--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/table-has-box-sizing-border-box-002.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/table-has-box-sizing-border-box-002.html@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-tables-3/#mapping"> <link rel="match" href="../reference/ref-filled-green-100px-square.xht"> <link rel="bookmark" href="https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=598134" />-<meta name="flags" content="" /> <meta name="assert" content="default <table> box-sizing:border-box is not applied to non-table elements that have display:table" /> <title> UA stylesheet, &lt;table>, box-sizing

Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be related to test file maintenance and documentation rather than security vulnerabilities.

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/table-has-box-sizing-border-box-002.html] [Lines 4-7]
[Old Code]
<meta name="flags" content="" />
[Fixed Code]
[Line removed]

The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which doesn't appear to have any security implications. This seems to be a cleanup of test metadata rather than a security fix.

No other vulnerabilities or potential security issues were identified in this diff. The modification doesn't affect any security-relevant code paths or introduce/remove any security-related functionality.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/src/options/from_derive.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/src/options/from_derive.rs@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ use proc_macro2::TokenStream; use quote::ToTokens;-use syn::{self, Ident};+use syn::Ident;-use codegen::FromDeriveInputImpl;-use options::{OuterFrom, ParseAttribute, ParseData, Shape};-use {FromMeta, Result};+use crate::codegen::FromDeriveInputImpl;+use crate::options::{OuterFrom, ParseAttribute, ParseData, Shape};+use crate::{FromMeta, Result}; #[derive(Debug)] pub struct FdiOptions {@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ impl FdiOptions {     pub fn new(di: &syn::DeriveInput) -> Result<Self> {         (FdiOptions {-            base: OuterFrom::start(di),+            base: OuterFrom::start(di)?,             vis: Default::default(),             generics: Default::default(),             data: Default::default(),

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    Potential Error Handling Improvement [File] [Lines 24]
    [Old Code]
    base: OuterFrom::start(di),
    [Fixed Code]
    base: OuterFrom::start(di)?,

Additional Details:
- The change adds proper error handling by adding the `?` operator to propagate errors from `OuterFrom::start()`
- While this improves code robustness, it's not clear if this was fixing an actual security vulnerability or just improving error handling
- The change could potentially prevent undefined behavior in error cases, but without more context about what `OuterFrom::start()` does, we can't be certain about security implications

Note: The other changes in the diff are purely stylistic/import reorganization (changing absolute imports to crate-relative imports) and don't appear to have any security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.get.transparent.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.get.transparent.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0,0,0,0)'; _assertSame(ctx.fillStyle, 'rgba(0, 0, 0, 0)', "ctx.fillStyle", "'rgba(0, 0, 0, 0)'");

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Variable Renaming] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.get.transparent.worker.js] [Lines 13-14]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

The change appears to be purely a variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. This modification doesn't address any security vulnerability but rather improves code consistency or readability. There are no security implications in this change as it doesn't affect the functionality or security properties of the code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/preferences/dialogs/sanitize.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/preferences/dialogs/sanitize.js@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@  * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this  * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */-/* import-globals-from ../../../../toolkit/content/preferencesBindings.js */+/* import-globals-from /toolkit/content/preferencesBindings.js */ document   .querySelector("dialog")

Let me analyze the diff for potential security vulnerabilities.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Path Traversal Vulnerability [browser/components/preferences/dialogs/sanitize.js] [Lines 3]
[Old Code] /* import-globals-from ../../../../toolkit/content/preferencesBindings.js */
[Fixed Code] /* import-globals-from /toolkit/content/preferencesBindings.js */

Additional Details:
- The change modifies the path reference from a relative path to an absolute path
- While this could potentially fix a path traversal issue if the relative path was vulnerable to manipulation, there's not enough context to confirm this was an actual security vulnerability
- The change might simply be for code consistency or reliability rather than security

No other vulnerabilities are apparent in this small diff. The change is minimal and only affects a comment line that specifies an import path.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/tools/lint/eslint/eslint-plugin-mozilla/lib/configs/browser-test.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/tools/lint/eslint/eslint-plugin-mozilla/lib/configs/browser-test.js@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@     TestUtils: false,     XPCNativeWrapper: false,     addLoadEvent: false,+    add_setup: false,     add_task: false,     content: false,     executeSoon: false,

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   No specific vulnerability found  
   File: tools/lint/eslint/eslint-plugin-mozilla/lib/configs/browser-test.js  
   Lines: Added line 26  
   Old Code: (no previous definition of 'add_setup')  
   Fixed Code: add_setup: false  

Additional details:
- This appears to be a simple configuration update adding a new global variable ('add_setup') to the ESLint configuration for browser tests
- The change is adding a new identifier to the list of predefined globals, marking it as false (not writable)
- No security vulnerability is being fixed here - this is likely just keeping the ESLint configuration up-to-date with test environment changes
- The change follows the same pattern as other test-related globals in the file (like 'add_task', 'TestUtils', etc.)

No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change is purely a configuration update to support test environment functionality.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/cross-origin-opener-policy/resources/fully-loaded.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/cross-origin-opener-policy/resources/fully-loaded.js@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@-r// Return a promise, which resolves when new navigations aren't considered+// Return a promise, which resolves when new navigations aren't considered // client-side redirects anymore. // // Note: A long `setTimeout` is used, because client-side redirect is an

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Comment typo fix] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/cross-origin-opener-policy/resources/fully-loaded.js] [Lines 1]
[Old Code]
r// Return a promise, which resolves when new navigations aren't considered
[Fixed Code]
// Return a promise, which resolves when new navigations aren't considered

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an accidental 'r' character at the start of a comment line
- This appears to be a typo correction rather than a security fix
- No security vulnerability is being addressed in this change
- The functionality of the code remains exactly the same
- The comment explains the purpose of the code (handling client-side redirects) but this change doesn't affect that functionality

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/accessible/base/NotificationController.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/accessible/base/NotificationController.cpp@@ -675,6 +675,8 @@                  "isn't created!");   }+  mDocument->ProcessPendingUpdates();+   nsTArray<CacheData> cache;   // Process rendered text change notifications.@@ -969,7 +971,7 @@   }   if (IPCAccessibilityActive() && mDocument) {-    mDocument->ProcessBoundsChanged();+    mDocument->ProcessQueuedCacheUpdates();   }   mObservingState = eRefreshObserving;

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   Potential Race Condition or Incomplete Update [File] accessible/base/NotificationController.cpp [Lines 675-675]  
   [Old Code]  
   (no code before the text change notification processing)  
   [Fixed Code]  
   mDocument->ProcessPendingUpdates();  

   Additional Details: The addition of ProcessPendingUpdates() suggests there might have been a race condition or incomplete updates being processed before handling text change notifications, but without more context, this is uncertain.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   Potential Inconsistent State or Stale Data [File] accessible/base/NotificationController.cpp [Lines 971-971]  
   [Old Code]  
   mDocument->ProcessBoundsChanged();  
   [Fixed Code]  
   mDocument->ProcessQueuedCacheUpdates();  

   Additional Details: The change from ProcessBoundsChanged() to ProcessQueuedCacheUpdates() suggests a more comprehensive update handling, possibly fixing cases where some updates were being missed or processed inconsistently, but the exact vulnerability (if any) is unclear.

