--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.zeroradius.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.zeroradius.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00' ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ ctx.moveTo(0, 25); ctx.arc(200, 25, 0, 0, Math.PI, true); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-related modifications.

For completeness, here's the analysis following the requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18, 28]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability, which doesn't affect security. The functionality remains identical.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/base/content/browser-development-helpers.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/base/content/browser-development-helpers.js@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@     let command = document.createXULElement("command");     command.setAttribute("id", "cmd_quickRestart");     command.addEventListener("command", this.quickRestart, true);-    command.setAttribute("oncommand", "void 0;"); // Needed - bug 371900     document.getElementById("mainCommandSet").prepend(command);     let key = document.createXULElement("key");@@ -38,7 +37,6 @@     key.setAttribute("key", "r");     key.setAttribute("modifiers", "accel,alt");     key.setAttribute("command", "cmd_quickRestart");-    key.setAttribute("oncommand", "void 0;"); // Needed - bug 371900     document.getElementById("mainKeyset").prepend(key);     let menuitem = document.createXULElement("menuitem");

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
[XUL Command Injection] [browser/base/content/browser-development-helpers.js] [Lines 30-38]  
[Old Code]  
```javascript
command.setAttribute("oncommand", "void 0;"); // Needed - bug 371900
...
key.setAttribute("oncommand", "void 0;"); // Needed - bug 371900
```  
[Fixed Code]  
```javascript
// oncommand attributes removed
```  

Additional Details:  
- The removed `oncommand` attributes were previously set to "void 0;" as noted in bug 371900, which appears to have been a workaround for some issue
- Setting arbitrary JavaScript code in XUL attributes like `oncommand` can be dangerous as it could potentially be manipulated to execute malicious code
- The fix removes these potentially vulnerable attributes while maintaining the same functionality through the proper event listener (`addEventListener`)
- This change follows better security practices by avoiding inline JavaScript in attributes

Note: While not a classic vulnerability in the sense of being actively exploited, this change improves security by removing a potential injection vector that could have been abused if other vulnerabilities existed in the XUL processing code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/python/mozlint/mozlint/cli.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/python/mozlint/mozlint/cli.py@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import os import sys from argparse import REMAINDER, SUPPRESS, ArgumentParser+from pathlib import Path from mozlint.errors import NoValidLinter from mozlint.formatters import all_formatters@@ -339,6 +340,10 @@             os.path.splitext(os.path.basename(l))[0] for l in lint_paths["lint_paths"]         ]         print("\n".join(sorted(linters)))+        print(+            "\nNote that clang-tidy checks are not run as part of this "+            "command, but using the static-analysis command."+        )         return 0     lint = LintRoller(**lintargs)@@ -356,12 +361,7 @@                 return 1             paths = lint.linters[0]["local_exclude"]-        if (-            not linters-            and not paths-            and os.getcwd() == lint.root-            and not (outgoing or workdir)-        ):+        if not paths and Path.cwd() == Path(lint.root) and not (outgoing or workdir):             print(                 "warning: linting the entire repo takes a long time, using --outgoing and "                 "--workdir instead. If you want to lint the entire repo, run `./mach lint .`"

I'll analyze the provided code diff for security vulnerabilities following the specified format.

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] python/mozlint/mozlint/cli.py [Lines 5,339,356]
[Old Code]
import os
...
if (
    not linters
    and not paths
    and os.getcwd() == lint.root
    and not (outgoing or workdir)
):
[Fixed Code]
from pathlib import Path
...
if not paths and Path.cwd() == Path(lint.root) and not (outgoing or workdir):

Additional Details:
- The changes appear to be code improvements rather than security fixes
- The main change is using Path from pathlib instead of os module for path handling
- A note about clang-tidy checks was added to the output
- The condition check was simplified but maintains the same logical behavior

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] python/mozlint/mozlint/cli.py [Lines 339-343]
[Old Code]
        print("\n".join(sorted(linters)))
[Fixed Code]
        print("\n".join(sorted(linters)))
        print(
            "\nNote that clang-tidy checks are not run as part of this "
            "command, but using the static-analysis command."
        )

Additional Details:
- This is purely an informational message addition with no security implications
- It helps users understand the tool's behavior better
- No actual functionality change or security improvement was made

No security vulnerabilities were identified in the provided diff. The changes appear to be code quality improvements and user experience enhancements rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/wasm/WasmBCFrame.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/wasm/WasmBCFrame.h@@ -28,7 +28,10 @@ #include "wasm/WasmBCStk.h" #include "wasm/WasmConstants.h"  // For MaxFrameSize-// The stack frame.+// [SMDOC] Wasm baseline compiler's stack frame.+//+// For background, see "Wasm's ABIs" in WasmFrame.h, the following should never+// be in conflict with that. // // The stack frame has four parts ("below" means at lower addresses): //

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Documentation Improvement] [js/src/wasm/WasmBCFrame.h] [Lines 28-31]
[Old Code]
// The stack frame.
[Fixed Code]
// [SMDOC] Wasm baseline compiler's stack frame.
//
// For background, see "Wasm's ABIs" in WasmFrame.h, the following should never
// be in conflict with that.

Analysis:
1. The change appears to be purely documentation-related, adding more context and references.
2. There are no code changes that would indicate a security fix.
3. The modifications improve documentation clarity but don't address any apparent vulnerabilities.
4. No specific vulnerability name is associated with this change as it's not a security fix.

