--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/sandbox/common/test/SandboxTestingChildTests.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/sandbox/common/test/SandboxTestingChildTests.h@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ #include "SandboxTestingChild.h"+#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_security.h" #include "nsXULAppAPI.h" #ifdef XP_UNIX@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@ #    include <sched.h> #    include <sys/syscall.h> #    include <sys/un.h>+#    include "mozilla/ProcInfo_linux.h" #  endif  // XP_LINUX #  include <sys/socket.h> #  include <sys/stat.h>@@ -33,6 +35,10 @@ #  include <CoreGraphics/CoreGraphics.h> #endif+#ifdef XP_WIN+#  include <stdio.h>+#endif+ namespace mozilla { #ifdef XP_LINUX@@ -47,7 +53,7 @@   });   struct sched_param param_pid_Ntid = {};-  child->ErrnoValueTest("sched_getparam(Ntid)"_ns, false, EPERM, [&] {+  child->ErrnoValueTest("sched_getparam(Ntid)"_ns, EPERM, [&] {     return sched_getparam((pid_t)(syscall(__NR_gettid) - 1), &param_pid_Ntid);   }); }@@ -78,11 +84,31 @@   child->ErrnoTest("clock_getres"_ns, true,                    [&] { return clock_getres(CLOCK_REALTIME, &res); });+  // same process is allowed+  struct timespec tproc = {0, 0};+  clockid_t same_process = MAKE_PROCESS_CPUCLOCK(getpid(), CPUCLOCK_SCHED);+  child->ErrnoTest("clock_gettime_same_process"_ns, true,+                   [&] { return clock_gettime(same_process, &tproc); });++  // different process is blocked by sandbox (SIGSYS, kernel would return+  // EINVAL)+  struct timespec tprocd = {0, 0};+  clockid_t diff_process = MAKE_PROCESS_CPUCLOCK(1, CPUCLOCK_SCHED);+  child->ErrnoValueTest("clock_gettime_diff_process"_ns, ENOSYS,+                        [&] { return clock_gettime(diff_process, &tprocd); });++  // thread is allowed+  struct timespec tthread = {0, 0};+  clockid_t thread =+      MAKE_THREAD_CPUCLOCK((pid_t)syscall(__NR_gettid), CPUCLOCK_SCHED);+  child->ErrnoTest("clock_gettime_thread"_ns, true,+                   [&] { return clock_gettime(thread, &tthread); });+   // An abstract socket that does not starts with '/', so we don't want it to   // work.   // Checking ENETUNREACH should be thrown by SandboxBrokerClient::Connect()   // when it detects it does not starts with a '/'-  child->ErrnoValueTest("connect_abstract_blocked"_ns, false, ENETUNREACH, [&] {+  child->ErrnoValueTest("connect_abstract_blocked"_ns, ENETUNREACH, [&] {     int sockfd;     struct sockaddr_un addr;     char str[] = "\0xyz";  // Abstract socket requires first byte to be NULL@@ -103,14 +129,22 @@   });   // An abstract socket that does starts with /, so we do want it to work.-  // Checking ECONNREFUSED because this is what the broker should get when-  // trying to establish the connect call for us.-  child->ErrnoValueTest("connect_abstract_permit"_ns, false, ECONNREFUSED, [&] {+  // Checking ECONNREFUSED because this is what the broker should get+  // when trying to establish the connect call for us if it's allowed;+  // otherwise we get EACCES, meaning that it was passed to the broker+  // (unlike the previous test) but rejected.+  const int errorForX =+      StaticPrefs::security_sandbox_content_headless_AtStartup() ? EACCES+                                                                 : ECONNREFUSED;+  child->ErrnoValueTest("connect_abstract_permit"_ns, errorForX, [&] {     int sockfd;     struct sockaddr_un addr;     // we re-use actual X path, because this is what is allowed within     // SandboxBrokerPolicyFactory::InitContentPolicy()     // We can't just use any random path allowed, but one with CONNECT allowed.++    // (Note that the real X11 sockets have names like `X0` for+    // display `:0`; there shouldn't be anything named just `X`.)     // Abstract socket requires first byte to be NULL     char str[] = "\0/tmp/.X11-unix/X";@@ -158,7 +192,7 @@   CFDictionaryRef windowServerDict = CGSessionCopyCurrentDictionary();   bool gotWindowServerDetails = (windowServerDict != nullptr);   child->SendReportTestResults(-      "CGSessionCopyCurrentDictionary"_ns, false, gotWindowServerDetails,+      "CGSessionCopyCurrentDictionary"_ns, !gotWindowServerDetails,       gotWindowServerDetails ? "Failed: dictionary unexpectedly returned"_ns                              : "Succeeded: no dictionary returned"_ns);   if (windowServerDict != nullptr) {@@ -227,23 +261,23 @@ #ifdef XP_UNIX #  ifdef XP_LINUX-  child->ErrnoValueTest("ioctl_tiocsti"_ns, false, ENOSYS, [&] {+  child->ErrnoValueTest("ioctl_tiocsti"_ns, ENOSYS, [&] {     int rv = ioctl(1, TIOCSTI, "x");     return rv;   });-  struct rusage res;+  struct rusage res = {};   child->ErrnoTest("getrusage"_ns, true, [&] {     int rv = getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &res);     return rv;   });-  child->ErrnoValueTest("unlink"_ns, false, ENOENT, [&] {+  child->ErrnoValueTest("unlink"_ns, ENOENT, [&] {     int rv = unlink("");     return rv;   });-  child->ErrnoValueTest("unlinkat"_ns, false, ENOENT, [&] {+  child->ErrnoValueTest("unlinkat"_ns, ENOENT, [&] {     int rv = unlinkat(AT_FDCWD, "", 0);     return rv;   });@@ -258,7 +292,7 @@     return uname(&uts);   });-  child->ErrnoValueTest("ioctl_dma_buf"_ns, false, ENOTTY, [] {+  child->ErrnoValueTest("ioctl_dma_buf"_ns, ENOTTY, [] {     // Apply the ioctl to the wrong kind of fd; it should fail with     // ENOTTY (rather than ENOSYS if it were blocked).     return ioctl(0, _IOW('b', 0, uint64_t), nullptr);@@ -317,4 +351,36 @@ #endif }+void RunTestsUtility(SandboxTestingChild* child) {+  MOZ_ASSERT(child, "No SandboxTestingChild*?");++#ifdef XP_UNIX+#  ifdef XP_LINUX+  child->ErrnoValueTest("ioctl_tiocsti"_ns, ENOSYS, [&] {+    int rv = ioctl(1, TIOCSTI, "x");+    return rv;+  });++  struct rusage res;+  child->ErrnoTest("getrusage"_ns, true, [&] {+    int rv = getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &res);+    return rv;+  });+#  endif  // XP_LINUX+#else     // XP_UNIX+#  ifdef XP_WIN+  child->ErrnoValueTest("write_only"_ns, EACCES, [&] {+    FILE* rv = fopen("test_sandbox.txt", "w");+    if (rv != nullptr) {+      fclose(rv);+      return 0;+    }+    return -1;+  });+#  else   // XP_WIN+  child->ReportNoTests();+#  endif  // XP_WIN+#endif+}+ }  // namespace mozilla

