a, b].into(), [c, d].into()],
           }
       }
   }
   ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   [Code Clarity Improvement] [third_party/rust/ppv-lite86/src/generic.rs] [Lines 623-634]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```rust
   [
       a[0], a[1], a[2], a[3],
       b[0], b[1], b[2], b[3],
       c[0], c[1], c[2], c[3],
       d[0], d[1], d[2], d[3],
   ]
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```rust
   [
       a[0], a[1], a[2], a[3], //
       b[0], b[1], b[2], b[3], //
       c[0], c[1], c[2], c[3], //
       d[0], d[1], d[2], d[3], //
   ]
   ```

The first change adds a new implementation for converting from [u64; 4] to vec256_storage. While this could potentially relate to memory safety if not implemented correctly, there's no clear evidence of a vulnerability being fixed here - it appears to be new functionality.

The second change only adds comments (//) to improve code readability and doesn't appear to fix any security vulnerability. The array initialization remains functionally identical.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.clip.source-atop.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.clip.source-atop.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ ctx.clip(); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 50, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where variable names were updated for consistency. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.clip.source-atop.html] [Lines 17-28]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes only involve:
1. Renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Updating all references to this variable accordingly
3. No functional changes to the actual canvas operations or security-related aspects

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/gmp/GMPServiceParent.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/gmp/GMPServiceParent.cpp@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #  include "mozilla/SandboxInfo.h" #endif #include "VideoUtils.h"+#include "mozilla/AppShutdown.h" #include "mozilla/Services.h" #include "mozilla/SpinEventLoopUntil.h" #include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_media.h"@@ -93,6 +94,10 @@ nsresult GeckoMediaPluginServiceParent::Init() {   MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());++  if (AppShutdown::GetCurrentShutdownPhase() != ShutdownPhase::NotInShutdown) {+    return NS_OK;+  }   nsCOMPtr<nsIObserverService> obsService =       mozilla::services::GetObserverService();@@ -604,6 +609,88 @@   } }+void GeckoMediaPluginServiceParent::SendFlushFOGData(+    nsTArray<RefPtr<FlushFOGDataPromise>>& promises) {+  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());+  MutexAutoLock lock(mMutex);++  for (const RefPtr<GMPParent>& gmp : mPlugins) {+    if (gmp->State() != GMPState::GMPStateLoaded) {+      // Plugins that are not in the Loaded state have no process attached to+      // them, and any IPC we would attempt to send them would be ignored (or+      // result in a warning on debug builds).+      continue;+    }+    RefPtr<FlushFOGDataPromise::Private> promise =+        new FlushFOGDataPromise::Private(__func__);+    // Direct dispatch will resolve the promise on the same thread, which is+    // faster; FOGIPC will move execution back to the main thread.+    promise->UseDirectTaskDispatch(__func__);+    promises.EmplaceBack(promise);++    mGMPThread->Dispatch(+        NewRunnableMethod<ipc::ResolveCallback<ipc::ByteBuf>&&,+                          ipc::RejectCallback&&>(+            "GMPParent::SendFlushFOGData", gmp,+            static_cast<void (GMPParent::*)(+                mozilla::ipc::ResolveCallback<ipc::ByteBuf> && aResolve,+                mozilla::ipc::RejectCallback && aReject)>(+                &GMPParent::SendFlushFOGData),++            [promise](ipc::ByteBuf&& aValue) {+              promise->Resolve(std::move(aValue), __func__);+            },+            [promise](ipc::ResponseRejectReason&& aReason) {+              promise->Reject(std::move(aReason), __func__);+            }),+        NS_DISPATCH_NORMAL);+  }+}++RefPtr<PGMPParent::TestTriggerMetricsPromise>+GeckoMediaPluginServiceParent::TestTriggerMetrics() {+  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());+  {+    MutexAutoLock lock(mMutex);+    for (const RefPtr<GMPParent>& gmp : mPlugins) {+      if (gmp->State() != GMPState::GMPStateLoaded) {+        // Plugins that are not in the Loaded state have no process attached to+        // them, and any IPC we would attempt to send them would be ignored (or+        // result in a warning on debug builds).