--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit/arm/Architecture-arm.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit/arm/Architecture-arm.cpp@@ -176,12 +176,15 @@ bool CPUFlagsHaveBeenComputed() { return armHwCapFlags != HWCAP_UNINITIALIZED; }-bool ParseARMHwCapFlags(const char* armHwCap) {-  uint32_t flags = 0;--  if (!armHwCap) {-    return false;-  }+static const char* gArmHwCapString = nullptr;++void SetARMHwCapFlagsString(const char* armHwCap) {+  MOZ_ASSERT(!CPUFlagsHaveBeenComputed());+  gArmHwCapString = armHwCap;+}++static void ParseARMHwCapFlags(const char* armHwCap) {+  MOZ_ASSERT(armHwCap);   if (strstr(armHwCap, "help")) {     fflush(NULL);@@ -208,7 +211,7 @@     /*NOTREACHED*/   }-  flags = ParseARMCpuFeatures(armHwCap, /* override = */ true);+  uint32_t flags = ParseARMCpuFeatures(armHwCap, /* override = */ true); #ifdef JS_CODEGEN_ARM_HARDFP   flags |= HWCAP_USE_HARDFP_ABI;@@ -216,21 +219,22 @@   armHwCapFlags = CanonicalizeARMHwCapFlags(flags);   JitSpew(JitSpew_Codegen, "ARM HWCAP: 0x%x\n", armHwCapFlags);-  return true; } void InitARMFlags() {+  MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(armHwCapFlags == HWCAP_UNINITIALIZED);++  if (const char* env = getenv("ARMHWCAP")) {+    ParseARMHwCapFlags(env);+    return;+  }++  if (gArmHwCapString) {+    ParseARMHwCapFlags(gArmHwCapString);+    return;+  }+   uint32_t flags = 0;--  if (armHwCapFlags != HWCAP_UNINITIALIZED) {-    return;-  }--  const char* env = getenv("ARMHWCAP");-  if (ParseARMHwCapFlags(env)) {-    return;-  }- #ifdef JS_SIMULATOR_ARM   // HWCAP_FIXUP_FAULT is on by default even if HWCAP_ALIGNMENT_FAULT is   // not on by default, because some memory access instructions always fault.

Here's the analysis of the code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
   Missing Input Validation [js/src/jit/arm/Architecture-arm.cpp] [Lines 176-219]  
   Old Code:  
   ```c
   bool ParseARMHwCapFlags(const char* armHwCap) {
     uint32_t flags = 0;
   
     if (!armHwCap) {
       return false;
     }
   ```
   Fixed Code:  
   ```c
   static void ParseARMHwCapFlags(const char* armHwCap) {
     MOZ_ASSERT(armHwCap);
   ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
   Uninitialized Memory Access [js/src/jit/arm/Architecture-arm.cpp] [Lines 219-236]  
   Old Code:  
   ```c
   void InitARMFlags() {
     uint32_t flags = 0;
   
     if (armHwCapFlags != HWCAP_UNINITIALIZED) {
       return;
     }
   ```
   Fixed Code:  
   ```c
   void InitARMFlags() {
     MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(armHwCapFlags == HWCAP_UNINITIALIZED);
   ```

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   Potential Information Leak [js/src/jit/arm/Architecture-arm.cpp] [Lines 176-219]  
   Old Code:  
   ```c
   if (strstr(armHwCap, "help")) {
     fflush(NULL);
     exit(0);
     /*NOTREACHED*/
   }
   ```
   Fixed Code:  
   (Same code remains but moved to new function)  
   Note: The "help" functionality could potentially be abused to terminate the process, but this might be intended behavior.

The main security improvements are:
1. Added assertion to ensure non-null input in ParseARMHwCapFlags
2. Added assertion to ensure proper initialization state
3. Restructured the code to be more defensive by separating flag setting from parsing
4. Added proper handling of environment variable vs preset string cases

The changes appear to address potential null pointer dereferences and uninitialized memory access issues while making the initialization flow more robust.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/svg/SVGObserverUtils.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/svg/SVGObserverUtils.cpp@@ -1399,6 +1399,10 @@ SVGGeometryElement* SVGObserverUtils::GetAndObserveTextPathsPath(     nsIFrame* aTextPathFrame) {+  // Continuations can come and go during reflow, and we don't need to observe+  // the referenced element more than once for a given node.+  aTextPathFrame = aTextPathFrame->FirstContinuation();+   SVGTextPathObserver* property =       aTextPathFrame->GetProperty(HrefAsTextPathProperty());

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Reference Handling Issue [File] layout/svg/SVGObserverUtils.cpp [Lines] 1399-1403
[Old Code]
SVGGeometryElement* SVGObserverUtils::GetAndObserveTextPathsPath(
    nsIFrame* aTextPathFrame) {
[Fixed Code]
SVGGeometryElement* SVGObserverUtils::GetAndObserveTextPathsPath(
    nsIFrame* aTextPathFrame) {
  // Continuations can come and go during reflow, and we don't need to observe
  // the referenced element more than once for a given node.
  aTextPathFrame = aTextPathFrame->FirstContinuation();

The change adds handling for frame continuations to ensure the referenced element is only observed once per node. While this doesn't appear to be fixing a specific named vulnerability, it could potentially prevent issues related to:
1. Duplicate observations of the same element
2. Race conditions during reflow
3. Potential memory leaks from multiple observations

The fix ensures proper handling of frame continuations, which could have led to inconsistent behavior or resource management issues, though I can't identify a specific CVE or vulnerability name for this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.alpha.5.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.alpha.5.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ ctx.shadowColor = '#00f'; ctx.shadowOffsetY = 50; ctx.fillRect(0, -50, 100, 50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 127,0,127,255, "50,25", "127,0,127,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 127,0,127,255, "50,25", "127,0,127,255", 2); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff content, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-sensitive operations. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.alpha.5.html [Lines] 17-26
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ...
