--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit/CacheIROps.yaml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit/CacheIROps.yaml@@ -2070,6 +2070,14 @@     val: RawInt32Field     result: Int32Id+- name: LoadDoubleConstant+  shared: true+  transpile: true+  cost_estimate: 1+  args:+    val: DoubleField+    result: NumberId+ - name: LoadBooleanConstant   shared: true   transpile: true

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Numeric Precision Issue] [js/src/jit/CacheIROps.yaml] [Lines 2070-2078]
    [Old Code: (no LoadDoubleConstant operation)]
    [Fixed Code: 
    - name: LoadDoubleConstant
      shared: true
      transpile: true
      cost_estimate: 1
      args:
        val: DoubleField
        result: NumberId
    ]

Additional Details:
- The diff adds a new LoadDoubleConstant operation to handle double precision floating-point constants
- While not clearly a security fix, adding proper handling of double precision numbers could prevent potential numeric precision issues or type confusion vulnerabilities
- The change appears to be adding functionality rather than fixing a specific vulnerability, but improper handling of floating-point numbers could lead to security issues in some contexts

No other vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change appears to be a feature addition rather than a direct security fix, but it may indirectly improve numeric handling safety.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/element/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.strokeRect.nonfinite.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/element/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.strokeRect.nonfinite.html@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);- ctx.strokeStyle = '#f00'; ctx.lineWidth = 150; ctx.strokeRect(Infinity, 0, 100, 50);@@ -47,7 +46,6 @@ ctx.strokeRect(0, Infinity, Infinity, Infinity); ctx.strokeRect(0, Infinity, 100, Infinity); ctx.strokeRect(0, 0, Infinity, Infinity);- _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be test case modifications rather than security fixes. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 21-47]
   [Old Code]
   ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';
   ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
   -
   ctx.strokeStyle = '#f00';
   ctx.lineWidth = 150;
   ctx.strokeRect(Infinity, 0, 100, 50);
   ...
   ctx.strokeRect(0, Infinity, Infinity, Infinity);
   ctx.strokeRect(0, Infinity, 100, Infinity);
   ctx.strokeRect(0, 0, Infinity, Infinity);
   -
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

   [Fixed Code]
   ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';
   ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
   ctx.strokeStyle = '#f00';
   ctx.lineWidth = 150;
   ctx.strokeRect(Infinity, 0, 100, 50);
   ...
   ctx.strokeRect(0, Infinity, Infinity, Infinity);
   ctx.strokeRect(0, Infinity, 100, Infinity);
   ctx.strokeRect(0, 0, Infinity, Infinity);
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes consist of:
1. Removing a blank line after fillRect()
2. Removing a blank line before _assertPixel()

These appear to be purely cosmetic changes to the test file and don't represent any security fixes. The test continues to verify how the canvas handles non-finite (Infinity) values in strokeRect operations, but this is test functionality rather than a security concern.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/netwerk/base/nsInputStreamPump.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/netwerk/base/nsInputStreamPump.cpp@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@       return rv;     }     // Any retargeting during STATE_START or START_TRANSFER is complete-    // after the call to AsyncWait; next callback wil be on mTargetThread.+    // after the call to AsyncWait; next callback will be on mTargetThread.     mRetargeting = false;     mWaitingForInputStreamReady = true;   }@@ -168,15 +168,9 @@ NS_IMETHODIMP nsInputStreamPump::Cancel(nsresult status) {-#if DEBUG-  if (mOffMainThread) {-    MOZ_ASSERT_IF(mTargetThread, mTargetThread->IsOnCurrentThread());-  } else {-    MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());-  }-#endif--  RecursiveMutexAutoLock lock(mMutex);+  RecursiveMutexAutoLock lock(mMutex);++  AssertOnThread();   LOG(("nsInputStreamPump::Cancel [this=%p status=%" PRIx32 "]\n", this,        static_cast<uint32_t>(status)));@@ -276,6 +270,8 @@ nsInputStreamPump::Init(nsIInputStream* stream, uint32_t segsize,                         uint32_t segcount, bool closeWhenDone,                         nsIEventTarget* mainThreadTarget) {+  // probably we can't be multithread-accessed yet+  RecursiveMutexAutoLock lock(mMutex);   NS_ENSURE_TRUE(mState == STATE_IDLE, NS_ERROR_IN_PROGRESS);   mStream = stream;@@ -297,6 +293,7 @@ nsInputStreamPump::AsyncRead(nsIStreamListener* listener) {   RecursiveMutexAutoLock lock(mMutex);+  // This ensures only one thread can interact with a pump at a time   NS_ENSURE_TRUE(mState == STATE_IDLE, NS_ERROR_IN_PROGRESS);   NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(listener);   MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread() || mOffMainThread,@@ -462,6 +459,8 @@     // deadlocks when calls to RetargetDeliveryTo for multiple     // nsInputStreamPumps are needed (e.g. nsHttpChannel).     RecursiveMutexAutoUnlock unlock(mMutex);+    // We're on the writing thread+    AssertOnThread();     rv = mListener->OnStartRequest(this);   }@@ -529,6 +528,16 @@       // deadlocks when calls to RetargetDeliveryTo for multiple       // nsInputStreamPumps are needed (e.g. nsHttpChannel).       RecursiveMutexAutoUnlock unlock(mMutex);+      // We're on the writing thread for mListener and mAsyncStream.+      // mStreamOffset is only touched in OnStateTransfer, and AsyncRead+      // shouldn't be called during OnDataAvailable()+      // We may be called on non-MainThread even if mOffMainThread is+      // false, due to RetargetDeliveryTo(), so don't use AssertOnThread()+      if (mTargetThread) {+        MOZ_ASSERT(mTargetThread->IsOnCurrentThread());+      } else {+        MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());+      }       rv = mListener->OnDataAvailable(this, mAsyncStream, mStreamOffset,                                       odaAvail);     }@@ -626,15 +635,18 @@   }   mAsyncStream = nullptr;-  mTargetThread = nullptr;   mIsPending = false;   {     // Note: Must exit mutex for call to OnStartRequest to avoid     // deadlocks when calls to RetargetDeliveryTo for multiple     // nsInputStreamPumps are needed (e.g. nsHttpChannel).     RecursiveMutexAutoUnlock unlock(mMutex);+    // We're on the writing thread.+    // We believe that mStatus can't be changed on us here.+    AssertOnThread();     mListener->OnStopRequest(this, mStatus);   }+  mTargetThread = nullptr;   mListener = nullptr;   if (mLoadGroup) mLoadGroup->RemoveRequest(this, nullptr, mStatus);

Here's the analysis of the code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Race Condition Vulnerability [netwerk/base/nsInputStreamPump.cpp] [Lines 276-283]
[Old Code]
nsInputStreamPump::Init(nsIInputStream* stream, uint32_t segsize,
                        uint32_t segcount, bool closeWhenDone,
                        nsIEventTarget* mainThreadTarget) {
  NS_ENSURE_TRUE(mState == STATE_IDLE, NS_ERROR_IN_PROGRESS);
[Fixed Code]
nsInputStreamPump::Init(nsIInputStream* stream, uint32_t segsize,
                        uint32_t segcount, bool closeWhenDone,
                        nsIEventTarget* mainThreadTarget) {
  // probably we can't be multithread-accessed yet
  RecursiveMutexAutoLock lock(mMutex);
  NS_ENSURE_TRUE(mState == STATE_IDLE, NS_ERROR_IN_PROGRESS);

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Thread Safety Vulnerability [netwerk/base/nsInputStreamPump.cpp] [Lines 462-470]
[Old Code]
    RecursiveMutexAutoUnlock unlock(mMutex);
    rv = mListener->OnStartRequest(this);
[Fixed Code]
    RecursiveMutexAutoUnlock unlock(mMutex);
    // We're on the writing thread
    AssertOnThread();
    rv = mListener->OnStartRequest(this);

3. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Thread Safety Vulnerability [netwerk/base/nsInputStreamPump.cpp] [Lines 529-540]
[Old Code]
      RecursiveMutexAutoUnlock unlock(mMutex);
      rv = mListener->OnDataAvailable(this, mAsyncStream, mStreamOffset,
                                      odaAvail);
[Fixed Code]
      RecursiveMutexAutoUnlock unlock(mMutex);
      // We're on the writing thread for mListener and mAsyncStream.
      // mStreamOffset is only touched in OnStateTransfer, and AsyncRead
      // shouldn't be called during OnDataAvailable()
      // We may be called on non-MainThread even if mOffMainThread is
      // false, due to RetargetDeliveryTo(), so don't use AssertOnThread()
      if (mTargetThread) {
        MOZ_ASSERT(mTargetThread->IsOnCurrentThread());
      } else {
        MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
      }
      rv = mListener->OnDataAvailable(this, mAsyncStream, mStreamOffset,
                                      odaAvail);

4. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Thread Safety Vulnerability [netwerk/base/nsInputStreamPump.cpp] [Lines 626-637]
[Old Code]
    RecursiveMutexAutoUnlock unlock(mMutex);
    mListener->OnStopRequest(this, mStatus);
[Fixed Code]
    RecursiveMutexAutoUnlock unlock(mMutex);
    // We're on the writing thread.
    // We believe that mStatus can't be changed on us here.
    AssertOnThread();
    mListener->OnStopRequest(this, mStatus);

The main theme of these fixes appears to be improving thread safety by:
1. Adding proper mutex locking in Init()
2. Adding thread assertion checks in critical callback methods
3. Ensuring proper thread context during asynchronous operations
4. Better documentation of thread safety assumptions

These changes help prevent race conditions and ensure thread-safe access to shared resources, particularly during asynchronous operations where multiple threads might be accessing the pump object.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/wr/webrender/src/batch.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/wr/webrender/src/batch.rs@@ -1002,7 +1002,7 @@                             self.add_split_composite_instance_to_batches(                                 key,                                 BatchFeatures::CLIP_MASK,-                                &child_prim_info.clip_chain.pic_clip_rect,+                                &child_prim_info.clip_chain.pic_coverage_rect,                                 z_id,                                 prim_header_index,                                 child.gpu_address,@@ -1055,7 +1055,7 @@         //           the scroll node...         let transform_kind = transform_id.transform_kind();         let prim_info = &prim_instance.vis;-        let bounding_rect = &prim_info.clip_chain.pic_clip_rect;+        let bounding_rect = &prim_info.clip_chain.pic_coverage_rect;         // If this primitive is a backdrop, that means that it is known to cover         // the entire picture cache background. In that case, the renderer will

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Incorrect Bounding Rect Calculation] [gfx/wr/webrender/src/batch.rs] [Lines 1005, 1058]
    [Old Code]
    &child_prim_info.clip_chain.pic_clip_rect
    &prim_info.clip_chain.pic_clip_rect
    [Fixed Code]
    &child_prim_info.clip_chain.pic_coverage_rect
    &prim_info.clip_chain.pic_coverage_rect