Note: Both changes appear to be improvements in how document updates are processed, but without more context about the specific issues they address or vulnerability reports, we can only speculate about potential security implications. The changes seem more related to correctness and reliability than to clear security vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/tools/yaml/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles.yaml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/tools/yaml/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles.yaml@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@   testing:   - 2d.gradient.interpolate.linear   code: |-    offscreenCanvas.width = 200;+    canvas.width = 200;     var g = ctx.createLinearGradient(0, 0, 200, 0);     g.addColorStop(0, '#ff0');     g.addColorStop(0.5, '#0ff');@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@   testing:   - 2d.gradient.interpolate.overlap   code: |-    offscreenCanvas.width = 200;+    canvas.width = 200;     var g = ctx.createLinearGradient(0, 0, 200, 0);     g.addColorStop(0, '#f00');     g.addColorStop(0, '#ff0');@@ -1044,21 +1044,21 @@   testing:   - 2d.pattern.zerocanvas   code: |-    offscreenCanvas.width = 0;-    offscreenCanvas.height = 10;-    @assert offscreenCanvas.width === 0;-    @assert offscreenCanvas.height === 10;-    @assert throws INVALID_STATE_ERR ctx.createPattern(offscreenCanvas, 'repeat');-    offscreenCanvas.width = 10;-    offscreenCanvas.height = 0;-    @assert offscreenCanvas.width === 10;-    @assert offscreenCanvas.height === 0;-    @assert throws INVALID_STATE_ERR ctx.createPattern(offscreenCanvas, 'repeat');-    offscreenCanvas.width = 0;-    offscreenCanvas.height = 0;-    @assert offscreenCanvas.width === 0;-    @assert offscreenCanvas.height === 0;-    @assert throws INVALID_STATE_ERR ctx.createPattern(offscreenCanvas, 'repeat');+    canvas.width = 0;+    canvas.height = 10;+    @assert canvas.width === 0;+    @assert canvas.height === 10;+    @assert throws INVALID_STATE_ERR ctx.createPattern(canvas, 'repeat');+    canvas.width = 10;+    canvas.height = 0;+    @assert canvas.width === 10;+    @assert canvas.height === 0;+    @assert throws INVALID_STATE_ERR ctx.createPattern(canvas, 'repeat');+    canvas.width = 0;+    canvas.height = 0;+    @assert canvas.width === 0;+    @assert canvas.height === 0;+    @assert throws INVALID_STATE_ERR ctx.createPattern(canvas, 'repeat');     t.done(); - name: 2d.pattern.basic.nocontext@@ -1130,42 +1130,42 @@   testing:   - 2d.pattern.unrecognised   code: |-    @assert ctx.createPattern(offscreenCanvas, null) != null;+    @assert ctx.createPattern(canvas, null) != null;     t.done(); - name: 2d.pattern.repeat.undefined   testing:   - 2d.pattern.unrecognised   code: |-    @assert throws SYNTAX_ERR ctx.createPattern(offscreenCanvas, undefined);+    @assert throws SYNTAX_ERR ctx.createPattern(canvas, undefined);     t.done(); - name: 2d.pattern.repeat.unrecognised   testing:   - 2d.pattern.unrecognised   code: |-    @assert throws SYNTAX_ERR ctx.createPattern(offscreenCanvas, "invalid");+    @assert throws SYNTAX_ERR ctx.createPattern(canvas, "invalid");     t.done(); - name: 2d.pattern.repeat.unrecognisednull   testing:   - 2d.pattern.unrecognised   code: |-    @assert throws SYNTAX_ERR ctx.createPattern(offscreenCanvas, "null");+    @assert throws SYNTAX_ERR ctx.createPattern(canvas, "null");     t.done(); - name: 2d.pattern.repeat.case   testing:   - 2d.pattern.exact   code: |-    @assert throws SYNTAX_ERR ctx.createPattern(offscreenCanvas, "Repeat");+    @assert throws SYNTAX_ERR ctx.createPattern(canvas, "Repeat");     t.done(); - name: 2d.pattern.repeat.nullsuffix   testing:   - 2d.pattern.exact   code: |-    @assert throws SYNTAX_ERR ctx.createPattern(offscreenCanvas, "repeat\0");+    @assert throws SYNTAX_ERR ctx.createPattern(canvas, "repeat\0");     t.done(); - name: 2d.pattern.modify.canvas1

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be test case modifications where references to `offscreenCanvas` were changed to `canvas`. This seems to be a test refactoring rather than a security fix.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found in the diff. The changes are test case refactoring from offscreenCanvas to canvas references.

The diff shows:
1. Multiple instances where `offscreenCanvas` was replaced with `canvas`
2. No changes in security-related behavior or validation
3. Only test assertions and canvas property references were modified

Since there are no actual security fixes, I'm not providing vulnerability names or code comparisons as none apply to this diff. The changes appear to be test maintenance rather than security-related.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.cross.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.cross.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -30,10 +30,10 @@ ctx.lineTo(110, 60); ctx.lineTo(100, 60); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 48,1, 0,255,0,255, "48,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 48,48, 0,255,0,255, "48,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 48,1, 0,255,0,255, "48,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 48,48, 0,255,0,255, "48,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to function calls using this variable. There are no security-related changes in the diff.

Here's the structured response:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.cross.html] [Lines 17-30]
    [Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); ... _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, ...)]
    [Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); ... _assertPixel(canvas, ...)]

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has changed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/blake2b_simd/src/sse41.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/blake2b_simd/src/sse41.rs@@ -70,26 +70,33 @@     }; }+// These rotations are the "simple version". For the "complicated version", see+// https://github.com/sneves/blake2-avx2/blob/b3723921f668df09ece52dcd225a36d4a4eea1d9/blake2b-common.h#L43-L46.+// For a discussion of the tradeoffs, see+// https://github.com/sneves/blake2-avx2/pull/5. In short:+// - Due to an LLVM bug (https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=44379), this+//   version performs better on recent x86 chips.+// - LLVM is able to optimize this version to AVX-512 rotation instructions+//   when those are enabled.+ #[inline(always)] unsafe fn rot32(x: __m128i) -> __m128i {-    _mm_shuffle_epi32(x, _MM_SHUFFLE!(2, 3, 0, 1))+    _mm_or_si128(_mm_srli_epi64(x, 32), _mm_slli_epi64(x, 64 - 32)) } #[inline(always)] unsafe fn rot24(x: __m128i) -> __m128i {-    let rotate24 = _mm_setr_epi8(3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 0, 1, 2, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 8, 9, 10);-    _mm_shuffle_epi8(x, rotate24)+    _mm_or_si128(_mm_srli_epi64(x, 24), _mm_slli_epi64(x, 64 - 24)) } #[inline(always)] unsafe fn rot16(x: __m128i) -> __m128i {-    let rotate16 = _mm_setr_epi8(2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 0, 1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 8, 9);-    _mm_shuffle_epi8(x, rotate16)+    _mm_or_si128(_mm_srli_epi64(x, 16), _mm_slli_epi64(x, 64 - 16)) } #[inline(always)] unsafe fn rot63(x: __m128i) -> __m128i {-    _mm_or_si128(_mm_srli_epi64(x, 63), add(x, x))+    _mm_or_si128(_mm_srli_epi64(x, 63), _mm_slli_epi64(x, 64 - 63)) } #[inline(always)]

