--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsl-6.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsl-6.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(120deg, 100.0%, 50.0%)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsl-6.worker.js [Lines] 13-14
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsl-6.worker.js [Lines] 19
   [Old Code]
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   [Fixed Code]
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, changing the variable name from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. There are no security-related changes in this diff. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name. No security vulnerabilities are introduced or fixed by these changes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/python/mozbuild/mozbuild/vendor/rewrite_mozbuild.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/python/mozbuild/mozbuild/vendor/rewrite_mozbuild.py@@ -862,7 +862,7 @@         moz_yaml_dir and vendoring_dir     ), "If either moz_yaml_dir or vendoring_dir are specified, they both must be"-    if moz_yaml_dir is not None:+    if moz_yaml_dir is not None and vendoring_dir is not None:         # Ensure they are provided with trailing slashes         moz_yaml_dir += "/" if moz_yaml_dir[-1] != "/" else ""         vendoring_dir += "/" if vendoring_dir[-1] != "/" else ""

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: yes
Insufficient Input Validation [File] [Lines 862-865]
[Old Code]
    if moz_yaml_dir is not None:
        # Ensure they are provided with trailing slashes
        moz_yaml_dir += "/" if moz_yaml_dir[-1] != "/" else ""
        vendoring_dir += "/" if vendoring_dir[-1] != "/" else ""
[Fixed Code]
    if moz_yaml_dir is not None and vendoring_dir is not None:
        # Ensure they are provided with trailing slashes
        moz_yaml_dir += "/" if moz_yaml_dir[-1] != "/" else ""
        vendoring_dir += "/" if vendoring_dir[-1] != "/" else ""

Additional Details:
The vulnerability was a potential Null Pointer Dereference or Invalid Memory Access. The original code would attempt to access vendoring_dir[-1] even when vendoring_dir was None, which could lead to a crash. The fix properly checks that both directories are not None before attempting to modify them. While this might not be a security vulnerability in all contexts, it could potentially be exploited to cause a denial of service if the code is exposed to untrusted input.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/vm/SymbolType.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/vm/SymbolType.h@@ -59,6 +59,8 @@  public:   static Symbol* new_(JSContext* cx, SymbolCode code,                       js::HandleString description);+  static Symbol* newWellKnown(JSContext* cx, SymbolCode code,+                              js::HandlePropertyName description);   static Symbol* for_(JSContext* cx, js::HandleString description);   SymbolCode code() const { return code_; }

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Symbol Handling Improvement] [js/src/vm/SymbolType.h] [Lines 59-61]
[Old Code]
  static Symbol* new_(JSContext* cx, SymbolCode code,
                      js::HandleString description);
[Fixed Code]
  static Symbol* new_(JSContext* cx, SymbolCode code,
                      js::HandleString description);
  static Symbol* newWellKnown(JSContext* cx, SymbolCode code,
                              js::HandlePropertyName description);

Additional Details:
The diff shows the addition of a new method `newWellKnown` that takes a `PropertyName` instead of a generic `String` for the description parameter. While this appears to be a security-related improvement (potentially adding stricter type checking for well-known symbols), I cannot definitively identify a specific vulnerability being fixed. The change might be related to preventing type confusion or ensuring proper symbol handling, but without more context or vulnerability reports, I can't be certain.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-utils/tests/sharded_lock.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-utils/tests/sharded_lock.rs@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ #[test] fn frob() {     const N: u32 = 10;+    #[cfg(miri)]+    const M: usize = 100;+    #[cfg(not(miri))]     const M: usize = 1000;     let r = Arc::new(ShardedLock::new(()));

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability] [third_party/rust/crossbeam-utils/tests/sharded_lock.rs] [Lines 21-26]
[Old Code]
    const N: u32 = 10;
    const M: usize = 1000;
[Fixed Code]
    const N: u32 = 10;
    #[cfg(miri)]
    const M: usize = 100;
    #[cfg(not(miri))]
    const M: usize = 1000;

Additional Details:
- This appears to be a test configuration change rather than a security fix
- The modification adds conditional compilation for different test environments (Miri vs non-Miri)
- The value of M is reduced from 1000 to 100 when running under Miri (Rust's experimental interpreter)
- No security vulnerability is being addressed here, just test optimization

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/dav1d/include/dav1d/dav1d.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/dav1d/include/dav1d/dav1d.h@@ -67,7 +67,14 @@     unsigned frame_size_limit; ///< maximum frame size, in pixels (0 = unlimited)     Dav1dPicAllocator allocator; ///< Picture allocator callback.     Dav1dLogger logger; ///< Logger callback.-    uint8_t reserved[32]; ///< reserved for future use+    int strict_std_compliance; ///< whether to abort decoding on standard compliance violations+                               ///< that don't affect actual bitstream decoding (e.g. inconsistent+                               ///< or invalid metadata)+    int output_invisible_frames; ///< output invisibly coded frames (in coding order) in addition+                                 ///< to all visible frames. Because of show-existing-frame, this+                                 ///< means some frames may appear twice (once when coded,+                                 ///< once when shown)+    uint8_t reserved[24]; ///< reserved for future use } Dav1dSettings; /**@@ -187,6 +194,27 @@ DAV1D_API int dav1d_get_picture(Dav1dContext *c, Dav1dPicture *out); /**+ * Apply film grain to a previously decoded picture. If the picture contains no+ * film grain metadata, then this function merely returns a new reference.+ *+ * @param   c Input decoder instance.+ * @param out Output frame. The caller assumes ownership of the returned+ *            reference.+ * @param  in Input frame. No ownership is transferred.+ *+ * @return+ *         0: Success, and a frame is returned.+ *  other negative DAV1D_ERR codes: Error due to lack of memory or because of+ *                                  invalid passed-in arguments.+ *+ * @note If `Dav1dSettings.apply_grain` is true, film grain was already applied+ *       by `dav1d_get_picture`, and so calling this function leads to double+ *       application of film grain. Users should only call this when needed.+ */+DAV1D_API int dav1d_apply_grain(Dav1dContext *c, Dav1dPicture *out,+                                const Dav1dPicture *in);++/**  * Close a decoder instance and free all associated memory.  *  * @param c_out The decoder instance to close. *c_out will be set to NULL.

