Shared security patch analysis results
AI Used: DEEPSEEK deepseek-chat--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-166.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-166.xml@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ ]]></style> <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/> <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->- <meta name="flags" content="" /> </head> <body> <p>The first letter of this paragraph should have a green background.</p>
Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis: Vulnerability Existed: no [No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-166.xml] [Lines 8] [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="" /> [Fixed Code] [This line was removed] Additional Details: - The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute - This appears to be a test cleanup rather than a security fix - No known vulnerabilities are associated with this change - The modification doesn't introduce or fix any security-relevant functionality The change seems to be removing unnecessary metadata from a test file rather than addressing any security concerns. The "flags" meta tag appears to have been empty and likely unused in this test context.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/downloads/test/browser/browser_libraryDrop.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/downloads/test/browser/browser_libraryDrop.js@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ win.close(); });- let listBox = win.document.getElementById("downloadsRichListBox");+ let listBox = win.document.getElementById("downloadsListBox"); ok(listBox, "download list box present"); await simulateDropAndCheck(win, listBox, [httpUrl("file1.txt")]);
Analysis of the code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential DOM-based XSS or incorrect element reference] [browser/components/downloads/test/browser/browser_libraryDrop.js] [Lines 27] [Old Code] let listBox = win.document.getElementById("downloadsRichListBox"); [Fixed Code] let listBox = win.document.getElementById("downloadsListBox"); Additional Details: - The change involves updating the element ID reference from "downloadsRichListBox" to "downloadsListBox" - While this doesn't appear to be a direct security fix, it could potentially relate to: * Fixing incorrect DOM references that might cause script errors * Aligning with security changes in the UI structure * Preventing potential issues if the old ID was deprecated or removed - Without more context about the UI changes, it's unclear if this was specifically security-related or just a maintenance update
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/themes/shared/ctrlTab.inc.css+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/themes/shared/ctrlTab.inc.css@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ outline: none !important; margin: 0; text-shadow: 0 0 1px hsl(0,0%,12%), 0 0 2px hsl(0,0%,12%);+ border: none;+ background-color: transparent; } .ctrlTab-preview > .button-box {
Analysis: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability found [File] browser/themes/shared/ctrlTab.inc.css [Lines] 28-30 Old Code: outline: none !important; margin: 0; text-shadow: 0 0 1px hsl(0,0%,12%), 0 0 2px hsl(0,0%,12%); Fixed Code: outline: none !important; margin: 0; text-shadow: 0 0 1px hsl(0,0%,12%), 0 0 2px hsl(0,0%,12%); border: none; background-color: transparent; Additional Details: - The changes appear to be purely stylistic/UI improvements (removing borders and making background transparent) rather than security fixes. - No known vulnerabilities are associated with these CSS property changes. - The changes improve the visual appearance of the Ctrl+Tab preview interface but don't address any security issues.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-fonts/first-available-font-006.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-fonts/first-available-font-006.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-fonts-3/#first-available-font"> <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-fonts-4/#first-available-font"> <link rel="match" href="first-available-font-005-ref.html">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="The position of the baseline in an inline-level box whose height is determined by a non-normal value of line-height does depend on the primary font, which is the first that contains U+0020."> <style>
Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis: Vulnerability Existed: no [No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-fonts/first-available-font-006.html] [Lines 5] [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content=""> [Fixed Code] [Removed line] Additional Details: 1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which doesn't appear to have any security implications. 2. This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix. 3. No actual security vulnerability is being addressed in this change. 4. The modification doesn't affect any security-related functionality or introduce any security controls. The change seems to be purely cosmetic/cleanup related, removing an unused or unnecessary meta tag from the test file. There's no indication this was fixing any security issue.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/base/nsGlobalWindowInner.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/base/nsGlobalWindowInner.h@@ -1181,6 +1181,10 @@ // Get the toplevel principal, returns null if this is a toplevel window. nsIPrincipal* GetTopLevelAntiTrackingPrincipal();+ // Get the client principal, returns null if the clientSource is not+ // available.+ nsIPrincipal* GetClientPrincipal();+ // This method is called if this window loads a 3rd party tracking resource // and the storage is just been granted. The window can reset the partitioned // storage objects and switch to the first party cookie jar.
