--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/promise/Promise-inl.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/promise/Promise-inl.h@@ -23,9 +23,11 @@   PromiseNativeThenHandlerBase(Promise& aPromise) : mPromise(&aPromise) {}-  void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override;+  void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+                        ErrorResult& aRv) override;-  void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override;+  void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+                        ErrorResult& aRv) override;  protected:   virtual ~PromiseNativeThenHandlerBase() = default;

Here's the analysis following the requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Error Handling Improvement] [dom/promise/Promise-inl.h] [Lines 23-27]
[Old Code]
void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override;
void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override;
[Fixed Code]
void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,
                     ErrorResult& aRv) override;
void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,
                     ErrorResult& aRv) override;

Additional Details:
The change adds ErrorResult parameters to callback functions, which suggests improved error handling. While this isn't directly fixing a known vulnerability, it could potentially prevent security issues related to unhandled errors. The modification allows for proper error propagation and handling, which could prevent undefined behavior or information leaks that might occur when errors aren't properly caught and managed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/base/GeometryUtils.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/base/GeometryUtils.cpp@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@     }   }-  virtual void AddBox(nsIFrame* aFrame) override {+  void AddBox(nsIFrame* aFrame) override {     nsIFrame* f = aFrame;     if (mBoxType == CSSBoxType::Margin && f->IsTableFrame()) {       // Margin boxes for table frames should be taken from the table wrapper@@ -207,8 +207,8 @@           CSSPoint(nsPresContext::AppUnitsToFloatCSSPixels(appUnits[i].x),                    nsPresContext::AppUnitsToFloatCSSPixels(appUnits[i].y));     }-    nsLayoutUtils::TransformResult rv =-        nsLayoutUtils::TransformPoints(f, mRelativeToFrame, 4, points);+    nsLayoutUtils::TransformResult rv = nsLayoutUtils::TransformPoints(+        RelativeTo{f}, RelativeTo{mRelativeToFrame}, 4, points);     if (rv == nsLayoutUtils::TRANSFORM_SUCCEEDED) {       CSSPoint delta(           nsPresContext::AppUnitsToFloatCSSPixels(mRelativeToBoxTopLeft.x),@@ -422,8 +422,8 @@   for (uint32_t i = 0; i < aPointCount; ++i) {     aPoints[i] += fromOffsetGfx;   }-  nsLayoutUtils::TransformResult rv =-      nsLayoutUtils::TransformPoints(fromFrame, toFrame, aPointCount, aPoints);+  nsLayoutUtils::TransformResult rv = nsLayoutUtils::TransformPoints(+      RelativeTo{fromFrame}, RelativeTo{toFrame}, aPointCount, aPoints);   if (rv == nsLayoutUtils::TRANSFORM_SUCCEEDED) {     CSSPoint toOffsetGfx(nsPresContext::AppUnitsToFloatCSSPixels(toOffset.x),                          nsPresContext::AppUnitsToFloatCSSPixels(toOffset.y));

Analyzing the provided code diff, I'll examine each change for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. First change (virtual keyword removal):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability - File: layout/base/GeometryUtils.cpp - Lines: 191
    Old Code: virtual void AddBox(nsIFrame* aFrame) override {
    Fixed Code: void AddBox(nsIFrame* aFrame) override {
    Additional Details: This is a code style/optimization change removing redundant virtual keyword (already implied by override)

2. Second change (TransformPoints parameter change):
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    Potential Parameter Handling Issue - File: layout/base/GeometryUtils.cpp - Lines: 207-208
    Old Code: nsLayoutUtils::TransformResult rv = nsLayoutUtils::TransformPoints(f, mRelativeToFrame, 4, points);
    Fixed Code: nsLayoutUtils::TransformResult rv = nsLayoutUtils::TransformPoints(RelativeTo{f}, RelativeTo{mRelativeToFrame}, 4, points);
    Additional Details: The change wraps frame parameters in RelativeTo struct. While this appears to be an API improvement, there's a possibility it could address potential frame reference handling issues, though no specific vulnerability is evident.

3. Third change (similar TransformPoints parameter change):
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    Potential Parameter Handling Issue - File: layout/base/GeometryUtils.cpp - Lines: 422-423
    Old Code: nsLayoutUtils::TransformResult rv = nsLayoutUtils::TransformPoints(fromFrame, toFrame, aPointCount, aPoints);
    Fixed Code: nsLayoutUtils::TransformResult rv = nsLayoutUtils::TransformPoints(RelativeTo{fromFrame}, RelativeTo{toFrame}, aPointCount, aPoints);
    Additional Details: Similar to previous change, this wraps parameters in RelativeTo struct. Could potentially address frame reference validation issues but no specific vulnerability is identified.

No clear security vulnerabilities were fixed in these changes, but the modifications to use RelativeTo wrappers might improve parameter validation and handling, potentially preventing certain classes of issues related to frame references. The changes appear to be more about API improvement and code robustness than fixing specific known vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/active-selection-045.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/active-selection-045.html@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-pseudo-4/#highlight-painting">   <link rel="match" href="../reference/ref-nothing-below.xht">-  <meta content="" name="flags">   <meta name="assert" content="This test checks that the associated overlay for image must not cover (or leak) outside the image's content box.">   <style>

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Leak] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/active-selection-045.html] [Line 10]
[Old Code] <meta content="" name="flags">
[Fixed Code] [removed]

Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of a meta tag with name="flags" and empty content
- While not clearly a security vulnerability, empty or improperly used meta tags could potentially be used for information leakage or fingerprinting
- The removal might be part of general cleanup rather than a security fix
- Without more context about the purpose of this "flags" meta tag, it's difficult to determine if this was actually a security issue

No other vulnerabilities are apparent in this small diff. The main change is the removal of a seemingly unused meta tag.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-size-062.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-size-062.html@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-contain-1/#containment-size">   <link rel="match" href="reference/contain-size-062-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <style>   div