   _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 127,0,127,255, "50,25", "127,0,127,255", 2);
   
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ...
   _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 127,0,127,255, "50,25", "127,0,127,255", 2);

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` throughout the file, which doesn't affect security in any way. This appears to be a code style or consistency improvement rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/python/mozboot/mozboot/bootstrap.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/python/mozboot/mozboot/bootstrap.py@@ -12,11 +12,18 @@ import sys import subprocess import time-from distutils.version import LooseVersion-from mozfile import which-from mach.util import get_state_dir, UserError+from typing import Optional+from pathlib import Path+from packaging.version import Version+from mach.util import (+    get_state_dir,+    UserError,+    to_optional_path,+    to_optional_str,+    win_to_msys_path,+) from mach.telemetry import initialize_telemetry_setting-+from mach.site import MachSiteManager from mozboot.base import MODERN_RUST_VERSION from mozboot.centosfedora import CentOSFedoraBootstrapper from mozboot.opensuse import OpenSUSEBootstrapper@@ -31,6 +38,7 @@ from mozboot.windows import WindowsBootstrapper from mozboot.mozillabuild import MozillaBuildBootstrapper from mozboot.mozconfig import find_mozconfig, MozconfigBuilder+from mozfile import which # Use distro package to retrieve linux platform information import distro@@ -120,7 +128,7 @@ # Version 2.24 changes the "core.commitGraph" setting to be "True" by default.-MINIMUM_RECOMMENDED_GIT_VERSION = LooseVersion("2.24")+MINIMUM_RECOMMENDED_GIT_VERSION = Version("2.24") OLD_GIT_WARNING = """ You are running an older version of git ("{old_version}"). We recommend upgrading to at least version "{minimum_recommended_version}" to improve@@ -168,7 +176,7 @@                 cls = GentooBootstrapper             elif dist_id in ("solus"):                 cls = SolusBootstrapper-            elif dist_id in ("arch") or os.path.exists("/etc/arch-release"):+            elif dist_id in ("arch") or Path("/etc/arch-release").exists():                 cls = ArchlinuxBootstrapper             elif dist_id in ("void"):                 cls = VoidBootstrapper@@ -191,7 +199,7 @@         elif sys.platform.startswith("darwin"):             # TODO Support Darwin platforms that aren't OS X.             osx_version = platform.mac_ver()[0]-            if platform.machine() == "arm64":+            if platform.machine() == "arm64" or _macos_is_running_under_rosetta():                 cls = OSXBootstrapperLight             else:                 cls = OSXBootstrapper@@ -236,7 +244,7 @@         # Like 'ensure_browser_packages' or 'ensure_mobile_android_packages'         getattr(self.instance, "ensure_%s_packages" % application)()-    def check_code_submission(self, checkout_root):+    def check_code_submission(self, checkout_root: Path):         if self.instance.no_interactive or which("moz-phab"):             return@@ -248,8 +256,8 @@         if not self.instance.prompt_yesno("Will you be submitting commits to Mozilla?"):             return-        mach_binary = os.path.join(checkout_root, "mach")-        subprocess.check_call((sys.executable, mach_binary, "install-moz-phab"))+        mach_binary = checkout_root / "mach"+        subprocess.check_call((sys.executable, str(mach_binary), "install-moz-phab"))     def bootstrap(self, settings):         if self.choice is None:@@ -288,15 +296,7 @@         ):             # If running on arm64 mac, check whether we're running under             # Rosetta and advise against it.-            proc = subprocess.run(-                ["sysctl", "-n", "sysctl.proc_translated"],-                stdout=subprocess.PIPE,-                stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,-            )-            if (-                proc.returncode == 0-                and proc.stdout.decode("ascii", "replace").strip() == "1"-            ):+            if _macos_is_running_under_rosetta():                 print(                     "Python is being emulated under Rosetta. Please use a native "                     "Python instead. If you still really want to go ahead, set "@@ -305,17 +305,20 @@                 )                 return 1-        state_dir = get_state_dir()+        state_dir = Path(get_state_dir())         self.instance.state_dir = state_dir++        hg = to_optional_path(which("hg"))         # We need to enable the loading of hgrc in case extensions are         # required to open the repo.         (checkout_type, checkout_root) = current_firefox_checkout(-            env=self.instance._hg_cleanenv(load_hgrc=True), hg=which("hg")+            env=self.instance._hg_cleanenv(load_hgrc=True),+            hg=hg,         )         self.instance.srcdir = checkout_root         self.instance.validate_environment()-        self._validate_python_environment()+        self._validate_python_environment(checkout_root)         if self.instance.no_system_changes:             self.maybe_install_private_packages_or_exit(application)@@ -330,6 +333,8 @@         hg_installed, hg_modern = self.instance.ensure_mercurial_modern()         if not self.instance.artifact_mode:             self.instance.ensure_rust_modern()++        git = to_optional_path(which("git"))         # Possibly configure Mercurial, but not if the current checkout or repo         # type is Git.@@ -340,10 +345,10 @@                 configure_hg = self.hg_configure             if configure_hg:-                configure_mercurial(which("hg"), state_dir)+                configure_mercurial(hg, state_dir)         # Offer to configure Git, if the current checkout or repo type is Git.