Note: While documentation improvements can sometimes help prevent future security issues by clarifying intended behavior, this particular change doesn't appear to directly fix any existing vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/python/mozbuild/mozbuild/mach_commands.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/python/mozbuild/mozbuild/mach_commands.py@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import sys import tempfile import time+import errno import mozbuild.settings  # noqa need @SettingsProvider hook to execute import mozpack.path as mozpath@@ -343,7 +344,11 @@     "mach command.", ) def show_log(command_context, log_file=None):-    """Show mach logs."""+    """Show mach logs+    If we're in a terminal context, the log is piped to 'less'+    for more convenient viewing.+    (https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/less.1.html)+    """     if not log_file:         path = command_context._get_state_filename("last_log.json")         log_file = open(path, "rb")@@ -351,22 +356,75 @@     if os.isatty(sys.stdout.fileno()):         env = dict(os.environ)         if "LESS" not in env:-            # Sensible default flags if none have been set in the user-            # environment.-            env[b"LESS"] = b"FRX"-        less = subprocess.Popen(["less"], stdin=subprocess.PIPE, env=env)-        # Various objects already have a reference to sys.stdout, so we-        # can't just change it, we need to change the file descriptor under-        # it to redirect to less's input.-        # First keep a copy of the sys.stdout file descriptor.-        output_fd = os.dup(sys.stdout.fileno())-        os.dup2(less.stdin.fileno(), sys.stdout.fileno())--    startTime = 0+            # Sensible default flags if none have been set in the user environment.+            env["LESS"] = "FRX"+        less = subprocess.Popen(+            ["less"], stdin=subprocess.PIPE, env=env, encoding="UTF-8"+        )++        try:+            # Create a new logger handler with the stream being the stdin of our 'less'+            # process so that we can pipe the logger output into 'less'+            less_handler = logging.StreamHandler(stream=less.stdin)+            less_handler.setFormatter(+                command_context.log_manager.terminal_handler.formatter+            )+            less_handler.setLevel(command_context.log_manager.terminal_handler.level)++            # replace the existing terminal handler with the new one for 'less' while+            # still keeping the original one to set back later+            original_handler = command_context.log_manager.replace_terminal_handler(+                less_handler+            )++            # Save this value so we can set it back to the original value later+            original_logging_raise_exceptions = logging.raiseExceptions++            # We need to explicitly disable raising exceptions inside logging so+            # that we can catch them here ourselves to ignore the ones we want+            logging.raiseExceptions = False++            # Parses the log file line by line and streams+            # (to less.stdin) the relevant records we want+            handle_log_file(command_context, log_file)++            # At this point we've piped the entire log file to+            # 'less', so we can close the input stream+            less.stdin.close()++            # Wait for the user to manually terminate `less`+            less.wait()+        except OSError as os_error:+            # (POSIX)   errno.EPIPE: BrokenPipeError: [Errno 32] Broken pipe+            # (Windows) errno.EINVAL: OSError:        [Errno 22] Invalid argument+            if os_error.errno == errno.EPIPE or os_error.errno == errno.EINVAL:+                # If the user manually terminates 'less' before the entire log file+                # is piped (without scrolling close enough to the bottom) we will get+                # one of these errors (depends on the OS) because the logger will still+                # attempt to stream to the now invalid less.stdin. To prevent a bunch+                # of errors being shown after a user terminates 'less', we just catch+                # the first of those exceptions here, and stop parsing the log file.+                pass+            else:+                raise+        except Exception:+            raise+        finally:+            # Ensure these values are changed back to the originals, regardless of outcome+            command_context.log_manager.replace_terminal_handler(original_handler)+            logging.raiseExceptions = original_logging_raise_exceptions+    else:+        # Not in a terminal context, so just handle the log file with the+        # default stream without piping it to a pager (less)+        handle_log_file(command_context, log_file)+++def handle_log_file(command_context, log_file):+    start_time = 0     for line in log_file:         created, action, params = json.loads(line)-        if not startTime:-            startTime = created+        if not start_time:+            start_time = created             command_context.log_manager.terminal_handler.formatter.start_time = created         if "line" in params:             record = logging.makeLogRecord(@@ -380,17 +438,6 @@                 }             )             command_context._logger.handle(record)--    if command_context.log_manager.terminal:-        # Close less's input so that it knows that we're done sending data.-        less.stdin.close()-        # Since the less's input file descriptor is now also the stdout-        # file descriptor, we still actually have a non-closed system file-        # descriptor for less's input. Replacing sys.stdout's file-        # descriptor with what it was before we replaced it will properly-        # close less's input.-        os.dup2(output_fd, sys.stdout.fileno())-        less.wait() # Provide commands for inspecting warnings.@@ -686,7 +733,6 @@             device_serial,             remote_test_root,             libxul_path,-            enable_webrender,             InstallIntent.NO if no_install else InstallIntent.YES,         )@@ -799,7 +845,6 @@     device_serial,     remote_test_root,     libxul_path,-    enable_webrender,     install, ):     # setup logging for mozrunner@@ -843,7 +888,6 @@         remote_test_root,         libxul_path,         None,-        enable_webrender,     ):         exit_code = 1     tester.cleanup()

Analyzing the provided code diff, here are the security-related findings:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Insecure Environment Variable Handling [python/mozbuild/mozbuild/mach_commands.py] [Lines 343-356]
[Old Code]
env = dict(os.environ)
if "LESS" not in env:
    # Sensible default flags if none have been set in the user
    # environment.
    env[b"LESS"] = b"FRX"
[Fixed Code]
env = dict(os.environ)
if "LESS" not in env:
    # Sensible default flags if none have been set in the user environment.
    env["LESS"] = "FRX"

Additional Details:
- The vulnerability was in the handling of environment variables where bytes were being used instead of strings for the LESS environment variable. While not a critical security issue, using bytes could potentially lead to encoding/decoding issues or improper handling of the environment variable.

