--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/src/options/outer_from.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/src/options/outer_from.rs@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@-use syn::{self, Field, Ident, Meta};+use syn::{Field, Ident, Meta};-use options::{Core, DefaultExpression, ForwardAttrs, ParseAttribute, ParseData};-use util::PathList;-use {FromMeta, Result};+use crate::options::{Core, DefaultExpression, ForwardAttrs, ParseAttribute, ParseData};+use crate::util::PathList;+use crate::{FromMeta, Result}; /// Reusable base for `FromDeriveInput`, `FromVariant`, `FromField`, and other top-level /// `From*` traits.@@ -28,15 +28,15 @@ } impl OuterFrom {-    pub fn start(di: &syn::DeriveInput) -> Self {-        OuterFrom {-            container: Core::start(di),+    pub fn start(di: &syn::DeriveInput) -> Result<Self> {+        Ok(OuterFrom {+            container: Core::start(di)?,             attrs: Default::default(),             ident: Default::default(),             attr_names: Default::default(),             forward_attrs: Default::default(),             from_ident: Default::default(),-        }+        })     } }@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@             self.container.default = Some(DefaultExpression::Trait);             self.from_ident = true;         } else {-            return self.container.parse_nested(mi)+            return self.container.parse_nested(mi);         }         Ok(())     }

Let me analyze the code diff for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Error Handling Improvement] [third_party/rust/darling_core/src/options/outer_from.rs] [Lines 28-38]
    [Old Code]
    pub fn start(di: &syn::DeriveInput) -> Self {
        OuterFrom {
            container: Core::start(di),
            attrs: Default::default(),
            ident: Default::default(),
            attr_names: Default::default(),
            forward_attrs: Default::default(),
            from_ident: Default::default(),
        }
    }
    [Fixed Code]
    pub fn start(di: &syn::DeriveInput) -> Result<Self> {
        Ok(OuterFrom {
            container: Core::start(di)?,
            attrs: Default::default(),
            ident: Default::default(),
            attr_names: Default::default(),
            forward_attrs: Default::default(),
            from_ident: Default::default(),
        })
    }

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Consistent Error Handling] [third_party/rust/darling_core/src/options/outer_from.rs] [Lines 53-57]
    [Old Code]
            return self.container.parse_nested(mi)
    [Fixed Code]
            return self.container.parse_nested(mi);

Notes:
- The main changes appear to be related to error handling improvements rather than direct security vulnerabilities
- The change from returning Self to Result<Self> suggests better error propagation
- The added ? operator for Core::start suggests potential error cases were being ignored before
- The semicolon change appears to be purely stylistic
- No obvious security vulnerabilities like injection, memory safety issues, or logic flaws are present
- The changes improve robustness but don't directly address any known vulnerability class

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/performance-new/test/browser/browser_popup-record-capture-view.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/performance-new/test/browser/browser_popup-record-capture-view.js@@ -8,6 +8,14 @@ const FRONTEND_BASE_PATH =   "/browser/devtools/client/performance-new/test/browser/fake-frontend.html"; const FRONTEND_BASE_URL = FRONTEND_BASE_HOST + FRONTEND_BASE_PATH;++add_setup(async function setup() {+  // The active tab view isn't enabled in all configurations. Let's make sure+  // it's enabled in these tests.+  SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({+    set: [["devtools.performance.recording.active-tab-view.enabled", true]],+  });+}); add_task(async function test() {   info(@@ -29,6 +37,7 @@   // First check for the "Media" preset which will have no "view" query   // string because it opens our traditional "full" view.   await openPopupAndAssertUrlForPreset({+    window,     preset: "Media",     expectedUrl: FRONTEND_BASE_URL,   });@@ -36,14 +45,61 @@   // Now, let's check for "web-developer" preset. This will open up the frontend   // with "active-tab" view query string. Frontend will understand and open the active tab view for it.   await openPopupAndAssertUrlForPreset({+    window,     preset: "Web Developer",     expectedUrl: FRONTEND_BASE_URL + "?view=active-tab&implementation=js",   }); });-async function openPopupAndAssertUrlForPreset({ preset, expectedUrl }) {+add_task(async function test_in_private_window() {+  info(+    "Test that the profiler pop-up correctly opens the captured profile on the " ++      "correct frontend view by adding proper view query string. This also tests " ++      "that a tab is opened on the non-private window even when the popup is used " ++      "in the private window."+  );++  // This test assumes that the Web Developer preset is set by default, which is+  // not the case on Nightly and custom builds.+  BackgroundJSM.changePreset(+    "aboutprofiling",+    "web-developer",+    Services.profiler.GetFeatures()+  );++  await setProfilerFrontendUrl(FRONTEND_BASE_HOST, FRONTEND_BASE_PATH);+  await makeSureProfilerPopupIsEnabled();++  info("Open a private window.");+  const privateWindow = await BrowserTestUtils.openNewBrowserWindow({+    private: true,+  });++  // First check for the "Media" preset which will have no "view" query+  // string because it opens our traditional "full" view.+  // Note that this utility will check for a new tab in the main non-private+  // window, which is exactly what we want here.+  await openPopupAndAssertUrlForPreset({+    window: privateWindow,+    preset: "Media",+    expectedUrl: FRONTEND_BASE_URL,+  });++  // Now, let's check for "web-developer" preset. This will open up the frontend+  // with "active-tab" view query string. Frontend will understand and open the active tab view for it.+  await openPopupAndAssertUrlForPreset({+    window: privateWindow,+    preset: "Web Developer",+    expectedUrl: FRONTEND_BASE_URL + "?view=active-tab&implementation=js",+  });++  await BrowserTestUtils.closeWindow(privateWindow);+});++async function openPopupAndAssertUrlForPreset({ window, preset, expectedUrl }) {   // Let's capture a profile and assert newly created tab's url.   await openPopupAndEnsureCloses(window, async () => {+    const { document } = window;     {       // Select the preset in the popup       const presetsInPopup = document.getElementById(

