Shared security patch analysis results
AI Used: DEEPSEEK deepseek-chat--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.get.semitransparent.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.get.semitransparent.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(255,255,255,0.45)'; assert_regexp_match(ctx.fillStyle, /^rgba\(255, 255, 255, 0\.4\d+\)$/);
Analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18]
Old Code:
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
Additional Details:
- The change appears to be purely a variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security-related changes or fixes are evident in this diff
- The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive operations or introduce/remove any security controls
- This seems to be a code style/readability improvement rather than a security fix
No vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change is purely cosmetic in nature, renaming a variable for potentially better readability or consistency with other code.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-54.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-54.xml@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/> <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found --> <link rel="match" href="reference/three-paragraph-lime-characters.xht"/>- <meta name="flags" content="" /> </head> <body> <div class="stub">
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
Meta Tag Removal [File] [Lines 8]
[Old Code]
<meta name="flags" content="" />
[Fixed Code]
(line removed)
Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag that wasn't serving any apparent purpose
- No security vulnerability is being fixed here - this appears to be just a cleanup of unnecessary markup
- The "flags" meta tag was empty and not being used for any security-related functionality
- This change doesn't relate to any known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.)
The modification is purely cosmetic/structural rather than security-related. The empty meta tag removal doesn't impact any security mechanisms or introduce/fix any vulnerabilities.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.canvas.source-over.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.canvas.source-over.html@@ -17,11 +17,11 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(offscreenCanvas.width, offscreenCanvas.height);+var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(canvas.width, canvas.height); var ctx2 = offscreenCanvas2.getContext('2d'); var promise = new Promise(function(resolve, reject) { var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'source-over'; ctx.drawImage(offscreenCanvas2, 0, 0);- _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 219,255,36,223, "50,25", "219,255,36,223", 5);+ _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 219,255,36,223, "50,25", "219,255,36,223", 5); }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);
Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.canvas.source-over.html [Lines] 17-39
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(offscreenCanvas.width, offscreenCanvas.height);
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 219,255,36,223, "50,25", "219,255,36,223", 5);
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(canvas.width, canvas.height);
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 219,255,36,223, "50,25", "219,255,36,223", 5);
Additional Details:
The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas') and don't indicate any security fixes. The functionality remains the same, just with different variable names. No security vulnerabilities were addressed in this diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/server/actors/targets/window-global.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/server/actors/targets/window-global.js@@ -3,8 +3,6 @@ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ "use strict";--/* global XPCNativeWrapper */ // protocol.js uses objects as exceptions in order to define // error packets.@@ -159,9 +157,6 @@ * This event contains the following attributes: * * url (string) * The new URI being loaded.- * * nativeConsoleAPI (boolean)- * `false` if the console API of the page has been overridden (e.g. by Firebug)- * `true` if the Gecko implementation is used * * state (string) * `start` if we just start requesting the new URL * `stop` if the new URL is done loading@@ -261,8 +256,8 @@ * If true, the actor will only focus on the passed docShell and not on the whole * docShell tree. This should be enabled when we have targets for all documents. * - sessionContext Object- * WatcherActor's session context. This helps know what is the overall debugged scope.- * See watcher actor constructor for more info.+ * The Session Context to help know what is debugged.+ * See devtools/server/actors/watcher/session-context.js */ initialize: function( connection,@@ -355,12 +350,6 @@ // filter console messages by addonID), set to an empty (no options) object by default. consoleAPIListenerOptions: {},- // Optional SourcesManager filter function (e.g. used by the WebExtensionActor to filter- // sources by addonID), allow all sources by default.