--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/utils/source-queue.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/utils/source-queue.js@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@  * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this  * file, You can obtain one at <http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/>. */-import { throttle } from "lodash";+const { throttle } = require("devtools/shared/throttle"); // This SourceQueue module is now only used for source mapped sources let newOriginalQueuedSources;

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Dependency Change [File] devtools/client/debugger/src/utils/source-queue.js [Lines 2]
[Old Code]
import { throttle } from "lodash";
[Fixed Code]
const { throttle } = require("devtools/shared/throttle");

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be replacing the lodash throttle function with a custom implementation from devtools/shared/throttle
- While this isn't clearly a security fix, it could potentially be related to:
  1) Reducing dependency on third-party libraries (lodash) which might have security issues
  2) Using a more controlled internal implementation
  3) Possible performance optimization
- Without more context, we can't be certain if this was specifically for security reasons

Note: There are no obvious security vulnerabilities like XSS, injection, etc. in this particular diff. The change seems more architectural than security-focused.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.nonfinite.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.nonfinite.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.moveTo(0, 0); ctx.lineTo(100, 0);@@ -63,8 +63,8 @@ ctx.lineTo(0, 50); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 90,45, 0,255,0,255, "90,45", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 90,45, 0,255,0,255, "90,45", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to function calls. Here's the analysis following your format:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    [No vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.nonfinite.worker.js] [Lines 13-14, 63-64]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 90,45, 0,255,0,255, "90,45", "0,255,0,255");
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    _assertPixel(canvas, 90,45, 0,255,0,255, "90,45", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or readability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.radius.intersecting.1.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.radius.intersecting.1.worker.js@@ -13,23 +13,23 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.roundRect(0, 0, 100, 50, [40, 40, 40, 40]); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 2,25, 0,255,0,255, "2,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 97,25, 0,255,0,255, "97,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 255,0,0,255, "1,1", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 255,0,0,255, "98,1", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 255,0,0,255, "1,48", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 255,0,0,255, "98,48", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 2,25, 0,255,0,255, "2,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 97,25, 0,255,0,255, "97,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 255,0,0,255, "1,1", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 255,0,0,255, "98,1", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 255,0,0,255, "1,48", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 255,0,0,255, "98,48", "255,0,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating all references to it. Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-23]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 2,25, 0,255,0,255, "2,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 2,25, 0,255,0,255, "2,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are purely variable naming improvements with no security implications. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a more concise variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.hsl-2.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.hsl-2.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl( -240 , 100% , 50% )'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes (variable renaming) rather than security fixes. Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14, 21]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and update the references accordingly. There are no security implications to this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.3.radii.2.dompoint.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.3.radii.2.dompoint.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -23,20 +23,20 @@ ctx.fill(); // top-right corner-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 79,1, 255,0,0,255, "79,1", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 58,1, 0,255,0,255, "58,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,10, 255,0,0,255, "98,10", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,21, 0,255,0,255, "98,21", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 79,1, 255,0,0,255, "79,1", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 58,1, 0,255,0,255, "58,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,10, 255,0,0,255, "98,10", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,21, 0,255,0,255, "98,21", "0,255,0,255"); // bottom-left corner-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 20,48, 255,0,0,255, "20,48", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 41,48, 0,255,0,255, "41,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,39, 255,0,0,255, "1,39", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,28, 0,255,0,255, "1,28", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 20,48, 255,0,0,255, "20,48", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 41,48, 0,255,0,255, "41,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,39, 255,0,0,255, "1,39", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,28, 0,255,0,255, "1,28", "0,255,0,255"); // other corners-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or clarity, and updating all references to this variable accordingly.

Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.3.radii.2.dompoint.worker.js] [Lines 13-14, 23-36]
[Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, ...)]
[Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(canvas, ...)]

