--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/shape-box/shape-outside-border-box-border-radius-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/shape-box/shape-outside-border-box-border-radius-001.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/">   <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#shapes-from-box-values">   <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-border-box-border-radius-001-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Test the boxes are wrapping around the left float shape defined by the border-box and border-radius value.">   <style>   .container {

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 9]
   Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">
   Fixed Code: (line removed)

Additional details:
- The diff shows the removal of an empty meta tag with name="flags". This appears to be a cleanup change rather than a security fix.
- No actual security vulnerability is being addressed here, just removal of unnecessary markup.
- The change is in a test file (html) and doesn't affect any security-sensitive functionality.
- The "flags" meta tag was likely used for test configuration but wasn't serving any purpose with empty content.

No other changes were detected in the provided diff that would indicate security fixes. The modification appears to be purely cosmetic/cleanup related.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/CSS2/visudet/content-height-005.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/CSS2/visudet/content-height-005.html@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Florian Rivoal" href="https://florian.rivoal.net"> <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css2/visudet.html#line-height"> <link rel="mismatch" href="reference/content-height-005-ref.html">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="The height of the content area of an inline-level depends on the primary font"> <style> @font-face {

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
No specific vulnerability [File: testing/web-platform/tests/css/CSS2/visudet/content-height-005.html] [Lines: 4]  
Old Code: `<meta name="flags" content="">`  
Fixed Code: (removed line)  

Additional Details:  
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which appears to be test-related metadata.  
- No security vulnerability is apparent in this change.  
- The modification seems to be cleanup/optimization rather than a security fix.  

Note: If this were a security-related meta tag (like CSP), its removal could be significant, but in this case it's just test configuration.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/dec_cache.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/dec_cache.h@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #include "lib/jxl/image.h" #include "lib/jxl/passes_state.h" #include "lib/jxl/quant_weights.h"+#include "lib/jxl/render_pipeline/render_pipeline.h" #include "lib/jxl/sanitizers.h" namespace jxl {@@ -105,6 +106,13 @@   // Manages the status of borders.   GroupBorderAssigner group_border_assigner;++  // Rendering pipeline. TODO(veluca): eventually, this pipeline will replace+  // most of the state in this struct.+  std::unique_ptr<RenderPipeline> render_pipeline;++  // Storage for the current frame if it can be referenced by future frames.+  ImageBundle frame_storage_for_referencing;   // TODO(veluca): this should eventually become "iff no global modular   // transform was applied".@@ -279,7 +287,7 @@   }   // Initialize the decoder state after all of DC is decoded.-  void InitForAC(ThreadPool* pool) {+  Status InitForAC(ThreadPool* pool) {     shared_storage.coeff_order_size = 0;     for (uint8_t o = 0; o < AcStrategy::kNumValidStrategies; ++o) {       if (((1 << o) & used_acs) == 0) continue;@@ -293,21 +301,23 @@     if (sz > shared_storage.coeff_orders.size()) {       shared_storage.coeff_orders.resize(sz);     }-    if (shared->frame_header.flags & FrameHeader::kNoise) {+    if (shared->frame_header.flags & FrameHeader::kNoise && !render_pipeline) {       noise = Image3F(shared->frame_dim.xsize_upsampled_padded,                       shared->frame_dim.ysize_upsampled_padded);       size_t num_x_groups = DivCeil(noise.xsize(), kGroupDim);       size_t num_y_groups = DivCeil(noise.ysize(), kGroupDim);       PROFILER_ZONE("GenerateNoise");-      auto generate_noise = [&](int group_index, int _) {+      auto generate_noise = [&](const uint32_t group_index,+                                size_t /* thread */) {         size_t gx = group_index % num_x_groups;         size_t gy = group_index / num_x_groups;         Rect rect(gx * kGroupDim, gy * kGroupDim, kGroupDim, kGroupDim,                   noise.xsize(), noise.ysize());         RandomImage3(noise_seed + group_index, rect, &noise);       };-      RunOnPool(pool, 0, num_x_groups * num_y_groups, ThreadPool::SkipInit(),-                generate_noise, "Generate noise");+      JXL_RETURN_IF_ERROR(RunOnPool(pool, 0, num_x_groups * num_y_groups,+                                    ThreadPool::NoInit, generate_noise,+                                    "Generate noise"));       {         PROFILER_ZONE("High pass noise");         // 4 * (1 - box kernel)@@ -336,6 +346,7 @@     // Avoid errors due to loading vectors on the outermost padding.     FillImage(msan::kSanitizerSentinel, &decoded); #endif+    return true;   }   void EnsureBordersStorage();

I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Thread Safety Issue] [third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/dec_cache.h] [Lines 287-346]
[Old Code]
void InitForAC(ThreadPool* pool) {
    // ... original implementation without proper error handling
    RunOnPool(pool, 0, num_x_groups * num_y_groups, ThreadPool::SkipInit(),
              generate_noise, "Generate noise");
    // ... rest of the function
}
[Fixed Code]
Status InitForAC(ThreadPool* pool) {
    // ... modified implementation with error handling
    JXL_RETURN_IF_ERROR(RunOnPool(pool, 0, num_x_groups * num_y_groups,
                                ThreadPool::NoInit, generate_noise,
                                "Generate noise"));
    // ... rest of the function with return true
}
Additional Details: The change adds proper error handling to thread pool operations, which could potentially prevent race conditions or unhandled exceptions. However, without more context, I can't be certain if this was fixing an actual vulnerability.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Memory Safety Issue] [third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/dec_cache.h] [Lines 106-113]
[Old Code]
// No equivalent in old code
[Fixed Code]
// Rendering pipeline. TODO(veluca): eventually, this pipeline will replace
// most of the state in this struct.
std::unique_ptr<RenderPipeline> render_pipeline;

