--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/places/nsNavHistory.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/places/nsNavHistory.cpp@@ -2212,10 +2212,11 @@     clause.Condition("AUTOCOMPLETE_MATCH(")         .Param(":search_string")         .Str(", h.url, page_title, tags, ")-        .Str(nsPrintfCString("1, 1, 1, 1, %d, %d)",+        .Str(nsPrintfCString("1, 1, 1, 1, %d, %d",                              mozIPlacesAutoComplete::MATCH_ANYWHERE_UNMODIFIED,                              searchBehavior)-                 .get());+                 .get())+        .Str(", NULL)");     // Serching by terms implicitly exclude queries.     excludeQueries = true;   }

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: yes
SQL Injection Vulnerability [File] [Lines 2212-2216]
[Old Code]
.Str(nsPrintfCString("1, 1, 1, 1, %d, %d)",
                     mozIPlacesAutoComplete::MATCH_ANYWHERE_UNMODIFIED,
                     searchBehavior)
     .get());
[Fixed Code]
.Str(nsPrintfCString("1, 1, 1, 1, %d, %d",
                     mozIPlacesAutoComplete::MATCH_ANYWHERE_UNMODIFIED,
                     searchBehavior)
     .get())
.Str(", NULL)");

The vulnerability appears to be related to SQL injection. The old code was missing a NULL parameter in the SQL function call, which could potentially lead to malformed SQL queries. The fix properly terminates the AUTOCOMPLETE_MATCH function call by adding the missing NULL parameter as a separate string concatenation. This ensures the SQL query is properly formatted and prevents any potential injection vectors that might arise from malformed queries.

The change shows a more secure approach to building SQL queries by properly separating constant parts of the query (", NULL)") from the parameterized parts.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/places/SQLFunctions.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/places/SQLFunctions.h@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@  * In SQL, you'd use it in the WHERE clause like so:  * WHERE AUTOCOMPLETE_MATCH(aSearchString, aURL, aTitle, aTags, aVisitCount,  *                          aTyped, aBookmark, aOpenPageCount, aMatchBehavior,- *                          aSearchBehavior)+ *                          aSearchBehavior, aFallbackTitle)  *  * @param aSearchString  *        The string to compare against.@@ -55,6 +55,9 @@  *        The match behavior to use for this search.  * @param aSearchBehavior  *        A bitfield dictating the search behavior.+ * @param aFallbackTitle+ *        The title may come from a bookmark or a snapshot, in that case the+ *        caller can provide the original history title to match on both.  */ class MatchAutoCompleteFunction final : public mozIStorageFunction {  public:@@ -94,7 +97,8 @@   static const uint32_t kArgIndexOpenPageCount = 7;   static const uint32_t kArgIndexMatchBehavior = 8;   static const uint32_t kArgIndexSearchBehavior = 9;-  static const uint32_t kArgIndexLength = 10;+  static const uint32_t kArgIndexFallbackTitle = 10;+  static const uint32_t kArgIndexLength = 11;   /**    * Typedefs

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be functional enhancements rather than security patches. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability [File] [Lines]
    The changes add a new parameter (aFallbackTitle) to the SQL function and update related documentation and constants. This is a feature enhancement rather than a security fix.

The diff shows:
1. Addition of a new parameter `aFallbackTitle` to the function documentation
2. Update of the constant values to accommodate the new parameter
3. No removal or modification of existing security-related code
4. No fixes to potentially dangerous operations

Since there are no security-related changes (no input validation fixes, no permission changes, no unsafe operations being modified), I conclude there are no security vulnerabilities being addressed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.wrongtype.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.wrongtype.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var imgdata = { width: 1, height: 1, data: [255, 0, 0, 255] }; assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { ctx.putImageData(imgdata, 0, 0); });

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14]
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');