-        elif which("git") and checkout_type == "git":+        elif git and checkout_type == "git":             should_configure_git = False             if not self.instance.no_interactive:                 should_configure_git = self.instance.prompt_yesno(prompt=CONFIGURE_GIT)@@ -353,7 +358,10 @@             if should_configure_git:                 configure_git(-                    which("git"), which("git-cinnabar"), state_dir, checkout_root+                    git,+                    to_optional_path(which("git-cinnabar")),+                    state_dir,+                    checkout_root,                 )         self.maybe_install_private_packages_or_exit(application)@@ -361,12 +369,12 @@         # Wait until after moz-phab setup to check telemetry so that employees         # will be automatically opted-in.         if not self.instance.no_interactive and not settings.mach_telemetry.is_set_up:-            initialize_telemetry_setting(settings, checkout_root, state_dir)+            initialize_telemetry_setting(settings, str(checkout_root), str(state_dir))         print(FINISHED % name)         if not (             which("rustc")-            and self.instance._parse_version("rustc") >= MODERN_RUST_VERSION+            and self.instance._parse_version(Path("rustc")) >= MODERN_RUST_VERSION         ):             print(                 "To build %s, please restart the shell (Start a new terminal window)"@@ -385,15 +393,14 @@         raw_mozconfig = mozconfig_builder.generate()         if raw_mozconfig:-            mozconfig_path = find_mozconfig(self.mach_context.topdir)+            mozconfig_path = find_mozconfig(Path(self.mach_context.topdir))             if not mozconfig_path:                 # No mozconfig file exists yet-                mozconfig_path = os.path.join(self.mach_context.topdir, "mozconfig")+                mozconfig_path = Path(self.mach_context.topdir) / "mozconfig"                 with open(mozconfig_path, "w") as mozconfig_file:                     mozconfig_file.write(raw_mozconfig)                 print(-                    'Your requested configuration has been written to "%s".'-                    % mozconfig_path+                    f'Your requested configuration has been written to "{mozconfig_path}".'                 )             else:                 suggestion = MOZCONFIG_SUGGESTION_TEMPLATE % (@@ -402,7 +409,7 @@                 )                 print(suggestion, end="")-    def _validate_python_environment(self):+    def _validate_python_environment(self, topsrcdir):         valid = True         try:             # distutils is singled out here because some distros (namely Ubuntu)@@ -420,7 +427,7 @@             print("ERROR: distutils is not behaving as expected.", file=sys.stderr)             self.instance.suggest_install_distutils()             valid = False-        pip3 = which("pip3")+        pip3 = to_optional_path(which("pip3"))         if not pip3:             print("ERROR: Could not find pip3.", file=sys.stderr)             self.instance.suggest_install_pip3()@@ -435,10 +442,16 @@             )             sys.exit(1)--def update_vct(hg, root_state_dir):+        mach_site = MachSiteManager.from_environment(+            topsrcdir,+            lambda: os.path.normpath(get_state_dir(True, topsrcdir=topsrcdir)),+        )+        mach_site.attempt_populate_optional_packages()+++def update_vct(hg: Path, root_state_dir: Path):     """Ensure version-control-tools in the state directory is up to date."""-    vct_dir = os.path.join(root_state_dir, "version-control-tools")+    vct_dir = root_state_dir / "version-control-tools"     # Ensure the latest revision of version-control-tools is present.     update_mercurial_repo(@@ -448,48 +461,50 @@     return vct_dir-def configure_mercurial(hg, root_state_dir):+def configure_mercurial(hg: Optional[Path], root_state_dir: Path):     """Run the Mercurial configuration wizard."""     vct_dir = update_vct(hg, root_state_dir)++    hg = to_optional_str(hg)     # Run the config wizard from v-c-t.     args = [         hg,         "--config",-        "extensions.configwizard=%s/hgext/configwizard" % vct_dir,+        f"extensions.configwizard={vct_dir}/hgext/configwizard",         "configwizard",     ]     subprocess.call(args)-def update_mercurial_repo(hg, url, dest, revision):+def update_mercurial_repo(hg: Path, url, dest: Path, revision):     """Perform a clone/pull + update of a Mercurial repository."""     # Disable common extensions whose older versions may cause `hg`     # invocations to abort.-    pull_args = [hg]-    if os.path.exists(dest):+    pull_args = [str(hg)]+    if dest.exists():         pull_args.extend(["pull", url])         cwd = dest     else:-        pull_args.extend(["clone", "--noupdate", url, dest])+        pull_args.extend(["clone", "--noupdate", url, str(dest)])         cwd = "/"-    update_args = [hg, "update", "-r", revision]+    update_args = [str(hg), "update", "-r", revision]     print("=" * 80)-    print("Ensuring %s is up to date at %s" % (url, dest))+    print(f"Ensuring {url} is up to date at {dest}")     env = os.environ.copy()     env.update({"HGPLAIN": "1"})     try:-        subprocess.check_call(pull_args, cwd=cwd, env=env)-        subprocess.check_call(update_args, cwd=dest, env=env)+        subprocess.check_call(pull_args, cwd=str(cwd), env=env)+        subprocess.check_call(update_args, cwd=str(dest), env=env)     finally:         print("=" * 80)-def current_firefox_checkout(env, hg=None):+def current_firefox_checkout(env, hg: Optional[Path] = None):     """Determine whether we're in a Firefox checkout.     Returns one of None, ``git``, or ``hg``.@@ -501,22 +516,22 @@         ]     )-    path = os.getcwd()+    path = Path.cwd()     while path:-        hg_dir = os.path.join(path, ".hg")-        git_dir = os.path.join(path, ".git")-        if hg and os.path.exists(hg_dir):+        hg_dir = path / ".hg"+        git_dir = path / ".git"+        if hg and hg_dir.exists():             # Verify the hg repo is a Firefox repo by looking at rev 0.             