--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.measure.actualBoundingBox.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.measure.actualBoundingBox.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var f = new FontFace("CanvasTest", "url('/fonts/CanvasTest.ttf')"); let fonts = (self.fonts ? self.fonts : document.fonts);

Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily variable renaming and minor code restructuring. Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.measure.actualBoundingBox.html] [Lines 17-20]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

The changes made:
1. Renamed variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Updated the context retrieval to use the new variable name

These changes appear to be code style/readability improvements rather than security fixes. No security vulnerabilities are being addressed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/accessible/basetypes/Accessible.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/accessible/basetypes/Accessible.cpp@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ #include "ARIAMap.h" #include "States.h" #include "mozilla/a11y/HyperTextAccessibleBase.h"+#include "mozilla/Components.h"+#include "nsIStringBundle.h" using namespace mozilla; using namespace mozilla::a11y;@@ -248,3 +250,20 @@     *aSetSize = groupInfo->SetSize();   } }++void Accessible::TranslateString(const nsString& aKey, nsAString& aStringOut) {+  nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundleService> stringBundleService =+      components::StringBundle::Service();+  if (!stringBundleService) return;++  nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundle> stringBundle;+  stringBundleService->CreateBundle(+      "chrome://global-platform/locale/accessible.properties",+      getter_AddRefs(stringBundle));+  if (!stringBundle) return;++  nsAutoString xsValue;+  nsresult rv = stringBundle->GetStringFromName(+      NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aKey).get(), xsValue);+  if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) aStringOut.Assign(xsValue);+}

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Resource Access Issue] [accessible/basetypes/Accessible.cpp] [Lines 248-250 added]
[Old Code]
(No previous implementation of TranslateString function)
[Fixed Code]
void Accessible::TranslateString(const nsString& aKey, nsAString& aStringOut) {
  nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundleService> stringBundleService =
      components::StringBundle::Service();
  if (!stringBundleService) return;

  nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundle> stringBundle;
  stringBundleService->CreateBundle(
      "chrome://global-platform/locale/accessible.properties",
      getter_AddRefs(stringBundle));
  if (!stringBundle) return;

  nsAutoString xsValue;
  nsresult rv = stringBundle->GetStringFromName(
      NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aKey).get(), xsValue);
  if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) aStringOut.Assign(xsValue);
}

Additional Details:
1. The diff adds a new string translation function that loads resources from a chrome:// URI. While not clearly a vulnerability, there could be potential security implications around:
   - The resource loading mechanism
   - The string bundle service initialization
   - The string conversion operations
2. The change includes new includes for mozilla/Components.h and nsIStringBundle.h, suggesting new dependencies that might have security implications.
3. Without more context about how this function will be used, it's difficult to determine if there are actual vulnerabilities, but the addition of resource loading code always warrants security review.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.repeat.nullsuffix.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.repeat.nullsuffix.worker.js@@ -13,10 +13,10 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-assert_throws_dom("SYNTAX_ERR", function() { ctx.createPattern(offscreenCanvas, "repeat\0"); });+assert_throws_dom("SYNTAX_ERR", function() { ctx.createPattern(canvas, "repeat\0"); }); t.done(); });

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Null Byte Injection] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.repeat.nullsuffix.worker.js] [Lines 13-17]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    assert_throws_dom("SYNTAX_ERR", function() { ctx.createPattern(offscreenCanvas, "repeat\0"); });
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    assert_throws_dom("SYNTAX_ERR", function() { ctx.createPattern(canvas, "repeat\0"); });

Notes:
- The main change is a variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- The test appears to be checking for proper handling of null bytes in pattern repetition strings ("repeat\0")
- While this might relate to null byte injection prevention, the change itself doesn't appear to fix a vulnerability - it's just a variable renaming
- The test continues to check for proper error handling of null bytes in pattern strings, suggesting this was a security consideration in the API design

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit/GenerateCacheIRFiles.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit/GenerateCacheIRFiles.py@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@     "IdField": ("jsid", "writeIdField"),     "ValueField": ("const Value&", "writeValueField"),     "RawInt64Field": ("uint64_t", "writeRawInt64Field"),+    "DoubleField": ("double", "writeDoubleField"),     "AllocSiteField": ("gc::AllocSite*", "writeAllocSiteField"),     "JSOpImm": ("JSOp", "writeJSOpImm"),     "BoolImm": ("bool", "writeBoolImm"),@@ -185,6 +186,7 @@     "IdField": ("uint32_t", "Offset", "reader.stubOffset()"),     "ValueField": ("uint32_t", "Offset", "reader.stubOffset()"),     "RawInt64Field": ("uint32_t", "Offset", "reader.stubOffset()"),+    "DoubleField": ("uint32_t", "Offset", "reader.stubOffset()"),     "AllocSiteField": ("uint32_t", "Offset", "reader.stubOffset()"),     "JSOpImm": ("JSOp", "", "reader.jsop()"),     "BoolImm": ("bool", "", "reader.readBool()"),@@ -268,6 +270,7 @@     "IdField": "spewField",     "ValueField": "spewField",     "RawInt64Field": "spewField",+    "DoubleField": "spewField",     "AllocSiteField": "spewField",     "JSOpImm": "spewJSOpImm",     "BoolImm": "spewBoolImm",@@ -400,6 +403,7 @@     "RawInt32Field": 1,     "RawPointerField": 1,     "RawInt64Field": 1,+    "DoubleField": 1,     "IdField": 1,     "ValueField": 1,     "AllocSiteField": 1,