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Buffer Overflow Mitigation] [third_party/dav1d/include/dav1d/dav1d.h] [Lines 67-74]
[Old Code]
    uint8_t reserved[32]; ///< reserved for future use
[Fixed Code]
    int strict_std_compliance; ///< whether to abort decoding on standard compliance violations
                               ///< that don't affect actual bitstream decoding (e.g. inconsistent
                               ///< or invalid metadata)
    int output_invisible_frames; ///< output invisibly coded frames (in coding order) in addition
                                 ///< to all visible frames. Because of show-existing-frame, this
                                 ///< means some frames may appear twice (once when coded,
                                 ///< once when shown)
    uint8_t reserved[24]; ///< reserved for future use

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Double Application of Film Grain] [third_party/dav1d/include/dav1d/dav1d.h] [Lines 194-214]
[Old Code]
(None - this is a new function addition)
[Fixed Code]
DAV1D_API int dav1d_apply_grain(Dav1dContext *c, Dav1dPicture *out,
                                const Dav1dPicture *in);

Notes:
1. The first change reduces the reserved buffer space and adds explicit configuration flags. This could potentially be related to preventing buffer overflows by making the structure more explicit, but I can't confirm this is a security fix.
2. The second change adds a new function with clear documentation about potential double application of film grain. While not a direct vulnerability fix, it helps prevent misuse that could lead to security issues. The documentation warns against double application which could potentially cause memory or processing issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/preferences/dialogs/fonts.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/preferences/dialogs/fonts.js@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@  * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this  * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */-/* import-globals-from ../../../base/content/utilityOverlay.js */-/* import-globals-from ../../../../toolkit/mozapps/preferences/fontbuilder.js */+/* import-globals-from /browser/base/content/utilityOverlay.js */+/* import-globals-from /toolkit/mozapps/preferences/fontbuilder.js */ // browser.display.languageList LOCK ALL when LOCKED

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Path Traversal or Module Import Vulnerability] [browser/components/preferences/dialogs/fonts.js] [Lines 3-6]
    [Old Code]
    /* import-globals-from ../../../base/content/utilityOverlay.js */
    /* import-globals-from ../../../../toolkit/mozapps/preferences/fontbuilder.js */
    [Fixed Code]
    /* import-globals-from /browser/base/content/utilityOverlay.js */
    /* import-globals-from /toolkit/mozapps/preferences/fontbuilder.js */

Additional Details:
- The change involves modifying import paths from relative paths to absolute paths
- While this could potentially be related to security (preventing path traversal attacks or ensuring correct module resolution), there's not enough context to confirm if this was fixing an actual vulnerability
- The change might simply be for code maintainability or consistency rather than security
- No specific vulnerability name can be identified from this change alone

No other vulnerabilities are apparent from this small diff. The changes appear to be path-related modifications without clear security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/subpixel-table-cell-width-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/subpixel-table-cell-width-001.html@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="David Grogan" href="[email protected]"> <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/CSS21/cascade.html#value-stages"> <link rel="match" href="subpixel-table-cell-width-001-ref.html">-<meta name="flags" content="" /> <meta name="assert" content="When a cell has a specified fractional fixed width and a block has the same specified fractional width, their actual widths should match." /> <style>

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/subpixel-table-cell-width-001.html [Lines] 2-7
   Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="" />
   Fixed Code: (removed line)

Additional Notes:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag with name="flags". This appears to be a cleanup change rather than a security fix.
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with empty meta flags tags in HTML.
- The change is likely related to test configuration or documentation rather than security.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/base/content/test/sync/browser_contextmenu_sendpage.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/base/content/test/sync/browser_contextmenu_sendpage.js@@ -10,16 +10,19 @@     id: 1,     name: "Foo",     availableCommands: { "https://identity.mozilla.com/cmd/open-uri": "baz" },+    lastAccessTime: Date.now(),   },   {     id: 2,     name: "Bar",     availableCommands: { "https://identity.mozilla.com/cmd/open-uri": "boo" },+    lastAccessTime: Date.now() + 60000, // add 30min   },   {     id: 3,     name: "Baz",     clientRecord: "bar",+    lastAccessTime: Date.now() + 120000, // add 60min   }, // Legacy send tab target (no availableCommands).   { id: 4, name: "Homer" }, // Incompatible target. ];

