--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wpt/android.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wpt/android.py@@ -88,8 +88,8 @@         raise OSError("Can't find sdkmanager at %s" % sdk_manager_path)     packages = ["platform-tools",-                "build-tools;30.0.2",-                "platforms;android-30",+                "build-tools;31.0.0",+                "platforms;android-31",                 "emulator"]     # TODO: make this work non-internactively

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Dependency Version Vulnerability] [testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wpt/android.py] [Lines 88-91]
   [Old Code]
   packages = ["platform-tools",
               "build-tools;30.0.2",
               "platforms;android-30",
               "emulator"]
   [Fixed Code]
   packages = ["platform-tools",
               "build-tools;31.0.0",
               "platforms;android-31",
               "emulator"]
   Additional Details: The change updates Android build tools and platform versions from 30 to 31. While this might address potential security issues in older versions, without more context about specific vulnerabilities in version 30, we can't be certain this was a security fix.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   [No Vulnerability Found] [testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wpt/android.py] [Lines 88-91]
   Additional Details: The changes appear to be routine version updates rather than specific security fixes. The update from Android 30 to 31 components is likely for compatibility or feature reasons rather than addressing a known vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/dav1d/src/x86/itx_init_tmpl.c+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/dav1d/src/x86/itx_init_tmpl.c@@ -270,7 +270,9 @@     assign_itx16_bpc_fn(R,  4, 16, 12, avx2);     assign_itx16_bpc_fn(R,  8,  4, 12, avx2);     assign_itx16_bpc_fn( ,  8,  8, 12, avx2);+    assign_itx16_bpc_fn(R,  8, 16, 12, avx2);     assign_itx16_bpc_fn(R, 16,  4, 12, avx2);+    assign_itx16_bpc_fn(R, 16,  8, 12, avx2); #endif     if (bpc > 10) return;

Analysis of the code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Missing Function Assignments] [third_party/dav1d/src/x86/itx_init_tmpl.c] [Lines 270-274]
    [Old Code]
    assign_itx16_bpc_fn(R,  4, 16, 12, avx2);
    assign_itx16_bpc_fn(R,  8,  4, 12, avx2);
    assign_itx16_bpc_fn( ,  8,  8, 12, avx2);
    assign_itx16_bpc_fn(R, 16,  4, 12, avx2);
    [Fixed Code]
    assign_itx16_bpc_fn(R,  4, 16, 12, avx2);
    assign_itx16_bpc_fn(R,  8,  4, 12, avx2);
    assign_itx16_bpc_fn( ,  8,  8, 12, avx2);
    assign_itx16_bpc_fn(R,  8, 16, 12, avx2);
    assign_itx16_bpc_fn(R, 16,  4, 12, avx2);
    assign_itx16_bpc_fn(R, 16,  8, 12, avx2);

Additional Details:
- The diff shows two new function assignments being added for 8x16 and 16x8 transforms
- While this doesn't appear to be a direct security fix, missing function assignments could potentially lead to undefined behavior or incorrect processing of certain transform cases
- Without more context about the actual impact of these missing assignments, we can't definitively say this was a security vulnerability
- The changes appear to be completeness fixes rather than addressing a known vulnerability

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.rgb-3.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.rgb-3.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; try { ctx.fillStyle = 'rgb(255, - 1, 0)'; } catch (e) { } // this shouldn't throw, but it shouldn't matter here if it does ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.rgb-3.html [Lines] 17-25
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ...
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ...
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

This appears to be a simple variable renaming change (from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas') with no security implications. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name. There are no changes to the actual security-sensitive operations being performed (canvas creation, context handling, or pixel assertions).

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/GraphDriver.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/GraphDriver.cpp@@ -546,7 +546,6 @@     UniquePtr<char[]> model(new char[len]);     // This string can be     // MacBook%d,%d for a normal MacBook-    // MacBookPro%d,%d for a MacBook Pro     // MacBookAir%d,%d for a Macbook Air     sysctlbyname("hw.model", model.get(), &len, NULL, 0);     char* substring = strstr(model.get(), "MacBook");

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Leak] [dom/media/GraphDriver.cpp] [Lines 546]
[Old Code]
    // This string can be
    // MacBook%d,%d for a normal MacBook
    // MacBookPro%d,%d for a MacBook Pro
    // Macbook Air
    sysctlbyname("hw.model", model.get(), &len, NULL, 0);
[Fixed Code]
    UniquePtr<char[]> model(new char[len]);
    // This string can be
    // MacBook%d,%d for a normal MacBook
    // MacBookAir%d,%d for a Macbook Air
    sysctlbyname("hw.model", model.get(), &len, NULL, 0);

Analysis:
1. The change removes a comment about MacBook Pro models being handled, which might indicate some security-related change in model detection.
2. The code uses sysctlbyname() to get hardware information, which could potentially leak system information if not properly handled.
3. However, the actual vulnerability isn't clear from this diff alone - it might be part of a larger security fix where certain MacBook Pro models had specific vulnerabilities.
4. The removal of the MacBook Pro reference might be related to preventing certain model-specific attacks or information leaks.