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific security vulnerability was identified in this diff. The changes appear to be functional improvements and test additions rather than security fixes.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Information Leak [File] devtools/client/performance-new/test/browser/browser_popup-record-capture-view.js [Lines] 8-14
[Old Code]
(No setup function existed)
[Fixed Code]
add_setup(async function setup() {
  // The active tab view isn't enabled in all configurations. Let's make sure
  // it's enabled in these tests.
  SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
    set: [["devtools.performance.recording.active-tab-view.enabled", true]],
  });
});

Note: While this isn't clearly a security fix, it's worth noting that the change ensures consistent test behavior by explicitly enabling a feature flag. This could potentially prevent information leaks that might occur if tests ran with inconsistent configurations.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Cross-Window Interaction Issue [File] devtools/client/performance-new/test/browser/browser_popup-record-capture-view.js [Lines] 29-37, 45-61
[Old Code]
async function openPopupAndAssertUrlForPreset({ preset, expectedUrl }) {
[Fixed Code]
async function openPopupAndAssertUrlForPreset({ window, preset, expectedUrl }) {

Note: The addition of explicit window handling in the test functions, particularly for private browsing mode, suggests awareness of potential cross-window security issues. However, this appears to be more of a test improvement than a direct security fix.

The main changes in this diff are:
1. Adding setup code for test configuration
2. Adding explicit window parameter handling
3. Adding tests for private browsing mode
4. Improving test coverage for different presets

No clear security vulnerabilities were fixed in this diff, though some changes might have security implications (like proper handling of private browsing windows).

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/workers/WorkerScope.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/workers/WorkerScope.cpp@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ #include "mozilla/dom/SharedWorkerGlobalScopeBinding.h" #include "mozilla/dom/SimpleGlobalObject.h" #include "mozilla/dom/TimeoutHandler.h"+#include "mozilla/dom/TestUtils.h" #include "mozilla/dom/WorkerCommon.h" #include "mozilla/dom/WorkerDebuggerGlobalScopeBinding.h" #include "mozilla/dom/WorkerGlobalScopeBinding.h"@@ -217,8 +218,7 @@ NS_INTERFACE_MAP_END_INHERITING(DOMEventTargetHelper) WorkerGlobalScopeBase::WorkerGlobalScopeBase(-    NotNull<WorkerPrivate*> aWorkerPrivate,-    UniquePtr<ClientSource> aClientSource)+    WorkerPrivate* aWorkerPrivate, UniquePtr<ClientSource> aClientSource)     : mWorkerPrivate(aWorkerPrivate),       mClientSource(std::move(aClientSource)),       mSerialEventTarget(aWorkerPrivate->HybridEventTarget()) {@@ -780,9 +780,9 @@                                                WorkerGlobalScope) DedicatedWorkerGlobalScope::DedicatedWorkerGlobalScope(-    NotNull<WorkerPrivate*> aWorkerPrivate,-    UniquePtr<ClientSource> aClientSource, const nsString& aName)-    : WorkerGlobalScope(aWorkerPrivate, std::move(aClientSource)),+    WorkerPrivate* aWorkerPrivate, UniquePtr<ClientSource> aClientSource,+    const nsString& aName)+    : WorkerGlobalScope(std::move(aWorkerPrivate), std::move(aClientSource)),       NamedWorkerGlobalScopeMixin(aName) {} bool DedicatedWorkerGlobalScope::WrapGlobalObject(@@ -954,9 +954,9 @@ } SharedWorkerGlobalScope::SharedWorkerGlobalScope(-    NotNull<WorkerPrivate*> aWorkerPrivate,-    UniquePtr<ClientSource> aClientSource, const nsString& aName)-    : WorkerGlobalScope(aWorkerPrivate, std::move(aClientSource)),+    WorkerPrivate* aWorkerPrivate, UniquePtr<ClientSource> aClientSource,+    const nsString& aName)+    : WorkerGlobalScope(std::move(aWorkerPrivate), std::move(aClientSource)),       NamedWorkerGlobalScopeMixin(aName) {} bool SharedWorkerGlobalScope::WrapGlobalObject(@@ -988,10 +988,9 @@ NS_IMPL_RELEASE_INHERITED(ServiceWorkerGlobalScope, WorkerGlobalScope) ServiceWorkerGlobalScope::ServiceWorkerGlobalScope(-    NotNull<WorkerPrivate*> aWorkerPrivate,-    UniquePtr<ClientSource> aClientSource,+    WorkerPrivate* aWorkerPrivate, UniquePtr<ClientSource> aClientSource,     const ServiceWorkerRegistrationDescriptor& aRegistrationDescriptor)-    : WorkerGlobalScope(aWorkerPrivate, std::move(aClientSource)),+    : WorkerGlobalScope(std::move(aWorkerPrivate), std::move(aClientSource)),       mScope(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(aRegistrationDescriptor.Scope()))       // Eagerly create the registration because we will need to receive

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Null Pointer Dereference] [dom/workers/WorkerScope.cpp] [Lines 217-221, 780-783, 954-957, 988-992]
   [Old Code]
   WorkerGlobalScopeBase::WorkerGlobalScopeBase(
       NotNull<WorkerPrivate*> aWorkerPrivate,
       UniquePtr<ClientSource> aClientSource)
   [Fixed Code]
   WorkerGlobalScopeBase::WorkerGlobalScopeBase(
       WorkerPrivate* aWorkerPrivate, UniquePtr<ClientSource> aClientSource)

   Note: The change removes the NotNull wrapper from WorkerPrivate* parameters, which could potentially lead to null pointer dereferences if not properly checked. However, without seeing the full context of how these constructors are used, we can't be certain if this introduces a vulnerability.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   [Header Addition] [dom/workers/WorkerScope.cpp] [Lines 76-77]
   [Old Code]
   #include "mozilla/dom/TimeoutHandler.h"
   [Fixed Code]
   #include "mozilla/dom/TimeoutHandler.h"
   #include "mozilla/dom/TestUtils.h"

   Note: This is simply adding a new header include and doesn't appear to be related to any security fix.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Move Semantics Change] [dom/workers/WorkerScope.cpp] [Multiple locations]
   [Old Code]
   : WorkerGlobalScope(aWorkerPrivate, std::move(aClientSource))
   [Fixed Code]
   : WorkerGlobalScope(std::move(aWorkerPrivate), std::move(aClientSource))

   Note: The change in move semantics for aWorkerPrivate could potentially affect object ownership and lifecycle management, but without more context it's unclear if this fixes or introduces any security issues.