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Error Handling Improvement [python/mozbuild/mozbuild/mach_commands.py] [Lines 351-356, 394-414]
[Old Code]
(No specific error handling for broken pipes or invalid arguments)
[Fixed Code]
try:
    # ... code ...
except OSError as os_error:
    if os_error.errno == errno.EPIPE or os_error.errno == errno.EINVAL:
        pass
    else:
        raise
except Exception:
    raise

Additional Details:
- The addition of proper error handling for EPIPE and EINVAL cases prevents potential information leakage or unexpected behavior when the less command is terminated prematurely. This is particularly important for security as it prevents error messages from being displayed that could reveal system information.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Resource Leak [python/mozbuild/mozbuild/mach_commands.py] [Lines 351-356]
[Old Code]
(Original code didn't properly restore original handlers and settings in all cases)
[Fixed Code]
finally:
    command_context.log_manager.replace_terminal_handler(original_handler)
    logging.raiseExceptions = original_logging_raise_exceptions

Additional Details:
- The addition of the finally block ensures proper cleanup of resources, which could potentially prevent resource exhaustion attacks. However, it's not clear if this was actually exploitable in the original code.

Note: The removal of the 'enable_webrender' parameter appears to be a feature change rather than a security fix, so it's not included as a vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/widget/gtk/DMABufSurface.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/widget/gtk/DMABufSurface.h@@ -16,6 +16,16 @@ typedef void* EGLSyncKHR; #define DMABUF_BUFFER_PLANES 4++#ifndef VA_FOURCC_NV12+#  define VA_FOURCC_NV12 0x3231564E+#endif+#ifndef VA_FOURCC_YV12+#  define VA_FOURCC_YV12 0x32315659+#endif+#ifndef VA_FOURCC_P010+#  define VA_FOURCC_P010 0x30313050+#endif namespace mozilla { namespace gfx {@@ -161,7 +171,7 @@   virtual ~DMABufSurface();   SurfaceType mSurfaceType;-  uint64_t mBufferModifier;+  uint64_t mBufferModifiers[DMABUF_BUFFER_PLANES];   int mBufferPlaneCount;   int mDmabufFds[DMABUF_BUFFER_PLANES];@@ -298,6 +308,8 @@   bool UpdateYUVData(void** aPixelData, int* aLineSizes);   bool UpdateYUVData(const VADRMPRIMESurfaceDescriptor& aDesc);+  bool VerifyTextureCreation();+  private:   ~DMABufSurfaceYUV();@@ -313,6 +325,9 @@                                   int aPlane);   void CloseFileDescriptorForPlane(const mozilla::MutexAutoLock& aProofOfLock,                                    int aPlane, bool aForceClose);++  bool CreateEGLImage(mozilla::gl::GLContext* aGLContext, int aPlane);+  void ReleaseEGLImages(mozilla::gl::GLContext* aGLContext);   int mWidth[DMABUF_BUFFER_PLANES];   int mHeight[DMABUF_BUFFER_PLANES];

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Buffer Overflow/Incorrect Memory Handling] [File: widget/gtk/DMABufSurface.h] [Lines: 161, 171]  
   [Old Code]  
   `uint64_t mBufferModifier;`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `uint64_t mBufferModifiers[DMABUF_BUFFER_PLANES];`  
   Additional Details: The change from a single modifier to an array suggests potential issues with handling multiple buffer planes. While not clearly a security fix, it could prevent incorrect memory access when dealing with multiple planes.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Missing Input Validation] [File: widget/gtk/DMABufSurface.h] [Lines: 298-308]  
   [Old Code]  
   (No previous verification method shown)  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `bool VerifyTextureCreation();`  
   Additional Details: The addition of a texture creation verification method suggests potential security improvements in validating texture creation, though the exact vulnerability being addressed isn't clear from the diff.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Resource Leak] [File: widget/gtk/DMABufSurface.h] [Lines: 313-325]  
   [Old Code]  
   (No previous EGL image management shown)  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `bool CreateEGLImage(mozilla::gl::GLContext* aGLContext, int aPlane);`  
   `void ReleaseEGLImages(mozilla::gl::GLContext* aGLContext);`  
   Additional Details: The addition of explicit EGL image creation and release methods suggests potential fixes for resource leaks, though the exact vulnerability isn't specified in the diff.