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Optimization Issue] [third_party/rust/blake2b_simd/src/sse41.rs] [Lines 70-93]  
   Old Code:  
   ```rust
   _mm_shuffle_epi32(x, _MM_SHUFFLE!(2, 3, 0, 1))
   ```
   Fixed Code:  
   ```rust
   _mm_or_si128(_mm_srli_epi64(x, 32), _mm_slli_epi64(x, 64 - 32))
   ```  
   Additional Details: The change appears to be an optimization improvement rather than a security fix, addressing LLVM bug #44379 and enabling better AVX-512 optimization.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Optimization Issue] [third_party/rust/blake2b_simd/src/sse41.rs] [Lines 70-93]  
   Old Code:  
   ```rust
   let rotate24 = _mm_setr_epi8(3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 0, 1, 2, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 8, 9, 10);
   _mm_shuffle_epi8(x, rotate24)
   ```
   Fixed Code:  
   ```rust
   _mm_or_si128(_mm_srli_epi64(x, 24), _mm_slli_epi64(x, 64 - 24))
   ```  
   Additional Details: Similar to the first change, this appears to be an optimization improvement rather than a security fix.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Optimization Issue] [third_party/rust/blake2b_simd/src/sse41.rs] [Lines 70-93]  
   Old Code:  
   ```rust
   let rotate16 = _mm_setr_epi8(2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 0, 1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 8, 9);
   _mm_shuffle_epi8(x, rotate16)
   ```
   Fixed Code:  
   ```rust
   _mm_or_si128(_mm_srli_epi64(x, 16), _mm_slli_epi64(x, 64 - 16))
   ```  
   Additional Details: Another optimization change following the same pattern.

4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Optimization Issue] [third_party/rust/blake2b_simd/src/sse41.rs] [Lines 70-93]  
   Old Code:  
   ```rust
   _mm_or_si128(_mm_srli_epi64(x, 63), add(x, x))
   ```
   Fixed Code:  
   ```rust
   _mm_or_si128(_mm_srli_epi64(x, 63), _mm_slli_epi64(x, 64 - 63))
   ```  
   Additional Details: This change makes the rotation operation consistent with the others, but doesn't appear to address a specific security vulnerability.

Note: All changes appear to be performance optimizations rather than security fixes, making the implementation more consistent and potentially faster on modern processors. No clear security vulnerabilities are being addressed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/docs/webIdlBindings/index.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/docs/webIdlBindings/index.md@@ -1361,7 +1361,7 @@ global interface (such as `Window`). Aside from regular property names, the name of an alias can be-[Symbol.iterator](/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Global_Objects/Symbol#Well-known_symbols).+[Symbol.iterator](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Global_Objects/Symbol/iterator). This is specified by writing `[Alias="@@iterator"]`. ### `[BindingAlias=propName]`@@ -1757,7 +1757,7 @@ ### `[Frozen]` Used to flag attributes that, when their getter is called, will call-[`Object.freeze`](/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Global_Objects/Object/freeze)+[`Object.freeze`](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Global_Objects/Object/freeze) on the return value before returning it. This extended attribute is only allowed on attributes that return sequences, dictionaries and `MozMap`, and corresponds to returning a frozen `Array` (for the@@ -2184,15 +2184,13 @@ }; ```-Next, create an XPCOM component that implements this interface. [Basic-directions](/en-US/docs/How_to_Build_an_XPCOM_Component_in_Javascript)-for how to do this can be found elsewhere on MDN. Use the same contract-ID as you specified in the Web IDL file. The class ID doesn't matter,-except that it should be a newly generated one. For `QueryInterface`,-you only need to implement `nsISupports`, not anything corresponding-to the Web IDL interface. The name you use for the XPCOM component should-be distinct from the name of the interface, to avoid confusing error-messages.+Next, create an XPCOM component that implements this interface.  Use+the same contract ID as you specified in the Web IDL file. The class+ID doesn't matter, except that it should be a newly generated one. For+`QueryInterface`, you only need to implement `nsISupports`, not+anything corresponding to the Web IDL interface. The name you use for+the XPCOM component should be distinct from the name of the interface,+to avoid confusing error messages. Web IDL attributes are implemented as properties on the JS object or its prototype chain, whereas Web IDL methods are implemented as methods on

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be documentation updates and link corrections. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Documentation Update [dom/docs/webIdlBindings/index.md] [Lines 1361]
    [Old Code]
    [Symbol.iterator](/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Global_Objects/Symbol#Well-known_symbols).
    [Fixed Code]
    [Symbol.iterator](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Global_Objects/Symbol/iterator).

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Documentation Update [dom/docs/webIdlBindings/index.md] [Lines 1757]
    [Old Code]
    [`Object.freeze`](/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Global_Objects/Object/freeze)
    [Fixed Code]
    [`Object.freeze`](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Global_Objects/Object/freeze)

3. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Documentation Update [dom/docs/webIdlBindings/index.md] [Lines 2184-2193]
    [Old Code]
    Next, create an XPCOM component that implements this interface. [Basic
    directions](/en-US/docs/How_to_Build_an_XPCOM_Component_in_Javascript)
    for how to do this can be found elsewhere on MDN. Use the same contract
    ID as you specified in the Web IDL file. The class ID doesn't matter,
    except that it should be a newly generated one. For `QueryInterface`,
    you only need to implement `nsISupports`, not anything corresponding
    to the Web IDL interface. The name you use for the XPCOM component should
    be distinct from the name of the interface, to avoid confusing error
    messages.
    [Fixed Code]
    Next, create an XPCOM component that implements this interface.  Use
    the same contract ID as you specified in the Web IDL file. The class
    ID doesn't matter, except that it should be a newly generated one. For
    `QueryInterface`, you only need to implement `nsISupports`, not
    anything corresponding to the Web IDL interface. The name you use for
    the XPCOM component should be distinct from the name of the interface,
    to avoid confusing error messages.