// Storage for the current frame if it can be referenced by future frames.
ImageBundle frame_storage_for_referencing;
Additional Details: The addition of proper resource management (std::unique_ptr) and frame storage could potentially address memory safety issues, but without seeing the previous implementation or knowing the context, this is uncertain.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Logic Error] [third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/dec_cache.h] [Line 301]
[Old Code]
if (shared->frame_header.flags & FrameHeader::kNoise) {
[Fixed Code]
if (shared->frame_header.flags & FrameHeader::kNoise && !render_pipeline) {
Additional Details: The added condition (!render_pipeline) might prevent some incorrect state handling, but it's unclear if this was fixing a security vulnerability or just a logical error.

Note: The changes appear to focus on improving code robustness and error handling, but without more context about previous vulnerabilities or actual exploits, I can't definitively state these were security fixes. The modifications do follow security-conscious programming practices.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/distribution.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/distribution.js@@ -24,6 +24,11 @@   "PlacesUtils",   "resource://gre/modules/PlacesUtils.jsm" );+ChromeUtils.defineModuleGetter(+  this,+  "AddonManager",+  "resource://gre/modules/AddonManager.jsm"+); function DistributionCustomizer() {}@@ -112,6 +117,19 @@     let language = this._locale.split("-")[0];     this.__defineGetter__("_language", () => language);     return this._language;+  },++  async _removeDistributionBookmarks() {+    await PlacesUtils.bookmarks.fetch(+      { guidPrefix: this.BOOKMARK_GUID_PREFIX },+      bookmark => PlacesUtils.bookmarks.remove(bookmark).catch()+    );+    await PlacesUtils.bookmarks.fetch(+      { guidPrefix: this.FOLDER_GUID_PREFIX },+      folder => {+        PlacesUtils.bookmarks.remove(folder).catch();+      }+    );   },   async _parseBookmarksSection(parentGuid, section) {@@ -278,7 +296,30 @@   _bookmarksApplied: false,   async applyBookmarks() {-    await this._doApplyBookmarks();+    let prefs = Services.prefs+      .getChildList("distribution.yandex")+      .concat(Services.prefs.getChildList("distribution.mailru"))+      .concat(Services.prefs.getChildList("distribution.okru"));+    if (prefs.length) {+      let extensionIDs = [+        "[email protected]",+        "[email protected]",+        "[email protected]",+        "[email protected]",+      ];+      for (let extensionID of extensionIDs) {+        let addon = await AddonManager.getAddonByID(extensionID);+        if (addon) {+          await addon.disable();+        }+      }+      for (let pref of prefs) {+        Services.prefs.clearUserPref(pref);+      }+      await this._removeDistributionBookmarks();+    } else {+      await this._doApplyBookmarks();+    }     this._bookmarksApplied = true;     this._checkCustomizationComplete();   },@@ -372,6 +413,16 @@     // separate because they are "special" (read: required)     defaults.set("distribution.id", distroID);++    if (+      distroID.startsWith("yandex") ||+      distroID.startsWith("mailru") ||+      distroID.startsWith("okru")+    ) {+      this.__defineGetter__("_ini", () => null);+      return this._checkCustomizationComplete();+    }+     defaults.set(       "distribution.version",       this._ini.getString("Global", "version")

Here's the security analysis following your requested format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   Unauthorized Extension Control [browser/components/distribution.js] [Lines 278-300]
   [Old Code]
   async applyBookmarks() {
     await this._doApplyBookmarks();
     this._bookmarksApplied = true;
     this._checkCustomizationComplete();
   },
   [Fixed Code]
   async applyBookmarks() {
     let prefs = Services.prefs
       .getChildList("distribution.yandex")
       .concat(Services.prefs.getChildList("distribution.mailru"))
       .concat(Services.prefs.getChildList("distribution.okru"));
     if (prefs.length) {
       let extensionIDs = [
         "[email protected]",
         "[email protected]",
         "[email protected]",
         "[email protected]",
       ];
       for (let extensionID of extensionIDs) {
         let addon = await AddonManager.getAddonByID(extensionID);
         if (addon) {
           await addon.disable();
         }
       }
       for (let pref of prefs) {
         Services.prefs.clearUserPref(pref);
       }
       await this._removeDistributionBookmarks();
     } else {
       await this._doApplyBookmarks();
     }
     this._bookmarksApplied = true;
     this._checkCustomizationComplete();
   },
   [Additional Details]
   The fix adds protection against potentially unwanted extensions by disabling specific extensions (Yandex and Mail.ru related) and clearing their preferences when certain distribution prefs are present.