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Missing Data Type Handling] [js/src/jit/GenerateCacheIRFiles.py] [Lines 88, 185, 268, 400]  
   [Old Code]  
   (No DoubleField in any of the sections)  
   [Fixed Code]  
   Added "DoubleField": ("double", "writeDoubleField"),  
   Added "DoubleField": ("uint32_t", "Offset", "reader.stubOffset()"),  
   Added "DoubleField": "spewField",  
   Added "DoubleField": 1,  

Additional Details:  
The diff shows the addition of DoubleField handling across multiple sections of the file. While this doesn't directly indicate a security vulnerability, it suggests that double data type handling was previously missing from the CacheIR generation system. This could potentially have led to improper handling of double values in the JIT compiler, though there's no explicit evidence of a security vulnerability being fixed. The change appears to be more of a feature addition than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-break/widows-orphans-011.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-break/widows-orphans-011.html@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@   -->-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="When column boxes are filled sequentially, their content should be distributed and fragmented in accordance with the 'orphans' and the 'widows' declarations. In the test, since the 3rd column box was going to get only 2 line boxes, then a class B break point should occur between '8' and the '9' so that there is a minimum of 6 line boxes at the top of the 3rd column box.">   <style>

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-break/widows-orphans-011.html [Lines] 20  
   Old Code: `<meta name="flags" content="">`  
   Fixed Code: (removed line)  

Additional Details:  
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which doesn't appear to be security-related  
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix  
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with this change  
- The modification doesn't introduce or fix any security-sensitive functionality  

The diff shows only this single change, which doesn't appear to address any security vulnerability. The change is likely part of test maintenance or cleanup.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.space.collapse.nonspace.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.space.collapse.nonspace.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var f = new FontFace("CanvasTest", "url('/fonts/CanvasTest.ttf')"); let fonts = (self.fonts ? self.fonts : document.fonts);@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@     ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);     ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';     ctx.fillText('E\x0b EE', -150, 37.5);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);   }).then(t_pass, t_fail); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where the variable name `offscreenCanvas` was renamed to `canvas` for consistency or readability purposes. All the functionality remains the same.

Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found]
[File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.space.collapse.nonspace.html
[Lines] Variable renaming throughout the file
[Old Code] var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
[Fixed Code] var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);

The changes are:
1. Variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Subsequent updates to use the new variable name in method calls
3. No changes to the actual security-related behavior or functionality of the code

No CVE or known vulnerability patterns are present in this diff. The changes appear to be part of code maintenance rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/dir-selector-ltr-003.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/dir-selector-ltr-003.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@     <link rel="author" title="Miyoung Shin" href="mailto:[email protected]">     <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/selectors4/#dir-pseudo">     <link rel="match" href="../reference/ref-filled-green-100px-square.xht">-    <meta name="flags" content="">     <meta name="assert" content="The multiple identifiers of :dir(ltr, rtl) pseudo-class don't match an element that has a directionality of (ltr). Even if the div element has dir=ltr, the selector should not match.">     <style>        div {

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/dir-selector-ltr-003.html [Lines] 5
    Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">
    Fixed Code: (line removed)

Explanation: The diff shows only the removal of an empty meta tag with the "flags" attribute. This appears to be a cleanup change rather than a security fix. The removed line didn't contain any sensitive information or security-related content, and its removal doesn't indicate any security vulnerability was present or fixed. The change is more likely related to test metadata cleanup.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/nss/lib/mozpkix/tools/DottedOIDToCode.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/nss/lib/mozpkix/tools/DottedOIDToCode.py@@ -43,11 +43,11 @@     # least significant byte has highest bit unset     result = [value % 0x80]-    value /= 0x80+    value = value // 0x80     while value != 0:         result = [0x80 | (value % 0x80)] + result-        value /= 0x80+        value = value // 0x80     return result

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
[Potential Integer Handling Issue] [security/nss/lib/mozpkix/tools/DottedOIDToCode.py] [Lines 43,46]  
[Old Code]  
```python
value /= 0x80
```  
[Fixed Code]  
```python
value = value // 0x80
```