+        continue;+      }++      RefPtr<PGMPParent::TestTriggerMetricsPromise::Private> promise =+          new PGMPParent::TestTriggerMetricsPromise::Private(__func__);+      // Direct dispatch will resolve the promise on the same thread, which is+      // faster; FOGIPC will move execution back to the main thread.+      promise->UseDirectTaskDispatch(__func__);++      mGMPThread->Dispatch(+          NewRunnableMethod<ipc::ResolveCallback<bool>&&,+                            ipc::RejectCallback&&>(+              "GMPParent::SendTestTriggerMetrics", gmp,+              static_cast<void (GMPParent::*)(+                  mozilla::ipc::ResolveCallback<bool> && aResolve,+                  mozilla::ipc::RejectCallback && aReject)>(+                  &PGMPParent::SendTestTriggerMetrics),++              [promise](bool aValue) {+                promise->Resolve(std::move(aValue), __func__);+              },+              [promise](ipc::ResponseRejectReason&& aReason) {+                promise->Reject(std::move(aReason), __func__);+              }),+          NS_DISPATCH_NORMAL);++      return promise;+    }+  }++  return PGMPParent::TestTriggerMetricsPromise::CreateAndReject(+      ipc::ResponseRejectReason::SendError, __func__);+}+ RefPtr<GenericPromise> GeckoMediaPluginServiceParent::AsyncAddPluginDirectory(     const nsAString& aDirectory) {   nsCOMPtr<nsISerialEventTarget> thread(GetGMPThread());@@ -1739,7 +1826,9 @@     const nsString& aGMPName, nsCString* aID) {   nsresult rv = mService->GetNodeId(aOrigin, aTopLevelOrigin, aGMPName, *aID);   if (!NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {-    return IPC_FAIL_NO_REASON(this);+    return IPC_FAIL(+        this,+        "GMPServiceParent::RecvGetGMPNodeId: mService->GetNodeId failed.");   }   return IPC_OK(); }

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Shutdown Phase Check Vulnerability [File] dom/media/gmp/GMPServiceParent.cpp [Lines 23-97]
[Old Code]
nsresult GeckoMediaPluginServiceParent::Init() {
  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());

  nsCOMPtr<nsIObserverService> obsService =
      mozilla::services::GetObserverService();
[Fixed Code]
nsresult GeckoMediaPluginServiceParent::Init() {
  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());

  if (AppShutdown::GetCurrentShutdownPhase() != ShutdownPhase::NotInShutdown) {
    return NS_OK;
  }

  nsCOMPtr<nsIObserverService> obsService =
      mozilla::services::GetObserverService();
Additional Details: The fix adds a shutdown phase check to prevent initialization during shutdown, which could lead to undefined behavior or resource leaks.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
IPC Failure Handling Vulnerability [File] dom/media/gmp/GMPServiceParent.cpp [Lines 1739-1826]
[Old Code]
  if (!NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
    return IPC_FAIL_NO_REASON(this);
  }
[Fixed Code]
  if (!NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
    return IPC_FAIL(
        this,
        "GMPServiceParent::RecvGetGMPNodeId: mService->GetNodeId failed.");
  }
Additional Details: The change improves error reporting in IPC communication, but it's unclear if this was fixing a specific security vulnerability or just improving debugging capability.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
New FOG Data Flushing Implementation [File] dom/media/gmp/GMPServiceParent.cpp [Lines 604-609, 609-688]
[Old Code]
(None - this is a completely new function)
[Fixed Code]
void GeckoMediaPluginServiceParent::SendFlushFOGData(
    nsTArray<RefPtr<FlushFOGDataPromise>>& promises) {
  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
  MutexAutoLock lock(mMutex);
  ...
Additional Details: The addition of FOG (Firefox Operations Gateway) data flushing functionality appears to be a new feature rather than a security fix, but proper implementation of such features can have security implications.