- _allowSource() {- return true;- },- /* * Return a Debugger instance or create one if there is none yet */@@ -450,6 +439,10 @@ return this.browsingContext?.browserId; },+ get openerBrowserId() {+ return this.browsingContext?.opener?.browserId;+ },+ /** * Getter for the WebExtensions ContentScript globals related to the * window global's current DOM window.@@ -545,10 +538,7 @@ get sourcesManager() { if (!this._sourcesManager) {- this._sourcesManager = new SourcesManager(- this.threadActor,- this._allowSource- );+ this._sourcesManager = new SourcesManager(this.threadActor); } return this._sourcesManager; },@@ -586,25 +576,22 @@ // created by DevTools, which always exists and help better connect resources to the target // in the frontend. Otherwise all other <browser> element of webext may be reloaded or go away // and then we would have troubles matching targets for resources.- const browsingContextID = this.devtoolsSpawnedBrowsingContextForWebExtension- ? this.devtoolsSpawnedBrowsingContextForWebExtension.id- : this.originalDocShell.browsingContext.id;- const originalInnerWindowId = this._originalWindow- ? getInnerId(this._originalWindow)- : null;- const innerWindowId = this.devtoolsSpawnedBrowsingContextForWebExtension- ? this.devtoolsSpawnedBrowsingContextForWebExtension.currentWindowGlobal- .innerWindowId- : originalInnerWindowId;- const originalParentInnerWindowId = this._originalWindow- ? this._originalWindow.docShell.browsingContext.parent- ?.currentWindowContext.innerWindowId- : null;- const parentInnerWindowId = this+ const originalBrowsingContext = this .devtoolsSpawnedBrowsingContextForWebExtension- ? this.devtoolsSpawnedBrowsingContextForWebExtension.parent- .currentWindowGlobal.innerWindowId- : originalParentInnerWindowId;+ ? this.devtoolsSpawnedBrowsingContextForWebExtension+ : this.originalDocShell.browsingContext;+ const browsingContextID = originalBrowsingContext.id;+ const innerWindowId =+ originalBrowsingContext.currentWindowContext.innerWindowId;+ const parentInnerWindowId =+ originalBrowsingContext.parent?.currentWindowContext.innerWindowId;+ // Doesn't only check `!!opener` as some iframe might have an opener+ // if their location was loaded via `window.open(url, "iframe-name")`.+ // So also ensure that the document is opened in a distinct tab.+ const isPopup =+ !!originalBrowsingContext.opener &&+ originalBrowsingContext.browserId !=+ originalBrowsingContext.opener.browserId; const response = { actor: this.actorID,@@ -616,6 +603,7 @@ topInnerWindowId: this.browsingContext.topWindowContext.innerWindowId, isTopLevelTarget: this.isTopLevelTarget, ignoreSubFrames: this.ignoreSubFrames,+ isPopup, traits: { // @backward-compat { version 64 } Exposes a new trait to help identify // BrowsingContextActor's inherited actors from the client side.@@ -634,11 +622,6 @@ watchpoints: true, // Supports back and forward navigation navigation: true,- // The target actor no longer expose attach/detach methods and is now running- // the code which used to be run while calling attach from its constructor.- // The target actor is now immediately fully usable and starts inspecting the- // WindowGlobal immediately- isAutoAttached: true, }, };@@ -1535,7 +1518,6 @@ if (!this.followWindowGlobalLifeCycle) { this.emit("tabNavigated", { url: newURI,- nativeConsoleAPI: true, state: "start", isFrameSwitching, });@@ -1586,32 +1568,9 @@ this.emit("tabNavigated", { url: this.url, title: this.title,- nativeConsoleAPI: this.hasNativeConsoleAPI(this.window), state: "stop", isFrameSwitching: isFrameSwitching, });- },-- /**- * Tells if the window.console object is native or overwritten by script in- * the page.- *- * @param nsIDOMWindow window- * The window object you want to check.- * @return boolean- * True if the window.console object is native, or false otherwise.- */- hasNativeConsoleAPI(window) {- let isNative = false;- try {- // We are very explicitly examining the "console" property of- // the non-Xrayed object here.- const console = window.wrappedJSObject.console;- isNative = new XPCNativeWrapper(console).IS_NATIVE_CONSOLE;- } catch (ex) {- // ignore- }- return isNative; }, /**
Here is the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Leak] [devtools/server/actors/targets/window-global.js] [Lines 159-162]
[Old Code]
```
* * nativeConsoleAPI (boolean)
* `false` if the console API of the page has been overridden (e.g. by Firebug)
* `true` if the Gecko implementation is used
```
[Fixed Code]
(Removed these lines)
Additional Details: The removal of the nativeConsoleAPI documentation and related functionality might indicate a security concern about exposing implementation details, but this is uncertain.
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential XSS Vector] [devtools/server/actors/targets/window-global.js] [Lines 1586-1588]
[Old Code]
```
nativeConsoleAPI: this.hasNativeConsoleAPI(this.window),
```
[Fixed Code]
(Removed this line)
Additional Details: The removal of the nativeConsoleAPI check could be related to preventing potential XSS vectors through console API manipulation, but this is speculative.