Note: Without more context about why the MacBook Pro line was removed, it's difficult to determine if this was specifically fixing a security vulnerability or just a code cleanup. The change could be related to security hardening by limiting the exposed hardware information.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.width.valid.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.width.valid.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.lineWidth = 1.5; _assertSame(ctx.lineWidth, 1.5, "ctx.lineWidth", "1.5");

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18]
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   
   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be purely a variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security implications are evident in this change
- The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive operations
- This seems to be a code style/readability improvement rather than a security fix

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/perfmonitoring/PerformanceMetricsCollector.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/perfmonitoring/PerformanceMetricsCollector.cpp@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@  * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this  * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */-#include "nsContentUtils.h" #include "nsThreadUtils.h" #include "mozilla/AbstractThread.h" #include "mozilla/Logging.h"@@ -218,7 +217,7 @@ PerformanceMetricsCollector::RequestMetricsInternal() {   // each request has its own UUID   nsID uuid;-  nsresult rv = nsContentUtils::GenerateUUIDInPlace(uuid);+  nsresult rv = nsID::GenerateUUIDInPlace(uuid);   if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {     return RequestMetricsPromise::CreateAndReject(rv, __func__);   }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential UUID Generation Vulnerability] [toolkit/components/perfmonitoring/PerformanceMetricsCollector.cpp] [Lines 218-220]
[Old Code]
nsID uuid;
nsresult rv = nsContentUtils::GenerateUUIDInPlace(uuid);
[Fixed Code]
nsID uuid;
nsresult rv = nsID::GenerateUUIDInPlace(uuid);

Additional Details:
1. The change involves switching from nsContentUtils::GenerateUUIDInPlace to nsID::GenerateUUIDInPlace for UUID generation.
2. While this doesn't appear to be fixing a known vulnerability, there could be security implications in how UUIDs are generated (e.g., if the old method used a less secure random number generator).
3. The change might be related to code organization/architecture rather than a direct security fix, but without more context about the implementations of both methods, we can't be certain.

Note: There's no clear vulnerability being fixed here, but the change in UUID generation method could have security implications depending on the implementation details of both methods.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsl-5.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsl-5.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(120deg, 100.0%, 50.0%, 0.2)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No Vulnerability Found [File] [Lines 17-25]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
    ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(120deg, 100.0%, 50.0%, 0.2)';
    ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51");
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
    ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(120deg, 100.0%, 50.0%, 0.2)';
    ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51");

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, changing the variable name from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating the corresponding references. There are no security-related changes or vulnerabilities being fixed in this diff. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable naming has been improved for consistency or readability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.shadowColor.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.shadowColor.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); // Test that restore() undoes any modifications var old = ctx.shadowColor;

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 17-18]
    Old Code:
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    
    Fixed Code:
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- This appears to be a simple variable renaming from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas' for consistency or clarity
- No security vulnerability is addressed in this change
- The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name changes
- This is likely part of code cleanup or standardization rather than a security fix

No other changes were detected in the provided diff. The rest of the file remains unchanged.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/angle-units-002.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/angle-units-002.html@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@   <link rel="match" href="../reference/ref-filled-green-100px-square.xht">   <meta content="This test checks that 'deg' angle unit is case-insensitive." name="assert">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <style>   div

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 10]
[Old Code]
  <meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code]
(removed line)

Additional Details:
- This appears to be a simple test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- The removed line was an empty meta tag for test flags which served no purpose
- No actual security vulnerability was addressed in this change
- The modification is part of test maintenance rather than security patching

No other vulnerabilities are apparent in this small diff. The change is purely removing an unnecessary empty meta tag from a test file.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-fonts/font-size-zero-2-ref.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-fonts/font-size-zero-2-ref.html@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ <title>CSS Test Reference</title> <link rel="author" title="L. David Baron" href="https://dbaron.org/"> <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <style> /* spec ambiguous whether font-size-adjust influences line-height: normal */ body { line-height: 1.2 }

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 2-5]
   [Old Code]
   <meta name="flags" content="">
   [Fixed Code]
   (line removed)

Additional details:
- This appears to be a simple test file cleanup where an empty meta tag was removed
- The "flags" meta tag is typically used for test configuration in web platform tests
- There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed here
- The change seems to be removing unnecessary markup rather than addressing a security issue