The most significant change is the removal of NotNull wrappers, which could potentially lead to null pointer issues if the calling code doesn't properly validate the pointers. However, the actual security impact depends on how these constructors are used throughout the codebase.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit/CacheIR.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit/CacheIR.cpp@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ #include "vm/RegExpObject.h" #include "vm/SelfHosting.h" #include "vm/ThrowMsgKind.h"  // ThrowCondition+#include "vm/Watchtower.h" #include "wasm/WasmInstance.h" #include "jit/BaselineFrame-inl.h"@@ -225,6 +226,10 @@ } const Value CacheIRCloner::getValueField(uint32_t stubOffset) {   return Value::fromRawBits(uint64_t(readStubInt64(stubOffset)));+}+double CacheIRCloner::getDoubleField(uint32_t stubOffset) {+  uint64_t bits = uint64_t(readStubInt64(stubOffset));+  return mozilla::BitwiseCast<double>(bits); } IRGenerator::IRGenerator(JSContext* cx, HandleScript script, jsbytecode* pc,@@ -4552,6 +4557,11 @@     }   }+  // For now we don't optimize Watchtower-monitored objects.+  if (Watchtower::watchesPropertyAdd(obj.as<NativeObject>())) {+    return false;+  }+   // Object must be extensible, or we must be initializing a private   // elem.   bool canAddNewProperty = obj->nonProxyIsExtensible() || id.isPrivateName();@@ -6900,12 +6910,18 @@ } static bool CanAttachInt32Pow(const Value& baseVal, const Value& powerVal) {-  MOZ_ASSERT(baseVal.isInt32() || baseVal.isBoolean());-  MOZ_ASSERT(powerVal.isInt32() || powerVal.isBoolean());--  int32_t base = baseVal.isInt32() ? baseVal.toInt32() : baseVal.toBoolean();-  int32_t power =-      powerVal.isInt32() ? powerVal.toInt32() : powerVal.toBoolean();+  auto valToInt32 = [](const Value& v) {+    if (v.isInt32()) {+      return v.toInt32();+    }+    if (v.isBoolean()) {+      return int32_t(v.toBoolean());+    }+    MOZ_ASSERT(v.isNull());+    return 0;+  };+  int32_t base = valToInt32(baseVal);+  int32_t power = valToInt32(powerVal);   // x^y where y < 0 is most of the time not an int32, except when x is 1 or y   // gets large enough. It's hard to determine when exactly y is "large enough",@@ -10633,17 +10649,35 @@   return AttachDecision::NoAction; }+static bool CanConvertToInt32ForToNumber(const Value& v) {+  return v.isInt32() || v.isBoolean() || v.isNull();+}++static Int32OperandId EmitGuardToInt32ForToNumber(CacheIRWriter& writer,+                                                  ValOperandId id,+                                                  const Value& v) {+  if (v.isInt32()) {+    return writer.guardToInt32(id);+  }+  if (v.isNull()) {+    writer.guardIsNull(id);+    return writer.loadInt32Constant(0);+  }+  MOZ_ASSERT(v.isBoolean());+  return writer.guardBooleanToInt32(id);+}+ AttachDecision UnaryArithIRGenerator::tryAttachInt32() {   if (op_ == JSOp::BitNot) {     return AttachDecision::NoAction;   }-  if (!val_.isInt32() || !res_.isInt32()) {+  if (!CanConvertToInt32ForToNumber(val_) || !res_.isInt32()) {     return AttachDecision::NoAction;   }   ValOperandId valId(writer.setInputOperandId(0));-  Int32OperandId intId = writer.guardToInt32(valId);+  Int32OperandId intId = EmitGuardToInt32ForToNumber(writer, valId, val_);   switch (op_) {     case JSOp::Pos:       writer.loadInt32Result(intId);@@ -10673,18 +10707,41 @@   return AttachDecision::Attach; }+static bool CanConvertToDoubleForToNumber(const Value& v) {+  return v.isNumber() || v.isBoolean() || v.isNullOrUndefined();+}++static NumberOperandId EmitGuardToDoubleForToNumber(CacheIRWriter& writer,+                                                    ValOperandId id,+                                                    const Value& v) {+  if (v.isNumber()) {+    return writer.guardIsNumber(id);+  }+  if (v.isBoolean()) {+    BooleanOperandId boolId = writer.guardToBoolean(id);+    return writer.booleanToNumber(boolId);+  }+  if (v.isNull()) {+    writer.guardIsNull(id);+    return writer.loadDoubleConstant(0.0);+  }+  MOZ_ASSERT(v.isUndefined());+  writer.guardIsUndefined(id);+  return writer.loadDoubleConstant(JS::GenericNaN());+}+ AttachDecision UnaryArithIRGenerator::tryAttachNumber() {   if (op_ == JSOp::BitNot) {     return AttachDecision::NoAction;   }-  if (!val_.isNumber()) {+  if (!CanConvertToDoubleForToNumber(val_)) {     return AttachDecision::NoAction;   }   MOZ_ASSERT(res_.isNumber());   ValOperandId valId(writer.setInputOperandId(0));-  NumberOperandId numId = writer.guardIsNumber(valId);-  Int32OperandId truncatedId;+  NumberOperandId numId = EmitGuardToDoubleForToNumber(writer, valId, val_);+   switch (op_) {     case JSOp::Pos:       writer.loadDoubleResult(numId);@@ -11106,16 +11163,17 @@     return AttachDecision::NoAction;   }-  // Check guard conditions-  if (!lhs_.isNumber() || !rhs_.isNumber()) {+  // Check guard conditions.+  if (!CanConvertToDoubleForToNumber(lhs_) ||+      !CanConvertToDoubleForToNumber(rhs_)) {     return AttachDecision::NoAction;   }   ValOperandId lhsId(writer.setInputOperandId(0));   ValOperandId rhsId(writer.setInputOperandId(1));-  NumberOperandId lhs = writer.guardIsNumber(lhsId);-  NumberOperandId rhs = writer.guardIsNumber(rhsId);+  NumberOperandId lhs = EmitGuardToDoubleForToNumber(writer, lhsId, lhs_);+  NumberOperandId rhs = EmitGuardToDoubleForToNumber(writer, rhsId, rhs_);   switch (op_) {     case JSOp::Add:@@ -11150,9 +11208,9 @@ } AttachDecision BinaryArithIRGenerator::tryAttachInt32() {-  // Check guard conditions-  if (!(lhs_.isInt32() || lhs_.isBoolean()) ||-      !(rhs_.isInt32() || rhs_.isBoolean())) {+  // Check guard conditions.+  if (!CanConvertToInt32ForToNumber(lhs_) ||+      !CanConvertToInt32ForToNumber(rhs_)) {     return AttachDecision::NoAction;   }@@ -11174,16 +11232,8 @@   ValOperandId lhsId(writer.setInputOperandId(0));   ValOperandId rhsId(writer.setInputOperandId(1));-  auto guardToInt32 = [&](ValOperandId id, const Value& v) {-    if (v.isInt32()) {-      return writer.guardToInt32(id);-    }-    MOZ_ASSERT(v.isBoolean());-    return writer.guardBooleanToInt32(id);-  };--  Int32OperandId lhsIntId = guardToInt32(lhsId, lhs_);-  Int32OperandId rhsIntId = guardToInt32(rhsId, rhs_);+  Int32OperandId lhsIntId = EmitGuardToInt32ForToNumber(writer, lhsId, lhs_);+  Int32OperandId rhsIntId = EmitGuardToInt32ForToNumber(writer, rhsId, rhs_);   switch (op_) {     case JSOp::Add:

I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

1. First vulnerability analysis:
    Vulnerability Existed: yes
    Type Confusion Vulnerability [js/src/jit/CacheIR.cpp] [Lines 6900-6918]
    [Old Code]
    static bool CanAttachInt32Pow(const Value& baseVal, const Value& powerVal) {
      MOZ_ASSERT(baseVal.isInt32() || baseVal.isBoolean());
      MOZ_ASSERT(powerVal.isInt32() || powerVal.isBoolean());

      int32_t base = baseVal.isInt32() ? baseVal.toInt32() : baseVal.toBoolean();
      int32_t power =
          powerVal.isInt32() ? powerVal.toInt32() : powerVal.toBoolean();
    [Fixed Code]
    static bool CanAttachInt32Pow(const Value& baseVal, const Value& powerVal) {
      auto valToInt32 = [](const Value& v) {
        if (v.isInt32()) {
          return v.toInt32();
        }
        if (v.isBoolean()) {
          return int32_t(v.toBoolean());
        }
        MOZ_ASSERT(v.isNull());
        return 0;
      };
      int32_t base = valToInt32(baseVal);
      int32_t power = valToInt32(powerVal);

2. Second vulnerability analysis:
    Vulnerability Existed: yes
    Type Confusion Vulnerability [js/src/jit/CacheIR.cpp] [Lines 10633-10649]
    [Old Code]
    if (!val_.isInt32() || !res_.isInt32()) {
      return AttachDecision::NoAction;
    }
    [Fixed Code]
    if (!CanConvertToInt32ForToNumber(val_) || !res_.isInt32()) {
      return AttachDecision::NoAction;
    }

3. Third vulnerability analysis:
    Vulnerability Existed: yes
    Type Confusion Vulnerability [js/src/jit/CacheIR.cpp] [Lines 10673-10707]
    [Old Code]
    if (!val_.isNumber()) {
      return AttachDecision::NoAction;
    }
    [Fixed Code]
    if (!CanConvertToDoubleForToNumber(val_)) {
      return AttachDecision::NoAction;
    }

4. Fourth vulnerability analysis:
    Vulnerability Existed: yes
    Type Confusion Vulnerability [js/src/jit/CacheIR.cpp] [Lines 11106-11163]
    [Old Code]
    if (!lhs_.isNumber() || !rhs_.isNumber()) {
      return AttachDecision::NoAction;
    }
    [Fixed Code]
    if (!CanConvertToDoubleForToNumber(lhs_) ||
        !CanConvertToDoubleForToNumber(rhs_)) {
      return AttachDecision::NoAction;
    }

5. Fifth vulnerability analysis:
    Vulnerability Existed: yes
    Type Confusion Vulnerability [js/src/jit/CacheIR.cpp] [Lines 11150-11208]
    [Old Code]
    if (!(lhs_.isInt32() || lhs_.isBoolean()) ||
        !(rhs_.isInt32() || rhs_.isBoolean())) {
      return AttachDecision::NoAction;
    }
    [Fixed Code]
    if (!CanConvertToInt32ForToNumber(lhs_) ||
        !CanConvertToInt32ForToNumber(rhs_)) {
      return AttachDecision::NoAction;
    }

The main pattern across all these fixes is the addition of proper type checking and conversion handling, particularly for cases involving null/undefined values that weren't properly handled before. These changes prevent potential type confusion vulnerabilities where improper type assumptions could lead to memory corruption or other security issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.end.2.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.end.2.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -25,10 +25,10 @@ ctx.rect(150, 150, 2000, 2000); ctx.lineTo(160, 160); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't affect security. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14, 25-28]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");