4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
New Metrics Testing Implementation [File] dom/media/gmp/GMPServiceParent.cpp [Lines 609-688]
[Old Code]
(None - this is a completely new function)
[Fixed Code]
RefPtr<PGMPParent::TestTriggerMetricsPromise>
GeckoMediaPluginServiceParent::TestTriggerMetrics() {
  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
  {
    MutexAutoLock lock(mMutex);
    ...
Additional Details: Similar to the FOG data flushing, this appears to be a new testing feature rather than a security fix, but proper implementation is important for security.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/vr/ipc/VRProcessParent.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/vr/ipc/VRProcessParent.cpp@@ -43,12 +43,6 @@ } VRProcessParent::~VRProcessParent() {-  // Cancel all tasks. We don't want anything triggering after our caller-  // expects this to go away.-  {-    MonitorAutoLock lock(mMonitor);-    mTaskFactory.RevokeAll();-  }   MOZ_COUNT_DTOR(VRProcessParent); }@@ -133,6 +127,13 @@ void VRProcessParent::DestroyProcess() {   if (mLaunchThread) {+    // Cancel all tasks. We don't want anything triggering after our caller+    // expects this to go away.+    {+      MonitorAutoLock lock(mMonitor);+      mTaskFactory.RevokeAll();+    }+     mLaunchThread->Dispatch(NS_NewRunnableFunction("DestroyProcessRunnable",                                                    [this] { Destroy(); }));   }@@ -181,7 +182,7 @@ void VRProcessParent::KillHard(const char* aReason) {   ProcessHandle handle = GetChildProcessHandle();-  if (!base::KillProcess(handle, base::PROCESS_END_KILLED_BY_USER, false)) {+  if (!base::KillProcess(handle, base::PROCESS_END_KILLED_BY_USER)) {     NS_WARNING("failed to kill subprocess!");   }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Race Condition in Task Cancellation [File] [Lines 43-48 (removed), 127-133 (added)]
[Old Code]
VRProcessParent::~VRProcessParent() {
  // Cancel all tasks. We don't want anything triggering after our caller
  // expects this to go away.
  {
    MonitorAutoLock lock(mMonitor);
    mTaskFactory.RevokeAll();
  }
  MOZ_COUNT_DTOR(VRProcessParent);
}
[Fixed Code]
The task cancellation code was moved to DestroyProcess() method:
void VRProcessParent::DestroyProcess() {
  if (mLaunchThread) {
    // Cancel all tasks. We don't want anything triggering after our caller
    // expects this to go away.
    {
      MonitorAutoLock lock(mMonitor);
      mTaskFactory.RevokeAll();
    }
    ...
  }
}
Additional Details: The fix addresses a potential race condition where tasks might still execute during destruction. Moving the task cancellation to DestroyProcess() ensures proper synchronization.

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Incomplete Process Termination [File] [Lines 181-183]
[Old Code]
if (!base::KillProcess(handle, base::PROCESS_END_KILLED_BY_USER, false)) {
[Fixed Code]
if (!base::KillProcess(handle, base::PROCESS_END_KILLED_BY_USER)) {
Additional Details: The fix removes the 'wait' parameter (false) from KillProcess, ensuring the process is properly terminated. The old code might have allowed the process to continue running in some cases. This could be related to a Zombie Process or Incomplete Termination vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslt.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslt.h@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@     ssl_hs_certificate_status = 22,     ssl_hs_key_update = 24,     ssl_hs_next_proto = 67,-    ssl_hs_message_hash = 254, /* Not a real message. */+    ssl_hs_message_hash = 254,           /* Not a real message. */+    ssl_hs_ech_outer_client_hello = 257, /* Not a real message. */ } SSLHandshakeType; typedef enum {@@ -550,9 +551,8 @@     ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn = 13172, /* Deprecated. */     ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn = 0xff01,     ssl_tls13_short_header_xtn = 0xff03, /* Deprecated. */-    ssl_tls13_ech_is_inner_xtn = 0xda09,     ssl_tls13_outer_extensions_xtn = 0xfd00,-    ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn = 0xfe0a,+    ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn = 0xfe0d,     ssl_tls13_encrypted_sni_xtn = 0xffce, /* Deprecated. */ } SSLExtensionType;

Here's the analysis following the requested format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
[Potential Protocol/Extension Identifier Conflict] [security/nss/lib/ssl/sslt.h] [Lines 550-551]  
[Old Code]  
```  
ssl_tls13_ech_is_inner_xtn = 0xda09,  
ssl_tls13_outer_extensions_xtn = 0xfd00,  
ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn = 0xfe0a,  
```  
[Fixed Code]  
```  
ssl_tls13_outer_extensions_xtn = 0xfd00,  
ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn = 0xfe0d,  
```  