All changes appear to be documentation improvements, link updates, and text clarifications without any security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-epoch/src/collector.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-epoch/src/collector.rs@@ -178,13 +178,18 @@     #[test]     fn pin_holds_advance() {+        #[cfg(miri)]+        const N: usize = 500;+        #[cfg(not(miri))]+        const N: usize = 500_000;+         let collector = Collector::new();         thread::scope(|scope| {             for _ in 0..NUM_THREADS {                 scope.spawn(|_| {                     let handle = collector.register();-                    for _ in 0..500_000 {+                    for _ in 0..N {                         let guard = &handle.pin();                         let before = collector.global.epoch.load(Ordering::Relaxed);@@ -202,6 +207,9 @@     #[cfg(not(crossbeam_sanitize))] // TODO: assertions failed due to `cfg(crossbeam_sanitize)` reduce `internal::MAX_OBJECTS`     #[test]     fn incremental() {+        #[cfg(miri)]+        const COUNT: usize = 500;+        #[cfg(not(miri))]         const COUNT: usize = 100_000;         static DESTROYS: AtomicUsize = AtomicUsize::new(0);@@ -230,12 +238,16 @@             let guard = &handle.pin();             collector.global.collect(guard);         }-        assert!(DESTROYS.load(Ordering::Relaxed) == 100_000);+        assert!(DESTROYS.load(Ordering::Relaxed) == COUNT);     }     #[test]     fn buffering() {         const COUNT: usize = 10;+        #[cfg(miri)]+        const N: usize = 500;+        #[cfg(not(miri))]+        const N: usize = 100_000;         static DESTROYS: AtomicUsize = AtomicUsize::new(0);         let collector = Collector::new();@@ -252,7 +264,7 @@             }         }-        for _ in 0..100_000 {+        for _ in 0..N {             collector.global.collect(&handle.pin());         }         assert!(DESTROYS.load(Ordering::Relaxed) < COUNT);@@ -268,6 +280,9 @@     #[test]     fn count_drops() {+        #[cfg(miri)]+        const COUNT: usize = 500;+        #[cfg(not(miri))]         const COUNT: usize = 100_000;         static DROPS: AtomicUsize = AtomicUsize::new(0);@@ -301,6 +316,9 @@     #[test]     fn count_destroy() {+        #[cfg(miri)]+        const COUNT: usize = 500;+        #[cfg(not(miri))]         const COUNT: usize = 100_000;         static DESTROYS: AtomicUsize = AtomicUsize::new(0);@@ -367,6 +385,9 @@     #[test]     fn destroy_array() {+        #[cfg(miri)]+        const COUNT: usize = 500;+        #[cfg(not(miri))]         const COUNT: usize = 100_000;         static DESTROYS: AtomicUsize = AtomicUsize::new(0);@@ -402,6 +423,9 @@     #[test]     fn stress() {         const THREADS: usize = 8;+        #[cfg(miri)]+        const COUNT: usize = 500;+        #[cfg(not(miri))]         const COUNT: usize = 100_000;         static DROPS: AtomicUsize = AtomicUsize::new(0);

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes are primarily related to test configuration adjustments for different environments (particularly for Miri, Rust's experimental interpreter for detecting undefined behavior). Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Test Configuration Adjustment [third_party/rust/crossbeam-epoch/src/collector.rs] [Multiple locations]
   [Old Code]
   Various test constants set to high values (e.g., 100_000, 500_000)
   [Fixed Code]
   Constants adjusted to lower values (500) when running under Miri

The changes are:
1. Adding `#[cfg(miri)]` conditional compilation to reduce iteration counts in tests when running under Miri
2. This is likely done to make tests run faster under Miri's interpreter
3. The actual test logic remains the same, just with different iteration counts based on the execution environment

No security vulnerabilities are being fixed here - these are test configuration changes to accommodate different execution environments. The changes don't modify any production code or fix any security issues in the actual collector implementation.

The pattern is consistent across all changes: high iteration counts for normal execution (100_000 or 500_000) and lower counts (500) for Miri execution. This suggests these are performance/CI-related changes rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/server/actors/webbrowser.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/server/actors/webbrowser.js@@ -519,8 +519,8 @@ BrowserTabList.prototype._onPageTitleChangedEvent = function(event) {   switch (event.type) {     case "pagetitlechanged": {-      const window = event.currentTarget.ownerGlobal;-      this._onDOMTitleChanged(window.browser);+      const browser = event.target;+      this._onDOMTitleChanged(browser);       break;     }   }

Here's the analysis following the requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential XSS or DOM-based security issue] [devtools/server/actors/webbrowser.js] [Lines 519-522]
[Old Code]
      const window = event.currentTarget.ownerGlobal;
      this._onDOMTitleChanged(window.browser);
[Fixed Code]
      const browser = event.target;
      this._onDOMTitleChanged(browser);

Additional Details:
1. The change moves from using `ownerGlobal` to access the browser object to directly using `event.target`. This could potentially be a security fix if the previous method allowed access to unintended global objects or if there were concerns about prototype pollution.
2. However, without more context about how these values are used in `_onDOMTitleChanged`, we can't be certain if this was fixing a specific vulnerability or just improving code reliability.
3. The change might be related to preventing potential DOM-based security issues that could arise from accessing the global object, but this is speculative.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.empty.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.empty.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ctx.beginPath(); ctx.arc(200, 25, 5, 0, 2*Math.PI, true); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-related modifications. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.empty.html [Lines 17-27]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability purposes, without any security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.basic.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.basic.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); _assertDifferent(ctx.getImageData(0, 0, 100, 50), null, "ctx.getImageData(0, 0, 100, 50)", "null"); t.done();

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18]
    Old Code:
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');

    Fixed Code:
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- The changes appear to be purely variable naming changes (offscreenCanvas → canvas)
- No security-related modifications were made
- The functionality remains identical
- This is likely a code style/readability improvement rather than a security fix

No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The changes are cosmetic in nature and don't affect the security posture of the code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.strokeRect.globalcomposite.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.strokeRect.globalcomposite.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'source-in'; ctx.strokeStyle = '#f00'; ctx.lineWidth = 50; ctx.strokeRect(25, 24, 50, 2);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.strokeRect.globalcomposite.worker.js [Lines] 13-21
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   [...]
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0");

   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   [...]
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0");

Additional Details:
- The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas')
- No security-relevant changes were made
- The functionality remains identical, just with different variable names
- This is likely a code style/consistency improvement rather than a security fix

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/pocket/content/panels/js/home/overlay.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/pocket/content/panels/js/home/overlay.js@@ -7,13 +7,13 @@ import React from "react"; import ReactDOM from "react-dom";-import PopularTopics from "../components/PopularTopics";+import PopularTopicsLegacy from "../components/PopularTopicsLegacy/PopularTopicsLegacy";+import Home from "../components/Home/Home"; import pktPanelMessaging from "../messages.js"; var HomeOverlay = function(options) {   this.inited = false;   this.active = false;-  this.pockethost = "getpocket.com";   this.parseHTML = function(htmlString) {     const parser = new DOMParser();     return parser.parseFromString(htmlString, `text/html`).documentElement;@@ -38,48 +38,23 @@ HomeOverlay.prototype = {   create() {-    var host = window.location.href.match(/pockethost=([\w|\.]*)&?/);-    if (host && host.length > 1) {-      this.pockethost = host[1];-    }-    var locale = window.location.href.match(/locale=([\w|\.]*)&?/);-    if (locale && locale.length > 1) {-      this.locale = locale[1].toLowerCase();-    }+    const { searchParams } = new URL(window.location.href);+    const pockethost = searchParams.get(`pockethost`) || `getpocket.com`;+    const locale = searchParams.get(`locale`) || ``;+    const layoutRefresh = searchParams.get(`layoutRefresh`) === `true`;     if (this.active) {       return;     }     this.active = true;-    // For English, we have a discover topics link.-    // For non English, we don't have a link yet for this.-    // When we do, we can consider flipping this on.-    const enableLocalizedExploreMore = false;-    const templateData = {-      pockethost: this.pockethost,-      utmsource: "firefox-button",-    };--    // extra modifier class for language-    if (this.locale) {-      document-        .querySelector(`body`)-        .classList.add(`pkt_ext_home_${this.locale}`);-    }--    // Create actual content-    document-      .querySelector(`body`)-      .append(this.parseHTML(Handlebars.templates.home_shell(templateData)));--    // We only have topic pages in English,-    // so ensure we only show a topics section for English browsers.-    if (this.locale.startsWith("en")) {+    if (layoutRefresh) {+      // Create actual content       ReactDOM.render(-        <PopularTopics-          pockethost={templateData.pockethost}-          utmsource={templateData.utmsource}+        <Home+          locale={locale}+          articles={[]}+          pockethost={pockethost}           topics={[             { title: "Self Improvement", topic: "self-improvement" },             { title: "Food", topic: "food" },@@ -87,17 +62,49 @@             { title: "Science", topic: "science" },           ]}         />,-        document.querySelector(`.pkt_ext_more`)+        document.querySelector(`body`)       );-    } else if (enableLocalizedExploreMore) {-      // For non English, we have a slightly different component to the page.+    } else {+      // For English, we have a discover topics link.+      // For non English, we don't have a link yet for this.+      // When we do, we can consider flipping this on.+      const enableLocalizedExploreMore = false;+      const templateData = {+        pockethost,+        utmsource: `firefox-button`,+      };++      // Create actual content       document-        .querySelector(`.pkt_ext_more`)-        .append(this.parseHTML(Handlebars.templates.explore_more()));+        .querySelector(`body`)+        .append(this.parseHTML(Handlebars.templates.home_shell(templateData)));++      // We only have topic pages in English,+      // so ensure we only show a topics section for English browsers.+      if (locale.startsWith("en")) {+        ReactDOM.render(+          <PopularTopicsLegacy+            pockethost={templateData.pockethost}+            utmsource={templateData.utmsource}+            topics={[+              { title: "Self Improvement", topic: "self-improvement" },+              { title: "Food", topic: "food" },+              { title: "Entertainment", topic: "entertainment" },+              { title: "Science", topic: "science" },+            ]}+          />,+          document.querySelector(`.pkt_ext_more`)+        );+      } else if (enableLocalizedExploreMore) {+        // For non English, we have a slightly different component to the page.+        document+          .querySelector(`.pkt_ext_more`)+          .append(this.parseHTML(Handlebars.templates.explore_more()));+      }++      // click events+      this.setupClickEvents();     }--    // click events-    this.setupClickEvents();     // tell back end we're ready     pktPanelMessaging.sendMessage("PKT_show_home");