Let me analyze this code diff for potential security fixes. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Principal Access Control] [dom/base/nsGlobalWindowInner.h] [Lines 1181+] [Old Code] // Get the toplevel principal, returns null if this is a toplevel window. nsIPrincipal* GetTopLevelAntiTrackingPrincipal(); [Fixed Code] // Get the toplevel principal, returns null if this is a toplevel window. nsIPrincipal* GetTopLevelAntiTrackingPrincipal(); // Get the client principal, returns null if the clientSource is not // available. nsIPrincipal* GetClientPrincipal(); Additional Details: - This appears to be adding a new method to access client principals, which could be related to security controls around principal access - Without seeing the implementation, it's unclear if this fixes a vulnerability or adds new security functionality - The change could be related to better principal isolation or tracking protection, but we can't confirm without more context
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.initial.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.initial.worker.js@@ -13,15 +13,15 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.closePath(); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-15] Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); Additional Details: This appears to be a simple variable renaming from "offscreenCanvas" to "canvas" with no security implications. 2. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 22] Old Code: _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); Fixed Code: _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); Additional Details: This change simply updates the variable name in the assertion to match the renamed variable, with no security impact. The changes in this diff appear to be purely cosmetic (variable renaming) rather than security-related fixes. No actual vulnerabilities or security improvements were identified in this diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/khr/android_surface.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/khr/android_surface.rs@@ -1,29 +1,23 @@ use crate::prelude::*; use crate::vk; use crate::RawPtr;-use crate::{EntryCustom, Instance};+use crate::{Entry, Instance}; use std::ffi::CStr; use std::mem; #[derive(Clone)] pub struct AndroidSurface { handle: vk::Instance,- android_surface_fn: vk::KhrAndroidSurfaceFn,+ fp: vk::KhrAndroidSurfaceFn, } impl AndroidSurface {- pub fn new<L>(entry: &EntryCustom<L>, instance: &Instance) -> Self {- let surface_fn = vk::KhrAndroidSurfaceFn::load(|name| unsafe {- mem::transmute(entry.get_instance_proc_addr(instance.handle(), name.as_ptr()))+ pub fn new(entry: &Entry, instance: &Instance) -> Self {+ let handle = instance.handle();+ let fp = vk::KhrAndroidSurfaceFn::load(|name| unsafe {+ mem::transmute(entry.get_instance_proc_addr(handle, name.as_ptr())) });- Self {- handle: instance.handle(),- android_surface_fn: surface_fn,- }- }-- pub fn name() -> &'static CStr {- vk::KhrAndroidSurfaceFn::name()+ Self { handle, fp } } #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkCreateAndroidSurfaceKHR.html>"]@@ -33,7 +27,7 @@ allocation_callbacks: Option<&vk::AllocationCallbacks>, ) -> VkResult<vk::SurfaceKHR> { let mut surface = mem::zeroed();- self.android_surface_fn+ self.fp .create_android_surface_khr( self.handle, create_info,@@ -43,8 +37,12 @@ .result_with_success(surface) }+ pub fn name() -> &'static CStr {+ vk::KhrAndroidSurfaceFn::name()+ }+ pub fn fp(&self) -> &vk::KhrAndroidSurfaceFn {- &self.android_surface_fn+ &self.fp } pub fn instance(&self) -> vk::Instance {
Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability found in this diff. The changes appear to be primarily code refactoring and reorganization rather than security fixes. The main changes are: - Changed from `EntryCustom<L>` to `Entry` - Renamed `android_surface_fn` to `fp` - Moved the `name()` function below other methods - Simplified the struct initialization 2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure Potential API Consistency Improvement [File] [Lines throughout] [Old Code] Used custom entry type (`EntryCustom<L>`) and separate field naming [Fixed Code] Uses standard `Entry` type and consistent field naming (`fp`) Note: While no specific vulnerabilities were fixed, the changes improve code consistency and potentially reduce complexity, which could indirectly improve security by making the code easier to maintain and audit. The removal of the generic parameter from `EntryCustom<L>` to just `Entry` might reduce potential type-related issues, but this isn't a direct security fix. No actual vulnerabilities (like memory safety issues, input validation problems, or similar security concerns) were identified in this diff. The changes appear to be primarily code quality improvements.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/push/test/test_utils.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/push/test/test_utils.js@@ -172,9 +172,30 @@ }); function setPushPermission(allow) {- return SpecialPowers.pushPermissions([+ let permissions = [ { type: "desktop-notification", allow, context: document },- ]);+ ];++ if (isXOrigin) {+ // We need to add permission for the xorigin tests. In xorigin tests, the+ // test page will be run under third-party context, so we need to use+ // partitioned principal to add the permission.+ let partitionedPrincipal = SpecialPowers.wrap(document)+ .partitionedPrincipal;++ permissions.push({+ type: "desktop-notification",+ allow,+ context: {+ url: partitionedPrincipal.originNoSuffix,+ originAttributes: {+ partitionKey: partitionedPrincipal.originAttributes.partitionKey,+ },+ },+ });+ }++ return SpecialPowers.pushPermissions(permissions); } function setupPrefs() {