   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Notes:
- The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas') with no security implications.
- The test continues to verify that putImageData() throws a TypeError when given incorrect input types, which is the expected behavior.
- No security vulnerabilities are introduced or fixed by this change. The modification seems to be for code consistency or readability purposes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.interpolate.overlap.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.interpolate.overlap.worker.js@@ -13,10 +13,10 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-offscreenCanvas.width = 200;+canvas.width = 200; var g = ctx.createLinearGradient(0, 0, 200, 0); g.addColorStop(0, '#f00'); g.addColorStop(0, '#ff0');@@ -36,12 +36,12 @@ g.addColorStop(1, '#00f'); ctx.fillStyle = g; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 200, 50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 49,25, 0,0,255,255, "49,25", "0,0,255,255", 16);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 51,25, 255,255,0,255, "51,25", "255,255,0,255", 16);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 99,25, 0,0,255,255, "99,25", "0,0,255,255", 16);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 101,25, 255,255,0,255, "101,25", "255,255,0,255", 16);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 149,25, 0,0,255,255, "149,25", "0,0,255,255", 16);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 151,25, 255,255,0,255, "151,25", "255,255,0,255", 16);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 49,25, 0,0,255,255, "49,25", "0,0,255,255", 16);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 51,25, 255,255,0,255, "51,25", "255,255,0,255", 16);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 99,25, 0,0,255,255, "99,25", "0,0,255,255", 16);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 101,25, 255,255,0,255, "101,25", "255,255,0,255", 16);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 149,25, 0,0,255,255, "149,25", "0,0,255,255", 16);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 151,25, 255,255,0,255, "151,25", "255,255,0,255", 16); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability purposes. Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-36]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    offscreenCanvas.width = 200;
    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, ...);
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    canvas.width = 200;
    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, ...);

The changes don't affect any security-related functionality or introduce/fix any security issues. The test assertions and canvas operations remain functionally identical, just with a renamed variable.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/mozapps/defaultagent/DefaultBrowser.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/mozapps/defaultagent/DefaultBrowser.h@@ -9,18 +9,12 @@ #include <string>+#include "mozilla/DefineEnum.h" #include "mozilla/WinHeaderOnlyUtils.h"-enum struct Browser {-  Unknown,-  Firefox,-  Chrome,-  EdgeWithEdgeHTML,-  EdgeWithBlink,-  InternetExplorer,-  Opera,-  Brave,-};+MOZ_DEFINE_ENUM_CLASS(Browser, (Unknown, Firefox, Chrome, EdgeWithEdgeHTML,+                                EdgeWithBlink, InternetExplorer, Opera, Brave,+                                Yandex, QQBrowser, _360Browser, Sogou)); struct DefaultBrowserInfo {   Browser currentDefaultBrowser;

Let me analyze the code diff for security fixes:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Enum Definition Improvement] [toolkit/mozapps/defaultagent/DefaultBrowser.h] [Lines 9-18]
[Old Code]
enum struct Browser {
  Unknown,
  Firefox,
  Chrome,
  EdgeWithEdgeHTML,
  EdgeWithBlink,
  InternetExplorer,
  Opera,
  Brave,
};
[Fixed Code]
MOZ_DEFINE_ENUM_CLASS(Browser, (Unknown, Firefox, Chrome, EdgeWithEdgeHTML,
                                EdgeWithBlink, InternetExplorer, Opera, Brave,
                                Yandex, QQBrowser, _360Browser, Sogou));

Additional Details:
1. This appears to be an improvement in enum definition rather than a security fix
2. The change replaces a manual enum definition with a macro-based approach (MOZ_DEFINE_ENUM_CLASS)
3. New browser types were added (Yandex, QQBrowser, _360Browser, Sogou)
4. No obvious security vulnerabilities are being fixed here - it's more of a code maintenance/extension change

Note: There doesn't appear to be any security vulnerability being fixed in this diff. The changes are related to code structure and adding support for additional browser types.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.parse.hex.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.parse.hex.worker.js@@ -13,13 +13,13 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-offscreenCanvas.width = '0x100';-offscreenCanvas.height = '0x100';-_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.width, 256, "offscreenCanvas.width", "256");-_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.height, 256, "offscreenCanvas.height", "256");+canvas.width = '0x100';+canvas.height = '0x100';+_assertSame(canvas.width, 256, "canvas.width", "256");+_assertSame(canvas.height, 256, "canvas.height", "256"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and test assertion message updates. Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.parse.hex.worker.js] [Lines 13-21]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    offscreenCanvas.width = '0x100';
    offscreenCanvas.height = '0x100';
    _assertSame(offscreenCanvas.width, 256, "offscreenCanvas.width", "256");
    _assertSame(offscreenCanvas.height, 256, "offscreenCanvas.height", "256");
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    canvas.width = '0x100';
    canvas.height = '0x100';
    _assertSame(canvas.width, 256, "canvas.width", "256");
    _assertSame(canvas.height, 256, "canvas.height", "256");

The changes are:
1. Renamed variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Updated the assertion messages to use the new variable name
3. No functional changes to the actual test logic or security-related behavior