Additional Details:  
The change replaces floating-point division (`/=`) with integer division (`//`). While this isn't a classic security vulnerability, it could potentially lead to incorrect OID encoding if floating-point values were produced and used in security-sensitive contexts. The change ensures proper integer handling during the conversion process. However, without more context about how these values are used, I can't definitively say whether this was fixing an actual security vulnerability or just improving code correctness.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/layers/GLImages.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/layers/GLImages.cpp@@ -85,6 +85,14 @@       mHasAlpha(aHasAlpha) {   MOZ_ASSERT(mHandle); }++Maybe<SurfaceDescriptor> SurfaceTextureImage::GetDesc() {+  SurfaceDescriptor sd = SurfaceTextureDescriptor(+      mHandle, mSize,+      mHasAlpha ? gfx::SurfaceFormat::R8G8B8A8 : gfx::SurfaceFormat::R8G8B8X8,+      false /* NOT continuous */, false /* do not ignore transform */);+  return Some(sd);+} #endif }  // namespace layers

Let me analyze this code diff for potential security vulnerabilities.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Leak] [gfx/layers/GLImages.cpp] [Lines 85-93]
[Old Code]
(No previous implementation of GetDesc() method)
[Fixed Code]
Maybe<SurfaceDescriptor> SurfaceTextureImage::GetDesc() {
  SurfaceDescriptor sd = SurfaceTextureDescriptor(
      mHandle, mSize,
      mHasAlpha ? gfx::SurfaceFormat::R8G8B8A8 : gfx::SurfaceFormat::R8G8B8X8,
      false /* NOT continuous */, false /* do not ignore transform */);
  return Some(sd);
}

Additional Details:
1. This appears to be a new method added to expose surface descriptor information
2. While not clearly a vulnerability, exposing surface handles and formats could potentially lead to information leaks if not properly secured
3. The security impact would depend on how this descriptor is used by callers
4. The addition of explicit format specifications (R8G8B8A8/R8G8B8X8) suggests improved type safety

No clear vulnerability name applies, but this change appears to be adding functionality that could have security implications depending on its usage context. The change itself looks like it's adding proper format specifications rather than fixing a specific vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.parse.zero.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.parse.zero.worker.js@@ -13,13 +13,13 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-offscreenCanvas.width = '0';-offscreenCanvas.height = '0';-_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.width, 0, "offscreenCanvas.width", "0");-_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.height, 0, "offscreenCanvas.height", "0");+canvas.width = '0';+canvas.height = '0';+_assertSame(canvas.width, 0, "canvas.width", "0");+_assertSame(canvas.height, 0, "canvas.height", "0"); t.done(); });

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 13-21]
    Old Code:
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    offscreenCanvas.width = '0';
    offscreenCanvas.height = '0';
    _assertSame(offscreenCanvas.width, 0, "offscreenCanvas.width", "0");
    _assertSame(offscreenCanvas.height, 0, "offscreenCanvas.height", "0");

    Fixed Code:
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    canvas.width = '0';
    canvas.height = '0';
    _assertSame(canvas.width, 0, "canvas.width", "0");
    _assertSame(canvas.height, 0, "canvas.height", "0");

Additional Details:
- The changes appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or brevity.
- There are no security-related changes in this diff.
- The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.
- No known vulnerabilities are addressed by this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.bezierCurveTo.ensuresubpath.1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.bezierCurveTo.ensuresubpath.1.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ ctx.beginPath(); ctx.bezierCurveTo(100, 50, 200, 50, 200, 50); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 95,45, 0,255,0,255, "95,45", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 95,45, 0,255,0,255, "95,45", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.bezierCurveTo.ensuresubpath.1.html] [Lines 17-18, 27-28]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 95,45, 0,255,0,255, "95,45", "0,255,0,255");

[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(canvas, 95,45, 0,255,0,255, "95,45", "0,255,0,255");

Additional Details:
The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming the variable 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas' for consistency or readability. There are no security-related changes or vulnerability fixes in this diff. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has changed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.solid.lighter.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.solid.lighter.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 255, 1.0)';@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'lighter'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(255, 255, 0, 1.0)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 255,255,255,255, "50,25", "255,255,255,255", 5);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 255,255,255,255, "50,25", "255,255,255,255", 5); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't involve any security-related modifications.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.solid.lighter.worker.js] [Lines 13-22]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 255,255,255,255, "50,25", "255,255,255,255", 5);
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 255,255,255,255, "50,25", "255,255,255,255", 5);

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-size-021.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-size-021.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="match" href="reference/contain-size-021-ref.html">   <meta content="This test checks that when laying out an inline-block element with 'contain: size', the inline-block element must be treated as if it would have no contents. In this test, the inline-block element has 1 image and no in-flow block descendant." name="assert">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <!--

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-size-021.html] [Lines 9]
[Old Code]
  <meta content="This test checks that when laying out an inline-block element with 'contain: size', the inline-block element must be treated as if it would have no contents. In this test, the inline-block element has 1 image and no in-flow block descendant." name="assert">
  <meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code]
  <meta content="This test checks that when laying out an inline-block element with 'contain: size', the inline-block element must be treated as if it would have no contents. In this test, the inline-block element has 1 image and no in-flow block descendant." name="assert">