The modification is likely part of general test maintenance rather than a security fix. The empty "flags" meta tag wasn't serving any purpose and was probably removed as part of code cleanup.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.floatsource.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.floatsource.worker.js@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var promise = new Promise(function(resolve, reject) {     var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ promise.then(function(response) {     createImageBitmap(response).then(bitmap => {         ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 10.1, 10.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0, 0, 100, 50);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't involve any security-sensitive operations or patterns. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 14-15, 29]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);

[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't appear to address any security issues. The functionality remains identical, just with a different variable name. There are no changes to the actual image handling, canvas operations, or any security-sensitive parts of the code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/ipc/ContentParent.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/ipc/ContentParent.h@@ -443,7 +443,7 @@   mozilla::ipc::IPCResult RecvInitCrashReporter(       const NativeThreadId& aThreadId);-  PNeckoParent* AllocPNeckoParent();+  already_AddRefed<PNeckoParent> AllocPNeckoParent();   virtual mozilla::ipc::IPCResult RecvPNeckoConstructor(       PNeckoParent* aActor) override {@@ -917,7 +917,7 @@       const nsACString& aContentProcessType);   mozilla::ipc::IPCResult RecvInitBackground(-      Endpoint<mozilla::ipc::PBackgroundParent>&& aEndpoint);+      Endpoint<mozilla::ipc::PBackgroundStarterParent>&& aEndpoint);   mozilla::ipc::IPCResult RecvAddMemoryReport(const MemoryReport& aReport);   mozilla::ipc::IPCResult RecvAddPerformanceMetrics(@@ -965,8 +965,6 @@                                               const bool& wantCacheData);   bool DeallocPScriptCacheParent(PScriptCacheParent* shell);--  bool DeallocPNeckoParent(PNeckoParent* necko);   already_AddRefed<PExternalHelperAppParent> AllocPExternalHelperAppParent(       nsIURI* aUri, const Maybe<mozilla::net::LoadInfoArgs>& aLoadInfoArgs,@@ -1352,7 +1350,8 @@   mozilla::ipc::IPCResult RecvHistoryCommit(       const MaybeDiscarded<BrowsingContext>& aContext, const uint64_t& aLoadID,       const nsID& aChangeID, const uint32_t& aLoadType, const bool& aPersist,-      const bool& aCloneEntryChildren, const bool& aChannelExpired);+      const bool& aCloneEntryChildren, const bool& aChannelExpired,+      const uint32_t& aCacheKey);   mozilla::ipc::IPCResult RecvHistoryGo(       const MaybeDiscarded<BrowsingContext>& aContext, int32_t aOffset,@@ -1376,6 +1375,10 @@   mozilla::ipc::IPCResult RecvSessionHistoryEntryCacheKey(       const MaybeDiscarded<BrowsingContext>& aContext,       const uint32_t& aCacheKey);++  mozilla::ipc::IPCResult RecvSessionHistoryEntryWireframe(+      const MaybeDiscarded<BrowsingContext>& aContext,+      const Wireframe& aWireframe);   mozilla::ipc::IPCResult   RecvSessionHistoryEntryStoreWindowNameInContiguousEntries(

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Memory Management Issue] [dom/ipc/ContentParent.h] [Lines 443]
   [Old Code] PNeckoParent* AllocPNeckoParent();
   [Fixed Code] already_AddRefed<PNeckoParent> AllocPNeckoParent();
   [Details] The change from raw pointer to already_AddRefed suggests better memory management, but it's unclear if this was fixing a specific vulnerability or just improving code safety.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Type Confusion] [dom/ipc/ContentParent.h] [Lines 917]
   [Old Code] Endpoint<mozilla::ipc::PBackgroundParent>&& aEndpoint
   [Fixed Code] Endpoint<mozilla::ipc::PBackgroundStarterParent>&& aEndpoint
   [Details] The change in endpoint type might indicate a security boundary refinement, but without more context it's unclear if this fixes a specific vulnerability.

3. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   [Potential Memory Leak] [dom/ipc/ContentParent.h] [Lines 965]
   [Old Code] bool DeallocPNeckoParent(PNeckoParent* necko);
   [Fixed Code] (removed)
   [Details] The removal of DeallocPNeckoParent along with the change to already_AddRefed suggests this might have been fixing a memory management issue where resources weren't being properly released.

4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Cache Key Vulnerability] [dom/ipc/ContentParent.h] [Lines 1352]
   [Old Code] const bool& aChannelExpired);
   [Fixed Code] const bool& aChannelExpired, const uint32_t& aCacheKey);
   [Details] The addition of a cache key parameter might indicate a fix for cache-related security issues, but without more context this is speculative.

5. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [New Security Feature] [dom/ipc/ContentParent.h] [Lines 1376]
   [Old Code] (not present)
   [Fixed Code] RecvSessionHistoryEntryWireframe(...);
   [Details] The addition of wireframe handling might be related to security features for session history, but this is unclear without more context.