I'll analyze the code diff and provide the security findings following the specified format:

Vulnerability Existed: yes
Incorrect Sandbox Error Handling [security/sandbox/common/test/SandboxTestingChildTests.h] [Lines 53, 84, 108, 129, 192, 261-292, 351-370]
[Old Code]
Various instances where error handling didn't properly check sandbox restrictions, e.g.:
- `child->ErrnoValueTest("sched_getparam(Ntid)"_ns, false, EPERM, [&] {`
- `child->ErrnoValueTest("connect_abstract_blocked"_ns, false, ENETUNREACH, [&] {`
- `child->SendReportTestResults("CGSessionCopyCurrentDictionary"_ns, false, gotWindowServerDetails,`
[Fixed Code]
Updated to properly test sandbox restrictions:
- `child->ErrnoValueTest("sched_getparam(Ntid)"_ns, EPERM, [&] {`
- `child->ErrnoValueTest("connect_abstract_blocked"_ns, ENETUNREACH, [&] {`
- `child->SendReportTestResults("CGSessionCopyCurrentDictionary"_ns, !gotWindowServerDetails,`

Vulnerability Existed: yes
Insufficient Process Isolation [security/sandbox/common/test/SandboxTestingChildTests.h] [Lines 78-102]
[Old Code]
Only basic clock_getres test was present
[Fixed Code]
Added comprehensive tests for process isolation:
- Tests for same process (`MAKE_PROCESS_CPUCLOCK(getpid(), CPUCLOCK_SCHED)`)
- Tests for different process (`MAKE_PROCESS_CPUCLOCK(1, CPUCLOCK_SCHED)`)
- Tests for thread isolation (`MAKE_THREAD_CPUCLOCK`)

Vulnerability Existed: yes
Abstract Socket Handling [security/sandbox/common/test/SandboxTestingChildTests.h] [Lines 108-155]
[Old Code]
Basic abstract socket tests with fixed expected errors
[Fixed Code]
Enhanced socket tests with dynamic error handling based on headless mode:
`const int errorForX = StaticPrefs::security_sandbox_content_headless_AtStartup() ? EACCES : ECONNREFUSED;`

Vulnerability Existed: yes
Windows File System Access Control [security/sandbox/common/test/SandboxTestingChildTests.h] [Lines 351-370]
[Old Code]
No Windows-specific file access tests
[Fixed Code]
Added Windows file access test:
`child->ErrnoValueTest("write_only"_ns, EACCES, [&] { FILE* rv = fopen("test_sandbox.txt", "w");`

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Information Leak [security/sandbox/common/test/SandboxTestingChildTests.h] [Lines 158-204]
[Old Code]
Basic CoreGraphics test
[Fixed Code]
Modified test to better check for information leaks:
`child->SendReportTestResults("CGSessionCopyCurrentDictionary"_ns, !gotWindowServerDetails,`

Note: The changes primarily focus on improving sandbox testing and hardening, rather than fixing specific known vulnerabilities. The improvements make the sandbox restrictions more comprehensive and properly tested.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/khr/swapchain.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/khr/swapchain.rs@@ -8,22 +8,16 @@ #[derive(Clone)] pub struct Swapchain {     handle: vk::Device,-    swapchain_fn: vk::KhrSwapchainFn,+    fp: vk::KhrSwapchainFn, } impl Swapchain {     pub fn new(instance: &Instance, device: &Device) -> Self {-        let swapchain_fn = vk::KhrSwapchainFn::load(|name| unsafe {-            mem::transmute(instance.get_device_proc_addr(device.handle(), name.as_ptr()))+        let handle = device.handle();+        let fp = vk::KhrSwapchainFn::load(|name| unsafe {+            mem::transmute(instance.get_device_proc_addr(handle, name.as_ptr()))         });-        Self {-            handle: device.handle(),-            swapchain_fn,-        }-    }--    pub fn name() -> &'static CStr {-        vk::KhrSwapchainFn::name()+        Self { handle, fp }     }     #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkDestroySwapchainKHR.html>"]@@ -32,11 +26,8 @@         swapchain: vk::SwapchainKHR,         allocation_callbacks: Option<&vk::AllocationCallbacks>,     ) {-        self.swapchain_fn.destroy_swapchain_khr(-            self.handle,-            swapchain,-            allocation_callbacks.as_raw_ptr(),-        );+        self.fp+            .destroy_swapchain_khr(self.handle, swapchain, allocation_callbacks.as_raw_ptr());     }     /// On success, returns the next image's index and whether the swapchain is suboptimal for the surface.@@ -49,7 +40,7 @@         fence: vk::Fence,     ) -> VkResult<(u32, bool)> {         let mut index = 0;-        let err_code = self.swapchain_fn.acquire_next_image_khr(+        let err_code = self.fp.acquire_next_image_khr(             self.handle,             swapchain,             timeout,@@ -71,7 +62,7 @@         allocation_callbacks: Option<&vk::AllocationCallbacks>,     ) -> VkResult<vk::SwapchainKHR> {         let mut swapchain = mem::zeroed();-        self.swapchain_fn+        self.fp             .create_swapchain_khr(                 self.handle,                 create_info,@@ -86,9 +77,9 @@     pub unsafe fn queue_present(         &self,         queue: vk::Queue,-        create_info: &vk::PresentInfoKHR,+        present_info: &vk::PresentInfoKHR,     ) -> VkResult<bool> {-        let err_code = self.swapchain_fn.queue_present_khr(queue, create_info);+        let err_code = self.fp.queue_present_khr(queue, present_info);         match err_code {             vk::Result::SUCCESS => Ok(false),             vk::Result::SUBOPTIMAL_KHR => Ok(true),@@ -102,13 +93,17 @@         swapchain: vk::SwapchainKHR,     ) -> VkResult<Vec<vk::Image>> {         read_into_uninitialized_vector(|count, data| {-            self.swapchain_fn+            self.fp                 .get_swapchain_images_khr(self.handle, swapchain, count, data)         })     }+    pub fn name() -> &'static CStr {+        vk::KhrSwapchainFn::name()+    }+     pub fn fp(&self) -> &vk::KhrSwapchainFn {-        &self.swapchain_fn+        &self.fp     }     pub fn device(&self) -> vk::Device {

I'll analyze the code diff for security vulnerabilities following the specified format.

