--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.measure.width.space.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.measure.width.space.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var f = new FontFace("CanvasTest", "url('/fonts/CanvasTest.ttf')"); let fonts = (self.fonts ? self.fonts : document.fonts);

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14]
    Old Code:
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');

    Fixed Code:
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- The changes appear to be purely variable naming changes (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`)
- No security-related changes or vulnerability fixes are evident in this diff
- The modification seems to be for code consistency or readability rather than security
- The functionality remains identical between the old and new versions

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/layers/ipc/VideoBridgeChild.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/layers/ipc/VideoBridgeChild.cpp@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ PTextureChild* VideoBridgeChild::CreateTexture(     const SurfaceDescriptor& aSharedData, ReadLockDescriptor&& aReadLock,     LayersBackend aLayersBackend, TextureFlags aFlags, uint64_t aSerial,-    wr::MaybeExternalImageId& aExternalImageId, nsISerialEventTarget* aTarget) {+    wr::MaybeExternalImageId& aExternalImageId) {   MOZ_ASSERT(CanSend());   return SendPTextureConstructor(aSharedData, std::move(aReadLock),                                  aLayersBackend, aFlags, aSerial);

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Parameter Removal Vulnerability] [gfx/layers/ipc/VideoBridgeChild.cpp] [Lines 166-168]
[Old Code]
PTextureChild* VideoBridgeChild::CreateTexture(
    const SurfaceDescriptor& aSharedData, ReadLockDescriptor&& aReadLock,
    LayersBackend aLayersBackend, TextureFlags aFlags, uint64_t aSerial,
    wr::MaybeExternalImageId& aExternalImageId, nsISerialEventTarget* aTarget) {
[Fixed Code]
PTextureChild* VideoBridgeChild::CreateTexture(
    const SurfaceDescriptor& aSharedData, ReadLockDescriptor&& aReadLock,
    LayersBackend aLayersBackend, TextureFlags aFlags, uint64_t aSerial,
    wr::MaybeExternalImageId& aExternalImageId) {

Additional Details:
- The change removes the `nsISerialEventTarget* aTarget` parameter from the function signature
- Without more context about how this parameter was used, it's difficult to determine if this was a security fix
- The removal could be related to thread safety improvements or removing unused parameters, but we can't confirm a specific vulnerability from this diff alone
- The function appears to be related to texture creation in Firefox's graphics layer IPC system

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/python/mozversioncontrol/test/test_context_manager.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/python/mozversioncontrol/test/test_context_manager.py@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@     is_git = repo.vcs == "git"     cmd = ["show", "--no-patch"] if is_git else ["tip"]-    vcs = get_repository_object(repo.strpath)+    vcs = get_repository_object(repo.dir)     output_subprocess = vcs._run(*cmd)     assert is_git or vcs._client.server is None     assert "Initial commit" in output_subprocess

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Path Traversal Vulnerability [python/mozversioncontrol/test/test_context_manager.py] [Lines 13]
[Old Code]
vcs = get_repository_object(repo.strpath)
[Fixed Code]
vcs = get_repository_object(repo.dir)

Additional Details:
The change involves switching from using `repo.strpath` to `repo.dir` when getting a repository object. While this might be related to path handling, I can't determine with certainty if there was an actual security vulnerability here. The change could be related to:
1. Preventing potential path traversal if `strpath` included user-controlled input (but this appears to be test code)
2. Switching to a more standardized path representation
3. General code improvement rather than a security fix

Without more context about how these paths are constructed and used, I can't definitively say this was a security fix, though it might relate to path handling safety.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-width-table-fixed-1-ref.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-width-table-fixed-1-ref.html@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ <head>   <title>CSS Reference: width: calc() on table-layout: auto tables</title>   <link rel="author" title="L. David Baron" href="https://dbaron.org/">-  <meta name="flags" content=""> <style type="text/css"> table { table-layout: fixed; width: 500px; border-spacing: 0 } </style>

Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no  
[No specific vulnerability] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-width-table-fixed-1-ref.html] [Lines 3-6]  
[Old Code]  
`<meta name="flags" content="">`  
[Fixed Code]  
[Removed line]  

Additional Details:  
The change simply removes an empty meta tag that wasn't serving any apparent purpose. This appears to be a cleanup change rather than a security fix. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being addressed here. The "flags" meta tag is typically used for test configuration in web platform tests, and its removal doesn't suggest any security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.newsubpath.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.newsubpath.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ ctx.lineTo(-50, 25); ctx.rect(200, 25, 1, 1); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where a variable name was changed from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability purposes. Here's the structured response:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.newsubpath.worker.js] [Lines 13-25]
    [Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, ...)]
    [Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(canvas, ...)]

The changes don't affect security in any way - they're just variable renaming and don't modify any security-relevant behavior or functionality. The canvas operations and assertions remain the same, just using a differently named variable.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.font.parse.invalid.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.font.parse.invalid.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.font = '20px serif'; _assertSame(ctx.font, '20px serif', "ctx.font", "'20px serif'");

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.font.parse.invalid.worker.js] [Lines 13-14]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be a simple variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security-related changes are evident in this diff
- The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive operations or introduce/remove any security controls
- This seems to be a code style or consistency improvement rather than a security fix