Additional Details: The change modifies extension type identifiers, possibly to avoid conflicts or follow updated standards. The removal of `ssl_tls13_ech_is_inner_xtn` and change in value for `ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn` suggests protocol updates, but without more context, it's unclear if this was fixing an actual vulnerability.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
[New Feature Addition] [security/nss/lib/ssl/sslt.h] [Lines 33-34]  
[Old Code]  
```  
ssl_hs_message_hash = 254, /* Not a real message. */  
```  
[Fixed Code]  
```  
ssl_hs_message_hash = 254,           /* Not a real message. */  
ssl_hs_ech_outer_client_hello = 257, /* Not a real message. */  
```  
Additional Details: A new handshake type was added for Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) functionality. This appears to be a feature addition rather than a security fix.

Note: The changes appear to be related to Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) functionality updates, which is a privacy-enhancing feature rather than a direct security vulnerability fix. Without more context about the specific security implications of the changed values or removed extensions, it's difficult to identify concrete vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.outside2.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.outside2.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -23,15 +23,15 @@ g.addColorStop(1, '#f00'); ctx.fillStyle = g; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating the corresponding assertions. Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found
    File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.outside2.worker.js
    Lines: 13-14, 23-31
    Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, ...)
    Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(canvas, ...)

The changes are purely variable name changes and don't affect security in any way. The functionality remains identical, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-ui/outline-style-011.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-ui/outline-style-011.html@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ <link rel="help" title="7.3. 'outline-style' property" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-ui/#outline-style"> <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/CSS21/box.html#value-def-border-style"> <link rel="match" href="reference/outline-style-011-ref.html">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="Test checks that the outline style is dotted when outline-style set dotted"> <style>   #test {

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-ui/outline-style-011.html [Lines] 6
   [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="">
   [Fixed Code] (removed line)

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which doesn't appear to be security-related
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerability is associated with this change
- The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive functionality

The change seems to be removing an unused or unnecessary meta tag from a test file, which doesn't indicate any security vulnerability being fixed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/glean/docs/dev/testing.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/glean/docs/dev/testing.md@@ -32,10 +32,45 @@     * `logging.glean_core::*` to `5`     * `logging.config.clear_on_startup` to `false` (or all these prefs will be cleared on startup)-For more information on logging in Firefox Desktop, see the-[Gecko Logging docs](https://developer.mozilla.org/docs/Mozilla/Developer_guide/Gecko_Logging).--**Note:** At present Rust logging in non-main processes just doesn't work.+For more information on logging in Gecko, see the+[Gecko Logging docs](/xpcom/logging).++User-destined logs (of the "You did something wrong" variety) might output to the+[Browser Console](/devtools-user/browser_console/index)+if they originate in JS land. Open via+<kbd>Ctrl</kbd>+<kbd>Shift</kbd>+<kbd>J</kbd>, or+<kbd>Cmd</kbd>+<kbd>Shift</kbd>+<kbd>J</kbd>.++```{admonition} Note+At present, Rust logging in non-main processes just doesn't work.+```++### What to log, and to where?++FOG covers a lot a ground (languages, layers):+where you are determines what logging you have available.++Here are some common situtations for logging:++#### JS to C++++If your logging is aimed at the user using the JS API+(e.g. because the type provided isn't convertable to the necessary C++ type)+then use the Browser Console via+[FOG's Common's `LogToBrowserConsole`](https://searchfox.org/mozilla-central/rev/d107bc8aeadcc816ba85cb21c1a6a1aac1d4ef9f/toolkit/components/glean/bindings/private/Common.cpp#19).++#### C++++If you are in C++ and didn't come from JS, use `MOZ_LOG` with module `fog`.++#### Rust++Use the logging macros from `log`, e.g. `log::info!` or `log::error!`.+Remember that, no matter the log level, `log::debug!` and `log::trace!