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   Distribution Customization Bypass [browser/components/distribution.js] [Lines 372-381]
   [Old Code]
   defaults.set("distribution.id", distroID);
   defaults.set(
     "distribution.version",
     this._ini.getString("Global", "version")
   [Fixed Code]
   defaults.set("distribution.id", distroID);
   if (
     distroID.startsWith("yandex") ||
     distroID.startsWith("mailru") ||
     distroID.startsWith("okru")
   ) {
     this.__defineGetter__("_ini", () => null);
     return this._checkCustomizationComplete();
   }
   defaults.set(
     "distribution.version",
     this._ini.getString("Global", "version")
   [Additional Details]
   The fix prevents certain distributions (yandex, mailru, okru) from applying their customization by nullifying the ini file access when these distributions are detected.

3. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   Bookmark Cleanup Missing [browser/components/distribution.js] [Lines 112-125]
   [Old Code]
   (No equivalent code existed before)
   [Fixed Code]
   async _removeDistributionBookmarks() {
     await PlacesUtils.bookmarks.fetch(
       { guidPrefix: this.BOOKMARK_GUID_PREFIX },
       bookmark => PlacesUtils.bookmarks.remove(bookmark).catch()
     );
     await PlacesUtils.bookmarks.fetch(
       { guidPrefix: this.FOLDER_GUID_PREFIX },
       folder => {
         PlacesUtils.bookmarks.remove(folder).catch();
       }
     );
   },
   [Additional Details]
   This new method provides proper cleanup of distribution-specific bookmarks, which was missing in the previous version. This helps prevent persistence of unwanted bookmarks from removed distributions.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/shape-box/shape-outside-border-box-border-radius-009.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/shape-box/shape-outside-border-box-border-radius-009.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/">   <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#shapes-from-box-values">   <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-border-box-border-radius-009-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Test the boxes are wrapping around the left float shape defined by the border-box and border-bottom-right-radius value under sideways-rl writing-mode.">   <style>   .container {

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/shape-box/shape-outside-border-box-border-radius-009.html [Lines] 9
[Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code] (line removed)

Additional details:
- This appears to be a simple test file modification where an empty meta tag for "flags" was removed
- The change doesn't appear to be security-related, but rather a cleanup of test metadata
- No actual security vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in this change
- The modification is part of a CSS shapes test case and doesn't involve any security-sensitive functionality

The change seems to be purely about test maintenance rather than addressing any security concerns.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/textwrap/.cargo-checksum.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/textwrap/.cargo-checksum.json@@ -1 +1 @@-{"files":{"Cargo.toml":"a0e3c783725beb480b666d52d49da0ec69865c82e8bd5c8a76ba330158e954c1","LICENSE":"ce93600c49fbb3e14df32efe752264644f6a2f8e08a735ba981725799e5309ef","README.md":"9af1f6627e8c2e19c7383c99462ca028b235b2f8dadbb33f13e2d1663c8c20e3","benches/linear.rs":"ec084063923bafc6e80c2cd78deb0f7ad18ae19a7e66005e991e00dac1ff3ce4","examples/layout.rs":"38cf4d316d28e0b99925bef604b68aad05489c06ec77e6105575cd26ce994631","examples/termwidth.rs":"67d95b60feb52cfd59fe5b17c37c53e51fb7f2a8e5e483d75aec8d0044dbcbd7","src/indentation.rs":"04f8479286fd87f2d75b0f02ce8309a815a5ffd1e79a7323132e34dc0e107aef","src/lib.rs":"115bf6ec566b8241d52cff83977146f03df3460d6f94ad897f2221cb56100118","src/splitting.rs":"071ef8ce0ea6c3f33230889a3426fd645276a6de626f45223ae7b873394df662","tests/version-numbers.rs":"e0e9316073d6d410440a6ee33c2f3bdfd0faa48895f6f9d05a220a91b7afcc99"},"package":"d326610f408c7a4eb6f51c37c330e496b08506c9457c9d34287ecc38809fb060"}+{"files":{"CHANGELOG.md":"02783800b8187cfd90e09a1362be4381748f29a96adc0157c06833d2c7f4ac4e","Cargo.toml":"5d55b1e1537d331df5ab2ffb81385544ffc1194ddb7243024284225a76fa9395","LICENSE":"ce93600c49fbb3e14df32efe752264644f6a2f8e08a735ba981725799e5309ef","README.md":"36c2030accc46c6df69c2254925d27e66b2b3c34c8ab263fd3d5daf14bfeb219","src/core.rs":"db8263e64a1b606343c7cc45d09b77d65f0a0442e17f0d14b45d612fc04a7946","src/indentation.rs":"49896f6e166f08a6f57f71a5d1bf706342c25e8410aa301fad590e001eb49799","src/lib.rs":"71f0a7d010cdb808179279c5dd6df3492eeeb7fca3132e60ca73139016ff343e","src/word_separators.rs":"99b5dddff8a89b850f002ebc4f8fb6d431c38d2ec10d3ee580393b5fe853c663","src/word_splitters.rs":"1f5b6faaa0a8f58edad5b65850b5d1c908f10af700af1bbb1f313d0fee33452d","src/wrap_algorithms.rs":"1bf0617704b24c0125e03a2032c816fff7b37ca2b80eaba00d80285d9b88b6fb","src/wrap_algorithms/optimal_fit.rs":"f27c5fd2f2360774bbf2d0d2e43036e61a995fddbceea578c0d9e110258023e2","tests/indent.rs":"51f977db11632a32fafecf86af88413d51238fe6efcf18ec52fac89133714278","tests/traits.rs":"ae5f7a6d5dc0ebc6ec41d5d933fc7ee3180af568248f495f072f3f73c43440b0","tests/version-numbers.rs":"9e964f58dbdf051fc6fe0d6542ab312d3e95f26c3fd14bce84449bb625e45761"},"package":"0066c8d12af8b5acd21e00547c3797fde4e8677254a7ee429176ccebbe93dd80"}=========testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/element/manual/imagebitmap/common.sub.js========--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/element/manual/imagebitmap/common.sub.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/element/manual/imagebitmap/common.sub.js@@ -139,16 +139,18 @@     }); }-function makeBlob() {-    return new Promise(function(resolve, reject) {-        var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();-        xhr.open("GET", '/images/pattern.png');-        xhr.responseType = 'blob';-        xhr.send();-        xhr.onload = function() {-            resolve(xhr.response);-        };-    });+function makeBlob(src) {+    return function () {+        return new Promise(function(resolve, reject) {+            var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();+            xhr.open("GET", src);+            xhr.responseType = 'blob';+            xhr.send();+            xhr.onload = function() {+                resolve(xhr.response);+            };+        });+    } } var imageSourceTypes = [@@ -162,5 +164,5 @@     { name: 'an OffscreenCanvas',   factory: makeOffscreenCanvas },     { name: 'an ImageData',         factory: makeImageData },     { name: 'an ImageBitmap',       factory: makeImageBitmap },-    { name: 'a Blob',               factory: makeBlob },+    { name: 'a Blob',               factory: makeBlob("/images/pattern.png") }, ];