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.hex6.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.hex6.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = '#00fF00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-related modifications. Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-25]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
    ctx.fillStyle = '#00fF00';
    ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
    ctx.fillStyle = '#00fF00';
    ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are:
1. Renamed variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Updated the variable name in the `_assertPixel` call
These changes don't address any security issues but rather improve code consistency or readability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/glean/tests/xpcshell/test_GIFFT.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/glean/tests/xpcshell/test_GIFFT.js@@ -20,11 +20,13 @@ } function scalarValue(aScalarName) {-  return Telemetry.getSnapshotForScalars().parent[aScalarName];+  let snapshot = Telemetry.getSnapshotForScalars();+  return "parent" in snapshot ? snapshot.parent[aScalarName] : undefined; } function keyedScalarValue(aScalarName) {-  return Telemetry.getSnapshotForKeyedScalars().parent[aScalarName];+  let snapshot = Telemetry.getSnapshotForKeyedScalars();+  return "parent" in snapshot ? snapshot.parent[aScalarName] : undefined; } add_task(function test_setup() {@@ -233,7 +235,8 @@   );   Glean.testOnlyIpc.aLabeledCounter.a_label.add(1);   Glean.testOnlyIpc.aLabeledCounter.another_label.add(2);-  Assert.equal(1, Glean.testOnlyIpc.aLabeledCounter.a_label.testGetValue());+  Glean.testOnlyIpc.aLabeledCounter.a_label.add(3);+  Assert.equal(4, Glean.testOnlyIpc.aLabeledCounter.a_label.testGetValue());   Assert.equal(     2,     Glean.testOnlyIpc.aLabeledCounter.another_label.testGetValue()@@ -253,7 +256,7 @@   let value = keyedScalarValue("telemetry.test.keyed_unsigned_int");   Assert.deepEqual(     {-      a_label: 1,+      a_label: 4,       another_label: 2,       InvalidLabel: 3,     },@@ -344,3 +347,113 @@     keyedScalarValue("telemetry.test.mirror_for_rate")   ); });++add_task(+  {+    // bug 1670259 to see if we can implement `testResetFOG` on Android.+    skip_if: () => AppConstants.platform == "android",+  },+  function test_gifft_numeric_limits() {+    // Glean and Telemetry don't share the same storage sizes or signedness.+    // Check the edges.++    // 0) Reset everything+    Services.fog.testResetFOG();+    Services.telemetry.getSnapshotForHistograms("main", true /* aClearStore */);+    Services.telemetry.getSnapshotForScalars("main", true /* aClearStore */);+    Services.telemetry.getSnapshotForKeyedScalars(+      "main",+      true /* aClearStore */+    );++    // 1) Counter: i32 (saturates), mirrored to uint Scalar: u32 (overflows)+    // 1.1) Negative parameters refused.+    Glean.testOnlyIpc.aCounter.add(-20);+    // Unfortunately we can't check what the error was, due to API design.+    // (chutten blames chutten for his shortsightedness)+    Assert.throws(+      () => Glean.testOnlyIpc.aCounter.testGetValue(),+      /NS_ERROR_LOSS_OF_SIGNIFICANT_DATA/,+      "Can't get the value when you're error'd"+    );+    Assert.equal(undefined, scalarValue("telemetry.test.unsigned_int_kind"));+    // Clear the error state+    Services.fog.testResetFOG();++    // 1.2) Values that sum larger than u32::max saturate (counter) and overflow (Scalar)+    // Sums to 2^32 + 1+    Glean.testOnlyIpc.aCounter.add(Math.pow(2, 31) - 1);+    Glean.testOnlyIpc.aCounter.add(1);+    Glean.testOnlyIpc.aCounter.add(Math.pow(2, 31) - 1);+    Glean.testOnlyIpc.aCounter.add(2);+    // Glean doesn't actually throw on saturation (bug 1751469),+    // so we can just check the saturation value.+    Assert.equal(+      Math.pow(2, 31) - 1,+      Glean.testOnlyIpc.aCounter.testGetValue()+    );+    // Telemetry will have wrapped around to 1+    Assert.equal(1, scalarValue("telemetry.test.unsigned_int_kind"));++    // 2) Quantity: i64 (saturates), mirrored to uint Scalar: u32 (overflows)+    // 2.1) Negative parameters refused.+    Glean.testOnly.meaningOfLife.set(-42);+    // Glean will error on this.+    Assert.throws(+      () => Glean.testOnly.meaningOfLife.testGetValue(),+      /NS_ERROR_LOSS_OF_SIGNIFICANT_DATA/,+      "Can't get the value when you're error'd"+    );+    // GIFFT doesn't tell Telemetry about the weird value at all.+    Assert.equal(undefined, scalarValue("telemetry.test.mirror_for_quantity"));+    // Clear the error state+    Services.fog.testResetFOG();++    // 2.2) A parameter larger than u32::max is passed to Glean unchanged,+    //      but is clamped to u32::max before being passed to Telemetry.+    Glean.testOnly.meaningOfLife.set(Math.pow(2, 32));+    Assert.equal(Math.pow(2, 32), Glean.testOnly.meaningOfLife.testGetValue());+    Assert.equal(+      Math.pow(2, 32) - 1,+      scalarValue("telemetry.test.mirror_for_quantity")+    );++    // 3) Rate: two i32 (saturates), mirrored to keyed uint Scalar: u32s (overflow)+    // 3.1) Negative parameters refused.+    Glean.testOnlyIpc.irate.addToNumerator(-22);+    Glean.testOnlyIpc.irate.addToDenominator(7);+    Assert.throws(+      () => Glean.testOnlyIpc.irate.testGetValue(),+      /NS_ERROR_LOSS_OF_SIGNIFICANT_DATA/,+      "Can't get the value when you're error'd"+    );+    Assert.deepEqual(+      { denominator: 7 },+      keyedScalarValue("telemetry.test.mirror_for_rate")+    );+    // Clear the error state+    Services.fog.testResetFOG();+    // Clear the partial Telemetry value+    Services.telemetry.getSnapshotForKeyedScalars(+      "main",+      true /* aClearStore */+    );++    // Now the denominator:+    Glean.testOnlyIpc.irate.addToNumerator(22);+    Glean.testOnlyIpc.irate.addToDenominator(-7);+    Assert.throws(+      () => Glean.testOnlyIpc.irate.testGetValue(),+      /NS_ERROR_LOSS_OF_SIGNIFICANT_DATA/,+      "Can't get the value when you're error'd"+    );+    Assert.deepEqual(+      { numerator: 22 },+      keyedScalarValue("telemetry.test.mirror_for_rate")+    );++    // 4) Timespan+    // ( Can't overflow time without finding a way to get TimeStamp to think+    // we're 2^32 milliseconds later without waiting a month )+  }+);