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Memory Safety Issue] [third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/khr/swapchain.rs] [Lines 8-16]
[Old Code]
    handle: vk::Device,
    swapchain_fn: vk::KhrSwapchainFn,
}
...
    pub fn new(instance: &Instance, device: &Device) -> Self {
        let swapchain_fn = vk::KhrSwapchainFn::load(|name| unsafe {
            mem::transmute(instance.get_device_proc_addr(device.handle(), name.as_ptr()))
[Fixed Code]
    handle: vk::Device,
    fp: vk::KhrSwapchainFn,
}
...
    pub fn new(instance: &Instance, device: &Device) -> Self {
        let handle = device.handle();
        let fp = vk::KhrSwapchainFn::load(|name| unsafe {
            mem::transmute(instance.get_device_proc_addr(handle, name.as_ptr()))

Additional Details: The change involves storing the device handle before using it in the unsafe block, which could potentially prevent use-after-free issues if the device were to be dropped unexpectedly. However, without more context about the overall safety guarantees, I can't be certain this was a security fix.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Parameter Naming Clarity] [third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/khr/swapchain.rs] [Lines 86-88]
[Old Code]
    pub unsafe fn queue_present(
        &self,
        queue: vk::Queue,
        create_info: &vk::PresentInfoKHR,
[Fixed Code]
    pub unsafe fn queue_present(
        &self,
        queue: vk::Queue,
        present_info: &vk::PresentInfoKHR,

Additional Details: The parameter name was changed from `create_info` to `present_info` to better reflect its purpose. While this isn't a direct security fix, clearer naming can help prevent misuse of the API which could lead to security issues.

Note: The diff appears to be primarily a refactoring (renaming `swapchain_fn` to `fp` and moving the `name()` function), with some minor improvements in code organization and clarity. I don't see any obvious security vulnerabilities being fixed, but there might be subtle safety improvements in the changes to how the device handle is obtained and stored.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-round-display/polar-origin-left-bottom-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-round-display/polar-origin-left-bottom-001.html@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@   <title>CSS Test: Origin of Coordinates</title>   <link rel="author" title="Jihye Hong" href="mailto:[email protected]" />   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/2016/WD-css-round-display-1-20160301/#polar-origin-property" />-  <meta name="flags" content="" />   <meta name="assert" content="Test checks that the origin of the coordinate system specified with 'polar-origin'." />   <style type="text/css">     .container {

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The change appears to be a minor cleanup of test metadata rather than a security-related fix.

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found in this diff. The change simply removes an empty "flags" meta tag from the test file.

Old Code:
<meta name="flags" content="" />

Fixed Code:
[This line was removed]

This appears to be a routine test file maintenance change rather than a security fix. The empty flags meta tag wasn't serving any purpose and was likely removed as part of general code cleanup.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-66b.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-66b.xml@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/>   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body> <p>This paragraph should be green.</p>

Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-66b.xml] [Lines 7]
[Old Code]
<meta name="flags" content="" />
[Fixed Code]
[Removed line]

Explanation:
1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which appears to be test-related metadata.
2. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed here - this appears to be a minor cleanup or test configuration change.
3. The empty "flags" attribute wasn't serving any security purpose and its removal doesn't impact security.
4. No known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in this change.

The modification seems to be part of routine test maintenance rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/widget/headless/HeadlessWidget.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/widget/headless/HeadlessWidget.cpp@@ -351,8 +351,7 @@   } }-nsresult HeadlessWidget::MakeFullScreen(bool aFullScreen,-                                        nsIScreen* aTargetScreen) {+nsresult HeadlessWidget::MakeFullScreen(bool aFullScreen) {   // Directly update the size mode here so a later call SetSizeMode does   // nothing.   if (aFullScreen) {@@ -377,11 +376,9 @@   // will be ignored if still transitioning to fullscreen, so it must be   // triggered on the next tick.   RefPtr<HeadlessWidget> self(this);-  nsCOMPtr<nsIScreen> targetScreen(aTargetScreen);   NS_DispatchToCurrentThread(NS_NewRunnableFunction(-      "HeadlessWidget::MakeFullScreen",-      [self, targetScreen, aFullScreen]() -> void {-        self->InfallibleMakeFullScreen(aFullScreen, targetScreen);+      "HeadlessWidget::MakeFullScreen", [self, aFullScreen]() -> void {+        self->InfallibleMakeFullScreen(aFullScreen);       }));   return NS_OK;