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be adding `lastAccessTime` fields to test data objects, which seems like a functional enhancement rather than a security fix.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found in this diff
[No old code to show]
[No fixed code to show]

Additional notes:
1. The changes are adding timestamp fields (`lastAccessTime`) to test data objects
2. The modifications appear to be test-related (file is in test directory)
3. No security-related patterns (like XSS, injection, etc.) are being modified
4. The changes don't show any security-sensitive operations being modified

If this were a security fix, I would expect to see changes to:
- Input validation
- Output encoding
- Permission checks
- Cryptographic operations
- Sensitive data handling

But none of these patterns are present in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/mozglue/static/rust/build.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/mozglue/static/rust/build.rs@@ -3,42 +3,20 @@  * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ use rustc_version::{version, Version};-use std::env;-use std::path::PathBuf; fn main() {-    let dist_path = {-        let path = PathBuf::from(env::var_os("MOZ_DIST").unwrap());-        if !path.is_absolute() || !path.is_dir() {-            panic!(-                "MOZ_DIST must be an absolute directory, was: {}",-                path.display()-            );-        }-        path-    };-    let topobjdir = {-        let path = PathBuf::from(env::var_os("MOZ_TOPOBJDIR").unwrap());-        if !path.is_absolute() || !path.is_dir() {-            panic!(-                "MOZ_TOPOBJDIR must be an absolute directory, was: {}",-                path.display()-            );-        }-        path-    };     let mut build = cc::Build::new();     build.cpp(true);     // For js-confdefs.h, see wrappers.cpp.-    build.include(topobjdir.join("js").join("src"));-    build.include(dist_path.join("include"));+    build.include(mozbuild::TOPOBJDIR.join("js").join("src"));+    build.include(mozbuild::TOPOBJDIR.join("dist").join("include"));     build.define("MOZ_HAS_MOZGLUE", None);     build.file("wrappers.cpp");     build.compile("wrappers");     println!("cargo:rerun-if-changed=wrappers.cpp");     let ver = version().unwrap();-    let max_oom_hook_version = Version::parse("1.59.0-alpha").unwrap();+    let max_oom_hook_version = Version::parse("1.60.0-alpha").unwrap();     if ver < max_oom_hook_version {         println!("cargo:rustc-cfg=feature=\"oom_with_hook\"");

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Path Traversal/Insecure Path Handling] [mozglue/static/rust/build.rs] [Lines 3-42]
   [Old Code: Manual path validation using env vars and PathBuf]
   [Fixed Code: Using mozbuild::TOPOBJDIR for path handling]
   Note: The change removes direct environment variable handling, which could potentially mitigate path traversal risks, but without more context about mozbuild::TOPOBJDIR's implementation, we can't be certain.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Version Check Update] [mozglue/static/rust/build.rs] [Lines 42-42]
   [Old Code: Version::parse("1.59.0-alpha").unwrap()]
   [Fixed Code: Version::parse("1.60.0-alpha").unwrap()]
   Note: This appears to be a routine version requirement update rather than a security fix, but version checks can sometimes relate to security patches.

The main changes involve:
1. Removing direct environment variable handling for paths and using a more controlled mozbuild::TOPOBJDIR instead
2. Updating the version check threshold

While these changes appear to improve security by removing direct environment variable usage, we can't definitively state they fix specific vulnerabilities without more context about the threat model and mozbuild implementation.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/naga/src/back/spv/instructions.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/naga/src/back/spv/instructions.rs@@ -564,6 +564,33 @@         instruction.add_operand(coordinates);         if let Some(dref) = depth_ref {             instruction.add_operand(dref);+        }++        instruction+    }++    pub(super) fn image_gather(+        result_type_id: Word,+        id: Word,+        sampled_image: Word,+        coordinates: Word,+        component_id: Word,+        depth_ref: Option<Word>,+    ) -> Self {+        let op = match depth_ref {+            None => Op::ImageGather,+            Some(_) => Op::ImageDrefGather,+        };++        let mut instruction = Self::new(op);+        instruction.set_type(result_type_id);+        instruction.set_result(id);+        instruction.add_operand(sampled_image);+        instruction.add_operand(coordinates);+        if let Some(dref) = depth_ref {+            instruction.add_operand(dref);+        } else {+            instruction.add_operand(component_id);         }         instruction

Let me analyze the code diff for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Missing Input Validation] [third_party/rust/naga/src/back/spv/instructions.rs] [Lines 564-597]
[Old Code]
        instruction.add_operand(dref);
        }

        instruction
    }
[Fixed Code]
        instruction.add_operand(dref);
        } else {
            instruction.add_operand(component_id);
        }

        instruction
    }

Additional Details:
The diff adds a new `image_gather` function with proper handling of both depth reference and component ID cases. While this appears to be a functional improvement rather than a direct security fix, there could be potential security implications if:
1. The component_id wasn't properly validated before being added as an operand
2. The depth_ref/component_id switching logic could lead to incorrect image operations if not properly handled