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-size-062.html [Lines 8]
[Old Code]
  <meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code]
(removed)

Additional Details:
This appears to be a simple cleanup of test metadata rather than a security fix. The removed line was an empty meta tag for test flags, which doesn't appear to have any security implications. The change seems to be removing unnecessary test configuration rather than addressing a vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/ipc/glue/BackgroundChild.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/ipc/glue/BackgroundChild.h@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ namespace dom { class BlobImpl;+class ContentChild; class ContentParent; class ContentProcess;@@ -24,12 +25,14 @@ namespace net { class SocketProcessChild;+class SocketProcessBridgeChild; }  // namespace net namespace ipc { class PBackgroundChild;+class PBackgroundStarterChild; // This class allows access to the PBackground protocol. PBackground allows // communication between any thread (in the parent or a child process) and a@@ -53,6 +56,10 @@ // // The PBackgroundChild actor and all its sub-protocol actors will be // automatically destroyed when its designated thread completes.+//+// Init{Content,Socket,SocketBridge}Starter must be called on the main thread+// with an actor bridging to the relevant target process type before these+// methods can be used. class BackgroundChild final {   friend class mozilla::dom::ContentParent;   friend class mozilla::dom::ContentProcess;@@ -65,19 +72,26 @@   static PBackgroundChild* GetForCurrentThread();   // See above.-  static PBackgroundChild* GetOrCreateForCurrentThread(-      nsIEventTarget* aMainEventTarget = nullptr);+  static PBackgroundChild* GetOrCreateForCurrentThread();++  // See above.+  static PBackgroundChild* GetOrCreateSocketActorForCurrentThread();++  // See above.+  static PBackgroundChild* GetOrCreateForSocketParentBridgeForCurrentThread();   // See above.   static void CloseForCurrentThread();   // See above.-  static PBackgroundChild* GetOrCreateSocketActorForCurrentThread(-      nsIEventTarget* aMainEventTarget = nullptr);+  static void InitContentStarter(mozilla::dom::ContentChild* aContent);   // See above.-  static PBackgroundChild* GetOrCreateForSocketParentBridgeForCurrentThread(-      nsIEventTarget* aMainEventTarget = nullptr);+  static void InitSocketStarter(mozilla::net::SocketProcessChild* aSocket);++  // See above.+  static void InitSocketBridgeStarter(+      mozilla::net::SocketProcessBridgeChild* aSocketBridge);  private:   // Only called by this class's friends.

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Access Control Issue] [ipc/glue/BackgroundChild.h] [Lines 65-92]
   [Old Code]
   static PBackgroundChild* GetOrCreateForCurrentThread(
       nsIEventTarget* aMainEventTarget = nullptr);
   static PBackgroundChild* GetOrCreateSocketActorForCurrentThread(
       nsIEventTarget* aMainEventTarget = nullptr);
   static PBackgroundChild* GetOrCreateForSocketParentBridgeForCurrentThread(
       nsIEventTarget* aMainEventTarget = nullptr);
   
   [Fixed Code]
   static PBackgroundChild* GetOrCreateForCurrentThread();
   static PBackgroundChild* GetOrCreateSocketActorForCurrentThread();
   static PBackgroundChild* GetOrCreateForSocketParentBridgeForCurrentThread();
   static void InitContentStarter(mozilla::dom::ContentChild* aContent);
   static void InitSocketStarter(mozilla::net::SocketProcessChild* aSocket);
   static void InitSocketBridgeStarter(
       mozilla::net::SocketProcessBridgeChild* aSocketBridge);

   Additional Details: The changes involve removing the optional nsIEventTarget parameter and adding explicit initialization methods. This could potentially address an access control issue where the wrong event target might be used, but without more context, we can't be certain.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Initialization Order Vulnerability] [ipc/glue/BackgroundChild.h] [Lines 56-60]
   [Old Code]
   // The PBackgroundChild actor and all its sub-protocol actors will be
   // automatically destroyed when its designated thread completes.
   
   [Fixed Code]
   // The PBackgroundChild actor and all its sub-protocol actors will be
   // automatically destroyed when its designated thread completes.
   //
   // Init{Content,Socket,SocketBridge}Starter must be called on the main thread
   // with an actor bridging to the relevant target process type before these
   // methods can be used.

   Additional Details: The added documentation suggests there might have been a potential issue with initialization order or thread safety that could lead to race conditions or improper initialization. The explicit requirement for initialization on the main thread could be addressing such an issue.

Note: While these changes appear to be security-related improvements, without more context about the actual vulnerabilities they address or the bug reports that motivated them, we can only speculate about the specific vulnerabilities that might have existed. The changes do suggest tighter control over initialization and thread safety, which are common areas for security vulnerabilities in IPC code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/enc_image_bundle.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/enc_image_bundle.h@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ // pointer to &in. // Returns false if color transform fails. Status TransformIfNeeded(const ImageBundle& in, const ColorEncoding& c_desired,-                         ThreadPool* pool, ImageBundle* store,-                         const ImageBundle** out);+                         const JxlCmsInterface& cms, ThreadPool* pool,+                         ImageBundle* store, const ImageBundle** out); }  // namespace jxl

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
Potential Missing Input Validation [File] third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/enc_image_bundle.h [Lines] 17-21  
[Old Code]  
```cpp
Status TransformIfNeeded(const ImageBundle& in, const ColorEncoding& c_desired,
                         ThreadPool* pool, ImageBundle* store,
                         const ImageBundle** out);
```  
[Fixed Code]  
```cpp
Status TransformIfNeeded(const ImageBundle& in, const ColorEncoding& c_desired,
                         const JxlCmsInterface& cms, ThreadPool* pool,
                         ImageBundle* store, const ImageBundle** out);
```  

Additional Details:  
The diff shows the addition of a new parameter `const JxlCmsInterface& cms` to the function. While this doesn't directly indicate a security vulnerability, it could potentially be related to security hardening by:  
1. Adding better color management system control  
2. Preventing potential color transformation issues  
3. Adding validation through the CMS interface  