[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");

The changes only rename the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and update all references to it. There are no security implications in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-text-decor/parsing/text-emphasis-style-computed.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-text-decor/parsing/text-emphasis-style-computed.html@@ -8,10 +8,10 @@ // Computed value: the keyword none, a pair of keywords representing the shape // and fill, or a string test_computed_value('text-emphasis-style', 'none');-test_computed_value('text-emphasis-style', 'dot', 'filled dot');-test_computed_value('text-emphasis-style', 'filled circle');-test_computed_value('text-emphasis-style', 'double-circle', 'filled double-circle');-test_computed_value('text-emphasis-style', 'triangle', 'filled triangle');+test_computed_value('text-emphasis-style', 'dot', 'dot');+test_computed_value('text-emphasis-style', 'filled circle', 'circle');+test_computed_value('text-emphasis-style', 'double-circle', 'double-circle');+test_computed_value('text-emphasis-style', 'triangle', 'triangle'); test_computed_value('text-emphasis-style', 'open sesame'); test_computed_value('text-emphasis-style', '"*"'); </script>

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be test case adjustments for CSS text-emphasis-style property computation. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found]
[File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-text-decor/parsing/text-emphasis-style-computed.html
[Old Code] Various test cases with 'filled' prefix in expected results
[Fixed Code] Test cases updated to remove 'filled' prefix from expected results

This appears to be a test case refinement rather than a security fix, adjusting the expected computed values for text-emphasis-style CSS property to match the specification more accurately. The changes are purely functional/behavioral rather than security-related.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/wgpu-core/src/command/mod.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/wgpu-core/src/command/mod.rs@@ -8,15 +8,12 @@ mod render; mod transfer;-pub use self::bundle::*;-pub(crate) use self::clear::collect_zero_buffer_copies_for_clear_texture;-pub use self::clear::ClearError;-pub use self::compute::*;-pub use self::draw::*;+pub(crate) use self::clear::clear_texture_no_device;+pub use self::{+    bundle::*, clear::ClearError, compute::*, draw::*, query::*, render::*, transfer::*,+};+ use self::memory_init::CommandBufferTextureMemoryActions;-pub use self::query::*;-pub use self::render::*;-pub use self::transfer::*; use crate::error::{ErrorFormatter, PrettyError}; use crate::init_tracker::BufferInitTrackerAction;@@ -101,7 +98,7 @@     buffer_memory_init_actions: Vec<BufferInitTrackerAction>,     texture_memory_actions: CommandBufferTextureMemoryActions,     limits: wgt::Limits,-    support_clear_buffer_texture: bool,+    support_clear_texture: bool,     #[cfg(feature = "trace")]     pub(crate) commands: Option<Vec<TraceCommand>>, }@@ -129,7 +126,7 @@             buffer_memory_init_actions: Default::default(),             texture_memory_actions: Default::default(),             limits,-            support_clear_buffer_texture: features.contains(wgt::Features::CLEAR_COMMANDS),+            support_clear_texture: features.contains(wgt::Features::CLEAR_TEXTURE),             #[cfg(feature = "trace")]             commands: if enable_tracing {                 Some(Vec::new())

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Feature Flag Misalignment] [third_party/rust/wgpu-core/src/command/mod.rs] [Lines 101, 129]  
   [Old Code]  
   `support_clear_buffer_texture: bool`  
   `support_clear_buffer_texture: features.contains(wgt::Features::CLEAR_COMMANDS)`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `support_clear_texture: bool`  
   `support_clear_texture: features.contains(wgt::Features::CLEAR_TEXTURE)`  
   Additional Details: The change involves updating a feature flag check from CLEAR_COMMANDS to CLEAR_TEXTURE. While this doesn't appear to be a direct security fix, it could potentially affect security if the wrong feature flag was being checked previously.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Module Export Restructuring] [third_party/rust/wgpu-core/src/command/mod.rs] [Lines 8-15]  
   [Old Code]  
   Multiple individual `pub use` statements  
   [Fixed Code]  
   Consolidated `pub use` with grouping  
   Additional Details: The change restructures how modules are exported. While this doesn't appear to be a direct security fix, it could potentially affect visibility and access control.