Additional Details:
The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute. This appears to be a cleanup change rather than a security fix. The empty meta tag didn't serve any purpose and its removal doesn't appear to address any security vulnerability. The change is more likely related to test maintenance or code cleanup.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.drawing.style.fontKerning.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.drawing.style.fontKerning.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); _assertSame(ctx.fontKerning, "auto", "ctx.fontKerning", "\"auto\""); ctx.fontKerning = "normal";

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.drawing.style.fontKerning.html [Lines] 17-18
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');

   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be a simple variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security-related changes or fixes are evident in this diff
- The modification doesn't address any known vulnerability patterns
- This is likely a code style/consistency change rather than a security fix

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-backgrounds/box-shadow-overlapping-003.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-backgrounds/box-shadow-overlapping-003.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="match" href="reference/box-shadow-overlapping-003-ref.html">   <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/fonts/ahem.css">-  <meta content="" name="flags">   <meta content="Box shadows do not affect layout. Box shadows take up no space. Box shadows do not affect or influence normal flow of boxes. Therefore, box shadows can 'collide' with other boxes and can overlap other boxes (inline box or line box) or be overlapped by other boxes. In this test, the text ('OVLPED') is from a previous line box and is overlapped by a top outer box shadow box that is tall enough to overlap it entirely." name="assert">   <style>

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
No specific vulnerability [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-backgrounds/box-shadow-overlapping-003.html [Lines] 9  
Old Code: `<meta content="" name="flags">`  
Fixed Code: (removed line)  

Additional Details:  
The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute. This doesn't appear to be a security fix but rather a cleanup of unnecessary markup. No known vulnerability is associated with this change.  

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
Potential HTML meta tag misuse [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-backgrounds/box-shadow-overlapping-003.html [Lines] 9  
Old Code: `<meta content="" name="flags">`  
Fixed Code: (removed line)  

Additional Details:  
While not clearly a security vulnerability, the removal of an empty meta tag with a non-standard "flags" name could potentially relate to preventing misuse of meta tags, though this is speculative. The original empty tag served no apparent purpose.  

Note: The diff shows only minor HTML cleanup with no obvious security implications. The changes appear to be test file maintenance rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/first-letter-002.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/first-letter-002.html@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Florian Rivoal" href="mailto:[email protected]">   <link rel="match" href="first-letter-001-ref.html">   <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-pseudo-4/#first-letter-styling">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Test checks that a floated ::first-letter is formatted identically to a floated non-pseudo element with the same content.">   <style>   div {

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/first-letter-002.html] [Lines 6-7]
[Old Code]
  <meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code]
[Removed line]

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which appears to be test-related metadata
- There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed
- The change seems to be a test cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in this change

The modification appears to be a benign test file cleanup rather than addressing any security issue. The removed line was an empty meta tag that didn't serve any apparent security purpose.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/futures-util/src/lib.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/futures-util/src/lib.rs@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@ //! Combinators and utilities for working with `Future`s, `Stream`s, `Sink`s, //! and the `AsyncRead` and `AsyncWrite` traits.-#![cfg_attr(feature = "read-initializer", feature(read_initializer))] #![cfg_attr(feature = "write-all-vectored", feature(io_slice_advance))] #![cfg_attr(not(feature = "std"), no_std)] #![warn(@@ -23,9 +22,6 @@ #[cfg(all(feature = "bilock", not(feature = "unstable")))] compile_error!("The `bilock` feature requires the `unstable` feature as an explicit opt-in to unstable features");-#[cfg(all(feature = "read-initializer", not(feature = "unstable")))]-compile_error!("The `read-initializer` feature requires the `unstable` feature as an explicit opt-in to unstable features");- #[cfg(feature = "alloc")] extern crate alloc;@@ -148,11 +144,6 @@ #[cfg(feature = "std")] macro_rules! delegate_async_read {     ($field:ident) => {-        #[cfg(feature = "read-initializer")]-        unsafe fn initializer(&self) -> $crate::io::Initializer {-            self.$field.initializer()-        }-         fn poll_read(             self: core::pin::Pin<&mut Self>,             cx: &mut core::task::Context<'_>,

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Removal of read-initializer feature] [third_party/rust/futures-util/src/lib.rs] [Lines 1, 23-25, 148-152]
[Old Code]
#![cfg_attr(feature = "read-initializer", feature(read_initializer))]
...
#[cfg(all(feature = "read-initializer", not(feature = "unstable")))]
compile_error!("The `read-initializer` feature requires the `unstable` feature as an explicit opt-in to unstable features");
...
#[cfg(feature = "read-initializer")]
unsafe fn initializer(&self) -> $crate::io::Initializer {
    self.$field.initializer()
}

[Fixed Code]
(All above code removed)

Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of the `read-initializer` feature and related code
- This appears to be removing an unstable feature that allowed initializing buffers before reading
- Without more context about the security implications of the `read-initializer` feature, it's unclear if this was a security fix or just cleanup
- The removal does enforce that unstable features must be explicitly opted into, which could be considered a security hardening measure