The changes are purely variable renaming and don't affect security in any way. The functionality remains identical, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.outside.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.outside.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -28,10 +28,10 @@ ctx.fillRect(25, -100, 50, 25); ctx.shadowOffsetY = -100; ctx.fillRect(25, 125, 50, 25);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 12,25, 0,255,0,255, "12,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 87,25, 0,255,0,255, "87,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,12, 0,255,0,255, "50,12", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,37, 0,255,0,255, "50,37", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 12,25, 0,255,0,255, "12,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 87,25, 0,255,0,255, "87,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,12, 0,255,0,255, "50,12", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,37, 0,255,0,255, "50,37", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 13-14, 28-31]
    Old Code:
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 12,25, 0,255,0,255, "12,25", "0,255,0,255");

    Fixed Code:
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(canvas, 12,25, 0,255,0,255, "12,25", "0,255,0,255");

    Additional Details: This appears to be a simple variable renaming from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas' for consistency or clarity. No security implications are evident in this change.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerabilities found in the remaining changes. The diff only shows variable renaming and corresponding updates to function calls, with no changes to the actual security-related behavior of the code.

Note: The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature, with no security fixes or vulnerabilities addressed in this diff. All modifications are related to variable naming consistency.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/CSS2/abspos/table-caption-passes-abspos-up-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/CSS2/abspos/table-caption-passes-abspos-up-001.html@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="David Grogan" href="[email protected]"> <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/CSS22/tables.html#model"> <link rel="match" href="../../reference/ref-filled-green-100px-square.xht">-<meta name="flags" content="" /> <meta name="assert" content="non-containing block caption passes abspos child to its parent" /> <title> Captions and abspos descendants

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities.

Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/css/CSS2/abspos/table-caption-passes-abspos-up-001.html] [Lines 3-6]
[Old Code]
<meta name="flags" content="" />
[Fixed Code]
(removed line)

Additional Details:
1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which doesn't appear to have any security implications.
2. This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix.
3. No known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in this change.
4. The modification doesn't affect any security-relevant functionality.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/xml/resources/XMLPrettyPrint.css+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/xml/resources/XMLPrettyPrint.css@@ -5,11 +5,22 @@ @import url("resource://content-accessible/viewsource.css");+:host {+  color-scheme: light dark;+}+ #header {   background-color: #ccc;   border-bottom: 3px solid black;   padding: 0.5em;   margin-bottom: 1em;+}++@media (prefers-color-scheme: dark) {+  #header {+    background-color: #333;+    border-color: #555;+  } } #tree,@@ -37,7 +48,7 @@   cursor: pointer;   padding-inline-end: 2px;   /* Don't want to inherit the styling from pi and comment elements */-  color: initial;+  color: buttontext;   font: initial; }

Analyzing the provided CSS diff for security fixes, here's the assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability was found in this diff. The changes appear to be:
- Added color scheme support for dark mode
- Modified styling for better accessibility/consistency
- Changed `color: initial` to `color: buttontext` for better cross-browser consistency

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Style Injection [File] [dom/xml/resources/XMLPrettyPrint.css] [Lines 37-48]
[Old Code]
  color: initial;
[Fixed Code]
  color: buttontext;
Additional Details: While not clearly a security fix, changing from 'initial' to 'buttontext' could potentially prevent some style inheritance issues that might be exploitable in edge cases, though this is speculative.

Note: The changes appear primarily focused on improving accessibility (dark mode support) and styling consistency rather than addressing security vulnerabilities. CSS-related security vulnerabilities are rare and typically involve improper sanitization leading to injection attacks, which doesn't appear to be the case here.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/examples/stopwatch.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/examples/stopwatch.rs@@ -33,11 +33,7 @@     // Prints the elapsed time.     fn show(dur: Duration) {-        println!(-            "Elapsed: {}.{:03} sec",-            dur.as_secs(),-            dur.subsec_nanos() / 1_000_000-        );+        println!("Elapsed: {}.{:03} sec", dur.as_secs(), dur.subsec_millis());     }     let start = Instant::now();