Without more context about the implementation or any associated CVE, I can't definitively say this fixes a security vulnerability, but it appears to be a robustness improvement that could have security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.hex2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.hex2.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; try { ctx.fillStyle = '#f0'; } catch (e) { } // this shouldn't throw, but it shouldn't matter here if it does ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring (variable renaming) with no security implications. Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.hex2.html] [Lines 17-25]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    [...]
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    [...]
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes only involve:
1. Renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Updating the variable name in the `_assertPixel` call accordingly

There are no changes to the actual functionality or security-related aspects of the code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/public/ContextOptions.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/public/ContextOptions.h@@ -51,10 +51,14 @@         fuzzing_(false),         privateClassFields_(false),         privateClassMethods_(false),- #ifdef ENABLE_CHANGE_ARRAY_BY_COPY+#ifdef NIGHTLY_BUILD+        arrayGrouping_(true),+#endif+#ifdef ENABLE_CHANGE_ARRAY_BY_COPY         changeArrayByCopy_(false),- #endif+#endif         ergonomicBrandChecks_(false),+        classStaticBlocks_(false),         importAssertions_(false) {   }   // clang-format on@@ -164,6 +168,14 @@     ergonomicBrandChecks_ = enabled;     return *this;   }++#ifdef NIGHTLY_BUILD+  bool arrayGrouping() const { return arrayGrouping_; }+  ContextOptions& setArrayGrouping(bool enabled) {+    arrayGrouping_ = enabled;+    return *this;+  }+#endif #ifdef ENABLE_CHANGE_ARRAY_BY_COPY   bool changeArrayByCopy() const { return changeArrayByCopy_; }@@ -294,6 +306,9 @@   bool fuzzing_ : 1;   bool privateClassFields_ : 1;   bool privateClassMethods_ : 1;+#ifdef NIGHTLY_BUILD+  bool arrayGrouping_ : 1;+#endif #ifdef ENABLE_CHANGE_ARRAY_BY_COPY   bool changeArrayByCopy_ : 1; #endif

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] js/public/ContextOptions.h [Lines] Various
   [Old Code]
   Various context options without arrayGrouping_ flag
   [Fixed Code]
   Added arrayGrouping_ flag conditionally for NIGHTLY_BUILD

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] js/public/ContextOptions.h [Lines] Various
   [Old Code]
   Missing classStaticBlocks_ flag
   [Fixed Code]
   Added classStaticBlocks_ flag initialization

The changes appear to be feature additions rather than security fixes:
1. Added support for arrayGrouping feature (gated behind NIGHTLY_BUILD)
2. Added support for classStaticBlocks feature
3. Maintained existing ENABLE_CHANGE_ARRAY_BY_COPY feature flag structure

No security vulnerabilities were fixed in this diff. The changes are primarily feature additions and code organization improvements.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/webcodecs/videoFrame-construction.any.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/webcodecs/videoFrame-construction.any.js@@ -262,7 +262,8 @@   let scaledFrame = new VideoFrame(image,     { visibleRect : {x: 0, y: 0, width: 2, height: 2},-      displayWidth: 10, displayHeight: 20+      displayWidth: 10, displayHeight: 20,+      timestamp: 0     });   assert_equals(scaledFrame.codedWidth, 32);   assert_equals(scaledFrame.codedHeight, 16);@@ -279,7 +280,8 @@   let scaledFrame = new VideoFrame(image,     {-      displayWidth: 10, displayHeight: 20+      displayWidth: 10, displayHeight: 20,+      timestamp: 0     });   assert_equals(scaledFrame.codedWidth, 32);   assert_equals(scaledFrame.codedHeight, 16);@@ -545,7 +547,7 @@ test(t => {   let canvas = makeOffscreenCanvas(16, 16);-  let frame = new VideoFrame(canvas);+  let frame = new VideoFrame(canvas, {timestamp: 0});   assert_equals(frame.displayWidth, 16);   assert_equals(frame.displayHeight, 16);   frame.close();@@ -609,14 +611,14 @@ test(t => {   let canvas = makeOffscreenCanvas(16, 16, {alpha: true});-  let frame = new VideoFrame(canvas);+  let frame = new VideoFrame(canvas, {timestamp: 0});   assert_true(       frame.format == 'RGBA' || frame.format == 'BGRA' ||           frame.format == 'I420A',       'plane format should have alpha: ' + frame.format);   frame.close();-  frame = new VideoFrame(canvas, {alpha: 'discard'});+  frame = new VideoFrame(canvas, {alpha: 'discard', timestamp: 0});   assert_true(       frame.format == 'RGBX' || frame.format == 'BGRX' ||           frame.format == 'I420',

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Missing Timestamp Parameter] [testing/web-platform/tests/webcodecs/videoFrame-construction.any.js] [Lines 262-280, 545, 609-611]
    [Old Code]
    let scaledFrame = new VideoFrame(image,
      { visibleRect : {x: 0, y: 0, width: 2, height: 2},
        displayWidth: 10, displayHeight: 20
      });
    [Fixed Code]
    let scaledFrame = new VideoFrame(image,
      { visibleRect : {x: 0, y: 0, width: 2, height: 2},
        displayWidth: 10, displayHeight: 20,
        timestamp: 0
      });

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Missing Timestamp Parameter] [testing/web-platform/tests/webcodecs/videoFrame-construction.any.js] [Lines 545]
    [Old Code]
    let frame = new VideoFrame(canvas);
    [Fixed Code]
    let frame = new VideoFrame(canvas, {timestamp: 0});

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Missing Timestamp Parameter] [testing/web-platform/tests/webcodecs/videoFrame-construction.any.js] [Lines 609-611]
    [Old Code]
    let frame = new VideoFrame(canvas);
    frame = new VideoFrame(canvas, {alpha: 'discard'});
    [Fixed Code]
    let frame = new VideoFrame(canvas, {timestamp: 0});
    frame = new VideoFrame(canvas, {alpha: 'discard', timestamp: 0});