Additional Details:
- The change replaces `pic_clip_rect` with `pic_coverage_rect` in two locations
- This appears to be a correction in how bounding rectangles are calculated for rendering
- While this could potentially affect security (if incorrect bounds could lead to memory access violations), there's no clear evidence this was an exploitable vulnerability
- The change likely improves rendering accuracy and potentially prevents visual artifacts or incorrect clipping calculations

Note: Without more context about the specific differences between `pic_clip_rect` and `pic_coverage_rect`, it's difficult to determine if this was fixing an actual security vulnerability or just improving rendering correctness. The change suggests there might have been an issue with how clipping regions were being calculated, but not necessarily a security vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/servo/components/style/stylesheets/layer_rule.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/servo/components/style/stylesheets/layer_rule.rs@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ use super::CssRules;-use cssparser::{Parser, SourceLocation, ToCss as CssParserToCss, Token};+use cssparser::{Parser, SourceLocation, Token}; use servo_arc::Arc; use smallvec::SmallVec; use std::fmt::{self, Write};

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13]
[Old Code]
use cssparser::{Parser, SourceLocation, ToCss as CssParserToCss, Token};
[Fixed Code]
use cssparser::{Parser, SourceLocation, Token};

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an unused import (`ToCss as CssParserToCss`) from the cssparser crate
- This appears to be a code cleanup/optimization rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerability patterns are present in this change
- The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive operations or data handling

No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change is purely related to code organization and doesn't impact security functionality.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/gmp/GMPStorageParent.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/gmp/GMPStorageParent.cpp@@ -60,7 +60,8 @@       ("GMPStorageParent[%p]::RecvOpen(record='%s')", this, aRecordName.get()));   if (mShutdown) {-    return IPC_FAIL_NO_REASON(this);+    // Shutdown is an expected state, so we do not IPC_FAIL.+    return IPC_OK();   }   if (mNodeId.EqualsLiteral("null")) {@@ -102,7 +103,8 @@       ("GMPStorageParent[%p]::RecvRead(record='%s')", this, aRecordName.get()));   if (mShutdown) {-    return IPC_FAIL_NO_REASON(this);+    // Shutdown is an expected state, so we do not IPC_FAIL.+    return IPC_OK();   }   nsTArray<uint8_t> data;@@ -128,7 +130,8 @@         aRecordName.get(), aBytes.Length()));   if (mShutdown) {-    return IPC_FAIL_NO_REASON(this);+    // Shutdown is an expected state, so we do not IPC_FAIL.+    return IPC_OK();   }   if (!mStorage->IsOpen(aRecordName)) {

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Incorrect Error Handling] [dom/media/gmp/GMPStorageParent.cpp] [Lines 60, 102, 128]
   [Old Code]
   if (mShutdown) {
     return IPC_FAIL_NO_REASON(this);
   }
   [Fixed Code]
   if (mShutdown) {
     // Shutdown is an expected state, so we do not IPC_FAIL.
     return IPC_OK();
   }

Additional Details:
- The change modifies how shutdown state is handled in three different functions (RecvOpen, RecvRead, and RecvWrite)
- The vulnerability name is uncertain because while the change improves error handling, it's not clear if the previous behavior was actually exploitable
- The fix changes from returning an IPC failure to returning success during shutdown, which appears to be a behavioral change rather than a direct security fix
- The comment suggests shutdown is an expected state, implying the previous behavior might have been unnecessarily strict rather than insecure

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/server/tests/chrome/inactive-property-helper/gap.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/server/tests/chrome/inactive-property-helper/gap.js@@ -95,4 +95,39 @@     rules: ["div { gap: 10px; column-count: 2; }"],     isActive: true,   },+  {+    info: "grid-gap is inactive on non-grid and non-flex container",+    property: "grid-gap",+    tagName: "div",+    rules: ["div { grid-gap: 10px; display: block; }"],+    isActive: false,+  },+  {+    info: "grid-gap is active on flex container",+    property: "grid-gap",+    tagName: "div",+    rules: ["div { grid-gap: 10px; display: flex; }"],+    isActive: true,+  },+  {+    info: "grid-gap is active on grid container",+    property: "grid-gap",+    tagName: "div",+    rules: ["div { grid-gap: 10px; display: grid; }"],+    isActive: true,+  },+  {+    info: "grid-gap is inactive on non-multi-col container",+    property: "grid-gap",+    tagName: "div",+    rules: ["div { grid-gap: 10px; column-count: auto; }"],+    isActive: false,+  },+  {+    info: "grid-gap is active on multi-col container",+    property: "grid-gap",+    tagName: "div",+    rules: ["div { grid-gap: 10px; column-count: 2; }"],+    isActive: true,+  }, ];

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be test case additions for CSS property behavior testing, specifically for the `grid-gap` property in different container contexts.

Here's the structured response:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found
    File: devtools/server/tests/chrome/inactive-property-helper/gap.js
    [The diff only adds test cases for grid-gap property behavior]