However, without more context about how these values are generated and used, I can't definitively identify a specific vulnerability. The change appears to be more about correct functionality than patching a known security issue.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.parse.plus.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.parse.plus.html@@ -17,13 +17,13 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-offscreenCanvas.width = '+100';-offscreenCanvas.height = '+100';-_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.width, 100, "offscreenCanvas.width", "100");-_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.height, 100, "offscreenCanvas.height", "100");+canvas.width = '+100';+canvas.height = '+100';+_assertSame(canvas.width, 100, "canvas.width", "100");+_assertSame(canvas.height, 100, "canvas.height", "100"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.parse.plus.html] [Lines 17-25]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');

offscreenCanvas.width = '+100';
offscreenCanvas.height = '+100';
_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.width, 100, "offscreenCanvas.width", "100");
_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.height, 100, "offscreenCanvas.height", "100");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

canvas.width = '+100';
canvas.height = '+100';
_assertSame(canvas.width, 100, "canvas.width", "100");
_assertSame(canvas.height, 100, "canvas.height", "100");

Additional Details:
The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. The functionality remains the same, testing how the OffscreenCanvas handles string values with '+' prefix for width/height attributes. No security vulnerabilities are apparent in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/widget/gtk/gtkdrawing.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/widget/gtk/gtkdrawing.h@@ -71,22 +71,6 @@ typedef struct {   bool initialized;-  struct {-    MozGtkSize scrollbar;-    MozGtkSize thumb;-    MozGtkSize button;-  } size;-  struct {-    GtkBorder scrollbar;-    GtkBorder track;-  } border;-  struct {-    GtkBorder thumb;-  } margin;-} ScrollbarGTKMetrics;--typedef struct {-  bool initialized;   MozGtkSize minSizeWithBorder;   GtkBorder borderAndPadding; } ToggleGTKMetrics;@@ -111,14 +95,6 @@   bool initialized;   GtkBorder decorationSize; } CSDWindowDecorationSize;--typedef enum {-  MOZ_GTK_STEPPER_DOWN = 1 << 0,-  MOZ_GTK_STEPPER_BOTTOM = 1 << 1,-  MOZ_GTK_STEPPER_VERTICAL = 1 << 2-} GtkScrollbarButtonFlags;--typedef enum { MOZ_GTK_TRACK_OPAQUE = 1 << 0 } GtkScrollbarTrackFlags; /** flags for tab state **/ typedef enum {@@ -163,20 +139,6 @@   MOZ_GTK_RADIOBUTTON,   /* Paints the label of a GtkRadioButton (focus outline) */   MOZ_GTK_RADIOBUTTON_LABEL,-  /**-   * Paints the button of a GtkScrollbar. flags is a GtkArrowType giving-   * the arrow direction.-   */-  MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_BUTTON,--  /* Horizontal GtkScrollbar counterparts */-  MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_HORIZONTAL,-  MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_CONTENTS_HORIZONTAL,-  /* Paints the trough (track) of a GtkScrollbar. */-  MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_TROUGH_HORIZONTAL,-  /* Paints the slider (thumb) of a GtkScrollbar. */-  MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_THUMB_HORIZONTAL,-   /* Vertical GtkScrollbar counterparts */   MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_VERTICAL,   MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_CONTENTS_VERTICAL,@@ -511,20 +473,6 @@                                     gint* thumb_height); /**- * Get the metrics in GTK pixels for a scrollbar.- * aOrientation:     [IN] the scrollbar orientation- */-const ScrollbarGTKMetrics* GetScrollbarMetrics(GtkOrientation aOrientation);--/**- * Get the metrics in GTK pixels for a scrollbar which is active- * (selected by mouse pointer).- * aOrientation:     [IN] the scrollbar orientation- */-const ScrollbarGTKMetrics* GetActiveScrollbarMetrics(-    GtkOrientation aOrientation);--/**  * Get the desired size of a dropdown arrow button  * width:   [OUT] the desired width  * height:  [OUT] the desired height

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze the changes for potential security fixes. The diff shows removal of scrollbar-related code, but it's not clear if this was for security reasons or just refactoring/cleanup.

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Scrollbar Metrics Removal] [widget/gtk/gtkdrawing.h] [Lines 71-95, 111-114, 163-173, 511-522]
   [Old Code: Various scrollbar-related structs, enums, and functions including ScrollbarGTKMetrics, GtkScrollbarButtonFlags, GtkScrollbarTrackFlags, and related functions]
   [Fixed Code: Removed all scrollbar-related code except vertical scrollbar components]

Additional Notes:
- The diff shows significant removal of scrollbar-related code, but without more context about why these were removed, it's difficult to determine if this was a security fix.
- The changes might be related to refactoring or removing unused code rather than security fixes.
- Some vertical scrollbar components remain, suggesting this might be a partial cleanup rather than a security fix.
- No obvious security vulnerability patterns (like buffer overflows, race conditions, etc.) are visible in the removed code.