3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Privilege Escalation] [devtools/server/actors/targets/window-global.js] [Lines 350-353]
[Old Code]
```
_allowSource() {
return true;
},
```
[Fixed Code]
(Removed this function)
Additional Details: The removal of the default source allowance function might indicate tighter security controls over source access, but the exact security implications are unclear.
4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Security Improvement] [devtools/server/actors/targets/window-global.js] [Lines 545-548]
[Old Code]
```
this._sourcesManager = new SourcesManager(
this.threadActor,
this._allowSource
);
```
[Fixed Code]
```
this._sourcesManager = new SourcesManager(this.threadActor);
```
Additional Details: The removal of the _allowSource parameter might indicate a security hardening measure by enforcing stricter source access controls at a lower level.
Note: The diff shows several changes that appear to be security-related (removal of XPCNativeWrapper usage, removal of potentially sensitive information exposure), but without more context about the threat model and specific vulnerabilities being addressed, these assessments remain uncertain. The changes do suggest a general trend towards reducing attack surface and removing potentially dangerous functionality.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.default.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.default.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); _assertSame(ctx.fillStyle, '#000000', "ctx.fillStyle", "'#000000'"); t.done();
Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:
Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.default.worker.js] [Lines 13-14]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. There's no indication of a security vulnerability being fixed in this change. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been changed for better consistency or readability.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-009.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-009.html@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ -ms-column-fill: auto; -webkit-column-fill: auto; column-fill: auto;- border: 2px dashed;+ border: 2px solid salmon; margin-bottom: 5px; }
Based on the provided code diff, this appears to be a test file related to CSS grid layout and fragmentation. The change is purely cosmetic (changing border style and color) rather than addressing any security vulnerability.
Answer Format for Each Vulnerability:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 23]
[Old Code] border: 2px dashed;
[Fixed Code] border: 2px solid salmon;
Additional Details:
- This is a visual/style change in a test file
- No security implications are apparent from this change
- The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive functionality
- The change is likely for better test visibility/readability
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.hex8.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.hex8.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; try { ctx.fillStyle = '#fg0000ff'; } catch (e) { } // this shouldn't throw, but it shouldn't matter here if it does ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-25]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';
try { ctx.fillStyle = '#fg0000ff'; } catch (e) { }
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';
try { ctx.fillStyle = '#fg0000ff'; } catch (e) { }
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring (variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`), with no security implications. The test continues to check the same functionality of invalid hex color parsing in canvas fillStyle. No security vulnerabilities were fixed in this diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/nss/lib/util/nssutil.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/nss/lib/util/nssutil.h@@ -19,9 +19,9 @@ * The format of the version string should be * "<major version>.<minor version>[.<patch level>[.<build number>]][ <Beta>]" */-#define NSSUTIL_VERSION "3.74"+#define NSSUTIL_VERSION "3.75" #define NSSUTIL_VMAJOR 3-#define NSSUTIL_VMINOR 74+#define NSSUTIL_VMINOR 75 #define NSSUTIL_VPATCH 0 #define NSSUTIL_VBUILD 0 #define NSSUTIL_BETA PR_FALSE
Analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
Version Update [File] security/nss/lib/util/nssutil.h [Lines 19-23]
Old Code:
#define NSSUTIL_VERSION "3.74"
#define NSSUTIL_VMAJOR 3
#define NSSUTIL_VMINOR 74
Fixed Code:
#define NSSUTIL_VERSION "3.75"
#define NSSUTIL_VMAJOR 3
#define NSSUTIL_VMINOR 75
Additional Details:
- This appears to be a routine version number update from 3.74 to 3.75
- No security-related changes or vulnerability fixes are evident in this diff
- The change only updates version macros and doesn't modify any functional code
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with these version number changes
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgba-solid-1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgba-solid-1.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba( 0 , 255 , 0 , 1 )'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes (variable renaming) rather than security-related fixes.