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/examples/stopwatch.rs] [Lines 33-39]
[Old Code]
println!(
    "Elapsed: {}.{:03} sec",
    dur.as_secs(),
    dur.subsec_nanos() / 1_000_000
);
[Fixed Code]
println!("Elapsed: {}.{:03} sec", dur.as_secs(), dur.subsec_millis());

Additional Details:
- The change is purely a code simplification/optimization
- The functionality remains exactly the same (printing elapsed time)
- The change replaces manual division of nanoseconds with direct millisecond access
- No security implications or vulnerabilities are introduced or fixed
- This appears to be a readability/maintainability improvement rather than a security fix

The modification simply uses the more direct `subsec_millis()` method instead of calculating milliseconds from nanoseconds, which is functionally equivalent but cleaner. There's no evidence of any security vulnerability being addressed here.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/dec_patch_dictionary.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/dec_patch_dictionary.h@@ -122,10 +122,14 @@     ComputePatchCache();   }+  // Adds patches to a segment of `xsize` pixels, starting at `inout`, assumed+  // to be located at position (x0, y) in the frame.+  void AddOneRow(float* const* inout, size_t y, size_t x0, size_t xsize) const;+   // Only adds patches that belong to the `image_rect` area of the decoded   // image, writing them to the `opsin_rect` area of `opsin`.-  Status AddTo(Image3F* opsin, const Rect& opsin_rect,-               float* const* extra_channels, const Rect& image_rect) const;+  void AddTo(Image3F* opsin, const Rect& opsin_rect,+             float* const* extra_channels, const Rect& image_rect) const;   // Returns dependencies of this patch dictionary on reference frame ids as a   // bit mask: bits 0-3 indicate reference frame 0-3.

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Buffer Overflow/Input Validation] [third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/dec_patch_dictionary.h] [Lines 122-130]
    [Old Code]
    Status AddTo(Image3F* opsin, const Rect& opsin_rect,
               float* const* extra_channels, const Rect& image_rect) const;
    [Fixed Code]
    void AddTo(Image3F* opsin, const Rect& opsin_rect,
             float* const* extra_channels, const Rect& image_rect) const;

    Additional Details: The change from returning Status to void might indicate removal of error checking, but without seeing the implementation, it's unclear if this introduces a vulnerability. The removal of status checking could potentially lead to unhandled error conditions.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Boundary Check Removal] [third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/dec_patch_dictionary.h] [Lines 122-130]
    [Old Code]
    (same as above)
    [Fixed Code]
    (same as above)
    
    Additional Details: The new AddOneRow function added above the changed code operates on raw pointers with size parameters. Without seeing bounds checking implementation, there's potential for boundary issues if input validation is insufficient.

Note: The changes appear to be interface modifications rather than direct security fixes. The most significant change is the return type modification of AddTo() from Status to void, which might affect error handling, but without seeing the implementation details, we can't be certain about security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-154.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-154.xml@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->   <link rel="match" href="reference/this-line-lime-background.xht"/>-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body>  <p>This line should have a green background.</p>

Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-154.xml [Lines] 9
[Old Code]
<meta name="flags" content="" />
[Fixed Code]
(removed line)

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which doesn't appear to have any security implications
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerability is associated with this change
- The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive functionality

Note: If this were a security-related meta tag (like CSP), its removal might be significant, but in this case it's just a testing flag that was empty.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/workers/remoteworkers/RemoteWorkerChild.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/workers/remoteworkers/RemoteWorkerChild.cpp@@ -181,6 +181,10 @@   }   nsresult Cancel() override {+    // We need to check first if cancel is called twice+    nsresult rv = WorkerRunnable::Cancel();+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);+     ReleaseMembers();     return NS_OK;   }@@ -226,9 +230,13 @@   }   nsresult Cancel() override {+    // We need to check first if cancel is called twice+    nsresult rv = WorkerRunnable::Cancel();+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);+     MaybeAbort();-    return WorkerRunnable::Cancel();+    return NS_OK;   }   // Slowly running out of synonyms for cancel, abort, terminate, etc...