Note: While the changes consistently add a timestamp parameter to VideoFrame constructors, I'm not certain if this constitutes a security vulnerability or just an API usage improvement. The timestamp parameter might be important for synchronization or security purposes in video processing, but without more context about the WebCodecs API requirements, I can't definitively classify this as a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/platforms/android/RemoteDataDecoder.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/platforms/android/RemoteDataDecoder.h@@ -92,6 +92,12 @@     return mNumPendingInputs > 0;   }+  // Returns true if we are in a state which requires a new decoder to be+  // created. In this case all errors will be reported as+  // NS_ERROR_DOM_MEDIA_NEED_NEW_DECODER to avoid reporting errors as fatal when+  // they can be fixed with a new decoder.+  virtual bool NeedsNewDecoder() const { return false; }+   // The following members must only be accessed on mThread.   MozPromiseHolder<DecodePromise> mDecodePromise;   MozPromiseHolder<DecodePromise> mDrainPromise;

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential State Management Issue] [dom/media/platforms/android/RemoteDataDecoder.h] [Lines 92-98]
    [Old Code]
    (No equivalent function existed before)
    [Fixed Code]
    // Returns true if we are in a state which requires a new decoder to be
    // created. In this case all errors will be reported as
    // NS_ERROR_DOM_MEDIA_NEED_NEW_DECODER to avoid reporting errors as fatal when
    // they can be fixed with a new decoder.
    virtual bool NeedsNewDecoder() const { return false; }

Analysis:
The change adds a new virtual method to handle decoder state management. While this doesn't directly show a security vulnerability, it appears to be part of a larger fix for error handling and state management in the media decoder. The comment suggests it's meant to prevent fatal errors by allowing decoder recreation, which could potentially relate to denial-of-service scenarios if the previous implementation didn't properly handle decoder errors. However, without seeing the complete context of how this function is used, I can't be certain if this fixes an actual vulnerability.

No clear vulnerability name can be identified from this change alone, but it appears to be related to error handling and state management improvements.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/vibration/META.yml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/vibration/META.yml@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@ spec: https://w3c.github.io/vibration/ suggested_reviewers:-  - zqzhang+  - anssiko

Based on the provided diff, this appears to be a simple change in reviewer assignment rather than a security fix. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/vibration/META.yml] [Lines 2-3]
[Old Code]
  - zqzhang
[Fixed Code]
  - anssiko

Additional Details:
- This is purely a metadata change in the test file's reviewer assignment
- No actual code changes were made that could affect security
- The file in question is a test configuration file (META.yml) rather than production code
- No security-related patterns or vulnerabilities are present in this diff

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-size-056.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-size-056.html@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-contain-1/#containment-size">   <link rel="match" href="reference/contain-size-056-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <style>   table

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The change appears to be removing an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which doesn't seem security-related.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-size-056.html] [Lines 8]
Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">
Fixed Code: (removed line)

Additional notes:
1. The change is removing an empty meta tag that doesn't appear to have any security implications
2. This seems to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
3. No known vulnerability patterns are present in this change
4. The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive functionality

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/src/waker.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/src/waker.rs@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ //! Waking mechanism for threads blocked on channel operations.+use std::ptr; use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering}; use std::thread::{self, ThreadId};@@ -13,7 +14,7 @@     pub(crate) oper: Operation,     /// Optional packet.-    pub(crate) packet: usize,+    pub(crate) packet: *mut (),     /// Context associated with the thread owning this operation.     pub(crate) cx: Context,@@ -44,12 +45,12 @@     /// Registers a select operation.     #[inline]     pub(crate) fn register(&mut self, oper: Operation, cx: &Context) {-        self.register_with_packet(oper, 0, cx);+        self.register_with_packet(oper, ptr::null_mut(), cx);     }     /// Registers a select operation and a packet.     #[inline]-    pub(crate) fn register_with_packet(&mut self, oper: Operation, packet: usize, cx: &Context) {+    pub(crate) fn register_with_packet(&mut self, oper: Operation, packet: *mut (), cx: &Context) {         self.selectors.push(Entry {             oper,             packet,@@ -76,34 +77,26 @@     /// Attempts to find another thread's entry, select the operation, and wake it up.     #[inline]     pub(crate) fn try_select(&mut self) -> Option<Entry> {-        let mut entry = None;--        if !self.selectors.is_empty() {-            let thread_id = current_thread_id();--            for i in 0..self.selectors.len() {+        self.selectors+            .iter()+            .position(|selector| {                 // Does the entry belong to a different thread?-                if self.selectors[i].cx.thread_id() != thread_id {-                    // Try selecting this operation.-                    let sel = Selected::Operation(self.selectors[i].oper);-                    let res = self.selectors[i].cx.try_select(sel);--                    if res.is_ok() {+                selector.cx.thread_id() != current_thread_id()+                    && selector // Try selecting this operation.+                        .cx+                        .try_select(Selected::Operation(selector.oper))+                        .is_ok()+                    && {                         // Provide the packet.-                        self.selectors[i].cx.store_packet(self.selectors[i].packet);+                        selector.cx.store_packet(selector.packet);                         // Wake the thread up.-                        self.selectors[i].cx.unpark();--                        // Remove the entry from the queue to keep it clean and improve-                        // performance.-                        entry = Some(self.selectors.remove(i));-                        break;+                        selector.cx.unpark();+                        true                     }-                }-            }-        }--        entry+            })+            // Remove the entry from the queue to keep it clean and improve+            // performance.+            .map(|pos| self.selectors.remove(pos))     }     /// Returns `true` if there is an entry which can be selected by the current thread.@@ -125,7 +118,7 @@     pub(crate) fn watch(&mut self, oper: Operation, cx: &Context) {         self.observers.push(Entry {             oper,-            packet: 0,+            packet: ptr::null_mut(),             cx: cx.clone(),         });     }@@ -269,7 +262,7 @@ impl Drop for SyncWaker {     #[inline]     fn drop(&mut self) {-        debug_assert_eq!(self.is_empty.load(Ordering::SeqCst), true);+        debug_assert!(self.is_empty.load(Ordering::SeqCst));     } }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   Vulnerability Name: Improper Pointer Type Usage
   File: third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/src/waker.rs
   Lines: Modified throughout file
   Old Code: `pub(crate) packet: usize`
   Fixed Code: `pub(crate) packet: *mut ()`
   Details: The change replaces the use of `usize` for storing pointers with the proper pointer type `*mut ()`. Using `usize` for pointers can lead to type safety issues and potential undefined behavior.