try:                 node = subprocess.check_output(-                    [hg, "log", "-r", "0", "--template", "{node}"],-                    cwd=path,+                    [str(hg), "log", "-r", "0", "--template", "{node}"],+                    cwd=str(path),                     env=env,                     universal_newlines=True,                 )                 if node in HG_ROOT_REVISIONS:                     _warn_if_risky_revision(path)-                    return ("hg", path)+                    return "hg", path                 # Else the root revision is different. There could be nested                 # repos. So keep traversing the parents.             except subprocess.CalledProcessError:@@ -525,14 +540,13 @@         # Just check for known-good files in the checkout, to prevent attempted         # foot-shootings.  Determining a canonical git checkout of mozilla-unified         # is...complicated-        elif os.path.exists(git_dir):-            moz_configure = os.path.join(path, "moz.configure")-            if os.path.exists(moz_configure):+        elif git_dir.exists():+            moz_configure = path / "moz.configure"+            if moz_configure.exists():                 _warn_if_risky_revision(path)-                return ("git", path)--        path, child = os.path.split(path)-        if child == "":+                return "git", path++        if not len(path.parents):             break     raise UserError(@@ -541,57 +555,68 @@     )-def update_git_tools(git, root_state_dir):+def update_git_tools(git: Optional[Path], root_state_dir: Path):     """Update git tools, hooks and extensions"""     # Ensure git-cinnabar is up to date.-    cinnabar_dir = os.path.join(root_state_dir, "git-cinnabar")+    cinnabar_dir = root_state_dir / "git-cinnabar"     # Ensure the latest revision of git-cinnabar is present.     update_git_repo(git, "https://github.com/glandium/git-cinnabar.git", cinnabar_dir)+    git = to_optional_str(git)+     # Perform a download of cinnabar.     download_args = [git, "cinnabar", "download"]     try:-        subprocess.check_call(download_args, cwd=cinnabar_dir)+        subprocess.check_call(download_args, cwd=str(cinnabar_dir))     except subprocess.CalledProcessError as e:         print(e)     return cinnabar_dir-def update_git_repo(git, url, dest):+def update_git_repo(git: Optional[Path], url, dest: Path):     """Perform a clone/pull + update of a Git repository."""-    pull_args = [git]--    if os.path.exists(dest):+    git_str = to_optional_str(git)++    pull_args = [git_str]++    if dest.exists():         pull_args.extend(["pull"])         cwd = dest     else:-        pull_args.extend(["clone", "--no-checkout", url, dest])-        cwd = "/"--    update_args = [git, "checkout"]+        pull_args.extend(["clone", "--no-checkout", url, str(dest)])+        cwd = Path("/")++    update_args = [git_str, "checkout"]     print("=" * 80)-    print("Ensuring %s is up to date at %s" % (url, dest))+    print(f"Ensuring {url} is up to date at {dest}")     try:-        subprocess.check_call(pull_args, cwd=cwd)-        subprocess.check_call(update_args, cwd=dest)+        subprocess.check_call(pull_args, cwd=str(cwd))+        subprocess.check_call(update_args, cwd=str(dest))     finally:         print("=" * 80)-def configure_git(git, cinnabar, root_state_dir, top_src_dir):+def configure_git(+    git: Optional[Path],+    cinnabar: Optional[Path],+    root_state_dir: Path,+    top_src_dir: Path,+):     """Run the Git configuration steps."""++    git_str = to_optional_str(git)     match = re.search(         r"(\d+\.\d+\.\d+)",-        subprocess.check_output([git, "--version"], universal_newlines=True),+        subprocess.check_output([git_str, "--version"], universal_newlines=True),     )     if not match:         raise Exception("Could not find git version")-    git_version = LooseVersion(match.group(1))+    git_version = Version(match.group(1))     if git_version < MINIMUM_RECOMMENDED_GIT_VERSION:         print(@@ -601,20 +626,19 @@             )         )-    if git_version >= LooseVersion("2.17"):+    if git_version >= Version("2.17"):         # "core.untrackedCache" has a bug before 2.17         subprocess.check_call(-            [git, "config", "core.untrackedCache", "true"], cwd=top_src_dir+            [git_str, "config", "core.untrackedCache", "true"], cwd=str(top_src_dir)         )-    cinnabar_dir = update_git_tools(git, root_state_dir)+    cinnabar_dir = str(update_git_tools(git, root_state_dir))     if not cinnabar:         if "MOZILLABUILD" in os.environ:             # Slightly modify the path on Windows to be correct             # for the copy/paste into the .bash_profile-            cinnabar_dir = "/" + cinnabar_dir-            cinnabar_dir = cinnabar_dir.replace(":", "")+            cinnabar_dir = win_to_msys_path(cinnabar_dir)             print(                 ADD_GIT_CINNABAR_PATH.format(@@ -625,7 +649,7 @@             print(ADD_GIT_CINNABAR_PATH.format(prefix="~", cinnabar_dir=cinnabar_dir))-def _warn_if_risky_revision(path):+def _warn_if_risky_revision(path: Path):     # Warn the user if they're trying to bootstrap from an obviously old     # version of tree as reported by the version control system (a month in     # this case). This is an approximate calculation but is probably good@@ -636,3 +660,14 @@     repo = get_repository_object(path)     if (time.time() - repo.get_commit_time()) >= NUM_SECONDS_IN_MONTH:         print(OLD_REVISION_WARNING)+++def _macos_is_running_under_rosetta():+    proc = subprocess.run(+        ["sysctl", "-n", "sysctl.proc_translated"],+        stdout=subprocess.PIPE,+        stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,+    )+    return (+        proc.returncode == 0 and proc.stdout.decode("ascii", "replace").strip() == "1"+    )

Here's the security analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Path Traversal Vulnerability [File] python/mozboot/mozboot/bootstrap.py [Lines 244, 256]
[Old Code]
    def check_code_submission(self, checkout_root):
        ...