The changes are purely functional tests to verify when the `grid-gap` CSS property should be active or inactive based on different display and container scenarios. There are no security implications in this change as it's only adding test cases to a test file.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/java/org/mozilla/geckoview/doc-files/CHANGELOG.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/java/org/mozilla/geckoview/doc-files/CHANGELOG.md@@ -13,15 +13,29 @@ ⚠️  breaking change and deprecation notices+## v98+- Add [`WebRequest.beConservative`][98.1] to allow critical infrastructure to+  avoid using bleeding-edge network features.+  ([bug 1750231]({{bugzilla}}1750231))++[98.1]: {{javadoc_uri}}/WebRequest.html#beConservative+ ## v97-- ⚠️ Deprecated GeckoSession.PermissionDelegate.MediaSource.rawId [97.1],-  which now provides the same string as id [97.2].-- Added [`EXTRA_CRASH_PROCESS_TYPE`][97.3] field to ACTION_CRASHED intents,+- ⚠️ Deprecated [`MediaSource.rawId`][97.1],+  which now provides the same string as [`id`][97.2].+  ([bug 1744346]({{bugzilla}}1744346))+- Added [`EXTRA_CRASH_PROCESS_TYPE`][97.3] field to `ACTION_CRASHED` intents,   and corresponding [`CRASHED_PROCESS_TYPE_*`][97.4] constants, indicating which   type of process a crash occured in.+  ([bug 1743454]({{bugzilla}}1743454)) - ⚠️ Deprecated [`EXTRA_CRASH_FATAL`][97.5]. Use `EXTRA_CRASH_PROCESS_TYPE` instead.+  ([bug 1743454]({{bugzilla}}1743454)) - Added [`OrientationController`][97.6] to allow GeckoView to handle orientation locking.-- Added [GeckoSession.goBack][97.7] and [GeckoSession.goForward][97.8] with a `userInteraction` parameter. Updated the default goBack/goForward behaviour to also be considered as a user interaction.+  ([bug 1697647]({{bugzilla}}1697647))+- Added [GeckoSession.goBack][97.7] and [GeckoSession.goForward][97.8] with a+  `userInteraction` parameter. Updated the default goBack/goForward behaviour+  to also be considered as a user interaction.+  ([bug 1644595]({{bugzilla}}1644595)) [97.1]: {{javadoc_uri}}/GeckoSession.PermissionDelegate.MediaSource.html#rawId [97.2]: {{javadoc_uri}}/GeckoSession.PermissionDelegate.MediaSource.html#id@@ -35,16 +49,17 @@ ## v96 - Added [`onLoginFetch`][96.1] which allows apps to provide all saved logins to   GeckoView.-  ([bug 1733423]({{bugzilla}}1733423)).+  ([bug 1733423]({{bugzilla}}1733423)) - Added [`GeckoResult.finally_`][96.2] to unconditionally run an action after   the GeckoResult has been completed.-  ([bug 1736433]({{bugzilla}}1736433)).-- Added [`ERROR_INVALID_DOMAIN`][96.3] to WebExtension.InstallException.ErrorCodes.-  ([bug 1740634]({{bugzilla}}1740634)).-- Added [`SelectionActionDelegate.Selection.pasteAsPlainText`][96.4] to paste-  HTML content as plain text.+  ([bug 1736433]({{bugzilla}}1736433))+- Added [`ERROR_INVALID_DOMAIN`][96.3] to `WebExtension.InstallException.ErrorCodes`.+  ([bug 1740634]({{bugzilla}}1740634))+- Added [`Selection.pasteAsPlainText`][96.4] to paste HTML content as plain+  text.+  ([bug 1740414]({{bugzilla}}1740414)) - Removed deprecated Content Blocking APIs.-  ([bug 1743706]({{bugzilla}}1743706)).+  ([bug 1743706]({{bugzilla}}1743706)) [96.1]: {{javadoc_uri}}/Autocomplete.StorageDelegate.html#onLoginFetch-- [96.2]: {{javadoc_uri}}/GeckoResult.html#finally_-java.lang.Runnable-@@ -55,46 +70,57 @@ - Added [`GeckoSession.ContentDelegate.onPointerIconChange()`][95.1] to notify   the application of changing pointer icon. If the application wants to handle   pointer icon, it should override this.+  ([bug 1672609]({{bugzilla}}1672609)) - Deprecated [`ContentBlockingController`][95.2], use   [`StorageController`][95.3] instead. A [`PERMISSION_TRACKING`][95.4]   permission is now present in [`onLocationChange`][95.5] for every page load,   which can be used to set tracking protection exceptions.+  ([bug 1714945]({{bugzilla}}1714945)) - Added [`setPrivateBrowsingPermanentPermission`][95.6], which allows apps to set   permanent permissions in private browsing (e.g. to set permanent tracking   protection permissions in private browsing).+  ([bug 1714945]({{bugzilla}}1714945)) - Deprecated [`GeckoRuntimeSettings.Builder.enterpiseRootsEnabled`][95.7] due to typo.+  ([bug 1708815]({{bugzilla}}1708815)) - Added [`GeckoRuntimeSettings.Builder.enterpriseRootsEnabled`][95.8] to replace [`GeckoRuntimeSettings.Builder.enterpiseRootsEnabled`][95.7].-- Added [`GeckoSession.ContentDelegate.onPreviewImage()`][95.9] to notify+  ([bug 1708815]({{bugzilla}}1708815))+- Added [`GeckoSession.ContentDelegate.onPreviewImage`][95.9] to notify   the application of a preview image URL.+  ([bug 1732219]({{bugzilla}}1732219)) [95.1]: {{javadoc_uri}}/GeckoSession.ContentDelegate.html#onPointerIconChange-org.mozilla.geckoview.GeckoSession-android.view.PointerIcon--[95.2]: {{javadoc_uri}/ContentBlockingController.html-[95.3]: {{javadoc_uri}/StorageController.java-[95.4]: {{javadoc_uri}/GeckoSession.PermissionDelegate.html#PERMISSION_TRACKING-[95.5]: {{javadoc_uri}/GeckoSession.NavigationDelegate.html#onLocationChange-org.mozilla.geckoview.GeckoSession-java.lang.String-java.util.List--[95.6]: {{javadoc_uri}/StorageController.html#setPrivateBrowsingPermanentPermission-org.mozilla.geckoview.GeckoSession.PermissionDelegate.ContentPermission-int-+[95.2]: {{javadoc_uri}}/ContentBlockingController.html+[95.3]: {{javadoc_uri}}/StorageController.java+[95.4]: {{javadoc_uri}}/GeckoSession.PermissionDelegate.html#PERMISSION_TRACKING+[95.5]: {{javadoc_uri}}/GeckoSession.NavigationDelegate.html#onLocationChange-org.mozilla.geckoview.GeckoSession-java.lang.String-java.util.List-+[95.6]: {{javadoc_uri}}/StorageController.html#setPrivateBrowsingPermanentPermission-org.mozilla.geckoview.GeckoSession.PermissionDelegate.ContentPermission-int- [95.7]: {{javadoc_uri}}/GeckoRuntimeSettings.Builder.html#enterpiseRootsEnabled-boolean- [95.8]: {{javadoc_uri}}/GeckoRuntimeSettings.Builder.html#enterpriseRootsEnabled-boolean- [95.9]: {{javadoc_uri}}/GeckoSession.ContentDelegate.html#onPreviewImage-org.mozilla.geckoview.GeckoSession-java.lang.String- ## v94 - Extended [`Autocomplete`][78.7] API to support credit card saving.+  ([bug 1703976]({{bugzilla}}1703976)) ## v93-- Removed deprecated ['Autocomplete.LoginStorageDelegate'][78.8].+- Removed deprecated [`Autocomplete.LoginStorageDelegate`][78.8].+  ([bug 1725469]({{bugzilla}}1725469)) - Removed deprecated [`GeckoRuntime.getProfileDir`][90.5].+  ([bug 1725469]({{bugzilla}}1725469)) - Added [`PromptInstanceDelegate`][93.1] to allow GeckoView to dismiss stale prompts.+  ([bug 1710668]({{bugzilla}}1710668)) - Added [`WebRequestError.ERROR_HTTPS_ONLY`][93.2] error code to allow GeckoView display custom HTTPS-only error pages and bypass them.+  ([bug 1697866]({{bugzilla}}1697866)) [93.1]: {{javadoc_uri}}/GeckoSession.PromptDelegate.PromptInstanceDelegate.html [93.2]: {{javadoc_uri}}/WebRequestError.html#ERROR_HTTPS_ONLY ## v92-- Added [`GeckoSession.PermissionDelegate.PERMISSION_STORAGE_ACCESS`][92.1] to+- Added [`PermissionDelegate.PERMISSION_STORAGE_ACCESS`][92.1] to   control the allowing of third-party frames to access first-party cookies and   storage. ([bug 1543720]({{bugzilla}}1543720))-- Added [`ContentDelegate#onShowDynamicToolbar(GeckoSession)`][92.2] to notify-  the app that it must fully-expand its dynamic toolbar ([bug 1690296]({{bugzilla}}1690296)).+- Added [`ContentDelegate.onShowDynamicToolbar`][92.2] to notify+  the app that it must fully-expand its dynamic toolbar ([bug 1690296]({{bugzilla}}1690296)) - Removed deprecated `GeckoResult.ALLOW` and `GeckoResult.DENY`.   Use [`GeckoResult.allow`][89.8] and [`GeckoResult.deny`][89.9] instead.@@ -163,7 +189,7 @@   ([bug 1668952]({{bugzilla}}1668952)) - Extended [`Autocomplete`][78.7] API to support credit cards.   ([bug 1691819]({{bugzilla}}1691819)).-- ⚠️  Deprecated ['Autocomplete.LoginStorageDelegate'][78.8] with the intention+- ⚠️  Deprecated [`Autocomplete.LoginStorageDelegate`][78.8] with the intention   of removing it in GeckoView v93. Please use   [`Autocomplete.StorageDelegate`][89.11] instead.   ([bug 1691819]({{bugzilla}}1691819)).@@ -225,7 +251,7 @@ [88.10]: {{javadoc_uri}}/GeckoSession.SessionState.html ## v87-- ⚠ Added [`WebExtension.DownloadInitData`][87.1] class that can be used to+- ⚠️ Added [`WebExtension.DownloadInitData`][87.1] class that can be used to   implement the WebExtension `downloads` API. This class represents initial state of a download. - Added [`WebExtension.Download.Info`][87.2] interface that can be used to   implement the WebExtension `downloads` API. This interface allows communicating@@ -235,7 +261,7 @@   ([bug 1689745]({{bugzilla}}1689745)) - Added support for HTTPS-only mode to [`GeckoRuntimeSettings`][87.5] via   [`setAllowInsecureConnections`][87.6].-- Removed [`JSONException`] throws from [`SessionState.fromString`][87.7], fixed annotations,+- Removed `JSONException` throws from [`SessionState.fromString`][87.7], fixed annotations,   and clarified null-handling a bit. [87.1]: {{javadoc_uri}}/WebExtension.DownloadInitData.html@@ -247,7 +273,7 @@ [87.7]: {{javadoc_uri}}/GeckoSession.SessionState.html#fromString-java.lang.String- ## v86-- Removed deprecated [`ContentDelegate#onExternalResponse(GeckoSession, WebResponseInfo)`].+- Removed deprecated `ContentDelegate#onExternalResponse(GeckoSession, WebResponseInfo)`.   Use [`ContentDelegate#onExternalResponse(GeckoSession, WebResponse)`][82.2] instead.   ([bug 1665157]({{bugzilla}}1665157)) - Added [`WebExtension.DownloadDelegate`][86.1] and  that can be used to@@ -275,15 +301,15 @@ [85.1]: {{javadoc_uri}}/WebExtension.BrowsingDataDelegate.html ## v84-- ⚠️  Removed deprecated [`GeckoRuntimeSettings.Builder.useMultiprocess`] and+- ⚠️  Removed deprecated `GeckoRuntimeSettings.Builder.useMultiprocess` and   [`GeckoRuntimeSettings.getUseMultiprocess`]. Single-process GeckoView is no   longer supported. ([bug 1650118]({{bugzilla}}1650118)) - Deprecated members now have an additional [`@DeprecationSchedule`][84.1] annotation which   includes the `version` that we expect to remove the member and an `id` that   can be used to group annotation notices in tooling.   ([bug 1671460]({{bugzilla}}1671460))-- ⚠️  Removed deprecated [`ContentBlockingController.ExceptionList`] abd-  [`ContentBlockingController.restoreExceptionList`]. ([bug 1674500]({{bugzilla}}1674500))+- ⚠️  Removed deprecated `ContentBlockingController.ExceptionList` and+  `ContentBlockingController.restoreExceptionList`. ([bug 1674500]({{bugzilla}}1674500)) [84.1]: {{javadoc_uri}}/DeprecationSchedule.html@@ -303,7 +329,7 @@ - Added [`GeckoRuntime.ActivityDelegate`][83.4] which allows applications to handle   starting external Activities on behalf of GeckoView. Currently this is used to integrate   FIDO support for WebAuthn.-- Added ['GeckoWebExecutor#FETCH_FLAG_PRIVATE'][83.5]. This new flag allows for private browsing downloads using WebExecutor.+- Added [`GeckoWebExecutor#FETCH_FLAG_PRIVATE`][83.5]. This new flag allows for private browsing downloads using WebExecutor.   ([bug 1665426]({{bugzilla}}1665426)) - ⚠️ Deprecated [`GeckoSession#loadUri`][83.6] variants in favor of   [`GeckoSession#load`][83.7]. See docs for [`Loader`][83.8].@@ -381,8 +407,8 @@ [80.2]: {{javadoc_uri}}/ContentBlocking.Settings.html ## v79-- Added `runtime.openOptionsPage` support. For `options_ui.open_in_new_tab` ==-  `false`, [`TabDelegate.onOpenOptionsPage`][79.1] is called.+- Added `runtime.openOptionsPage` support. For `options_ui.open_in_new_tab ==+  false`, [`TabDelegate.onOpenOptionsPage`][79.1] is called.   ([bug 1618058]({{bugzilla}}1619766)) - Added [`WebNotification.source`][79.2], which is the URL of the page   or Service Worker that created the notification.@@ -428,7 +454,7 @@ - Added [`BeforeUnloadPrompt`][78.6] to respond to prompts from onbeforeunload. - ⚠️  Refactored `LoginStorage` to the [`Autocomplete`][78.7] API to support   login form autocomplete delegation.-  Refactored 'LoginStorage.Delegate' to ['Autocomplete.LoginStorageDelegate'][78.8].+  Refactored `LoginStorage.Delegate` to [`Autocomplete.LoginStorageDelegate`][78.8].   Refactored `GeckoSession.PromptDelegate.onLoginStoragePrompt` to   [`GeckoSession.PromptDelegate.onLoginSave`][78.9].   Added [`GeckoSession.PromptDelegate.onLoginSelect`][78.10].@@ -461,7 +487,7 @@ - [`RuntimeTelemetry#getSnapshots`][68.10] is deprecated and will be removed   in 79. Use Glean to handle Gecko telemetry.   ([bug 1620395]({{bugzilla}}1620395))-- Added [`LoadRequest.isDirectNavigation`] to know when calls to+- Added `LoadRequest.isDirectNavigation` to know when calls to   [`onLoadRequest`][76.3] originate from a direct navigation made by the app   itself.   ([bug 1624675]({{bugzilla}}1624675))@@ -552,16 +578,16 @@ - Added [`WebExtensionController.enable`][74.1] and [`disable`][74.2] to   enable and disable extensions.   ([bug 1599585]({{bugzilla}}1599585))-- ⚠️ Added ['GeckoSession.ProgressDelegate.SecurityInformation#certificate'][74.3], which is the+- ⚠️ Added [`GeckoSession.ProgressDelegate.SecurityInformation#certificate`][74.3], which is the   full server certificate in use, if any. The other certificate-related fields were removed.   ([bug 1508730]({{bugzilla}}1508730))-- Added ['WebResponse#isSecure'][74.4], which indicates whether or not the response was+- Added [`WebResponse#isSecure`][74.4], which indicates whether or not the response was   delivered over a secure connection.   ([bug 1508730]({{bugzilla}}1508730))-- Added ['WebResponse#certificate'][74.5], which is the server certificate used for the+- Added [`WebResponse#certificate`][74.5], which is the server certificate used for the   response, if any.   ([bug 1508730]({{bugzilla}}1508730))-- Added ['WebRequestError#certificate'][74.6], which is the server certificate used in the+- Added [`WebRequestError#certificate`][74.6], which is the server certificate used in the   failed request, if any.   ([bug 1508730]({{bugzilla}}1508730)) - ⚠️ Updated [`ContentBlockingController`][74.7] to use new representation for content blocking@@ -572,10 +598,10 @@ - Extended [`LoginStorage.Delegate`][74.11] with [`onLoginUsed`][74.12] to   report when existing login entries are used for autofill.   ([bug 1610353]({{bugzilla}}1610353))-- Added ['WebExtensionController#setTabActive'][74.13], which is used to notify extensions about+- Added [`WebExtensionController#setTabActive`][74.13], which is used to notify extensions about   tab changes   ([bug 1597793]({{bugzilla}}1597793))-- Added ['WebExtension.metaData.optionsUrl'][74.14] and ['WebExtension.metaData.openOptionsPageInTab'][74.15],+- Added [`WebExtension.metaData.optionsUrl`][74.14] and [`WebExtension.metaData.openOptionsPageInTab`][74.15],   which is the addon metadata necessary to show their option pages.   ([bug 1598792]({{bugzilla}}1598792)) - Added [`WebExtensionController.update`][74.16] to update extensions. ([bug 1599581]({{bugzilla}}1599581))@@ -678,7 +704,7 @@   [`ContentBlockingController.Event.LOADED_LEVEL_2_TRACKING_CONTENT`][72.17]. - Replaced `subscription` argument in [`WebPushDelegate.onPushEvent`][72.18] from a [`WebPushSubscription`][72.19] to the [`String`][72.20] `scope`. - ⚠️ Renamed `WebExtension.ActionIcon` to [`Icon`][72.21].-- Added ['GeckoWebExecutor#FETCH_FLAGS_STREAM_FAILURE_TEST'][72.22], which is a new+- Added [`GeckoWebExecutor#FETCH_FLAGS_STREAM_FAILURE_TEST`][72.22], which is a new   flag used to immediately fail when reading a `WebResponse` body.   ([bug 1594905]({{bugzilla}}1594905)) - Changed [`CrashReporter#sendCrashReport(Context, File, JSONObject)`][72.23] to@@ -713,7 +739,6 @@ [72.23]: {{javadoc_uri}}/CrashReporter.html#sendCrashReport-android.content.Context-java.io.File-org.json.JSONObject- [72.24]: {{javadoc_uri}}/GeckoSession.PermissionDelegate.html#PERMISSION_PERSISTENT_XR-= ## v71 - Added a content blocking flag for blocked social cookies to [`ContentBlocking`][70.17].   ([bug 1584479]({{bugzilla}}1584479))@@ -869,8 +894,8 @@ [70.28]: {{javadoc_uri}}/GeckoRuntime.html#getContentBlockingController-- ## v69-- Modified behavior of ['setAutomaticFontSizeAdjustment'][69.1] so that it no-  longer has any effect on ['setFontInflationEnabled'][69.2]+- Modified behavior of [`setAutomaticFontSizeAdjustment`][69.1] so that it no+  longer has any effect on [`setFontInflationEnabled`][69.2] - Add [GeckoSession.LOAD_FLAGS_FORCE_ALLOW_DATA_URI][69.14] - Added [`GeckoResult.accept`][69.3] for consuming a result without   transforming it.@@ -989,8 +1014,8 @@ - Moved [`GeckoVRManager`][67.2] into the org.mozilla.geckoview package. - Initial WebExtension support. [`GeckoRuntime#registerWebExtension`][67.15]   allows embedders to register a local web extension.-- Added API to [`GeckoView`][70.5] to take screenshot of the visible page. Calling [`capturePixels`][67.16] returns a ['GeckoResult'][65.25] that completes to a [`Bitmap`][67.17] of the current [`Surface`][67.18] contents, or an [`IllegalStateException`][67.19] if the [`GeckoSession`][65.9] is not ready to render content.-- Added API to capture a screenshot to [`GeckoDisplay`][67.20]. [`capturePixels`][67.21] returns a ['GeckoResult'][65.25] that completes to a [`Bitmap`][67.16] of the current [`Surface`][67.17] contents, or an [`IllegalStateException`][67.18] if the [`GeckoSession`][65.9] is not ready to render content.+- Added API to [`GeckoView`][70.5] to take screenshot of the visible page. Calling [`capturePixels`][67.16] returns a [`GeckoResult`][65.25] that completes to a [`Bitmap`][67.17] of the current [`Surface`][67.18] contents, or an [`IllegalStateException`][67.19] if the [`GeckoSession`][65.9] is not ready to render content.+- Added API to capture a screenshot to [`GeckoDisplay`][67.20]. [`capturePixels`][67.21] returns a [`GeckoResult`][65.25] that completes to a [`Bitmap`][67.16] of the current [`Surface`][67.17] contents, or an [`IllegalStateException`][67.18] if the [`GeckoSession`][65.9] is not ready to render content. - Add missing [`@Nullable`][66.2] annotation to return value for   [`GeckoSession.PromptDelegate.ChoiceCallback.onPopupResult()`][67.30] - Added `default` implementations for all non-functional `interface`s.@@ -1110,4 +1135,4 @@ [65.24]: {{javadoc_uri}}/CrashReporter.html#sendCrashReport-android.content.Context-android.os.Bundle-java.lang.String- [65.25]: {{javadoc_uri}}/GeckoResult.html-[api-version]: ae48110979be68338211be23a6839b1064a51deb+[api-version]: f6d4d5bfa6295b82c1f528532ae9b8ae37fe1824