Let me analyze the code diff for security fixes: Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Cross-Origin Permission Handling] [dom/push/test/test_utils.js] [Lines 172-196] [Old Code] function setPushPermission(allow) { return SpecialPowers.pushPermissions([ { type: "desktop-notification", allow, context: document }, ]); } [Fixed Code] function setPushPermission(allow) { let permissions = [ { type: "desktop-notification", allow, context: document }, ]; if (isXOrigin) { // We need to add permission for the xorigin tests. In xorigin tests, the // test page will be run under third-party context, so we need to use // partitioned principal to add the permission. let partitionedPrincipal = SpecialPowers.wrap(document) .partitionedPrincipal; permissions.push({ type: "desktop-notification", allow, context: { url: partitionedPrincipal.originNoSuffix, originAttributes: { partitionKey: partitionedPrincipal.originAttributes.partitionKey, }, }, }); } return SpecialPowers.pushPermissions(permissions); } Additional Details: 1. The change appears to address cross-origin (xorigin) testing scenarios by properly handling permissions in third-party contexts. 2. The fix introduces partitioned principal handling for cross-origin cases, which suggests it might be related to preventing permission leakage across origins. 3. While this looks like a security-related improvement, I can't definitively identify a specific vulnerability being fixed since it's test code and the change might be for test correctness rather than fixing a security hole.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-paint-clip-015.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-paint-clip-015.html@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ -->- <meta name="flags" content=""> <style> div
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes: Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-paint-clip-015.html [Lines] 33 [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content=""> [Fixed Code] (removed line) Additional Details: - The change simply removes an empty meta tag that wasn't serving any purpose - No security vulnerability is being fixed here - This appears to be a minor cleanup rather than a security fix - The "flags" meta tag was empty and not being used for any security-related functionality No other vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change is purely cosmetic/cleanup related.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/mozglue/baseprofiler/public/BaseProfiler.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/mozglue/baseprofiler/public/BaseProfiler.h@@ -220,6 +220,7 @@ MFBT_API void profiler_register_page(uint64_t aTabD, uint64_t aInnerWindowID, const std::string& aUrl, uint64_t aEmbedderInnerWindowID);+ // Unregister page with the profiler. // // Take a Inner Window ID and unregister the page entry that has the same ID.
Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis: Vulnerability Existed: no [No specific vulnerability found] [mozglue/baseprofiler/public/BaseProfiler.h] [Lines 220-223] [Old Code] MFBT_API void profiler_register_page(uint64_t aTabD, uint64_t aInnerWindowID, const std::string& aUrl, uint64_t aEmbedderInnerWindowID); [Fixed Code] MFBT_API void profiler_register_page(uint64_t aTabD, uint64_t aInnerWindowID, const std::string& aUrl, uint64_t aEmbedderInnerWindowID); Additional Details: The change appears to be a minor formatting change (adding a newline after the function declaration) rather than a security fix. No actual code logic was modified, just whitespace was added. Therefore, no specific vulnerability appears to have been addressed in this diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/serviceworkers/test/gtest/TestReadWrite.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/serviceworkers/test/gtest/TestReadWrite.cpp@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ void TestDeleteData() { DeleteData(); } void TestRegisterServiceWorker(const ServiceWorkerRegistrationData& aData) {+ mozilla::MonitorAutoLock lock(mMonitor); RegisterServiceWorkerInternal(aData); }
Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities. Vulnerability Existed: yes Race Condition Vulnerability [dom/serviceworkers/test/gtest/TestReadWrite.cpp] [Lines 41-44] [Old Code] void TestRegisterServiceWorker(const ServiceWorkerRegistrationData& aData) { RegisterServiceWorkerInternal(aData); } [Fixed Code] void TestRegisterServiceWorker(const ServiceWorkerRegistrationData& aData) { mozilla::MonitorAutoLock lock(mMonitor); RegisterServiceWorkerInternal(aData); } Additional Details: - The vulnerability appears to be a potential race condition in service worker registration - The fix adds a monitor lock (mozilla::MonitorAutoLock) to ensure thread safety - Without the lock, concurrent calls to TestRegisterServiceWorker could lead to race conditions during service worker registration - The fix follows the pattern of using monitors for thread synchronization in Mozilla code Note: While this is a test file, race conditions in test code could potentially affect test reliability and mask real issues in production code.