        mach_binary = os.path.join(checkout_root, "mach")
        subprocess.check_call((sys.executable, mach_binary, "install-moz-phab"))
[Fixed Code]
    def check_code_submission(self, checkout_root: Path):
        ...
        mach_binary = checkout_root / "mach"
        subprocess.check_call((sys.executable, str(mach_binary), "install-moz-phab"))

The change improves path handling by using Path objects instead of string concatenation, which helps prevent path traversal vulnerabilities by properly handling path separators.

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Command Injection Vulnerability [File] python/mozboot/mozboot/bootstrap.py [Lines 348-351, 360-363]
[Old Code]
    configure_mercurial(which("hg"), state_dir)
    ...
    configure_git(which("git"), which("git-cinnabar"), state_dir, checkout_root)
[Fixed Code]
    configure_mercurial(hg, state_dir)
    ...
    configure_git(git, to_optional_path(which("git-cinnabar")), state_dir, checkout_root)

The changes add better type safety and path handling, reducing the risk of command injection by using properly typed path objects.

3. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Insecure Temporary File Creation [File] python/mozboot/mozboot/bootstrap.py [Lines 393-397]
[Old Code]
    mozconfig_path = os.path.join(self.mach_context.topdir, "mozconfig")
    with open(mozconfig_path, "w") as mozconfig_file:
[Fixed Code]
    mozconfig_path = Path(self.mach_context.topdir) / "mozconfig"
    with open(mozconfig_path, "w") as mozconfig_file:

The change improves file path handling by using Path objects, though the file creation itself remains similar. The improvement helps prevent path manipulation issues.

4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Code Execution via Repository Updates [File] python/mozboot/mozboot/bootstrap.py [Lines 448-451, 477-480]
[Old Code]
    update_mercurial_repo(hg, url, dest, revision)
    ...
    update_git_repo(git, url, dest)
[Fixed Code]
    update_mercurial_repo(hg, url, dest: Path, revision)
    ...
    update_git_repo(git: Optional[Path], url, dest: Path)

The changes add type hints and better path handling, but it's unclear if this addresses any specific vulnerability or is just general code improvement.

5. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Improper Input Validation [File] python/mozboot/mozboot/bootstrap.py [Lines 555-558]
[Old Code]
    git_version = LooseVersion(match.group(1))
[Fixed Code]
    git_version = Version(match.group(1))

The change from distutils.version.LooseVersion to packaging.version.Version provides more strict version parsing, reducing the risk of version comparison vulnerabilities.

Note: Many of these changes appear to be part of a larger modernization effort to use Path objects instead of string paths and improve type safety, which generally improves security by reducing the risk of path manipulation and command injection vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/thiserror/src/lib.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/thiserror/src/lib.rs@@ -161,6 +161,22 @@ //!   # }; //!   ``` //!+//! - If a field is both a source (named `source`, or has `#[source]` or+//!   `#[from]` attribute) *and* is marked `#[backtrace]`, then the Error+//!   trait's `backtrace()` method is forwarded to the source's backtrace.+//!+//!   ```rust+//!   # const IGNORE: &str = stringify! {+//!   #[derive(Error, Debug)]+//!   pub enum MyError {+//!       Io {+//!           #[backtrace]+//!           source: io::Error,+//!       },+//!   }+//!   # };+//!   ```+//! //! - Errors may use `error(transparent)` to forward the source and Display //!   methods straight through to an underlying error without adding an //!   additional message. This would be appropriate for enums that need an@@ -185,7 +201,11 @@ //! //!   [`anyhow`]: https://github.com/dtolnay/anyhow-#![allow(clippy::module_name_repetitions)]+#![allow(+    // Clippy bug: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust-clippy/issues/7421+    clippy::doc_markdown,+    clippy::module_name_repetitions,+)] mod aserror; mod display;

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be documentation improvements and Clippy lint adjustments.

Analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   - This is a documentation update adding examples for `#[backtrace]` usage
   - No code changes affecting security

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   - The Clippy lint changes (`#![allow(...)]`) are cosmetic/development related
   - No security implications from allowing these lints

The diff shows:
1. Added documentation about combining `#[backtrace]` with source fields
2. Added `clippy::doc_markdown` to allowed lints due to a Clippy bug

Neither of these changes indicate any security fixes or vulnerabilities being addressed. The changes are purely documentation and development quality-of-life improvements.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/bitreader/src/tests.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/bitreader/src/tests.rs@@ -282,3 +282,34 @@     });     assert_eq!(&output, &[0u8; 4]); }++#[test]+fn relative_reader() {+    let bytes = &[+        0b0001_0010, 0b0011_0100,+    ];+    let mut reader = BitReader::new(bytes);+    assert_eq!(reader.read_u8(4).unwrap(), 0b0001);++    let mut relative_reader = reader.relative_reader();++    assert_eq!(reader.read_u8(4).unwrap(), 0b0010);+    assert_eq!(reader.read_u8(4).unwrap(), 0b0011);+    assert_eq!(reader.read_u8(4).unwrap(), 0b0100);++    assert_eq!(reader.read_u8(1).unwrap_err(), BitReaderError::NotEnoughData {+        position: 16,+        length: 16,+        requested: 1+    });++    assert_eq!(relative_reader.read_u8(4).unwrap(), 0b0010);+    assert_eq!(relative_reader.read_u8(4).unwrap(), 0b0011);+    assert_eq!(relative_reader.read_u8(4).unwrap(), 0b0100);++    assert_eq!(relative_reader.read_u8(1).unwrap_err(), BitReaderError::NotEnoughData {+        position: 12,+        length: 12,+        requested: 1+    });+}

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be adding a new test case (`relative_reader`) for the BitReader functionality rather than fixing any security issues.

Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [third_party/rust/bitreader/src/tests.rs] [Lines 282-316]
[No old code being fixed]
[New test case added for relative_reader functionality]

The diff shows only the addition of a new test function that verifies the behavior of the `relative_reader` method, including proper error handling when reading beyond available data. There are no security fixes or vulnerability patches in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.angle.5.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.angle.5.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ ctx.moveTo(100, 0); ctx.arc(100, 0, 150, (1024-1)*Math.PI, (512+1/2)*Math.PI, false); ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes (variable renaming) rather than security-related fixes.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.angle.5.worker.js] [Lines 13-23]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes only involve:
1. Renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Updating the variable name in the `_assertPixel` call
3. No functional changes to the security properties of the code

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/wptcommandline.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/wptcommandline.py@@ -116,6 +116,10 @@                             default=None,                             help="The maximum number of minutes for the job to run",                             type=lambda x: timedelta(minutes=float(x)))+    mode_group.add_argument("--repeat-max-time", action="store",+                            default=100,+                            help="The maximum number of minutes for the test suite to attempt repeat runs",+                            type=int)     output_results_group = mode_group.add_mutually_exclusive_group()     output_results_group.add_argument("--verify-no-output-results", action="store_false",                                       dest="verify_output_results",

I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability] [testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/wptcommandline.py] [Lines 116+]
[Old Code: No argument for repeat max time]
[Fixed Code: Added --repeat-max-time argument with default value of 100 minutes]

Additional details:
- This appears to be a feature addition rather than a security fix
- The change adds a new command line option to control maximum test suite repeat time
- No security vulnerability is being addressed here
- The change improves functionality by adding more control over test execution time limits

No other vulnerabilities are apparent in this diff. The modification is purely additive and doesn't modify any existing security-sensitive functionality.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/profiling/CHANGELOG.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/profiling/CHANGELOG.md@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@ # Changelog++## 1.0.5+ * Update puffin to 0.12.1 ## 1.0.4  * Update puffin to 0.10

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Dependency Update] [third_party/rust/profiling/CHANGELOG.md] [Lines 1-4]
[Old Code]
# Changelog

## 1.0.4
 * Update puffin to 0.10
[Fixed Code]
# Changelog

## 1.0.5
 * Update puffin to 0.12.1

## 1.0.4
 * Update puffin to 0.10

Additional Details:
The diff shows an update to the puffin dependency from 0.10 to 0.12.1. While this could potentially include security fixes (as dependency updates often do), the changelog doesn't explicitly mention any security-related changes. Without access to the puffin changelogs or CVE databases, I can't definitively say whether this update addresses any specific vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.initial.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.initial.html@@ -17,15 +17,15 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.closePath(); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-25]
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ...
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ...
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

Additional Details:
- The changes appear to be purely variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security-related patterns or vulnerabilities are being addressed
- This seems to be a code style/consistency improvement rather than a security fix
- The functionality remains identical, just with a different variable name

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/webdriver/tests/support/defaults.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/webdriver/tests/support/defaults.py@@ -4,6 +4,3 @@ WINDOW_POSITION = (100, 100) WINDOW_SIZE = (800, 600)--DRIVER_HOST = '127.0.0.1'-DRIVER_PORT = 4444

Let me analyze this code diff for potential security vulnerabilities.

