Shared security patch analysis results
AI Used: DEEPSEEK deepseek-chat--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/aboutdebugging/src/modules/client-wrapper.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/aboutdebugging/src/modules/client-wrapper.js@@ -180,7 +180,8 @@ */ async loadPerformanceProfiler(win, openAboutProfiling) { const perfFront = await this.getFront("perf");- await win.gInit(perfFront, "devtools-remote", openAboutProfiling);+ const { traits } = this.client;+ await win.gInit(perfFront, traits, "devtools-remote", openAboutProfiling); } /**
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Leak or Missing Authentication] [devtools/client/aboutdebugging/src/modules/client-wrapper.js] [Lines 180-183]
[Old Code]
```javascript
await win.gInit(perfFront, "devtools-remote", openAboutProfiling);
```
[Fixed Code]
```javascript
const { traits } = this.client;
await win.gInit(perfFront, traits, "devtools-remote", openAboutProfiling);
```
Additional Details:
1. The change adds client traits to the initialization call, which might be related to security features or capabilities of the client.
2. Without knowing more about what `traits` contains or how `gInit` uses it, we can't definitively say if this fixes a security vulnerability.
3. This could potentially be related to fixing an information leak or adding proper authentication checks, but we'd need more context about the traits system to be certain.
4. The change suggests the previous version might have been missing some security-related client information during initialization.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/mobile/locales/filter.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/mobile/locales/filter.py@@ -75,15 +75,4 @@ return "ignore" return "error"- # we're in mod == "mobile"- if path == "chrome/region.properties":- # only region.properties exceptions remain- if (- re.match(r"browser\.contentHandlers\.types\.[0-5]", entity)- or re.match(r"gecko\.handlerService\.schemes\.", entity)- or re.match(r"gecko\.handlerService\.defaultHandlersVersion", entity)- or re.match(r"browser\.suggestedsites\.", entity)- ):- return "ignore"- return "error"
Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Overly Permissive Filtering] [mobile/locales/filter.py] [Lines 75-84]
[Old Code]
# we're in mod == "mobile"
if path == "chrome/region.properties":
# only region.properties exceptions remain
if (
re.match(r"browser\.contentHandlers\.types\.[0-5]", entity)
or re.match(r"gecko\.handlerService\.schemes\.", entity)
or re.match(r"gecko\.handlerService\.defaultHandlersVersion", entity)
or re.match(r"browser\.suggestedsites\.", entity)
):
return "ignore"
[Fixed Code]
[Entire block was removed]
Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of a filtering exception block for "chrome/region.properties"
- The old code had several regex patterns that would cause certain entities to be ignored
- While not clearly a security vulnerability, removing these exceptions could potentially:
* Tighten security by removing special cases that bypassed filtering
* Reduce attack surface by eliminating potential injection points
- Without more context about the purpose of these filters, it's hard to determine if this was actually a security fix or just a cleanup
- The removal could be related to fixing potential regex injection or overly permissive filtering, but this is speculative
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/tests/mpsc.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/tests/mpsc.rs@@ -20,6 +20,12 @@ //! - https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/blob/master/COPYRIGHT //! - https://www.rust-lang.org/en-US/legal.html+#![allow(+ clippy::drop_copy,+ clippy::match_single_binding,+ clippy::redundant_clone+)]+ use std::sync::mpsc::{RecvError, RecvTimeoutError, TryRecvError}; use std::sync::mpsc::{SendError, TrySendError}; use std::thread::JoinHandle;@@ -176,7 +182,7 @@ ) => ({ cc::crossbeam_channel_internal! { $(- recv(($rx).inner) -> res => {+ $meth(($rx).inner) -> res => { let $name = res.map_err(|_| ::std::sync::mpsc::RecvError); $code }@@ -314,13 +320,18 @@ #[test] fn stress() {- let (tx, rx) = channel::<i32>();- let t = thread::spawn(move || {- for _ in 0..10000 {+ #[cfg(miri)]+ const COUNT: usize = 500;+ #[cfg(not(miri))]+ const COUNT: usize = 10000;++ let (tx, rx) = channel::<i32>();+ let t = thread::spawn(move || {+ for _ in 0..COUNT { tx.send(1).unwrap(); } });- for _ in 0..10000 {+ for _ in 0..COUNT { assert_eq!(rx.recv().unwrap(), 1); } t.join().ok().unwrap();@@ -328,6 +339,9 @@ #[test] fn stress_shared() {+ #[cfg(miri)]+ const AMT: u32 = 500;+ #[cfg(not(miri))] const AMT: u32 = 10000; const NTHREADS: u32 = 8; let (tx, rx) = channel::<i32>();@@ -336,10 +350,7 @@ for _ in 0..AMT * NTHREADS { assert_eq!(rx.recv().unwrap(), 1); }- match rx.try_recv() {- Ok(..) => panic!(),- _ => {}- }+ assert!(rx.try_recv().is_err()); }); let mut ts = Vec::with_capacity(NTHREADS as usize);@@ -735,12 +746,17 @@ #[test] fn recv_a_lot() {+ #[cfg(miri)]+ const N: usize = 100;+ #[cfg(not(miri))]+ const N: usize = 10000;+ // Regression test that we don't run out of stack in scheduler context let (tx, rx) = channel();- for _ in 0..10000 {+ for _ in 0..N { tx.send(()).unwrap(); }- for _ in 0..10000 {+ for _ in 0..N { rx.recv().unwrap(); } }@@ -880,7 +896,7 @@ }; assert_eq!(iter.next().unwrap(), 1); assert_eq!(iter.next().unwrap(), 2);- assert_eq!(iter.next().is_none(), true);+ assert!(iter.next().is_none()); } #[test]@@ -892,7 +908,7 @@ let mut iter = (&rx).into_iter(); assert_eq!(iter.next().unwrap(), 1); assert_eq!(iter.next().unwrap(), 2);- assert_eq!(iter.next().is_none(), true);+ assert!(iter.next().is_none()); } #[test]@@ -1079,13 +1095,18 @@ #[test] fn stress() {+ #[cfg(miri)]+ const N: usize = 100;+ #[cfg(not(miri))]+ const N: usize = 10000;+ let (tx, rx) = sync_channel::<i32>(0); let t = thread::spawn(move || {- for _ in 0..10000 {+ for _ in 0..N { tx.send(1).unwrap(); } });- for _ in 0..10000 {+ for _ in 0..N { assert_eq!(rx.recv().unwrap(), 1); } t.join().unwrap();@@ -1093,10 +1114,15 @@ #[test] fn stress_recv_timeout_two_threads() {+ #[cfg(miri)]+ const N: usize = 100;+ #[cfg(not(miri))]+ const N: usize = 10000;+ let (tx, rx) = sync_channel::<i32>(0); let t = thread::spawn(move || {- for _ in 0..10000 {+ for _ in 0..N { tx.send(1).unwrap(); } });@@ -1113,12 +1139,15 @@ } }- assert_eq!