Analyzing the provided code diff, here are the security findings:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Double Call Vulnerability [dom/workers/remoteworkers/RemoteWorkerChild.cpp] [Lines 181-186]
[Old Code]
  nsresult Cancel() override {
    ReleaseMembers();
    return NS_OK;
  }
[Fixed Code]
  nsresult Cancel() override {
    // We need to check first if cancel is called twice
    nsresult rv = WorkerRunnable::Cancel();
    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);

    ReleaseMembers();
    return NS_OK;
  }

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Double Call Vulnerability [dom/workers/remoteworkers/RemoteWorkerChild.cpp] [Lines 226-232]
[Old Code]
  nsresult Cancel() override {
    MaybeAbort();

    return WorkerRunnable::Cancel();
  }
[Fixed Code]
  nsresult Cancel() override {
    // We need to check first if cancel is called twice
    nsresult rv = WorkerRunnable::Cancel();
    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);

    MaybeAbort();

    return NS_OK;
  }

The fixes address potential issues where Cancel() could be called multiple times on the same object, which could lead to undefined behavior or resource management issues. The vulnerability type is essentially a double call/double free scenario, though it doesn't have a specific CWE identifier. The fixes ensure proper cleanup by checking the result of the parent class's Cancel() operation before proceeding with additional cleanup actions.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/mozbase/mozcrash/mozcrash/mozcrash.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/mozbase/mozcrash/mozcrash/mozcrash.py@@ -250,11 +250,10 @@         self._dump_files = None     def _get_symbols(self):-        # If no symbols path has been set create a temporary folder to let the-        # minidump stackwalk download the symbols.         if not self.symbols_path:-            self.symbols_path = tempfile.mkdtemp()-            self.remove_symbols = True+            self.logger.warning(+                "No local symbols_path provided, only http symbols will be used."+            )         # This updates self.symbols_path so we only download once.         if mozfile.is_url(self.symbols_path):@@ -332,8 +331,7 @@         reason = None         java_stack = None         if (-            self.symbols_path-            and self.stackwalk_binary+            self.stackwalk_binary             and os.path.exists(self.stackwalk_binary)             and os.access(self.stackwalk_binary, os.X_OK)         ):@@ -390,7 +388,9 @@             # (in practice the CLI parsers are more permissive, but best not to             # unecessarily play with fire).             command.append(path)-            command.append(self.symbols_path)++            if self.symbols_path:+                command.append(self.symbols_path)             self.logger.info(u"Copy/paste: {}".format(" ".join(command)))             # run minidump_stackwalk@@ -437,8 +437,6 @@                 include_stderr = True         else:-            if not self.symbols_path:-                errors.append("No symbols path given, can't process dump.")             if not self.stackwalk_binary:                 errors.append(                     "MINIDUMP_STACKWALK not set, can't process dump. Either set "

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   [Temporary Directory Creation Without Cleanup] [testing/mozbase/mozcrash/mozcrash/mozcrash.py] [Lines 250-254]
   [Old Code]
   if not self.symbols_path:
       self.symbols_path = tempfile.mkdtemp()
       self.remove_symbols = True
   [Fixed Code]
   if not self.symbols_path:
       self.logger.warning(
           "No local symbols_path provided, only http symbols will be used."
       )
   [Details] The old code created temporary directories without guaranteed cleanup, which could lead to temporary directory accumulation. The fix removes this behavior and just logs a warning.

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   [Symbols Path Validation Missing] [testing/mozbase/mozcrash/mozcrash/mozcrash.py] [Lines 332-335]
   [Old Code]
   if (
       self.symbols_path
       and self.stackwalk_binary
   [Fixed Code]
   if (
       self.stackwalk_binary
   [Details] The old code required symbols_path for stackwalk execution, which was unnecessary and could cause issues. The fix makes symbols_path optional.

3. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   [Command Injection Potential] [testing/mozbase/mozcrash/mozcrash/mozcrash.py] [Lines 390-392]
   [Old Code]
   command.append(path)
   command.append(self.symbols_path)
   [Fixed Code]
   command.append(path)
   if self.symbols_path:
       command.append(self.symbols_path)
   [Details] The old code unconditionally appended symbols_path to the command, which could potentially lead to command injection if the path contained malicious content. The fix makes it conditional.

4. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   [Error Message Information Leak] [testing/mozbase/mozcrash/mozcrash/mozcrash.py] [Lines 437-440]
   [Old Code]
   if not self.symbols_path:
       errors.append("No symbols path given, can't process dump.")
   [Fixed Code]
   [Removed]
   [Details] The old code revealed potentially sensitive information about missing symbols path in error messages. The fix removes this error message.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit/JitContext.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit/JitContext.cpp@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include "jit/CacheIRSpewer.h" #include "jit/CompileWrappers.h"+#include "jit/Ion.h" #include "jit/JitCode.h" #include "jit/JitOptions.h" #include "jit/JitSpewer.h"@@ -20,6 +21,10 @@ #include "jit/PerfSpewer.h" #include "js/HeapAPI.h" #include "vm/JSContext.h"++#ifdef JS_CODEGEN_ARM64+#  include "jit/arm64/vixl/Cpu-vixl.h"+#endif #if defined(ANDROID) #  include <sys/system_properties.h>@@ -97,21 +102,47 @@   } #endif+#if defined(JS_CODEGEN_X86) || defined(JS_CODEGEN_X64)+  // Compute flags.+  js::jit::CPUInfo::ComputeFlags();+#endif+ #if defined(JS_CODEGEN_ARM)   InitARMFlags(); #endif+#ifdef JS_CODEGEN_ARM64+  // Initialize instruction cache flushing.+  vixl::CPU::SetUp();+#endif++#ifndef JS_CODEGEN_NONE+  MOZ_ASSERT(js::jit::CPUFlagsHaveBeenComputed());+#endif+   // Note: jit flags need to be initialized after the InitARMFlags call above.-  ComputeJitSupportFlags();+  // This is the final point where we can set disableJitBackend = true, before+  // we use this flag below with the HasJitBackend call.+  if (!MacroAssembler::SupportsFloatingPoint()) {+    JitOptions.disableJitBackend = true;+  }+  JitOptions.supportsUnalignedAccesses =+      MacroAssembler::SupportsUnalignedAccesses();++  if (HasJitBackend()) {+    if (!InitProcessExecutableMemory()) {+      return false;+    }+  }   CheckPerf();   return true; }-void jit::ComputeJitSupportFlags() {-  JitOptions.supportsFloatingPoint = MacroAssembler::SupportsFloatingPoint();-  JitOptions.supportsUnalignedAccesses =-      MacroAssembler::SupportsUnalignedAccesses();+void jit::ShutdownJit() {+  if (HasJitBackend() && !JSRuntime::hasLiveRuntimes()) {+    ReleaseProcessExecutableMemory();+  } } bool jit::JitSupportsWasmSimd() {

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential CPU Flag Initialization Issue] [js/src/jit/JitContext.cpp] [Lines 97-102]
[Old Code]
[No initialization of CPU flags for x86/x64 architectures]
[Fixed Code]
[Added CPU flag initialization for x86/x64 architectures]

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential ARM64 Instruction Cache Flushing Issue] [js/src/jit/JitContext.cpp] [Lines 20-23, 108-110]
[Old Code]
[No initialization of ARM64 instruction cache flushing]
[Fixed Code]
[Added ARM64 CPU initialization and instruction cache flushing setup]

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential JIT Backend Security Check] [js/src/jit/JitContext.cpp] [Lines 117-123]
[Old Code]
[Simple flag computation without backend validation]
[Fixed Code]
[Added explicit JIT backend validation and executable memory initialization]