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
   [DOM-based XSS Potential] [browser/components/pocket/content/panels/js/home/overlay.js] [Lines 7-13, 38-62]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   this.pockethost = "getpocket.com";
   // ...
   var host = window.location.href.match(/pockethost=([\w|\.]*)&?/);
   if (host && host.length > 1) {
     this.pockethost = host[1];
   }
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   const { searchParams } = new URL(window.location.href);
   const pockethost = searchParams.get(`pockethost`) || `getpocket.com`;
   ```  
   Additional Details: The old code used a regex match on window.location.href which could potentially allow XSS if not properly sanitized. The new code uses URL.searchParams which is more secure for parameter parsing.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Information Exposure] [browser/components/pocket/content/panels/js/home/overlay.js] [Lines 38-62]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   var locale = window.location.href.match(/locale=([\w|\.]*)&?/);
   if (locale && locale.length > 1) {
     this.locale = locale[1].toLowerCase();
   }
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   const locale = searchParams.get(`locale`) || ``;
   ```  
   Additional Details: While not clearly a security vulnerability, the change to using URL.searchParams for locale parameter parsing is more robust and could prevent potential edge cases in parameter handling.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential React Injection] [browser/components/pocket/content/panels/js/home/overlay.js] [Lines 7-13, 50-62]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   import PopularTopics from "../components/PopularTopics";
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   import PopularTopicsLegacy from "../components/PopularTopicsLegacy/PopularTopicsLegacy";
   import Home from "../components/Home/Home";
   ```  
   Additional Details: The component restructuring might include security improvements in the new components, but without seeing their implementation, we can't be certain.

Note: The changes appear to be primarily architectural improvements with some security benefits in parameter handling, but no clear high-severity vulnerabilities were fixed. The most notable security improvement is the safer URL parameter parsing.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/aboutdebugging/test/browser/browser_aboutdebugging_devtoolstoolbox_navigate_reload_button.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/aboutdebugging/test/browser/browser_aboutdebugging_devtoolstoolbox_navigate_reload_button.js@@ -9,19 +9,18 @@ // Test that ensures the remote page is reloaded when the button is clicked add_task(async function() {-  await addTab("about:home");+  const debug_tab = await addTab("about:home");   const { document, tab, window } = await openAboutDebugging();   // go to This Firefox and inspect the new tab   info("Inspecting a new tab in This Firefox");   await selectThisFirefoxPage(document, window.AboutDebugging.store);-  const { devtoolsDocument, devtoolsWindow } = await openAboutDevtoolsToolbox(-    document,-    tab,-    window,-    "about:home"-  );+  const {+    devtoolsDocument,+    devtoolsTab,+    devtoolsWindow,+  } = await openAboutDevtoolsToolbox(document, tab, window, "about:home");   info("Clicking reload button and waiting for requests to complete");   const toolbox = getToolbox(devtoolsWindow);@@ -29,13 +28,30 @@     onDomCompleteResource,   } = await waitForNextTopLevelDomCompleteResource(toolbox.commands);+  // Watch for navigation promises.   const refreshes = Promise.all([     onDomCompleteResource,     toolbox.commands.client.waitForRequestsToSettle(),     waitForAboutDebuggingRequests(window.AboutDebugging.store),   ]);++  // We cannot include this one in the Promise.all array, as it needs to be+  // explicitly called after navigation started.+  const waitForLoadedPanelsReload = await watchForLoadedPanelsReload(toolbox);+   clickReload(devtoolsDocument);   await refreshes;+  await waitForLoadedPanelsReload();   ok(true, "Clicked refresh; both page and devtools reloaded");++  await closeAboutDevtoolsToolbox(document, devtoolsTab, window);++  info("Remove the debugged tab");+  await removeTab(debug_tab);+  await waitUntil(() => !findDebugTargetByText("about:home", document));+  await waitForAboutDebuggingRequests(window.AboutDebugging.store);++  info("Remove the about:debugging tab.");+  await removeTab(tab); });

I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Resource Leak [File] [Lines 9,28-30,45-50]
[Old Code]
- No explicit cleanup of debug_tab or devtoolsTab
- No explicit waiting for resource cleanup after operations
[Fixed Code]
+ Added explicit tab cleanup with `debug_tab` and `devtoolsTab`
+ Added explicit waiting for resource cleanup with `waitForAboutDebuggingRequests`
+ Added proper tab removal sequence

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Race Condition [File] [Lines 29-35]
[Old Code]
- Single Promise.all for all refresh operations
[Fixed Code]
+ Separated waitForLoadedPanelsReload to ensure proper operation sequence
+ Added explicit waiting for panel reload after navigation

The changes appear to focus on improving test reliability and resource management rather than fixing specific security vulnerabilities. The modifications include:
1. Better resource cleanup (tabs)
2. More robust waiting for operations to complete
3. Explicit sequencing of operations