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/ipc/URLClassifierParent.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/ipc/URLClassifierParent.cpp@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ nsCOMPtr<nsIURIClassifier> uriClassifier = do_GetService(NS_URICLASSIFIERSERVICE_CONTRACTID, &rv); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {- rv = uriClassifier->Classify(aPrincipal, nullptr, this, aSuccess);+ rv = uriClassifier->Classify(aPrincipal, this, aSuccess); } if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !*aSuccess) { // We treat the case where we fail to classify and the case where the
Here's my analysis of the provided code diff: Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Improper Input Validation] [dom/ipc/URLClassifierParent.cpp] [Lines 28] [Old Code] rv = uriClassifier->Classify(aPrincipal, nullptr, this, aSuccess); [Fixed Code] rv = uriClassifier->Classify(aPrincipal, this, aSuccess); Additional Details: The change removes the `nullptr` parameter from the `Classify` call. While this could potentially affect input validation or security checks (since nullptr might have been used as a placeholder for some security-related parameter), I cannot determine with certainty if this was an actual security vulnerability fix or just a refactoring. The removal of a parameter could indicate: 1. A fix for a potential null pointer dereference vulnerability 2. Removal of an unused parameter that might have caused confusion 3. A change in the API contract that might have security implications Without more context about the `Classify` method's implementation and purpose, I can't definitively identify a specific vulnerability. However, parameter changes in security-sensitive functions (like URI classification) should always be examined carefully.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.attributes.shadowBlur.initial.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.attributes.shadowBlur.initial.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); _assertSame(ctx.shadowBlur, 0, "ctx.shadowBlur", "0"); t.done();
Analysis of the provided code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.attributes.shadowBlur.initial.html] [Lines 17-18] Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); Additional Notes: - The change appears to be purely a variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` - No security-related changes are evident in this diff - The modification seems to be for code consistency or readability rather than security fixes - No known vulnerabilities are addressed by this change
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/darling/examples/supports_struct.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/darling/examples/supports_struct.rs@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@-#[macro_use]-extern crate darling;+// The use of fields in debug print commands does not count as "used",+// which causes the fields to trigger an unwanted dead code warning.+#![allow(dead_code)]-extern crate syn;--use darling::{ast, util, FromDeriveInput};+use darling::{ast, util, FromDeriveInput, FromField}; use syn::{Ident, Type}; #[derive(Debug, FromField)]
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities: Vulnerability Existed: no [Removed unused macro imports and added dead_code allowance] [third_party/rust/darling/examples/supports_struct.rs] [Lines 1-9] [Old Code] #[macro_use] extern crate darling; extern crate syn; use darling::{ast, util, FromDeriveInput}; [Fixed Code] // The use of fields in debug print commands does not count as "used", // which causes the fields to trigger an unwanted dead code warning. #![allow(dead_code)] use darling::{ast, util, FromDeriveInput, FromField}; This change appears to be a code cleanup and improvement rather than a security fix. The modifications include: 1. Removing explicit extern crate declarations (which are no longer needed in Rust 2018 edition) 2. Adding a dead_code allowance to suppress warnings 3. Adding FromField to the use statement 4. Adding explanatory comments No security vulnerabilities are apparent in this change. The modifications are primarily stylistic and related to compiler warnings rather than security concerns.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/webrtc/RTCRtpReceiver-getStats.https.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/webrtc/RTCRtpReceiver-getStats.https.html@@ -80,4 +80,46 @@ assert_stats_report_has_stats(statsReport, ['inbound-rtp']); }, 'receiver.getStats() via addTrack should return stats report containing inbound-rtp stats');++ promise_test(async t => {+ const caller = new RTCPeerConnection();+ t.add_cleanup(() => caller.close());+ const callee = new RTCPeerConnection();+ t.add_cleanup(() => callee.close());+ const stream = await getNoiseStream({audio:true});+ t.add_cleanup(() => stream.getTracks().forEach(track => track.stop()));+ const [track] = stream.getTracks();+ caller.addTrack(track, stream);++ await exchangeOfferAnswer(caller, callee);+ const [receiver] = callee.getReceivers();+ const [transceiver] = callee.getTransceivers();+ const statsPromiseFirst = receiver.getStats();+ transceiver.stop();+ const statsReportFirst = await statsPromiseFirst;+ const statsReportSecond = await receiver.getStats();+ validateStatsReport(statsReportFirst);+ validateStatsReport(statsReportSecond);+ }, 'receiver.getStats() should work on a stopped transceiver');++ promise_test(async t => {+ const caller = new RTCPeerConnection();+ t.add_cleanup(() => caller.close());+ const callee = new RTCPeerConnection();+ t.add_cleanup(() => callee.close());+ const stream = await getNoiseStream({audio:true});+ t.add_cleanup(() => stream.getTracks().forEach(track => track.stop()));+ const [track] = stream.getTracks();+ caller.addTrack(track, stream);++ await exchangeOfferAnswer(caller, callee);+ const [receiver] = callee.getReceivers();+ const statsPromiseFirst = receiver.getStats();+ callee.close();+ const statsReportFirst = await statsPromiseFirst;+ const statsReportSecond = await receiver.getStats();+ validateStatsReport(statsReportFirst);+ validateStatsReport(statsReportSecond);+ }, 'receiver.getStats() should work with a closed PeerConnection');+ </script>
Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be adding new test cases for WebRTC functionality rather than patching security issues. Here's my analysis: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/webrtc/RTCRtpReceiver-getStats.https.html [Lines] 80-124 [Old Code] (Only contained one test case) [Fixed Code] (Added two new test cases for stopped transceiver and closed PeerConnection scenarios) The changes are: 1. Adding a test case to verify getStats() works on a stopped transceiver 2. Adding a test case to verify getStats() works with a closed PeerConnection These appear to be functional test additions rather than security fixes. The changes don't show any: - Removal of insecure code patterns - Addition of security checks - Fixes for common vulnerabilities (XSS, injection, etc.) - Changes to authentication or authorization logic The modifications are purely focused on expanding test coverage for WebRTC API behavior under different conditions.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/java/org/mozilla/geckoview/Autocomplete.java+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/java/org/mozilla/geckoview/Autocomplete.java@@ -811,7 +811,7 @@ @IntDef( flag = true, value = {UsedField.PASSWORD})- /* package */ @interface LSUsedField {}+ public @interface LSUsedField {} // Sync with UsedField in GeckoViewAutocomplete.jsm. /** Possible login entry field types for {@link StorageDelegate#onLoginUsed}. */@@ -945,7 +945,7 @@ @IntDef( flag = true, value = {Hint.NONE, Hint.GENERATED, Hint.LOW_CONFIDENCE})- /* package */ @interface SaveOptionHint {}+ public @interface SaveOptionHint {} /** Hint types for login saving requests. */ public static class Hint {@@ -982,7 +982,7 @@ Hint.DUPLICATE_USERNAME, Hint.MATCHING_ORIGIN })- /* package */ @interface SelectOptionHint {}+ public @interface SelectOptionHint {} /** Hint types for selection requests. */ public static class Hint {@@ -1166,7 +1166,7 @@ @IntDef( flag = true, value = {Hint.NONE, Hint.INSECURE_FORM})- /* package */ @interface CreditCardSelectHint {}+ public @interface CreditCardSelectHint {} /** Hint types for credit card selection requests. */ public static class Hint {@@ -1223,7 +1223,7 @@ @IntDef( flag = true, value = {Hint.NONE, Hint.INSECURE_FORM})- /* package */ @interface AddressSelectHint {}+ public @interface AddressSelectHint {} /** Hint types for credit card selection requests. */ public static class Hint {
Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes are all related to changing the visibility of annotation interfaces from package-private to public. This appears to be an API visibility change rather than a security fix. Here's the analysis following your requested format: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found in the diff. The changes are visibility modifications for annotation interfaces. The changes made are: 1. Changed LSUsedField from package-private to public 2. Changed SaveOptionHint from package-private to public 3. Changed SelectOptionHint from package-private to public 4. Changed CreditCardSelectHint from package-private to public 5. Changed AddressSelectHint from package-private to public These changes appear to be API design decisions rather than security fixes. Making these annotation interfaces public allows them to be used outside their package, which is likely an intentional change to expand their usability rather than fix any security issue. No known vulnerabilities (like injection, XSS, etc.) are being addressed in this diff. The changes are purely about interface visibility in the Java code.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.create1.zero.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.create1.zero.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { ctx.createImageData(null); }); t.done();
Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis: Vulnerability Existed: no [No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.create1.zero.html] [Lines 17-18] [Old Code] var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); [Fixed Code] var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); The changes in the diff appear to be purely a variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. This doesn't represent a security fix but rather a code style/readability improvement. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being addressed in this change.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-144.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-144.xml@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ p { background : red;}]]></style> <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/> <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->- <meta name="flags" content="" /> </head> <body> <div>
Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-144.xml [Lines] 6 [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="" /> [Fixed Code] (line removed) Additional details: - The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag with "flags" attribute - This appears to be test-related cleanup rather than a security fix - No known vulnerabilities are associated with this change - The modification seems to be removing unused test configuration rather than addressing a security issue No other changes were detected in the diff that would indicate security fixes. The modification appears to be minor test file cleanup rather than addressing any security vulnerabilities.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit/WarpCacheIRTranspiler.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit/WarpCacheIRTranspiler.cpp@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ #include "jit/WarpCacheIRTranspiler.h"+#include "mozilla/Casting.h" #include "mozilla/Maybe.h" #include "jsmath.h"@@ -183,6 +184,11 @@ uint64_t raw = static_cast<uint64_t>(stubInfo_->getStubRawInt64(stubData_, offset)); return Value::fromRawBits(raw);+ }+ double doubleStubField(uint32_t offset) {+ uint64_t raw =+ static_cast<uint64_t>(stubInfo_->getStubRawInt64(stubData_, offset));+ return mozilla::BitwiseCast<double>(raw); } // This must only be called when the caller knows the object is tenured and@@ -1366,6 +1372,13 @@ Int32OperandId resultId) { int32_t val = int32StubField(valOffset); auto* valConst = constant(Int32Value(val));+ return defineOperand(resultId, valConst);+}++bool WarpCacheIRTranspiler::emitLoadDoubleConstant(uint32_t valOffset,+ NumberOperandId resultId) {+ double val = doubleStubField(valOffset);+ auto* valConst = constant(DoubleValue(val)); return defineOperand(resultId, valConst); }
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes: 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure Potential Type Confusion or Precision Loss Vulnerability [js/src/jit/WarpCacheIRTranspiler.cpp] [Lines 184-188] [Old Code] (No previous implementation of doubleStubField) [Fixed Code] ```cpp double doubleStubField(uint32_t offset) { uint64_t raw = static_cast<uint64_t>(stubInfo_->getStubRawInt64(stubData_, offset)); return mozilla::BitwiseCast<double>(raw); } ``` 2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure Potential Floating-Point Precision Handling Issue [js/src/jit/WarpCacheIRTranspiler.cpp] [Lines 1372-1378] [Old Code] (No previous implementation of emitLoadDoubleConstant) [Fixed Code] ```cpp bool WarpCacheIRTranspiler::emitLoadDoubleConstant(uint32_t valOffset, NumberOperandId resultId) { double val = doubleStubField(valOffset); auto* valConst = constant(DoubleValue(val)); return defineOperand(resultId, valConst); } ``` Additional Details: - The changes introduce proper handling of double-precision floating-point values using mozilla::BitwiseCast, which suggests there might have been potential issues with type punning or floating-point representation in the previous version. - The inclusion of "mozilla/Casting.h" suggests the fix involves safer casting operations. - While no specific vulnerability is identified, the changes appear to improve type safety and precision handling for floating-point operations in the JIT compiler.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/base/nsFrameMessageManager.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/base/nsFrameMessageManager.cpp@@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ } // Not clonable, try JSON- // XXX This is ugly but currently structured cloning doesn't handle+ // Bug 1749037 - This is ugly but currently structured cloning doesn't handle // properly cases when interface is implemented in JS and used // as a dictionary. nsAutoString json;
Analyzing the provided code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Comment Update] dom/base/nsFrameMessageManager.cpp [Lines 456] [Old Code] // XXX This is ugly but currently structured cloning doesn't handle [Fixed Code] // Bug 1749037 - This is ugly but currently structured cloning doesn't handle Additional Details: - The change appears to be primarily a comment update, replacing "XXX" with a specific bug reference (Bug 1749037) - There's no direct code change that would indicate a security fix - The comment suggests there may be an underlying issue with structured cloning of JS-implemented interfaces used as dictionaries, but the diff doesn't show any actual security fixes - Without seeing the referenced bug or more context about the structured cloning issue, I can't determine if this was a security fix or just a general bug fix Note: The change might be related to a security fix documented in Bug 1749037, but the diff itself doesn't show any security-relevant code changes.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.