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   Vulnerability Name: Potential Null Pointer Dereference
   File: third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/src/waker.rs
   Lines: Modified throughout file
   Old Code: `0` used as null pointer value
   Fixed Code: `ptr::null_mut()` used for null pointer value
   Details: The change replaces magic number `0` with proper null pointer constant `ptr::null_mut()`, making the code more explicit and safer when dealing with null pointers.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   Vulnerability Name: Potential Race Condition
   File: third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/src/waker.rs
   Lines: Modified try_select function implementation
   Old Code: Manual iteration with mutable access
   Fixed Code: Functional style with position() and remove()
   Details: The change in `try_select` implementation might affect thread safety, though it's not clear if this was fixing an actual race condition or just improving code quality. The new implementation appears cleaner but maintains the same basic logic.

4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   Vulnerability Name: Potential Assertion Weakness
   File: third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/src/waker.rs
   Lines: 269
   Old Code: `debug_assert_eq!(self.is_empty.load(Ordering::SeqCst), true)`
   Fixed Code: `debug_assert!(self.is_empty.load(Ordering::SeqCst))`
   Details: The change simplifies the assertion, which might make it slightly more robust, though it's not clear if this was fixing a specific vulnerability or just a code style improvement.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.uncovered.pattern.destination-in.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.uncovered.pattern.destination-in.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 255, 0.5)';@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@     createImageBitmap(response).then(bitmap => {         ctx.fillStyle = ctx.createPattern(bitmap, 'no-repeat');         ctx.fillRect(0, 50, 100, 50);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't involve any security-related modifications.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14, 33]
Old Code: 
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);

Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The test functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/animation/test/mozilla/file_restyles.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/animation/test/mozilla/file_restyles.html@@ -51,6 +51,10 @@   from { transform: translate(120%, 120%); }   to { transform: translate(0%, 0%); } }+@keyframes background-color {+  from { background-color: rgb(255, 0, 0,); }+  to { background-color: rgb(0, 255, 0,); }+} div {   /* Element needs geometry to be eligible for layerization */   width: 100px;@@ -2098,7 +2102,7 @@   add_task_if_omta_enabled(async function no_restyling_compositor_animations_in_opacity_zero_descendant() {     const container = addDiv(null, { style: 'opacity: 0' });-    const child = addDiv(null, { style: 'animation: rotate 100s infinite;' });+    const child = addDiv(null, { style: 'animation: background-color 100s infinite;' });     container.appendChild(child);     const animation = child.getAnimations()[0];@@ -2115,7 +2119,7 @@   add_task_if_omta_enabled(async function no_restyling_compositor_animations_in_opacity_zero_descendant_abspos() {     const container = addDiv(null, { style: 'opacity: 0' });-    const child = addDiv(null, { style: 'position: abspos; animation: rotate 100s infinite;' });+    const child = addDiv(null, { style: 'position: abspos; animation: background-color 100s infinite;' });     container.appendChild(child);     const animation = child.getAnimations()[0];

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
No specific vulnerability found [File: dom/animation/test/mozilla/file_restyles.html] [Lines: 51-54, 2102, 2119]  
[Old Code]  
(None - new animation added)  
[Fixed Code]  
@keyframes background-color {  
  from { background-color: rgb(255, 0, 0,); }  
  to { background-color: rgb(0, 255, 0,); }  
}  

2. Vulnerability Existed: no  
No specific vulnerability found [File: dom/animation/test/mozilla/file_restyles.html] [Lines: 2102]  
[Old Code]  
const child = addDiv(null, { style: 'animation: rotate 100s infinite;' });  
[Fixed Code]  
const child = addDiv(null, { style: 'animation: background-color 100s infinite;' });  

3. Vulnerability Existed: no  
No specific vulnerability found [File: dom/animation/test/mozilla/file_restyles.html] [Lines: 2119]  
[Old Code]  
const child = addDiv(null, { style: 'position: abspos; animation: rotate 100s infinite;' });  
[Fixed Code]  
const child = addDiv(null, { style: 'position: abspos; animation: background-color 100s infinite;' });  

Notes:
- The changes appear to be test modifications rather than security fixes
- The main change is replacing a rotation animation with a background-color animation in test cases
- The diff shows test case updates to verify animation behavior with opacity and positioning
- No security vulnerabilities are evident in these changes

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.solid.destination-atop.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.solid.destination-atop.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 255, 1.0)';@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'destination-atop'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(255, 255, 0, 1.0)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,255,255, "50,25", "0,255,255,255", 5);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,255,255, "50,25", "0,255,255,255", 5); t.done(); });

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 17-18, 26]
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Variable Reference Update [File] [Line 26]
   Old Code:
   _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,255,255, "50,25", "0,255,255,255", 5);
   Fixed Code:
   _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,255,255, "50,25", "0,255,255,255", 5);

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating all references to it. There are no security vulnerabilities being fixed in this diff - it's simply a variable naming consistency improvement. The functionality remains exactly the same.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-background-position-1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-background-position-1.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="L. David Baron" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=594934">   <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-values/#calc-notation">   <link rel="match" href="calc-background-position-1-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content=""> <style type="text/css"> p {