(recv_count, 10000);+ assert_eq!(recv_count, N); t.join().unwrap(); } #[test] fn stress_recv_timeout_shared() {+ #[cfg(miri)]+ const AMT: u32 = 100;+ #[cfg(not(miri))] const AMT: u32 = 1000; const NTHREADS: u32 = 8; let (tx, rx) = sync_channel::<i32>(0);@@ -1165,6 +1194,9 @@ #[test] fn stress_shared() {+ #[cfg(miri)]+ const AMT: u32 = 100;+ #[cfg(not(miri))] const AMT: u32 = 1000; const NTHREADS: u32 = 8; let (tx, rx) = sync_channel::<i32>(0);@@ -1174,10 +1206,7 @@ for _ in 0..AMT * NTHREADS { assert_eq!(rx.recv().unwrap(), 1); }- match rx.try_recv() {- Ok(..) => panic!(),- _ => {}- }+ assert!(rx.try_recv().is_err()); dtx.send(()).unwrap(); });@@ -1449,12 +1478,17 @@ #[test] fn recv_a_lot() {+ #[cfg(miri)]+ const N: usize = 100;+ #[cfg(not(miri))]+ const N: usize = 10000;+ // Regression test that we don't run out of stack in scheduler context- let (tx, rx) = sync_channel(10000);- for _ in 0..10000 {+ let (tx, rx) = sync_channel(N);+ for _ in 0..N { tx.send(()).unwrap(); }- for _ in 0..10000 {+ for _ in 0..N { rx.recv().unwrap(); } }@@ -1792,7 +1826,11 @@ #[test] fn stress() {+ #[cfg(miri)]+ const AMT: i32 = 100;+ #[cfg(not(miri))] const AMT: i32 = 10000;+ let (tx1, rx1) = channel::<i32>(); let (tx2, rx2) = channel::<i32>(); let (tx3, rx3) = channel::<()>();
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily: 1. Adding clippy lint allowances 2. Adjusting test constants for MIRI (Rust's experimental interpreter) 3. Code style improvements (like replacing `assert_eq!(x.is_none(), true)` with `assert!(x.is_none())`) 4. Making test cases run with smaller iteration counts under MIRI Here are the structured responses: Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability was found in this diff. The changes are test-related improvements and lint adjustments. Vulnerability Existed: no The changes to test constants (reducing iteration counts for MIRI) are performance/CI related and don't indicate any security fixes. [File] third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/tests/mpsc.rs [Lines] multiple test cases Vulnerability Existed: no The code style improvements (like assert! instead of assert_eq!) are quality improvements, not security fixes. [File] third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/tests/mpsc.rs [Lines] 350, 896, 908, 1206 The changes appear to be focused on: 1. Making tests compatible with MIRI by reducing iteration counts 2. Improving code style and clarity 3. Adding clippy lint allowances 4. No security vulnerabilities were identified in these changes
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/python/taskcluster_taskgraph/taskgraph/graph.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/python/taskcluster_taskgraph/taskgraph/graph.py@@ -9,9 +9,8 @@ @attr.s(frozen=True) class Graph:- """- Generic representation of a directed acyclic graph with labeled edges- connecting the nodes. Graph operations are implemented in a functional+ """Generic representation of a directed acyclic graph with labeled edges+ connecting the nodes. Graph operations are implemented in a functional manner, so the data structure is immutable. It permits at most one edge of a given name between any set of nodes. The@@ -21,27 +20,27 @@ The `nodes` and `edges` attributes may be accessed in a read-only fashion. The `nodes` attribute is a set of node names, while `edges` is a set of `(left, right, name)` tuples representing an edge named `name` going from- node `left` to node `right..+ node `left` to node `right`.. """ nodes = attr.ib(converter=frozenset) edges = attr.ib(converter=frozenset) def transitive_closure(self, nodes, reverse=False):- """- Return the transitive closure of <nodes>: the graph containing all+ """Return the transitive closure of <nodes>: the graph containing all specified nodes as well as any nodes reachable from them, and any intervening edges. If `reverse` is true, the "reachability" will be reversed and this will return the set of nodes that can reach the specified nodes.- Example- -------+ Example:- a ------> b ------> c- |- `-------> d+ .. code-block::++ a ------> b ------> c+ |+ `-------> d transitive_closure([b]).nodes == set([a, b]) transitive_closure([c]).nodes == set([c, b, a])@@ -49,7 +48,10 @@ transitive_closure([b], reverse=True).nodes == set([b, c, d]) """ assert isinstance(nodes, set)- assert nodes <= self.nodes+ if not (nodes <= self.nodes):+ raise Exception(+ f"Unknown nodes in transitive closure: {nodes - self.nodes}"+ ) # generate a new graph by expanding along edges until reaching a fixed # point
Let me analyze the code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Input Validation Vulnerability [File] [Lines 49-52]
[Old Code]
assert nodes <= self.nodes
[Fixed Code]
if not (nodes <= self.nodes):
raise Exception(
f"Unknown nodes in transitive closure: {nodes - self.nodes}"
)
Additional Details:
- The vulnerability was a lack of proper input validation that could lead to potential security issues if invalid nodes were passed to the transitive_closure method.
- The old code used a simple assert statement which could be disabled in optimized Python builds (with -O flag), potentially allowing invalid input to pass through.
- The fixed code properly validates the input and raises an explicit exception with a descriptive message when invalid nodes are provided.
- This is a defensive programming improvement that prevents potential issues when the method is called with invalid input.
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Documentation Improvement [File] [Lines 9-21]
[Old Code]
"""
Generic representation of a directed acyclic graph with labeled edges
connecting the nodes. Graph operations are implemented in a functional
manner, so the data structure is immutable.
[Fixed Code]
"""Generic representation of a directed acyclic graph with labeled edges
connecting the nodes. Graph operations are implemented in a functional
manner, so the data structure is immutable.
Additional Details:
- While these changes appear to be documentation formatting improvements (removing extra spaces, fixing punctuation), it's unclear if they relate to any security vulnerability.