I'll analyze the code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

1. First vulnerability analysis:
    Vulnerability Existed: yes
    Null Pointer Dereference [File] toolkit/components/glean/tests/xpcshell/test_GIFFT.js [Lines 20-23, 25-28]
    [Old Code]
    function scalarValue(aScalarName) {
      return Telemetry.getSnapshotForScalars().parent[aScalarName];
    }
    
    function keyedScalarValue(aScalarName) {
      return Telemetry.getSnapshotForKeyedScalars().parent[aScalarName];
    }
    [Fixed Code]
    function scalarValue(aScalarName) {
      let snapshot = Telemetry.getSnapshotForScalars();
      return "parent" in snapshot ? snapshot.parent[aScalarName] : undefined;
    }
    
    function keyedScalarValue(aScalarName) {
      let snapshot = Telemetry.getSnapshotForKeyedScalars();
      return "parent" in snapshot ? snapshot.parent[aScalarName] : undefined;
    }

2. Second vulnerability analysis:
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    Potential Integer Overflow [File] toolkit/components/glean/tests/xpcshell/test_GIFFT.js [Lines 233-256]
    [Old Code]
    Glean.testOnlyIpc.aLabeledCounter.a_label.add(1);
    Assert.equal(1, Glean.testOnlyIpc.aLabeledCounter.a_label.testGetValue());
    ...
    {
      a_label: 1,
    [Fixed Code]
    Glean.testOnlyIpc.aLabeledCounter.a_label.add(3);
    Assert.equal(4, Glean.testOnlyIpc.aLabeledCounter.a_label.testGetValue());
    ...
    {
      a_label: 4,

3. Third vulnerability analysis:
    Vulnerability Existed: yes
    Numeric Limits Handling [File] toolkit/components/glean/tests/xpcshell/test_GIFFT.js [Lines 347-447]
    [Old Code]
    (New test case added)
    [Fixed Code]
    (Added comprehensive tests for numeric limits handling including negative values, saturation, and overflow cases)

The first fix clearly addresses a potential null pointer dereference by adding proper checks before accessing the 'parent' property. The second change appears to be adjusting test values, but it's unclear if this was fixing a security issue or just correcting test expectations. The third addition shows new test cases that verify proper handling of numeric limits, which helps prevent potential integer overflow vulnerabilities.

Note that while the test file itself doesn't contain the actual vulnerabilities (since it's test code), these changes reflect fixes to potential issues in the production code being tested.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.transform.identity.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.transform.identity.worker.js@@ -13,15 +13,15 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.transform(1,0, 0,1, 0,0); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes (variable renaming) rather than security-related fixes.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.transform.identity.worker.js] [Lines 13-15, 21]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and update all references to it. There are no security implications to this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.ensuresubpath.1.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.ensuresubpath.1.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ ctx.beginPath(); ctx.arcTo(100, 50, 200, 50, 0.1); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming for better clarity. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No Vulnerability Found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.ensuresubpath.1.worker.js] [Lines 13-23]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` throughout the file. This doesn't represent a security fix but rather a code style/readability improvement. No security-related functionality was modified.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/geckodriver/doc/Building.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/geckodriver/doc/Building.md@@ -29,13 +29,13 @@ 	% ./mach geckodriver -- --other --flags-See [Testing](Testing.html) for how to run tests.+See [Testing](Testing.md) for how to run tests. [Rust]: https://www.rust-lang.org/ [webdriver crate]: https://crates.io/crates/webdriver [commands]: https://docs.rs/webdriver/newest/webdriver/command/ [responses]: https://docs.rs/webdriver/newest/webdriver/response/ [errors]: https://docs.rs/webdriver/newest/webdriver/error/enum.ErrorStatus.html-[Marionette protocol]: /testing/marionette/doc/marionette/Protocol.html+[Marionette protocol]: /testing/marionette/Protocol.md [WebDriver]: https://w3c.github.io/webdriver/-[Marionette]: /testing/marionette/doc/marionette+[Marionette]: /testing/marionette/index.rst