However, these don't clearly correspond to any known vulnerability patterns, so I've marked them as "not sure". The changes seem more related to test stability and resource management than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/mediasink/AudioSink.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/mediasink/AudioSink.cpp@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_media.h" #include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_dom.h" #include "nsPrintfCString.h"+#include "Tracing.h" namespace mozilla {@@ -29,9 +30,6 @@ // The amount of audio frames that is used to fuzz rounding errors. static const int64_t AUDIO_FUZZ_FRAMES = 1;--// Amount of audio frames we will be processing ahead of use-static const int32_t LOW_AUDIO_USECS = 300000; using media::TimeUnit;@@ -43,11 +41,9 @@       mInfo(aInfo),       mAudioDevice(aAudioDevice),       mPlaying(true),-      mMonitor("AudioSink"),       mWritten(0),       mErrored(false),       mOwnerThread(aThread),-      mProcessedQueueLength(0),       mFramesParsed(0),       mOutputRate(DecideAudioPlaybackSampleRate(aInfo)),       mOutputChannels(DecideAudioPlaybackChannels(aInfo)),@@ -55,7 +51,18 @@           mOutputRate,           StaticPrefs::dom_media_silence_duration_for_audibility()),       mIsAudioDataAudible(false),-      mAudioQueue(aAudioQueue) {}+      mProcessedQueueFinished(false),+      mAudioQueue(aAudioQueue),+      mProcessedQueueThresholdMS(+          StaticPrefs::media_audio_audiosink_threshold_ms()) {+  // Twice the limit that trigger a refill.+  float capacitySeconds = mProcessedQueueThresholdMS / 1000.f * 2;+  mProcessedSPSCQueue =+      MakeUnique<SPSCQueue<AudioDataValue>>(static_cast<uint32_t>(+          capacitySeconds * static_cast<float>(mOutputChannels * mOutputRate)));+  SINK_LOG("Ringbuffer has space for %u elements (%lf seconds)",+           mProcessedSPSCQueue->Capacity(), capacitySeconds);+} AudioSink::~AudioSink() = default;@@ -67,8 +74,8 @@       mOwnerThread, this, &AudioSink::OnAudioPushed);   mAudioQueueFinishListener = mAudioQueue.FinishEvent().Connect(       mOwnerThread, this, &AudioSink::NotifyAudioNeeded);-  mProcessedQueueListener = mProcessedQueue.PopFrontEvent().Connect(-      mOwnerThread, this, &AudioSink::OnAudioPopped);+  mProcessedQueueListener =+      mAudioPopped.Connect(mOwnerThread, this, &AudioSink::OnAudioPopped);   // To ensure at least one audio packet will be popped from AudioQueue and   // ready to be played.@@ -77,6 +84,7 @@   if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {     return Err(rv);   }+   return mAudioStream->Start(); }@@ -103,13 +111,8 @@ bool AudioSink::HasUnplayedFrames() {   // Experimentation suggests that GetPositionInFrames() is zero-indexed,   // so we need to add 1 here before comparing it to mWritten.-  int64_t total;-  {-    MonitorAutoLock mon(mMonitor);-    total = mWritten + (mCursor.get() ? mCursor->Available() : 0);-  }-  return mProcessedQueue.GetSize() ||-         (mAudioStream && mAudioStream->GetPositionInFrames() + 1 < total);+  return mProcessedSPSCQueue->AvailableRead() ||+         (mAudioStream && mAudioStream->GetPositionInFrames() + 1 < mWritten); } void AudioSink::Shutdown() {@@ -123,38 +126,7 @@     mAudioStream->Shutdown();     mAudioStream = nullptr;   }-  // Shutdown audio sink doesn't mean the playback is going to stop, so if we-  // simply discard these data, then we will no longer be able to play them.-  // Eg. we change to sink to capture-based sink that will need to continue play-  // remaining data from the audio queue.-  {-    MonitorAutoLock mon(mMonitor);-    while (mProcessedQueue.GetSize() > 0) {-      RefPtr<AudioData> audio = mProcessedQueue.PopBack();-      if (audio == mCurrentData) {-        break;-      }-      mAudioQueue.PushFront(audio);-    }-    if (mCurrentData) {-      uint32_t unplayedFrames = mCursor->Available();-      // If we've consumed some partial content from the first audio data, then-      // we have to adjust its data offset and frames number in order not to-      // play the same content again.-      if (unplayedFrames > 0 && unplayedFrames < mCurrentData->Frames()) {-        const uint32_t orginalFrames = mCurrentData->Frames();-        const uint32_t offsetFrames = mCurrentData->Frames() - unplayedFrames;-        Unused << mCurrentData->SetTrimWindow(-            {mCurrentData->mTime + FramesToTimeUnit(offsetFrames, mOutputRate),-             mCurrentData->GetEndTime()});-        SINK_LOG_V("After adjustment, audio frame from %u to %u", orginalFrames,-                   mCurrentData->Frames());-      }-      mAudioQueue.PushFront(mCurrentData);-    }-    MOZ_ASSERT(mProcessedQueue.GetSize() == 0);-  }-  mProcessedQueue.Finish();+  mProcessedQueueFinished = true; } void AudioSink::SetVolume(double aVolume) {@@ -198,7 +170,6 @@ } nsresult AudioSink::InitializeAudioStream(const PlaybackParams& aParams) {-  mAudioStream = new AudioStream(*this);   // When AudioQueue is empty, there is no way to know the channel layout of   // the coming audio data, so we use the predefined channel map instead.   AudioConfig::ChannelLayout::ChannelMap channelMap =@@ -208,8 +179,9 @@   // mOutputChannels into SMPTE format, so there is no need to worry if   // StaticPrefs::accessibility_monoaudio_enable() or   // StaticPrefs::media_forcestereo_enabled() is applied.-  nsresult rv = mAudioStream->Init(mOutputChannels, channelMap, mOutputRate,-                                   mAudioDevice);+  mAudioStream =+      new AudioStream(*this, mOutputRate, mOutputChannels, channelMap);+  nsresult rv = mAudioStream->Init(mAudioDevice);   if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {     mAudioStream->Shutdown();     mAudioStream = nullptr;@@ -225,12 +197,7 @@ } TimeUnit AudioSink::GetEndTime() const {-  int64_t written;-  {-    MonitorAutoLock mon(mMonitor);-    written = mWritten;-  }-  TimeUnit played = FramesToTimeUnit(written, mOutputRate) + mStartTime;+  TimeUnit played = FramesToTimeUnit(mWritten, mOutputRate) + mStartTime;   if (!played.IsValid()) {     NS_WARNING("Int overflow calculating audio end time");     return TimeUnit::Zero();@@ -240,100 +207,56 @@   return std::min(mLastEndTime, played); }-UniquePtr<AudioStream::Chunk> AudioSink::PopFrames(uint32_t aFrames) {-  class Chunk : public AudioStream::Chunk {-   public:-    Chunk(AudioData* aBuffer, uint32_t aFrames, AudioDataValue* aData)-        : mBuffer(aBuffer), mFrames(aFrames), mData(aData) {}-    Chunk() : mFrames(0), mData(nullptr) {}-    const AudioDataValue* Data() const override { return mData; }-    uint32_t Frames() const override { return mFrames; }-    uint32_t Channels() const override {-      return mBuffer ? mBuffer->mChannels : 0;-    }-    uint32_t Rate() const override { return mBuffer ? mBuffer->mRate : 0; }-    AudioDataValue* GetWritable() const override { return mData; }--   private:-    const RefPtr<AudioData> mBuffer;-    const uint32_t mFrames;-    AudioDataValue* const mData;-  };--  bool needPopping = false;-  if (!mCurrentData) {-    // No data in the queue. Return an empty chunk.-    if (!mProcessedQueue.GetSize()) {-      return MakeUnique<Chunk>();-    }--    // We need to update our values prior popping the processed queue in-    // order to prevent the pop event to fire too early (prior-    // mProcessedQueueLength being updated) or prevent HasUnplayedFrames-    // to incorrectly return true during the time interval betweeen the-    // when mProcessedQueue is read and mWritten is updated.