`+[will not appear in non-debug builds](/testing-rust-code/index.html#gecko-logging)++If you are logging due to a situation caused by and fixable by a developer using the API,+use `log::error!(...)`. Otherwise, use a quieter level. ## `about:glean`@@ -99,7 +134,7 @@ in `toolkit/components/glean/tests/gtest/`. You can write the actual test code in Rust. It needs to be accompanied by a C++ GTest that calls a C FFI-exported Rust function.-See [Testing & Debugging Rust Code](/testing-rust-code/) for more.+See [Testing & Debugging Rust Code](/testing-rust-code/index.md) for more. See [`toolkit/components/glean/tests/gtest/TestFog.cpp`](https://searchfox.org/mozilla-central/source/toolkit/components/glean/tests/gtest/TestFog.cpp) and [`toolkit/components/glean/tests/gtest/test.rs`](https://searchfox.org/mozilla-central/source/toolkit/components/glean/tests/gtest/test.rs) for an example.

After analyzing the provided code diff, I can conclude the following:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   This is a documentation update with no security implications. The changes include:
   - Updated logging documentation links and instructions
   - Added more detailed logging guidance for different scenarios (JS to C++, C++, Rust)
   - Formatting improvements and clarifications
   - No actual code changes were made, only documentation

The diff shows purely documentation improvements in testing.md, with no security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes are focused on:
- Updating links from MDN to internal documentation
- Adding more detailed logging instructions
- Improving documentation structure and clarity
- No actual code or security-related changes were made

No vulnerabilities were identified in this documentation-only change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/editing/data/inserthtml.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/editing/data/inserthtml.js@@ -585,4 +585,9 @@      "<div>a<span class=\"s1\"></span>b<span class=\"s2\"></span>c<br></div>"],     [true],     {"inserthtml":[false,false,"",false,false,""]}],+["{}",+    [["inserthtml","<div class=\"d1\"></div><div class=\"d2\"><span class=\"s1\">some text</span><a href=\"foo.html\"></a></div>"]],+    "<div class=\"d1\"></div><div class=\"d2\"><span class=\"s1\">some text</span><a href=\"foo.html\"></a></div>",+    [true],+    {"inserthtml":[false,false,"",false,false,""]}], ]

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found in the diff. This appears to be a test case addition for HTML insertion functionality.
File: testing/web-platform/tests/editing/data/inserthtml.js
Lines: Added lines after 585
Old Code: (no previous test case for this specific HTML structure)
Fixed Code: Added test case for inserting HTML with nested elements and attributes

Additional Notes:
- The diff shows an addition of a new test case for the `inserthtml` functionality
- The test case verifies handling of HTML with nested divs, spans, and anchor tags with attributes
- No security-related changes or fixes are apparent in this diff
- This appears to be routine test coverage expansion rather than a security fix

No vulnerabilities (XSS, HTML injection, etc.) were fixed in this particular diff, just test case additions.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgba-clamp-1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgba-clamp-1.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 0, -2)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-25]
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
   ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 0, -2)';
   ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0");

   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
   ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 0, -2)';
   ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0");

The changes appear to be primarily variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't indicate any security fixes. The test continues to check the same functionality - how the canvas handles invalid alpha values in rgba() colors. The behavior being tested (clamping negative alpha values) remains the same.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.globalAlpha.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.globalAlpha.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); // Test that restore() undoes any modifications var old = ctx.globalAlpha;

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring (variable renaming) rather than addressing any security issues.

Answer for Each Vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.globalAlpha.worker.js] [Lines 13-14]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

The change simply renames the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` without altering any security-relevant functionality. The test's behavior and security implications remain identical.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.