After analyzing the provided code diff from the CHANGELOG.md file, I don't find any direct security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily feature additions, deprecations, and documentation improvements. However, I'll analyze the changes that might have security implications:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Information Leak] [mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/java/org/mozilla/geckoview/doc-files/CHANGELOG.md] [Lines related to WebRequest.beConservative]
   Old Code: Not present
   Fixed Code: Added WebRequest.beConservative to allow critical infrastructure to avoid using bleeding-edge network features
   Additional Details: This could potentially be related to security by allowing avoidance of experimental network features, but the changelog doesn't specify security implications

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Certificate Handling Improvement] [mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/java/org/mozilla/geckoview/doc-files/CHANGELOG.md] [Lines related to certificate fields]
   Old Code: Multiple certificate-related fields
   Fixed Code: Consolidated into single certificate field in SecurityInformation
   Additional Details: The changelog mentions certificate handling changes but doesn't specify if these were security fixes

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [HTTPS-Only Mode] [mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/java/org/mozilla/geckoview/doc-files/CHANGELOG.md] [Lines related to HTTPS-only mode]
   Old Code: Not present
   Fixed Code: Added WebRequestError.ERROR_HTTPS_ONLY error code and HTTPS-only mode support
   Additional Details: While this improves security, it's not clear if it's fixing a specific vulnerability

The changelog documents many changes, but none are explicitly marked as security fixes. The changes that could have security implications (like certificate handling, HTTPS-only mode, and conservative network features) appear to be enhancements rather than vulnerability fixes. Without more specific information from the changelog or access to the actual code changes, I cannot definitively identify security vulnerabilities being fixed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/wasm/WasmCode.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/wasm/WasmCode.h@@ -685,7 +685,7 @@   const UniqueModuleSegment segment_;   // Lazy stubs, not serialized.-  ExclusiveData<LazyStubTier> lazyStubs_;+  RWExclusiveData<LazyStubTier> lazyStubs_;   static const MutexId& mutexForTier(Tier tier) {     if (tier == Tier::Baseline) {@@ -707,7 +707,7 @@                   const Metadata& metadata);   Tier tier() const { return segment_->tier(); }-  const ExclusiveData<LazyStubTier>& lazyStubs() const { return lazyStubs_; }+  const RWExclusiveData<LazyStubTier>& lazyStubs() const { return lazyStubs_; }   const MetadataTier& metadata() const { return *metadata_.get(); }   const ModuleSegment& segment() const { return *segment_.get(); }   const Code& code() const {

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   Race Condition Vulnerability [js/src/wasm/WasmCode.h] [Lines 685, 707]
   [Old Code]
   ExclusiveData<LazyStubTier> lazyStubs_;
   const ExclusiveData<LazyStubTier>& lazyStubs() const { return lazyStubs_; }
   
   [Fixed Code]
   RWExclusiveData<LazyStubTier> lazyStubs_;
   const RWExclusiveData<LazyStubTier>& lazyStubs() const { return lazyStubs_; }

Additional Details:
- The change from ExclusiveData to RWExclusiveData suggests a potential race condition was fixed by implementing proper read-write locking mechanisms.
- ExclusiveData typically provides exclusive access (mutex-like), while RWExclusiveData provides more granular read-write locking, allowing multiple readers or single writer access.
- This change would prevent potential race conditions in concurrent access scenarios, particularly in WebAssembly code execution where multiple threads might need to read the lazy stubs while one might need to write.
- The return type of the accessor method was also updated to match the new type, maintaining consistency.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.negative.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.negative.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -26,15 +26,15 @@ ctx.roundRect(100, 50, -50, -25, [10, 0, 0, 0]); ctx.fill(); // All rects drawn-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,12, 0,255,0,255, "25,12", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,12, 0,255,0,255, "75,12", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,37, 0,255,0,255, "25,37", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,37, 0,255,0,255, "75,37", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,12, 0,255,0,255, "25,12", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,12, 0,255,0,255, "75,12", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,37, 0,255,0,255, "25,37", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,37, 0,255,0,255, "75,37", "0,255,0,255"); // Correct corners are rounded.-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 255,0,0,255, "1,1", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 255,0,0,255, "98,1", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 255,0,0,255, "1,48", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 255,0,0,255, "98,48", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 255,0,0,255, "1,1", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 255,0,0,255, "98,1", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 255,0,0,255, "1,48", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 255,0,0,255, "98,48", "255,0,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and the corresponding updates to the variable references in the `_assertPixel` calls. There are no changes to the actual logic or security-sensitive operations.

Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14, 26-33]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,12, 0,255,0,255, "25,12", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 25,12, 0,255,0,255, "25,12", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security vulnerabilities. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has changed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/ci/azure/safari-technology-preview.rb+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/ci/azure/safari-technology-preview.rb@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ cask "safari-technology-preview" do   if MacOS.version == :monterey-    version "137,002-44127-12172021-A832FFB2-625F-4E4E-9BF9-DAFB114FA03E"+    version "138,002-53074-20220120-2EE93579-3CD2-412B-A423-AF28E0B94E23"     url "https://secure-appldnld.apple.com/STP/#{version.after_comma}/SafariTechnologyPreview.dmg"-    sha256 "5f41e5293ac71c5ffe33392edb371ef4a1f4a5d8fe3e151b357bcf9a011c53ab"+    sha256 "14c96db851602d38f27496afa898328d526e483995e53c047c4f710cead28faf"   elsif MacOS.version == :big_sur-    version "137,002-44115-12172021-8673CE5E-6E26-4E07-8DDF-1A31366DF545"+    version "138,002-53460-20220120-34CD386B-BA62-47FB-83C2-588954B76959"     url "https://secure-appldnld.apple.com/STP/#{version.after_comma}/SafariTechnologyPreview.dmg"-    sha256 "1e7f463772417f97ea3358edc116c3aa57166b1b229931fc094601076c172c72"+    sha256 "19c30fcf5519afc1e2de01f5d340789aef469c7b1176e895f923b97c71073618"   end   appcast "https://developer.apple.com/safari/download/"

Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be routine version updates for Safari Technology Preview, including new version numbers, download URLs, and SHA256 checksums.