-    needPopping = true;-    {-      MonitorAutoLock mon(mMonitor);-      mCurrentData = mProcessedQueue.PeekFront();-      mCursor = MakeUnique<AudioBufferCursor>(mCurrentData->Data(),-                                              mCurrentData->mChannels,-                                              mCurrentData->Frames());-    }-    MOZ_ASSERT(mCurrentData->Frames() > 0);-    mProcessedQueueLength -=-        FramesToUsecs(mCurrentData->Frames(), mOutputRate).value();-  }--  auto framesToPop = std::min(aFrames, mCursor->Available());--  SINK_LOG_V("playing audio at time=%" PRId64 " offset=%u length=%u",-             mCurrentData->mTime.ToMicroseconds(),-             mCurrentData->Frames() - mCursor->Available(), framesToPop);--  if (profiler_thread_is_being_profiled_for_markers()) {-    mOwnerThread->Dispatch(NS_NewRunnableFunction(-        "AudioSink:AddMarker",-        [startTime = mCurrentData->mTime.ToMicroseconds(),-         endTime = mCurrentData->GetEndTime().ToMicroseconds()] {-          PROFILER_MARKER("PlayAudio", MEDIA_PLAYBACK, {}, MediaSampleMarker,-                          startTime, endTime);-        }));-  }--  UniquePtr<AudioStream::Chunk> chunk =-      MakeUnique<Chunk>(mCurrentData, framesToPop, mCursor->Ptr());--  {-    MonitorAutoLock mon(mMonitor);-    mWritten += framesToPop;-    mCursor->Advance(framesToPop);-    // All frames are popped. Reset mCurrentData so we can pop new elements from-    // the audio queue in next calls to PopFrames().-    if (!mCursor->Available()) {-      mCurrentData = nullptr;-    }-  }--  if (needPopping) {-    // We can now safely pop the audio packet from the processed queue.-    // This will fire the popped event, triggering a call to NotifyAudioNeeded.-    RefPtr<AudioData> releaseMe = mProcessedQueue.PopFront();-    CheckIsAudible(releaseMe);-  }--  return chunk;+uint32_t AudioSink::PopFrames(AudioDataValue* aBuffer, uint32_t aFrames,+                              bool aAudioThreadChanged) {+  // This is safe, because we have the guarantee, by the OS, that audio+  // callbacks are never called concurrently. Audio thread changes can only+  // happen when not using cubeb remoting, and often when changing audio device+  // at the system level.+  if (aAudioThreadChanged) {+    mProcessedSPSCQueue->ResetThreadIds();+  }++  TRACE_COMMENT("AudioSink::PopFrames", "%u frames (ringbuffer: %u/%u)",+                aFrames, SampleToFrame(mProcessedSPSCQueue->AvailableRead()),+                SampleToFrame(mProcessedSPSCQueue->Capacity()));++  const int samplesToPop = static_cast<int>(aFrames * mOutputChannels);+  const int samplesRead = mProcessedSPSCQueue->Dequeue(aBuffer, samplesToPop);+  MOZ_ASSERT(samplesRead % mOutputChannels == 0);+  mWritten += SampleToFrame(samplesRead);+  if (samplesRead != samplesToPop) {+    if (Ended()) {+      SINK_LOG("Last PopFrames -- Source ended.");+    } else {+      NS_WARNING("Underrun when popping samples from audiosink ring buffer.");+      TRACE_COMMENT("AudioSink::PopFrames", "Underrun %u frames missing",+                    SampleToFrame(samplesToPop - samplesRead));+    }+    // silence the rest+    PodZero(aBuffer + samplesRead, samplesToPop - samplesRead);+  }++  mAudioPopped.Notify();++  SINK_LOG_V("Popping %u frames. Remaining in ringbuffer %u / %u\n", aFrames,+             SampleToFrame(mProcessedSPSCQueue->AvailableRead()),+             SampleToFrame(mProcessedSPSCQueue->Capacity()));++  // Don't consider the silence added because of an underrun.+  CheckIsAudible(Span(aBuffer, samplesRead), mOutputChannels);++  return SampleToFrame(samplesRead); } bool AudioSink::Ended() const {   // Return true when error encountered so AudioStream can start draining.-  return mProcessedQueue.IsFinished() || mErrored;-}--void AudioSink::CheckIsAudible(const AudioData* aData) {-  MOZ_ASSERT(aData);--  mAudibilityMonitor.Process(aData);+  return mProcessedQueueFinished || mErrored;+}++void AudioSink::CheckIsAudible(const Span<AudioDataValue>& aInterleaved,+                               size_t aChannel) {+  mAudibilityMonitor.ProcessInterleaved(aInterleaved, aChannel);   bool isAudible = mAudibilityMonitor.RecentlyAudible();   if (isAudible != mIsAudioDataAudible) {@@ -342,7 +265,7 @@   } }-void AudioSink::OnAudioPopped(const RefPtr<AudioData>& aSample) {+void AudioSink::OnAudioPopped() {   SINK_LOG_V("AudioStream has used an audio packet.");   NotifyAudioNeeded(); }@@ -352,15 +275,34 @@   NotifyAudioNeeded(); }+uint32_t AudioSink::AudioQueuedInRingBufferMS() const {+  return static_cast<uint32_t>(+      1000 * SampleToFrame(mProcessedSPSCQueue->AvailableRead()) / mOutputRate);+}++uint32_t AudioSink::SampleToFrame(uint32_t aSamples) const {+  return aSamples / mOutputChannels;+}+ void AudioSink::NotifyAudioNeeded() {   MOZ_ASSERT(mOwnerThread->IsCurrentThreadIn(),              "Not called from the owner's thread");-  // Always ensure we have two processed frames pending to allow for processing-  // latency.   while (mAudioQueue.GetSize() &&-         (mAudioQueue.IsFinished() || mProcessedQueueLength < LOW_AUDIO_USECS ||-          mProcessedQueue.GetSize() < 2)) {+         AudioQueuedInRingBufferMS() < mProcessedQueueThresholdMS) {+    // Check if there's room in our ring buffer.+    if (mAudioQueue.PeekFront()->Frames() >+        SampleToFrame(mProcessedSPSCQueue->AvailableWrite())) {+      SINK_LOG_V("Can't push %u frames. In ringbuffer %u / %u\n",+                 mAudioQueue.PeekFront()->Frames(),+                 SampleToFrame(mProcessedSPSCQueue->AvailableRead()),+                 SampleToFrame(mProcessedSPSCQueue->Capacity()));+      return;+    }+    SINK_LOG_V("Pushing %u frames. In ringbuffer %u / %u\n",+               mAudioQueue.PeekFront()->Frames(),+               SampleToFrame(mProcessedSPSCQueue->AvailableRead()),+               SampleToFrame(mProcessedSPSCQueue->Capacity()));     RefPtr<AudioData> data = mAudioQueue.PopFront();     // Ignore the element with 0 frames and try next.@@ -376,7 +318,7 @@                  mConverter ? mConverter->InputConfig().Rate() : 0,                  data->mChannels, data->mRate);-      DrainConverter();+      DrainConverter(SampleToFrame(mProcessedSPSCQueue->AvailableWrite()));       // mFramesParsed indicates the current playtime in frames at the current       // input sampling rate. Recalculate it per the new sampling rate.