No other obvious security vulnerabilities are apparent in this diff. The changes appear to be primarily about feature management and code organization rather than direct security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/workers/WorkerDebugger.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/workers/WorkerDebugger.h@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #define mozilla_dom_workers_WorkerDebugger_h #include "mozilla/PerformanceTypes.h"+#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerScope.h" #include "nsCOMPtr.h" #include "nsIWorkerDebugger.h"@@ -24,7 +25,7 @@   class ReportDebuggerErrorRunnable;   class PostDebuggerMessageRunnable;-  WorkerPrivate* mWorkerPrivate;+  CheckedUnsafePtr<WorkerPrivate> mWorkerPrivate;   bool mIsInitialized;   nsTArray<nsCOMPtr<nsIWorkerDebuggerListener>> mListeners;

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   Dangling Pointer Vulnerability [dom/workers/WorkerDebugger.h] [Lines 24]
   Old Code: `WorkerPrivate* mWorkerPrivate;`
   Fixed Code: `CheckedUnsafePtr<WorkerPrivate> mWorkerPrivate;`

Additional Details:
- The change from a raw pointer to `CheckedUnsafePtr` suggests there was potential for a dangling pointer vulnerability where the WorkerPrivate object could be deleted while still being referenced.
- `CheckedUnsafePtr` provides safer pointer handling by checking for null/non-null states and helping prevent use-after-free scenarios.
- This is a common security pattern in Mozilla code to prevent memory safety issues.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   Missing Header Inclusion [dom/workers/WorkerDebugger.h] [Lines 8]
   Old Code: No inclusion of WorkerScope.h
   Fixed Code: Added `#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerScope.h"`

Additional Details:
- While adding a missing include could potentially fix compilation issues or undefined behavior, I'm not certain if this was specifically addressing a security vulnerability or just a code maintenance improvement.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/python/taskcluster_taskgraph/taskgraph/actions/util.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/python/taskcluster_taskgraph/taskgraph/actions/util.py@@ -251,7 +251,8 @@ def add_args_to_command(cmd_parts, extra_args=[]):     """     Add custom command line args to a given command.-    args:++    Args:       cmd_parts: the raw command as seen by taskcluster       extra_args: array of args we want to add     """

Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily documentation improvements rather than security fixes. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [third_party/python/taskcluster_taskgraph/taskgraph/actions/util.py] [Lines 251-255]
[Old Code]
    """
    Add custom command line args to a given command.
    args:
      cmd_parts: the raw command as seen by taskcluster
      extra_args: array of args we want to add
    """
[Fixed Code]
    """
    Add custom command line args to a given command.

    Args:
      cmd_parts: the raw command as seen by taskcluster
      extra_args: array of args we want to add
    """

The changes made are:
1. Added a blank line after the initial docstring line
2. Changed "args:" to "Args:" (capitalization)
3. Fixed the indentation of the parameter descriptions