Note: The changes appear to be primarily refactoring and feature flag updates rather than direct security fixes. The most notable change is the feature flag check update, but without more context about the wgt::Features enum and its security implications, it's difficult to determine if this was fixing a security vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/naga/src/back/spv/block.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/naga/src/back/spv/block.rs@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@                     crate::BinaryOperator::Modulo => match left_ty_inner.scalar_kind() {                         Some(crate::ScalarKind::Sint) => spirv::Op::SMod,                         Some(crate::ScalarKind::Uint) => spirv::Op::UMod,-                        Some(crate::ScalarKind::Float) => spirv::Op::FMod,+                        Some(crate::ScalarKind::Float) => spirv::Op::FRem,                         _ => unimplemented!(),                     },                     crate::BinaryOperator::Equal => match left_ty_inner.scalar_kind() {@@ -433,9 +433,15 @@                         Some(crate::ScalarKind::Float) => spirv::Op::FOrdGreaterThanEqual,                         _ => unimplemented!(),                     },-                    crate::BinaryOperator::And => spirv::Op::BitwiseAnd,+                    crate::BinaryOperator::And => match left_ty_inner.scalar_kind() {+                        Some(crate::ScalarKind::Bool) => spirv::Op::LogicalAnd,+                        _ => spirv::Op::BitwiseAnd,+                    },                     crate::BinaryOperator::ExclusiveOr => spirv::Op::BitwiseXor,-                    crate::BinaryOperator::InclusiveOr => spirv::Op::BitwiseOr,+                    crate::BinaryOperator::InclusiveOr => match left_ty_inner.scalar_kind() {+                        Some(crate::ScalarKind::Bool) => spirv::Op::LogicalOr,+                        _ => spirv::Op::BitwiseOr,+                    },                     crate::BinaryOperator::LogicalAnd => spirv::Op::LogicalAnd,                     crate::BinaryOperator::LogicalOr => spirv::Op::LogicalOr,                     crate::BinaryOperator::ShiftLeft => spirv::Op::ShiftLeftLogical,@@ -534,6 +540,8 @@                     Mf::Asinh => MathOp::Ext(spirv::GLOp::Asinh),                     Mf::Acosh => MathOp::Ext(spirv::GLOp::Acosh),                     Mf::Atanh => MathOp::Ext(spirv::GLOp::Atanh),+                    Mf::Radians => MathOp::Ext(spirv::GLOp::Radians),+                    Mf::Degrees => MathOp::Ext(spirv::GLOp::Degrees),                     // decomposition                     Mf::Ceil => MathOp::Ext(spirv::GLOp::Ceil),                     Mf::Round => MathOp::Ext(spirv::GLOp::RoundEven),@@ -656,6 +664,12 @@                         arg2_id,                         arg3_id,                     )),+                    Mf::FindLsb => MathOp::Ext(spirv::GLOp::FindILsb),+                    Mf::FindMsb => MathOp::Ext(match arg_scalar_kind {+                        Some(crate::ScalarKind::Uint) => spirv::GLOp::FindUMsb,+                        Some(crate::ScalarKind::Sint) => spirv::GLOp::FindSMsb,+                        other => unimplemented!("Unexpected findMSB({:?})", other),+                    }),                     Mf::Pack4x8unorm => MathOp::Ext(spirv::GLOp::PackUnorm4x8),                     Mf::Pack4x8snorm => MathOp::Ext(spirv::GLOp::PackSnorm4x8),                     Mf::Pack2x16float => MathOp::Ext(spirv::GLOp::PackHalf2x16),@@ -885,6 +899,7 @@             crate::Expression::ImageSample {                 image,                 sampler,+                gather,                 coordinate,                 array_index,                 offset,@@ -894,6 +909,7 @@                 result_type_id,                 image,                 sampler,+                gather,                 coordinate,                 array_index,                 offset,

I'll analyze the code diff and provide the security findings following the specified format.

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Floating Point Modulo Operation Fix [third_party/rust/naga/src/back/spv/block.rs] [Lines 390-393]
Old Code:
Some(crate::ScalarKind::Float) => spirv::Op::FMod,
Fixed Code:
Some(crate::ScalarKind::Float) => spirv::Op::FRem,

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Logical Operation Fix for Boolean Types [third_party/rust/naga/src/back/spv/block.rs] [Lines 433-439]
Old Code:
crate::BinaryOperator::And => spirv::Op::BitwiseAnd,
Fixed Code:
crate::BinaryOperator::And => match left_ty_inner.scalar_kind() {
    Some(crate::ScalarKind::Bool) => spirv::Op::LogicalAnd,
    _ => spirv::Op::BitwiseAnd,
},

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Logical Operation Fix for Boolean Types [third_party/rust/naga/src/back/spv/block.rs] [Lines 440-444]
Old Code:
crate::BinaryOperator::InclusiveOr => spirv::Op::BitwiseOr,
Fixed Code:
crate::BinaryOperator::InclusiveOr => match left_ty_inner.scalar_kind() {
    Some(crate::ScalarKind::Bool) => spirv::Op::LogicalOr,
    _ => spirv::Op::BitwiseOr,
},

4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Image Sampling Operation Enhancement [third_party/rust/naga/src/back/spv/block.rs] [Lines 885-894]
Old Code:
crate::Expression::ImageSample {
    image,
    sampler,
    coordinate,
Fixed Code:
crate::Expression::ImageSample {
    image,
    sampler,
    gather,
    coordinate,

Note: While these changes appear to be functional fixes rather than direct security vulnerabilities, they could potentially prevent security issues that might arise from incorrect operations (especially the floating point modulo operation change and the logical operation fixes). The addition of the 'gather' parameter to image sampling could also be related to security if it enables more secure sampling methods, though this isn't clear from the diff alone.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/wr/webrender/src/renderer/mod.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/wr/webrender/src/renderer/mod.rs@@ -945,7 +945,7 @@             unsafe {                 if let Ok(ref tracy_path) = std::env::var("WR_TRACY_PATH") {                     let ok = tracy_rs::load(tracy_path);-                    println!("Load tracy from {} -> {}", tracy_path, ok);+                    info!("Load tracy from {} -> {}", tracy_path, ok);                 }             }@@ -1334,7 +1334,7 @@         } else if device.supports_extension("GL_EXT_debug_marker") {             GpuDebugMethod::MarkerEXT         } else {-            println!("Warning: asking to enable_gpu_markers but no supporting extension was found");+            warn!("asking to enable_gpu_markers but no supporting extension was found");             GpuDebugMethod::None         };

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   Information Leakage via Debug Logging [gfx/wr/webrender/src/renderer/mod.rs] [Lines 945-948]  
   Old Code:  
   ```rust
   println!("Load tracy from {} -> {}", tracy_path, ok);
   ```  
   Fixed Code:  
   ```rust
   info!("Load tracy from {} -> {}", tracy_path, ok);
   ```  
   Additional Details: The change switches from println! to info! macro, which is typically routed through proper logging channels. While not a direct security vulnerability, println! could potentially leak sensitive information to stdout in production environments.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   Information Leakage via Debug Logging [gfx/wr/webrender/src/renderer/mod.rs] [Lines 1334-1337]  
   Old Code:  
   ```rust
   println!("Warning: asking to enable_gpu_markers but no supporting extension was found");
   ```  
   Fixed Code:  
   ```rust
   warn!("asking to enable_gpu_markers but no supporting extension was found");
   ```  
   Additional Details: Similar to the first case, this changes debug output from println! to warn! macro. While not a direct security vulnerability, it improves the handling of diagnostic messages by using proper logging levels.

