Shared security patch analysis results
AI Used: DEEPSEEK deepseek-chat--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/widget/gtk/nsDragService.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/widget/gtk/nsDragService.h@@ -16,12 +16,6 @@ class nsICookieJarSettings; class nsWindow;--#ifdef MOZ_WAYLAND-class DataOffer;-#else-typedef nsISupports DataOffer;-#endif namespace mozilla { namespace gfx {@@ -80,12 +74,10 @@ guint aInfo, guint32 aTime); gboolean ScheduleMotionEvent(nsWindow* aWindow, GdkDragContext* aDragContext,- RefPtr<DataOffer> aPendingWaylandDataOffer, mozilla::LayoutDeviceIntPoint aWindowPoint, guint aTime); void ScheduleLeaveEvent(); gboolean ScheduleDropEvent(nsWindow* aWindow, GdkDragContext* aDragContext,- RefPtr<DataOffer> aPendingWaylandDataOffer, mozilla::LayoutDeviceIntPoint aWindowPoint, guint aTime);@@ -153,9 +145,6 @@ // any D&D operation. uintptr_t mCachedDragContext;-#ifdef MOZ_WAYLAND- RefPtr<DataOffer> mPendingWaylandDataOffer;-#endif guint mPendingTime; // mTargetWindow and mTargetWindowPoint record the position of the last@@ -167,9 +156,6 @@ // motion or drop events. mTime records the corresponding timestamp. RefPtr<GtkWidget> mTargetWidget; RefPtr<GdkDragContext> mTargetDragContext;-#ifdef MOZ_WAYLAND- RefPtr<DataOffer> mTargetWaylandDataOffer;-#endif // When we route D'n'D request to child process // (by EventStateManager::DispatchCrossProcessEvent)@@ -180,9 +166,6 @@ // We need to store GdkDragContext because mTargetDragContext is cleared // after every D'n'D event. RefPtr<GdkDragContext> mTargetDragContextForRemote;-#ifdef MOZ_WAYLAND- RefPtr<DataOffer> mTargetWaylandDataOfferForRemote;-#endif guint mTargetTime; // is it OK to drop on us?@@ -222,7 +205,6 @@ gboolean Schedule(DragTask aTask, nsWindow* aWindow, GdkDragContext* aDragContext,- RefPtr<DataOffer> aPendingWaylandDataOffer, mozilla::LayoutDeviceIntPoint aWindowPoint, guint aTime); // Callback for g_idle_add_full() to run mScheduledTask.@@ -231,9 +213,6 @@ void UpdateDragAction(); MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void DispatchMotionEvents(); void ReplyToDragMotion(GdkDragContext* aDragContext);-#ifdef MOZ_WAYLAND- void ReplyToDragMotion(RefPtr<DataOffer> aDragContext);-#endif #ifdef MOZ_LOGGING const char* GetDragServiceTaskName(nsDragService::DragTask aTask); #endif
Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Code Cleanup/Refactoring] [widget/gtk/nsDragService.h] [Lines 16-21, 80-82, 153-155, 167-169, 180-182, 222-224, 231-233]
[Old Code]
```cpp
#ifdef MOZ_WAYLAND
class DataOffer;
#else
typedef nsISupports DataOffer;
#endif
...
gboolean ScheduleMotionEvent(nsWindow* aWindow, GdkDragContext* aDragContext,
RefPtr<DataOffer> aPendingWaylandDataOffer,
mozilla::LayoutDeviceIntPoint aWindowPoint,
guint aTime);
...
#ifdef MOZ_WAYLAND
RefPtr<DataOffer> mPendingWaylandDataOffer;
#endif
...
#ifdef MOZ_WAYLAND
RefPtr<DataOffer> mTargetWaylandDataOffer;
#endif
...
#ifdef MOZ_WAYLAND
RefPtr<DataOffer> mTargetWaylandDataOfferForRemote;
#endif
...
gboolean Schedule(DragTask aTask, nsWindow* aWindow,
GdkDragContext* aDragContext,
RefPtr<DataOffer> aPendingWaylandDataOffer,
mozilla::LayoutDeviceIntPoint aWindowPoint, guint aTime);
...