Vulnerability Existed: yes
Hardcoded Credentials/Configuration File: testing/web-platform/tests/webdriver/tests/support/defaults.py [Lines 4-6]
[Old Code]
DRIVER_HOST = '127.0.0.1'
DRIVER_PORT = 4444
[Fixed Code]
[These lines were removed]

Additional Details:
The diff shows removal of hardcoded network configuration values (host and port) for the WebDriver. While this might not be a direct security vulnerability, hardcoding such values is generally considered a security risk as it:
1. Makes the system less flexible for deployment in different environments
2. Could potentially expose services on fixed ports that might be targeted
3. Makes it harder to implement security controls like port randomization

The removal of these hardcoded values suggests a move toward more secure configuration practices, likely to be replaced by environment-specific configuration.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/gl/GLBlitHelper.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/gl/GLBlitHelper.cpp@@ -23,9 +23,7 @@ #ifdef MOZ_WIDGET_ANDROID #  include "AndroidSurfaceTexture.h"-#  include "GLImages.h" #  include "GLLibraryEGL.h"-#  include "mozilla/java/GeckoSurfaceTextureWrappers.h" #endif #ifdef XP_MACOSX@@ -730,6 +728,13 @@       return BlitImage(surf, destSize, destOrigin);     } #endif+#ifdef MOZ_WIDGET_ANDROID+    case layers::SurfaceDescriptor::TSurfaceTextureDescriptor: {+      const auto& sd = asd.get_SurfaceTextureDescriptor();+      auto surfaceTexture = java::GeckoSurfaceTexture::Lookup(sd.handle());+      return Blit(surfaceTexture, destSize, destOrigin);+    }+#endif     default:       return false;   }@@ -745,15 +750,18 @@       return BlitPlanarYCbCr(*data, destSize, destOrigin);     }-    case ImageFormat::SURFACE_TEXTURE:+    case ImageFormat::SURFACE_TEXTURE: { #ifdef MOZ_WIDGET_ANDROID-      return BlitImage(static_cast<layers::SurfaceTextureImage*>(srcImage),-                       destSize, destOrigin);+      auto* image = srcImage->AsSurfaceTextureImage();+      MOZ_ASSERT(image);+      auto surfaceTexture =+          java::GeckoSurfaceTexture::Lookup(image->GetHandle());+      return Blit(surfaceTexture, destSize, destOrigin); #else       MOZ_ASSERT(false);       return false; #endif-+    }     case ImageFormat::MAC_IOSURFACE: #ifdef XP_MACOSX       return BlitImage(srcImage->AsMacIOSurfaceImage(), destSize, destOrigin);@@ -801,12 +809,9 @@ // ------------------------------------- #ifdef MOZ_WIDGET_ANDROID-bool GLBlitHelper::BlitImage(layers::SurfaceTextureImage* srcImage,-                             const gfx::IntSize& destSize,-                             const OriginPos destOrigin) const {-  AndroidSurfaceTextureHandle handle = srcImage->GetHandle();-  const auto& surfaceTexture = java::GeckoSurfaceTexture::Lookup(handle);-+bool GLBlitHelper::Blit(const java::GeckoSurfaceTexture::Ref& surfaceTexture,+                        const gfx::IntSize& destSize,+                        const OriginPos destOrigin) const {   if (!surfaceTexture) {     return false;   }@@ -827,38 +832,10 @@   const ScopedBindTexture savedTex(mGL, surfaceTexture->GetTexName(),                                    LOCAL_GL_TEXTURE_EXTERNAL);   surfaceTexture->UpdateTexImage();--  gfx::Matrix4x4 transform4;-  AndroidSurfaceTexture::GetTransformMatrix(-      java::sdk::SurfaceTexture::Ref::From(surfaceTexture), &transform4);-  Mat3 transform3;-  transform3.at(0, 0) = transform4._11;-  transform3.at(0, 1) = transform4._12;-  transform3.at(0, 2) = transform4._14;-  transform3.at(1, 0) = transform4._21;-  transform3.at(1, 1) = transform4._22;-  transform3.at(1, 2) = transform4._24;-  transform3.at(2, 0) = transform4._41;-  transform3.at(2, 1) = transform4._42;-  transform3.at(2, 2) = transform4._44;--  // We don't do w-divison, so if these aren't what we expect, we're probably-  // doing something wrong.-  MOZ_ASSERT(transform3.at(0, 2) == 0);-  MOZ_ASSERT(transform3.at(1, 2) == 0);-  MOZ_ASSERT(transform3.at(2, 2) == 1);--  const auto& srcOrigin = srcImage->GetOriginPos();--  // I honestly have no idea why this logic is flipped, but changing the-  // source origin would mean we'd have to flip it in the compositor-  // which makes just as little sense as this.-  const bool yFlip = (srcOrigin == destOrigin);-+  const auto transform3 = Mat3::I();+  const auto srcOrigin = OriginPos::TopLeft;+  const bool yFlip = (srcOrigin != destOrigin);   const auto& prog = GetDrawBlitProg({kFragHeader_TexExt, kFragBody_RGBA});--  // There is no padding on these images, so we can use the GetTransformMatrix-  // directly.   const DrawBlitProg::BaseArgs baseArgs = {transform3, yFlip, destSize,                                            Nothing()};   prog->Draw(baseArgs, nullptr);

I'll analyze the code diff for security fixes following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Resource Access Control] [gfx/gl/GLBlitHelper.cpp] [730-738]
   [Old Code: No handling of SurfaceTextureDescriptor case]
   [Fixed Code: Added case for SurfaceTextureDescriptor with proper lookup and Blit call]

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Null Pointer Dereference] [gfx/gl/GLBlitHelper.cpp] [750-758]
   [Old Code: Direct static_cast without validation]
   [Fixed Code: Added MOZ_ASSERT and proper type conversion with AsSurfaceTextureImage()]

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Information Leak] [gfx/gl/GLBlitHelper.cpp] [809-832]
   [Old Code: Complex transform matrix handling with potential unvalidated inputs]
   [Fixed Code: Simplified to identity matrix (Mat3::I()) and fixed origin handling]

The changes appear to:
1. Add proper handling for SurfaceTextureDescriptor case
2. Improve type safety with assertions and proper conversion
3. Simplify the transform matrix handling which could potentially remove a source of errors
4. Standardize the origin handling logic

While these changes improve code robustness, I can't definitively identify specific security vulnerabilities that were fixed. The modifications appear to be more about code quality and maintainability improvements rather than direct security fixes. The removal of complex matrix transformations might reduce attack surface, but without more context about the threat model, this is speculative.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.offset.positiveX.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.offset.positiveX.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ ctx.shadowColor = '#0f0'; ctx.shadowOffsetX = 50; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 50, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18, 26-27]
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 26-27]
   [Old Code]
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");
   [Fixed Code]
   _assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");
   _assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas') with no security implications. The functionality remains identical, and there are no security vulnerabilities being addressed in this diff. The changes seem to be for code consistency or readability rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/layers/apz/src/CheckerboardEvent.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/layers/apz/src/CheckerboardEvent.cpp@@ -21,14 +21,16 @@ const char* CheckerboardEvent::sDescriptions[] = {     "page",-    "painted critical displayport",     "painted displayport",     "requested displayport",     "viewport", }; const char* CheckerboardEvent::sColors[] = {-    "brown", "darkgreen", "lightgreen", "yellow", "red",+    "brown",+    "lightgreen",+    "yellow",+    "red", }; CheckerboardEvent::CheckerboardEvent(bool aRecordTrace)

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Information Leak] [gfx/layers/apz/src/CheckerboardEvent.cpp] [Lines 21-23]
   [Old Code]
   const char* CheckerboardEvent::sDescriptions[] = {
       "page",
       "painted critical displayport",
       "painted displayport",
       "requested displayport",
       "viewport",
   };
   [Fixed Code]
   const char* CheckerboardEvent::sDescriptions[] = {
       "page",
       "painted displayport",
       "requested displayport",
       "viewport",
   };

   Additional Details: The removal of "painted critical displayport" might indicate a security-conscious change to reduce exposed internal terminology, but it's unclear if this was actually fixing a vulnerability or just a code cleanup.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Information Leak] [gfx/layers/apz/src/CheckerboardEvent.cpp] [Lines 26-28]
   [Old Code]
   const char* CheckerboardEvent::sColors[] = {
       "brown", "darkgreen", "lightgreen", "yellow", "red",
   };
   [Fixed Code]
   const char* CheckerboardEvent::sColors[] = {
       "brown",
       "lightgreen",
       "yellow",
       "red",
   };

   Additional Details: The removal of "darkgreen" from the color array might be related to reducing exposed information, but without more context it's unclear if this was a security fix or just a code simplification.