I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

1. For the first file (textwrap/.cargo-checksum.json):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    This appears to be a standard dependency version update with checksum changes. No security-related changes are evident in the diff.

2. For the second file (common.sub.js):
    Vulnerability Existed: yes
    [Potential XSS Vulnerability] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/element/manual/imagebitmap/common.sub.js] [Lines 139-162]
    [Old Code]
    function makeBlob() {
        return new Promise(function(resolve, reject) {
            var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
            xhr.open("GET", '/images/pattern.png');
            xhr.responseType = 'blob';
            xhr.send();
            xhr.onload = function() {
                resolve(xhr.response);
            };
        });
    }
    [Fixed Code]
    function makeBlob(src) {
        return function () {
            return new Promise(function(resolve, reject) {
                var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
                xhr.open("GET", src);
                xhr.responseType = 'blob';
                xhr.send();
                xhr.onload = function() {
                    resolve(xhr.response);
                };
            });
        }
    }

    The change makes the image source configurable rather than hardcoded, which could help prevent potential XSS if the source was previously vulnerable to injection. However, since this is test code and the source is still controlled (set to "/images/pattern.png"), the actual security impact is minimal. The change appears to be more about code flexibility than fixing an active vulnerability.

Additional Note: The modification adds a layer of indirection (returning a function) which could be seen as a security improvement by making the XHR request more controlled, but without more context about how this function is used, it's hard to determine if this was specifically addressing a security issue.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/semantics/forms/the-input-element/cloning-steps.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/semantics/forms/the-input-element/cloning-steps.html@@ -35,6 +35,15 @@   test(function() {     var input = document.createElement("input");     input.setAttribute("type", inputType);+    input.indeterminate = true;++    var copy = input.cloneNode();+    assert_equals(copy.indeterminate, true);+  }, `input[type=${inputType}] element's indeterminateness should be cloned`);++  test(function() {+    var input = document.createElement("input");+    input.setAttribute("type", inputType);     input.checked = true;     var copy = input.cloneNode();

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/semantics/forms/the-input-element/cloning-steps.html] [Lines 35-45]
[Old Code]
  test(function() {
    var input = document.createElement("input");
    input.setAttribute("type", inputType);
    input.checked = true;

    var copy = input.cloneNode();
[Fixed Code]
  test(function() {
    var input = document.createElement("input");
    input.setAttribute("type", inputType);
    input.indeterminate = true;

    var copy = input.cloneNode();
    assert_equals(copy.indeterminate, true);
  }, `input[type=${inputType}] element's indeterminateness should be cloned`);

  test(function() {
    var input = document.createElement("input");
    input.setAttribute("type", inputType);
    input.checked = true;

    var copy = input.cloneNode();

Additional Details:
The diff shows the addition of a new test case for checking if the indeterminate state of an input element is properly cloned. This is a test enhancement rather than a security fix. The change doesn't address any security vulnerability but rather adds test coverage for a specific DOM property behavior. No security-related changes or fixes are present in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsla-7.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsla-7.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(133.33333333grad, 100.0%, 50.0%)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-25]
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
   ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(133.33333333grad, 100.0%, 50.0%)';
   ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
   ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(133.33333333grad, 100.0%, 50.0%)';
   ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring (variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`), with no security implications. There's no indication of any vulnerability being fixed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgb-clamp-3.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgb-clamp-3.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgb(-2147483649, 4294967298, -18446744073709551619)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No Vulnerability Found [File] [Lines 17-25]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
    ctx.fillStyle = 'rgb(-2147483649, 4294967298, -18446744073709551619)';
    ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
    ctx.fillStyle = 'rgb(-2147483649, 4294967298, -18446744073709551619)';
    ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating the corresponding assertion call. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed in this change. The test continues to check the same edge case behavior with extreme RGB values.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/places/tests/browser/browser_bookmark_popup.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/places/tests/browser/browser_bookmark_popup.js@@ -302,6 +302,18 @@   }); });+add_task(async function bookmark_with_invalid_default_folder() {+  await createAndRemoveDefaultFolder();++  await test_bookmarks_popup({+    isNewBookmark: true,+    shouldAutoClose: true,+    async popupShowFn(browser) {+      EventUtils.synthesizeKey("d", { accelKey: true }, window);+    },+  });+});+ add_task(   async function panel_shown_for_new_bookmark_compositionstart_no_autoclose() {     await test_bookmarks_popup({