Since there's no clear indication of a security vulnerability being fixed and no CVE or vulnerability name is mentioned in the changes, I've marked this as "not sure". The changes appear to be more about code cleanup than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/widget/nsIWidget.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/widget/nsIWidget.h@@ -1167,17 +1167,12 @@   /**    * Put the toplevel window into or out of fullscreen mode.-   * If aTargetScreen is given, attempt to go fullscreen on that screen,-   * if possible.  (If not, it behaves as if aTargetScreen is null.)-   * If !aFullScreen, aTargetScreen is ignored.-   * aTargetScreen support is currently only implemented on Windows.    *    * @return NS_OK if the widget is setup properly for fullscreen and    * FullscreenChanged callback has been or will be called. If other    * value is returned, the caller should continue the change itself.    */-  virtual nsresult MakeFullScreen(bool aFullScreen,-                                  nsIScreen* aTargetScreen = nullptr) = 0;+  virtual nsresult MakeFullScreen(bool aFullScreen) = 0;   /**    * Same as MakeFullScreen, except that, on systems which natively@@ -1185,9 +1180,8 @@    * requests that behavior.    * It is currently only supported on macOS 10.7+.    */-  virtual nsresult MakeFullScreenWithNativeTransition(-      bool aFullScreen, nsIScreen* aTargetScreen = nullptr) {-    return MakeFullScreen(aFullScreen, aTargetScreen);+  virtual nsresult MakeFullScreenWithNativeTransition(bool aFullScreen) {+    return MakeFullScreen(aFullScreen);   }   /**

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Information Disclosure] [widget/nsIWidget.h] [Lines 1167-1180]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```  
   virtual nsresult MakeFullScreen(bool aFullScreen,  
                                 nsIScreen* aTargetScreen = nullptr) = 0;  
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```  
   virtual nsresult MakeFullScreen(bool aFullScreen) = 0;  
   ```  

   Additional Details: The removal of the `aTargetScreen` parameter might indicate a security fix related to potential information disclosure or improper screen targeting, but without more context, this is uncertain. The comment suggests this was Windows-specific functionality that might have been removed due to security concerns.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Privilege Escalation] [widget/nsIWidget.h] [Lines 1185-1180]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```  
   virtual nsresult MakeFullScreenWithNativeTransition(  
       bool aFullScreen, nsIScreen* aTargetScreen = nullptr) {  
     return MakeFullScreen(aFullScreen, aTargetScreen);  
   }  
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```  
   virtual nsresult MakeFullScreenWithNativeTransition(bool aFullScreen) {  
     return MakeFullScreen(aFullScreen);  
   }  
   ```  

   Additional Details: The consistent removal of the screen targeting parameter across both methods suggests a possible security concern with screen targeting functionality, but the exact nature isn't clear from the diff alone. This could relate to preventing potential privilege escalation through screen manipulation.

Note: The changes appear to simplify the API by removing screen targeting functionality, which might have been done for security reasons, but without additional context or vulnerability reports, we can't be certain about specific vulnerabilities being fixed. The removal of platform-specific functionality (Windows screen targeting) could indicate it was a source of security issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/neqo-http3/tests/priority.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/neqo-http3/tests/priority.rs@@ -16,12 +16,11 @@ fn exchange_packets(client: &mut Http3Client, server: &mut Http3Server) {     let mut out = None;-    let mut client_data;     loop {         out = client.process(out, now()).dgram();-        client_data = out.is_none();+        let client_done = out.is_none();         out = server.process(out, now()).dgram();-        if out.is_none() && client_data {+        if out.is_none() && client_done {             break;         }     }@@ -107,23 +106,20 @@     client.priority_update(stream_id, update_priority).unwrap();     exchange_packets(&mut client, &mut server);-    let priority_event = loop {-        let event = server.next_event().unwrap();-        if matches!(event, Http3ServerEvent::PriorityUpdate { .. }) {-            break event;-        }-    };--    match priority_event {-        Http3ServerEvent::PriorityUpdate {+    let found = server.events().any(|e| {+        if let Http3ServerEvent::PriorityUpdate {             stream_id: update_id,             priority,-        } => {+        } = e+        {             assert_eq!(update_id, stream_id);             assert_eq!(priority, update_priority);+            true+        } else {+            false         }-        other => panic!("unexpected server event: {:?}", other),-    }+    });+    assert!(found); } #[test]

Analyzing the provided code diff, here are the potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 16-23]
   [Old Code]
   let mut client_data;
   loop {
       out = client.process(out, now()).dgram();
       client_data = out.is_none();
       out = server.process(out, now()).dgram();
       if out.is_none() && client_data {
           break;
       }
   }
   [Fixed Code]
   loop {
       out = client.process(out, now()).dgram();
       let client_done = out.is_none();
       out = server.process(out, now()).dgram();
       if out.is_none() && client_done {
           break;
       }
   }
   Additional Details: This is a code cleanup/refactoring change that improves readability by using a local variable instead of a mutable one. No security impact.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 107-126]
   [Old Code]
   let priority_event = loop {
       let event = server.next_event().unwrap();
       if matches!(event, Http3ServerEvent::PriorityUpdate { .. }) {
           break event;
       }
   };

   match priority_event {
       Http3ServerEvent::PriorityUpdate {
           stream_id: update_id,
           priority,
       } => {
           assert_eq!(update_id, stream_id);
           assert_eq!(priority, update_priority);
       }
       other => panic!("unexpected server event: {:?}", other),
   }
   [Fixed Code]
   let found = server.events().any(|e| {
       if let Http3ServerEvent::PriorityUpdate {
           stream_id: update_id,
           priority,
       } = e
       {
           assert_eq!(update_id, stream_id);
           assert_eq!(priority, update_priority);
           true
       } else {
           false
       }
   });
   assert!(found);
   Additional Details: This is a test code improvement that changes the event handling logic to be more concise using iterator methods. No security impact.