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-background-position-1.html] [Lines 5]
[Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">]
[Fixed Code: [removed line]]

Additional Details:
1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which appears to be test-related metadata.
2. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed here - this appears to be a minor cleanup or test configuration change.
3. The empty flags attribute wasn't posing any security risk, and its removal doesn't correspond to any known vulnerability pattern.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/webauthn/U2FTokenManager.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/webauthn/U2FTokenManager.cpp@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@   mLastTransactionId = aTransactionId;   // Determine whether direct attestation was requested.-  bool directAttestationRequested = false;+  bool noneAttestationRequested = true; // On Android, let's always reject direct attestations until we have a // mechanism to solicit user consent, from Bug 1550164@@ -332,17 +332,16 @@     AttestationConveyancePreference attestation =         extra.attestationConveyancePreference();-    directAttestationRequested =-        attestation == AttestationConveyancePreference::Direct;+    noneAttestationRequested =+        attestation == AttestationConveyancePreference::None;   } #endif  // not MOZ_WIDGET_ANDROID   // Start a register request immediately if direct attestation   // wasn't requested or the test pref is set.-  if (!directAttestationRequested ||+  if (noneAttestationRequested ||       U2FPrefManager::Get()->GetAllowDirectAttestationForTesting()) {-    // Force "none" attestation when "direct" attestation wasn't requested.-    DoRegister(aTransactionInfo, !directAttestationRequested);+    DoRegister(aTransactionInfo, noneAttestationRequested);     return;   }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
Potential Attestation Policy Bypass [dom/webauthn/U2FTokenManager.cpp] [Lines 321-332]  
[Old Code]  
```cpp
bool directAttestationRequested = false;
...
directAttestationRequested = attestation == AttestationConveyancePreference::Direct;
```  
[Fixed Code]  
```cpp
bool noneAttestationRequested = true;
...
noneAttestationRequested = attestation == AttestationConveyancePreference::None;
```

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
Potential Logic Flaw in Attestation Check [dom/webauthn/U2FTokenManager.cpp] [Lines 339-342]  
[Old Code]  
```cpp
if (!directAttestationRequested ||
    U2FPrefManager::Get()->GetAllowDirectAttestationForTesting()) {
    DoRegister(aTransactionInfo, !directAttestationRequested);
```  
[Fixed Code]  
```cpp
if (noneAttestationRequested ||
    U2FPrefManager::Get()->GetAllowDirectAttestationForTesting()) {
    DoRegister(aTransactionInfo, noneAttestationRequested);
```

The changes appear to be related to how attestation preferences are handled in WebAuthn, but without more context about the security implications of attestation conveyance preferences, it's difficult to determine if these were actual vulnerabilities or just code improvements. The changes:
1. Flip the logic from checking for "direct" attestation to checking for "none" attestation
2. Change the default behavior (from defaulting to no direct attestation to defaulting to none attestation)
3. Simplify the logic in the conditional check

These could potentially relate to security if the attestation preferences affect what sensitive information is shared during authentication, but we can't confirm specific vulnerabilities without more context.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/neqo-crypto/build.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/neqo-crypto/build.rs@@ -315,10 +315,13 @@     flags }+#[cfg(feature = "gecko")] fn setup_for_gecko() -> Vec<String> {+    use mozbuild::TOPOBJDIR;+     let mut flags: Vec<String> = Vec::new();-    let fold_libs = env::var("MOZ_FOLD_LIBS").unwrap_or_default() == "1";+    let fold_libs = mozbuild::config::MOZ_FOLD_LIBS;     let libs = if fold_libs {         vec!["nss3"]     } else {@@ -329,59 +332,62 @@         println!("cargo:rustc-link-lib=dylib={}", lib);     }-    if let Some(path) = env::var_os("MOZ_TOPOBJDIR").map(PathBuf::from) {-        if fold_libs {-            println!(-                "cargo:rustc-link-search=native={}",-                path.join("security").to_str().unwrap()-            );-        } else {-            println!(-                "cargo:rustc-link-search=native={}",-                path.join("dist").join("bin").to_str().unwrap()-            );-            let nsslib_path = path.join("security").join("nss").join("lib");-            println!(-                "cargo:rustc-link-search=native={}",-                nsslib_path.join("nss").join("nss_nss3").to_str().unwrap()-            );-            println!(-                "cargo:rustc-link-search=native={}",-                nsslib_path.join("ssl").join("ssl_ssl3").to_str().unwrap()-            );-            println!(-                "cargo:rustc-link-search=native={}",-                path.join("config")-                    .join("external")-                    .join("nspr")-                    .join("pr")-                    .to_str()-                    .unwrap()-            );-        }--        let flags_path = path.join("netwerk/socket/neqo/extra-bindgen-flags");--        println!("cargo:rerun-if-changed={}", flags_path.to_str().unwrap());-        flags = fs::read_to_string(flags_path)-            .expect("Failed to read extra-bindgen-flags file")-            .split_whitespace()-            .map(std::borrow::ToOwned::to_owned)-            .collect();--        flags.push(String::from("-include"));-        flags.push(-            path.join("dist")-                .join("include")-                .join("mozilla-config.h")+    if fold_libs {+        println!(+            "cargo:rustc-link-search=native={}",+            TOPOBJDIR.join("security").to_str().unwrap()+        );+    } else {+        println!(+            "cargo:rustc-link-search=native={}",+            TOPOBJDIR.join("dist").join("bin").to_str().unwrap()+        );+        let nsslib_path = TOPOBJDIR.join("security").join("nss").join("lib");+        println!(+            "cargo:rustc-link-search=native={}",+            nsslib_path.join("nss").join("nss_nss3").to_str().unwrap()+        );+        println!(+            "cargo:rustc-link-search=native={}",+            nsslib_path.join("ssl").join("ssl_ssl3").to_str().unwrap()+        );+        println!(+            "cargo:rustc-link-search=native={}",+            TOPOBJDIR+                .join("config")+                .join("external")+                .join("nspr")+                .join("pr")                 .to_str()                 .unwrap()-                .to_string(),         );-    } else {-        println!("cargo:warning=MOZ_TOPOBJDIR should be set by default, otherwise the build is not guaranteed to finish.");-    }+    }++    let flags_path = TOPOBJDIR.join("netwerk/socket/neqo/extra-bindgen-flags");++    println!("cargo:rerun-if-changed={}", flags_path.to_str().unwrap());+    flags = fs::read_to_string(flags_path)+        .expect("Failed to read extra-bindgen-flags file")+        .split_whitespace()+        .map(std::borrow::ToOwned::to_owned)+        .collect();++    flags.push(String::from("-include"));+    flags.push(+        TOPOBJDIR+            .join("dist")+            .join("include")+            .join("mozilla-config.h")+            .to_str()+            .unwrap()+            .to_string(),+    );     flags+}++#[cfg(not(feature = "gecko"))]+fn setup_for_gecko() -> Vec<String> {+    unreachable!() } fn main() {