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be adding a new test case for bookmark functionality rather than addressing security issues.

Analysis:
1. The diff adds a new test case `bookmark_with_invalid_default_folder` that tests bookmark creation behavior when there's no default folder.
2. The test simulates pressing Ctrl+D (or Cmd+D on Mac) to create a new bookmark.
3. There are no security-related changes like input validation, permission checks, or security mechanism implementations.

Answer:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found in this diff. The changes are adding a test case for bookmark functionality with invalid default folder scenario.

The changes are focused on testing functionality rather than fixing security issues. The test appears to verify proper behavior when the default bookmark folder is missing, which is more about robustness than security.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/context.unrecognised.badname.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/context.unrecognised.badname.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { offscreenCanvas2.getContext('This is not an implemented context in any real browser'); });

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability found [File] [Line 20]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { offscreenCanvas2.getContext('This is not an implemented context in any real browser'); });
    [Fixed Code]
    (same as old code, no changes)

The changes appear to be:
1. A variable rename from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency/clarity
2. No changes to the security test case that verifies invalid context types throw TypeError

No actual security vulnerabilities were fixed in this diff - it's primarily a code style/readability improvement. The test case for invalid context types was already properly implemented to check for TypeError.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/writable-streams/properties.any.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/writable-streams/properties.any.js@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@-// META: global=window,worker,jsshell+// META: global=window,worker 'use strict'; const sinkMethods = {

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potentially removed jsshell environment] [testing/web-platform/tests/streams/writable-streams/properties.any.js] [Lines 1]
[Old Code]
// META: global=window,worker,jsshell
[Fixed Code]
// META: global=window,worker

Additional Details:
The change removes 'jsshell' from the list of global environments where this test should run. While this might indicate a security concern about running these tests in jsshell environment, without more context about why it was removed, I can't be certain if this was for security reasons or other considerations. The change could be related to security hardening by limiting the execution environments, but this is speculative.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.isPointInPath.arc.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.isPointInPath.arc.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.arc(50, 25, 10, 0, Math.PI, false); _assertSame(ctx.isPointInPath(50, 10), false, "ctx.isPointInPath(50, 10)", "false");

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.isPointInPath.arc.html] [Lines 17-18]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature, simply renaming a variable from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas'. There are no security-related changes in this diff. The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive operations or introduce/remove any security controls. The test functionality remains identical, only the variable name has been changed for better readability or consistency.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.quadraticCurveTo.ensuresubpath.2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.quadraticCurveTo.ensuresubpath.2.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ ctx.beginPath(); ctx.quadraticCurveTo(0, 25, 100, 25); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 5,45, 0,255,0,255, "5,45", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 5,45, 0,255,0,255, "5,45", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to function calls. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No Vulnerability Found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.quadraticCurveTo.ensuresubpath.2.html] [Lines 17-27]
    [Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, ...)]
    [Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(canvas, ...)]