Note: Neither change appears to address a specific named vulnerability, but both improve security hygiene by moving from direct stdout printing to proper logging mechanisms, which helps prevent potential information leakage in production environments.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.equal.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.equal.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,15 +27,15 @@ g.addColorStop(1, '#f00'); ctx.fillStyle = g; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found. The changes appear to be a variable rename from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and corresponding updates to assertions. This is likely a code style/consistency improvement rather than a security fix.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security-related changes detected in the gradient creation or pixel assertion logic. The changes are purely variable naming and don't affect the security properties of the code.

3. Vulnerability Existed: no
   The color handling (using '#0f0' and '#f00') remains unchanged and doesn't present any security concerns. The gradient creation and filling operations are standard Canvas API usage.

The diff shows no evidence of security vulnerabilities being fixed - it appears to be a simple refactoring for consistency in variable naming. All functional aspects of the test remain identical, just using a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.shape.4.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.shape.4.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -23,11 +23,11 @@ ctx.beginPath(); ctx.arc(-50, 50, 100, 0, -Math.PI/2, true); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
The changes in the diff appear to be purely variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating all corresponding references. There are no security-related changes or vulnerabilities being fixed in this diff.

The modifications are:
- Changed variable name `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` in initialization
- Updated all `_assertPixel` calls to use the new variable name
- No changes to the actual canvas operations or security-sensitive operations

This appears to be a code style/readability improvement rather than a security fix. The canvas operations and assertions remain functionally identical, just using a different variable name.

No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.invalidtype.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.invalidtype.html@@ -17,15 +17,15 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillStyle = null; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring (variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and corresponding updates to references). Here's the analysis following your format:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.invalidtype.html] [Lines 17-25]
    [Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");]
    [Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");]

The changes don't appear to address any security issues but rather improve code consistency or readability. No vulnerability names are applicable here as no security-related fixes were made.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.baseline.middle.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.baseline.middle.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var f = new FontFace("CanvasTest", "url('/fonts/CanvasTest.ttf')"); let fonts = (self.fonts ? self.fonts : document.fonts);@@ -27,12 +27,12 @@     ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';     ctx.textBaseline = 'middle';     ctx.fillText('CC', 0, 25);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 5,5, 0,255,0,255, "5,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 95,5, 0,255,0,255, "95,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 5,45, 0,255,0,255, "5,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 95,45, 0,255,0,255, "95,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 5,5, 0,255,0,255, "5,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 95,5, 0,255,0,255, "95,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 5,45, 0,255,0,255, "5,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 95,45, 0,255,0,255, "95,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);   }).then(t_pass, t_fail); });

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 13-14, 27-32]  
   Old Code:  
   ```javascript
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   // ...
   _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 5,5, 0,255,0,255, "5,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);
   // ...
   ```  
   Fixed Code:  
   ```javascript
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   // ...
   _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 5,5, 0,255,0,255, "5,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);
   // ...
   ```  
   Additional Details: This appears to be a simple variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability. No security implications are evident in this change.

The diff shows only variable name changes with no apparent security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.object.compare.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.object.compare.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var g1 = ctx.createLinearGradient(0, 0, 100, 0); var g2 = ctx.createLinearGradient(0, 0, 100, 0);

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis following the required format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.object.compare.worker.js] [Lines 13-14]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be a simple variable name refactoring from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security-related changes or vulnerabilities are evident in this diff
- The modification doesn't affect the functionality or security of the code
- This is likely a code style/readability improvement rather than a security fix

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.animated.poster.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.animated.poster.worker.js@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var promise = new Promise(function(resolve, reject) {     var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ promise.then(function(response) {     createImageBitmap(response).then(bitmap => {         ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 0, 0);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 14-15, 29]
    Old Code:
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    Fixed Code:
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

    Additional Details:
    This appears to be a simple variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or clarity. No security implications are evident in this change.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Variable Reference Update [File] [Line 29]
    Old Code:
    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
    Fixed Code:
    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);

    Additional Details:
    This change simply updates the variable reference to match the renamed variable from the previous change. No security implications are present.

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature, with no identifiable security vulnerabilities being addressed. The modifications maintain identical functionality while improving code consistency through variable renaming.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.measure.width.space.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.measure.width.space.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var f = new FontFace("CanvasTest", "url('/fonts/CanvasTest.ttf')"); let fonts = (self.fonts ? self.fonts : document.fonts);

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Variable Naming Change] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.measure.width.space.html] [Lines 17-18]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

The change appears to be purely a variable naming change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. There are no security implications in this change, and no known vulnerability is being addressed. This is likely a code style or consistency improvement rather than a security fix.

No other vulnerabilities or changes were detected in the provided diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/themes/osx/global/menu.css+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/themes/osx/global/menu.css@@ -146,14 +146,12 @@ /* checked menuitems */-:not(menulist) > menupopup > menuitem[checked="true"],-:not(menulist) > menupopup > menuitem[selected="true"] {+:not(menulist) > menupopup > menuitem:is([checked="true"], [selected="true"]) {   appearance: auto;   -moz-default-appearance: checkmenuitem; }-menulist > menupopup > menuitem[checked="true"]::before,-menulist > menupopup > menuitem[selected="true"]::before {+menulist > menupopup > menuitem:is([checked="true"], [selected="true"])::before {   content: '\2713'; /* a checkmark */   display: inline-block;   vertical-align: middle;