#ifdef MOZ_WAYLAND
void ReplyToDragMotion(RefPtr<DataOffer> aDragContext);
#endif
```
[Fixed Code]
[All above code blocks removed]
Additional Details:
The changes appear to be removing Wayland-specific DataOffer related code. While this doesn't show a clear security vulnerability, removing unused code can reduce attack surface. The impact is unclear without more context about why these were removed.
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Parameter Removal] [widget/gtk/nsDragService.h] [Lines 80-82, 222-224]
[Old Code]
```cpp
gboolean ScheduleMotionEvent(nsWindow* aWindow, GdkDragContext* aDragContext,
RefPtr<DataOffer> aPendingWaylandDataOffer,
mozilla::LayoutDeviceIntPoint aWindowPoint,
guint aTime);
...
gboolean Schedule(DragTask aTask, nsWindow* aWindow,
GdkDragContext* aDragContext,
RefPtr<DataOffer> aPendingWaylandDataOffer,
mozilla::LayoutDeviceIntPoint aWindowPoint, guint aTime);
```
[Fixed Code]
```cpp
gboolean ScheduleMotionEvent(nsWindow* aWindow, GdkDragContext* aDragContext,
mozilla::LayoutDeviceIntPoint aWindowPoint,
guint aTime);
...
gboolean Schedule(DragTask aTask, nsWindow* aWindow,
GdkDragContext* aDragContext,
mozilla::LayoutDeviceIntPoint aWindowPoint, guint aTime);
```
Additional Details:
The removal of the DataOffer parameter from these functions could indicate a security-related change if the parameter was previously used in an unsafe way, but without more context this is uncertain. The change appears to be part of a larger refactoring to remove Wayland-specific code paths.
Note: The diff shows significant removal of Wayland-specific code, but without more context about the security implications of the DataOffer class or its usage, it's difficult to determine if this was fixing a specific vulnerability or just general code cleanup. The changes could potentially relate to drag-and-drop security improvements, but no specific vulnerability is evident from the diff alone.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.winding.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.winding.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -29,10 +29,10 @@ ctx.rect(0, 25, 100, -25); ctx.rect(100, 25, -100, 25); ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,12, 0,255,0,255, "25,12", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,12, 0,255,0,255, "75,12", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,37, 0,255,0,255, "25,37", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,37, 0,255,0,255, "75,37", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,12, 0,255,0,255, "25,12", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,12, 0,255,0,255, "75,12", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,37, 0,255,0,255, "25,37", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,37, 0,255,0,255, "75,37", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating the corresponding references. Here's the analysis following your requested format:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found
File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.winding.html
Lines: 17-29
Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found
File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.winding.html
Lines: 29-33
Old Code: _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,12, 0,255,0,255, "25,12", "0,255,0,255"); etc.
Fixed Code: _assertPixel(canvas, 25,12, 0,255,0,255, "25,12", "0,255,0,255"); etc.
The changes are purely variable name refactoring with no security implications. No actual functionality or security-related behavior was modified.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-conditional/at-supports-012.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-conditional/at-supports-012.html@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ <link rel="author" href="http://opera.com" title="Opera Software ASA"> <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-conditional/#at-supports"> <link rel="match" href="at-supports-001-ref.html">- <meta name="flags" content=""> <style> div { background-color:red;
Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 6] [Old Code] `<meta name="flags" content="">` [Fixed Code] (line removed) Additional Details: - The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag with "flags" attribute. This doesn't appear to be a security fix but rather a cleanup of unnecessary markup. - No known vulnerabilities are associated with this change. - The modification appears to be part of general code maintenance rather than addressing a specific security issue.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/ellipse/shape-outside-ellipse-037.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/ellipse/shape-outside-ellipse-037.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/"> <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#supported-basic-shapes"> <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-ellipse-037-ref.html">- <meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="Test the boxes are wrapping around the left float shape defined by the basic shape ellipse(closest-side farthest-side at left 40px top 60px) border-box"> <style> .container {
Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities: Vulnerability Existed: no No Vulnerability Found [File] [Lines 9] [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content=""> [Fixed Code] (Line removed) Additional Details: - This appears to be a simple removal of an empty meta tag that wasn't serving any purpose - The change doesn't relate to any security vulnerability - The "flags" meta tag was likely used for test configuration but is no longer needed - No security implications are apparent from this change No other changes were present in the diff to analyze for vulnerabilities.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/vk/macros.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/vk/macros.rs@@ -1,23 +1,19 @@ #[macro_export] macro_rules! vk_bitflags_wrapped {- ($ name : ident , $ all : expr , $ flag_type : ty) => {+ ($ name : ident , $ flag_type : ty) => { impl Default for $name {- fn default() -> $name {- $name(0)+ fn default() -> Self {+ Self(0) } } impl $name { #[inline]- pub const fn empty() -> $name {- $name(0)- }- #[inline]- pub const fn all() -> $name {- $name($all)+ pub const fn empty() -> Self {+ Self(0) } #[inline] pub const fn from_raw(x: $flag_type) -> Self {- $name(x)+ Self(x) } #[inline] pub const fn as_raw(self) -> $flag_type {@@ -25,79 +21,62 @@ } #[inline] pub fn is_empty(self) -> bool {- self == $name::empty()+ self == Self::empty() } #[inline]- pub fn is_all(self) -> bool {- self & $name::all() == $name::all()- }- #[inline]- pub fn intersects(self, other: $name) -> bool {- self & other != $name::empty()+ pub fn intersects(self, other: Self) -> bool {+ self & other != Self::empty() } #[doc = r" Returns whether `other` is a subset of `self`"] #[inline]- pub fn contains(self, other: $name) -> bool {+ pub fn contains(self, other: Self) -> bool { self & other == other } } impl ::std::ops::BitOr for $name {- type Output = $name;+ type Output = Self; #[inline]- fn bitor(self, rhs: $name) -> $name {- $name(self.0 | rhs.0)+ fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self {+ Self(self.0 | rhs.0) } } impl ::std::ops::BitOrAssign for $name { #[inline]- fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: $name) {+ fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { *self = *self | rhs } } impl ::std::ops::BitAnd for $name {- type Output = $name;+ type Output = Self; #[inline]- fn bitand(self, rhs: $name) -> $name {- $name(self.0 & rhs.0)+ fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self {+ Self(self.0 & rhs.0) } } impl ::std::ops::BitAndAssign for $name { #[inline]- fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: $name) {+ fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { *self = *self & rhs } } impl ::std::ops::BitXor for $name {- type Output = $name;+ type Output = Self; #[inline]- fn bitxor(self, rhs: $name) -> $name {- $name(self.0 ^ rhs.0)+ fn bitxor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self {+ Self(self.0 ^ rhs.0) } } impl ::std::ops::BitXorAssign for $name { #[inline]- fn bitxor_assign(&mut self, rhs: $name) {+ fn bitxor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { *self = *self ^ rhs } }- impl ::std::ops::Sub for $name {- type Output = $name;+ impl ::std::ops::Not for $name {+ type Output = Self; #[inline]- fn sub(self, rhs: $name) -> $name {- self & !rhs- }- }- impl ::std::ops::SubAssign for $name {- #[inline]- fn sub_assign(&mut self, rhs: $name) {- *self = *self - rhs- }- }- impl ::std::ops::Not for $name {- type Output = $name;- #[inline]- fn not(self) -> $name {- self ^ $name::all()+ fn not(self) -> Self {+ Self(!self.0) } } };@@ -118,12 +97,12 @@ self.0 as u64 } fn from_raw(x: u64) -> Self {- $name(x as _)+ Self(x as _) } } impl $name {- pub const fn null() -> $name {- $name(0)+ pub const fn null() -> Self {+ Self(0) } } impl fmt::Pointer for $name {@@ -149,8 +128,8 @@ #[$doc_link] pub struct $name(*mut u8); impl Default for $name {- fn default() -> $name {- $name::null()+ fn default() -> Self {+ Self::null() } } impl Handle for $name {@@ -159,14 +138,14 @@ self.0 as u64 } fn from_raw(x: u64) -> Self {- $name(x as _)+ Self(x as _) } } unsafe impl Send for $name {} unsafe impl Sync for $name {} impl $name { pub const fn null() -> Self {- $name(::std::ptr::null_mut())+ Self(::std::ptr::null_mut()) } } impl fmt::Pointer for $name {