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/promise/PromiseNativeHandler.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/promise/PromiseNativeHandler.cpp@@ -24,7 +24,8 @@ } void DomPromiseListener::ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx,-                                          JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) {+                                          JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+                                          ErrorResult& aRv) {   if (mResolve) {     mResolve(aCx, aValue);   }@@ -33,7 +34,8 @@ } void DomPromiseListener::RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx,-                                          JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) {+                                          JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+                                          ErrorResult& aRv) {   if (mReject) {     nsresult errorCode;     if (!aValue.isInt32()) {

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Error Handling Improvement [File] dom/promise/PromiseNativeHandler.cpp [Lines 24-34]
[Old Code]
void DomPromiseListener::ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx,
                                          JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) {
void DomPromiseListener::RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx,
                                          JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) {
[Fixed Code]
void DomPromiseListener::ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx,
                                          JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,
                                          ErrorResult& aRv) {
void DomPromiseListener::RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx,
                                          JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,
                                          ErrorResult& aRv) {

Additional Details:
The diff shows that ErrorResult& aRv parameter was added to both callback functions. This appears to be an improvement in error handling, allowing the functions to properly report errors back to the caller. While this doesn't directly indicate a specific vulnerability was fixed, it improves the robustness of error handling which could potentially prevent security issues related to unhandled errors. The change is particularly notable in the RejectedCallback where error handling is more critical. Without more context about how these functions are used, it's difficult to determine if this was fixing a specific vulnerability or just general code improvement.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/manager/ssl/LocalCertService.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/manager/ssl/LocalCertService.cpp@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@     if (!cert) {       return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;     }-    mCert = nsNSSCertificate::Create(cert.get());+    mCert = new nsNSSCertificate(cert.get());     return NS_OK;   }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
[Potential Memory Management Issue] [security/manager/ssl/LocalCertService.cpp] [Lines 268]  
[Old Code]  
`mCert = nsNSSCertificate::Create(cert.get());`  
[Fixed Code]  
`mCert = new nsNSSCertificate(cert.get());`  

Additional Details:
1. The change involves switching from a static factory method (`Create()`) to direct instantiation (`new`). While this doesn't immediately indicate a security vulnerability, it could potentially relate to memory management if the `Create()` method had special handling for resource allocation/deallocation.
2. Without seeing the implementation of `nsNSSCertificate::Create()`, we can't be certain if this change fixes a vulnerability or is just a refactoring.
3. There's no obvious security vulnerability like buffer overflow, injection, etc. visible in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/media/webrtc/signaling/gtest/MockConduit.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/media/webrtc/signaling/gtest/MockConduit.h@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@   MockConduit() = default;   MOCK_CONST_METHOD0(type, Type());+  MOCK_CONST_METHOD0(ActiveSendPayloadType, Maybe<int>());+  MOCK_CONST_METHOD0(ActiveRecvPayloadType, Maybe<int>());   MOCK_METHOD1(SetTransportActive, void(bool));   MOCK_METHOD0(SenderRtpSendEvent, MediaEventSourceExc<MediaPacket>&());   MOCK_METHOD0(SenderRtcpSendEvent, MediaEventSourceExc<MediaPacket>&());

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability [File] media/webrtc/signaling/gtest/MockConduit.h [Lines] 24-26
   [Old Code]
   (No code shown for these methods before)
   [Fixed Code]
   MOCK_CONST_METHOD0(ActiveSendPayloadType, Maybe<int>());
   MOCK_CONST_METHOD0(ActiveRecvPayloadType, Maybe<int>());

Analysis:
The diff shows the addition of two mock methods (ActiveSendPayloadType and ActiveRecvPayloadType) to a test mock class. This appears to be test infrastructure code rather than production code changes. The changes don't show any security fixes - they're just adding new mock methods that were presumably needed for testing. There's no evidence of any vulnerability being fixed here, just test code being updated to match new interface requirements.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/spelling-error-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/spelling-error-001.html@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-pseudo-4/#highlight-styling">   <link rel="match" href="spelling-error-001-ref.html">-  <meta content="" name="flags">   <style>   div

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/spelling-error-001.html [Lines] 11  
   [Old Code] `<meta content="" name="flags">`  
   [Fixed Code] (line removed)  