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Unused Parameter Vulnerability] [widget/headless/HeadlessWidget.cpp] [Lines 351-377]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   nsresult HeadlessWidget::MakeFullScreen(bool aFullScreen,
                                        nsIScreen* aTargetScreen) {
   ...
   NS_DispatchToCurrentThread(NS_NewRunnableFunction(
      "HeadlessWidget::MakeFullScreen",
      [self, targetScreen, aFullScreen]() -> void {
        self->InfallibleMakeFullScreen(aFullScreen, targetScreen);
      }));
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   nsresult HeadlessWidget::MakeFullScreen(bool aFullScreen) {
   ...
   NS_DispatchToCurrentThread(NS_NewRunnableFunction(
      "HeadlessWidget::MakeFullScreen", [self, aFullScreen]() -> void {
        self->InfallibleMakeFullScreen(aFullScreen);
      }));
   ```  
   Additional Details: The diff shows removal of the `aTargetScreen` parameter and related code. While this might indicate a security fix (like preventing potential null pointer dereference), it could also be a simple refactoring. Without more context about how `aTargetScreen` was used, we can't be certain if this was fixing a security vulnerability.

Note: The analysis shows one potential issue, but since there's no clear vulnerability name or security impact documented in the diff, we can only speculate about possible implications. The change appears to simplify the API by removing an unused or unnecessary parameter.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/vm/Iteration.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/vm/Iteration.cpp@@ -273,11 +273,12 @@         return true;       } else {-        Rooted<TupleType*> tup(cx);-        if (TupleObject::maybeUnbox(pobj, &tup)) {+        mozilla::Maybe<TupleType&> tup = TupleObject::maybeUnbox(pobj);+        if (tup) {+          uint32_t len = (*tup).length();           RootedId id(cx);-          for (size_t i = 0; i < tup->length(); i++) {+          for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++) {             if (!JS_IndexToId(cx, i, &id)) {               return false;             }

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Memory Safety Issue [File] js/src/vm/Iteration.cpp [Lines 273-281]
[Old Code]
Rooted<TupleType*> tup(cx);
if (TupleObject::maybeUnbox(pobj, &tup)) {
    RootedId id(cx);
    for (size_t i = 0; i < tup->length(); i++) {

[Fixed Code]
mozilla::Maybe<TupleType&> tup = TupleObject::maybeUnbox(pobj);
if (tup) {
    uint32_t len = (*tup).length();
    RootedId id(cx);
    for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++) {

Additional Details:
The change appears to modify how tuple objects are handled during iteration. The main differences are:
1. Changed from using Rooted<TupleType*> to mozilla::Maybe<TupleType&>
2. Pre-calculates the length before the loop
3. Uses safer reference semantics with Maybe

While this could potentially address memory safety issues (like null pointer dereferences or use-after-free), I can't definitively say this fixes a specific known vulnerability without more context. The changes improve code safety but may not necessarily fix an actual exploit.

The pre-calculation of length could potentially prevent race conditions if the tuple were modified during iteration, but this would depend on the broader context of how TupleObject is used.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/widget/nsXPLookAndFeel.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/widget/nsXPLookAndFeel.cpp@@ -16,7 +16,9 @@ #include "nsFont.h" #include "nsIFrame.h" #include "nsIXULRuntime.h"-#include "nsNativeBasicTheme.h"+#include "Theme.h"+#include "SurfaceCacheUtils.h"+#include "mozilla/dom/ContentParent.h" #include "mozilla/dom/ContentChild.h" #include "mozilla/Preferences.h" #include "mozilla/Services.h"@@ -354,7 +356,7 @@     *lnf = {};   }-  nsNativeBasicTheme::Init();+  widget::Theme::Init();   return sInstance; }@@ -371,7 +373,7 @@   // This keeps strings alive, so need to clear to make leak checking happy.   sFontCache.Clear();-  nsNativeBasicTheme::Shutdown();+  widget::Theme::Shutdown(); } static void IntPrefChanged() {@@ -676,6 +678,7 @@       break;     case ColorID::Field:     case ColorID::Buttonface:  // --in-content-button-background+    case ColorID::Threedface:     case ColorID::MozCombobox:     case ColorID::MozCellhighlighttext:     case ColorID::Selecteditemtext:  // --in-content-primary-button-text-color /@@ -1037,12 +1040,60 @@ namespace mozilla {-// static+static widget::ThemeChangeKind sGlobalThemeChangeKind{0};+ void LookAndFeel::NotifyChangedAllWindows(widget::ThemeChangeKind aKind) {+  sGlobalThemeChanged = true;+  sGlobalThemeChangeKind |= aKind;+   if (nsCOMPtr<nsIObserverService> obs = services::GetObserverService()) {     const char16_t kind[] = {char16_t(aKind), 0};     obs->NotifyObservers(nullptr, "internal-look-and-feel-changed", kind);   }+}++void LookAndFeel::DoHandleGlobalThemeChange() {+  MOZ_ASSERT(sGlobalThemeChanged);+  sGlobalThemeChanged = false;+  auto kind = std::exchange(sGlobalThemeChangeKind, widget::ThemeChangeKind(0));++  // Tell the theme that it changed, so it can flush any handles to stale theme+  // data.+  //+  // We can use the *DoNotUseDirectly functions directly here, because we want+  // to notify all possible themes in a given process (but just once).+  if (XRE_IsParentProcess() ||+      !StaticPrefs::widget_non_native_theme_enabled()) {+    if (nsCOMPtr<nsITheme> theme = do_GetNativeThemeDoNotUseDirectly()) {+      theme->ThemeChanged();+    }+  }+  if (nsCOMPtr<nsITheme> theme = do_GetBasicNativeThemeDoNotUseDirectly()) {+    theme->ThemeChanged();+  }++  // Clear all cached LookAndFeel colors.+  LookAndFeel::Refresh();++  // Reset default background and foreground colors for the document since they+  // may be using system colors.+  PreferenceSheet::Refresh();++  // Vector images (SVG) may be using theme colors so we discard all cached+  // surfaces. (We could add a vector image only version of DiscardAll, but+  // in bug 940625 we decided theme changes are rare enough not to bother.)+  image::SurfaceCacheUtils::DiscardAll();++  if (XRE_IsParentProcess()) {+    dom::ContentParent::BroadcastThemeUpdate(kind);+  }++  nsContentUtils::AddScriptRunner(+      NS_NewRunnableFunction("HandleGlobalThemeChange", [] {+        if (nsCOMPtr<nsIObserverService> obs = services::GetObserverService()) {+          obs->NotifyObservers(nullptr, "look-and-feel-changed", nullptr);+        }+      })); } static bool ShouldUseStandinsForNativeColorForNonNativeTheme(@@ -1090,6 +1141,7 @@ ColorScheme LookAndFeel::sChromeColorScheme; ColorScheme LookAndFeel::sContentColorScheme; bool LookAndFeel::sColorSchemeInitialized;+bool LookAndFeel::sGlobalThemeChanged; auto LookAndFeel::ColorSchemeSettingForChrome() -> ChromeColorSchemeSetting {   switch (StaticPrefs::browser_theme_toolbar_theme()) {@@ -1320,7 +1372,7 @@ // static void LookAndFeel::Refresh() {   nsLookAndFeel::GetInstance()->RefreshImpl();-  nsNativeBasicTheme::LookAndFeelChanged();+  widget::Theme::LookAndFeelChanged(); } // static