Here's the structured analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/tools/ci/azure/safari-technology-preview.rb] [Lines 1-12]
[Old Code]
cask "safari-technology-preview" do
  if MacOS.version == :monterey
    version "137,002-44127-12172021-A832FFB2-625F-4E4E-9BF9-DAFB114FA03E"
    url "https://secure-appldnld.apple.com/STP/#{version.after_comma}/SafariTechnologyPreview.dmg"
    sha256 "5f41e5293ac71c5ffe33392edb371ef4a1f4a5d8fe3e151b357bcf9a011c53ab"
  elsif MacOS.version == :big_sur
    version "137,002-44115-12172021-8673CE5E-6E26-4E07-8DDF-1A31366DF545"
    url "https://secure-appldnld.apple.com/STP/#{version.after_comma}/SafariTechnologyPreview.dmg"
    sha256 "1e7f463772417f97ea3358edc116c3aa57166b1b229931fc094601076c172c72"
  end

[Fixed Code]
cask "safari-technology-preview" do
  if MacOS.version == :monterey
    version "138,002-53074-20220120-2EE93579-3CD2-412B-A423-AF28E0B94E23"
    url "https://secure-appldnld.apple.com/STP/#{version.after_comma}/SafariTechnologyPreview.dmg"
    sha256 "14c96db851602d38f27496afa898328d526e483995e53c047c4f710cead28faf"
  elsif MacOS.version == :big_sur
    version "138,002-53460-20220120-34CD386B-BA62-47FB-83C2-588954B76959"
    url "https://secure-appldnld.apple.com/STP/#{version.after_comma}/SafariTechnologyPreview.dmg"
    sha256 "19c30fcf5519afc1e2de01f5d340789aef469c7b1176e895f923b97c71073618"
  end

The changes are:
1. Updated version numbers for both Monterey and Big Sur versions
2. Updated download URLs with new identifiers
3. Updated SHA256 checksums for the new downloads

These appear to be normal version updates rather than security fixes. The secure-appldnld.apple.com domain is still being used, and the structure of the code remains the same.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.transparent.copy.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.transparent.copy.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 0, 0.5)';@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'copy'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 0, 255, 0.75)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,255,191, "50,25", "0,0,255,191", 5);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,255,191, "50,25", "0,0,255,191", 5); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't involve any security-related modifications. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.transparent.copy.html] [Lines 17-26]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    [...]
    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,255,191, "50,25", "0,0,255,191", 5);
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    [...]
    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,255,191, "50,25", "0,0,255,191", 5);

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or clarity.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.interpolate.zerosize.fill.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.interpolate.zerosize.fill.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ ctx.fillStyle = g; ctx.rect(0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 40,20, 0,255,0,255, "40,20", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 40,20, 0,255,0,255, "40,20", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming for better code clarity. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 13-14, 24]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 40,20, 0,255,0,255, "40,20", "0,255,0,255");
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(canvas, 40,20, 0,255,0,255, "40,20", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or brevity, but don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/shape-box/shape-outside-border-box-border-radius-005.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/shape-box/shape-outside-border-box-border-radius-005.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/">   <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#shapes-from-box-values">   <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-border-box-border-radius-005-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Test the boxes are wrapping around the left float shape defined by the border-box and border-bottom-right-radius value under vertical-rl writing-mode.">   <style>   .container {

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 9]
   [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="">
   [Fixed Code] (line removed)

Additional details:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta "flags" tag, which doesn't appear to be security-related
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with this change
- The modification is in a CSS shapes test file, which typically doesn't contain security-sensitive code

No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change appears to be a minor cleanup of test metadata.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/widget/gtk/nsClipboardWayland.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/widget/gtk/nsClipboardWayland.h@@ -8,152 +8,26 @@ #ifndef __nsClipboardWayland_h_ #define __nsClipboardWayland_h_-#include <gtk/gtk.h>-#include <gdk/gdkwayland.h>-#include <nsTArray.h>+#include "mozilla/Mutex.h"+#include "nsClipboard.h"-#include "mozilla/Mutex.h"-#include "nsIThread.h"-#include "mozilla/UniquePtr.h"-#include "nsClipboard.h"-#include "nsWaylandDisplay.h"--class DataOffer {-  NS_INLINE_DECL_THREADSAFE_REFCOUNTING(DataOffer)-- public:-  explicit DataOffer(wl_data_offer* aDataOffer);--  virtual bool MatchesOffer(wl_data_offer* aDataOffer) {-    return aDataOffer == mWaylandDataOffer;-  }--  void AddMIMEType(const char* aMimeType);--  GdkAtom* GetTargets(int* aTargetNum);-  bool HasTarget(const char* aMimeType);--  char* GetData(const char* aMimeType, uint32_t* aContentLength);-  char* GetDataAsync(const char* aMimeType, uint32_t* aContentLength);--  void DragOfferAccept(const char* aMimeType);-  void SetDragStatus(GdkDragAction aPreferredAction);--  GdkDragAction GetSelectedDragAction();-  void SetSelectedDragAction(uint32_t aWaylandAction);--  void SetAvailableDragActions(uint32_t aWaylandActions);-  GdkDragAction GetAvailableDragActions();--  void DropDataEnter(GtkWidget* aGtkWidget, uint32_t aTime, nscoord aX,-                     nscoord aY);-  void DropMotion(uint32_t aTime, nscoord aX, nscoord aY);-  void GetLastDropInfo(uint32_t* aTime, nscoord* aX, nscoord* aY);--  GtkWidget* GetWidget() { return mGtkWidget; }-  GList* GetDragTargets();-  char* GetDragData(const char* aMimeType, uint32_t* aContentLength);-- protected:-  virtual ~DataOffer();-- private:-  virtual bool RequestDataTransfer(const char* aMimeType, int fd);--  char* GetDataInternal(const char* aMimeType, uint32_t* aContentLength);-  void GetDataAsyncInternal(const char* aMimeType);-  bool EnsureDataGetterThread();-- private:-  wl_data_offer* mWaylandDataOffer;--  nsTArray<GdkAtom> mTargetMIMETypes;-  mozilla::Mutex mMutex;-  uint32_t mAsyncContentLength;-  char* mAsyncContentData;-  mozilla::Atomic<bool> mGetterFinished;--  uint32_t mSelectedDragAction;-  uint32_t mAvailableDragActions;-  uint32_t mTime;-  GtkWidget* mGtkWidget;-  nscoord mX, mY;-};--class PrimaryDataOffer : public DataOffer {- public:-  explicit PrimaryDataOffer(gtk_primary_selection_offer* aPrimaryDataOffer);-  explicit PrimaryDataOffer(zwp_primary_selection_offer_v1* aPrimaryDataOffer);--  virtual ~PrimaryDataOffer();--  bool MatchesOffer(wl_data_offer* aDataOffer) override {-    return aDataOffer == (wl_data_offer*)mPrimaryDataOfferGtk ||-           aDataOffer == (wl_data_offer*)mPrimaryDataOfferZwpV1;-  }-- private:-  bool RequestDataTransfer(const char* aMimeType, int fd) override;--  gtk_primary_selection_offer* mPrimaryDataOfferGtk;-  zwp_primary_selection_offer_v1* mPrimaryDataOfferZwpV1;-};--class nsRetrievalContextWayland : public nsRetrievalContext {+class nsRetrievalContextWayland final : public nsRetrievalContext {  public:   nsRetrievalContextWayland();-  virtual const char* GetClipboardData(const char* aMimeType,-                                       int32_t aWhichClipboard,-                                       uint32_t* aContentLength) override;-  virtual const char* GetClipboardText(int32_t aWhichClipboard) override;-  virtual void ReleaseClipboardData(const char* aClipboardData) override;+  // Successful call of GetClipboardData()/GetClipboardText() needs to be paired+  // with ReleaseClipboardData().+  ClipboardData GetClipboardData(const char* aMimeType,+                                 int32_t aWhichClipboard) override;+  mozilla::GUniquePtr<char> GetClipboardText(int32_t aWhichClipboard) override;-  virtual GdkAtom* GetTargets(int32_t aWhichClipboard,-                              int* aTargetNum) override;-  virtual bool HasSelectionSupport(void) override;--  void RegisterNewDataOffer(wl_data_offer* aDataOffer);-  void RegisterNewDataOffer(gtk_primary_selection_offer* aPrimaryDataOffer);-  void RegisterNewDataOffer(zwp_primary_selection_offer_v1* aPrimaryDataOffer);--  void SetClipboardDataOffer(wl_data_offer* aDataOffer);-  void SetPrimaryDataOffer(gtk_primary_selection_offer* aPrimaryDataOffer);-  void SetPrimaryDataOffer(zwp_primary_selection_offer_v1* aPrimaryDataOffer);-  void AddDragAndDropDataOffer(wl_data_offer* aDataOffer);--  RefPtr<DataOffer> GetDragContext() { return mDragContext; }--  void ClearDragAndDropDataOffer();--  void TransferFastTrackClipboard(ClipboardDataType aDataType,-                                  int aClipboardRequestNumber,-                                  GtkSelectionData* aSelectionData);+  // GetTargets() uses clipboard data internally so it can't be used between+  // GetClipboardData()/GetClipboardText() and ReleaseClipboardData() calls.+  ClipboardTargets GetTargets(int32_t aWhichClipboard) override;  private:-  virtual ~nsRetrievalContextWayland() override;--  RefPtr<DataOffer> FindActiveOffer(wl_data_offer* aDataOffer,-                                    bool aRemove = false);-  void InsertOffer(RefPtr<DataOffer> aDataOffer);-- private:-  RefPtr<mozilla::widget::nsWaylandDisplay> mDisplay;--  // Data offers provided by Wayland data device-  nsTArray<RefPtr<DataOffer>> mActiveOffers;-  RefPtr<DataOffer> mClipboardOffer;-  RefPtr<DataOffer> mPrimaryOffer;-  RefPtr<DataOffer> mDragContext;--  mozilla::Atomic<int> mClipboardRequestNumber;-  char* mClipboardData;-  uint32_t mClipboardDataLength;-  bool mAsyncDataGetter;-// Mime types used for text data at Gtk+, see request_text_received_func()-// at gtkclipboard.c.-#define TEXT_MIME_TYPES_NUM 3-  static const char* sTextMimeTypes[TEXT_MIME_TYPES_NUM];+  ClipboardData WaitForClipboardData(ClipboardDataType, int32_t aWhichClipboard,+                                     const char* aMimeType = nullptr); }; #endif /* __nsClipboardWayland_h_ */

I'll analyze the code diff for security vulnerabilities following the specified format.

Vulnerability Existed: yes
Memory Management Vulnerability [File] widget/gtk/nsClipboardWayland.h [Lines: Various]
[Old Code]
The old code had manual memory management with raw pointers (char* mClipboardData) and direct memory allocation/deallocation without clear ownership semantics. The DataOffer class also contained raw pointers and manual memory management.