Additional Details:  
The diff shows the removal of an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute. This doesn't appear to be a security fix but rather a cleanup of unnecessary markup. No known vulnerabilities are associated with this change. The "flags" meta tag isn't a standard HTML element and wasn't serving any apparent purpose in this test file.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/generic/ScrollPositionUpdate.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/generic/ScrollPositionUpdate.cpp@@ -10,32 +10,7 @@ namespace mozilla {-uint64_t ScrollGeneration::sCounter = 0;--ScrollGeneration ScrollGeneration::New() {-  uint64_t value = ++sCounter;-  return ScrollGeneration(value);-}--ScrollGeneration::ScrollGeneration() : mValue(0) {}--ScrollGeneration::ScrollGeneration(uint64_t aValue) : mValue(aValue) {}--bool ScrollGeneration::operator<(const ScrollGeneration& aOther) const {-  return mValue < aOther.mValue;-}--bool ScrollGeneration::operator==(const ScrollGeneration& aOther) const {-  return mValue == aOther.mValue;-}--bool ScrollGeneration::operator!=(const ScrollGeneration& aOther) const {-  return !(*this == aOther);-}--std::ostream& operator<<(std::ostream& aStream, const ScrollGeneration& aGen) {-  return aStream << aGen.mValue;-}+static ScrollGenerationCounter sGenerationCounter; ScrollPositionUpdate::ScrollPositionUpdate()     : mType(ScrollUpdateType::Absolute),@@ -47,7 +22,7 @@ ScrollPositionUpdate ScrollPositionUpdate::NewScrollframe(     nsPoint aInitialPosition) {   ScrollPositionUpdate ret;-  ret.mScrollGeneration = ScrollGeneration::New();+  ret.mScrollGeneration = sGenerationCounter.NewMainThreadGeneration();   ret.mScrollMode = ScrollMode::Instant;   ret.mDestination = CSSPoint::FromAppUnits(aInitialPosition);   return ret;@@ -60,7 +35,7 @@   MOZ_ASSERT(aOrigin != ScrollOrigin::None);   ScrollPositionUpdate ret;-  ret.mScrollGeneration = ScrollGeneration::New();+  ret.mScrollGeneration = sGenerationCounter.NewMainThreadGeneration();   ret.mType = ScrollUpdateType::Absolute;   ret.mScrollMode = ScrollMode::Instant;   ret.mScrollOrigin = aOrigin;@@ -72,7 +47,7 @@ ScrollPositionUpdate ScrollPositionUpdate::NewRelativeScroll(     nsPoint aSource, nsPoint aDestination) {   ScrollPositionUpdate ret;-  ret.mScrollGeneration = ScrollGeneration::New();+  ret.mScrollGeneration = sGenerationCounter.NewMainThreadGeneration();   ret.mType = ScrollUpdateType::Relative;   ret.mScrollMode = ScrollMode::Instant;   ret.mScrollOrigin = ScrollOrigin::Relative;@@ -89,7 +64,7 @@   MOZ_ASSERT(aOrigin != ScrollOrigin::None);   ScrollPositionUpdate ret;-  ret.mScrollGeneration = ScrollGeneration::New();+  ret.mScrollGeneration = sGenerationCounter.NewMainThreadGeneration();   ret.mType = ScrollUpdateType::Absolute;   ret.mScrollMode = ScrollMode::SmoothMsd;   ret.mScrollOrigin = aOrigin;@@ -105,7 +80,7 @@   MOZ_ASSERT(aOrigin != ScrollOrigin::None);   ScrollPositionUpdate ret;-  ret.mScrollGeneration = ScrollGeneration::New();+  ret.mScrollGeneration = sGenerationCounter.NewMainThreadGeneration();   ret.mType = ScrollUpdateType::PureRelative;   ret.mScrollMode = aMode;   ret.mScrollOrigin = aOrigin;@@ -120,7 +95,7 @@   return mScrollGeneration == aOther.mScrollGeneration; }-ScrollGeneration ScrollPositionUpdate::GetGeneration() const {+MainThreadScrollGeneration ScrollPositionUpdate::GetGeneration() const {   return mScrollGeneration; }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Integer Overflow] [File] [Lines 10-32]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   uint64_t ScrollGeneration::sCounter = 0;
   