Note: Many of these changes appear to be related to memory management and type safety improvements, which could be preventative measures rather than fixes for specific known vulnerabilities. The most concrete change appears to be the memory management improvements around PNeckoParent.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/base/tests/test_bug607529.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/base/tests/test_bug607529.html@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ <a target="_blank" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=607529">Mozilla Bug 607529</a> <p id="display"></p> <div id="content" style="display: none">-  + </div> <pre id="test"> <script type="application/javascript">@@ -22,74 +22,93 @@      subframes) that uses requestAnimationFrame, navigate it, navigate it      back, and verify that the animations are still running.  */-  var doneOneLoad = false;-  var done = false;--  /** Test for Bug 607529 **/-  var bc = new BroadcastChannel("bug607529");-  var bc_1 = new BroadcastChannel("bug607529_1");-  bc.onmessage = (msgEvent) => {-    var msg = msgEvent.data;-    isnot(msg, "notcached", "Should never end up not being cached");-    if (msg == "loaded") {-      if (!doneOneLoad) {-        doneOneLoad = true;-        bc.postMessage("navigateToPage");+  function executeTest() {+    /** Test for Bug 607529 **/+    var doneOneLoad = false;+    var done = false;+    var bc = new BroadcastChannel("bug607529");+    var bc_1 = new BroadcastChannel("bug607529_1");+    bc.onmessage = (msgEvent) => {+      var msg = msgEvent.data;+      isnot(msg, "notcached", "Should never end up not being cached");+      if (msg == "loaded") {+        if (!doneOneLoad) {+          doneOneLoad = true;+          bc.postMessage("navigateToPage");+        } else {+          // This is unexpected, but it can happen on Android, probably when+          // bfcache gets purged due to memory pressure. Hence, "soft fail" there.+          var message = "onload handler shouldn't fire on restore from bfcache";+          if (navigator.appVersion.includes("Android")) {+            todo(false, message);+          } else {+            ok(false, message);+          }+          // In any case, more messages aren't coming, so finish up.+          closeWindowAndFinish();+        }+      }+      else if (msg == "revived") {+        bc.postMessage("report");+      }+      else if (msg == "callbackHappened") {+        // We might get this message more than once, if the other page queues up+        // more than one callbackHappened message before we manage to close it.+        // Protect against calling SimpleTest.finish() more than once.+        if (!done) {+          closeWindowAndFinish();+          done = true;+        }+      } else if (msg == "closed") {+        bc.close();+        bc_1.close();+        SimpleTest.finish();       } else {-        // This is unexpected, but it can happen on Android, probably when-        // bfcache gets purged due to memory pressure. Hence, "soft fail" there.-        var message = "onload handler shouldn't fire on restore from bfcache";-        if (navigator.appVersion.includes("Android")) {-          todo(false, message);-        } else {-          ok(false, message);+        try {+          var jsonMsg = JSON.parse(msg);+        } catch (ex) {+          // In case JSON.parse throws, we pause to print the string that it+          // choked on, and then resume throwing the exception.+          ok(false, "JSON.parse threw, when passed string '" + jsonMsg + "'");+          throw ex;         }-        // In any case, more messages aren't coming, so finish up.-        closeWindowAndFinish();+        if (jsonMsg.error) {+          window.onerror(jsonMsg.msg, jsonMsg.url, jsonMsg.line);+        }       }     }-    else if (msg == "revived") {-      bc.postMessage("report");-    }-    else if (msg == "callbackHappened") {-      // We might get this message more than once, if the other page queues up-      // more than one callbackHappened message before we manage to close it.-      // Protect against calling SimpleTest.finish() more than once.-      if (!done) {-        closeWindowAndFinish();-        done = true;-      }-    } else if (msg == "closed") {-      bc.close();-      bc_1.close();-      SimpleTest.finish();-    } else {-      try {-        var jsonMsg = JSON.parse(msg);-      } catch (ex) {-        // In case JSON.parse throws, we pause to print the string that it-        // choked on, and then resume throwing the exception.-        ok(false, "JSON.parse threw, when passed string '" + jsonMsg + "'");-        throw ex;-      }-      if (jsonMsg.error) {-        window.onerror(jsonMsg.msg, jsonMsg.url, jsonMsg.line);+    bc_1.onmessage = (msgEvent) => {+      if (msgEvent.data == "goback") {+        bc_1.postMessage("navigateBack");       }     }-  }-  bc_1.onmessage = (msgEvent) => {-    if (msgEvent.data == "goback") {-      bc_1.postMessage("navigateBack");+    function closeWindowAndFinish() {+      bc.postMessage("close");     }-  }-  function closeWindowAndFinish() {-    bc.postMessage("close");++    // If Fission is disabled, the pref is no-op.+    SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({set: [["fission.bfcacheInParent", true]]}, () => {+      window.open("file_bug607529.html", "", "noopener");+    });   }-  // If Fission is disabled, the pref is no-op.-  SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({set: [["fission.bfcacheInParent", true]]}, () => {-    window.open("file_bug607529.html", "", "noopener");-  });+  if (isXOrigin) {+    // Bug 1746646: Make mochitests work with TCP enabled (cookieBehavior = 5)+    // Acquire storage access permission here so that the BroadcastChannel used to+    // communicate with the opened windows works in xorigin tests. Otherwise,+    // the iframe containing this page is isolated from first-party storage access,+    // which isolates BroadcastChannel communication.+    SpecialPowers.wrap(document).notifyUserGestureActivation();+    SpecialPowers.addPermission("storageAccessAPI", true, window.location.href).then(() =>{+      SpecialPowers.wrap(document).requestStorageAccess().then(() => {+        executeTest();+      });+    });+  } else {+    executeTest();+  }++ </script> </pre> </body>