Note: The diff also includes additions of VA_FOURCC definitions, but these appear to be standard format definitions rather than security fixes. The changes primarily focus on improving memory and resource management for DMA buffer surfaces, but without more context about the specific vulnerabilities being addressed, we can only speculate about the security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/webrtc/tests/mochitests/test_ondevicechange.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/webrtc/tests/mochitests/test_ondevicechange.html@@ -13,50 +13,168 @@   bug: "1152383" });-const RESPONSE_WAIT_TIME_MS = 3000;--async function maybeReceiveDevicechangeEvent() {-  return Promise.race([-    new Promise(r => navigator.mediaDevices.ondevicechange = () => r(true)),-    wait(RESPONSE_WAIT_TIME_MS).then(() => false)-  ]);+async function resolveOnEvent(target, name) {+  return new Promise(r => target.addEventListener(name, r, {once: true}));+}+let eventCount = 0;+async function triggerVideoDevicechange() {+  ++eventCount;+  // "media.getusermedia.fake-camera-name" specifies the name of the single+  // fake video camera.+  // Changing the pref imitates replacing one device with another.+  return pushPrefs(["media.getusermedia.fake-camera-name",+                    `devicechange ${eventCount}`])+}+function addIframe() {+  const iframe = document.createElement("iframe");+  // Workaround for bug 1743933+  iframe.loadPromise = resolveOnEvent(iframe, "load");+  document.documentElement.appendChild(iframe);+  return iframe; } runTest(async () => {-  SimpleTest.requestCompleteLog();+  // A toplevel Window and an iframe Windows are compared for devicechange+  // events.+  const iframe1 = addIframe();+  const iframe2 = addIframe();+  await Promise.all([+    iframe1.loadPromise,+    iframe2.loadPromise,+    pushPrefs(+      // Use the fake video backend to trigger devicechange events.+      ["media.navigator.streams.fake", true],+      // Loopback would override fake.+      ["media.video_loopback_dev", ""],+      // Make fake devices count as real, permission-wise, or devicechange+      // events won't be exposed+      ["media.navigator.permission.fake", true],+      // For gUM.+      ["media.navigator.permission.disabled", true]+    ),+  ]);+  const topDevices = navigator.mediaDevices;+  const frame1Devices = iframe1.contentWindow.navigator.mediaDevices;+  const frame2Devices = iframe2.contentWindow.navigator.mediaDevices;+  // Initialization of MediaDevices::mLastPhysicalDevices is triggered when+  // ondevicechange is set but tests "media.getusermedia.fake-camera-name"+  // asynchronously.  Wait for getUserMedia() completion to ensure that the+  // pref has been read before doDevicechanges() changes it.+  frame1Devices.ondevicechange = () => {};+  const topEventPromise = resolveOnEvent(topDevices, "devicechange");+  const frame2EventPromise = resolveOnEvent(frame2Devices, "devicechange");+  (await frame1Devices.getUserMedia({video: true})).getTracks()[0].stop();-  await pushPrefs(-    // Ensure there are continuous fake devicechange events throughout this test-    ["media.ondevicechange.fakeDeviceChangeEvent.enabled", true],-    // Make fake devices count as real, permission-wise, or devicechange events-    // won't be exposed-    ["media.navigator.permission.fake", true],-    // Ensure this precondition to the below tests-    ["media.navigator.permission.disabled", true]-  );+  await Promise.all([+    resolveOnEvent(frame1Devices, "devicechange"),+    triggerVideoDevicechange(),+  ]);+  ok(true,+     "devicechange event is fired when gUM has been in use");+  // The number of devices has not changed.  Race a settled Promise to check+  // that no devicechange event has been received in frame2.+  const racer = {};+  is(await Promise.race([frame2EventPromise, racer]), racer,+     "devicechange event is NOT fired in iframe2 for replaced device when " ++     "gUM has NOT been in use");+  // getUserMedia() is invoked on frame2Devices after a first device list+  // change but before returning to the previous state, in order to test that+  // the device set is compared with the set after previous device list+  // changes regardless of whether a "devicechange" event was previously+  // dispatched.+  (await frame2Devices.getUserMedia({video: true})).getTracks()[0].stop();+  // Revert device list change.+  await Promise.all([+    resolveOnEvent(frame1Devices, "devicechange"),+    resolveOnEvent(frame2Devices, "devicechange"),+    SpecialPowers.popPrefEnv(),+  ]);+  ok(true,+     "devicechange event is fired on return to previous list " ++     "after gUM has been is use");-  const stream = await getUserMedia({video: true, fake: true});-  const [track] = stream.getVideoTracks();-  await pushPrefs(["media.navigator.permission.disabled", false]);-  try {-    ok(await maybeReceiveDevicechangeEvent(),-        "devicechange event is fired when gUM is in use without permanent " +-        "permission granted");-  } finally {-    track.stop();+  const frame1EventPromise1 = resolveOnEvent(frame1Devices, "devicechange");+  while (true) {+    const racePromise = Promise.race([+      frame1EventPromise1,+      // 100ms is half the coalescing time in MediaManager::DeviceListChanged().+      wait(100, {type: "wait done"}),+    ]);+    await triggerVideoDevicechange();+    if ((await racePromise).type == "devicechange") {+      ok(true,+         "devicechange event is fired even when hardware changes continue");+      break;+    }   }-  ok(!await maybeReceiveDevicechangeEvent(),-     "devicechange event is NOT fired when gUM is NOT in use and " +-     "permanent permission is NOT granted");+  is(await Promise.race([topEventPromise, racer]), racer,+     "devicechange event is NOT fired for device replacements when " ++     "gUM has NOT been in use");-  await pushPrefs(["media.navigator.permission.disabled", true]);-  ok(await maybeReceiveDevicechangeEvent(),-     "devicechange event is fired when gUM is NOT in use and permanent "+-     "permission is granted");+  if (navigator.userAgent.includes("Android")) {+    todo(false, "test assumes Firefox-for-Desktop specific API and behavior");+    return;+  }+  // Open a new tab, which is expected to receive focus and hide the first tab.+  const tab = window.open();+  SimpleTest.registerCleanupFunction(() => tab.close());+  await Promise.all([+    resolveOnEvent(document, 'visibilitychange'),+    resolveOnEvent(tab, 'focus'),+  ]);+  ok(tab.document.hasFocus(), "tab.document.hasFocus()");+  await Promise.all([+    resolveOnEvent(tab, 'blur'),+    SpecialPowers.spawnChrome([], function focusUrlBar() {+      this.browsingContext.topChromeWindow.gURLBar.focus();+    }),+  ]);+  ok(!tab.document.hasFocus(), "!tab.document.hasFocus()");+  is(document.visibilityState, 'hidden', 'visibilityState')+  const frame1EventPromise2 = resolveOnEvent(frame1Devices, "devicechange");+  const tabDevices = tab.navigator.mediaDevices;+  tabDevices.ondevicechange = () => {};+  const tabStream = await tabDevices.getUserMedia({video: true});+  // Trigger and await two devicechanges on tabDevices to wait long enough to+  // provide that a devicechange on another MediaDevices would be received.+  for (let i = 0; i < 2; ++i) {+    await Promise.all([+      resolveOnEvent(tabDevices, "devicechange"),+      triggerVideoDevicechange(),+    ]);+  };+  is(await Promise.race([frame1EventPromise2, racer]), racer,+     "devicechange event is NOT fired while tab is in background");+  tab.close();+  await resolveOnEvent(document, 'visibilitychange');+  is(document.visibilityState, 'visible', 'visibilityState')+  await frame1EventPromise2;+  ok(true, "devicechange event IS fired when tab returns to foreground");++  const audioLoopbackDev =+        SpecialPowers.getCharPref("media.audio_loopback_dev", "");+  if (!navigator.userAgent.includes("Linux")) {+    todo_isnot(audioLoopbackDev, "", "audio_loopback_dev");+    return;+  }+  isnot(audioLoopbackDev, "", "audio_loopback_dev");+  await Promise.all([+    resolveOnEvent(topDevices, "devicechange"),+    pushPrefs(["media.audio_loopback_dev", "none"]),+  ]);+  ok(true,+     "devicechange event IS fired when last audio device is removed and " ++     "gUM has NOT been in use");+  await Promise.all([+    resolveOnEvent(topDevices, "devicechange"),+    pushPrefs(["media.audio_loopback_dev", audioLoopbackDev]),+  ]);+  ok(true,+     "devicechange event IS fired when first audio device is added and " ++     "gUM has NOT been in use"); }); </script>-</pre> </body> </html>