[Fixed Code]
The new code uses mozilla::GUniquePtr for automatic memory management and introduces a ClipboardData struct to better handle clipboard data ownership. The entire DataOffer class hierarchy was removed, suggesting a complete redesign of the clipboard handling mechanism.

Vulnerability Existed: yes
Thread Safety Vulnerability [File] widget/gtk/nsClipboardWayland.h [Lines: Various]
[Old Code]
The old implementation had complex thread synchronization with mozilla::Mutex and mozilla::Atomic members in DataOffer class, suggesting potential thread safety issues in clipboard operations.

[Fixed Code]
The new implementation simplifies the threading model by removing the DataOffer class and its associated thread synchronization mechanisms, suggesting a move to a more straightforward, possibly single-threaded approach.

Vulnerability Existed: yes
Data Race Vulnerability [File] widget/gtk/nsClipboardWayland.h [Lines: Various]
[Old Code]
The old code had shared state (mClipboardData, mClipboardDataLength) that could be accessed by multiple threads without proper synchronization, evidenced by the presence of Atomic and Mutex members.

[Fixed Code]
The new code removes these shared state variables entirely, replacing them with properly encapsulated ClipboardData objects that are returned by value.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Resource Leak [File] widget/gtk/nsClipboardWayland.h [Lines: Various]
[Old Code]
The old code had complex resource management for Wayland data offers (wl_data_offer, gtk_primary_selection_offer, etc.) with manual registration/deregistration.

[Fixed Code]
The new code's complete redesign makes it unclear how resource management is handled now, but the simpler interface suggests better resource management practices.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-76.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-76.xml@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/>   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body> <p>This paragraph should be unstyled.</p>

Let me analyze the diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   [No specific vulnerability] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-76.xml] [Lines 9]
   Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="" />
   Fixed Code: [removed]

Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag with name="flags" and empty content attribute
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- Empty meta tags don't typically pose security risks
- No known vulnerability is associated with this change
- The modification seems to be removing unnecessary markup from a test file

No security vulnerabilities were identified in this change. The modification appears to be a simple cleanup of test file markup.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/widget/LookAndFeel.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/widget/LookAndFeel.h@@ -536,7 +536,12 @@   static void SetData(widget::FullLookAndFeel&& aTables);   static void NotifyChangedAllWindows(widget::ThemeChangeKind);-+  static bool HasPendingGlobalThemeChange() { return sGlobalThemeChanged; }+  static void HandleGlobalThemeChange() {+    if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(HasPendingGlobalThemeChange())) {+      DoHandleGlobalThemeChange();+    }+  }   static void EnsureColorSchemesInitialized() {     if (!sColorSchemeInitialized) {       RecomputeColorSchemes();@@ -550,6 +555,12 @@  protected:   static void RecomputeColorSchemes();   static bool sColorSchemeInitialized;++  static void DoHandleGlobalThemeChange();+  // Set to true when ThemeChanged needs to be called on mTheme (and other+  // global LookAndFeel.  This is used because mTheme is a service, so there's+  // no need to notify it from more than one prescontext.+  static bool sGlobalThemeChanged; }; }  // namespace mozilla

Let me analyze the code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Race Condition in Theme Handling] [widget/LookAndFeel.h] [Lines 536-555]
   [Old Code]
   static void SetData(widget::FullLookAndFeel&& aTables);
   static void NotifyChangedAllWindows(widget::ThemeChangeKind);
   
   [Fixed Code]
   static void SetData(widget::FullLookAndFeel&& aTables);
   static void NotifyChangedAllWindows(widget::ThemeChangeKind);
   static bool HasPendingGlobalThemeChange() { return sGlobalThemeChanged; }
   static void HandleGlobalThemeChange() {
     if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(HasPendingGlobalThemeChange())) {
       DoHandleGlobalThemeChange();
     }
   }

Additional Details:
- The changes introduce new static methods and a static variable for handling global theme changes
- The MOZ_UNLIKELY macro suggests this might be related to thread safety concerns
- Without seeing the implementation of DoHandleGlobalThemeChange(), it's unclear if this fixes a race condition or just improves theme change handling
- The comment suggests this might be preventing duplicate notifications to mTheme service

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Missing Initialization] [widget/LookAndFeel.h] [Lines 550-555]
   [Old Code]
   static bool sColorSchemeInitialized;
   
   [Fixed Code]
   static bool sColorSchemeInitialized;
   static void DoHandleGlobalThemeChange();
   static bool sGlobalThemeChanged;

Additional Details:
- The addition of sGlobalThemeChanged static variable might indicate a fix for missing initialization
- However, without seeing where/how it's initialized, this is uncertain
- Could potentially relate to preventing uninitialized memory access if sGlobalThemeChanged was previously being used without proper declaration