Note: While these changes appear to be security-related improvements (adding proper CPU flag initialization, instruction cache flushing, and JIT backend validation), without more context about the specific threat models or vulnerabilities they address, I can't definitively identify specific CVE-level vulnerabilities. The changes seem to be hardening measures that could prevent potential security issues related to CPU feature detection and JIT compilation.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.enable.off.1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.enable.off.1.html@@ -17,13 +17,13 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.shadowColor = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.enable.off.1.html] [Lines 17-25]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');

ctx.shadowColor = '#f00';
ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

ctx.shadowColor = '#f00';
ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. There are no security-related changes or vulnerability fixes in this diff. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or readability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.repeatx.outside.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.repeatx.outside.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -38,10 +38,10 @@         ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);         ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';         ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 16);-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to the variable name in function calls. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No Vulnerability Found [File] [Lines 17-18, 38-41]
   Old Code:
   ```javascript
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```javascript
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
   ```

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name. There are no security-related patterns being modified (no changes to input validation, no changes to sensitive operations, etc.).

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/tests/non262/ReadableStream/bug-1501502.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/tests/non262/ReadableStream/bug-1501502.js@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@+// |reftest| skip-if(!this.hasOwnProperty('ReadableStream')) // A stream can become errored with an exception from another realm. let g = newGlobal();

Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The change appears to be adding a test directive and a comment. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability [File] js/src/tests/non262/ReadableStream/bug-1501502.js [Lines] 1
   [Old Code] 
   // A stream can become errored with an exception from another realm.
   
   [Fixed Code]
   // |reftest| skip-if(!this.hasOwnProperty('ReadableStream'))
   // A stream can become errored with an exception from another realm.

The change simply adds a test directive to skip the test if the environment doesn't have ReadableStream support. This appears to be a test infrastructure improvement rather than a security fix. No actual vulnerability is being addressed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/netwerk/protocol/http/HttpChannelChild.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/netwerk/protocol/http/HttpChannelChild.cpp@@ -50,7 +50,6 @@ #include "mozilla/StoragePrincipalHelper.h" #include "SerializedLoadContext.h" #include "nsInputStreamPump.h"-#include "InterceptedChannel.h" #include "nsContentSecurityManager.h" #include "nsICompressConvStats.h" #include "mozilla/dom/Document.h"@@ -879,7 +878,9 @@     profiler_add_network_marker(         mURI, requestMethod, priority, mChannelId, NetworkLoadType::LOAD_STOP,         mLastStatusReported, TimeStamp::Now(), mTransferSize, kCacheUnknown,-        mLoadInfo->GetInnerWindowID(), &mTransactionTimings, std::move(mSource),+        mLoadInfo->GetInnerWindowID(),+        mLoadInfo->GetOriginAttributes().mPrivateBrowsingId > 0,+        &mTransactionTimings, std::move(mSource),         Some(nsDependentCString(contentType.get())));   }@@ -1365,9 +1366,11 @@     profiler_add_network_marker(         mURI, requestMethod, mPriority, mChannelId,         NetworkLoadType::LOAD_REDIRECT, mLastStatusReported, TimeStamp::Now(),-        0, kCacheUnknown, mLoadInfo->GetInnerWindowID(), &mTransactionTimings,-        std::move(mSource), Some(nsDependentCString(contentType.get())), uri,-        redirectFlags, channelId);+        0, kCacheUnknown, mLoadInfo->GetInnerWindowID(),+        mLoadInfo->GetOriginAttributes().mPrivateBrowsingId > 0,+        &mTransactionTimings, std::move(mSource),+        Some(nsDependentCString(contentType.get())), uri, redirectFlags,+        channelId);   }   if (!securityInfoSerialization.IsEmpty()) {@@ -1670,7 +1673,8 @@     profiler_add_network_marker(         mURI, requestMethod, mPriority, mChannelId, NetworkLoadType::LOAD_START,         mChannelCreationTimestamp, mLastStatusReported, 0, kCacheUnknown,-        mLoadInfo->GetInnerWindowID());+        mLoadInfo->GetInnerWindowID(),+        mLoadInfo->GetOriginAttributes().mPrivateBrowsingId > 0);   }   StoreIsPending(true);   StoreWasOpened(true);@@ -1996,7 +2000,8 @@     profiler_add_network_marker(         mURI, requestMethod, mPriority, mChannelId, NetworkLoadType::LOAD_START,         mChannelCreationTimestamp, mLastStatusReported, 0, kCacheUnknown,-        mLoadInfo->GetInnerWindowID());+        mLoadInfo->GetInnerWindowID(),+        mLoadInfo->GetOriginAttributes().mPrivateBrowsingId > 0);   }   StoreIsPending(true);   StoreWasOpened(true);@@ -2034,8 +2039,6 @@   if (!target) {     return;   }--  gNeckoChild->SetEventTargetForActor(this, target);   {     MutexAutoLock lock(mEventTargetMutex);@@ -2481,8 +2484,6 @@   RefPtr<AltDataOutputStreamChild> stream = new AltDataOutputStreamChild();   stream->AddIPDLReference();-  gNeckoChild->SetEventTargetForActor(stream, neckoTarget);-   if (!gNeckoChild->SendPAltDataOutputStreamConstructor(           stream, nsCString(aType), aPredictedSize, this)) {     return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Leak] [netwerk/protocol/http/HttpChannelChild.cpp] [Lines 879, 1365, 1670, 1996]
[Old Code]
profiler_add_network_marker calls without private browsing flag
[Fixed Code]
profiler_add_network_marker calls now include mLoadInfo->GetOriginAttributes().mPrivateBrowsingId > 0