Here's the analysis following your requested format:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-25]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
The changes simply rename the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and update the references accordingly. There are no security implications to these changes. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.scale.2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.scale.2.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -28,15 +28,15 @@ ctx.beginPath(); ctx.arc(0, 0, 0.6, 0, Math.PI/2, false); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, here are the findings:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.scale.2.html [Lines] 17-48
[Old Code] var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code] var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
2. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.scale.2.html [Lines] 28-48
[Old Code] _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, ...) calls
[Fixed Code] _assertPixel(canvas, ...) calls
The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from "offscreenCanvas" to "canvas") and don't indicate any security fixes. The functionality remains the same, just with a different variable name. No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.bezierCurveTo.scaled.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.bezierCurveTo.scaled.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@ ctx.moveTo(-2, 3.1); ctx.bezierCurveTo(-2, -1, 2.1, -1, 2.1, 3.1); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't involve any security-related modifications. Here's the structured response: Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found in the diff. The changes are purely variable renaming. The changes are: 1. Variable `offscreenCanvas` renamed to `canvas` in initialization 2. All subsequent references to `offscreenCanvas` updated to use the new `canvas` variable name 3. No changes to the actual functionality or security-related aspects of the code This appears to be a code style/readability improvement rather than a security fix.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/mozapps/extensions/test/xpcshell/test_types.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/mozapps/extensions/test/xpcshell/test_types.js@@ -8,60 +8,110 @@ add_task(async function setup() { await promiseStartupManager();+});- Assert.equal(false, "test" in AddonManager.addonTypes);- let types = AddonManager.addonTypes;+add_task(async function test_new_addonType() {+ Assert.equal(false, AddonManager.hasAddonType("test")); // The dumbest provider possible- var provider = {};+ const provider = {};- var expectedAdd = "test";- var expectedRemove = null;+ AddonManagerPrivate.registerProvider(provider, ["test"]);- AddonManager.addTypeListener({- onTypeAdded(aType) {- Assert.equal(aType.id, expectedAdd);- expectedAdd = null;- },-- onTypeRemoved(aType) {- Assert.equal(aType.id, expectedRemove);- expectedRemove = null;- },- });-- AddonManagerPrivate.registerProvider(provider, [- {- id: "test",- name: "Test",- uiPriority: 1,- },- {- id: "t$e%st",- name: "Test",- uiPriority: 1,- },- ]);-- Assert.equal(expectedAdd, null);-- Assert.ok("test" in types);- Assert.equal(types.test.name, "Test");- Assert.equal(false, "t$e%st" in types);-- delete types.test;- Assert.ok("test" in types);-- types.foo = "bar";- Assert.equal(false, "foo" in types);-- expectedRemove = "test";+ Assert.equal(true, AddonManager.hasAddonType("test"));+ Assert.equal(false, AddonManager.hasAddonType("t$e%st"));+ Assert.equal(false, AddonManager.hasAddonType(null));+ Assert.equal(false, AddonManager.hasAddonType(undefined)); AddonManagerPrivate.unregisterProvider(provider);- Assert.equal(expectedRemove, null);+ Assert.equal(false, AddonManager.hasAddonType("test"));+});- Assert.equal(false, "test" in AddonManager.addonTypes);- // The cached reference to addonTypes is live- Assert.equal(false, "test" in types);+add_task(async function test_bad_addonType() {+ const provider = {};+ Assert.throws(+ () => AddonManagerPrivate.registerProvider(provider, /* addonTypes =*/ {}),+ /aTypes must be an array or null/+ );++ Assert.throws(+ () => AddonManagerPrivate.registerProvider(provider, new Set()),+ /aTypes must be an array or null/+ ); });++add_task(async function test_addonTypes_should_be_immutable() {+ const provider = {};+ const addonTypes = [];++ addonTypes.push("test");+ AddonManagerPrivate.registerProvider(provider, addonTypes);+ addonTypes.pop();+ addonTypes.push("test_added");+ // Modifications to addonTypes should not affect AddonManager.+ Assert.equal(true, AddonManager.hasAddonType("test"));+ Assert.equal(false, AddonManager.hasAddonType("test_added"));+ AddonManagerPrivate.unregisterProvider(provider);++ AddonManagerPrivate.registerProvider(provider, addonTypes);+ // After re-registering the provider, the type change should have been processed.