The changes appear to be code quality improvements and test refactoring rather than security fixes. No vulnerabilities were identified in the diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-size-063.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-size-063.html@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Florian Rivoal" href="https://florian.rivoal.net"> <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-contain-1/#containment-size"> <link rel="match" href="reference/contain-size-063-ref.html">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="asserts" content="the intrinsic size of a size-contained element is treated as 0 in various scenarios involving intrinsic sizing."> <style>

Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-size-063.html [Lines] 4-7
[Old Code]
<meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code]
(removed line)

Additional Details:
1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which appears to be test configuration metadata.
2. This doesn't relate to any security vulnerability - it's just cleaning up test markup.
3. No actual code changes or security-related modifications were made.
4. The "flags" meta tag was likely used for test configuration and is no longer needed.

Note: While this isn't a security fix, it's worth noting that removing unnecessary code can be considered a good practice for code hygiene, even if it doesn't directly impact security.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/wr/webrender/src/prepare.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/wr/webrender/src/prepare.rs@@ -222,13 +222,13 @@         scratch,     ) {         if prim_instance.is_chased() {-            println!("\tconsidered invisible");+            info!("\tconsidered invisible");         }         return false;     }     if prim_instance.is_chased() {-        println!("\tconsidered visible and ready with local pos {:?}", prim_rect.min);+        info!("\tconsidered visible and ready with local pos {:?}", prim_rect.min);     }     #[cfg(debug_assertions)]@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@             // Work out the device pixel size to be used to cache this line decoration.             if is_chased {-                println!("\tline decoration key={:?}", line_dec_data.cache_key);+                info!("\tline decoration key={:?}", line_dec_data.cache_key);             }             // If we have a cache key, it's a wavy / dashed / dotted line. Otherwise, it's@@ -375,7 +375,7 @@                             SubpixelMode::Conditional { allowed_rect } => {                                 // Conditional mode allows subpixel AA to be enabled for this                                 // text run, so long as it's inside the allowed rect.-                                allowed_rect.contains_box(&prim_instance.vis.clip_chain.pic_clip_rect)+                                allowed_rect.contains_box(&prim_instance.vis.clip_chain.pic_coverage_rect)                             }                         }                     } else {@@ -836,7 +836,7 @@                 );             } else {                 if prim_instance.is_chased() {-                    println!("\tBackdrop primitive culled because backdrop task was not assigned render tasks");+                    info!("\tBackdrop primitive culled because backdrop task was not assigned render tasks");                 }                 prim_instance.clear_visibility();             }@@ -902,54 +902,49 @@     spatial_tree: &SpatialTree,     mut callback: Option<&mut dyn FnMut(&LayoutRect, GpuDataRequest)>, ) -> GradientTileRange {-    let mut visible_tiles = Vec::new();+    let tile_range = gradient_tiles.open_range();     // Tighten the clip rect because decomposing the repeated image can     // produce primitives that are partially covering the original image     // rect and we want to clip these extra parts out.-    let tight_clip_rect = prim_vis+    if let Some(tight_clip_rect) = prim_vis         .combined_local_clip_rect-        .intersection(prim_local_rect).unwrap();--    let visible_rect = compute_conservative_visible_rect(-        &prim_vis.clip_chain,-        frame_state.current_dirty_region().combined,-        prim_spatial_node_index,-        spatial_tree,-    );-    let stride = *stretch_size + *tile_spacing;--    let repetitions = image_tiling::repetitions(prim_local_rect, &visible_rect, stride);-    for Repetition { origin, .. } in repetitions {-        let mut handle = GpuCacheHandle::new();-        let rect = LayoutRect::from_origin_and_size(-            origin,-            *stretch_size,+        .intersection(prim_local_rect) {++        let visible_rect = compute_conservative_visible_rect(+            &prim_vis.clip_chain,+            frame_state.current_dirty_region().combined,+            prim_spatial_node_index,+            spatial_tree,         );--        if let Some(callback) = &mut callback {-            if let Some(request) = frame_state.gpu_cache.request(&mut handle) {-                callback(&rect, request);-            }-        }--        visible_tiles.push(VisibleGradientTile {-            local_rect: rect,-            local_clip_rect: tight_clip_rect,-            handle-        });+        let stride = *stretch_size + *tile_spacing;++        let repetitions = image_tiling::repetitions(prim_local_rect, &visible_rect, stride);+        gradient_tiles.reserve(repetitions.num_repetitions());+        for Repetition { origin, .. } in repetitions {+            let mut handle = GpuCacheHandle::new();+            let rect = LayoutRect::from_origin_and_size(+                origin,+                *stretch_size,+            );++            if let Some(callback) = &mut callback {+                if let Some(request) = frame_state.gpu_cache.request(&mut handle) {+                    callback(&rect, request);+                }+            }++            gradient_tiles.push(VisibleGradientTile {+                local_rect: rect,+                local_clip_rect: tight_clip_rect,+                handle+            });+        }     }     // At this point if we don't have tiles to show it means we could probably     // have done a better a job at culling during an earlier stage.-    // Clearing the screen rect has the effect of "culling out" the primitive-    // from the point of view of the batch builder, and ensures we don't hit-    // assertions later on because we didn't request any image.-    if visible_tiles.is_empty() {-        GradientTileRange::empty()-    } else {-        gradient_tiles.extend(visible_tiles)-    }+    gradient_tiles.close_range(tile_range) }@@ -1160,12 +1155,12 @@     let device_pixel_scale = frame_state.surfaces[pic_context.surface_index.0].device_pixel_scale;     if instance.is_chased() {-        println!("\tupdating clip task with pic rect {:?}", instance.vis.clip_chain.pic_clip_rect);+        info!("\tupdating clip task with pic rect {:?}", instance.vis.clip_chain.pic_coverage_rect);     }     // Get the device space rect for the primitive if it was unclipped.     let unclipped = match get_unclipped_device_rect(-        instance.vis.clip_chain.pic_clip_rect,+        instance.vis.clip_chain.pic_coverage_rect,         &pic_state.map_pic_to_raster,         device_pixel_scale,     ) {@@ -1201,7 +1196,7 @@         device_pixel_scale,     ) {         if instance.is_chased() {-            println!("\tsegment tasks have been created for clipping: {:?}", clip_task_index);+            info!("\tsegment tasks have been created for clipping: {:?}", clip_task_index);         }         clip_task_index     } else if instance.vis.clip_chain.needs_mask {@@ -1236,7 +1231,7 @@             frame_state.surfaces,         );         if instance.is_chased() {-            println!("\tcreated task {:?} with device rect {:?}",+            info!("\tcreated task {:?} with device rect {:?}",                 clip_task_id, device_rect);         }         // Set the global clip mask instance for this primitive.@@ -1250,7 +1245,7 @@         clip_task_index     } else {         if instance.is_chased() {-            println!("\tno mask is needed");+            info!("\tno mask is needed");         }         ClipTaskIndex::INVALID     };@@ -1282,7 +1277,7 @@         return ClipMaskKind::None;     }-    let segment_world_rect = match pic_state.map_pic_to_world.map(&clip_chain.pic_clip_rect) {+    let segment_world_rect = match pic_state.map_pic_to_world.map(&clip_chain.pic_coverage_rect) {         Some(rect) => rect,         None => return ClipMaskKind::Clipped,     };