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Type Confusion Vulnerability [third_party/rust/ash/src/vk/macros.rs] [Lines modified throughout]
[Old Code] Various implementations using `$name` directly
[Fixed Code] Changed to use `Self` type consistently
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Bit Manipulation Vulnerability [third_party/rust/ash/src/vk/macros.rs] [Lines 72-80]
[Old Code] `fn not(self) -> $name { self ^ $name::all() }`
[Fixed Code] `fn not(self) -> Self { Self(!self.0) }`
3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Pointer Handling Vulnerability [third_party/rust/ash/src/vk/macros.rs] [Lines 97-128]
[Old Code] Various pointer-related implementations using `$name`
[Fixed Code] Changed to use `Self` type consistently in pointer handling
The changes primarily involve:
1. Removing the `all()` functionality and related operations
2. Changing from explicit `$name` to `Self` type throughout
3. Modifying the `not()` implementation to use direct bitwise negation
4. Consistently using `Self` in pointer-related code
While these changes improve type safety and consistency, I cannot definitively identify specific security vulnerabilities that were fixed. The modifications appear to be more about code quality and maintainability rather than addressing known security issues. The switch to `Self` might prevent potential type confusion issues, and the changed `not()` implementation might be more correct for the intended use cases, but without more context about how this code is used, I can't confirm actual vulnerabilities.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.angle.2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.angle.2.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ctx.moveTo(100, 0); ctx.arc(100, 0, 150, -3*Math.PI/2, -Math.PI, true); ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where a variable name was changed from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability purposes.
Here's the structured response:
Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.angle.2.html] [Lines 17-18, 27]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
The changes don't affect any security-related functionality and maintain the same behavior with just a variable name change. No security vulnerabilities were introduced or fixed in this diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/examples/halmark/main.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/examples/halmark/main.rs@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@+//! This example shows basic usage of wgpu-hal by rendering+//! a ton of moving sprites, each with a separate texture and draw call. extern crate wgpu_hal as hal; use hal::{@@ -11,6 +13,7 @@ const GRAVITY: f32 = -9.8 * 100.0; const MAX_VELOCITY: f32 = 750.0; const COMMAND_BUFFER_PER_CONTEXT: usize = 100;+const DESIRED_FRAMES: u32 = 3; #[repr(C)] #[derive(Clone, Copy)]@@ -96,12 +99,12 @@ return Err(hal::InstanceError); } let exposed = adapters.swap_remove(0);- println!(- "Surface caps: {:?}",- exposed.adapter.surface_capabilities(&surface)- ); (exposed.adapter, exposed.capabilities) };+ let surface_caps =+ unsafe { adapter.surface_capabilities(&surface) }.ok_or(hal::InstanceError)?;+ log::info!("Surface caps: {:#?}", surface_caps);+ let hal::OpenDevice { device, mut queue } = unsafe { adapter .open(wgt::Features::empty(), &wgt::Limits::default())@@ -110,7 +113,9 @@ let window_size: (u32, u32) = window.inner_size().into(); let surface_config = hal::SurfaceConfiguration {- swap_chain_size: 3,+ swap_chain_size: DESIRED_FRAMES+ .max(*surface_caps.swap_chain_sizes.start())+ .min(*surface_caps.swap_chain_sizes.end()), present_mode: wgt::PresentMode::Fifo, composite_alpha_mode: hal::CompositeAlphaMode::Opaque, format: wgt::TextureFormat::Bgra8UnormSrgb,
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Leak] [third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/examples/halmark/main.rs] [Lines 96-99]
[Old Code]
println!(
"Surface caps: {:?}",
exposed.adapter.surface_capabilities(&surface)
);
[Fixed Code]
let surface_caps =
unsafe { adapter.surface_capabilities(&surface) }.ok_or(hal::InstanceError)?;
log::info!("Surface caps: {:#?}", surface_caps);
[Additional Details]
The change replaces println! with log::info!, which is generally better for production code but doesn't necessarily indicate a security fix. However, printing sensitive surface capabilities to stdout could potentially leak system information in some contexts.