@@ -432,9 +374,14 @@       // The next audio packet begins some time after the end of the last packet       // we pushed to the audio hardware. We must push silence into the audio       // hardware so that the next audio packet begins playback at the correct-      // time.-      missingFrames = std::min<int64_t>(INT32_MAX, missingFrames.value());+      // time. But don't push more than the ring buffer can receive.+      missingFrames = std::min<int64_t>(+          std::min<int64_t>(INT32_MAX, missingFrames.value()),+          SampleToFrame(mProcessedSPSCQueue->AvailableWrite()));       mFramesParsed += missingFrames.value();++      SINK_LOG("Gap in the audio input, push %" PRId64 " frames of silence",+               missingFrames.value());       RefPtr<AudioData> silenceData;       AlignedAudioBuffer silenceBuffer(missingFrames.value() * data->mChannels);@@ -451,6 +398,7 @@       } else {         silenceData = CreateAudioFromBuffer(std::move(silenceBuffer), data);       }+      TRACE("Pushing silence");       PushProcessedAudio(silenceData);     }@@ -470,8 +418,8 @@   if (mAudioQueue.IsFinished()) {     // We have reached the end of the data, drain the resampler.-    DrainConverter();-    mProcessedQueue.Finish();+    DrainConverter(SampleToFrame(mProcessedSPSCQueue->AvailableWrite()));+    mProcessedQueueFinished = true;   } }@@ -479,14 +427,22 @@   if (!aData || !aData->Frames()) {     return 0;   }-  mProcessedQueue.Push(aData);-  mProcessedQueueLength += FramesToUsecs(aData->Frames(), mOutputRate).value();+  int framesToEnqueue = static_cast<int>(aData->Frames() * aData->mChannels);+  TRACE_COMMENT("AudioSink::PushProcessedAudio", "%u frames (%u/%u)",+                framesToEnqueue,+                SampleToFrame(mProcessedSPSCQueue->AvailableWrite()),+                SampleToFrame(mProcessedSPSCQueue->Capacity()));+  DebugOnly<int> rv =+      mProcessedSPSCQueue->Enqueue(aData->Data().Elements(), framesToEnqueue);+  NS_WARNING_ASSERTION(+      rv == static_cast<int>(aData->Frames() * aData->mChannels),+      "AudioSink ring buffer over-run, can't push new data");   return aData->Frames(); } already_AddRefed<AudioData> AudioSink::CreateAudioFromBuffer(     AlignedAudioBuffer&& aBuffer, AudioData* aReference) {-  uint32_t frames = aBuffer.Length() / mOutputChannels;+  uint32_t frames = SampleToFrame(aBuffer.Length());   if (!frames) {     return nullptr;   }@@ -518,7 +474,7 @@   AlignedAudioBuffer convertedData =       mConverter->Process(AudioSampleBuffer(AlignedAudioBuffer())).Forget();-  uint32_t frames = convertedData.Length() / mOutputChannels;+  uint32_t frames = SampleToFrame(convertedData.Length());   if (!convertedData.SetLength(std::min(frames, aMaxFrames) *                                mOutputChannels)) {     // This can never happen as we were reducing the length of convertData.@@ -531,7 +487,12 @@   if (!data) {     return 0;   }-  mProcessedQueue.Push(data);+  int framesToEnqueue = static_cast<int>(data->mChannels * data->Frames());+  DebugOnly<int> rv =+      mProcessedSPSCQueue->Enqueue(data->Data().Elements(), framesToEnqueue);+  NS_WARNING_ASSERTION(+      rv == static_cast<int>(data->Frames() * data->mChannels),+      "AudioSink ring buffer over-run when draining, can't push new data");   return data->Frames(); }

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Race Condition [File] dom/media/mediasink/AudioSink.cpp [Lines 207-217]
Old Code: Uses mMonitor for thread synchronization
Fixed Code: Uses SPSCQueue which is inherently thread-safe for single producer/consumer

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Integer Overflow [File] dom/media/mediasink/AudioSink.cpp [Lines 432-439]
Old Code: Missing bounds checking when calculating missing frames
Fixed Code: Adds bounds checking with std::min to prevent overflow:
missingFrames = std::min<int64_t>(
    std::min<int64_t>(INT32_MAX, missingFrames.value()),
    SampleToFrame(mProcessedSPSCQueue->AvailableWrite()));

3. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Buffer Overflow [File] dom/media/mediasink/AudioSink.cpp [Lines 427-437]
Old Code: No explicit buffer size checking when pushing audio data
Fixed Code: Adds buffer size checking and warnings:
DebugOnly<int> rv =
    mProcessedSPSCQueue->Enqueue(aData->Data().Elements(), framesToEnqueue);
NS_WARNING_ASSERTION(...);

4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Memory Leak [File] dom/media/mediasink/AudioSink.cpp [Lines 51-61]
Old Code: No clear resource management for processed queue
Fixed Code: Explicitly uses UniquePtr for SPSCQueue and proper initialization

5. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Thread Safety [File] dom/media/mediasink/AudioSink.cpp [Lines 207-217]
Old Code: Uses Monitor for synchronization which could lead to deadlocks
Fixed Code: Replaces with lock-free SPSC queue design

The most clear security improvements are:
1. The addition of bounds checking to prevent integer overflow
2. The addition of buffer size checks to prevent buffer overflows
3. The replacement of manual synchronization with a thread-safe queue implementation

The changes appear to be focused on making the audio processing more robust against potential security issues related to concurrency and memory safety.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/webrtc/third_party_build/gn-configs/x64_True_x86_linux.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/webrtc/third_party_build/gn-configs/x64_True_x86_linux.json@@ -28159,7 +28159,6 @@                 "-Wunused-lambda-capture"             ],             "defines": [-                "MULTI_MONITOR_SCREENSHARE",                 "WEBRTC_USE_PIPEWIRE",                 "USE_UDEV",                 "USE_AURA=1",

Analyzing the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Removed Feature Flag] [dom/media/webrtc/third_party_build/gn-configs/x64_True_x86_linux.json] [Lines 28159-28163]
   [Old Code]
   "defines": [
       "MULTI_MONITOR_SCREENSHARE",
       "WEBRTC_USE_PIPEWIRE",
       "USE_UDEV",
       "USE_AURA=1",

   [Fixed Code]
   "defines": [
       "WEBRTC_USE_PIPEWIRE",
       "USE_UDEV",
       "USE_AURA=1",

Additional Notes:
- The diff shows removal of the "MULTI_MONITOR_SCREENSHARE" define flag
- Without more context, it's unclear if this was a security fix or just a feature removal
- The removal could potentially be related to screen sharing security improvements, but this is speculative
- No specific vulnerability name can be determined from this change alone

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.