- The changes could potentially improve code maintainability and clarity, but don't appear to address any specific security issue.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/forms/nsFileControlFrame.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/forms/nsFileControlFrame.cpp@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ #include "mozilla/dom/HTMLButtonElement.h" #include "mozilla/dom/HTMLInputElement.h" #include "mozilla/dom/MutationEventBinding.h"+#include "mozilla/EventStates.h"+#include "mozilla/intl/Segmenter.h" #include "mozilla/Preferences.h" #include "mozilla/PresShell.h" #include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_dom.h"@@ -29,8 +31,7 @@ #include "nsContentCreatorFunctions.h" #include "nsContentUtils.h" #include "nsIFile.h"-#include "nsUnicodeProperties.h"-#include "mozilla/EventStates.h"+#include "nsLayoutUtils.h" #include "nsTextNode.h" #include "nsTextFrame.h"@@ -68,9 +69,9 @@ nsLayoutUtils::GetFontMetricsForFrame(aFrame, 1.0f); // see if the text will completely fit in the width given- nscoord textWidth = nsLayoutUtils::AppUnitWidthOfStringBidi(- aText, aFrame, *fm, aRenderingContext);- if (textWidth <= aWidth) {+ if (const nscoord textWidth = nsLayoutUtils::AppUnitWidthOfStringBidi(+ aText, aFrame, *fm, aRenderingContext);+ textWidth <= aWidth) { return false; }@@ -79,54 +80,49 @@ // see if the width is even smaller than the ellipsis fm->SetTextRunRTL(false);- textWidth = nsLayoutUtils::AppUnitWidthOfString(kEllipsis, *fm, drawTarget);- if (textWidth >= aWidth) {+ const nscoord ellipsisWidth =+ nsLayoutUtils::AppUnitWidthOfString(kEllipsis, *fm, drawTarget);+ if (ellipsisWidth >= aWidth) { aText = kEllipsis; return true; } // determine how much of the string will fit in the max width- nscoord totalWidth = textWidth;- using mozilla::unicode::ClusterIterator;- using mozilla::unicode::ClusterReverseIterator;- ClusterIterator leftIter(aText.Data(), aText.Length());- ClusterReverseIterator rightIter(aText.Data(), aText.Length());- const char16_t* leftPos = leftIter;- const char16_t* rightPos = rightIter;- const char16_t* pos;- ptrdiff_t length;+ nscoord totalWidth = ellipsisWidth;+ const Span text(aText);+ intl::GraphemeClusterBreakIteratorUtf16 leftIter(text);+ intl::GraphemeClusterBreakReverseIteratorUtf16 rightIter(text);+ uint32_t leftPos = 0;+ uint32_t rightPos = aText.Length(); nsAutoString leftString, rightString; while (leftPos < rightPos) {- leftIter.Next();- pos = leftIter;- length = pos - leftPos;- textWidth =- nsLayoutUtils::AppUnitWidthOfString(leftPos, length, *fm, drawTarget);- if (totalWidth + textWidth > aWidth) {+ Maybe<uint32_t> pos = leftIter.Next();+ Span chars = text.FromTo(leftPos, *pos);+ nscoord charWidth =+ nsLayoutUtils::AppUnitWidthOfString(chars, *fm, drawTarget);+ if (totalWidth + charWidth > aWidth) { break; }- leftString.Append(leftPos, length);- leftPos = pos;- totalWidth += textWidth;+ leftString.Append(chars);+ leftPos = *pos;+ totalWidth += charWidth; if (leftPos >= rightPos) { break; }- rightIter.Next();- pos = rightIter;- length = rightPos - pos;- textWidth =- nsLayoutUtils::AppUnitWidthOfString(pos, length, *fm, drawTarget);- if (totalWidth + textWidth > aWidth) {+ pos = rightIter.Next();+ chars = text.FromTo(*pos, rightPos);+ charWidth = nsLayoutUtils::AppUnitWidthOfString(chars, *fm, drawTarget);+ if (totalWidth + charWidth > aWidth) { break; }- rightString.Insert(pos, 0, length);- rightPos = pos;- totalWidth += textWidth;+ rightString.Insert(chars, 0);+ rightPos = *pos;+ totalWidth += charWidth; } aText = leftString + kEllipsis + rightString;
Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Integer Overflow/Underflow] [layout/forms/nsFileControlFrame.cpp] [Lines 68-80]
[Old Code]
```cpp
nscoord textWidth = nsLayoutUtils::AppUnitWidthOfStringBidi(
aText, aFrame, *fm, aRenderingContext);
if (textWidth <= aWidth) {
```
[Fixed Code]
```cpp
if (const nscoord textWidth = nsLayoutUtils::AppUnitWidthOfStringBidi(
aText, aFrame, *fm, aRenderingContext);
textWidth <= aWidth) {
```
Additional Details: The change moves the text width calculation into the conditional scope, which might help prevent potential integer overflow/underflow issues by limiting the scope of the variable, but it's unclear if this was the actual intent.
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Buffer Overflow] [layout/forms/nsFileControlFrame.cpp] [Lines 79-130]
[Old Code]
```cpp
using mozilla::unicode::ClusterIterator;
using mozilla::unicode::ClusterReverseIterator;
ClusterIterator leftIter(aText.Data(), aText.Length());
ClusterReverseIterator rightIter(aText.Data(), aText.Length());
const char16_t* leftPos = leftIter;
const char16_t* rightPos = rightIter;
```
[Fixed Code]
```cpp
const Span text(aText);
intl::GraphemeClusterBreakIteratorUtf16 leftIter(text);
intl::GraphemeClusterBreakReverseIteratorUtf16 rightIter(text);
uint32_t leftPos = 0;
uint32_t rightPos = aText.Length();
```
Additional Details: The change replaces low-level pointer arithmetic with safer span-based operations, which could mitigate potential buffer overflow vulnerabilities when processing text clusters. However, without more context, we can't be certain this was specifically a security fix.
3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Memory Safety Issues] [layout/forms/nsFileControlFrame.cpp] [Lines 21-31]
[Old Code]
```cpp
#include "mozilla/dom/MutationEventBinding.h"
#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
#include "mozilla/PresShell.h"
#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_dom.h"
#include "nsContentCreatorFunctions.h"
#include "nsContentUtils.h"
#include "nsIFile.h"
#include "nsUnicodeProperties.h"
#include "mozilla/EventStates.h"
```
[Fixed Code]
```cpp
#include "mozilla/dom/MutationEventBinding.h"
#include "mozilla/EventStates.h"
#include "mozilla/intl/Segmenter.h"
#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
#include "mozilla/PresShell.h"
#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_dom.h"
#include "nsContentCreatorFunctions.h"
#include "nsContentUtils.h"
#include "nsIFile.h"
#include "nsLayoutUtils.h"
```
Additional Details: The header reorganization includes adding mozilla/intl/Segmenter.h and removing nsUnicodeProperties.h, which might relate to memory safety improvements in text processing, but this is speculative.
Note: While the changes appear to improve code safety and maintainability, none of them clearly address specific, known vulnerabilities. The modifications primarily involve modernization of text processing code and better scoping of variables.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/once_cell/.cargo-checksum.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/once_cell/.cargo-checksum.json@@ -1 +1 @@-{"files":{"CHANGELOG.md":"abb8c3977a69e288097ac9e6d86c78b95170fabcaa4454ce3250e06f6fc388ab","Cargo.lock":"8904e3dc1908b63c1c81005d34a1e5e498c639a65f05d306b3388bc88a919f3a","Cargo.toml":"0ab421ab8c48cc6410965fd82a82dbaec19bb8b24adb7bf0cab07870fac472e9","LICENSE-APACHE":"a60eea817514531668d7e00765731449fe14d059d3249e0bc93b36de45f759f2","LICENSE-MIT":"23f18e03dc49df91622fe2a76176497404e46ced8a715d9d2b67a7446571cca3","README.md":"7e93eec9a4c6c38db0eb3851c1e868c55e64ff2bacc86380d601a2ee08a11589","bors.toml":"ebd69f714a49dceb8fd10ebadfea6e2767be4732fdef49eddf6239151b4bc78c","examples/bench.rs":"1597a52529f75d6c5ad0b86759a775b1d723dfa810e2016317283b13594219da","examples/bench_acquire.rs":"9f4912ca262194cb55e893c33739c85c2f4868d07905b9dd3238552b6ce8a6e4","examples/bench_vs_lazy_static.rs":"d527294a2e73b53ac5faed8b316dfd1ae2a06adb31384134af21f10ce76333a5","examples/lazy_static.rs":"90541b093ed1d1cbb73f4097ff02cf80657e28264d281d6a31d96a708fdfea90","examples/reentrant_init_deadlocks.rs":"ff84929de27a848e5b155549caa96db5db5f030afca975f8ba3f3da640083001","examples/regex.rs":"4a2e0fb093c7f5bbe0fff8689fc0c670c5334344a1bfda376f5faa98a05d459f","examples/test_synchronization.rs":"88abd5c16275bb2f2d77eaecf369d97681404a77b8edd0021f24bfd377c46be3","src/imp_pl.rs":"cac67286119fcfa2b69ffb9ada51d5cb57c89e95a533d95d5d40b0ae4d38a6c2","src/imp_std.rs":"7a9b58444f71ca3025655f060dabc0f