Analyzing the provided code diff, I'll identify potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Hardcoded Path Vulnerability [third_party/rust/neqo-crypto/build.rs] [Lines 315-332]
Old Code:
```rust
fn setup_for_gecko() -> Vec<String> {
    let mut flags: Vec<String> = Vec::new();

    let fold_libs = env::var("MOZ_FOLD_LIBS").unwrap_or_default() == "1";
```
Fixed Code:
```rust
#[cfg(feature = "gecko")]
fn setup_for_gecko() -> Vec<String> {
    use mozbuild::TOPOBJDIR;

    let mut flags: Vec<String> = Vec::new();

    let fold_libs = mozbuild::config::MOZ_FOLD_LIBS;
```
Analysis: The change moves from environment variable reading to using a config value, which might be more secure, but it's unclear if this was specifically a security fix.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Path Traversal Vulnerability [third_party/rust/neqo-crypto/build.rs] [Lines 329-362]
Old Code:
```rust
if let Some(path) = env::var_os("MOZ_TOPOBJDIR").map(PathBuf::from) {
    if fold_libs {
        println!(
            "cargo:rustc-link-search=native={}",
            path.join("security").to_str().unwrap()
        );
```
Fixed Code:
```rust
if fold_libs {
    println!(
        "cargo:rustc-link-search=native={}",
        TOPOBJDIR.join("security").to_str().unwrap()
    );
```
Analysis: The change removes dependency on environment variables for path construction, which could potentially prevent path traversal if MOZ_TOPOBJDIR was maliciously set, but this isn't clearly a security fix.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Build System Misconfiguration [third_party/rust/neqo-crypto/build.rs] [Lines 389-392]
Old Code: (No equivalent)
Fixed Code:
```rust
#[cfg(not(feature = "gecko"))]
fn setup_for_gecko() -> Vec<String> {
    unreachable!()
}
```
Analysis: Added explicit unreachable case for non-gecko builds, which could prevent accidental execution of incorrect code paths, but this appears more like a robustness improvement than a security fix.