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily test improvements and functionality enhancements rather than security fixes. Here's my analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No clear security vulnerability [dom/media/webrtc/tests/mochitests/test_ondevicechange.html] [Various]
   The changes involve:
   - Complete rewrite of the test structure
   - More comprehensive testing of devicechange events
   - Better handling of iframes and tabs
   - More detailed test cases for different scenarios

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security issue found [dom/media/webrtc/tests/mochitests/test_ondevicechange.html] [Various]
   The changes include:
   - Removal of RESPONSE_WAIT_TIME_MS constant
   - Replacement of maybeReceiveDevicechangeEvent with resolveOnEvent
   - Addition of triggerVideoDevicechange function
   - More sophisticated test cases with multiple iframes

The diff shows significant test improvements but no identifiable security fixes. The changes focus on:
- Better test coverage for devicechange events
- More reliable test execution
- Handling of edge cases
- Cross-window/iframe testing scenarios

If there were any security implications, they would be related to the WebRTC/media device handling, but the diff itself doesn't show any vulnerability fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/debugger/test/mochitest/browser_dbg-breakpoints-duplicate-functions.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/debugger/test/mochitest/browser_dbg-breakpoints-duplicate-functions.js@@ -2,21 +2,34 @@  * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this  * file, You can obtain one at <http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/>. */-// tests to make sure we do not accidentally slide the breakpoint up to the first+// Tests to make sure we do not accidentally slide the breakpoint up to the first // function with the same name in the file.+// TODO: Likely to remove this test when removing the breakpoint sliding functionality add_task(async function() {   const dbg = await initDebugger(     "doc-duplicate-functions.html",     "doc-duplicate-functions"   );-  const source = findSource(dbg, "doc-duplicate-functions");+  let source = findSource(dbg, "doc-duplicate-functions");   await selectSource(dbg, source.url);-  await addBreakpoint(dbg, source.url, 19);+  await addBreakpoint(dbg, source.url, 21);-  await reload(dbg, source.url);+  await reload(dbg, "doc-duplicate-functions");+   await waitForState(dbg, state => dbg.selectors.getBreakpointCount() == 1);   const firstBreakpoint = dbg.selectors.getBreakpointsList()[0];-  is(firstBreakpoint.location.line, 19, "Breakpoint is on line 19");+  is(firstBreakpoint.location.line, 21, "Breakpoint is on line 21");++  // Make sure the breakpoint set on line 19 gets hit+  await invokeInTab("b");+  invokeInTab("func");+  await waitForPaused(dbg);++  source = findSource(dbg, "doc-duplicate-functions");+  assertPausedAtSourceAndLine(dbg, source.id, 21);+  await assertBreakpoint(dbg, 21);++  await resume(dbg); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be related to test functionality and breakpoint verification rather than security fixes. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found
    The changes are test improvements and breakpoint verification updates
    The modifications include:
    - Updated test comments
    - Changed breakpoint line number from 19 to 21
    - Added additional test assertions
    - Improved test flow with more verification steps

The diff shows test improvements rather than security fixes, with changes focused on:
1. Updating test comments
2. Adjusting breakpoint line numbers
3. Adding more comprehensive test assertions
4. Improving test reliability with additional verification steps

No CVE or known vulnerability patterns are present in these changes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/systemservices/video_engine/desktop_device_info.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/systemservices/video_engine/desktop_device_info.h@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@   void InitializeWindowList();   virtual void InitializeTabList();-  virtual void InitializeScreenList() = 0;+  void InitializeScreenList();   void RefreshWindowList();   void RefreshTabList();

Let me analyze the code diff according to the provided format.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Leak or Improper Access Control] [dom/media/systemservices/video_engine/desktop_device_info.h] [Lines 107]
[Old Code]
virtual void InitializeScreenList() = 0;
[Fixed Code]
void InitializeScreenList();

Additional Details:
The change removes the pure virtual function declaration and makes InitializeScreenList() a concrete method. While this isn't clearly a security fix, it could potentially relate to:
1. Preventing potential information leaks by controlling how screen list initialization is handled
2. Ensuring consistent behavior across implementations
3. Removing a potential attack surface from derived classes

However, without more context about how this function is used and what security implications the virtual vs non-virtual implementation has, I can't definitively identify a specific vulnerability. The change might be more about code structure than security.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/server/actors/utils/sources-manager.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/server/actors/utils/sources-manager.js@@ -30,12 +30,9 @@  * the sources, etc for ThreadActors.  */ class SourcesManager extends EventEmitter {-  constructor(threadActor, allowSourceFn = () => true) {+  constructor(threadActor) {     super();     this._thread = threadActor;-    this.allowSource = source => {-      return !isHiddenSource(source) && allowSourceFn(source);-    };     this.blackBoxedSources = new Map();@@ -92,7 +89,7 @@   createSourceActor(source) {     assert(source, "SourcesManager.prototype.source needs a source");-    if (!this.allowSource(source)) {+    if (isHiddenSource(source)) {       return null;     }@@ -408,7 +405,12 @@         contentType: data.contentType,       };     }-+    if (partial) {+      return {+        content: "",+        contentType: "",+      };+    }     return this._fetchURLContents(url, partial, canUseCache);   }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Authorization Bypass or Information Leak] [devtools/server/actors/utils/sources-manager.js] [Lines 30-33, 92]
   [Old Code]
   constructor(threadActor, allowSourceFn = () => true) {
     super();
     this._thread = threadActor;
     this.allowSource = source => {
       return !isHiddenSource(source) && allowSourceFn(source);
     };
   ...
   if (!this.allowSource(source)) {
   
   [Fixed Code]
   constructor(threadActor) {
     super();
     this._thread = threadActor;
   ...
   if (isHiddenSource(source)) {

   Additional Details: The removal of the customizable allowSource function and its replacement with a direct isHiddenSource check might indicate a security fix where the previous implementation could potentially allow unauthorized access to sources if a malicious allowSourceFn was provided. However, without more context about the threat model, this is uncertain.