33a775d3b27916e9c22fe4182b286265d","src/lib.rs":"80c30678f1583e6abf5105c704650564505556cf97e30ab507acf70d5e90d25a","src/race.rs":"4b19f459ac16605353e4b6559ea3b194f45c3812aa157e2c0e3a82f67ebacfeb","tests/it.rs":"ed9ff44665f29fa138055800d7199405740bce912f9c568c11aa2ff2249c17f8"},"package":"692fcb63b64b1758029e0a96ee63e049ce8c5948587f2f7208df04625e5f6b56"}+{"files":{"CHANGELOG.md":"82ab4befbaaa36caf65981a5b404e2694211e73a893d0bb52c9be4b2c4499c24","Cargo.lock":"a59f0983203428f13b7998cacbcb611d87bb097333f24daaddfeb82cf52758d2","Cargo.toml":"6eb98fe8d0db8728b5d327a25290aebdd2c7d69dd0636baf24422a7b70c6be8f","LICENSE-APACHE":"a60eea817514531668d7e00765731449fe14d059d3249e0bc93b36de45f759f2","LICENSE-MIT":"23f18e03dc49df91622fe2a76176497404e46ced8a715d9d2b67a7446571cca3","README.md":"7e93eec9a4c6c38db0eb3851c1e868c55e64ff2bacc86380d601a2ee08a11589","bors.toml":"ebd69f714a49dceb8fd10ebadfea6e2767be4732fdef49eddf6239151b4bc78c","examples/bench.rs":"1597a52529f75d6c5ad0b86759a775b1d723dfa810e2016317283b13594219da","examples/bench_acquire.rs":"9f4912ca262194cb55e893c33739c85c2f4868d07905b9dd3238552b6ce8a6e4","examples/bench_vs_lazy_static.rs":"d527294a2e73b53ac5faed8b316dfd1ae2a06adb31384134af21f10ce76333a5","examples/lazy_static.rs":"90541b093ed1d1cbb73f4097ff02cf80657e28264d281d6a31d96a708fdfea90","examples/reentrant_init_deadlocks.rs":"ff84929de27a848e5b155549caa96db5db5f030afca975f8ba3f3da640083001","examples/regex.rs":"4a2e0fb093c7f5bbe0fff8689fc0c670c5334344a1bfda376f5faa98a05d459f","examples/test_synchronization.rs":"88abd5c16275bb2f2d77eaecf369d97681404a77b8edd0021f24bfd377c46be3","src/imp_pl.rs":"cac67286119fcfa2b69ffb9ada51d5cb57c89e95a533d95d5d40b0ae4d38a6c2","src/imp_std.rs":"7a9b58444f71ca3025655f060dabc0f33a775d3b27916e9c22fe4182b286265d","src/lib.rs":"b7263ecf5c5e293903c522a8bfee9fc5e61d1379bc53bb656b34dc0ec4b6cc8c","src/race.rs":"2a6613a50df41c1433e692160cba427f3c7a5624960b82bc6f84ea7b383286c2","tests/it.rs":"ed9ff44665f29fa138055800d7199405740bce912f9c568c11aa2ff2249c17f8"},"package":"da32515d9f6e6e489d7bc9d84c71b060db7247dc035bbe44eac88cf87486d8d5"}=========testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.clip.html========--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.clip.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.clip.html@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ promise.then(function(response) { createImageBitmap(response).then(bitmap => { ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 0, 0);- _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+ _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2); }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);
Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes following the required format:
1. For the first file (once_cell/.cargo-checksum.json):
Vulnerability Existed: no
This appears to be a standard checksum update for the once_cell Rust crate. The changes are just hash updates for various files, which is normal for dependency updates and doesn't indicate any security fixes.
2. For the second file (2d.drawImage.clip.html):
Vulnerability Existed: no
The changes here are purely variable renaming (offscreenCanvas → canvas) and don't indicate any security fixes. This appears to be a code style/readability improvement rather than a security patch.
No actual security vulnerabilities were identified in these changes. The modifications appear to be routine updates and code improvements rather than security fixes.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.system.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.system.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
Additional Details:
- The change appears to be purely a variable name refactoring from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security-related changes were made in this diff
- The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name was changed for better clarity/consistency
- No known vulnerabilities are addressed by this change
The modification doesn't appear to fix any security issues but rather improves code readability/maintainability.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/newtab/yamscripts.yml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/newtab/yamscripts.yml@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ tddmc: karma start karma.mc.config.js --tdd- debugcoverage: open logs/coverage/index.html+ debugcoverage: open logs/coverage/lcov-report/index.html # lint: Run various linters with mach or local dev dependencies lint:
Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes. Vulnerability Existed: no [No specific vulnerability] [browser/components/newtab/yamscripts.yml] [Lines 32] [Old Code] debugcoverage: open logs/coverage/index.html [Fixed Code] debugcoverage: open logs/coverage/lcov-report/index.html Additional Details: The change appears to be a simple path correction in a debug command, updating the path to the coverage report from 'logs/coverage/index.html' to 'logs/coverage/lcov-report/index.html'. This doesn't appear to be a security-related fix but rather a maintenance update to reflect the correct file structure. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being addressed in this change.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/wasm/WasmFrame.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/wasm/WasmFrame.h@@ -14,6 +14,138 @@ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License.+ */++/* [SMDOC] The WASM ABIs+ *+ * Wasm-internal ABI.+ *+ * This section pertains to calls from one wasm function to another, and to+ * wasm's view of the situation when calling into wasm from JS and C++. Calls+ * to JS and to C++ have other conventions.+ *+ * We pass the first function arguments in registers (GPR and FPU both) and the+ * rest on the stack, generally according to platform ABI conventions (which can+ * be hairy). On x86-32 there are no register arguments.+ *+ * We have no callee-saves registers in the wasm-internal ABI, regardless of the+ * platform ABI conventions, though see below about TlsReg or HeapReg.+ *+ * We return the last return value in the first return register, according to+ * platform ABI conventions. If there is more than one return value, an area is+ * allocated in the caller's frame to receive the other return values, and the+ * address of this area is passed to the callee as the last argument. Return+ * values except the last are stored in ascending order within this area. Also+ * see below about alignment of this area and the values in it.+ *+ * When a function is entered, there are two incoming register values in+ * addition to the function's declared parameters: TlsReg must have the correct+ * TLS pointer, and HeapReg the correct memoryBase, for the function. (On+ * x86-32 there is no HeapReg.) From the TLS we can get to the JSContext, the+ * instance, the MemoryBase, and many other things. The TLS maps one-to-one+ * with an instance.+ *+ * HeapReg and TlsReg are not parameters in the usual sense, nor are they+ * callee-saves registers. Instead they constitute global register state, the+ * purpose of which is to bias the call ABI in favor of intra-instance calls,+ * the predominant case where the caller and the callee have the same TlsReg and+ * HeapReg values.+ *+ * With this global register state, literally no work needs to take place to+ * save and restore the TLS and MemoryBase values across intra-instance call+ * boundaries.+ *+ * For inter-instance calls, in contrast, there must be an instance switch at+ * the call boundary: Before the call, the callee's TLS must be loaded (from a+ * closure or from the import table), and from the TLS we load the callee's+ * MemoryBase, the realm, and the JSContext. The caller's and callee's TLS+ * values must be stored into the frame (to aid unwinding), the callee's realm+ * must be stored into the JSContext, and the callee's TLS and MemoryBase values+ * must be moved to appropriate registers. After the call, the caller's TLS+ * must be loaded, and from it the caller's MemoryBase and realm, and the+ * JSContext. The realm must be stored into the JSContext and the caller's TLS+ * and MemoryBase values must be moved to appropriate registers.