Here's the security analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific security vulnerability was found in this diff. The changes appear to be primarily architectural refactoring and feature enhancements.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Information Leak [File] widget/nsXPLookAndFeel.cpp [Lines 1037-1090]
The changes introduce new theme handling functionality and broadcast theme updates to content processes. While not clearly a vulnerability, there might be potential for information leakage if theme data could be used to fingerprint users across processes.

3. Vulnerability Existed: no
The changes mainly involve:
- Replacing nsNativeBasicTheme with widget::Theme
- Adding new theme change handling infrastructure
- Adding new color ID case (ColorID::Threedface)
- Adding SurfaceCacheUtils and ContentParent includes
- Implementing global theme change handling

The modifications appear to be part of a larger theme system refactoring rather than security fixes. The changes improve theme handling consistency and add new functionality for theme change notifications across processes.

4. Vulnerability Existed: no
The changes include proper cleanup and shutdown procedures for the theme system, with corresponding initialization and shutdown calls being updated to use the new widget::Theme interface.

No specific CVE or known vulnerability patterns were identified in these changes. The modifications appear to be part of normal code maintenance and feature development rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/remote/doc/CodeStyle.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/remote/doc/CodeStyle.md@@ -68,6 +68,6 @@ abort if there are any problems.  This is convenient for avoiding a try run failing due to a simple linting issue.-[mozlint]: /tools/lint/usage.html-[eslint]: https://eslint.org/-[enable automatic linting]: https://firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org/tools/lint/usage.html#using-a-vcs-hook+[mozlint]: /code-quality/lint/mozlint.rst+[eslint]: /code-quality/lint/linters/eslint.rst+[enable automatic linting]: /tools/lint/usage.html#using-a-vcs-hook

Based on the provided diff, this appears to be a documentation update rather than a security fix. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
Documentation Link Update [File] remote/doc/CodeStyle.md [Lines] 68-70
[Old Code]
[mozlint]: /tools/lint/usage.html
[eslint]: https://eslint.org/
[enable automatic linting]: https://firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org/tools/lint/usage.html#using-a-vcs-hook
[Fixed Code]
[mozlint]: /code-quality/lint/mozlint.rst
[eslint]: /code-quality/lint/linters/eslint.rst
[enable automatic linting]: /tools/lint/usage.html#using-a-vcs-hook

The changes only update documentation links and don't appear to address any security vulnerabilities. The modifications:
1. Change internal Mozilla documentation paths
2. Move ESLint documentation from external site to internal documentation
3. Keep one link the same but with different formatting

No security vulnerabilities were identified in this documentation-only change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/taskcluster/docker/funsize-update-generator/scripts/funsize.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/taskcluster/docker/funsize-update-generator/scripts/funsize.py@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@     else:         await asyncio.gather(             read_output(process.stdout, label, log.info),-            read_output(process.stderr, label, log.warn),+            read_output(process.stderr, label, log.warning),         )         await process.wait()

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
[Log Level Change] [taskcluster/docker/funsize-update-generator/scripts/funsize.py] [Lines 310-313]  
[Old Code]  
`read_output(process.stderr, label, log.warn),`  
[Fixed Code]  
`read_output(process.stderr, label, log.warning),`

Additional Details:
- The change replaces `log.warn` with `log.warning`. While this isn't a direct security vulnerability, it's worth noting that:
  1. `log.warn` is deprecated in favor of `log.warning` in Python's logging module
  2. This could be considered a code quality/maintenance improvement rather than a security fix
  3. No actual security vulnerability is being fixed here, but using deprecated functions could potentially lead to issues in future Python versions

There doesn't appear to be a clear security vulnerability being addressed in this diff. The change is more about following Python best practices and maintaining code consistency.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/inspector/animation/test/browser_animation_playback-rate-selector.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/inspector/animation/test/browser_animation_playback-rate-selector.js@@ -31,13 +31,13 @@   is(Number(selectEl.value), 1.5, "Selected option should be 1.5");   info("Checking playback rate of animations");-  clickOnPlaybackRateSelector(animationInspector, panel, 0.5);+  await changePlaybackRateSelector(animationInspector, panel, 0.5);   await assertPlaybackRate(animationInspector, 0.5);   info("Checking mixed playback rate");   await selectNode("div", inspector);   await waitUntil(() => panel.querySelectorAll(".animation-item").length === 1);-  clickOnPlaybackRateSelector(animationInspector, panel, 2);+  await changePlaybackRateSelector(animationInspector, panel, 2);   await assertPlaybackRate(animationInspector, 2);   await selectNode("body", inspector);   await waitUntil(() => panel.querySelectorAll(".animation-item").length === 2);@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@   ok(true, "Selected option should be empty");   info("Checking playback rate after re-setting");-  clickOnPlaybackRateSelector(animationInspector, panel, 1);+  await changePlaybackRateSelector(animationInspector, panel, 1);   await assertPlaybackRate(animationInspector, 1);   info(

Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be related to test functionality improvements rather than security fixes. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] devtools/client/inspector/animation/test/browser_animation_playback-rate-selector.js [Lines 31-45]
   [Old Code]
   clickOnPlaybackRateSelector(animationInspector, panel, 0.5);
   clickOnPlaybackRateSelector(animationInspector, panel, 2);
   clickOnPlaybackRateSelector(animationInspector, panel, 1);
   
   [Fixed Code]
   await changePlaybackRateSelector(animationInspector, panel, 0.5);
   await changePlaybackRateSelector(animationInspector, panel, 2);
   await changePlaybackRateSelector(animationInspector, panel, 1);

The changes involve:
1. Replacing synchronous `clickOnPlaybackRateSelector` calls with asynchronous `changePlaybackRateSelector` calls
2. Adding `await` to properly handle the asynchronous operations
3. The function name change suggests a more accurate representation of the operation being performed