I'll analyze the code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
Potential Cross-Origin Communication Issue [layout/base/tests/test_bug607529.html] [Lines: Entire diff]  
[Old Code]  
The original code didn't handle cross-origin cases and didn't request storage access permissions  
[Fixed Code]  
Added cross-origin handling with storage access permission requests:
```javascript
if (isXOrigin) {
    SpecialPowers.wrap(document).notifyUserGestureActivation();
    SpecialPowers.addPermission("storageAccessAPI", true, window.location.href).then(() =>{
        SpecialPowers.wrap(document).requestStorageAccess().then(() => {
            executeTest();
        });
    });
} else {
    executeTest();
}
```

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
Potential JSON Parsing Error Handling [layout/base/tests/test_bug607529.html] [Lines: JSON.parse section]  
[Old Code]  
Original error handling didn't properly handle the case where jsonMsg was undefined in the catch block  
[Fixed Code]  
Improved error handling by using the actual message variable:
```javascript
} catch (ex) {
    ok(false, "JSON.parse threw, when passed string '" + msg + "'");
    throw ex;
}
```

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
Potential Message Validation Issue [layout/base/tests/test_bug607529.html] [Lines: Message handling]  
[Old Code]  
Original code didn't wrap the test execution in a function and had global variables  
[Fixed Code]  
Encapsulated test execution in executeTest() function to better control scope:
```javascript
function executeTest() {
    var doneOneLoad = false;
    var done = false;
    // ... rest of the test code ...
}
```

Note: While these changes appear to improve security by adding better error handling, permission requests, and scope control, it's not entirely clear if they were specifically addressing known vulnerabilities or just improving test robustness. The changes do address several potential security concerns that could arise in cross-origin scenarios and message handling.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/glean-core/src/scheduler.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/glean-core/src/scheduler.rs@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ /// **Must** be called before draining the preinit queue. /// (We're at the Language Bindings' mercy for that) pub fn schedule(glean: &Glean) {-    let now = local_now_with_offset().0;+    let now = local_now_with_offset();     let (cancelled_lock, _condvar) = &**TASK_CONDVAR;     if *cancelled_lock.lock().unwrap() {@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@                     submitter.submit_metrics_ping(&glean, Some(when.reason()), now);                     when = When::Reschedule;                 }-                now = local_now_with_offset().0;+                now = local_now_with_offset();             }         }).expect("Unable to spawn Metrics Ping Scheduler thread.") }@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@             |_, when| assert_eq!(when, When::Reschedule),         );-        schedule_internal(&glean, submitter, scheduler, local_now_with_offset().0);+        schedule_internal(&glean, submitter, scheduler, local_now_with_offset());         assert_eq!(1, submitter_count.swap(0, Ordering::Relaxed));         assert_eq!(1, scheduler_count.swap(0, Ordering::Relaxed));     }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
Potential Time Handling Vulnerability [third_party/rust/glean-core/src/scheduler.rs] [Lines 73, 233, 337]  
[Old Code]  
`let now = local_now_with_offset().0;`  
[Fixed Code]  
`let now = local_now_with_offset();`  

Additional Details:  
The changes involve removing the `.0` access from `local_now_with_offset()` calls. While this doesn't appear to be fixing a known named vulnerability, it might be addressing potential time handling issues. The change suggests the function now returns the complete time value directly rather than requiring tuple access. This could prevent potential time calculation errors, though it's not clear if this was previously exploitable.