Based on the provided CSS diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely stylistic/refactoring improvements to the CSS selectors. Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    [No security vulnerability found] [toolkit/themes/osx/global/menu.css] [Lines 146-154]
    [Old Code]
    :not(menulist) > menupopup > menuitem[checked="true"],
    :not(menulist) > menupopup > menuitem[selected="true"] {
    appearance: auto;
    -moz-default-appearance: checkmenuitem;
    }

    menulist > menupopup > menuitem[checked="true"]::before,
    menulist > menupopup > menuitem[selected="true"]::before {
    [Fixed Code]
    :not(menulist) > menupopup > menuitem:is([checked="true"], [selected="true"]) {
    appearance: auto;
    -moz-default-appearance: checkmenuitem;
    }

    menulist > menupopup > menuitem:is([checked="true"], [selected="true"])::before {

The changes simply:
1. Combine multiple attribute selectors into one using the :is() pseudo-class
2. Maintain the exact same functionality but with more concise syntax
3. Don't affect any security-related properties or behaviors

No known CSS-related vulnerabilities (like XSS or injection issues) are being addressed here. The modification is purely a code quality improvement.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/src/usage/lifetimes.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/src/usage/lifetimes.rs@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ use fnv::FnvHashSet; use syn::punctuated::Punctuated;-use syn::{self, Lifetime, Type};--use usage::Options;+use syn::{Lifetime, Type};++use crate::usage::Options; /// A set of lifetimes. pub type LifetimeSet = FnvHashSet<Lifetime>;@@ -176,8 +176,8 @@             Type::ImplTrait(ref v) => v.uses_lifetimes(options, lifetimes),             Type::Macro(_) | Type::Verbatim(_) | Type::Infer(_) | Type::Never(_) => {                 Default::default()-            },-            _ => panic!("Unknown syn::Type: {:?}", self)+            }+            _ => panic!("Unknown syn::Type: {:?}", self),         }     } }@@ -282,11 +282,11 @@ #[cfg(test)] mod tests {     use proc_macro2::Span;-    use syn::{self, DeriveInput};+    use syn::DeriveInput;     use super::UsesLifetimes;-    use usage::GenericsExt;-    use usage::Purpose::*;+    use crate::usage::GenericsExt;+    use crate::usage::Purpose::*;     #[test]     fn struct_named() {

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found in this diff. The changes appear to be primarily code style improvements and import path updates (changing from `use usage::Options` to `use crate::usage::Options` and similar for other imports). The panic message remains the same, just with formatting changes.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   The diff shows changes in error handling formatting (moving the comma outside the string in the panic message), but this doesn't represent a security vulnerability fix. The behavior remains identical, just with different code style.

3. Vulnerability Existed: no
   The changes in test imports (from `use syn::{self, DeriveInput}` to `use syn::DeriveInput`) are purely stylistic and don't affect security.

The diff primarily shows:
- Import path updates (changing to `crate::` style)
- Code formatting improvements (consistent comma placement)
- Removal of unused imports (`syn::self`)
- No functional changes to the panic behavior or other security-relevant code

No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff, and all changes appear to be maintenance-related rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.norepeat.coord2.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.norepeat.coord2.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var promise = new Promise(function(resolve, reject) {     var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();@@ -35,10 +35,10 @@         ctx.fillStyle = pattern;         ctx.translate(50, 0);         ctx.fillRect(-50, 0, 100, 50);-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to the assertions. There are no security-related patterns or fixes evident in this diff.

Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.norepeat.coord2.worker.js] [Lines 13-35]
[Old Code: Used variable name 'offscreenCanvas']
[Fixed Code: Changed variable name to 'canvas']

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains identical, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/base/content/browser-fullScreenAndPointerLock.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/base/content/browser-fullScreenAndPointerLock.js@@ -870,24 +870,11 @@     for (let el of document.querySelectorAll(       "toolbar[fullscreentoolbar=true]"     )) {+      // Set the inFullscreen attribute to allow specific styling+      // in fullscreen mode       if (aEnterFS) {-        // Give the main nav bar and the tab bar the fullscreen context menu,-        // otherwise remove context menu to prevent breakage-        el.setAttribute("saved-context", el.getAttribute("context"));-        if (el.id == "nav-bar" || el.id == "TabsToolbar") {-          el.setAttribute("context", "autohide-context");-        } else {-          el.removeAttribute("context");-        }--        // Set the inFullscreen attribute to allow specific styling-        // in fullscreen mode         el.setAttribute("inFullscreen", true);       } else {-        if (el.hasAttribute("saved-context")) {-          el.setAttribute("context", el.getAttribute("saved-context"));-          el.removeAttribute("saved-context");-        }         el.removeAttribute("inFullscreen");       }     }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Context Menu Manipulation] [browser/base/content/browser-fullScreenAndPointerLock.js] [Lines 870-881]
[Old Code]
if (aEnterFS) {
  // Give the main nav bar and the tab bar the fullscreen context menu,
  // otherwise remove context menu to prevent breakage
  el.setAttribute("saved-context", el.getAttribute("context"));
  if (el.id == "nav-bar" || el.id == "TabsToolbar") {
    el.setAttribute("context", "autohide-context");
  } else {
    el.removeAttribute("context");
  }
  el.setAttribute("inFullscreen", true);
} else {
  if (el.hasAttribute("saved-context")) {
    el.setAttribute("context", el.getAttribute("saved-context"));
    el.removeAttribute("saved-context");
  }
  el.removeAttribute("inFullscreen");
}
[Fixed Code]
if (aEnterFS) {
  el.setAttribute("inFullscreen", true);
} else {
  el.removeAttribute("inFullscreen");
}

Additional Details:
The removed code was handling context menu attributes for toolbar elements during fullscreen transitions. While not clearly a security vulnerability, removing context menu manipulation could potentially address:
1. A possible XSS vector if context attributes weren't properly sanitized
2. A potential UI spoofing issue if context menus could be manipulated
3. A possible privilege escalation if context menus could be modified to expose privileged actions

However, without more context about why this code was removed, I can't definitively identify a specific vulnerability. The change simplifies the fullscreen behavior by only managing the 'inFullscreen' attribute.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.