These changes appear to be test reliability improvements rather than security fixes, ensuring proper synchronization in test execution. No security-related vulnerabilities were identified in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/transform-origin-011.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/transform-origin-011.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Jieqiong Cui" href="mailto:[email protected]"> <link rel="help" title="8. The 'transform-origin' Property" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css-transforms-1/#transform-origin-property"> <link rel="match" href="transform-origin-007-ref.html">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="The 'transform-origin' property set 'right' computes to 100% for the horizontal position."> <style>   .div1 {

Analysis of the code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/transform-origin-011.html] [Lines 5]
    Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">
    Fixed Code: (removed line)

Additional Notes:
- This appears to be a minor cleanup change removing an empty meta tag for "flags"
- No security implications are apparent in this change
- The modification is likely related to test metadata rather than security fixes
- No known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are affected by this change

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13ech.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13ech.h@@ -21,12 +21,20 @@  * - Some of the buffering (construction/compression/decompression) could likely  *   be optimized, but the spec is still evolving so that work is deferred.  */-#define TLS13_ECH_VERSION 0xfe0a+#define TLS13_ECH_VERSION 0xfe0d #define TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN 8+#define TLS13_ECH_AEAD_TAG_LEN 16+#define TLS13_ECH_GREASE_SNI_LEN 100 static const char kHpkeInfoEch[] = "tls ech"; static const char hHkdfInfoEchConfigID[] = "tls ech config id"; static const char kHkdfInfoEchConfirm[] = "ech accept confirmation";+static const char kHkdfInfoEchHrrConfirm[] = "hrr ech accept confirmation";++typedef enum {+    ech_xtn_type_outer = 0,+    ech_xtn_type_inner = 1,+} EchXtnType; struct sslEchConfigContentsStr {     PRUint8 configId;@@ -36,9 +44,21 @@     HpkeAeadId aeadId;     SECItem suites; /* One or more HpkeCipherSuites. The selected s                      * suite is placed in kdfId and aeadId. */-    PRUint16 maxNameLen;+    PRUint8 maxNameLen;     char *publicName;     /* No supported extensions. */+};++/* ECH Information needed by a server to process a second CH after a+ * HelloRetryRequest is sent. This data is stored in the cookie. + */+struct sslEchCookieDataStr {+    PRBool previouslyOffered;+    PRUint8 configId;+    HpkeKdfId kdfId;+    HpkeAeadId aeadId;+    HpkeContext *hpkeCtx;+    sslBuffer signal; }; struct sslEchConfigStr {@@ -58,6 +78,9 @@     PRBool retryConfigsValid; /* Client: Extraction of retry_configss is allowed.                                *  This is set once the handshake completes (having                                *  verified to the ECHConfig public name). */+    PRUint8 *hrrConfirmation; /* Client/Server: HRR Confirmation Location */+    PRBool receivedInnerXtn;  /* Server: Handled ECH Xtn with Inner Enum */+    PRUint8 *payloadStart;    /* Server: Start of ECH Payload*/ }; SECStatus SSLExp_EncodeEchConfigId(PRUint8 configId, const char *publicName, unsigned int maxNameLen,@@ -84,11 +107,14 @@                                      const SECItem *configId, sslEchConfig **cfg); SECStatus tls13_MaybeHandleEch(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *msg, PRUint32 msgLen, SECItem *sidBytes,                                SECItem *comps, SECItem *cookieBytes, SECItem *suites, SECItem **echInner);-SECStatus tls13_MaybeHandleEchSignal(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *savedMsg, PRUint32 savedLength);+SECStatus tls13_MaybeHandleEchSignal(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *savedMsg, PRUint32 savedLength, PRBool isHrr); SECStatus tls13_MaybeAcceptEch(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *sidBytes, const PRUint8 *chOuter,                                unsigned int chOuterLen, SECItem **chInner);-SECStatus tls13_MaybeGreaseEch(sslSocket *ss, unsigned int prefixLen, sslBuffer *buf);+SECStatus tls13_MaybeGreaseEch(sslSocket *ss, const sslBuffer *preamble, sslBuffer *buf); SECStatus tls13_WriteServerEchSignal(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *sh, unsigned int shLen);+SECStatus tls13_WriteServerEchHrrSignal(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *sh, unsigned int shLen);+SECStatus tls13_DeriveEchSecret(const sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey **output);+SECStatus tls13_ComputeEchSignal(sslSocket *ss, PRBool isHrr, const PRUint8 *sh, unsigned int shLen, PRUint8 *out); PRBool tls13_IsIp(const PRUint8 *str, unsigned int len); PRBool tls13_IsLDH(const PRUint8 *str, unsigned int len);

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Version Update] [security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13ech.h] [Line 21]  
   [Old Code] `#define TLS13_ECH_VERSION 0xfe0a`  
   [Fixed Code] `#define TLS13_ECH_VERSION 0xfe0d`  
   Additional Details: Version number changed, but unclear if this was fixing a specific vulnerability or just a protocol update.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Missing Length Definitions] [security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13ech.h] [Lines 22-24]  
   [Old Code] (No definitions for AEAD_TAG_LEN or GREASE_SNI_LEN)  
   [Fixed Code] `#define TLS13_ECH_AEAD_TAG_LEN 16` and `#define TLS13_ECH_GREASE_SNI_LEN 100`  
   Additional Details: Added length definitions which could prevent buffer-related issues, but not clear if this was fixing an existing vulnerability.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Type Change] [security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13ech.h] [Line 44]  
   [Old Code] `PRUint16 maxNameLen;`  
   [Fixed Code] `PRUint8 maxNameLen;`  
   Additional Details: Changed data type which might prevent overflow issues, but not clear if this was fixing an existing vulnerability.

4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Missing HRR Confirmation] [security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13ech.h] [Multiple lines]  
   [Old Code] (No support for HRR confirmation)  
   [Fixed Code] Added `kHkdfInfoEchHrrConfirm`, `tls13_WriteServerEchHrrSignal`, and related structures  
   Additional Details: Added HelloRetryRequest confirmation support which improves protocol security, but not clear if this was fixing a specific vulnerability.

Note: The changes appear to be protocol improvements and additions rather than clear security fixes. The version number change suggests possible protocol updates, and the added definitions and structures improve the implementation's robustness, but without more context, we can't definitively say these were fixing specific vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/ipc/chromium/src/base/process_util.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/ipc/chromium/src/base/process_util.h@@ -246,10 +246,9 @@                ProcessHandle* process_handle); // Attempts to kill the process identified by the given process-// entry structure, giving it the specified exit code. If |wait| is true, wait-// for the process to be actually terminated before returning.+// entry structure, giving it the specified exit code. // Returns true if this is successful, false otherwise.-bool KillProcess(ProcessHandle process, int exit_code, bool wait);+bool KillProcess(ProcessHandle process, int exit_code); // Get the termination status (exit code) of the process and return true if the // status indicates the process crashed. |child_exited| is set to true iff the