Based on the provided diff, this appears to be a documentation update rather than a security fix. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
Documentation Link Update [File] [Lines 29-38]
[Old Code]
See [Testing](Testing.html) for how to run tests.
...
[Marionette protocol]: /testing/marionette/doc/marionette/Protocol.html
[Marionette]: /testing/marionette/doc/marionette
[Fixed Code]
See [Testing](Testing.md) for how to run tests.
...
[Marionette protocol]: /testing/marionette/Protocol.md
[Marionette]: /testing/marionette/index.rst

Additional Details:
The changes only involve updating documentation links from .html to .md/.rst formats and adjusting file paths. There are no security-related fixes in this diff. The modifications appear to be part of a documentation system migration or standardization effort.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/cache-padded/README.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/cache-padded/README.md@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@ # cache-padded-[![Build](https://github.com/stjepang/cache-padded/workflows/Build%20and%20test/badge.svg)](-https://github.com/stjepang/cache-padded/actions)-[![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT%2FApache--2.0-blue.svg)](-https://github.com/stjepang/cache-padded)+[![Build](https://github.com/smol-rs/cache-padded/workflows/Build%20and%20test/badge.svg)](+https://github.com/smol-rs/cache-padded/actions)+[![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-Apache--2.0_OR_MIT-blue.svg)](+https://github.com/smol-rs/cache-padded) [![Cargo](https://img.shields.io/crates/v/cache-padded.svg)]( https://crates.io/crates/cache-padded) [![Documentation](https://docs.rs/cache-padded/badge.svg)](

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   Repository URL Change [File] [Lines 1-9]  
   [Old Code]  
   `[![Build](https://github.com/stjepang/cache-padded/workflows/Build%20and%20test/badge.svg)](https://github.com/stjepang/cache-padded/actions)`  
   `[![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT%2FApache--2.0-blue.svg)](https://github.com/stjepang/cache-padded)`  

   [Fixed Code]  
   `[![Build](https://github.com/smol-rs/cache-padded/workflows/Build%20and%20test/badge.svg)](https://github.com/smol-rs/cache-padded/actions)`  
   `[![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-Apache--2.0_OR_MIT-blue.svg)](https://github.com/smol-rs/cache-padded)`  

   Additional Details:  
   This change only updates repository URLs and license badge formatting. No security vulnerabilities are addressed here - it's purely an ownership/URL change from "stjepang" to "smol-rs" organization and minor license text formatting update.

The diff shows no security-related fixes, only repository metadata updates. No vulnerabilities were found in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/serviceworkers/ServiceWorkerManager.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/serviceworkers/ServiceWorkerManager.h@@ -101,8 +101,6 @@  * }  */ class ServiceWorkerManager final : public nsIServiceWorkerManager,-                                   public nsITimerCallback,-                                   public nsINamed,                                    public nsIObserver {   friend class GetRegistrationsRunnable;   friend class GetRegistrationRunnable;@@ -117,8 +115,6 @@   NS_DECL_ISUPPORTS   NS_DECL_NSISERVICEWORKERMANAGER   NS_DECL_NSIOBSERVER-  NS_DECL_NSITIMERCALLBACK-  NS_DECL_NSINAMED   // Return true if the given principal and URI matches a registered service   // worker which handles fetch event.@@ -272,6 +268,15 @@       uint32_t aShutdownStateId,       ServiceWorkerShutdownState::Progress aProgress) const;+  // Record periodic telemetry on number of running ServiceWorkers.  When+  // the number of running ServiceWorkers changes (or on shutdown),+  // ServiceWorkerPrivateImpl will call RecordTelemetry with the number of+  // running serviceworkers and those supporting Fetch.  We use+  // mTelemetryLastChange to determine how many datapoints to inject into+  // Telemetry, and dispatch a background runnable to call+  // RecordTelemetryGap() and Accumulate them.+  void RecordTelemetry(uint32_t aNumber, uint32_t aFetch);+  private:   struct RegistrationDataPerPrincipal;@@ -422,7 +427,8 @@   nsTArray<UniquePtr<PendingReadyData>> mPendingReadyList;-  nsCOMPtr<nsITimer> mTelemetryTimer;+  const uint32_t mTelemetryPeriodMs = 5 * 1000;+  TimeStamp mTelemetryLastChange; }; }  // namespace dom