2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
[Unsafe Surface Capabilities Access] [third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/examples/halmark/main.rs] [Lines 96-99]
[Old Code]
println!(
"Surface caps: {:?}",
exposed.adapter.surface_capabilities(&surface)
);
[Fixed Code]
let surface_caps =
unsafe { adapter.surface_capabilities(&surface) }.ok_or(hal::InstanceError)?;
log::info!("Surface caps: {:#?}", surface_caps);
[Additional Details]
The fix properly handles the unsafe surface capabilities access by using proper error handling (ok_or) and marking the unsafe block explicitly. The old code might have silently failed or caused undefined behavior.
3. Vulnerability Existed: yes
[Potential Integer Overflow/Underflow] [third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/examples/halmark/main.rs] [Lines 110-112]
[Old Code]
swap_chain_size: 3,
[Fixed Code]
swap_chain_size: DESIRED_FRAMES
.max(*surface_caps.swap_chain_sizes.start())
.min(*surface_caps.swap_chain_sizes.end()),
[Additional Details]
The fix properly bounds the swap chain size between minimum and maximum supported values, preventing potential integer overflow/underflow or unsupported values that could lead to undefined behavior or crashes. The hardcoded value of 3 might have been unsafe on some systems.
Note: While these changes improve safety and robustness, some might not be strictly security vulnerabilities but rather general safety improvements. The most clear security-related improvement is the proper handling of the unsafe surface capabilities access.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/pocket/content/panels/signup.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/pocket/content/panels/signup.html@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ <body class="pkt_ext_containersignup" aria-live="polite"> <script src="js/vendor/handlebars.runtime.js"></script> <script src="js/tmpl.js"></script>+ <script src="js/vendor.bundle.js"></script> <script src="js/main.bundle.js"></script> <script src="js/signup/entry.js"></script> </body>
Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis: Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Missing Resource Integrity Check] [browser/components/pocket/content/panels/signup.html] [Lines 13-16] [Old Code] ```html <script src="js/vendor/handlebars.runtime.js"></script> <script src="js/tmpl.js"></script> <script src="js/main.bundle.js"></script> <script src="js/signup/entry.js"></script> ``` [Fixed Code] ```html <script src="js/vendor/handlebars.runtime.js"></script> <script src="js/tmpl.js"></script> <script src="js/vendor.bundle.js"></script> <script src="js/main.bundle.js"></script> <script src="js/signup/entry.js"></script> ``` Additional Details: 1. The diff shows an added script (`vendor.bundle.js`) but no security-related changes. 2. While not directly shown as a vulnerability, the lack of integrity attributes on script tags could potentially allow for script injection if the files are compromised (Subresource Integrity vulnerability). However, since this wasn't changed in the diff, it's marked as "not sure". 3. No other obvious security vulnerabilities are visible in this diff. The change appears to be simply adding a new JavaScript file to the page.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/screen-orientation/onchange-event-subframe.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/screen-orientation/onchange-event-subframe.html@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ <!DOCTYPE html> <script src="/resources/testharness.js"></script> <script src="/resources/testharnessreport.js"></script>+<script src="/resources/testdriver.js"></script>+<script src="/resources/testdriver-vendor.js"></script> <iframe id="testIframe"
Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities: Vulnerability Existed: no [No specific vulnerability] [testing/web-platform/tests/screen-orientation/onchange-event-subframe.html] [Lines added] [Old Code: Just testharness.js and testharnessreport.js included] [Fixed Code: Added testdriver.js and testdriver-vendor.js] Additional details: - This appears to be a test file modification where additional testing resources were added - The change doesn't show any security fixes, just additional test functionality - No actual vulnerability is being fixed here, just test infrastructure improvement The diff shows only the addition of two more test script files, which suggests this is part of test suite enhancement rather than a security fix. There are no visible security-related changes in this diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/compositing/mix-blend-mode/mix-blend-mode-blended-with-3D-transform.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/compositing/mix-blend-mode/mix-blend-mode-blended-with-3D-transform.html@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Ion Roșca" href="mailto:[email protected]"> <link rel="reviewer" title="Mihai Țică" href="mailto:[email protected]"> <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.fxtf.org/compositing-1/#mix-blend-mode">- <meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="Test checks that the element with mix-blend-mode and 3D transform blends correctly with its parent"> <link rel="match" href="reference/mix-blend-mode-blended-with-3D-transform-ref.html"> <style type="text/css">
Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis: Vulnerability Existed: no [No specific vulnerability] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/compositing/mix-blend-mode/mix-blend-mode-blended-with-3D-transform.html] [Lines 7] [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content=""> [Fixed Code] [Removed line] Additional Details: 1. This appears to be a simple test file modification where an empty meta tag for "flags" was removed. 2. There's no security vulnerability being fixed here - it's just cleanup of test metadata. 3. The change doesn't affect any security-related functionality or introduce/remove any security controls. 4. The modification is part of test infrastructure rather than production code. The change is purely cosmetic/structural and doesn't represent a security fix. The "flags" meta tag was likely used for test configuration but was empty and therefore removed as unnecessary.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.clip.basic.1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.clip.basic.1.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ctx.clip(); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-related modifications. Here's the analysis following your requested format:
Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.clip.basic.1.html] [Lines 17-27]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
The changes are simply renaming the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` throughout the test file, which doesn't have any security implications. The functionality remains exactly the same.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-text-indent-1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-text-indent-1.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="L. David Baron" href="https://dbaron.org/"> <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-values/#calc-notation"> <link rel="match" href="calc-text-indent-1-ref.html">- <meta name="flags" content=""> <style type="text/css"> body { width: 500px }
Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-text-indent-1.html [Lines] 5 [Old Code] `<meta name="flags" content="">` [Fixed Code] (line removed) Additional Details: - The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which doesn't appear to be related to any security vulnerability. - This seems to be a minor cleanup or test configuration change rather than a security fix. - No known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in this change. No other vulnerabilities detected in the provided diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/python/mach/mach/main.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/python/mach/mach/main.py@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ import traceback import uuid from collections.abc import Iterable-from typing import Union, List+from typing import Union, Dict, List from pathlib import Path from .base import (@@ -174,6 +174,18 @@ setattr(object.__getattribute__(self, "_context"), key, value)+class MachCommandReference:+ """A reference to a mach command.++ Holds the metadata for a mach command.+ """++ module: Path++ def __init__(self, module: Union[str, Path]):+ self.module = Path(module)++ class Mach(object): """Main mach driver type.@@ -269,6 +281,22 @@ raise raise MissingFileError(f"{path} does not exist")++ def load_commands_from_spec(+ self, spec: Dict[str, MachCommandReference], topsrcdir: str, missing_ok=False+ ):+ """Load mach commands based on the given spec.++ Takes a dictionary mapping command names to their metadata.+ """+ modules = set(spec[command].module for command in spec)++ for path in modules:+ try:+ self.load_commands_from_file(topsrcdir / path)+ except MissingFileError:+ if not missing_ok:+ raise def load_commands_from_entry_point(self, group="mach.providers"): """Scan installed packages for mach command provider entry points. An
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability was identified in this diff. The changes appear to be functional improvements rather than security fixes. The main changes are: - Added Dict to typing imports - Added a new MachCommandReference class - Added a new load_commands_from_spec method 2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure Potential Path Traversal [File] python/mach/mach/main.py [Lines 269-281] Old Code: (none - new method) Fixed Code: The new load_commands_from_spec method handles path operations but it's unclear if there are sufficient protections against path traversal attacks. The method uses Path objects which generally provide some protection, but without seeing the full context of how paths are constructed and used, we can't be certain. 3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure Potential Module Loading Vulnerability [File] python/mach/mach/main.py [Lines 269-281] Old Code: (none - new method) Fixed Code: The new method loads Python modules dynamically based on paths. While there's a missing_ok parameter to handle missing files, it's unclear if there are sufficient checks against loading malicious modules or modules from unexpected locations. Note: The changes primarily appear to be adding new functionality rather than fixing existing vulnerabilities. The security implications would depend on how these new features are used in the broader context of the application.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.interpolate.overlap.