These changes improve documentation consistency but don't appear to address any security issues. The functionality of the code remains unchanged.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/naga/src/front/wgsl/mod.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/naga/src/front/wgsl/mod.rs@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@     Operation(char),     LogicalOperation(char),     ShiftOperation(char),+    AssignmentOperation(char),     Arrow,     Unknown(char),     UnterminatedString,@@ -148,6 +149,7 @@     },     InvalidResolve(ResolveError),     InvalidForInitializer(Span),+    InvalidGatherComponent(Span, i32),     ReservedIdentifierPrefix(Span),     UnknownStorageClass(Span),     UnknownAttribute(Span),@@ -163,7 +165,7 @@     ZeroSizeOrAlign(Span),     InconsistentBinding(Span),     UnknownLocalFunction(Span),-    InitializationTypeMismatch(Span, Handle<crate::Type>),+    InitializationTypeMismatch(Span, String),     MissingType(Span),     InvalidAtomicPointer(Span),     InvalidAtomicOperandType(Span),@@ -197,6 +199,8 @@                                 Token::Operation(c) => format!("operation ('{}')", c),                                 Token::LogicalOperation(c) => format!("logical operation ('{}')", c),                                 Token::ShiftOperation(c) => format!("bitshift ('{}{}')", c, c),+                                Token::AssignmentOperation(c) if c=='<' || c=='>' => format!("bitshift ('{}{}=')", c, c),+                                Token::AssignmentOperation(c) => format!("operation ('{}=')", c),                                 Token::Arrow => "->".to_string(),                                 Token::Unknown(c) => format!("unknown ('{}')", c),                                 Token::UnterminatedString => "unterminated string".to_string(),@@ -342,6 +346,11 @@                 labels: vec![(bad_span.clone(), "not an assignment or function call".into())],                 notes: vec![],             },+            Error::InvalidGatherComponent(ref bad_span, component) => ParseError {+                message: format!("textureGather component {} doesn't exist, must be 0, 1, 2, or 3", component),+                labels: vec![(bad_span.clone(), "invalid component".into())],+                notes: vec![],+            },             Error::ReservedIdentifierPrefix(ref bad_span) => ParseError {                 message: format!("Identifier starts with a reserved prefix: '{}'", &source[bad_span.clone()]),                 labels: vec![(bad_span.clone(), "invalid identifier".into())],@@ -408,7 +417,7 @@                 notes: vec![],             },             Error::InitializationTypeMismatch(ref name_span, ref expected_ty) => ParseError {-                message: format!("the type of `{}` is expected to be {:?}", &source[name_span.clone()], expected_ty),+                message: format!("the type of `{}` is expected to be `{}`", &source[name_span.clone()], expected_ty),                 labels: vec![(name_span.clone(), format!("definition of `{}`", &source[name_span.clone()]).into())],                 notes: vec![],             },@@ -1167,7 +1176,12 @@     /// Emits a summary of the error to standard error stream.     pub fn emit_to_stderr(&self, source: &str) {-        let files = SimpleFile::new("wgsl", source);+        self.emit_to_stderr_with_path(source, "wgsl")+    }++    /// Emits a summary of the error to standard error stream.+    pub fn emit_to_stderr_with_path(&self, source: &str, path: &str) {+        let files = SimpleFile::new(path, source);         let config = codespan_reporting::term::Config::default();         let writer = StandardStream::stderr(ColorChoice::Always);         term::emit(&mut writer.lock(), &config, &files, &self.diagnostic())@@ -1648,6 +1662,7 @@                     crate::Expression::ImageSample {                         image: sc.image,                         sampler: ctx.lookup_ident.lookup(sampler_name, sampler_span)?.handle,+                        gather: None,                         coordinate,                         array_index,                         offset,@@ -1681,6 +1696,7 @@                     crate::Expression::ImageSample {                         image: sc.image,                         sampler: ctx.lookup_ident.lookup(sampler_name, sampler_span)?.handle,+                        gather: None,                         coordinate,                         array_index,                         offset,@@ -1714,6 +1730,7 @@                     crate::Expression::ImageSample {                         image: sc.image,                         sampler: ctx.lookup_ident.lookup(sampler_name, sampler_span)?.handle,+                        gather: None,                         coordinate,                         array_index,                         offset,@@ -1749,6 +1766,7 @@                     crate::Expression::ImageSample {                         image: sc.image,                         sampler: ctx.lookup_ident.lookup(sampler_name, sampler_span)?.handle,+                        gather: None,                         coordinate,                         array_index,                         offset,@@ -1782,6 +1800,7 @@                     crate::Expression::ImageSample {                         image: sc.image,                         sampler: ctx.lookup_ident.lookup(sampler_name, sampler_span)?.handle,+                        gather: None,                         coordinate,                         array_index,                         offset,@@ -1815,6 +1834,91 @@                     crate::Expression::ImageSample {                         image: sc.image,                         sampler: ctx.lookup_ident.lookup(sampler_name, sampler_span)?.handle,+                        gather: None,+                        coordinate,+                        array_index,+                        offset,+                        level: crate::SampleLevel::Zero,+                        depth_ref: Some(reference),+                    }+                }+                "textureGather" => {+                    let _ = lexer.next();+                    lexer.open_arguments()?;+                    let component = if let (+                        Token::Number {+                            value,+                            ty: NumberType::Sint,+                            width: None,+                        },+                        span,+                    ) = lexer.peek()+                    {+                        let _ = lexer.next();+                        lexer.expect(Token::Separator(','))?;+                        let index = get_i32_literal(value, span.clone())?;+                        *crate::SwizzleComponent::XYZW+                            .get(index as usize)+                            .ok_or(Error::InvalidGatherComponent(span, index))?+                    } else {+                        crate::SwizzleComponent::X+                    };+                    let (image_name, image_span) = lexer.next_ident_with_span()?;+                    lexer.expect(Token::Separator(','))?;+                    let (sampler_name, sampler_span) = lexer.next_ident_with_span()?;+                    lexer.expect(Token::Separator(','))?;+                    let coordinate = self.parse_general_expression(lexer, ctx.reborrow())?;+                    let sc = ctx.prepare_sampling(image_name, image_span)?;+                    let array_index = if sc.arrayed {+                        lexer.expect(Token::Separator(','))?;+                        Some(self.parse_general_expression(lexer, ctx.reborrow())?)+                    } else {+                        None+                    };+                    let offset = if lexer.skip(Token::Separator(',')) {+                        Some(self.parse_const_expression(lexer, ctx.types, ctx.constants)?)+                    } else {+                        None+                    };+                    lexer.close_arguments()?;+                    crate::Expression::ImageSample {+                        image: sc.image,+                        sampler: ctx.lookup_ident.lookup(sampler_name, sampler_span)?.handle,+                        gather: Some(component),+                        coordinate,+                        array_index,+                        offset,+                        level: crate::SampleLevel::Zero,+                        depth_ref: None,+                    }+                }+                "textureGatherCompare" => {+                    let _ = lexer.next();+                    lexer.open_arguments()?;+                    let (image_name, image_span) = lexer.next_ident_with_span()?;+                    lexer.expect(Token::Separator(','))?;+                    let (sampler_name, sampler_span) = lexer.next_ident_with_span()?;+                    lexer.expect(Token::Separator(','))?;+                    let coordinate = self.parse_general_expression(lexer, ctx.reborrow())?;+                    let sc = ctx.prepare_sampling(image_name, image_span)?;+                    let array_index = if sc.arrayed {+                        lexer.expect(Token::Separator(','))?;+                        Some(self.parse_general_expression(lexer, ctx.reborrow())?)+                    } else {+                        None+                    };+                    lexer.expect(Token::Separator(','))?;+                    let reference = self.parse_general_expression(lexer, ctx.reborrow())?;+                    let offset = if lexer.skip(Token::Separator(',')) {+                        Some(self.parse_const_expression(lexer, ctx.types, ctx.constants)?)