Note: While there are several changes in the build configuration, none clearly address known vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be more about improving build reliability and code organization rather than fixing specific security issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/downloads/test/browser/browser_downloads_panel_context_menu.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/downloads/test/browser/browser_downloads_panel_context_menu.js@@ -4,6 +4,19 @@ let gDownloadDir; const TestFiles = {};++let ReferrerInfo = Components.Constructor(+  "@mozilla.org/referrer-info;1",+  "nsIReferrerInfo",+  "init"+);++// Load a new URI with a specific referrer.+let exampleRefInfo = new ReferrerInfo(+  Ci.nsIReferrerInfo.EMPTY,+  true,+  Services.io.newURI("https://example.org")+); const MENU_ITEMS = {   pause: ".downloadPauseMenuItem",@@ -14,9 +27,10 @@   alwaysOpenSimilarFiles: '[command="downloadsCmd_alwaysOpenSimilarFiles"]',   show: '[command="downloadsCmd_show"]',   commandsSeparator: "menuseparator,.downloadCommandsSeparator",-  openReferrer: '[command="downloadsCmd_openReferrer"]',-  copyLocation: '[command="downloadsCmd_copyLocation"]',+  openReferrer: ".downloadOpenReferrerMenuItem",+  copyLocation: ".downloadCopyLocationMenuItem",   separator: "menuseparator",+  deleteFile: ".downloadDeleteFileMenuItem",   delete: '[command="cmd_delete"]',   clearList: '[command="downloadsCmd_clearList"]',   clearDownloads: '[command="downloadsCmd_clearDownloads"]',@@ -31,6 +45,9 @@         state: DownloadsCommon.DOWNLOAD_FINISHED,         contentType: "application/pdf",         target: {},+        source: {+          referrerInfo: exampleRefInfo,+        },       },     ],     expected: {@@ -42,6 +59,32 @@         MENU_ITEMS.openReferrer,         MENU_ITEMS.copyLocation,         MENU_ITEMS.separator,+        MENU_ITEMS.deleteFile,+        MENU_ITEMS.delete,+        MENU_ITEMS.clearList,+      ],+    },+  },+  {+    name:+      "Completed PDF download with improvements pref disabled and referrer info missing",+    prefEnabled: false,+    downloads: [+      {+        state: DownloadsCommon.DOWNLOAD_FINISHED,+        contentType: "application/pdf",+        target: {},+      },+    ],+    expected: {+      menu: [+        MENU_ITEMS.openInSystemViewer,+        MENU_ITEMS.alwaysOpenInSystemViewer,+        MENU_ITEMS.show,+        MENU_ITEMS.commandsSeparator,+        MENU_ITEMS.copyLocation,+        MENU_ITEMS.separator,+        MENU_ITEMS.deleteFile,         MENU_ITEMS.delete,         MENU_ITEMS.clearList,       ],@@ -55,6 +98,9 @@         state: DownloadsCommon.DOWNLOAD_CANCELED,         contentType: "application/pdf",         target: {},+        source: {+          referrerInfo: exampleRefInfo,+        },       },     ],     expected: {@@ -78,6 +124,9 @@         state: DownloadsCommon.DOWNLOAD_FINISHED,         contentType: "text/plain",         target: {},+        source: {+          referrerInfo: exampleRefInfo,+        },       },     ],     expected: {@@ -87,6 +136,7 @@         MENU_ITEMS.openReferrer,         MENU_ITEMS.copyLocation,         MENU_ITEMS.separator,+        MENU_ITEMS.deleteFile,         MENU_ITEMS.delete,         MENU_ITEMS.clearList,       ],@@ -100,6 +150,9 @@         state: DownloadsCommon.DOWNLOAD_CANCELED,         contentType: "text/plain",         target: {},+        source: {+          referrerInfo: exampleRefInfo,+        },       },     ],     expected: {@@ -123,6 +176,9 @@         state: DownloadsCommon.DOWNLOAD_FINISHED,         contentType: "text/plain",         target: {},+        source: {+          referrerInfo: exampleRefInfo,+        },       },     ],     expected: {@@ -133,6 +189,7 @@         MENU_ITEMS.openReferrer,         MENU_ITEMS.copyLocation,         MENU_ITEMS.separator,+        MENU_ITEMS.deleteFile,         MENU_ITEMS.delete,         MENU_ITEMS.clearList,       ],@@ -146,6 +203,9 @@         state: DownloadsCommon.DOWNLOAD_CANCELED,         contentType: "text/plain",         target: {},+        source: {+          referrerInfo: exampleRefInfo,+        },       },     ],     expected: {@@ -168,6 +228,9 @@         state: DownloadsCommon.DOWNLOAD_FINISHED,         contentType: "application/octet-stream",         target: {},+        source: {+          referrerInfo: exampleRefInfo,+        },       },     ],     expected: {@@ -177,6 +240,7 @@         MENU_ITEMS.openReferrer,         MENU_ITEMS.copyLocation,         MENU_ITEMS.separator,+        MENU_ITEMS.deleteFile,         MENU_ITEMS.delete,         MENU_ITEMS.clearList,       ],@@ -192,6 +256,9 @@         state: DownloadsCommon.DOWNLOAD_FINISHED,         contentType: "application/octet-stream",         target: {},+        source: {+          referrerInfo: exampleRefInfo,+        },       },     ],     expected: {@@ -205,6 +272,35 @@         MENU_ITEMS.openReferrer,         MENU_ITEMS.copyLocation,         MENU_ITEMS.separator,+        MENU_ITEMS.deleteFile,+        MENU_ITEMS.delete,+        MENU_ITEMS.clearList,+      ],+    },+  },+];++const TestCasesDeletedFile = [+  {+    name: "Deleted PDF download with improvements pref enabled",+    prefEnabled: true,+    deleted: true,+    downloads: [+      {+        state: DownloadsCommon.DOWNLOAD_FINISHED,+        contentType: "application/pdf",+        target: {},+        source: {+          referrerInfo: exampleRefInfo,+        },+      },+    ],+    expected: {+      menu: [+        MENU_ITEMS.alwaysOpenInSystemViewer,+        MENU_ITEMS.openReferrer,+        MENU_ITEMS.copyLocation,+        MENU_ITEMS.separator,         MENU_ITEMS.delete,         MENU_ITEMS.clearList,       ],@@ -293,11 +389,27 @@   add_task(tmp[testData.name]); }+for (let testData of TestCasesDeletedFile) {+  if (testData.skip) {+    info("Skipping test:" + testData.name);+    continue;+  }+  // use the 'name' property of each test case as the test function name+  // so we get useful logs+  let tmp = {+    async [testData.name]() {+      await testDownloadContextMenu(testData);+    },+  };+  add_task(tmp[testData.name]);+}+ async function testDownloadContextMenu({   overrideExtension = null,   downloads = [],   expected,   prefEnabled,+  deleted, }) {   info(     `Setting browser.download.improvements_to_download_panel to ${prefEnabled}`@@ -309,9 +421,19 @@   // prepare downloads   await prepareDownloads(downloads, overrideExtension);   let downloadList = await Downloads.getList(Downloads.PUBLIC);-  let [firstDownload] = await downloadList.getAll();-  info("Download succeeded? " + firstDownload.succeeded);-  info("Download target exists? " + firstDownload.target.exists);+  let all = await downloadList.getAll();+  for (let dl of all) {+    info("Download succeeded? " + dl.succeeded);+    if (deleted) {+      let { path } = dl.target;+      await IOUtils.setPermissions(path, 0o660);+      await IOUtils.remove(path, { ignoreAbsent: true });+      await dl.removePartialData();+      await dl.refresh();+      await dl.finalize();+    }+    info("Download target exists? " + dl.target.exists);+  }   // open panel   await task_openPanel();

After analyzing the code diff, I don't find any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily test case additions and modifications to test the download panel's context menu functionality. Here's my analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found
   File: browser/components/downloads/test/browser/browser_downloads_panel_context_menu.js
   The changes mainly involve:
   - Adding referrer info handling for test cases
   - Adding new test cases for different scenarios
   - Adding deleteFile menu item testing
   - Adding test cases for deleted files

The changes appear to be functional improvements and test coverage enhancements rather than security fixes. The main modifications are:
- Added ReferrerInfo constructor and example reference
- Added deleteFile menu item to test cases
- Added new test cases for deleted files scenario
- Modified test structure to handle more cases
- Added more detailed test verification

There are no obvious security-related changes like:
- No input validation fixes
- No permission changes (except in test cleanup)
- No security-related API changes
- No authentication/authorization modifications
- No sensitive data handling changes

The changes to file permissions (0o660) are only in test cleanup code and don't represent a security fix.

Would you like me to analyze any specific aspect of these changes in more detail?

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.