+ *+ * Direct calls to functions within the same module are always intra-instance,+ * while direct calls to imported functions are always inter-instance. Indirect+ * calls -- call_indirect in the MVP, future call_ref and call_funcref -- may or+ * may not be intra-instance.+ *+ * call_indirect, and future call_funcref, also pass a signature value in a+ * register (even on x86-32), this is a small integer or a pointer value+ * denoting the caller's expected function signature. The callee must compare+ * it to the value or pointer that denotes its actual signature, and trap on+ * mismatch.+ *+ * This is what the stack looks like during a call, after the callee has+ * completed the prologue:+ *+ * | |+ * +-----------------------------------+ <-++ * | ... | |+ * | Caller's private frame | |+ * +-----------------------------------+ |+ * | Multi-value return (optional) | |+ * | ... | |+ * +-----------------------------------+ |+ * | Stack args (optional) | |+ * | ... | |+ * +-----------------------------------+ -+|+ * | Caller TLS slot | \+ * | Callee TLS slot | | \+ * +-----------------------------------+ | \+ * | Shadowstack area (Win64) | | wasm::FrameWithTls+ * | (32 bytes) | | /+ * +-----------------------------------+ | / <= SP "Before call"+ * | Return address | // <= SP "After call"+ * | Saved FP ----|--+/+ * +-----------------------------------+ -+ <= FP (a wasm::Frame*)+ * | DebugFrame, Locals, spills, etc |+ * | (i.e., callee's private frame) |+ * | .... |+ * +-----------------------------------+ <= SP+ *+ * The FrameWithTls is a struct with four fields: the saved FP, the return+ * address, and the two TLS slots; the shadow stack area is there only on Win64+ * and is unused by wasm but is part of the native ABI, with which the wasm ABI+ * is mostly compatible. The slots for caller and callee TLS are only populated+ * by the instance switching code in inter-instance calls so that stack+ * unwinding can keep track of the correct TLS value for each frame, the TLS not+ * being obtainable from anywhere else. Nothing in the frame itself indicates+ * directly whether the TLS slots are valid - for that, the return address must+ * be used to look up a CallSite structure that carries that information.+ *+ * The stack area above the return address is owned by the caller, which may+ * deallocate the area on return or choose to reuse it for subsequent calls.+ * (The baseline compiler allocates and frees the stack args area and the+ * multi-value result area per call. Ion reuses the areas and allocates them as+ * part of the overall activation frame when the procedure is entered; indeed,+ * the multi-value return area can be anywhere within the caller's private+ * frame, not necessarily directly above the stack args.)+ *+ * If the stack args area contain references, it is up to the callee's stack map+ * to name the locations where those references exist, and the caller's stack+ * map must not (redundantly) name those locations. (The callee's ownership of+ * this area will be crucial for making tail calls work, as the types of the+ * locations can change if the callee makes a tail call.) If pointer values are+ * spilled by anyone into the Shadowstack area they will not be traced.+ *+ * References in the multi-return area are covered by the caller's map, as these+ * slots outlive the call.+ *+ * The address "Before call", ie the part of the FrameWithTls above the Frame,+ * must be aligned to WasmStackAlignment, and everything follows from that, with+ * padding inserted for alignment as required for stack arguments. In turn+ * WasmStackAlignment is at least as large as the largest parameter type.+ *+ * The address of the multiple-results area is currently 8-byte aligned by Ion+ * and its alignment in baseline is uncertain, see bug 1747787. Result values+ * are stored packed within the area in fields whose size is given by+ * ResultStackSize(ValType), this breaks alignment too. This all seems+ * underdeveloped.+ *+ * In the wasm-internal ABI, the ARM64 PseudoStackPointer (PSP) is garbage on+ * entry but must be synced with the real SP at the point the function returns. */ #ifndef wasm_frame_h
After carefully analyzing the provided diff, I can see that this is primarily a documentation update rather than a code change fixing security vulnerabilities. The diff adds extensive documentation about WASM ABIs and frame handling, but doesn't modify any actual code that could contain vulnerabilities. Vulnerability Existed: no No vulnerability found [File] js/src/wasm/WasmFrame.h [Lines] Documentation addition [Old Code] /* [SMDOC] The WASM ABIs * * Wasm-internal ABI. ... [Fixed Code] The entire documentation block was added (no "old code" existed for this section) The changes are purely documentation improvements explaining the WASM ABI implementation details, call frame structure, and register usage conventions. There are no actual code modifications that would indicate security fixes. The documentation appears to be added to improve understanding of the system rather than to address any specific security issues.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/server/actors/errordocs.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/server/actors/errordocs.js@@ -112,8 +112,6 @@ "https://developer.mozilla.org/docs/Web/HTTP/Public_Key_Pinning"; const STRICT_TRANSPORT_SECURITY_LEARN_MORE = "https://developer.mozilla.org/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Strict-Transport-Security";-const WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_LEARN_MORE =- "https://developer.mozilla.org/docs/Web/Security/Weak_Signature_Algorithm"; const MIME_TYPE_MISMATCH_LEARN_MORE = "https://developer.mozilla.org/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/X-Content-Type-Options"; const SOURCE_MAP_LEARN_MORE =@@ -134,7 +132,6 @@ "Mixed Content Blocker": MIXED_CONTENT_LEARN_MORE, "Invalid HPKP Headers": PUBLIC_KEY_PINS_LEARN_MORE, "Invalid HSTS Headers": STRICT_TRANSPORT_SECURITY_LEARN_MORE,- "SHA-1 Signature": WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_LEARN_MORE, "Tracking Protection": TRACKING_PROTECTION_LEARN_MORE, MIMEMISMATCH: MIME_TYPE_MISMATCH_LEARN_MORE, "source map": SOURCE_MAP_LEARN_MORE,
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format: Vulnerability Existed: yes Deprecated Security Documentation Link [devtools/server/actors/errordocs.js] [Lines 112-113, 134] [Old Code] const WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_LEARN_MORE = "https://developer.mozilla.org/docs/Web/Security/Weak_Signature_Algorithm"; ... "SHA-1 Signature": WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_LEARN_MORE, [Fixed Code] [Removed entirely] Additional Details: The diff shows removal of documentation links related to weak signature algorithms (specifically SHA-1). This appears to be removing outdated security documentation, as SHA-1 has been considered cryptographically broken and deprecated for security purposes. The removal suggests these references are no longer relevant or maintained.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/base/nsCSSFrameConstructor.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/base/nsCSSFrameConstructor.h@@ -1662,16 +1662,13 @@ void FinishBuildingScrollFrame(nsContainerFrame* aScrollFrame, nsIFrame* aScrolledFrame);- // InitializeSelectFrame puts scrollFrame in aFrameList if aBuildCombobox is- // false aBuildCombobox indicates if we are building a combobox that has a- // dropdown popup widget or not.- void InitializeSelectFrame(nsFrameConstructorState& aState,- nsContainerFrame* aScrollFrame,- nsContainerFrame* aScrolledFrame,- nsIContent* aContent,- nsContainerFrame* aParentFrame,- ComputedStyle* aComputedStyle, bool aBuildCombobox,- nsFrameList& aFrameList);+ void InitializeListboxSelect(nsFrameConstructorState& aState,+ nsContainerFrame* aScrollFrame,+ nsContainerFrame* aScrolledFrame,+ nsIContent* aContent,+ nsContainerFrame* aParentFrame,+ ComputedStyle* aComputedStyle,+ nsFrameList& aFrameList); /** * Recreate frames for aContent.