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Race Condition] [netwerk/protocol/http/HttpChannelChild.cpp] [Lines 2034-2484]
[Old Code]
gNeckoChild->SetEventTargetForActor calls present
[Fixed Code]
gNeckoChild->SetEventTargetForActor calls removed

The changes appear to be related to:
1. Adding private browsing status to network profiler markers, which could help prevent information leakage in private browsing mode
2. Removing actor event target setting which might relate to race condition prevention, though the exact security implications aren't clear from the diff alone

Note: While these changes appear security-related, I can't definitively identify specific CVE or well-known vulnerability patterns from this diff alone. The changes seem to be improving security posture rather than fixing known vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.fillRect.clip.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.fillRect.clip.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 16, 16);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Variable Renaming [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.fillRect.clip.html] [Lines 17-29]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` throughout the file. There are no security-related changes in this diff, just a variable name refactoring for consistency or clarity. No security vulnerabilities were identified or fixed in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/uriloader/exthandler/tests/mochitest/browser_download_skips_dialog.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/uriloader/exthandler/tests/mochitest/browser_download_skips_dialog.js@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@     set: [       ["browser.download.improvements_to_download_panel", true],       ["browser.download.useDownloadDir", true],+      ["image.webp.enabled", true],     ],   });@@ -26,7 +27,7 @@   let loadingTab = await BrowserTestUtils.openNewForegroundTab({     gBrowser,-    opening: TEST_PATH + "file_image_svgxml.svg",+    opening: TEST_PATH + "file_green.webp",     waitForLoad: false,     waitForStateStop: true,   });

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability [uriloader/exthandler/tests/mochitest/browser_download_skips_dialog.js] [Lines 13,26]
Old Code: 
    set: [
      ["browser.download.improvements_to_download_panel", true],
      ["browser.download.useDownloadDir", true],
    ],
    opening: TEST_PATH + "file_image_svgxml.svg",
Fixed Code:
    set: [
      ["browser.download.improvements_to_download_panel", true],
      ["browser.download.useDownloadDir", true],
      ["image.webp.enabled", true],
    ],
    opening: TEST_PATH + "file_green.webp",

Additional Details:
1. The changes appear to be test-related modifications rather than security fixes
2. The main changes are:
   - Adding WebP image support configuration
   - Changing the test file from SVG to WebP format
3. No obvious security vulnerabilities are being addressed in this diff
4. The changes seem to be related to test coverage expansion for WebP handling

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.