+                    } else {+                        None+                    };+                    lexer.close_arguments()?;+                    crate::Expression::ImageSample {+                        image: sc.image,+                        sampler: ctx.lookup_ident.lookup(sampler_name, sampler_span)?.handle,+                        gather: Some(crate::SwizzleComponent::X),                         coordinate,                         array_index,                         offset,@@ -1981,15 +2085,15 @@             Ok(last_component)         })?;+        // We can't use the `TypeInner` returned by this because+        // `resolve_type` borrows context mutably.+        // Use it to insert into the right maps,+        // and then grab it again immutably.+        ctx.resolve_type(last_component)?;+         let expr = if components.is_empty()             && ty_resolution.inner_with(ctx.types).scalar_kind().is_some()         {-            // We can't use the `TypeInner` returned by this because-            // `resolve_type` borrows context mutably.-            // Use it to insert into the right maps,-            // and then grab it again immutably.-            ctx.resolve_type(last_component)?;-             match (                 ty_resolution.inner_with(ctx.types),                 ctx.typifier.get(last_component, ctx.types),@@ -2035,14 +2139,60 @@                 }             }         } else {+            components.push(last_component);+            let mut compose_components = Vec::new();++            if let (+                &crate::TypeInner::Matrix {+                    rows,+                    width,+                    columns,+                },+                &crate::TypeInner::Scalar {+                    kind: crate::ScalarKind::Float,+                    ..+                },+            ) = (+                ty_resolution.inner_with(ctx.types),+                ctx.typifier.get(last_component, ctx.types),+            ) {+                let vec_ty = ctx.types.insert(+                    crate::Type {+                        name: None,+                        inner: crate::TypeInner::Vector {+                            width,+                            kind: crate::ScalarKind::Float,+                            size: rows,+                        },+                    },+                    Default::default(),+                );++                compose_components.reserve(columns as usize);+                for vec_components in components.chunks(rows as usize) {+                    let handle = ctx.expressions.append(+                        crate::Expression::Compose {+                            ty: vec_ty,+                            components: Vec::from(vec_components),+                        },+                        crate::Span::default(),+                    );+                    compose_components.push(handle);+                }+            } else {+                compose_components = components;+            }+             let ty = match ty_resolution {                 TypeResolution::Handle(handle) => handle,                 TypeResolution::Value(inner) => ctx                     .types                     .insert(crate::Type { name: None, inner }, Default::default()),             };-            components.push(last_component);-            crate::Expression::Compose { ty, components }+            crate::Expression::Compose {+                ty,+                components: compose_components,+            }         };         let span = NagaSpan::from(self.pop_scope(lexer));@@ -3161,6 +3311,8 @@         lexer: &mut Lexer<'a>,         mut context: ExpressionContext<'a, '_, 'out>,     ) -> Result<(), Error<'a>> {+        use crate::BinaryOperator as Bo;+         let span_start = lexer.current_byte_offset();         context.emitter.start(context.expressions);         let reference = self.parse_unary_expression(lexer, context.reborrow())?;@@ -3172,8 +3324,40 @@                 span,             ));         }-        lexer.expect(Token::Operation('='))?;-        let value = self.parse_general_expression(lexer, context.reborrow())?;++        let value = match lexer.next() {+            (Token::Operation('='), _) => {+                self.parse_general_expression(lexer, context.reborrow())?+            }+            (Token::AssignmentOperation(c), span) => {+                let op = match c {+                    '<' => Bo::ShiftLeft,+                    '>' => Bo::ShiftRight,+                    '+' => Bo::Add,+                    '-' => Bo::Subtract,+                    '*' => Bo::Multiply,+                    '/' => Bo::Divide,+                    '%' => Bo::Modulo,+                    '&' => Bo::And,+                    '|' => Bo::InclusiveOr,+                    '^' => Bo::ExclusiveOr,+                    //Note: `consume_token` shouldn't produce any other assignment ops+                    _ => unreachable!(),+                };+                let left = context.expressions.append(+                    crate::Expression::Load {+                        pointer: reference.handle,+                    },+                    NagaSpan::from(span_start..lexer.current_byte_offset()),+                );+                let right = self.parse_general_expression(lexer, context.reborrow())?;+                context+                    .expressions+                    .append(crate::Expression::Binary { op, left, right }, span.into())+            }+            other => return Err(Error::Unexpected(other, ExpectedToken::SwitchItem)),+        };+         let span_end = lexer.current_byte_offset();         context             .block@@ -3306,7 +3490,10 @@                                     given_inner,                                     expr_inner                                 );-                                return Err(Error::InitializationTypeMismatch(name_span, ty));+                                return Err(Error::InitializationTypeMismatch(+                                    name_span,+                                    expr_inner.to_wgsl(context.types, context.constants),+                                ));                             }                         }                         block.extend(emitter.finish(context.expressions));@@ -3371,7 +3558,8 @@                                             expr_inner                                         );                                         return Err(Error::InitializationTypeMismatch(-                                            name_span, ty,+                                            name_span,+                                            expr_inner.to_wgsl(context.types, context.constants),                                         ));                                     }                                     ty@@ -3470,9 +3658,20 @@                         lexer.expect(Token::Paren(')'))?;                         let accept = self.parse_block(lexer, context.reborrow(), false)?;+                         let mut elsif_stack = Vec::new();                         let mut elseif_span_start = lexer.current_byte_offset();-                        while lexer.skip(Token::Word("elseif")) {+                        let mut reject = loop {+                            if !lexer.skip(Token::Word("else")) {+                                break crate::Block::new();+                            }++                            if !lexer.skip(Token::Word("if")) {+                                // ... else { ... }+                                break self.parse_block(lexer, context.reborrow(), false)?;+                            }++                            // ... else if (...) { ... }                             let mut sub_emitter = super::Emitter::default();                             lexer.expect(Token::Paren('('))?;@@ -3491,12 +3690,8 @@                                 other_block,                             ));                             elseif_span_start = lexer.current_byte_offset();-                        }-                        let mut reject = if lexer.skip(Token::Word("else")) {-                            self.parse_block(lexer, context.reborrow(), false)?-                        } else {-                            crate::Block::new()                         };+                         let span_end = lexer.current_byte_offset();                         // reverse-fold the else-if blocks                         //Note: we may consider uplifting this to the IR@@ -4139,7 +4334,22 @@                         crate::ConstantInner::Composite { ty, components: _ } => ty == explicit_ty,                     };                     if !type_match {-                        return Err(Error::InitializationTypeMismatch(name_span, explicit_ty));+                        let exptected_inner_str = match con.inner {+                            crate::ConstantInner::Scalar { width, value } => {+                                crate::TypeInner::Scalar {+                                    kind: value.scalar_kind(),+                                    width,+                                }+                                .to_wgsl(&module.types, &module.constants)+                            }+                            crate::ConstantInner::Composite { .. } => module.types[explicit_ty]+                                .inner+                                .to_wgsl(&module.types, &module.constants),+                        };+                        return Err(Error::InitializationTypeMismatch(+                            name_span,+                            exptected_inner_str,+                        ));                     }                 }