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Function Signature Mismatch] [layout/base/nsCSSFrameConstructor.h] [Lines 1662-1675]
[Old Code]
void InitializeSelectFrame(nsFrameConstructorState& aState,
nsContainerFrame* aScrollFrame,
nsContainerFrame* aScrolledFrame,
nsIContent* aContent,
nsContainerFrame* aParentFrame,
ComputedStyle* aComputedStyle, bool aBuildCombobox,
nsFrameList& aFrameList);
[Fixed Code]
void InitializeListboxSelect(nsFrameConstructorState& aState,
nsContainerFrame* aScrollFrame,
nsContainerFrame* aScrolledFrame,
nsIContent* aContent,
nsContainerFrame* aParentFrame,
ComputedStyle* aComputedStyle,
nsFrameList& aFrameList);
Additional Details:
- The change involves renaming a function and removing a boolean parameter (aBuildCombobox)
- While this appears to be a refactoring change, it could potentially address:
1) A potential logic vulnerability if the removed parameter was causing unsafe behavior
2) A potential type confusion if the function was being called incorrectly
- Without more context about how this function was used, it's difficult to determine if this was fixing a security vulnerability or just refactoring code
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/python/attrs/attr/validators.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/python/attrs/attr/validators.py@@ -4,10 +4,23 @@ from __future__ import absolute_import, division, print_function+import re+ from ._make import _AndValidator, and_, attrib, attrs---__all__ = ["and_", "in_", "instance_of", "optional", "provides"]+from .exceptions import NotCallableError+++__all__ = [+ "and_",+ "deep_iterable",+ "deep_mapping",+ "in_",+ "instance_of",+ "is_callable",+ "matches_re",+ "optional",+ "provides",+] @attrs(repr=False, slots=True, hash=True)@@ -40,18 +53,90 @@ def instance_of(type): """- A validator that raises a :exc:`TypeError` if the initializer is called+ A validator that raises a `TypeError` if the initializer is called with a wrong type for this particular attribute (checks are performed using- :func:`isinstance` therefore it's also valid to pass a tuple of types).+ `isinstance` therefore it's also valid to pass a tuple of types). :param type: The type to check for. :type type: type or tuple of types :raises TypeError: With a human readable error message, the attribute- (of type :class:`attr.Attribute`), the expected type, and the value it+ (of type `attr.Attribute`), the expected type, and the value it got. """ return _InstanceOfValidator(type)+++@attrs(repr=False, frozen=True)+class _MatchesReValidator(object):+ regex = attrib()+ flags = attrib()+ match_func = attrib()++ def __call__(self, inst, attr, value):+ """+ We use a callable class to be able to change the ``__repr__``.+ """+ if not self.match_func(value):+ raise ValueError(+ "'{name}' must match regex {regex!r}"+ " ({value!r} doesn't)".format(+ name=attr.name, regex=self.regex.pattern, value=value+ ),+ attr,+ self.regex,+ value,+ )++ def __repr__(self):+ return "<matches_re validator for pattern {regex!r}>".format(+ regex=self.regex+ )+++def matches_re(regex, flags=0, func=None):+ r"""+ A validator that raises `ValueError` if the initializer is called+ with a string that doesn't match *regex*.++ :param str regex: a regex string to match against+ :param int flags: flags that will be passed to the underlying re function+ (default 0)+ :param callable func: which underlying `re` function to call (options+ are `re.fullmatch`, `re.search`, `re.match`, default+ is ``None`` which means either `re.fullmatch` or an emulation of+ it on Python 2). For performance reasons, they won't be used directly+ but on a pre-`re.compile`\ ed pattern.++ .. versionadded:: 19.2.0+ """+ fullmatch = getattr(re, "fullmatch", None)+ valid_funcs = (fullmatch, None, re.search, re.match)+ if func not in valid_funcs:+ raise ValueError(+ "'func' must be one of %s."+ % (+ ", ".join(+ sorted(+ e and e.__name__ or "None" for e in set(valid_funcs)+ )+ ),+ )+ )++ pattern = re.compile(regex, flags)+ if func is re.match:+ match_func = pattern.match+ elif func is re.search:+ match_func = pattern.search+ else:+ if fullmatch:+ match_func = pattern.fullmatch+ else:+ pattern = re.compile(r"(?:{})\Z".format(regex), flags)+ match_func = pattern.match++ return _MatchesReValidator(pattern, flags, match_func) @attrs(repr=False, slots=True, hash=True)@@ -81,7 +166,7 @@ def provides(interface): """- A validator that raises a :exc:`TypeError` if the initializer is called+ A validator that raises a `TypeError` if the initializer is called with an object that does not provide the requested *interface* (checks are performed using ``interface.providedBy(value)`` (see `zope.interface <https://zopeinterface.readthedocs.io/en/latest/>`_).@@ -89,7 +174,7 @@ :param zope.interface.Interface interface: The interface to check for. :raises TypeError: With a human readable error message, the attribute- (of type :class:`attr.Attribute`), the expected interface, and the+ (of type `attr.Attribute`), the expected interface, and the value it got. """ return _ProvidesValidator(interface)@@ -119,7 +204,7 @@ :param validator: A validator (or a list of validators) that is used for non-``None`` values.- :type validator: callable or :class:`list` of callables.+ :type validator: callable or `list` of callables. .. versionadded:: 15.1.0 .. versionchanged:: 17.1.0 *validator* can be a list of validators.@@ -154,15 +239,15 @@ def in_(options): """- A validator that raises a :exc:`ValueError` if the initializer is called+ A validator that raises a `ValueError` if the initializer is called with a value that does not belong in the options provided. The check is performed using ``value in options``. :param options: Allowed options.- :type options: list, tuple, :class:`enum.Enum`, ...+ :type options: list, tuple, `enum.Enum`, ... :raises ValueError: With a human readable error message, the attribute (of- type :class:`attr.Attribute`), the expected options, and the value it+ type `attr.Attribute`), the expected options, and the value it got. .. versionadded:: 17.1.0@@ -177,7 +262,16 @@ We use a callable class to be able to change the ``__repr__``. """ if not callable(value):- raise TypeError("'{name}' must be callable".format(name=attr.name))+ message = (+ "'{name}' must be callable "+ "(got {value!r} that is a {actual!r})."+ )+ raise NotCallableError(+ msg=message.format(+ name=attr.name, value=value, actual=value.__class__+ ),+ value=value,+ ) def __repr__(self): return "<is_callable validator>"@@ -185,13 +279,15 @@ def is_callable(): """- A validator that raises a :class:`TypeError` if the initializer is called- with a value for this particular attribute that is not callable.+ A validator that raises a `attr.exceptions.NotCallableError` if the+ initializer is called with a value for this particular attribute+ that is not callable. .. versionadded:: 19.1.0- :raises TypeError: With a human readable error message containing the- attribute (of type :class:`attr.Attribute`) name.+ :raises `attr.exceptions.NotCallableError`: With a human readable error+ message containing the attribute (`attr.Attribute`) name,+ and the value it got. """ return _IsCallableValidator()
Let me analyze the code diff for potential security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Regex Injection (Potential) [third_party/python/attrs/attr/validators.py] [Lines added for matches_re function]
[Old Code] (No regex validation function existed before)
[Fixed Code] Added new `matches_re` validator function with proper regex compilation and validation
2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Improper Error Handling [third_party/python/attrs/attr/validators.py] [Lines modified in _IsCallableValidator]
[Old Code]
if not callable(value):
raise TypeError("'{name}' must be callable".format(name=attr.name))
[Fixed Code]
if not callable(value):
message = (
"'{name}' must be callable "
"(got {value!r} that is a {actual!r})."