+ Assert.equal(false, AddonManager.hasAddonType("test"));+ Assert.equal(true, AddonManager.hasAddonType("test_added"));+ AddonManagerPrivate.unregisterProvider(provider);+});++add_task(async function test_missing_addonType() {+ const dummyAddon = {+ id: "some dummy addon from provider without .addonTypes property",+ };+ const provider = {+ // addonTypes Set is missing. This only happens in unit tests, but let's+ // verify that the implementation behaves reasonably.+ // A provider without an explicitly registered type may still return an+ // entry when getAddonsByTypes is called.+ async getAddonsByTypes(types) {+ Assert.equal(null, types);+ return [dummyAddon];+ },+ };++ AddonManagerPrivate.registerProvider(provider); // addonTypes not set.+ Assert.equal(false, AddonManager.hasAddonType("test"));+ Assert.equal(false, AddonManager.hasAddonType(null));+ Assert.equal(false, AddonManager.hasAddonType(undefined));++ const addons = await AddonManager.getAddonsByTypes(null);+ Assert.equal(1, addons.length);+ Assert.equal(dummyAddon, addons[0]);++ AddonManagerPrivate.unregisterProvider(provider);+});++add_task(async function test_getAddonTypesByProvider() {+ let defaultTypes = AddonManagerPrivate.getAddonTypesByProvider("XPIProvider");+ Assert.ok(defaultTypes.includes("extension"), `extension in ${defaultTypes}`);+ Assert.throws(+ () => AddonManagerPrivate.getAddonTypesByProvider(),+ /No addonTypes found for provider: undefined/+ );+ Assert.throws(+ () => AddonManagerPrivate.getAddonTypesByProvider("MaybeExistent"),+ /No addonTypes found for provider: MaybeExistent/+ );++ const provider = { name: "MaybeExistent" };+ AddonManagerPrivate.registerProvider(provider, ["test"]);+ Assert.deepEqual(+ AddonManagerPrivate.getAddonTypesByProvider("MaybeExistent"),+ ["test"],+ "Newly registered type returned by getAddonTypesByProvider"+ );++ AddonManagerPrivate.unregisterProvider(provider);++ Assert.throws(+ () => AddonManagerPrivate.getAddonTypesByProvider("MaybeExistent"),+ /No addonTypes found for provider: MaybeExistent/+ );+});
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Type Confusion Vulnerability [toolkit/mozapps/extensions/test/xpcshell/test_types.js] [Lines 8-110]
[Old Code]
```javascript
AddonManager.addTypeListener({
onTypeAdded(aType) {
Assert.equal(aType.id, expectedAdd);
expectedAdd = null;
},
onTypeRemoved(aType) {
Assert.equal(aType.id, expectedRemove);
expectedRemove = null;
},
});
```
[Fixed Code]
```javascript
Assert.equal(true, AddonManager.hasAddonType("test"));
Assert.equal(false, AddonManager.hasAddonType("t$e%st"));
Assert.equal(false, AddonManager.hasAddonType(null));
Assert.equal(false, AddonManager.hasAddonType(undefined));
```
Additional Details: The old code used a more complex listener pattern while the new code simplifies the type checking with direct assertions, including checks for null/undefined which could prevent potential type confusion issues.
2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Input Validation Vulnerability [toolkit/mozapps/extensions/test/xpcshell/test_types.js] [Lines 60-110]
[Old Code]
No input validation for addonTypes parameter
[Fixed Code]
```javascript
Assert.throws(
() => AddonManagerPrivate.registerProvider(provider, /* addonTypes =*/ {}),
/aTypes must be an array or null/
);
Assert.throws(
() => AddonManagerPrivate.registerProvider(provider, new Set()),
/aTypes must be an array or null/
);
```
Additional Details: The new code adds explicit input validation to ensure addonTypes is either an array or null, preventing potential issues from invalid input types.
3. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Immutable Data Handling Vulnerability [toolkit/mozapps/extensions/test/xpcshell/test_types.js] [Lines 60-110]
[Old Code]
No protection against modification of addonTypes array
[Fixed Code]
```javascript
const addonTypes = [];
addonTypes.push("test");
AddonManagerPrivate.registerProvider(provider, addonTypes);
addonTypes.pop();
addonTypes.push("test_added");
// Modifications to addonTypes should not affect AddonManager.
Assert.equal(true, AddonManager.hasAddonType("test"));
Assert.equal(false, AddonManager.hasAddonType("test_added"));
```
Additional Details: The new code demonstrates and tests that modifications to the original addonTypes array don't affect the registered types, preventing potential security issues from unexpected modifications.
4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Missing Type Handling Vulnerability [toolkit/mozapps/extensions/test/xpcshell/test_types.js] [Lines 60-110]
[Old Code]
No handling for providers without addonTypes property
[Fixed Code]
```javascript
const provider = {
async getAddonsByTypes(types) {
Assert.equal(null, types);
return [dummyAddon];
},
};
AddonManagerPrivate.registerProvider(provider); // addonTypes not set.