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Removed Timer Callback Interface] [dom/serviceworkers/ServiceWorkerManager.h] [Lines 101-102, 117]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   class ServiceWorkerManager final : public nsIServiceWorkerManager,
                                    public nsITimerCallback,
                                    public nsINamed,
   ```
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   class ServiceWorkerManager final : public nsIServiceWorkerManager,
   ```

   Additional Details:  
   The removal of `nsITimerCallback` and `nsINamed` interfaces might indicate a security-related change, as timer callbacks can sometimes be sources of vulnerabilities if not properly managed. However, without more context, it's unclear if this was specifically fixing a known vulnerability.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Telemetry Timer Removal] [dom/serviceworkers/ServiceWorkerManager.h] [Lines 422]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   nsCOMPtr<nsITimer> mTelemetryTimer;
   ```
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   const uint32_t mTelemetryPeriodMs = 5 * 1000;
   TimeStamp mTelemetryLastChange;
   ```

   Additional Details:  
   The replacement of a timer-based telemetry system with a simpler timestamp-based approach could be related to security (e.g., preventing timer-related race conditions or resource exhaustion). However, the diff doesn't provide enough information to confirm if this was fixing a specific vulnerability.

Note: The changes appear to be architectural improvements rather than direct security fixes, but they might have security implications. Without more context about the actual vulnerabilities being addressed, we can't be certain.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/quota/StorageManager.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/quota/StorageManager.cpp@@ -752,6 +752,19 @@                                        aRv); }+already_AddRefed<Promise> StorageManager::GetDirectory() {+  IgnoredErrorResult rv;++  RefPtr<Promise> promise = Promise::Create(GetParentObject(), rv);+  if (rv.Failed()) {+    return nullptr;+  }++  promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);++  return promise.forget();+}+ NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_WRAPPERCACHE(StorageManager, mOwner) NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTING_ADDREF(StorageManager)

Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Missing Implementation Security Check] [dom/quota/StorageManager.cpp] [Lines 752-764]
[Old Code]
(None - this is a new function addition)
[Fixed Code]
already_AddRefed<Promise> StorageManager::GetDirectory() {
  IgnoredErrorResult rv;

  RefPtr<Promise> promise = Promise::Create(GetParentObject(), rv);
  if (rv.Failed()) {
    return nullptr;
  }

  promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);

  return promise.forget();
}

Additional Details:
1. This appears to be a new function addition rather than a security fix
2. The function currently just rejects with NOT_IMPLEMENTED, so it's not clear if there are security implications
3. Without seeing the context of how this function will be used or implemented, it's hard to determine potential vulnerabilities
4. The function is related to storage management, which typically requires careful security considerations, but none are evident in this specific change

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/src/codegen/error.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/src/codegen/error.rs@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ use proc_macro2::TokenStream;-use quote::{TokenStreamExt, ToTokens};+use quote::{ToTokens, TokenStreamExt}; /// Declares the local variable into which errors will be accumulated. #[derive(Default)]

Analyzing the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] third_party/rust/darling_core/src/codegen/error.rs [Lines] 1-5
   [Old Code]
   use proc_macro2::TokenStream;
   use quote::{TokenStreamExt, ToTokens};
   
   [Fixed Code]
   use proc_macro2::TokenStream;
   use quote::{ToTokens, TokenStreamExt};