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   Invalid Gather Component Vulnerability [File] [Lines 1681-1696, 1730-1749, 1800-1815, 1834-1891]
   [Old Code]
   The old code didn't validate the component index for textureGather operations, which could lead to out-of-bounds access.
   [Fixed Code]
   The new code adds validation for textureGather component index (must be 0, 1, 2, or 3) and adds Error::InvalidGatherComponent to handle invalid cases.

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   Type Mismatch Information Leak Vulnerability [File] [Lines 163, 342-346, 408-413, 3306-3311, 3371-3380, 3470-3480, 4134-4149]
   [Old Code]
   The old code showed internal type handles in error messages, which could leak implementation details.
   [Fixed Code]
   The new code changes InitializationTypeMismatch to use String instead of Handle<crate::Type> and shows human-readable type information in error messages.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   Potential Assignment Operation Parsing Issue [File] [Lines 68-73, 197-204, 3161-3330]
   [Old Code]
   The old code didn't properly handle compound assignment operations (like +=, -=).
   [Fixed Code]
   The new code adds Token::AssignmentOperation and proper parsing for compound assignment operations, but it's unclear if this was fixing a security issue or just adding functionality.

4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   Error Reporting Path Exposure [File] [Lines 1167-1181]
   [Old Code]
   The old code hardcoded the file path as "wgsl" in error messages.
   [Fixed Code]
   The new code adds emit_to_stderr_with_path to allow custom paths in error messages, but it's unclear if this was fixing a security issue or just improving functionality.

Note: The most clearly security-related fixes are the textureGather component validation and the type information leak prevention. The other changes appear to be more about functionality improvements, but could have security implications in certain contexts.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.