)
raise NotCallableError(
msg=message.format(
name=attr.name, value=value, actual=value.__class__
),
value=value,
)
3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Input Validation Enhancement [third_party/python/attrs/attr/validators.py] [Lines added for new validators]
[Old Code] Only basic validators existed
[Fixed Code] Added new validators (deep_iterable, deep_mapping, matches_re, is_callable) with more robust validation
The most significant security-related change appears to be the improved error handling in the callable validator, where it now provides more detailed error information through a custom NotCallableError instead of a generic TypeError. This could help prevent information leakage or make debugging easier in security-sensitive contexts.
The new matches_re validator could help prevent regex-related vulnerabilities if used properly, though the implementation itself doesn't appear to have security flaws.
The changes to __all__ and addition of new validators seem to be feature additions rather than security fixes.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/themes/windows/controlcenter/panel.css+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/themes/windows/controlcenter/panel.css@@ -37,8 +37,3 @@ #protections-popup[type="arrow"][side="right"] { margin-block: calc(-20px + 2 * var(--urlbar-container-padding)); }--.protections-popup-tp-switch:-moz-focusring {- outline: var(--default-focusring);- outline-offset: unset;-}
After analyzing the provided CSS diff, here's the security assessment:
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Clickjacking Protection Removal] [browser/themes/windows/controlcenter/panel.css] [Lines 37-42]
[Old Code]
.protections-popup-tp-switch:-moz-focusring {
outline: var(--default-focusring);
outline-offset: unset;
}
[Fixed Code]
[Removed entirely]
Additional Details:
1. The diff shows removal of focus ring styling for a protection popup switch element
2. While this could potentially affect accessibility and user interaction visibility, it's unclear if this constitutes a direct security vulnerability
3. The removal of focus indicators might make the UI slightly more susceptible to clickjacking by making it harder for users to see where their keyboard focus is, but this is speculative
4. No known vulnerability name directly applies to this change
Note: CSS changes rarely represent direct security vulnerabilities, but can sometimes impact security-adjacent areas like accessibility or UI visibility that could indirectly affect security.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/streams/UnderlyingSourceCallbackHelpers.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/streams/UnderlyingSourceCallbackHelpers.h@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ */ namespace mozilla::dom {+class BodyStreamHolder;+ // Note: Until we need to be able to provide a native implementation of start, // I don't distinguish between UnderlyingSourceStartCallbackHelper and a // hypothetical IDLUnderlingSourceStartCallbackHelper@@ -103,6 +105,29 @@ RefPtr<UnderlyingSourcePullCallback> mCallback; };+class BodyStreamUnderlyingSourcePullCallbackHelper final+ : public UnderlyingSourcePullCallbackHelper {+ public:+ NS_DECL_ISUPPORTS_INHERITED+ NS_DECL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_CLASS_INHERITED(+ BodyStreamUnderlyingSourcePullCallbackHelper,+ UnderlyingSourcePullCallbackHelper)++ explicit BodyStreamUnderlyingSourcePullCallbackHelper(+ BodyStreamHolder* underlyingSource);++ MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT+ virtual already_AddRefed<Promise> PullCallback(+ JSContext* aCx, ReadableStreamController& aController,+ ErrorResult& aRv) override;++ protected:+ virtual ~BodyStreamUnderlyingSourcePullCallbackHelper() = default;++ private:+ RefPtr<BodyStreamHolder> mUnderlyingSource;+};+ class UnderlyingSourceCancelCallbackHelper : public nsISupports { public: NS_DECL_CYCLE_COLLECTING_ISUPPORTS@@ -149,17 +174,59 @@ RefPtr<UnderlyingSourceCancelCallback> mCallback; };+class BodyStreamUnderlyingSourceCancelCallbackHelper final+ : public UnderlyingSourceCancelCallbackHelper {+ public:+ NS_DECL_ISUPPORTS_INHERITED+ NS_DECL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_CLASS_INHERITED(+ BodyStreamUnderlyingSourceCancelCallbackHelper,+ UnderlyingSourceCancelCallbackHelper)++ explicit BodyStreamUnderlyingSourceCancelCallbackHelper(+ BodyStreamHolder* aUnderlyingSource);++ MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT+ virtual already_AddRefed<Promise> CancelCallback(+ JSContext* aCx, const Optional<JS::Handle<JS::Value>>& aReason,+ ErrorResult& aRv) override;++ protected:+ virtual ~BodyStreamUnderlyingSourceCancelCallbackHelper() = default;++ private:+ RefPtr<BodyStreamHolder> mUnderlyingSource;+};+ // Callback called when erroring a stream. class UnderlyingSourceErrorCallbackHelper : public nsISupports { public: NS_DECL_CYCLE_COLLECTING_ISUPPORTS- NS_DECL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_SCRIPT_HOLDER_CLASS(+ NS_DECL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_CLASS(UnderlyingSourceErrorCallbackHelper)++ virtual void Call() = 0;++ protected:+ virtual ~UnderlyingSourceErrorCallbackHelper() = default;+};++class BodyStreamUnderlyingSourceErrorCallbackHelper final+ : public UnderlyingSourceErrorCallbackHelper {+ public:+ NS_DECL_ISUPPORTS_INHERITED+ NS_DECL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_CLASS_INHERITED(+ BodyStreamUnderlyingSourceErrorCallbackHelper, UnderlyingSourceErrorCallbackHelper)- virtual void Call() = 0;-- protected:- virtual ~UnderlyingSourceErrorCallbackHelper() = default;+ explicit BodyStreamUnderlyingSourceErrorCallbackHelper(+ BodyStreamHolder* aUnderlyingSource);++ virtual void Call() override;++ protected:+ virtual ~BodyStreamUnderlyingSourceErrorCallbackHelper() = default;++ private:+ RefPtr<BodyStreamHolder> mUnderlyingSource; }; } // namespace mozilla::dom
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze the changes for potential security vulnerabilities. The diff primarily adds new classes related to BodyStreamHolder functionality rather than modifying existing security-sensitive code. 1. Vulnerability Existed: no The changes introduce new helper classes (BodyStreamUnderlyingSourcePullCallbackHelper, BodyStreamUnderlyingSourceCancelCallbackHelper, and BodyStreamUnderlyingSourceErrorCallbackHelper) but don't appear to fix any existing vulnerabilities. These are new additions to support BodyStreamHolder functionality. 2. Vulnerability Existed: no The modification to UnderlyingSourceErrorCallbackHelper changes its cycle collection declaration from NS_DECL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_SCRIPT_HOLDER_CLASS to NS_DECL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_CLASS, but this appears to be a refinement rather than a security fix. The change suggests the class no longer needs to be a script holder. The diff shows architectural improvements and additions rather than security fixes. The changes: 1. Add forward declaration for BodyStreamHolder 2. Introduce new callback helper classes for BodyStream operations 3. Modify the cycle collection declaration for UnderlyingSourceErrorCallbackHelper No specific vulnerabilities are being addressed in this diff, and the changes appear to be functional improvements rather than security patches.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.unaffected.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.unaffected.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 50, 50)@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@ var imgdata = ctx.getImageData(0, 0, 50, 50); ctx.restore(); ctx.putImageData(imgdata, 50, 0);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2); t.done(); });
Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't involve any security-related modifications.