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't appear to address any security issues. The functionality remains identical, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/sandbox/common/SandboxSettings.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/sandbox/common/SandboxSettings.cpp@@ -6,11 +6,13 @@ #include "mozilla/SandboxSettings.h" #include "mozISandboxSettings.h"+#include "nsServiceManagerUtils.h" #include "mozilla/Components.h" #include "mozilla/Preferences.h" #include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_media.h" #include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_security.h"+#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_webgl.h" #include "prenv.h"@@ -25,51 +27,77 @@ namespace mozilla { const char* ContentWin32kLockdownStateToString(-    ContentWin32kLockdownState aValue) {+    nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState aValue) {   switch (aValue) {-    case ContentWin32kLockdownState::LockdownEnabled:+    case nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::LockdownEnabled:       return "Win32k Lockdown enabled";-    case ContentWin32kLockdownState::MissingWebRender:+    case nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::MissingWebRender:       return "Win32k Lockdown disabled -- Missing WebRender";-    case ContentWin32kLockdownState::OperatingSystemNotSupported:+    case nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::OperatingSystemNotSupported:       return "Win32k Lockdown disabled -- Operating system not supported";-    case ContentWin32kLockdownState::PrefNotSet:+    case nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::PrefNotSet:       return "Win32k Lockdown disabled -- Preference not set";++    case nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::MissingRemoteWebGL:+      return "Win32k Lockdown disabled -- Missing Remote WebGL";++    case nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::MissingNonNativeTheming:+      return "Win32k Lockdown disabled -- Missing Non-Native Theming";++    case nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::DecodersArentRemote:+      return "Win32k Lockdown disabled -- Not all media decoders are remoted "+             "to Utility Process";++    case nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::DisabledByEnvVar:+      return "Win32k Lockdown disabled -- MOZ_ENABLE_WIN32K is set";++    case nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::DisabledBySafeMode:+      return "Win32k Lockdown disabled -- Running in Safe Mode";++    case nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::DisabledByE10S:+      return "Win32k Lockdown disabled -- E10S is disabled";++    case nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::DisabledByUserPref:+      return "Win32k Lockdown disabled -- manually set "+             "security.sandbox.content.win32k-disable to false";++    case nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::EnabledByUserPref:+      return "Win32k Lockdown enabled -- manually set "+             "security.sandbox.content.win32k-disable to true";++    case nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::DisabledByControlGroup:+      return "Win32k Lockdown disabled -- user in Control Group";++    case nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::EnabledByTreatmentGroup:+      return "Win32k Lockdown enabled -- user in Treatment Group";++    case nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::DisabledByDefault:+      return "Win32k Lockdown disabled -- default value is false";++    case nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::EnabledByDefault:+      return "Win32k Lockdown enabled -- default value is true";   }   MOZ_CRASH("Should never reach here"); }-ContentWin32kLockdownState GetContentWin32kLockdownState() {+bool GetContentWin32kLockdownEnabled() {+  auto state = GetContentWin32kLockdownState();+  return state ==+             nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::EnabledByUserPref ||+         state == nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::+                      EnabledByTreatmentGroup ||+         state == nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::EnabledByDefault;+}++nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState GetContentWin32kLockdownState() { #ifdef XP_WIN-  static ContentWin32kLockdownState result = [] {-    ContentWin32kLockdownState state = [] {-      if (!IsWin8OrLater()) {-        return ContentWin32kLockdownState::OperatingSystemNotSupported;-      }--      // Win32k Lockdown requires WebRender, but WR is not currently guaranteed-      // on all computers. It can also fail to initialize and fallback to-      // non-WR render path.-      //-      // We don't want a situation where "Win32k Lockdown + No WR" occurs-      // without the user explicitly requesting unsupported behavior.-      if (!gfx::gfxVars::UseWebRender()) {-        return ContentWin32kLockdownState::MissingWebRender;-      }--      // It's important that this goes last, as we'd like to know in-      // telemetry and crash reporting if the only thing holding the user-      // back from Win32k Lockdown is the-lack-of-asking-for-it-      if (!StaticPrefs::security_sandbox_content_win32k_disable()) {-        return ContentWin32kLockdownState::PrefNotSet;-      }--      return ContentWin32kLockdownState::LockdownEnabled;-    }();++  static auto getLockdownState = [] {+    auto state = GetWin32kLockdownState();     const char* stateStr = ContentWin32kLockdownStateToString(state);     CrashReporter::AnnotateCrashReport(@@ -77,13 +105,14 @@         nsDependentCString(stateStr));     return state;-  }();-+  };++  static nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState result = getLockdownState();   return result; #else  // XP_WIN-  return ContentWin32kLockdownState::OperatingSystemNotSupported;+  return nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::OperatingSystemNotSupported; #endif  // XP_WIN }@@ -165,7 +194,7 @@ NS_IMETHODIMP SandboxSettings::GetContentWin32kLockdownStateString(nsAString& aString) {-  ContentWin32kLockdownState lockdownState =+  nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState lockdownState =       mozilla::GetContentWin32kLockdownState();   aString = NS_ConvertASCIItoUTF16(       mozilla::ContentWin32kLockdownStateToString(lockdownState));

I'll analyze the code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Win32k Lockdown State Enumeration Expansion] [security/sandbox/common/SandboxSettings.cpp] [Lines 25-83]
[Old Code]
    case ContentWin32kLockdownState::LockdownEnabled:
      return "Win32k Lockdown enabled";

    case ContentWin32kLockdownState::MissingWebRender:
      return "Win32k Lockdown disabled -- Missing WebRender";

    case ContentWin32kLockdownState::OperatingSystemNotSupported:
      return "Win32k Lockdown disabled -- Operating system not supported";

    case ContentWin32kLockdownState::PrefNotSet:
      return "Win32k Lockdown disabled -- Preference not set";
[Fixed Code]
    case nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::LockdownEnabled:
      return "Win32k Lockdown enabled";

    case nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::MissingWebRender:
      return "Win32k Lockdown disabled -- Missing WebRender";

    case nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::OperatingSystemNotSupported:
      return "Win32k Lockdown disabled -- Operating system not supported";

    case nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::PrefNotSet:
      return "Win32k Lockdown disabled -- Preference not set";

    case nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::MissingRemoteWebGL:
      return "Win32k Lockdown disabled -- Missing Remote WebGL";

    case nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::MissingNonNativeTheming:
      return "Win32k Lockdown disabled -- Missing Non-Native Theming";

    case nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::DecodersArentRemote:
      return "Win32k Lockdown disabled -- Not all media decoders are remoted 
             "to Utility Process";

    case nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::DisabledByEnvVar:
      return "Win32k Lockdown disabled -- MOZ_ENABLE_WIN32K is set";

    case nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::DisabledBySafeMode:
      return "Win32k Lockdown disabled -- Running in Safe Mode";

    case nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::DisabledByE10S:
      return "Win32k Lockdown disabled -- E10S is disabled";

    case nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::DisabledByUserPref:
      return "Win32k Lockdown disabled -- manually set 
             "security.sandbox.content.win32k-disable to false";

    case nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::EnabledByUserPref:
      return "Win32k Lockdown enabled -- manually set 
             "security.sandbox.content.win32k-disable to true";

    case nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::DisabledByControlGroup:
      return "Win32k Lockdown disabled -- user in Control Group";

    case nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::EnabledByTreatmentGroup:
      return "Win32k Lockdown enabled -- user in Treatment Group";

    case nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::DisabledByDefault:
      return "Win32k Lockdown disabled -- default value is false";

    case nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState::EnabledByDefault:
      return "Win32k Lockdown enabled -- default value is true";