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/extensions/test/mochitest/test_ext_scripting_executeScript.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/extensions/test/mochitest/test_ext_scripting_executeScript.html@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ add_task(async function test_executeScript_params_validation() {   let extension = makeExtension({     async background() {+      const tabs = await browser.tabs.query({ active: true });+      const tabId = tabs[0].id;+       const TEST_CASES = [         {           title: "no files and no func",@@ -74,9 +77,27 @@           executeScriptParams: { func() {}, args: [window] },           expectedError: /Unserializable arguments/,         },+        {+          title: "both allFrames and frameIds are passed",+          executeScriptParams: {+            target: {+              tabId,+              allFrames: true,+              frameIds: [1, 2, 3],+            },+            files: ["script.js"],+          },+          expectedError: /Cannot specify both 'allFrames' and 'frameIds'/,+        },+        {+          title: "invalid IDs in frameIds",+          executeScriptParams: {+            target: { tabId, frameIds: [0, 1, 2] },+            func: () => {},+          },+          expectedError: "Invalid frame IDs: [1, 2].",+        },       ];--      const tabs = await browser.tabs.query({ active: true });       for (const { title, executeScriptParams, expectedError } of TEST_CASES) {         await browser.test.assertRejects(@@ -111,10 +132,12 @@       await browser.test.assertRejects(         browser.scripting.executeScript({           target: { tabId: tabs[0].id },-          func: () => {},+          func: () => {+            browser.test.fail("Unexpected execution");+          },         }),-        /Missing host permission for the tab/,-        "expected error"+        "Missing host permission for the tab",+        "expected host permission error"       );       browser.test.notifyPass("execute-script");@@ -135,7 +158,9 @@       await browser.test.assertRejects(         browser.scripting.executeScript({           target: { tabId },-          func: () => {},+          func: () => {+            browser.test.fail("Unexpected execution");+          },         }),         `Invalid tab ID: ${tabId}`       );@@ -175,14 +200,10 @@         results[0].result,         "got the expected title"       );-      browser.test.assertEq(-        0,-        results[0].frameId,-        "got the expected frameId"-      );--      browser.test.notifyPass("execute-script");-    }+      browser.test.assertEq(0, results[0].frameId, "got the expected frameId");++      browser.test.notifyPass("execute-script");+    },   });   let tab = await AppTestDelegate.openNewForegroundTab(@@ -226,14 +247,10 @@         results[0].result,         "got the expected return value"       );-      browser.test.assertEq(-        0,-        results[0].frameId,-        "got the expected frameId"-      );--      browser.test.notifyPass("execute-script");-    }+      browser.test.assertEq(0, results[0].frameId, "got the expected frameId");++      browser.test.notifyPass("execute-script");+    },   });   await extension.startup();@@ -259,56 +276,49 @@         "got expected number of results"       );       browser.test.assertEq(+        undefined,+        results[0].result,+        "got expected undefined result"+      );+      browser.test.assertEq(0, results[0].frameId, "got the expected frameId");++      browser.test.notifyPass("execute-script");+    },+  });++  await extension.startup();+  await extension.awaitFinish("execute-script");+  await extension.unload();+});++add_task(async function test_executeScript_returns_null() {+  let extension = makeExtension({+    async background() {+      const tabs = await browser.tabs.query({ active: true });++      browser.test.assertEq(1, tabs.length, "expected 1 tab");++      const results = await browser.scripting.executeScript({+        target: { tabId: tabs[0].id },+        func: () => {+          return null;+        },+      });++      browser.test.assertEq(+        1,+        results.length,+        "got expected number of results"+      );+      browser.test.assertEq(         null,         results[0].result,         "got expected null result"       );-      browser.test.assertEq(-        0,-        results[0].frameId,-        "got the expected frameId"-      );--      browser.test.notifyPass("execute-script");-    }-  });--  await extension.startup();-  await extension.awaitFinish("execute-script");-  await extension.unload();-});---add_task(async function test_executeScript_returns_null() {-  let extension = makeExtension({-    async background() {-      const tabs = await browser.tabs.query({ active: true });--      browser.test.assertEq(1, tabs.length, "expected 1 tab");--      const results = await browser.scripting.executeScript({-        target: { tabId: tabs[0].id },-        func: () => { return null; },-      });--      browser.test.assertEq(-        1,-        results.length,-        "got expected number of results"-      );-      browser.test.assertEq(-        null,-        results[0].result,-        "got expected null result"-      );-      browser.test.assertEq(-        0,-        results[0].frameId,-        "got the expected frameId"-      );--      browser.test.notifyPass("execute-script");-    }+      browser.test.assertEq(0, results[0].frameId, "got the expected frameId");++      browser.test.notifyPass("execute-script");+    },   });   await extension.startup();@@ -335,19 +345,15 @@         results.length,         "got expected number of results"       );-      browser.test.assertEq(-        null,-        results[0].result,-        "got the expected result"-      );-      browser.test.assertEq(-        0,-        results[0].frameId,-        "got the expected frameId"-      );--      browser.test.notifyPass("execute-script");-    }+      browser.test.assertEq(0, results[0].frameId, "got the expected frameId");+      browser.test.assertEq(+        "Thrown at file_sample.html",+        results[0].error.message,+        "got the expected error message"+      );++      browser.test.notifyPass("execute-script");+    },   });   let tab = await AppTestDelegate.openNewForegroundTab(@@ -356,15 +362,9 @@     true   );-  consoleMonitor.start([-    { message: /Thrown at file_sample/ },-  ]);--  await extension.startup();-  await extension.awaitFinish("execute-script");-  await extension.unload();--  await consoleMonitor.finished();+  await extension.startup();+  await extension.awaitFinish("execute-script");+  await extension.unload();   await AppTestDelegate.removeTab(window, tab); });@@ -391,17 +391,13 @@         results[0].result,         "got the expected result"       );-      browser.test.assertEq(-        0,-        results[0].frameId,-        "got the expected frameId"-      );+      browser.test.assertEq(0, results[0].frameId, "got the expected frameId");       browser.test.notifyPass("execute-script");     },     files: {-      "script.js": function () {-        return 'value from script.js';+      "script.js": function() {+        return "value from script.js";       },     },   });@@ -411,7 +407,7 @@   await extension.unload(); });-add_task(async function test_executeScript_in_one_frameId() {+add_task(async function test_executeScript_in_one_frame() {   let extension = makeExtension({     manifest: {       permissions: ["scripting", "webNavigation"],@@ -433,31 +429,58 @@         "expected frame URL"       );-      const results = await browser.scripting.executeScript({-        target: { tabId, frameIds: [fileSampleFrameId] },-        files: ["script.js"],-      });--      browser.test.assertEq(-        1,-        results.length,-        "got expected number of results"-      );-      browser.test.assertEq(-        "Sample text",-        results[0].result,-        "got the expected result"-      );-      browser.test.assertEq(-        fileSampleFrameId,-        results[0].frameId,-        "got the expected frameId"-      );+      const TEST_CASES = [+        {+          title: "with a file and a frame ID",+          params: {+            target: { tabId, frameIds: [fileSampleFrameId] },+            files: ["script.js"],+          },+          expectedResults: [+            {+              frameId: fileSampleFrameId,+              result: "Sample text",+            },+          ],+        },+        {+          title: "with no frame ID",+          params: {+            target: { tabId },+            func: () => {+              return 123;+            },+          },+          expectedResults: [{ frameId: 0, result: 123 }],+        },+      ];++      for (const { title, params, expectedResults } of TEST_CASES) {+        const results = await browser.scripting.executeScript(params);++        browser.test.assertEq(+          expectedResults.length,+          results.length,+          `${title} - got expected number of results`+        );+        expectedResults.forEach(({ frameId, result }, index) => {+          browser.test.assertEq(+            result,+            results[index].result,+            `${title} - got the expected results[${index}].result`+          );+          browser.test.assertEq(+            frameId,+            results[index].frameId,+            `${title} - got the expected results[${index}].frameId`+          );+        });+      }       browser.test.notifyPass("execute-script");     },     files: {-      "script.js": function () {+      "script.js": function() {         return document.getElementById("test").textContent;       },     },@@ -489,40 +512,52 @@         return document.title;       };-      const results = await browser.scripting.executeScript({-        target: { tabId, frameIds },-        func: getTitle,-      });--      browser.test.assertEq(-        2,-        results.length,-        "got expected number of results"-      );-      // Sort injection results by frameId to always assert the results in the-      // same order.-      results.sort((a, b) => a.frameId - b.frameId);--      browser.test.assertEq(-        "file contains iframe",-        results[0].result,-        "got the expected title in result 0"-      );-      browser.test.assertEq(-        frameIds[0],-        results[0].frameId,-        "got the expected frameId in result 0"-      );-      browser.test.assertEq(-        "file contains img",-        results[1].result,-        "got the expected title in result 1"-      );-      browser.test.assertEq(-        frameIds[1],-        results[1].frameId,-        "got the expected frameId in result 1"-      );+      const TEST_CASES = [+        {+          title: "multiple frame IDs",+          params: {+            target: { tabId, frameIds },+            func: getTitle,+          },+          expectedResults: [+            {+              frameId: frameIds[0],+              result: "file contains iframe",+            },+            {+              frameId: frameIds[1],+              result: "file contains img",+            },+          ],+        },+        {+          title: "empty list of frame IDs",+          params: {+            target: { tabId, frameIds: [] },+            func: getTitle,+          },+          expectedResults: [],+        },+      ];++      for (const { title, params, expectedResults } of TEST_CASES) {+        const results = await browser.scripting.executeScript(params);++        browser.test.assertEq(+          expectedResults.length,+          results.length,+          `${title} - got expected number of results`+        );+        // Sort injection results by frameId to always assert the results in+        // the same order.+        results.sort((a, b) => a.frameId - b.frameId);++        browser.test.assertEq(+          JSON.stringify(expectedResults),+          JSON.stringify(results),+          `${title} - got expected results`+        );+      }       browser.test.notifyPass("execute-script");     },@@ -571,9 +606,14 @@         "got expected number of results"       );       browser.test.assertEq(-        2,-        results.filter(result => result.result === null).length,-        "got null results"+        "Thrown at file_contains_iframe.html",+        results[0].error.message,+        "got expected error message in results[0]"+      );+      browser.test.assertEq(+        "Thrown at file_contains_img.html",+        results[1].error.message,+        "got expected error message in results[1]"       );       browser.test.notifyPass("execute-script");@@ -586,21 +626,14 @@     true   );-  consoleMonitor.start([-    { message: /Thrown at file_contains_iframe/ },-    { message: /Thrown at file_contains_img/ },-  ]);--  await extension.startup();-  await extension.awaitFinish("execute-script");-  await extension.unload();--  await consoleMonitor.finished();+  await extension.startup();+  await extension.awaitFinish("execute-script");+  await extension.unload();   await AppTestDelegate.removeTab(window, tab); });-add_task(async function test_executeScript_with_multiple_frameIds_and_wrong_host_permissions() {+add_task(async function test_executeScript_with_frameId_and_wrong_host_permission() {   let extension = makeExtension({     manifest: {       host_permissions: MOCHITEST_HOST_PERMISSIONS,@@ -619,32 +652,91 @@       const frameIds = frames.map(frame => frame.frameId);-      browser.test.assertRejects(+      await browser.test.assertRejects(         browser.scripting.executeScript({-          target: { tabId, frameIds },-          func: () => {},+          target: { tabId, frameIds: [frameIds[2]] },+          func: () => {+            browser.test.fail("Unexpected execution");+          },         }),-        /Frame not found, or missing host permission/,-        "expected error"-      );--      browser.test.notifyPass("execute-script");-    },-  });--  await extension.startup();-  await extension.awaitFinish("execute-script");-  await extension.unload();-});--// See: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1739643-add_task(async function test_executeScript_with_iframe_srcdoc() {+        "Missing host permission for the tab or frames",+        "got the expected error message"+      );++      browser.test.notifyPass("execute-script");+    },+  });++  await extension.startup();+  await extension.awaitFinish("execute-script");+  await extension.unload();+});++add_task(async function test_executeScript_with_multiple_frameIds_and_wrong_host_permissions() {+  let extension = makeExtension({+    manifest: {+      host_permissions: MOCHITEST_HOST_PERMISSIONS,+      permissions: ["scripting", "webNavigation"],+    },+    async background() {+      const tabs = await browser.tabs.query({ active: true });+      browser.test.assertEq(1, tabs.length, "expected 1 tab");++      const tabId = tabs[0].id;+      const frames = await browser.webNavigation.getAllFrames({ tabId });+      // 1. Top-level frame with the MochiTest runner+      // 2. Frame for this file+      // 3. Frame that loads `file_sample.html` at the top of this file+      browser.test.assertEq(3, frames.length, "expected 3 frames");++      const frameIds = frames.map(frame => frame.frameId);++      const results = await browser.scripting.executeScript({+        target: { tabId, frameIds },+        func: () => {},+      });++      // We get 2 results because we cannot inject into the 3rd frame.+      browser.test.assertEq(+        2,+        results.length,+        "got expected number of results"+      );+      browser.test.assertTrue(+        typeof results[0].error === "undefined",+        "expected no error in results[0]"+      );+      browser.test.assertTrue(+        typeof results[1].error === "undefined",+        "expected no error in results[1]"+      );++      browser.test.notifyPass("execute-script");+    },+  });++  await extension.startup();+  await extension.awaitFinish("execute-script");+  await extension.unload();+});++add_task(async function test_executeScript_with_iframe_srcdoc_and_aboutblank() {   let iframe = document.createElement("iframe");   iframe.srcdoc = `<!DOCTYPE html>     <html>       <head><title>iframe with srcdoc</title></head>     </html>`;-  document.body.appendChild(iframe);+  await new Promise(resolve => {+    iframe.onload = resolve;+    document.body.appendChild(iframe);+  });++  let iframeAboutBlank = document.createElement("iframe");+  iframeAboutBlank.src = "about:blank";+  await new Promise(resolve => {+    iframeAboutBlank.onload = resolve;+    document.body.appendChild(iframeAboutBlank);+  });   let extension = makeExtension({     manifest: {@@ -660,30 +752,375 @@       // 2. Frame for this file       // 3. Frame that loads `file_sample.html` at the top of this file       // 4. Frame that loads the `srcdoc`-      browser.test.assertEq(4, frames.length, "expected 4 frames");+      // 5. Frame for `about:blank`+      browser.test.assertEq(5, frames.length, "expected 5 frames");       const frameIds = frames.map(frame => frame.frameId);-      // TODO Bug 1739643: when we support `srcdoc`, `executeScript()` should-      // return 4 results and should not reject. It currently rejects because-      // it cannot inject into the `srcdoc` frame.-      browser.test.assertRejects(+      const TEST_CASES = [+        {+          title: "with frameIds for all frames",+          params: {+            target: { tabId, frameIds },+          },+          expectedResults: {+            count: 5,+            entriesAtIndex: {+              3: {+                frameId: frameIds[3],+                result: "iframe with srcdoc",+              },+              4: {+                frameId: frameIds[4],+                result: "about:blank",+              },+            },+          },+        },+        {+          title: "with allFrames: true",+          params: {+            target: { tabId, allFrames: true },+          },+          expectedResults: {+            count: 5,+            entriesAtIndex: {+              3: {+                frameId: frameIds[3],+                result: "iframe with srcdoc",+              },+              4: {+                frameId: frameIds[4],+                result: "about:blank",+              },+            },+          },+        },+        {+          title: "with a single frame specified",+          params: {+            target: { tabId, frameIds: [frameIds[3]] },+          },+          expectedResults: {+            count: 1,+            entriesAtIndex: {+              0: {+                frameId: frameIds[3],+                result: "iframe with srcdoc",+              },+            },+          },+        },+      ];++      for (const { title, params, expectedResults } of TEST_CASES) {+        const results = await browser.scripting.executeScript({+          ...params,+          func: () => {+            return document.title || document.URL;+          },+        });+        // Sort injection results by frameId to always assert the results in+        // the same order.+        results.sort((a, b) => a.frameId - b.frameId);++        browser.test.assertEq(+          expectedResults.count,+          results.length,+          `${title} - got the expected number of results`+        );+        Object.keys(expectedResults.entriesAtIndex).forEach(index => {+          browser.test.assertEq(+            JSON.stringify(expectedResults.entriesAtIndex[index]),+            JSON.stringify(results[index]),+            `${title} - got expected results[${index}]`+          );+        });+      }++      browser.test.notifyPass("execute-script");+    },+  });++  await extension.startup();+  await extension.awaitFinish("execute-script");+  await extension.unload();++  iframe.remove();+  iframeAboutBlank.remove();+});++add_task(async function test_executeScript_with_multiple_files() {+  let extension = makeExtension({+    async background() {+      const tabs = await browser.tabs.query({ active: true });++      browser.test.assertEq(1, tabs.length, "expected 1 tab");++      const results = await browser.scripting.executeScript({+        target: { tabId: tabs[0].id },+        files: ["1.js", "2.js"],+      });++      browser.test.assertEq(+        1,+        results.length,+        "got expected number of results"+      );+      browser.test.assertEq(+        "value from 2.js",+        results[0].result,+        "got the expected result"+      );+      browser.test.assertEq(0, results[0].frameId, "got the expected frameId");++      browser.test.notifyPass("execute-script");+    },+    files: {+      "1.js": function() {+        return "value from 1.js";+      },+      "2.js": function() {+        return "value from 2.js";+      },+    },+  });++  await extension.startup();+  await extension.awaitFinish("execute-script");+  await extension.unload();+});++add_task(async function test_executeScript_with_multiple_files_and_an_error() {+  let tab = await AppTestDelegate.openNewForegroundTab(+    window,+    "https://test1.example.com/tests/toolkit/components/extensions/test/mochitest/file_contains_iframe.html",+    true+  );++  let extension = makeExtension({+    async background() {+      const tabs = await browser.tabs.query({ active: true });++      browser.test.assertEq(1, tabs.length, "expected 1 tab");++      const results = await browser.scripting.executeScript({+        target: { tabId: tabs[0].id },+        files: ["1.js", "2.js"],+      });++      browser.test.assertEq(+        1,+        results.length,+        "got expected number of results"+      );+      browser.test.assertEq(0, results[0].frameId, "got the expected frameId");+      browser.test.assertEq(+        "Thrown at file_contains_iframe.html",+        results[0].error.message,+        "got the expected error message"+      );++      browser.test.notifyPass("execute-script");+    },+    files: {+      "1.js": function() {+        throw new Error(`Thrown at ${location.pathname.split("/").pop()}`);+      },+      "2.js": function() {+        return "value from 2.js";+      },+    },+  });++  await extension.startup();+  await extension.awaitFinish("execute-script");+  await extension.unload();++  await AppTestDelegate.removeTab(window, tab);+});++add_task(async function test_executeScript_with_file_not_in_extension() {+  let tab = await AppTestDelegate.openNewForegroundTab(+    window,+    "https://test1.example.com/tests/toolkit/components/extensions/test/mochitest/file_contains_iframe.html",+    true+  );++  let extension = makeExtension({+    async background() {+      const tabs = await browser.tabs.query({ active: true });++      browser.test.assertEq(1, tabs.length, "expected 1 tab");++      await browser.test.assertRejects(         browser.scripting.executeScript({-          target: { tabId, frameIds },+          target: { tabId: tabs[0].id },+          files: ["https://example.com/script.js"],+        }),+        /Files to be injected must be within the extension/,+        "got the expected error message"+      );++      browser.test.notifyPass("execute-script");+    },+  });++  await extension.startup();+  await extension.awaitFinish("execute-script");+  await extension.unload();++  await AppTestDelegate.removeTab(window, tab);+});++add_task(async function test_executeScript_allFrames() {+  let extension = makeExtension({+    manifest: {+      permissions: ["scripting", "webNavigation"],+    },+    async background() {+      const tabs = await browser.tabs.query({ active: true });+      browser.test.assertEq(1, tabs.length, "expected 1 tab");++      const tabId = tabs[0].id;+      const frames = await browser.webNavigation.getAllFrames({ tabId });+      // 1. Top-level frame that loads `file_contains_iframe.html`+      // 2. Frame that loads `file_contains_img.html`+      browser.test.assertEq(2, frames.length, "expected 2 frames");+      const frameIds = frames.map(frame => frame.frameId);++      const getTitle = () => {+        return document.title;+      };++      const TEST_CASES = [+        {+          title: "allFrames set to true",+          scriptingParams: {+            target: { tabId, allFrames: true },+            func: getTitle,+          },+          expectedResults: [+            {+              frameId: frameIds[0],+              result: "file contains iframe",+            },+            {+              frameId: frameIds[1],+              result: "file contains img",+            },+          ],+        },+        {+          title: "allFrames set to false",+          scriptingParams: {+            target: { tabId, allFrames: false },+            func: getTitle,+          },+          expectedResults: [+            {+              frameId: frameIds[0],+              result: "file contains iframe",+            },+          ],+        },+        {+          title: "allFrames and runtime errors",+          scriptingParams: {+            target: { tabId, allFrames: true },+            func: () => {+              throw new Error(`Thrown at ${location.pathname.split("/").pop()}`);+            },+          },+          expectedResults: [+            {+              frameId: frameIds[0],+              error: { message: "Thrown at file_contains_iframe.html" },+            },+            {+              frameId: frameIds[1],+              error: { message: "Thrown at file_contains_img.html" },+            },+          ],+        },+      ];++      for (const { title, scriptingParams, expectedResults } of TEST_CASES) {+        const results = await browser.scripting.executeScript(scriptingParams);+        // Sort injection results by frameId to always assert the results in+        // the same order.+        results.sort((a, b) => a.frameId - b.frameId);++        browser.test.assertEq(+          JSON.stringify(expectedResults),+          JSON.stringify(results),+          `${title} - got expected results`+        );+      }++      browser.test.notifyPass("execute-script");+    },+  });++  let tab = await AppTestDelegate.openNewForegroundTab(+    window,+    "https://test1.example.com/tests/toolkit/components/extensions/test/mochitest/file_contains_iframe.html",+    true+  );++  await extension.startup();+  await extension.awaitFinish("execute-script");+  await extension.unload();++  await AppTestDelegate.removeTab(window, tab);+});++add_task(+  async function test_executeScript_with_allFrames_and_wrong_host_permissions() {+    let extension = makeExtension({+      manifest: {+        host_permissions: MOCHITEST_HOST_PERMISSIONS,+        permissions: ["scripting", "webNavigation"],+      },+      async background() {+        const tabs = await browser.tabs.query({ active: true });+        browser.test.assertEq(1, tabs.length, "expected 1 tab");++        const tabId = tabs[0].id;+        const frames = await browser.webNavigation.getAllFrames({ tabId });+        // 1. Top-level frame with the MochiTest runner+        // 2. Frame for this file+        // 3. Frame that loads `file_sample.html` at the top of this file+        browser.test.assertEq(3, frames.length, "expected 3 frames");++        const results = await browser.scripting.executeScript({+          target: { tabId, allFrames: true },           func: () => {},-        }),-        /Frame not found, or missing host permission/,-        "expected error"-      );--      browser.test.notifyPass("execute-script");-    },-  });--  await extension.startup();-  await extension.awaitFinish("execute-script");-  await extension.unload();-});+        });++        browser.test.assertEq(+          2,+          results.length,+          "got expected number of results"+        );+        browser.test.assertTrue(+          typeof results[0].error === "undefined",+          "expected no error in results[0]"+        );+        browser.test.assertTrue(+          typeof results[1].error === "undefined",+          "expected no error in results[1]"+        );++        browser.test.notifyPass("execute-script");+      },+    });++    await extension.startup();+    await extension.awaitFinish("execute-script");+    await extension.unload();+  }+); </script>