I'll analyze the code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Logging Sensitive Information] [gfx/wr/webrender/src/prepare.rs] [222, 227, 283, 836, 1155, 1196, 1231, 1245]
[Old Code]
println!("\tconsidered invisible");
println!("\tconsidered visible and ready with local pos {:?}", prim_rect.min);
println!("\tline decoration key={:?}", line_dec_data.cache_key);
println!("\tBackdrop primitive culled because backdrop task was not assigned render tasks");
println!("\tupdating clip task with pic rect {:?}", instance.vis.clip_chain.pic_clip_rect);
println!("\tsegment tasks have been created for clipping: {:?}", clip_task_index);
println!("\tcreated task {:?} with device rect {:?}", clip_task_id, device_rect);
println!("\tno mask is needed");

[Fixed Code]
info!("\tconsidered invisible");
info!("\tconsidered visible and ready with local pos {:?}", prim_rect.min);
info!("\tline decoration key={:?}", line_dec_data.cache_key);
info!("\tBackdrop primitive culled because backdrop task was not assigned render tasks");
info!("\tupdating clip task with pic rect {:?}", instance.vis.clip_chain.pic_coverage_rect);
info!("\tsegment tasks have been created for clipping: {:?}", clip_task_index);
info!("\tcreated task {:?} with device rect {:?}", clip_task_id, device_rect);
info!("\tno mask is needed");

Additional Details: The change replaces println! with info! for logging. While not necessarily a security vulnerability, using proper logging levels is a security best practice as println! would output to stdout regardless of log level configuration.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Null Pointer Dereference] [gfx/wr/webrender/src/prepare.rs] [902-949]
[Old Code]
let tight_clip_rect = prim_vis
    .combined_local_clip_rect
    .intersection(prim_local_rect).unwrap();

[Fixed Code]
if let Some(tight_clip_rect) = prim_vis
    .combined_local_clip_rect
    .intersection(prim_local_rect) {

Additional Details: The change removes an unwrap() and properly handles the case where the intersection might be None, avoiding a potential panic. While not a classic security vulnerability, panic scenarios could potentially be exploited in some contexts.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Incorrect Clip Rect Handling] [gfx/wr/webrender/src/prepare.rs] [375, 1155, 1160, 1277]
[Old Code]
allowed_rect.contains_box(&prim_instance.vis.clip_chain.pic_clip_rect)
println!("\tupdating clip task with pic rect {:?}", instance.vis.clip_chain.pic_clip_rect);
instance.vis.clip_chain.pic_clip_rect
pic_state.map_pic_to_world.map(&clip_chain.pic_clip_rect)

[Fixed Code]
allowed_rect.contains_box(&prim_instance.vis.clip_chain.pic_coverage_rect)
info!("\tupdating clip task with pic rect {:?}", instance.vis.clip_chain.pic_coverage_rect);
instance.vis.clip_chain.pic_coverage_rect
pic_state.map_pic_to_world.map(&clip_chain.pic_coverage_rect)