Additional Details:
The change significantly expands the enumeration of possible Win32k lockdown states, which could indicate either:
1) A security improvement by adding more granular control and reporting of the sandbox state
2) A fix for potential security issues where certain conditions weren't properly handled before
3) Or simply an enhancement of the feature without specific security implications

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Win32k Lockdown State Function Return Type Change] [security/sandbox/common/SandboxSettings.cpp] [Lines 89-92]
[Old Code]
ContentWin32kLockdownState GetContentWin32kLockdownState() {
[Fixed Code]
nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState GetContentWin32kLockdownState() {

Additional Details:
The change in return type to use the fully qualified enum type might be related to namespace resolution or type safety, but the security implications are unclear.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Win32k Lockdown State Implementation Change] [security/sandbox/common/SandboxSettings.cpp] [Lines 94-123]
[Old Code]
    ContentWin32kLockdownState state = [] {
      if (!IsWin8OrLater()) {
        return ContentWin32kLockdownState::OperatingSystemNotSupported;
      }

      if (!gfx::gfxVars::UseWebRender()) {
        return ContentWin32kLockdownState::MissingWebRender;
      }

      if (!StaticPrefs::security_sandbox_content_win32k_disable()) {
        return ContentWin32kLockdownState::PrefNotSet;
      }

      return ContentWin32kLockdownState::LockdownEnabled;
    }();
[Fixed Code]
    auto state = GetWin32kLockdownState();

Additional Details:
The implementation was simplified by delegating to a new GetWin32kLockdownState() function, which might indicate either:
1) A security fix by centralizing the state determination logic
2) Or simply a code reorganization without security implications

Note: Without seeing the implementation of GetWin32kLockdownState(), it's impossible to determine if this change fixes any specific vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/executors/protocol.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/executors/protocol.py@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ import traceback+from http.client import HTTPConnection from abc import ABCMeta, abstractmethod from typing import ClassVar, List, Type@@ -617,3 +618,56 @@         self.parent.base.load(urljoin(self.parent.executor.server_url("https"),                               "/common/third_party/reftest-analyzer.xhtml#log=%s" %                                quote(output.getvalue())))+++class ConnectionlessBaseProtocolPart(BaseProtocolPart):+    def load(self, url):+        pass++    def execute_script(self, script, asynchronous=False):+        pass++    def set_timeout(self, timeout):+        pass++    def wait(self):+        return False++    def set_window(self, handle):+        pass++    def window_handles(self):+        return []+++class ConnectionlessProtocol(Protocol):+    implements = [ConnectionlessBaseProtocolPart]++    def connect(self):+        pass++    def after_connect(self):+        pass+++class WdspecProtocol(ConnectionlessProtocol):+    implements = [ConnectionlessBaseProtocolPart]++    def __init__(self, executor, browser):+        super().__init__(executor, browser)++    def is_alive(self):+        """Test that the connection is still alive.++        Because the remote communication happens over HTTP we need to+        make an explicit request to the remote.  It is allowed for+        WebDriver spec tests to not have a WebDriver session, since this+        may be what is tested.++        An HTTP request to an invalid path that results in a 404 is+        proof enough to us that the server is alive and kicking.+        """+        conn = HTTPConnection(self.browser.host, self.browser.port)+        conn.request("HEAD", "/invalid")+        res = conn.getresponse()+        return res.status == 404

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential HTTP Connection Security Issue] [File: protocol.py] [Lines: 617-618, added code]
   [Old Code: None (new code added)]
   [Fixed Code: Uses HTTPConnection without HTTPS for connection check]

   Note: The new code uses HTTPConnection (plain HTTP) rather than HTTPSConnection, which could potentially expose sensitive information if used for actual data transmission. However, in this case it's only used for a liveness check to an invalid path, so the risk may be minimal.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Information Disclosure] [File: protocol.py] [Lines: 617-618, added code]
   [Old Code: None (new code added)]
   [Fixed Code: Returns server status information (404) to caller]

   Note: The is_alive() method exposes server status information which could potentially be used by an attacker to gather information about the server, though this is a common pattern for health checks.