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes. The changes appear to be primarily test case additions and modifications for the `executeScript` API in Firefox extensions, but there are some security-related validations added.

1. First vulnerability fix:
```
Vulnerability Existed: yes
Parameter Validation for Frame Injection [toolkit/components/extensions/test/mochitest/test_ext_scripting_executeScript.html] [Lines 48-77]
Old Code: No validation for conflicting frame parameters
Fixed Code: Added validation for conflicting 'allFrames' and 'frameIds' parameters with expectedError: /Cannot specify both 'allFrames' and 'frameIds'/
```

2. Second vulnerability fix:
```
Vulnerability Existed: yes
Invalid Frame ID Validation [toolkit/components/extensions/test/mochitest/test_ext_scripting_executeScript.html] [Lines 48-77]
Old Code: No validation for invalid frame IDs
Fixed Code: Added validation for invalid frame IDs with expectedError: "Invalid frame IDs: [1, 2]."
```

3. Third security improvement:
```
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Host Permission Verification [toolkit/components/extensions/test/mochitest/test_ext_scripting_executeScript.html] [Lines 111-132]
Old Code: Basic host permission check with regex match
Fixed Code: More explicit host permission check with specific error message "Missing host permission for the tab"
```

4. Fourth security improvement:
```
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Unexpected Execution Prevention [toolkit/components/extensions/test/mochitest/test_ext_scripting_executeScript.html] [Multiple locations]
Old Code: Empty functions in test cases
Fixed Code: Added explicit failure for unexpected execution: browser.test.fail("Unexpected execution")
```

The changes primarily focus on:
1. Adding proper parameter validation for frame injection
2. Improving security checks around host permissions
3. Preventing unexpected script execution in test cases
4. Adding more comprehensive error handling and messaging

These changes help prevent potential security issues like:
- Invalid frame injection attempts
- Bypassing of host permissions
- Unexpected script execution in restricted contexts

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-utils/build.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-utils/build.rs@@ -4,9 +4,31 @@ include!("no_atomic.rs");-// The rustc-cfg strings below are *not* public API. Please let us know by-// opening a GitHub issue if your build environment requires some way to enable-// these cfgs other than by executing our build script.+// The rustc-cfg listed below are considered public API, but it is *unstable*+// and outside of the normal semver guarantees:+//+// - `crossbeam_no_atomic_cas`+//      Assume the target does *not* support atomic CAS operations.+//      This is usually detected automatically by the build script, but you may+//      need to enable it manually when building for custom targets or using+//      non-cargo build systems that don't run the build script.+//+// - `crossbeam_no_atomic`+//      Assume the target does *not* support any atomic operations.+//      This is usually detected automatically by the build script, but you may+//      need to enable it manually when building for custom targets or using+//      non-cargo build systems that don't run the build script.+//+// - `crossbeam_no_atomic_64`+//      Assume the target does *not* support AtomicU64/AtomicI64.+//      This is usually detected automatically by the build script, but you may+//      need to enable it manually when building for custom targets or using+//      non-cargo build systems that don't run the build script.+//+// With the exceptions mentioned above, the rustc-cfg strings below are+// *not* public API. Please let us know by opening a GitHub issue if your build+// environment requires some way to enable these cfgs other than by executing+// our build script. fn main() {     let target = match env::var("TARGET") {         Ok(target) => target,

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be documentation improvements and clarifications about the public API status of certain rustc-cfg strings rather than security fixes.

Here's the structured analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [third_party/rust/crossbeam-utils/build.rs] [Lines 4-31]
[Old code was a brief comment about rustc-cfg strings not being public API]
[New code provides detailed documentation about which cfg strings are considered public API and their meanings]

The changes consist of:
1. Adding detailed documentation about specific cfg flags (`crossbeam_no_atomic_cas`, `crossbeam_no_atomic`, `crossbeam_no_atomic_64`)
2. Clarifying which parts are considered public API (though unstable)
3. Maintaining the warning that other cfg strings are not public API

These appear to be documentation improvements rather than security fixes. No actual code behavior was changed, only comments were expanded.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.modified.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.modified.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50)@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@     imgdata.data[i+1] = 255; } ctx.putImageData(imgdata, 45, 20);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2); t.done(); });

Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't involve any security-sensitive operations or fixes.

Here's the structured response:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.modified.html] [Lines 17-31]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.