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Race Condition or Resource Leak] [ipc/chromium/src/base/process_util.h] [Lines 246-249]
[Old Code]
bool KillProcess(ProcessHandle process, int exit_code, bool wait);
[Fixed Code]
bool KillProcess(ProcessHandle process, int exit_code);

Additional Details:
The removed 'wait' parameter suggests a potential fix for either:
1. A race condition where waiting for process termination could cause issues
2. A resource leak if processes weren't being properly waited on
3. Simplification of the API to enforce consistent behavior

However, without more context about the actual usage patterns or bug reports that led to this change, I can't definitively identify a specific vulnerability. The change appears to be more about API simplification than a direct security fix.

Note: This could potentially relate to process handling security (like PID recycling issues), but that would depend on the implementation details not shown in the diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.modify.canvas1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.modify.canvas1.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx2 = offscreenCanvas2.getContext('2d');@@ -29,10 +29,10 @@ ctx2.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.fillStyle = pattern; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and updating the corresponding assertions to use the new variable name. There are no security-related changes in this diff.

Answer Format for Each Vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerabilities found in this diff. The changes are purely variable renaming and test assertion updates.

Additional Details:
    - The changes are consistent throughout the file (variable name change and corresponding assertion updates)
    - No security-sensitive operations were modified
    - No new security controls were added
    - No potential vulnerabilities were patched

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/neqo-common/.cargo-checksum.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/neqo-common/.cargo-checksum.json@@ -1 +1 @@-{"files":{"Cargo.toml":"dd7ab541b6d38e83665fa35fa50dc8a68867974df6085420bf45ca6f30c9816a","build.rs":"a17b1bb1bd3de3fc958f72d4d1357f7bc4432faa26640c95b5fbfccf40579d67","src/codec.rs":"ee422054b6f330d303a150223fd498dc2277c70663b0c3c0dcb7f0fc14fee7d8","src/datagram.rs":"569f8d9e34d7ee17144bf63d34136ecd9778da0d337e513f338738c50284615e","src/event.rs":"f60fee9f4b09ef47ff5e4bfa21c07e45ffd5873c292f2605f24d834070127d62","src/header.rs":"b7d4eeb40952b36f71ae1f37ce82c9617af8b84c171576de4eca9d50a3071103","src/hrtime.rs":"45a608ce9f00e2666ce95422a278c6dc0ff4e229b114e7bcf0b4c0d9dc61ad56","src/incrdecoder.rs":"91dab6f99073b1a6c88ff2f2625315dadb0b00d7bb0704e13b186155fbf496e8","src/lib.rs":"0a3679ab0bc67817097701010881e1c2f48ad1ab0700f12babc46cc59c5c788b","src/log.rs":"b69e492af85e65866cb6588138e8a337dd897d3ce399cb4e9fb8cc04ac042b7f","src/qlog.rs":"ca323c91d61810ebef2ebeb967836dda384a60a9fb492c2b8d1b235a98f2e4bf","src/timer.rs":"e63af7e7df968bf702583f263cfb63e6dca4e599bacffa2de0a6383d85333636","tests/log.rs":"480b165b7907ec642c508b303d63005eee1427115d6973a349eaf6b2242ed18d"},"package":null}+{"files":{"Cargo.toml":"9013a62945e20404cfc3624df017feeb3b86e096b6882b0fd2254c4e87d24b6b","build.rs":"a17b1bb1bd3de3fc958f72d4d1357f7bc4432faa26640c95b5fbfccf40579d67","src/codec.rs":"876fe7da558964046765aa2a2d7ebad9d53e1d4b31a1bf233d47b939f417dba1","src/datagram.rs":"569f8d9e34d7ee17144bf63d34136ecd9778da0d337e513f338738c50284615e","src/event.rs":"f60fee9f4b09ef47ff5e4bfa21c07e45ffd5873c292f2605f24d834070127d62","src/header.rs":"b7d4eeb40952b36f71ae1f37ce82c9617af8b84c171576de4eca9d50a3071103","src/hrtime.rs":"45a608ce9f00e2666ce95422a278c6dc0ff4e229b114e7bcf0b4c0d9dc61ad56","src/incrdecoder.rs":"97eb93502afabf13d46de37ca05430c49e876bfa9f013ce264231639eaf9df64","src/lib.rs":"0a3679ab0bc67817097701010881e1c2f48ad1ab0700f12babc46cc59c5c788b","src/log.rs":"b69e492af85e65866cb6588138e8a337dd897d3ce399cb4e9fb8cc04ac042b7f","src/qlog.rs":"ca323c91d61810ebef2ebeb967836dda384a60a9fb492c2b8d1b235a98f2e4bf","src/timer.rs":"e63af7e7df968bf702583f263cfb63e6dca4e599bacffa2de0a6383d85333636","tests/log.rs":"480b165b7907ec642c508b303d63005eee1427115d6973a349eaf6b2242ed18d"},"package":null}=========dom/ipc/SharedMessageBody.cpp========--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/ipc/SharedMessageBody.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/ipc/SharedMessageBody.cpp@@ -257,6 +257,9 @@ SharedMessageBody::FromMessageToSharedParent(     MessageData& aMessage,     StructuredCloneHolder::TransferringSupport aSupportsTransferring) {+  // TODO: This alloc is not fallible and there is no codepath that returns+  // nullptr. But the caller checks for nullptr and handles array allocations+  // for these items as fallible. See bug 1750497.   RefPtr<SharedMessageBody> data =       new SharedMessageBody(aSupportsTransferring, aMessage.agentClusterId());

Analyzing the provided code diffs:

1. For the first diff in `third_party/rust/neqo-common/.cargo-checksum.json`:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability - checksum updates
    The changes show only checksum updates for various files, which is a normal maintenance activity and doesn't indicate any security fixes.

2. For the second diff in `dom/ipc/SharedMessageBody.cpp`:
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    Potential Memory Allocation Issue [dom/ipc/SharedMessageBody.cpp] [Lines 257-260]
    Old Code: No explicit comment about allocation fallibility
    Fixed Code: Added TODO comment highlighting potential memory allocation issue
    The added comment suggests there might be a memory allocation issue that needs to be addressed (bug 1750497), but since this is just a TODO comment and not an actual fix, we can't be certain if this represents a security vulnerability.

Note: The second case shows a potential issue being identified (memory allocation not being properly handled as fallible), but since it's not yet fixed, we can't definitively say whether this was an actual vulnerability or just a code quality improvement.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/tps/tps/__init__.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/tps/tps/__init__.py@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ # flake8: noqa-from __future__ import absolute_import from .firefoxrunner import TPSFirefoxRunner from .testrunner import TPSTestRunner

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/tps/tps/__init__.py [Lines] 4
[Old Code]
from __future__ import absolute_import
[Fixed Code]
(removed line)

Additional Details:
The change simply removes a Python future import statement (`absolute_import`) which was likely no longer needed as the codebase moved to Python 3. This appears to be a routine maintenance change rather than a security fix. The removal of future imports is common when dropping Python 2 compatibility, but doesn't indicate any security vulnerability was present or fixed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-14e.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-14e.xml@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ ]]></style>   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body>   <p class="t1 t2">This line should be green.</p>

Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-14e.xml] [Lines 12]
[Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="" />]
[Fixed Code: (line removed)]

Additional details:
1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which appears to be test-related metadata.
2. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed here - this appears to be a minor cleanup or test configuration change.
3. The "flags" meta tag doesn't appear to have any security implications in this context.
4. The change is likely related to test suite maintenance rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-border-radius-1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-border-radius-1.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="L. David Baron" href="https://dbaron.org/">   <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-values/#calc-notation">   <link rel="match" href="calc-border-radius-1-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content=""> <style type="text/css"> p {

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-border-radius-1.html] [Lines 5]
[Old Code]
  <meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code]
[Removed line]

Additional Details:
This appears to be a minor cleanup change rather than a security fix. The removal of an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute doesn't indicate any security vulnerability being addressed. The change seems to be removing unnecessary markup from a test file.

No known vulnerability is associated with this change, and it doesn't appear to be fixing any security issue. The modification is likely part of general code maintenance or test suite cleanup.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/python/taskcluster_taskgraph/taskgraph/util/parameterization.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/python/taskcluster_taskgraph/taskgraph/util/parameterization.py@@ -39,11 +39,10 @@ def resolve_task_references(label, task_def, task_id, decision_task_id, dependencies):-    """Resolve all instances of-      {'task-reference': '..<..>..'}-    and-      {'artifact-reference`: '..<dependency/artifact/path>..'}-    in the given task definition, using the given dependencies"""+    """Resolve all instances of ``{'task-reference': '..<..>..'} ``+    and ``{'artifact-reference`: '..<dependency/artifact/path>..'}``+    in the given task definition, using the given dependencies.+    """     def task_reference(val):         def repl(match):

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Documentation String Injection] [third_party/python/taskcluster_taskgraph/taskgraph/util/parameterization.py] [Lines 39-46]
[Old Code]
    """Resolve all instances of
      {'task-reference': '..<..>..'}
    and
      {'artifact-reference`: '..<dependency/artifact/path>..'}
    in the given task definition, using the given dependencies"""
[Fixed Code]
    """Resolve all instances of ``{'task-reference': '..<..>..'} ``
    and ``{'artifact-reference`: '..<dependency/artifact/path>..'}``
    in the given task definition, using the given dependencies.
    """

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be primarily documentation formatting (changing indented examples to use backticks)
- While this doesn't indicate a direct security vulnerability in the code logic, the original format could potentially lead to documentation parsing issues or injection if the docstring is processed in a certain way
- The change improves clarity and might prevent potential docstring parsing vulnerabilities, though this is speculative

Note: No clear security vulnerability was fixed, but the change improves code documentation which could have indirect security benefits. The main change is in docstring formatting conventions.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/netwerk/dns/nsHostResolver.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/netwerk/dns/nsHostResolver.cpp@@ -1323,8 +1323,7 @@   MOZ_ASSERT(!aAddrRec->mResolving);   if (!StaticPrefs::network_trr_strict_native_fallback()) {     LOG(("nsHostResolver::MaybeRetryTRRLookup retrying with native"));-    NativeLookup(aAddrRec, aLock);-    return true;+    return NS_SUCCEEDED(NativeLookup(aAddrRec, aLock));   }   if (aFirstAttemptSkipReason == TRRSkippedReason::TRR_NXDOMAIN ||@@ -1334,8 +1333,7 @@         ("nsHostResolver::MaybeRetryTRRLookup retrying with native in strict "          "mode, skip reason was %d",          static_cast<uint32_t>(aFirstAttemptSkipReason)));-    NativeLookup(aAddrRec, aLock);-    return true;+    return NS_SUCCEEDED(NativeLookup(aAddrRec, aLock));   }   if (aAddrRec->mTrrAttempts > 1) {@@ -1354,9 +1352,13 @@     auto trrQuery = aAddrRec->mTRRQuery.Lock();     trrQuery.ref() = nullptr;   }-  aAddrRec->NotifyRetryingTrr();-  TrrLookup(aAddrRec, aLock, nullptr /* pushedTRR */);-  return true;++  if (NS_SUCCEEDED(TrrLookup(aAddrRec, aLock, nullptr /* pushedTRR */))) {+    aAddrRec->NotifyRetryingTrr();+    return true;+  }++  return false; } //

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Error Handling Issue] [netwerk/dns/nsHostResolver.cpp] [Lines 1323-1334]
   [Old Code]
   NativeLookup(aAddrRec, aLock);
   return true;
   [Fixed Code]
   return NS_SUCCEEDED(NativeLookup(aAddrRec, aLock));

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Error Handling Issue] [netwerk/dns/nsHostResolver.cpp] [Lines 1354-1359]
   [Old Code]
   aAddrRec->NotifyRetryingTrr();
   TrrLookup(aAddrRec, aLock, nullptr /* pushedTRR */);
   return true;
   [Fixed Code]
   if (NS_SUCCEEDED(TrrLookup(aAddrRec, aLock, nullptr /* pushedTRR */))) {
     aAddrRec->NotifyRetryingTrr();
     return true;
   }
   return false;

Analysis:
The changes primarily focus on improving error handling in the DNS resolution process. While not clearly fixing a specific named vulnerability, the modifications:
1. Changed to properly check the return status of NativeLookup instead of always returning true
2. Added proper error checking for TrrLookup and only notify retry on success

These changes appear to address potential reliability issues in the DNS resolution process, particularly around TRR (Trusted Recursive Resolver) fallback behavior. The fixes ensure that:
- Operations are only considered successful when they actually succeed
- Notifications are only sent when the operation succeeds
- The caller gets accurate information about the operation's outcome

While these don't match any specific named vulnerability, they do improve the robustness of the DNS resolution code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.