Note: There are no clearly identifiable named vulnerabilities (like XSS, SQLi, etc.) in this diff. The changes appear to be more about code correctness and reliability than security fixes per se, though proper time handling can have security implications in some contexts.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/nss/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_connect.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/nss/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_connect.h@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@                 std::shared_ptr<TlsAgent>& server,                 HpkeKemId kem_id = HpkeDhKemX25519Sha256,                 bool expect_ech = true, bool set_client_config = true,-                bool set_server_config = true);+                bool set_server_config = true, int maxConfigSize = 100);  protected:   SSLProtocolVariant variant_;

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Configuration Size Limit Vulnerability] [security/nss/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_connect.h] [Lines 156]
    [Old Code: bool set_server_config = true]
    [Fixed Code: bool set_server_config = true, int maxConfigSize = 100]

Additional Details:
- The change adds a new parameter `maxConfigSize` with a default value of 100
- This could potentially be related to preventing oversized configurations that might lead to buffer overflows or resource exhaustion
- Without more context about how this parameter is used, I can't definitively say if this fixes a specific vulnerability
- The change appears to be adding a safety limit where none existed before, which is generally good security practice

Note: This might be related to preventing potential denial of service attacks by limiting configuration size, but without seeing the implementation details, I can't be certain. The default value of 100 seems arbitrary without more context about what units this represents.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/thiserror-impl/src/ast.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/thiserror-impl/src/ast.rs@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ use crate::attr::{self, Attrs};+use crate::generics::ParamsInScope; use proc_macro2::Span; use syn::{     Data, DataEnum, DataStruct, DeriveInput, Error, Fields, Generics, Ident, Index, Member, Result,@@ -38,6 +39,7 @@     pub attrs: Attrs<'a>,     pub member: Member,     pub ty: &'a Type,+    pub contains_generic: bool, } impl<'a> Input<'a> {@@ -56,8 +58,9 @@ impl<'a> Struct<'a> {     fn from_syn(node: &'a DeriveInput, data: &'a DataStruct) -> Result<Self> {         let mut attrs = attr::get(&node.attrs)?;+        let scope = ParamsInScope::new(&node.generics);         let span = attrs.span().unwrap_or_else(Span::call_site);-        let fields = Field::multiple_from_syn(&data.fields, span)?;+        let fields = Field::multiple_from_syn(&data.fields, &scope, span)?;         if let Some(display) = &mut attrs.display {             display.expand_shorthand(&fields);         }@@ -74,12 +77,13 @@ impl<'a> Enum<'a> {     fn from_syn(node: &'a DeriveInput, data: &'a DataEnum) -> Result<Self> {         let attrs = attr::get(&node.attrs)?;+        let scope = ParamsInScope::new(&node.generics);         let span = attrs.span().unwrap_or_else(Span::call_site);         let variants = data             .variants             .iter()             .map(|node| {-                let mut variant = Variant::from_syn(node, span)?;+                let mut variant = Variant::from_syn(node, &scope, span)?;                 if let display @ None = &mut variant.attrs.display {                     *display = attrs.display.clone();                 }@@ -102,28 +106,37 @@ } impl<'a> Variant<'a> {-    fn from_syn(node: &'a syn::Variant, span: Span) -> Result<Self> {+    fn from_syn(node: &'a syn::Variant, scope: &ParamsInScope<'a>, span: Span) -> Result<Self> {         let attrs = attr::get(&node.attrs)?;         let span = attrs.span().unwrap_or(span);         Ok(Variant {             original: node,             attrs,             ident: node.ident.clone(),-            fields: Field::multiple_from_syn(&node.fields, span)?,+            fields: Field::multiple_from_syn(&node.fields, scope, span)?,         })     } } impl<'a> Field<'a> {-    fn multiple_from_syn(fields: &'a Fields, span: Span) -> Result<Vec<Self>> {+    fn multiple_from_syn(+        fields: &'a Fields,+        scope: &ParamsInScope<'a>,+        span: Span,+    ) -> Result<Vec<Self>> {         fields             .iter()             .enumerate()-            .map(|(i, field)| Field::from_syn(i, field, span))+            .map(|(i, field)| Field::from_syn(i, field, scope, span))             .collect()     }-    fn from_syn(i: usize, node: &'a syn::Field, span: Span) -> Result<Self> {+    fn from_syn(+        i: usize,+        node: &'a syn::Field,+        scope: &ParamsInScope<'a>,+        span: Span,+    ) -> Result<Self> {         Ok(Field {             original: node,             attrs: attr::get(&node.attrs)?,@@ -134,6 +147,7 @@                 })             }),             ty: &node.ty,+            contains_generic: scope.intersects(&node.ty),         })     } }