   ScrollGeneration ScrollGeneration::New() {
     uint64_t value = ++sCounter;
     return ScrollGeneration(value);
   }
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   static ScrollGenerationCounter sGenerationCounter;
   ```  
   Additional Details: The old code used a simple incrementing counter which could theoretically overflow, though unlikely with uint64_t. The new version uses a dedicated counter class which might have better overflow protection.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Thread Safety Issue] [File] [All instances where ScrollGeneration::New() was replaced]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   ret.mScrollGeneration = ScrollGeneration::New();
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   ret.mScrollGeneration = sGenerationCounter.NewMainThreadGeneration();
   ```  
   Additional Details: The change from a static counter to a thread-specific counter suggests potential thread safety improvements, though without seeing the implementation of ScrollGenerationCounter, we can't be certain.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Type Safety Improvement] [File] [Line 120]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   ScrollGeneration ScrollPositionUpdate::GetGeneration() const {
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   MainThreadScrollGeneration ScrollPositionUpdate::GetGeneration() const {
   ```  
   Additional Details: The change to a more specific return type (MainThreadScrollGeneration) suggests better type safety, though this might not be directly security-related.

Note: While these changes appear to be improvements in code quality and potentially security, without seeing the full context (especially the implementation of ScrollGenerationCounter), we can't definitively identify specific vulnerabilities that were fixed. The changes suggest improvements in thread safety and type safety, which could have security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/xhr/XMLHttpRequestMainThread.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/xhr/XMLHttpRequestMainThread.h@@ -309,6 +309,8 @@   void MaybeLowerChannelPriority();  public:+  bool CanSend(ErrorResult& aRv);+   virtual void Send(       const Nullable<           DocumentOrBlobOrArrayBufferViewOrArrayBufferOrFormDataOrURLSearchParamsOrUSVString>&@@ -317,6 +319,9 @@   virtual void SendInputStream(nsIInputStream* aInputStream,                                ErrorResult& aRv) override {+    if (!CanSend(aRv)) {+      return;+    }     BodyExtractor<nsIInputStream> body(aInputStream);     SendInternal(&body, false, aRv);   }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   [Missing Authorization Check] [dom/xhr/XMLHttpRequestMainThread.h] [Lines 319-321]
   [Old Code]
   virtual void SendInputStream(nsIInputStream* aInputStream,
                               ErrorResult& aRv) override {
     BodyExtractor<nsIInputStream> body(aInputStream);
     SendInternal(&body, false, aRv);
   }
   [Fixed Code]
   virtual void SendInputStream(nsIInputStream* aInputStream,
                               ErrorResult& aRv) override {
     if (!CanSend(aRv)) {
       return;
     }
     BodyExtractor<nsIInputStream> body(aInputStream);
     SendInternal(&body, false, aRv);
   }

Additional Details:
- The vulnerability appears to be a missing authorization check before processing the input stream in the SendInputStream method.
- The fix adds a CanSend() check that validates whether the request can be sent, which likely includes permission/authorization checks.
- Without this check, there was potential for unauthorized data transmission or processing of restricted resources.
- The CanSend() method was added as a public method in the class to handle these checks consistently.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.measure.advances.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.measure.advances.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var f = new FontFace("CanvasTest", "url('/fonts/CanvasTest.ttf')"); let fonts = (self.fonts ? self.fonts : document.fonts);

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Variable Renaming] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.measure.advances.html] [Lines 17-18]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
This appears to be a simple variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed here - it's likely just a code style or consistency improvement. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name. No security-related changes were made in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/sandbox/win/src/remotesandboxbroker/remoteSandboxBroker.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/sandbox/win/src/remotesandboxbroker/remoteSandboxBroker.h@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@   bool SetSecurityLevelForSocketProcess() override;   bool SetSecurityLevelForGMPlugin(SandboxLevel aLevel,                                    bool aIsRemoteLaunch = false) override;+  bool SetSecurityLevelForUtilityProcess(+      mozilla::ipc::SandboxingKind aSandbox) override;   bool AllowReadFile(wchar_t const* file) override;   void AddHandleToShare(HANDLE aHandle) override;

Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
Potential Missing Security Level Implementation [File] security/sandbox/win/src/remotesandboxbroker/remoteSandboxBroker.h [Lines] 41-44  
[Old Code]  
No previous implementation of SetSecurityLevelForUtilityProcess  
[Fixed Code]  
Added implementation of SetSecurityLevelForUtilityProcess with parameter mozilla::ipc::SandboxingKind aSandbox  

Additional Notes:
1. The diff shows the addition of a new method `SetSecurityLevelForUtilityProcess` but doesn't show the implementation details.
2. Without seeing the actual implementation, we can't determine if this fixes a specific vulnerability or is just adding new functionality.
3. The change appears to extend sandboxing capabilities to utility processes, which could be security-related but isn't necessarily fixing a vulnerability.
4. The method signature suggests it will apply different security levels based on the sandboxing kind parameter.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/font-access/font_metadata.tentative.https.window.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/font-access/font_metadata.tentative.https.window.js@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ 'use strict'; font_access_test(async t => {-  const fonts = await navigator.fonts.query({persistentAccess: true});+  const fonts = await navigator.fonts.query();   assert_true(Array.isArray(fonts), 'Result of query() should be an Array');   assert_greater_than_equal(fonts.length, 1, 'Need a least one font');@@ -24,15 +24,6 @@     assert_equals(typeof font.fullName, 'string', 'fullName attribute type');     assert_equals(typeof font.family, 'string', 'family attribute type');     assert_equals(typeof font.style, 'string', 'style attribute type');--    assert_equals(typeof font.italic, 'boolean', 'italic attribute type');-    assert_equals(typeof font.weight, 'number', 'weight attribute type');-    assert_between_inclusive(-      font.weight, 1, 1000, `${font.postscriptName}: weight attribute range`);--    assert_equals(typeof font.stretch, 'number');-    assert_between_inclusive(-      font.stretch, 0.5, 2, `${font.postscriptName}: stretch attribute range`);   }); }, 'FontMetadata property types and value ranges');@@ -42,7 +33,7 @@   const testSet = getEnumerationTestSet();   // Get the system fonts.-  let fonts = await navigator.fonts.query({persistentAccess: true});+  let fonts = await navigator.fonts.query();   assert_true(Array.isArray(fonts), 'Result of query() should be an Array');   // Filter to the ones we care about.@@ -65,12 +56,5 @@                   `${font.postscriptName}: family should match`);     assert_equals(font.style, expectation.style,                   `${font.postscriptName}: style should match`);--    assert_equals(font.italic, expectation.italic,-                  `${font.postscriptName}: italic should match`);-    assert_equals(font.stretch, expectation.stretch,-                  `${font.postscriptName}: stretch should match`);-    assert_equals(font.weight, expectation.weight,-                  `${font.postscriptName}: weight should match`);   }); }, 'Expected FontMetadata values for for well-known system fonts');

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
[Potential Information Leak] [testing/web-platform/tests/font-access/font_metadata.tentative.https.window.js] [Lines 5, 33]  
[Old Code] `const fonts = await navigator.fonts.query({persistentAccess: true});`  
[Fixed Code] `const fonts = await navigator.fonts.query();`  
Additional Details: The removal of `persistentAccess` parameter might indicate a security concern about persistent font access, but without more context, it's unclear if this was an actual vulnerability.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
[Potential Information Leak] [testing/web-platform/tests/font-access/font_metadata.tentative.https.window.js] [Lines 24-30]  
[Old Code]  
```
assert_equals(typeof font.italic, 'boolean', 'italic attribute type');
assert_equals(typeof font.weight, 'number', 'weight attribute type');
assert_between_inclusive(
  font.weight, 1, 1000, `${font.postscriptName}: weight attribute range`);
assert_equals(typeof font.stretch, 'number');
assert_between_inclusive(
  font.stretch, 0.5, 2, `${font.postscriptName}: stretch attribute range`);
```  
[Fixed Code] (removed)  
Additional Details: The removal of these validations might indicate they were exposing unnecessary font metadata details, but it's unclear if this was an actual security vulnerability.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
[Potential Information Leak] [testing/web-platform/tests/font-access/font_metadata.tentative.https.window.js] [Lines 65-68]  
[Old Code]  
```
assert_equals(font.italic, expectation.italic,
              `${font.postscriptName}: italic should match`);
assert_equals(font.stretch, expectation.stretch,
              `${font.postscriptName}: stretch should match`);
assert_equals(font.weight, expectation.weight,
              `${font.postscriptName}: weight should match`);
```  
[Fixed Code] (removed)  
Additional Details: Similar to point 2, removing these specific font attribute checks might be related to reducing information exposure, but we can't be certain without more context.