The main changes appear to be adding new protocol classes (ConnectionlessProtocol and WdspecProtocol) with a specific implementation for checking WebDriver server liveness. While there are potential security considerations, none appear to be clear vulnerabilities in this context. The HTTP connection is only used for a basic liveness check to an invalid path, and the 404 status check is a reasonable approach for verifying server availability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/wgpu-core/src/device/life.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/wgpu-core/src/device/life.rs@@ -256,7 +256,10 @@         for res in temp_resources {             match res {                 TempResource::Buffer(raw) => last_resources.buffers.push(raw),-                TempResource::Texture(raw) => last_resources.textures.push(raw),+                TempResource::Texture(raw, views) => {+                    last_resources.textures.push(raw);+                    last_resources.texture_views.extend(views);+                }             }         }@@ -336,7 +339,10 @@             .map_or(&mut self.free_resources, |a| &mut a.last_resources);         match temp_resource {             TempResource::Buffer(raw) => resources.buffers.push(raw),-            TempResource::Texture(raw) => resources.textures.push(raw),+            TempResource::Texture(raw, views) => {+                resources.texture_views.extend(views);+                resources.textures.push(raw);+            }         }     }@@ -455,12 +461,20 @@                             resource::TextureInner::Native { raw: Some(raw) } => raw,                             _ => continue,                         };-                        self.active+                        let non_referenced_resources = self+                            .active                             .iter_mut()                             .find(|a| a.index == submit_index)-                            .map_or(&mut self.free_resources, |a| &mut a.last_resources)-                            .textures-                            .push(raw);+                            .map_or(&mut self.free_resources, |a| &mut a.last_resources);++                        non_referenced_resources.textures.push(raw);+                        if let resource::TextureClearMode::RenderPass { clear_views, .. } =+                            res.clear_mode+                        {+                            non_referenced_resources+                                .texture_views+                                .extend(clear_views.into_iter());+                        }                     }                 }             }

I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Memory Leak Vulnerability [third_party/rust/wgpu-core/src/device/life.rs] [Lines 256-339, 455-473]
[Old Code]
```rust
TempResource::Texture(raw) => last_resources.textures.push(raw),
// and
TempResource::Texture(raw) => resources.textures.push(raw),
// and
self.active
    .iter_mut()
    .find(|a| a.index == submit_index)
    .map_or(&mut self.free_resources, |a| &mut a.last_resources)
    .textures
    .push(raw);
```
[Fixed Code]
```rust
TempResource::Texture(raw, views) => {
    last_resources.textures.push(raw);
    last_resources.texture_views.extend(views);
}
// and
TempResource::Texture(raw, views) => {
    resources.texture_views.extend(views);
    resources.textures.push(raw);
}
// and
let non_referenced_resources = /* ... */;
non_referenced_resources.textures.push(raw);
if let resource::TextureClearMode::RenderPass { clear_views, .. } = res.clear_mode {
    non_referenced_resources.texture_views.extend(clear_views.into_iter());
}
```

Additional Details:
The vulnerability appears to be a memory/resource leak where texture views weren't being properly cleaned up when textures were being released. The fix adds proper handling of texture views alongside the texture resources themselves, ensuring both the textures and their associated views are properly tracked and released. This prevents potential memory leaks that could occur when texture views weren't being properly managed during resource cleanup.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.stroke.basic-manual.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.stroke.basic-manual.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#000'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.stroke.basic-manual.html] [Lines 17-18]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
The change appears to be purely a variable name refactoring from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. There are no security implications in this change as it doesn't affect any security-sensitive operations or data handling. The modification is likely for code consistency or readability purposes rather than addressing any security vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsla-6.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsla-6.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(120deg, 100.0%, 50.0%)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No Vulnerability Found [File] [Lines 13-14, 20]
   Old Code: 
   ```
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   ```

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or style reasons. There are no security-related changes in this diff, no changes to the actual functionality or security-sensitive operations. The color parsing and assertion logic remains the same, just with a renamed variable.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.cap.butt.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.cap.butt.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -34,18 +34,18 @@ ctx.lineTo(75, 35); ctx.stroke(); ctx.fillRect(65, 15, 20, 20);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,14, 0,255,0,255, "25,14", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,15, 0,255,0,255, "25,15", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,16, 0,255,0,255, "25,16", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,34, 0,255,0,255, "25,34", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,35, 0,255,0,255, "25,35", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,36, 0,255,0,255, "25,36", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,14, 0,255,0,255, "75,14", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,15, 0,255,0,255, "75,15", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,16, 0,255,0,255, "75,16", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,34, 0,255,0,255, "75,34", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,35, 0,255,0,255, "75,35", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,36, 0,255,0,255, "75,36", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,14, 0,255,0,255, "25,14", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,15, 0,255,0,255, "25,15", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,16, 0,255,0,255, "25,16", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,34, 0,255,0,255, "25,34", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,35, 0,255,0,255, "25,35", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,36, 0,255,0,255, "25,36", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,14, 0,255,0,255, "75,14", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,15, 0,255,0,255, "75,15", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,16, 0,255,0,255, "75,16", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,34, 0,255,0,255, "75,34", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,35, 0,255,0,255, "75,35", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,36, 0,255,0,255, "75,36", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to function calls using this variable. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found
   File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.cap.butt.worker.js
   Lines: 13-14, 34-45
   Old Code: 
   ```javascript
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   // ...
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,14, 0,255,0,255, "25,14", "0,255,0,255");
   // ...
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```javascript
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   // ...
   _assertPixel(canvas, 25,14, 0,255,0,255, "25,14", "0,255,0,255");
   // ...
   ```

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't affect security. The functionality remains identical, just with a different variable name. No security-related patterns or vulnerabilities were introduced or fixed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.