Here's the analysis following your requested format:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found
File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.unaffected.worker.js
Lines: 13-14, 30-31
Old Code:
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.join.round.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.join.round.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -47,16 +47,16 @@ ctx.moveTo(80, 20); ctx.arc(80, 20, 10+tol, 0, 2*Math.PI, true); ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 36,14, 0,255,0,255, "36,14", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 36,13, 0,255,0,255, "36,13", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 37,13, 0,255,0,255, "37,13", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 38,13, 0,255,0,255, "38,13", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 38,12, 0,255,0,255, "38,12", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 86,14, 0,255,0,255, "86,14", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 86,13, 0,255,0,255, "86,13", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 87,13, 0,255,0,255, "87,13", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 88,13, 0,255,0,255, "88,13", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 88,12, 0,255,0,255, "88,12", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 36,14, 0,255,0,255, "36,14", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 36,13, 0,255,0,255, "36,13", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 37,13, 0,255,0,255, "37,13", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 38,13, 0,255,0,255, "38,13", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 38,12, 0,255,0,255, "38,12", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 86,14, 0,255,0,255, "86,14", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 86,13, 0,255,0,255, "86,13", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 87,13, 0,255,0,255, "87,13", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 88,13, 0,255,0,255, "88,13", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 88,12, 0,255,0,255, "88,12", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability purposes. Here's the structured response: Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.join.round.worker.js [Lines] Throughout file [Old Code] Used variable name `offscreenCanvas` [Fixed Code] Changed variable name to `canvas` This is a refactoring change that doesn't impact security. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been changed to be more concise. All assertions and canvas operations remain identical in their behavior.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/webcodecs/videoFrame-alpha.any.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/webcodecs/videoFrame-alpha.any.js@@ -37,14 +37,14 @@ promise_test(async () => { let src = makeRGBACanvas();- let frame = new VideoFrame(src, {alpha: 'keep'});+ let frame = new VideoFrame(src, {alpha: 'keep', timestamp: 0}); verifyPicture(frame); verifyPicture(await createImageBitmap(frame)); }, 'OffscreenCanvas source preserves alpha'); promise_test(async () => { let src = makeRGBACanvas().transferToImageBitmap();- let frame = new VideoFrame(src, {alpha: 'keep'});+ let frame = new VideoFrame(src, {alpha: 'keep', timestamp: 0}); verifyPicture(frame); verifyPicture(await createImageBitmap(frame)); }, 'ImageBitmap source preserves alpha');
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Missing Timestamp Parameter [File] testing/web-platform/tests/webcodecs/videoFrame-alpha.any.js [Lines 37-47]
[Old Code]
let frame = new VideoFrame(src, {alpha: 'keep'});
[Fixed Code]
let frame = new VideoFrame(src, {alpha: 'keep', timestamp: 0});
Additional Details:
- The change adds a required `timestamp` parameter to the VideoFrame constructor calls
- While this appears to be fixing incomplete/missing API usage rather than a security vulnerability, it's worth noting that missing required parameters could potentially lead to undefined behavior
- The WebCodecs specification requires a timestamp for VideoFrame construction
- No specific CVE or vulnerability name is associated with this change
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/wasm/WasmInstance.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/wasm/WasmInstance.cpp@@ -859,7 +859,7 @@ void* Instance::ensureAndGetIndirectStub(Tier tier, uint32_t funcIndex) { const CodeTier& codeTier = code(tier);- auto stubs = codeTier.lazyStubs().lock();+ auto stubs = codeTier.lazyStubs().writeLock(); void* stub_entry = stubs->lookupIndirectStub(funcIndex, tlsData()); if (stub_entry) {@@ -885,7 +885,7 @@ } const CodeTier& codeTier = code(tier);- auto stubs = codeTier.lazyStubs().lock();+ auto stubs = codeTier.lazyStubs().writeLock(); return stubs->createManyIndirectStubs(targets, codeTier); }@@ -893,7 +893,7 @@ const Tier tier) const { MOZ_ASSERT(funcIndex != NullFuncIndex);- auto stubs = code(tier).lazyStubs().lock();+ auto stubs = code(tier).lazyStubs().readLock(); return stubs->lookupIndirectStub(funcIndex, targetTlsData); }@@ -2148,7 +2148,7 @@ // // Also see doc block for stubs in WasmJS.cpp.- auto stubs = instance.code(tier).lazyStubs().lock();+ auto stubs = instance.code(tier).lazyStubs().writeLock(); *interpEntry = stubs->lookupInterpEntry(fe.funcIndex()); if (*interpEntry) { return true;@@ -2169,7 +2169,7 @@ } MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(prevTier == Tier::Baseline && tier == Tier::Optimized);- auto stubs2 = instance.code(tier).lazyStubs().lock();+ auto stubs2 = instance.code(tier).lazyStubs().writeLock(); // If it didn't have a stub in the first tier, background compilation // shouldn't have made one in the second tier.
Analyzing the provided code diff, I can identify a potential thread safety issue being addressed through lock type changes. Here's the analysis: 1. Vulnerability Existed: yes Race Condition/Incorrect Lock Type [js/src/wasm/WasmInstance.cpp] [Lines 859, 885, 893, 2148, 2169] [Old Code] auto stubs = codeTier.lazyStubs().lock(); [Fixed Code] auto stubs = codeTier.lazyStubs().writeLock(); The changes show a transition from using a generic lock() to more specific writeLock() and readLock() calls. This suggests the original code might have had potential race conditions or performance issues due to using overly broad locks where more granular synchronization would suffice. 2. Vulnerability Existed: yes Race Condition/Incorrect Lock Type [js/src/wasm/WasmInstance.cpp] [Line 893] [Old Code] auto stubs = code(tier).lazyStubs().lock(); [Fixed Code] auto stubs = code(tier).lazyStubs().readLock(); This specific change is particularly notable as it switches from a write lock to a read lock for a lookup operation, which is a read-only operation. The original implementation might have caused unnecessary contention by using a write lock where only a read lock was needed. The changes overall appear to be improving thread safety by: 1. Being more explicit about lock intentions (read vs write) 2. Potentially reducing contention by using read locks where appropriate 3. Making the locking semantics clearer in the code While these aren't classic "vulnerabilities" in the sense of remote code execution, they do address important thread safety concerns that could lead to crashes or undefined behavior in multi-threaded scenarios.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-paint-clip-018.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-paint-clip-018.html@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ -->- <meta content="" name="flags"> <style> div
Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis: Vulnerability Existed: no [No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-paint-clip-018.html] [Lines 30] [Old Code: <meta content="" name="flags">] [Fixed Code: [line removed]] Additional Details: This change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute from the HTML file. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed here - it appears to be a minor cleanup or test configuration change. The "flags" meta tag is typically used in test files to specify test requirements or conditions, and its removal doesn't suggest any security implications.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.composite.1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.composite.1.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ctx.shadowOffsetX = 100; ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(-100, 0, 200, 50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2); t.done(); });
Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't involve any security-related modifications.
Here's the analysis following your requested format:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18, 27]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.