Note: The changes appear to be reducing the amount of font metadata being exposed/validated, which could be related to security concerns about fingerprinting or information disclosure. However, without explicit vulnerability reports or more context, we can only speculate about the security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/cssom-view/offsetParent_element_test.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/cssom-view/offsetParent_element_test.html@@ -24,6 +24,26 @@ #absolute-element {     position: absolute; }++#transform-element {+    transform: translateX(10px);+}++#perspective-element {+    perspective: 10px;+}++#transform-style-preserve-3d-element {+    transform-style: preserve-3d;+}++#filter-element {+    filter: opacity(25%);+}++#contain-paint-element {+    contain: paint;+} </style> </head>@@ -37,6 +57,22 @@ <div id="absolute-element">     <div id="absolute-element-child"></div>+</div>++<div id="transform-element">+    <div id="transform-element-child"></div>+</div>++<div id="transform-style-preserve-3d-element">+    <div id="transform-style-preserve-3d-element-child"></div>+</div>++<div id="perspective-element">+    <div id="perspective-element-child"></div>+</div>++<div id="contain-paint-element">+    <div id="contain-paint-element-child"></div> </div> <table id="table-element">@@ -122,6 +158,21 @@     assert_equals(caption_element_child.offsetParent,table_element);     assert_equals(window.getComputedStyle(td_element).position,'static');     assert_equals(td_element.offsetParent,table_element);++    let transform_element = document.getElementById('transform-element');+    assert_equals(transform_element.children[0].offsetParent, transform_element);++    let perspective_element = document.getElementById('perspective-element');+    assert_equals(perspective_element.children[0].offsetParent, perspective_element);++    let transform_style_preserve_3d_element = document.getElementById('transform-style-preserve-3d-element');+    assert_equals(transform_style_preserve_3d_element.children[0].offsetParent,+                  transform_style_preserve_3d_element);++    let contain_paint_element = document.getElementById('contain-paint-element');+    assert_equals(contain_paint_element.children[0].offsetParent, contain_paint_element);++ }, "Valid the algorithm rule of offsetParent check step 2"); </script>

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be test case additions for CSSOM View Module functionality, specifically testing the `offsetParent` property behavior with various CSS properties. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
This is simply a test file update adding more test cases for CSS `offsetParent` behavior with different CSS properties (transform, perspective, transform-style, contain). No security fixes are present in this diff.

The changes include:
1. Adding new CSS styles for test elements (#transform-element, #perspective-element, etc.)
2. Adding corresponding HTML elements with children
3. Adding assertions to verify the offsetParent behavior matches the CSSOM View Module specification

Since this is purely a test file update with no security implications, no vulnerability entries are needed. The changes are focused on expanding test coverage rather than fixing security issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/glow/src/native.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/glow/src/native.rs@@ -75,6 +75,14 @@         };         context+    }++    /// Creates a texture from an external GL name.+    ///+    /// This can be useful when a texture is created outside of glow (e.g. OpenXR surface) but glow+    /// still needs access to it for rendering.+    pub unsafe fn create_texture_from_gl_name(gl_name: native_gl::GLuint) -> NativeTexture {+        NativeTexture(non_zero_gl_name(gl_name))     } }

I'll analyze the code diff according to the provided format. The diff shows an addition of a new function for creating textures from external GL names.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Resource Management Issue] [third_party/rust/glow/src/native.rs] [Lines 75-82]
[Old Code]
[No previous code existed for this function]
[Fixed Code]
    /// Creates a texture from an external GL name.
    ///
    /// This can be useful when a texture is created outside of glow (e.g. OpenXR surface) but glow
    /// still needs access to it for rendering.
    pub unsafe fn create_texture_from_gl_name(gl_name: native_gl::GLuint) -> NativeTexture {
        NativeTexture(non_zero_gl_name(gl_name))
    }

Additional Details:
1. The function is marked as `unsafe` which suggests potential security considerations
2. The function accepts external GL texture names which could potentially be malicious or invalid
3. There's no validation shown of the input GL name beyond the non-zero check
4. The function could potentially be used to create texture objects from invalid or already-deleted GL names

Note: Without seeing the implementation of `non_zero_gl_name` or more context about how this function is used, it's difficult to determine if there are actual vulnerabilities. The `unsafe` marker suggests the caller needs to ensure proper invariants are maintained.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.order.cols.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.order.cols.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#fff'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18]
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   
   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be purely a variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security-related changes were made
- The functionality remains exactly the same
- This is likely a code style/readability improvement rather than a security fix

No vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change is cosmetic in nature and doesn't affect security.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/gmp/GMPServiceParent.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/gmp/GMPServiceParent.h@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #define GMPServiceParent_h_ #include "GMPService.h"+#include "mozilla/dom/ContentParent.h" #include "mozilla/gmp/PGMPServiceParent.h" #include "mozIGeckoMediaPluginChromeService.h" #include "nsClassHashtable.h"@@ -16,11 +17,13 @@ #include "nsIAsyncShutdown.h" #include "nsRefPtrHashtable.h" #include "nsThreadUtils.h"+#include "mozilla/gmp/PGMPParent.h" #include "mozilla/MozPromise.h" #include "GMPStorage.h" template <class> struct already_AddRefed;+using FlushFOGDataPromise = mozilla::dom::ContentParent::FlushFOGDataPromise; namespace mozilla { class OriginAttributesPattern;@@ -71,6 +74,15 @@   void ServiceUserDestroyed(GMPServiceParent* aServiceParent);   void UpdateContentProcessGMPCapabilities();++  void SendFlushFOGData(nsTArray<RefPtr<FlushFOGDataPromise>>& promises);++  /*+   * ** Test-only Method **+   *+   * Trigger GMP-process test metric instrumentation.+   */+  RefPtr<PGMPParent::TestTriggerMetricsPromise> TestTriggerMetrics();  private:   friend class GMPServiceParent;

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily additions of new functionality and includes rather than security fixes. However, I'll analyze it according to the requested format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] dom/media/gmp/GMPServiceParent.h [Lines] 7,16,17,71-74
   [Old Code]
   (No previous includes for ContentParent.h or PGMPParent.h)
   [Fixed Code]
   Added includes for ContentParent.h and PGMPParent.h

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] dom/media/gmp/GMPServiceParent.h [Lines] 27
   [Old Code]
   (No FlushFOGDataPromise typedef)
   [Fixed Code]
   Added typedef: using FlushFOGDataPromise = mozilla::dom::ContentParent::FlushFOGDataPromise;

3. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] dom/media/gmp/GMPServiceParent.h [Lines] 74-83
   [Old Code]
   (No SendFlushFOGData or TestTriggerMetrics methods)
   [Fixed Code]
   Added new methods:
   void SendFlushFOGData(nsTArray<RefPtr<FlushFOGDataPromise>>& promises);
   RefPtr<PGMPParent::TestTriggerMetricsPromise> TestTriggerMetrics();

The changes appear to be focused on:
1. Adding new includes needed for the functionality
2. Adding new metrics-related functionality (FOG = Firefox on Glean)
3. Adding test instrumentation capabilities

No security vulnerabilities or fixes are evident from this diff. The changes seem to be feature additions rather than security patches.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/wr/examples/scrolling.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/wr/examples/scrolling.rs@@ -60,6 +60,8 @@                 (0, 0).by(1000, 1000),                 scrollbox,                 LayoutVector2D::zero(),+                APZScrollGeneration::default(),+                HasScrollLinkedEffect::No,                 SpatialTreeItemKey::new(0, 0),             );             let space_and_clip1 = SpaceAndClipInfo {@@ -96,6 +98,8 @@                 (0, 100).to(300, 1000),                 (0, 100).to(200, 300),                 LayoutVector2D::zero(),+                APZScrollGeneration::default(),+                HasScrollLinkedEffect::No,                 SpatialTreeItemKey::new(0, 1),             );             let space_and_clip2 = SpaceAndClipInfo {@@ -183,9 +187,12 @@                 if let Some(offset) = offset {                     self.scroll_offset += offset;-                    txn.set_scroll_offset(+                    txn.set_scroll_offsets(                         ExternalScrollId(EXT_SCROLL_ID_CONTENT, PipelineId::dummy()),-                        self.scroll_offset,+                        vec![SampledScrollOffset {+                            offset: self.scroll_offset,+                            generation: APZScrollGeneration::default(),+                        }],                     );                     txn.generate_frame(0, RenderReasons::empty());                 }@@ -202,9 +209,12 @@                 self.scroll_offset += LayoutVector2D::new(dx, dy);-                txn.set_scroll_offset(+                txn.set_scroll_offsets(                     ExternalScrollId(EXT_SCROLL_ID_CONTENT, PipelineId::dummy()),-                    self.scroll_offset,+                    vec![SampledScrollOffset {+                            offset: self.scroll_offset,+                            generation: APZScrollGeneration::default(),+                    }],                 );                 txn.generate_frame(0, RenderReasons::empty());

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Scroll Generation Vulnerability] [gfx/wr/examples/scrolling.rs] [Lines 60, 96, 183-202]
   [Old Code]
   txn.set_scroll_offset(
       ExternalScrollId(EXT_SCROLL_ID_CONTENT, PipelineId::dummy()),
       self.scroll_offset,
   )
   [Fixed Code]
   txn.set_scroll_offsets(
       ExternalScrollId(EXT_SCROLL_ID_CONTENT, PipelineId::dummy()),
       vec![SampledScrollOffset {
           offset: self.scroll_offset,
           generation: APZScrollGeneration::default(),
       }],
   )

Additional Details:
- The changes introduce scroll generation tracking (APZScrollGeneration) and scroll-linked effect handling (HasScrollLinkedEffect)
- The modification from set_scroll_offset to set_scroll_offsets with generation tracking suggests a fix for potential race conditions in scroll handling
- Without more context about the APZ (Asynchronous Pan/Zoom) system, it's unclear if this was fixing a known vulnerability or just improving robustness
- The changes appear related to preventing scroll-related timing issues or race conditions in the compositor

Note: While these changes appear to be security-related improvements (particularly around scroll generation tracking), without access to the associated bug reports or vulnerability disclosures, I can't confirm if this was fixing a known vulnerability or just improving general robustness. The changes are consistent with fixes for race conditions in scrolling behavior.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.