Additional Details: The change replaces pic_clip_rect with pic_coverage_rect throughout the code. This appears to be a correctness fix rather than a security vulnerability, but incorrect clip rect handling could potentially lead to rendering artifacts or information disclosure in some cases.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/debugger/Debugger.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/debugger/Debugger.cpp@@ -5779,15 +5779,15 @@     {       // We can't tolerate the GC moving things around while we're       // searching the heap. Check that nothing we do causes a GC.-      Maybe<JS::AutoCheckCannotGC> maybeNoGC;       RootedObject dbgObj(cx, dbg->object);-      JS::ubi::RootList rootList(cx, maybeNoGC);-      if (!rootList.init(dbgObj)) {+      JS::ubi::RootList rootList(cx);+      auto [ok, nogc] = rootList.init(dbgObj);+      if (!ok) {         ReportOutOfMemory(cx);         return false;       }-      Traversal traversal(cx, *this, maybeNoGC.ref());+      Traversal traversal(cx, *this, nogc);       traversal.wantNames = false;       return traversal.addStart(JS::ubi::Node(&rootList)) &&

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Memory Safety Issue [File] js/src/debugger/Debugger.cpp [Lines 5779-5790]
[Old Code]
Maybe<JS::AutoCheckCannotGC> maybeNoGC;
RootedObject dbgObj(cx, dbg->object);
JS::ubi::RootList rootList(cx, maybeNoGC);
if (!rootList.init(dbgObj)) {
[Fixed Code]
RootedObject dbgObj(cx, dbg->object);
JS::ubi::RootList rootList(cx);
auto [ok, nogc] = rootList.init(dbgObj);
if (!ok) {

Additional Details:
The change appears to modify how garbage collection (GC) safety is handled during heap traversal. The old code used a Maybe<JS::AutoCheckCannotGC> that was passed to RootList constructor, while the new code handles GC safety differently through the init() method's return value. This could potentially relate to memory safety, but without more context about the specific vulnerabilities being addressed, it's difficult to determine if this was fixing a known vulnerability or just improving code robustness. The change does suggest a more robust handling of GC safety during heap operations.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/darling/tests/skip.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/darling/tests/skip.rs@@ -1,13 +1,7 @@ //! Test that skipped fields are not read into structs when they appear in input.-#[macro_use]-extern crate darling;-#[macro_use]-extern crate syn;-#[macro_use]-extern crate quote;--use darling::FromDeriveInput;+use darling::{FromDeriveInput, FromMeta};+use syn::parse_quote; #[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq, FromDeriveInput)] #[darling(attributes(skip_test))]

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Dependency Cleanup [third_party/rust/darling/tests/skip.rs] [Lines 1-13]
   Old Code:
   ```rust
   #[macro_use]
   extern crate darling;
   #[macro_use]
   extern crate syn;
   #[macro_use]
   extern crate quote;
   
   use darling::FromDeriveInput;
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```rust
   use darling::{FromDeriveInput, FromMeta};
   use syn::parse_quote;
   ```

This appears to be a code cleanup/modernization change rather than a security fix. The changes:
1. Removed explicit `extern crate` declarations (which are no longer needed in Rust 2018 edition)
2. Updated imports to be more concise
3. Added `FromMeta` to the imports from darling
4. Added explicit import of `parse_quote` from syn

There are no obvious security vulnerabilities being fixed here - it's primarily modernization of the code to use newer Rust idioms. The functionality remains the same, just with more modern import syntax.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/widget/cocoa/NativeMenuMac.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/widget/cocoa/NativeMenuMac.h@@ -49,8 +49,7 @@   // nsMenuX::Observer   void OnMenuWillOpen(dom::Element* aPopupElement) override;   void OnMenuDidOpen(dom::Element* aPopupElement) override;-  void OnMenuWillActivateItem(dom::Element* aPopupElement,-                              dom::Element* aMenuItemElement) override;+  void OnMenuWillActivateItem(dom::Element* aPopupElement, dom::Element* aMenuItemElement) override;   void OnMenuClosed(dom::Element* aPopupElement) override;   NSMenu* NativeNSMenu() { return mMenu ? mMenu->NativeNSMenu() : nil; }

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [widget/cocoa/NativeMenuMac.h] [Lines 49-51]
[Old Code]
  void OnMenuWillActivateItem(dom::Element* aPopupElement,
                              dom::Element* aMenuItemElement) override;
[Fixed Code]
  void OnMenuWillActivateItem(dom::Element* aPopupElement, dom::Element* aMenuItemElement) override;

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be purely cosmetic/formatting, changing from a multi-line function declaration to a single-line one.
- No security-related changes were made in this diff.
- The function signature and parameters remain exactly the same, only the formatting changed.
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with this type of change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/extensions/screenshots/test/browser/head.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/extensions/screenshots/test/browser/head.js@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@   visiblePageButton: "button.visible",   previewIframe: "#firefox-screenshots-preview-iframe",   copyButton: "button.highlight-button-copy",+  downloadButton: "button.highlight-button-download", }; class ScreenshotsHelper {

Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The change appears to be a simple addition of a new UI element (download button) to the selectors object.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No vulnerability found [browser/extensions/screenshots/test/browser/head.js] [Lines 19-19]
    [Old Code]
      copyButton: "button.highlight-button-copy",
    };
    [Fixed Code]
      copyButton: "button.highlight-button-copy",
      downloadButton: "button.highlight-button-download",
    };

This appears to be a purely functional change adding support for a new download button in the test infrastructure, with no security implications. The change is in test code (specifically a test helper file) and doesn't modify any security-sensitive functionality.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.