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   [Partial Content Information Leak] [devtools/server/actors/utils/sources-manager.js] [Lines 408-413]
   [Old Code]
   (No handling of partial content case)
   
   [Fixed Code]
   if (partial) {
     return {
       content: "",
       contentType: "",
     };
   }

   Additional Details: This appears to be a fix for a potential information leak where partial content might expose sensitive information. The fix ensures empty content is returned for partial requests.

Note: The first vulnerability assessment is marked as "not sure" because while the change appears security-related (removing a customizable filtering function), without knowing the exact threat model or previous vulnerabilities, we can't be certain it was specifically addressing a known vulnerability. The second change clearly addresses a potential information leak scenario.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.nonfinite.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.nonfinite.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -65,8 +65,8 @@ ctx.lineTo(0, 50); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 90,45, 0,255,0,255, "90,45", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 90,45, 0,255,0,255, "90,45", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming for better code clarity. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.nonfinite.worker.js] [Lines 13-14, 65-66]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 90,45, 0,255,0,255, "90,45", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(canvas, 90,45, 0,255,0,255, "90,45", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` throughout the file, which doesn't appear to address any security issues but rather improves code readability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.repeaty.basic.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.repeaty.basic.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@         var pattern = ctx.createPattern(bitmap, 'repeat-y');         ctx.fillStyle = pattern;         ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines]
   Old Code: `var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');`
   Fixed Code: `var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');`
   Additional Details: This appears to be a simple variable renaming change with no security implications.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines]
   Old Code: `_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");` (and similar lines)
   Fixed Code: `_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");` (and similar lines)
   Additional Details: These changes simply update the variable name in assertion calls to match the renamed variable, with no security impact.

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring (variable renaming) rather than security fixes. No vulnerabilities were identified in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.newsubpath.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.newsubpath.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ ctx.lineTo(-50, 25); ctx.roundRect(200, 25, 1, 1, [0]); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't address any security vulnerabilities.

Answer for Each Vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found
    File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.newsubpath.worker.js
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or clarity, but don't address any security issues. The functionality remains identical.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wpt/run.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wpt/run.py@@ -177,9 +177,10 @@             return self.browser.install(self.venv.path, channel)     def install_requirements(self):-        if not self.venv.skip_virtualenv_setup:+        if not self.venv.skip_virtualenv_setup and self.browser.requirements:             self.venv.install_requirements(os.path.join(                 wpt_root, "tools", "wptrunner", self.browser.requirements))+     def setup(self, kwargs):         self.setup_kwargs(kwargs)

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   Missing Requirements Check [testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wpt/run.py] [Lines 177-180]
   Old Code:
   ```
   if not self.venv.skip_virtualenv_setup:
       self.venv.install_requirements(os.path.join(
           wpt_root, "tools", "wptrunner", self.browser.requirements))
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   if not self.venv.skip_virtualenv_setup and self.browser.requirements:
       self.venv.install_requirements(os.path.join(
           wpt_root, "tools", "wptrunner", self.browser.requirements))
   ```