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.interpolate.overlap.html@@ -17,10 +17,10 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-offscreenCanvas.width = 200;+canvas.width = 200; var g = ctx.createLinearGradient(0, 0, 200, 0); g.addColorStop(0, '#f00'); g.addColorStop(0, '#ff0');@@ -40,12 +40,12 @@ g.addColorStop(1, '#00f'); ctx.fillStyle = g; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 200, 50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 49,25, 0,0,255,255, "49,25", "0,0,255,255", 16);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 51,25, 255,255,0,255, "51,25", "255,255,0,255", 16);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 99,25, 0,0,255,255, "99,25", "0,0,255,255", 16);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 101,25, 255,255,0,255, "101,25", "255,255,0,255", 16);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 149,25, 0,0,255,255, "149,25", "0,0,255,255", 16);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 151,25, 255,255,0,255, "151,25", "255,255,0,255", 16);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 49,25, 0,0,255,255, "49,25", "0,0,255,255", 16);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 51,25, 255,255,0,255, "51,25", "255,255,0,255", 16);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 99,25, 0,0,255,255, "99,25", "0,0,255,255", 16);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 101,25, 255,255,0,255, "101,25", "255,255,0,255", 16);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 149,25, 0,0,255,255, "149,25", "0,0,255,255", 16);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 151,25, 255,255,0,255, "151,25", "255,255,0,255", 16); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and consistency updates. Here's the analysis:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
Variable Renaming Consistency Fix [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.interpolate.overlap.html] [Lines 17-18, 20, 40-45]
Old Code:
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
offscreenCanvas.width = 200;
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 49,25, 0,0,255,255, "49,25", "0,0,255,255", 16);
etc...
Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
canvas.width = 200;
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 49,25, 0,0,255,255, "49,25", "0,0,255,255", 16);
etc...
The changes simply rename the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` throughout the file, which doesn't appear to address any security issues but rather improves code consistency. No security-related vulnerabilities were identified in this diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-029-ref.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-029-ref.html@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ -ms-column-fill: auto; -webkit-column-fill: auto; column-fill: auto;- border: 2px dashed;+ border: 2px solid salmon; margin-bottom: 5px; }
After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment: Vulnerability Existed: no [No security vulnerability found] [layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-029-ref.html] [Lines 21] [Old Code: border: 2px dashed;] [Fixed Code: border: 2px solid salmon;] Explanation: 1. This is a purely visual/style change in a test file (reftest) 2. The change modifies the border style from dashed to solid and changes the color to salmon 3. There are no security implications in this change as it doesn't affect any security-sensitive functionality 4. The file appears to be a reference test case for CSS grid fragmentation behavior No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change appears to be purely cosmetic for testing purposes.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.collinear.2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.collinear.2.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ ctx.moveTo(100, 25); ctx.arcTo(200, 25, 110, 25, 1); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes (variable renaming) rather than security fixes. Here's the analysis:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
Variable Renaming Refactoring [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.collinear.2.html] [Lines 17-18, 33]
Old Code:
```javascript
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
```
Fixed Code:
```javascript
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
```
2. Vulnerability Existed: no
Variable Renaming Refactoring [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.collinear.2.html] [Line 33]
Old Code:
```javascript
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
```
Fixed Code:
```javascript
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
```
The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or clarity, without any security implications. No actual security vulnerabilities are being addressed in this diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.object.update.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.object.update.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var g = ctx.createLinearGradient(-100, 0, 200, 0); g.addColorStop(0, '#f00');@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ g.addColorStop(0.1, '#0f0'); g.addColorStop(0.9, '#0f0'); ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2); t.done(); });
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 17-18, 27]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
Additional Details:
- This appears to be a simple variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability
- No security vulnerabilities are addressed in this change
- The change doesn't affect any security-related functionality
- The test assertions remain the same, only the variable name is updated
No other potential vulnerabilities were identified in this diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-style-baseline-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-style-baseline-001.html@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ <meta name=assert content="contain:style does not suppress baseline alignment"> <link rel="match" href="reference/contain-baseline-ref.html"> <link rel=help href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-contain-1/#containment-style">- <meta name="flags" content=""> <style> div {
Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The change appears to be a minor cleanup of test metadata rather than a security-related fix. Here's the analysis following your requested format: Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-style-baseline-001.html] [Lines 6] [Old Code] <meta name=assert content="contain:style does not suppress baseline alignment"> <link rel="match" href="reference/contain-baseline-ref.html"> <link rel=help href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-contain-1/#containment-style"> <meta name="flags" content=""> [Fixed Code] <meta name=assert content="contain:style does not suppress baseline alignment"> <link rel="match" href="reference/contain-baseline-ref.html"> <link rel=help href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-contain-1/#containment-style"> Additional Details: The only change is the removal of an empty "flags" meta tag, which doesn't appear to have any security implications. This seems to be a minor cleanup of test metadata rather than a security fix.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/remote/doc/Debugging.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/remote/doc/Debugging.md@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Logging observer notifications -------------------------------[System observer notifications] are used extensively throughout the+Observer notifications are used extensively throughout the code and it can sometimes be useful to log these to see what is available and when they are fired.@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ output in the file service.log in your current working directory.-[preference]: ./Prefs.html+[preference]: Prefs.md [System observer notifications]: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Archive/Add-ons/Overlay_Extensions/XUL_School/Observer_Notifications [prlog.h]: https://searchfox.org/mozilla-central/source/nsprpub/pr/include/prlog.h [wiki]: https://wiki.mozilla.org/Remote/Developer_Resources
Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security-related changes. The changes appear to be documentation updates and link corrections. Here's the analysis:
1. First change:
Vulnerability Existed: no
Documentation Update [File] [Lines 29-29]
[Old Code: "[System observer notifications] are used extensively throughout the"]
[Fixed Code: "Observer notifications are used extensively throughout the"]
2. Second change:
Vulnerability Existed: no
Link Correction [File] [Lines 47-47]
[Old Code: "[preference]: ./Prefs.html"]
[Fixed Code: "[preference]: Prefs.md"]
Both changes are purely documentation-related with no security implications. The first change modifies text for clarity/accuracy, and the second updates a documentation link to use the correct file extension (.md instead of .html). Neither change addresses any security vulnerability.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit-test/tests/parser/stencil.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit-test/tests/parser/stencil.js@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@ const optionsLazy = { fileName: "compileToStencil-DATA.js", lineNumber: 1,+};++const optionsLazyCache = {+ fileName: "compileToStencil-DATA.js",+ lineNumber: 1,+ fillRuntimeCache: true, }; function testMainThread(script_str) {@@ -24,6 +30,18 @@ } const eval_f = eval; const stencil = compileAndDelazifyAllToStencil(script_str, optionsLazy);+ const result = evalStencil(stencil, optionsLazy);+ assertEq(result, eval_f(script_str));+}++function testMainThreadCacheAll(script_str) {+ if (isLcovEnabled()) {+ // Code-coverage implies forceFullParse = true, and as such it cannot be+ // used while testing to incrementally delazify.+ return;+ }+ const eval_f = eval;+ const stencil = compileAndDelazifyAllToStencil(script_str, optionsLazyCache); const result = evalStencil(stencil, optionsLazy); assertEq(result, eval_f(script_str)); }@@ -62,6 +80,22 @@ f1(); `);+testMainThreadCacheAll(`+var a3 = 10;+let b3 = 20, c3 = 30;+const d3 = 40;+function g3() {+ function h3() {+ return a3 + b3;+ }+ return h3() + c3;+}+function f3() {+ return a3 + b3 + c3 + d3;+}+f3();+`);+ if (helperThreadCount() > 0) { testOffThread(` var a2 = 10;
Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be adding new test functionality rather than patching security issues. Here's my analysis: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found The changes add new test cases and functionality for caching behavior in the JavaScript parser, but don't appear to address any security issues. 2. Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found The diff primarily adds: - A new `optionsLazyCache` configuration - A new test function `testMainThreadCacheAll` - Additional test cases These appear to be feature additions rather than security fixes. The changes seem focused on testing the parser's behavior with runtime caching enabled (`fillRuntimeCache: true`), which is a functional enhancement rather than a security patch. Without more context about specific vulnerabilities in the previous version, I can't identify any security-related fixes in this diff. The modifications follow standard testing patterns and don't show any signs of fixing: - Input validation issues - Memory safety problems - Injection vulnerabilities - Or other common security concerns Would you like me to analyze any other aspects of these changes?
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.