The change is purely stylistic - it only reorders the imports within the same module. There are no security implications in this change, and no known vulnerability is being addressed. The modification appears to be for code style consistency rather than any security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit/JitScript.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit/JitScript.h@@ -315,11 +315,11 @@   // Baseline code for the script. Either nullptr, BaselineDisabledScriptPtr or   // a valid BaselineScript*.-  BaselineScript* baselineScript_ = nullptr;+  GCStructPtr<BaselineScript*> baselineScript_;   // Ion code for this script. Either nullptr, IonDisabledScriptPtr,   // IonCompilingScriptPtr or a valid IonScript*.-  IonScript* ionScript_ = nullptr;+  GCStructPtr<IonScript*> ionScript_;   // The size of this allocation.   Offset endOffset_ = 0;@@ -411,15 +411,7 @@   void incWarmUpCount(uint32_t amount) { icScript_.warmUpCount_ += amount; }   void resetWarmUpCount(uint32_t count);-  void prepareForDestruction(Zone* zone) {-    // When the script contains pointers to nursery things, the store buffer can-    // contain entries that point into the stub space. Since we can destroy-    // scripts outside the context of a GC, this situation could result in us-    // trying to mark invalid store buffer entries.-    //-    // Defer freeing any allocated blocks until after the next minor GC.-    jitScriptStubSpace_.freeAllAfterMinorGC(zone);-  }+  void prepareForDestruction(Zone* zone);   JitScriptICStubSpace* jitScriptStubSpace() { return &jitScriptStubSpace_; }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
   [Use After Free] [js/src/jit/JitScript.h] [Lines 315, 318]  
   [Old Code]  
   `BaselineScript* baselineScript_ = nullptr;`  
   `IonScript* ionScript_ = nullptr;`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `GCStructPtr<BaselineScript*> baselineScript_;`  
   `GCStructPtr<IonScript*> ionScript_;`  
   Additional Details: The change from raw pointers to GCStructPtr suggests a potential use-after-free vulnerability was fixed by ensuring proper garbage collection handling of these script pointers.

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
   [Memory Management Issue] [js/src/jit/JitScript.h] [Lines 411-419]  
   [Old Code]  
   `void prepareForDestruction(Zone* zone) { ... }` (with inline implementation)  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `void prepareForDestruction(Zone* zone);` (declaration only, implementation moved elsewhere)  
   Additional Details: The removal of the inline implementation suggests potential memory management issues were addressed by moving the destruction preparation logic to a more controlled location, possibly to better handle garbage collection timing.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Memory Safety Issue] [js/src/jit/JitScript.h] [Lines 315, 318]  
   [Old Code]  
   `BaselineScript* baselineScript_ = nullptr;`  
   `IonScript* ionScript_ = nullptr;`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `GCStructPtr<BaselineScript*> baselineScript_;`  
   `GCStructPtr<IonScript*> ionScript_;`  
   Additional Details: While the change clearly improves memory safety, without more context about the specific vulnerabilities addressed, we can't be certain what exact issues were fixed by this change beyond general memory safety improvements.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.miter.exceeded.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.miter.exceeded.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ ctx.lineTo(200, 200); ctx.lineTo(1000, 201); // slightly non-right-angle to avoid being a special case ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 48,1, 0,255,0,255, "48,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 48,48, 0,255,0,255, "48,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 48,1, 0,255,0,255, "48,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 48,48, 0,255,0,255, "48,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't affect security aspects. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.miter.exceeded.worker.js
[Old Code] var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
[Fixed Code] var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.miter.exceeded.worker.js
[Old Code] _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code] _assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are consistent throughout the file, simply renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating all references to it. There are no security implications to these changes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-003-ref.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-003-ref.html@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@       -ms-column-fill: auto;   -webkit-column-fill: auto;           column-fill: auto;-  border: 2px dashed;+  border: 2px solid salmon;   margin-bottom: 5px; }

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines]
[Old Code] border: 2px dashed;
[Fixed Code] border: 2px solid salmon;

Additional Details:
This appears to be a purely cosmetic change in a test file, changing the border style from dashed to solid and adding a color (salmon). There's no indication of any security-related fix in this change. The modification is in a CSS property within a test HTML file, which doesn't affect security aspects of the application.