   The fix adds a check for `self.browser.requirements` before attempting to install requirements. This prevents potential issues when requirements are not specified, which could lead to undefined behavior or errors. While not a classic security vulnerability, this could be considered a security improvement as it makes the code more robust against unexpected states.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [No specific vulnerability name] [testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wpt/run.py] [Line 180]
   Old Code: (no extra newline)
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   
   ```
   The diff shows an added newline at the end of the function. While this doesn't appear to be security-related, it could potentially be part of a larger change not fully visible in this diff. Without more context, I can't determine if this has any security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/processtools/metrics.yaml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/processtools/metrics.yaml@@ -13,10 +13,62 @@ $schema: moz://mozilla.org/schemas/glean/metrics/2-0-0 power:+  cpu_time_per_process_type_ms:+    type: labeled_counter+    description: >+      CPU time used by each process type in ms.+    bugs:+      - https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1747138+    data_reviews:+      - https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1747138+    data_sensitivity:+      - technical+    notification_emails:+      - [email protected]+    expires: never+    labels: &per_process_type_labels+      - parent.active+      - parent.active.playing-audio+      - parent.active.playing-video+      - parent.inactive+      - parent.inactive.playing-audio+      - parent.inactive.playing-video+      - prealloc+      - privilegedabout+      - rdd+      - socket+      - web.background+      - web.background-perceivable+      - web.foreground+      - extension+      - gpu+      - gmplugin+      - utility+    telemetry_mirror: POWER_CPU_TIME_PER_PROCESS_TYPE_MS++  gpu_time_per_process_type_ms:+    type: labeled_counter+    description: >+      GPU time used by each process type in ms.+    bugs:+      - https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1747138+    data_reviews:+      - https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1747138+    data_sensitivity:+      - technical+    notification_emails:+      - [email protected]+    expires: never+    labels: *per_process_type_labels+    telemetry_mirror: POWER_GPU_TIME_PER_PROCESS_TYPE_MS+   total_cpu_time_ms:     type: counter     description: >       Total CPU time used by all processes in ms.+    metadata: &metadata+      tags:+        - "Core :: DOM: Content Processes"     bugs:       - https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1736040     data_reviews:@@ -32,6 +84,7 @@     type: counter     description: >       Total GPU time used by all processes in ms.+    metadata: *metadata     bugs:       - https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1743176     data_reviews:@@ -42,5 +95,3 @@       - [email protected]     expires: never     telemetry_mirror: POWER_TOTAL_GPU_TIME_MS-    no_lint:-      - COMMON_PREFIX

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found in the diff. This appears to be an enhancement to metrics collection, adding new labeled counters for CPU and GPU time per process type and adding metadata tags.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   The changes mainly involve:
   - Adding new metrics (cpu_time_per_process_type_ms and gpu_time_per_process_type_ms)
   - Adding metadata tags to existing metrics
   - Removing a no_lint directive
   These are configuration changes rather than security fixes.

3. Vulnerability Existed: no
   The diff shows structural changes to the metrics.yaml file including:
   - New labeled counters with process type breakdowns
   - Shared labels via YAML anchors (&per_process_type_labels)
   - Shared metadata via YAML anchors (&metadata)
   No security-related changes are evident.

The changes appear to be feature additions and configuration improvements rather than security fixes. The Bugzilla links (1736040, 1743176, 1747138) referenced in the diff don't indicate security issues but rather tracking/metrics improvements.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/angle-units-003.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/angle-units-003.html@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@   <link rel="match" href="../reference/ref-filled-green-100px-square.xht">   <meta content="This test checks that 'grad' angle unit is case-insensitive." name="assert">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <style>   div

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/angle-units-003.html [Lines] 10
    [Old Code]
    <meta name="flags" content="">
    [Fixed Code]
    (line removed)

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which appears to be test-related metadata
- There's no indication this was related to any security vulnerability
- The change appears to be a test cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerability patterns match this change

No other changes were present in the diff to analyze.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/utils/pause/mapScopes/buildGeneratedBindingList.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/utils/pause/mapScopes/buildGeneratedBindingList.js@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@  * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this  * file, You can obtain one at <http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/>. */-import { has } from "lodash"; import { clientCommands } from "../../../client/firefox"; import { locColumn } from "./locColumn";@@ -75,7 +74,7 @@   for (const generated of generatedGlobalScopes) {     for (const name of Object.keys(generated.bindings)) {       const { refs } = generated.bindings[name];-      const bindings = clientGlobalScopes.find(b => has(b, name));+      const bindings = clientGlobalScopes.find(b => name in b);       for (const loc of refs) {         if (bindings) {

Let me analyze the code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Prototype Pollution] [devtools/client/debugger/src/utils/pause/mapScopes/buildGeneratedBindingList.js] [Lines 75-77]
   [Old Code]
      const bindings = clientGlobalScopes.find(b => has(b, name));
   [Fixed Code]
      const bindings = clientGlobalScopes.find(b => name in b);

Additional Details:
- The change replaces lodash's `has()` function with the native `in` operator
- While this might not be a direct security fix, using native operators instead of library functions can reduce potential attack surface
- The `has()` function from lodash could potentially have edge cases in property checking that might be exploitable
- The native `in` operator is generally more predictable and secure for property existence checking

No other clear vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change appears to be more about code simplification and modernization rather than fixing a specific known vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/workers/sharedworkers/SharedWorker.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/workers/sharedworkers/SharedWorker.cpp@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ #include "mozilla/ipc/URIUtils.h" #include "mozilla/net/CookieJarSettings.h" #include "mozilla/StorageAccess.h"-#include "nsContentUtils.h" #include "nsGlobalWindowInner.h" #include "nsPIDOMWindow.h"@@ -195,7 +194,7 @@     ipcClientInfo.emplace(clientInfo.value().ToIPC());   }-  nsID agentClusterId = nsContentUtils::GenerateUUID();+  nsID agentClusterId = nsID::GenerateUUID();   net::CookieJarSettingsArgs cjsData;   MOZ_ASSERT(loadInfo.mCookieJarSettings);

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential UUID Generation Vulnerability] [dom/workers/sharedworkers/SharedWorker.cpp] [Lines 195]  
   [Old Code]  
   `nsID agentClusterId = nsContentUtils::GenerateUUID();`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `nsID agentClusterId = nsID::GenerateUUID();`  
   Additional Details: The change moves UUID generation from nsContentUtils to nsID class. While not clearly a security fix, it might relate to more secure UUID generation practices. The exact security implications are unclear without more context.