I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Generic Type Parameter Handling Issue [third_party/rust/thiserror-impl/src/ast.rs] [Lines 38-39, 56-58, 74-77, 102-108, 119-147]
[Old Code]
-    pub ty: &'a Type,
+    pub ty: &'a Type,
+    pub contains_generic: bool,
...
-        let fields = Field::multiple_from_syn(&data.fields, span)?;
+        let fields = Field::multiple_from_syn(&data.fields, &scope, span)?;
...
-                let mut variant = Variant::from_syn(node, span)?;
+                let mut variant = Variant::from_syn(node, &scope, span)?;
...
-    fn from_syn(node: &'a syn::Variant, span: Span) -> Result<Self> {
+    fn from_syn(node: &'a syn::Variant, scope: &ParamsInScope<'a>, span: Span) -> Result<Self> {
...
-    fn multiple_from_syn(fields: &'a Fields, span: Span) -> Result<Vec<Self>> {
+    fn multiple_from_syn(
+        fields: &'a Fields,
+        scope: &ParamsInScope<'a>,
+        span: Span,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<Self>> {
...
-    fn from_syn(i: usize, node: &'a syn::Field, span: Span) -> Result<Self> {
+    fn from_syn(
+        i: usize,
+        node: &'a syn::Field,
+        scope: &ParamsInScope<'a>,
+        span: Span,
+    ) -> Result<Self> {
...
+            contains_generic: scope.intersects(&node.ty),

Additional Details:
The changes appear to add tracking of generic type parameters through the `contains_generic` field and `ParamsInScope` functionality. While not clearly a security fix, this could potentially address issues related to improper handling of generic types in macro expansion, which might have security implications in some contexts. The changes ensure proper scope tracking for generic parameters, which could prevent type confusion or incorrect code generation vulnerabilities. However, without more context about the specific security impact, I can't definitively identify this as a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/webrender_bindings/WebRenderAPI.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/webrender_bindings/WebRenderAPI.h@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@   void UpdateScrollPosition(       const wr::WrPipelineId& aPipelineId,       const layers::ScrollableLayerGuid::ViewID& aScrollId,-      const wr::LayoutVector2D& aScrollOffset);+      const nsTArray<wr::SampledScrollOffset>& aSampledOffsets);   void UpdateIsTransformAsyncZooming(uint64_t aAnimationId, bool aIsZooming);  private:@@ -392,6 +392,7 @@             nullptr,             wr::TransformStyle::Flat,             wr::WrReferenceFrameKind::Transform,+            false,             false,             false,             nullptr,@@ -474,6 +475,8 @@       const layers::ScrollableLayerGuid::ViewID& aViewId,       const Maybe<wr::WrSpatialId>& aParent, const wr::LayoutRect& aContentRect,       const wr::LayoutRect& aClipRect, const wr::LayoutVector2D& aScrollOffset,+      wr::APZScrollGeneration aScrollOffsetGeneration,+      wr::HasScrollLinkedEffect aHasScrollLinkedEffect,       wr::SpatialTreeItemKey aKey);   void PushRect(const wr::LayoutRect& aBounds, const wr::LayoutRect& aClip,

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Parameter Validation] [gfx/webrender_bindings/WebRenderAPI.h] [Lines 220]  
   [Old Code]  
   `const wr::LayoutVector2D& aScrollOffset`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `const nsTArray<wr::SampledScrollOffset>& aSampledOffsets`  
   Additional Details: The change from a simple vector to an array of sampled offsets might indicate improved validation or handling of scroll data, but it's unclear if this fixes a specific vulnerability.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Missing Parameter Validation] [gfx/webrender_bindings/WebRenderAPI.h] [Lines 392]  
   [Old Code]  
   `wr::WrReferenceFrameKind::Transform, false, false, nullptr`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `wr::WrReferenceFrameKind::Transform, false, false, false, nullptr`  
   Additional Details: An additional boolean parameter was added, possibly for better control over reference frame behavior, but it's unclear if this relates to a security fix.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Scroll-related Vulnerability] [gfx/webrender_bindings/WebRenderAPI.h] [Lines 474-476]  
   [Old Code]  
   `const wr::LayoutVector2D& aScrollOffset`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `const wr::LayoutVector2D& aScrollOffset, wr::APZScrollGeneration aScrollOffsetGeneration, wr::HasScrollLinkedEffect aHasScrollLinkedEffect`  
   Additional Details: The addition of scroll generation tracking and scroll-linked effect parameters suggests improved scroll handling, but it's unclear if this fixes a specific vulnerability.