Assert.equal(false, AddonManager.hasAddonType("test"));
Assert.equal(false, AddonManager.hasAddonType(null));
Assert.equal(false, AddonManager.hasAddonType(undefined));
```
Additional Details: The new code explicitly tests and handles the case where a provider doesn't have an addonTypes property, which could prevent potential undefined behavior.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/pin-project-internal/src/lib.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/pin-project-internal/src/lib.rs@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ ))] #![warn(unsafe_code)] #![warn(rust_2018_idioms, single_use_lifetimes, unreachable_pub)]-#![warn(clippy::all, clippy::default_trait_access)]+#![warn(clippy::default_trait_access, clippy::wildcard_imports)] // mem::take and #[non_exhaustive] requires Rust 1.40 #![allow(clippy::mem_replace_with_default, clippy::manual_non_exhaustive)] #![allow(clippy::needless_doctest_main)]
Analysis of the provided code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no Linter Configuration Update [File] [Lines 6-7] [Old Code] #![warn(clippy::all, clippy::default_trait_access)] [Fixed Code] #![warn(clippy::default_trait_access, clippy::wildcard_imports)] Additional Details: - This diff only shows changes to linter configuration warnings in Rust code - The change replaces `clippy::all` with more specific linter warnings (`clippy::wildcard_imports`) - No security vulnerabilities are being fixed here - this is purely a code quality/maintenance change - The modification helps focus the linter on more specific potential issues rather than using the broad `all` category No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The changes appear to be related to code quality improvements rather than security fixes.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/shared/specs/watcher.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/shared/specs/watcher.js@@ -53,6 +53,13 @@ }, },+ getBlackboxingActor: {+ request: {},+ response: {+ blackboxing: RetVal("blackboxing"),+ },+ },+ getBreakpointListActor: { request: {}, response: {
Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[New Feature Addition] [devtools/shared/specs/watcher.js] [Lines 53-60]
[Old Code]
[Fixed Code]
getBlackboxingActor: {
request: {},
response: {
blackboxing: RetVal("blackboxing"),
},
}
Additional Details:
- This appears to be an addition of a new feature (getBlackboxingActor) rather than a security fix
- No obvious security vulnerability is being patched here
- The change adds a new API endpoint for retrieving blackboxing information
- Without more context about the blackboxing functionality, I can't determine if this relates to a security fix
No clear security vulnerabilities are being fixed in this diff. The change appears to be a feature addition rather than a security patch.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-8.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-8.xml@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ span[lang|="fr"] { background-color : red }]]></style> <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/> <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->- <meta name="flags" content="" /> </head> <body> <p lang="en-gb">This paragraph should have green background because its language is "en-gb"</p>
After analyzing the provided code diff, here's my assessment: Vulnerability Existed: no [No specific vulnerability] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-8.xml] [Lines around 9] [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="" /> [Fixed Code] [Removed line] Additional Details: 1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute. This doesn't appear to be security-related. 2. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed here - it seems like a minor cleanup or test configuration change. 3. The "flags" meta tag appears to be test-related metadata rather than something that would impact security. 4. No known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in this change. The modification appears to be a benign test file cleanup rather than a security fix.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgb-eof.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgb-eof.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgb(0, 255, 0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14, 21]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) with no security implications. There are no visible security vulnerabilities being fixed in this diff. The changes seem to be related to code style or consistency rather than security fixes.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/assorted/float-retry-push-inset.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/assorted/float-retry-push-inset.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/"> <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/"> <link rel="match" href="reference/float-retry-push-ref.html">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="Test that a too-wide inline block is pushed in the block direction along a shape-outside inset until it fits."> <style> body {
Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis: Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 5] Old Code: <meta name="flags" content=""> Fixed Code: (line removed) Additional Details: - The change simply removes a meta tag with an empty "flags" attribute - This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix - No actual security vulnerability is being addressed here - The modification doesn't relate to any known vulnerability patterns Note: While this change doesn't represent a security fix, it's worth noting that removing unused code is generally a good practice as it reduces potential attack surface, though no specific vulnerability existed in this case.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/caption-writing-mode-002.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/caption-writing-mode-002.html@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ <script src='/resources/testharnessreport.js'></script> <link rel="author" title="David Grogan" href="[email protected]"> <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-writing-modes-3/#orthogonal-flows">-<meta name="flags" content="" /> <style> x-table { display: table;
Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The change appears to be a minor cleanup of test metadata rather than a security-related fix.