No other clear security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The main change appears to be a refactoring of UUID generation functionality.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/neqo-qpack/src/reader.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/neqo-qpack/src/reader.rs@@ -328,16 +328,9 @@     use super::{Error, ReadByte, Reader, Res};     use std::collections::VecDeque;+    #[derive(Default)]     pub struct TestReceiver {         buf: VecDeque<u8>,-    }--    impl Default for TestReceiver {-        fn default() -> Self {-            Self {-                buf: VecDeque::new(),-            }-        }     }     impl ReadByte for TestReceiver {

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Code Simplification] [third_party/rust/neqo-qpack/src/reader.rs] [Lines 328-338]
[Old Code]
    pub struct TestReceiver {
        buf: VecDeque<u8>,
    }

    impl Default for TestReceiver {
        fn default() -> Self {
            Self {
                buf: VecDeque::new(),
            }
        }
    }
[Fixed Code]
    #[derive(Default)]
    pub struct TestReceiver {
        buf: VecDeque<u8>,
    }

This change doesn't appear to address any security vulnerability. It's simply a code simplification where the manual implementation of the `Default` trait is replaced with a derived implementation, which is functionally equivalent but more concise. The security implications remain the same as before - the `TestReceiver` still initializes with an empty `VecDeque` in both versions.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/telemetry/Scalars.yaml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/telemetry/Scalars.yaml@@ -306,6 +306,27 @@     record_into_store:       - 'main'       - 'account-ecosystem'++  mirror_for_uri_count:+    bug_numbers:+      - 1741674+      - 1752890+    description: >+      The count of the total non-unique http(s) URIs visited in a subsession, including+      page reloads, after the session has been restored. URIs on minimized or background+      tabs may also be counted towards this. Private browsing is included in this count.+      Used for comparing with browser.engagement.total_uri_count_normal_and_private_mode+      as a mirror of Glean's browser.engagement.uri_count.+    expires: '100'+    kind: uint+    notification_emails:+      - [email protected]+      - [email protected]+    release_channel_collection: opt-out+    products:+      - 'firefox'+    record_in_processes:+      - 'main'   unfiltered_uri_count:     bug_numbers:@@ -370,6 +391,27 @@     record_into_store:       - 'main'       - 'account-ecosystem'++  mirror_for_active_ticks:+    bug_numbers:+      - 1741674+      - 1752890+    description: >+      The count of the number of five-second intervals ('ticks') the user+      was considered 'active' in a subsession. Session activity involves keyboard or mouse+      interaction with the application. It does not take into account whether or not the window+      has focus or is in the foreground, only if it is receiving these interaction events.+      Used for comparing with browser.engagement.active_ticks as a mirror for+      Glean's browser.engagement.active_ticks+    expires: '100'+    kind: uint+    notification_emails:+      - [email protected]+    release_channel_collection: opt-out+    products:+      - 'firefox'+    record_in_processes:+      - 'main'   profile_count:     bug_numbers:@@ -2047,6 +2089,19 @@       - 'firefox'     record_in_processes:       - main+  toggle_enabled:+    bug_numbers:+      - 1639774+    description: Whether the user has Picture-in-Picture enabled.+    expires: "never"+    kind: boolean+    notification_emails:+      - [email protected]+    release_channel_collection: opt-out+    products:+      - 'firefox'+    record_in_processes:+      - main preferences:   created_new_user_prefs_file:@@ -2308,24 +2363,6 @@     products:       - 'firefox'     record_in_processes:-      - 'content'--  wmf_process_usage:-    bug_numbers:-      - 1690372-      - 1720616-    description: >-      Record whether the WMF decoder module is used in content or chrome process.-    expires: "99"-    kind: boolean-    notification_emails:-      - [email protected]-      - [email protected]-    release_channel_collection: opt-out-    products:-      - 'firefox'-    record_in_processes:-      - 'main'       - 'content'   video_hardware_decoding_support:@@ -4988,6 +5025,29 @@     record_in_processes:       - main+  suppress_prompts:+    bug_numbers:+      - 1749155+    description: >+      When an update is available and app.update.auto is disabled, a popup is+      opened prompting the user to download and install the update. The pref+      app.update.suppressPrompts causes Firefox Nightly to wait up to 7 days+      before showing the prompt, instead showing a badge and banner in the+      meantime. It also prevents Nightly from showing update restart prompts,+      instead showing a badge and banner immediately. This value is set for+      the users who set this pref to true.+    expires: never+    kind: boolean+    keyed: false+    notification_emails:+      - [email protected]+      - [email protected]+    release_channel_collection: opt-in+    products:+      - 'firefox'+    record_in_processes:+      - main+ # The following section contains search counters. browser.search:   with_ads:@@ -5779,6 +5839,7 @@       - 1522934       - 1570652       - 1623406+      - 1749887     description: >       How the profile was selected during startup. One of the following reasons:         unknown:@@ -5811,7 +5872,7 @@           A first run of the application created a new profile to use.         default:           The default profile was selected as normal.-    expires: "99"+    expires: "never"     keyed: false     kind: string     notification_emails:@@ -5820,7 +5881,7 @@       - [email protected]       - [email protected]       - [email protected]-      - [email protected]+      - [email protected]     release_channel_collection: opt-out     products:       - 'firefox'@@ -7354,6 +7415,58 @@       - main power:+  cpu_time_per_process_type_ms:+    bug_numbers:+      - 1747138+    description: >+      CPU time used by each process type in ms.+    expires: never+    kind: uint+    notification_emails:+      - [email protected]+    release_channel_collection: opt-out+    products:+      - 'firefox'+    record_in_processes:+      - 'all'+    keyed: true+    keys: &per_process_type_keys+      - parent.active+      - parent.active.playing-audio+      - parent.active.playing-video+      - parent.inactive+      - parent.inactive.playing-audio+      - parent.inactive.playing-video+      - prealloc+      - privilegedabout+      - rdd+      - socket+      - web.background+      - web.background-perceivable+      - web.foreground+      - extension+      - gpu+      - gmplugin+      - utility++  gpu_time_per_process_type_ms:+    bug_numbers:+      - 1747138+    description: >+      GPU time used by each process type in ms.+    expires: never+    kind: uint+    notification_emails:+      - [email protected]+    release_channel_collection: opt-out+    products:+      - 'firefox'+    record_in_processes:+      - 'main'+      - 'gpu'+    keyed: true+    keys: *per_process_type_keys+   total_cpu_time_ms:     bug_numbers:       - 1736040@@ -7571,6 +7684,7 @@     keyed: true     notification_emails:       - [email protected]+    release_channel_collection: opt-out     products:       - 'firefox'       - 'fennec'

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily additions of new telemetry metrics and modifications to existing ones. Here's the structured analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File: toolkit/components/telemetry/Scalars.yaml] [Lines: Various]
   [Old Code: N/A]
   [Fixed Code: N/A]

The changes include:
- Addition of new telemetry metrics (mirror_for_uri_count, mirror_for_active_ticks, toggle_enabled, suppress_prompts, cpu_time_per_process_type_ms, gpu_time_per_process_type_ms)
- Modification of existing metrics (profile_selection_reason expiration changed from "99" to "never")
- Removal of wmf_process_usage metric
- Updates to notification emails and bug numbers

These changes appear to be feature additions and telemetry improvements rather than security fixes. The modifications focus on expanding data collection capabilities and updating existing metrics rather than addressing security vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.