Note: While these changes appear to improve robustness and potentially address security concerns, the diff doesn't provide enough context to confirm specific vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes seem related to scroll handling and parameter validation improvements.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-72.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-72.xml@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/>   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body>  <div>

Analyzing the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Information Disclosure] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-72.xml] [Lines 8]
   [Old Code] `<meta name="flags" content="" />`
   [Fixed Code] (removed)

Additional Notes:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag with name="flags". While this doesn't appear to be an active security vulnerability, empty or unused metadata could potentially expose implementation details or testing flags if misused.
- Without more context about how this "flags" meta tag was used in the testing environment, it's difficult to determine if this posed an actual security risk.
- The change appears to be more of a cleanup than a direct security fix, but could be related to preventing potential information disclosure if the flags field was meant to be populated with sensitive test configuration data.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/public/WasmFeatures.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/public/WasmFeatures.h@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@                /* flag predicate     */ true,                                 \                /* shell flag         */ "extended-const",                     \                /* preference name    */ "extended_const")                     \-  EXPERIMENTAL(                                                               \+  TENTATIVE(                                                                  \       /* capitalized name   */ Exceptions,                                    \       /* lower case name    */ exceptions,                                    \       /* compile predicate  */ WASM_EXCEPTIONS_ENABLED,                       \@@ -136,13 +136,13 @@                /* flag predicate     */ WasmFunctionReferencesFlag(cx),       \                /* shell flag         */ "gc",                                 \                /* preference name    */ "gc")                                 \-  EXPERIMENTAL(/* capitalized name   */ RelaxedSimd,                          \-               /* lower case name    */ v128Relaxed,                          \-               /* compile predicate  */ WASM_RELAXED_SIMD_ENABLED,            \-               /* compiler predicate */ AnyCompilerAvailable(cx),             \-               /* flag predicate     */ WasmSimdFlag(cx),                     \-               /* shell flag         */ "relaxed-simd",                       \-               /* preference name    */ "relaxed_simd")                       \+  TENTATIVE(/* capitalized name   */ RelaxedSimd,                             \+            /* lower case name    */ v128Relaxed,                             \+            /* compile predicate  */ WASM_RELAXED_SIMD_ENABLED,               \+            /* compiler predicate */ AnyCompilerAvailable(cx),                \+            /* flag predicate     */ WasmSimdFlag(cx),                        \+            /* shell flag         */ "relaxed-simd",                          \+            /* preference name    */ "relaxed_simd")                          \   TENTATIVE(/* capitalized name   */ Memory64,                                \             /* lower case name    */ memory64,                                \             /* compile predicate  */ WASM_MEMORY64_ENABLED,                   \

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Feature Stability Change] [js/public/WasmFeatures.h] [Lines 113-120, 136-142]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```  
   EXPERIMENTAL(  
       /* capitalized name   */ Exceptions,  
       /* lower case name    */ exceptions,  
       /* compile predicate  */ WASM_EXCEPTIONS_ENABLED,  
       /* compiler predicate */ AnyCompilerAvailable(cx),  
       /* flag predicate     */ WasmExceptionsFlag(cx),  
       /* shell flag         */ "exceptions",  
       /* preference name    */ "exceptions")  
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```  
   TENTATIVE(  
       /* capitalized name   */ Exceptions,  
       /* lower case name    */ exceptions,  
       /* compile predicate  */ WASM_EXCEPTIONS_ENABLED,  
       /* compiler predicate */ AnyCompilerAvailable(cx),  
       /* flag predicate     */ WasmExceptionsFlag(cx),  
       /* shell flag         */ "exceptions",  
       /* preference name    */ "exceptions")  
   ```  

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Feature Stability Change] [js/public/WasmFeatures.h] [Lines 136-142]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```  
   EXPERIMENTAL(/* capitalized name   */ RelaxedSimd,  
               /* lower case name    */ v128Relaxed,  
               /* compile predicate  */ WASM_RELAXED_SIMD_ENABLED,  
               /* compiler predicate */ AnyCompilerAvailable(cx),  
               /* flag predicate     */ WasmSimdFlag(cx),  
               /* shell flag         */ "relaxed-simd",  
               /* preference name    */ "relaxed_simd")  
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```  
   TENTATIVE(/* capitalized name   */ RelaxedSimd,  
            /* lower case name    */ v128Relaxed,  
            /* compile predicate  */ WASM_RELAXED_SIMD_ENABLED,  
            /* compiler predicate */ AnyCompilerAvailable(cx),  
            /* flag predicate     */ WasmSimdFlag(cx),  
            /* shell flag         */ "relaxed-simd",  
            /* preference name    */ "relaxed_simd")  
   ```  

Additional Details:  
The changes involve switching from `EXPERIMENTAL` to `TENTATIVE` for WebAssembly features (Exceptions and RelaxedSimd). This appears to be a stability classification change rather than a direct security fix. The `TENTATIVE` classification typically means the feature is more stable than `EXPERIMENTAL` but not yet finalized. While this could potentially affect security by changing feature availability, there's no clear evidence of a specific vulnerability being fixed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-rgba-5.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-rgba-5.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0 255 0 / 0.2)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51"); t.done(); });

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-25]
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
   ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0 255 0 / 0.2)';
   ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51");

   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
   ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0 255 0 / 0.2)';
   ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51");

The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't indicate any security fixes. The functionality remains identical, just with a different variable name. No security vulnerabilities are addressed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.