Answer for Each Vulnerability:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/caption-writing-mode-002.html] [Lines 3-6]
[Old Code]
<link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-writing-modes-3/#orthogonal-flows">
<meta name="flags" content="" />
<style>
[Fixed Code]
<link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-writing-modes-3/#orthogonal-flows">
<style>
The change simply removes an empty meta tag that wasn't serving any purpose. This doesn't appear to be security-related but rather a cleanup of test file metadata. No known vulnerability is being addressed here.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/neqo-http3/src/settings.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/neqo-http3/src/settings.rs@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ } impl HSetting {+ #[must_use] pub fn new(setting_type: HSettingType, value: u64) -> Self { Self { setting_type,@@ -62,12 +63,14 @@ } impl HSettings {+ #[must_use] pub fn new(settings: &[HSetting]) -> Self { Self { settings: settings.to_vec(), } }+ #[must_use] pub fn get(&self, setting: HSettingType) -> u64 { match self.settings.iter().find(|s| s.setting_type == setting) { Some(v) => v.value,@@ -100,6 +103,8 @@ }); }+ /// # Errors+ /// Returns an error if settings types are reserved of settings value are not permitted. pub fn decode_frame_contents(&mut self, dec: &mut Decoder) -> Res<()> { while dec.remaining() > 0 { let t = dec.decode_varint();@@ -120,9 +125,13 @@ (Some(SETTINGS_QPACK_BLOCKED_STREAMS), Some(value)) => self .settings .push(HSetting::new(HSettingType::BlockedStreams, value)),- (Some(SETTINGS_ENABLE_WEB_TRANSPORT), Some(value)) => self- .settings- .push(HSetting::new(HSettingType::EnableWebTransport, value)),+ (Some(SETTINGS_ENABLE_WEB_TRANSPORT), Some(value)) => {+ if value > 1 {+ return Err(Error::HttpSettings);+ }+ self.settings+ .push(HSetting::new(HSettingType::EnableWebTransport, value));+ } // other supported settings here (Some(_), Some(_)) => {} // ignore unknown setting, it is fine. _ => return Err(Error::NotEnoughData),
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Input Validation Vulnerability [third_party/rust/neqo-http3/src/settings.rs] [Lines 125-130]
Old Code:
```rust
(Some(SETTINGS_ENABLE_WEB_TRANSPORT), Some(value)) => self
.settings
.push(HSetting::new(HSettingType::EnableWebTransport, value)),
```
Fixed Code:
```rust
(Some(SETTINGS_ENABLE_WEB_TRANSPORT), Some(value)) => {
if value > 1 {
return Err(Error::HttpSettings);
}
self.settings
.push(HSetting::new(HSettingType::EnableWebTransport, value));
}
```
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Missing #[must_use] Vulnerability [third_party/rust/neqo-http3/src/settings.rs] [Lines 48, 62, 75]
Old Code:
```rust
pub fn new(setting_type: HSettingType, value: u64) -> Self
pub fn new(settings: &[HSetting]) -> Self
pub fn get(&self, setting: HSettingType) -> u64
```
Fixed Code:
```rust
#[must_use]
pub fn new(setting_type: HSettingType, value: u64) -> Self
#[must_use]
pub fn new(settings: &[HSetting]) -> Self
#[must_use]
pub fn get(&self, setting: HSettingType) -> u64
```
The first vulnerability is a clear security fix that adds input validation for the Web Transport setting value, preventing invalid values (greater than 1) from being accepted. The second change adds #[must_use] attributes which might help prevent bugs from ignoring return values, but it's not clear if this was fixing an actual security vulnerability or just improving code quality.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-30.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-30.xml@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ ]]></style> <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/> <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->- <meta name="flags" content="" /> </head> <body> <p>This paragraph is here only to fill space in the DOM</p>
Analysis of the provided code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 8] Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="" /> Fixed Code: (removed line) Additional Notes: - The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag with "flags" attribute, which doesn't appear to be security-related - This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix - No known vulnerabilities are associated with this change - The modification seems to be removing unused or unnecessary metadata from a test file
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.