Note: The file is part of layout reftests for CSS grid functionality, and this change seems to be for better visual clarity in test results rather than addressing any security concern.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/extensions/webidl-api/ExtensionAPIBase.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/extensions/webidl-api/ExtensionAPIBase.cpp@@ -43,15 +43,17 @@   aPromise->AppendNativeHandler(handler); }-void ChromeCompatCallbackHandler::ResolvedCallback(-    JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) {+void ChromeCompatCallbackHandler::ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx,+                                                   JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+                                                   ErrorResult& aRv) {   JS::RootedValue retval(aCx);   IgnoredErrorResult rv;   MOZ_KnownLive(mCallback)->Call({aValue}, &retval, rv); }-void ChromeCompatCallbackHandler::RejectedCallback(-    JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) {+void ChromeCompatCallbackHandler::RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx,+                                                   JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+                                                   ErrorResult& aRv) {   JS::RootedValue retval(aCx);   IgnoredErrorResult rv;   // Call the chrome-compatible callback without any parameter, the errors

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Error Handling Improvement] [File: ExtensionAPIBase.cpp] [Lines: 43-57]
[Old Code]
void ChromeCompatCallbackHandler::ResolvedCallback(
    JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) {
  JS::RootedValue retval(aCx);
  IgnoredErrorResult rv;
  MOZ_KnownLive(mCallback)->Call({aValue}, &retval, rv);
}

void ChromeCompatCallbackHandler::RejectedCallback(
    JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) {
  JS::RootedValue retval(aCx);
  IgnoredErrorResult rv;
[Fixed Code]
void ChromeCompatCallbackHandler::ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx,
                                                   JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,
                                                   ErrorResult& aRv) {
  JS::RootedValue retval(aCx);
  IgnoredErrorResult rv;
  MOZ_KnownLive(mCallback)->Call({aValue}, &retval, rv);
}

void ChromeCompatCallbackHandler::RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx,
                                                   JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,
                                                   ErrorResult& aRv) {
  JS::RootedValue retval(aCx);
  IgnoredErrorResult rv;

Additional Details:
1. The main change is the addition of ErrorResult& aRv parameter to both callback functions
2. While not clearly a security fix, this could be related to better error handling
3. The IgnoredErrorResult rv is still being used in the function body, suggesting this might be an intermediate change
4. Without more context about how aRv is used elsewhere, it's hard to determine if this fixes a specific vulnerability

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/accessible/generic/OuterDocAccessible.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/accessible/generic/OuterDocAccessible.cpp@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ LocalAccessible* OuterDocAccessible::LocalChildAtPoint(     int32_t aX, int32_t aY, EWhichChildAtPoint aWhichChild) {-  nsIntRect docRect = Bounds();+  LayoutDeviceIntRect docRect = Bounds();   if (!docRect.Contains(aX, aY)) return nullptr;   // Always return the inner doc as direct child accessible unless bounds@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ Accessible* OuterDocAccessible::ChildAtPoint(int32_t aX, int32_t aY,                                              EWhichChildAtPoint aWhichChild) {-  nsIntRect docRect = Bounds();+  LayoutDeviceIntRect docRect = Bounds();   if (!docRect.Contains(aX, aY)) return nullptr;   // Always return the inner doc as direct child accessible unless bounds

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Type Mismatch or Integer Overflow] [accessible/generic/OuterDocAccessible.cpp] [Lines 77, 212]  
   [Old Code]  
   `nsIntRect docRect = Bounds();`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `LayoutDeviceIntRect docRect = Bounds();`  

Additional Details:  
The change involves replacing `nsIntRect` with `LayoutDeviceIntRect` for coordinate handling. While this could potentially address:
- Integer overflow vulnerabilities if `LayoutDeviceIntRect` has better bounds checking
- Type safety issues if `nsIntRect` wasn't the correct type for device coordinates
- Potential coordinate system mismatches

However, without more context about the coordinate systems and how these types differ, we can't be certain this fixes a specific vulnerability. The change appears to be more about correct type usage than fixing a known security issue.

No other obvious security vulnerabilities are apparent in this diff. The rest of the changes appear to be consistent type replacements throughout the file.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.