Note: The changes appear to be removing elements from string arrays used for descriptions and colors. While these could potentially be security-related changes (reducing exposed information), there isn't enough context to confirm they were actual vulnerability fixes rather than just code cleanup or feature changes. The changes don't clearly match any known vulnerability patterns.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/newtab/bin/try-runner.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/newtab/bin/try-runner.js@@ -169,8 +169,25 @@   return errors.length === 0 && !exitCode; }+function zipCodeCoverage() {+  logStart("zipCodeCoverage");+  const { exitCode, out } = execOut("zip", [+    "-j",+    "logs/coverage/code-coverage-grcov",+    "logs/coverage/lcov.info",+  ]);++  console.log("zipCodeCoverage log output: ", out);++  if (!exitCode) {+    return true;+  }++  return false;+}+ const tests = {};-const success = [checkBundles, karma, sasslint].every(+const success = [checkBundles, karma, zipCodeCoverage, sasslint].every(   t => (tests[t.name] = t()) ); console.log(tests);

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential File Path Manipulation] [browser/components/newtab/bin/try-runner.js] [Lines 169-184]
    [Old Code: No zipCodeCoverage function]
    [Fixed Code: Added zipCodeCoverage function with hardcoded paths]

Additional Details:
- The diff shows the addition of a new `zipCodeCoverage` function that handles file operations with hardcoded paths.
- While not clearly a vulnerability, hardcoded paths can sometimes lead to security issues if they're not properly sanitized or if they could be manipulated.
- The function uses the `zip` command with hardcoded paths, which might be problematic if an attacker could manipulate the working directory or path resolution.
- However, without more context about the execution environment and how these paths are used, it's difficult to determine if this constitutes an actual vulnerability.

Note: No clear vulnerability name could be identified from this diff alone, but the pattern matches potential file path manipulation concerns. The code change appears to be adding functionality rather than fixing a specific security issue.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.pattern.alpha.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.pattern.alpha.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var promise = new Promise(function(resolve, reject) {     var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found in this diff. The changes appear to be purely variable name refactoring from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability purposes. The functionality remains identical.

Additional details:
- The change is in a test file (worker.js) for canvas shadow patterns
- Both versions create an OffscreenCanvas and get its 2D context
- The XMLHttpRequest usage appears to be for test purposes and isn't modified
- No security-sensitive operations were modified

The diff doesn't show any security fixes, just code style improvements. No vulnerabilities were addressed in this particular change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/polygon/shape-outside-polygon-025.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/polygon/shape-outside-polygon-025.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/">   <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#supported-basic-shapes">   <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-polygon-025-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Test the boxes are wrapping around the right float shape defined by the polygon(60px 20px, 100px 60px, 20px 60px, 60px 100px) border-box value under sideways-lr writing-mode.">   <style>   .container {

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 9]
[Old Code]
  <meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code]
(removed line)

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute
- This appears to be a test cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with this change
- The modification doesn't introduce or fix any security-relevant functionality

There are no other changes in the diff to analyze. The modification seems to be related to test maintenance rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-ui/text-overflow-002.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-ui/text-overflow-002.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Shiyou Tan" href="mailto:[email protected]"> <link rel="help" title="8.2. Overflow Ellipsis: the 'text-overflow' property" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-ui/#text-overflow"> <link rel="match" href="reference/text-overflow-002-ref.html">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="Test checks that an ellipsis (...) is shown instead of overflowing textual content"> <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/fonts/ahem.css" /> <style>

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-ui/text-overflow-002.html [Lines] 5
   [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="">
   [Fixed Code] (line removed)

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute
- This appears to be a cleanup change rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with empty meta tags
- The change doesn't affect any security-related functionality

No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The modification appears to be a minor cleanup of test file metadata rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.hex8.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.hex8.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = '#00ff00ff'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-related modifications. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found in this diff. The changes are:
- Variable name changed from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- Corresponding change in `_assertPixel` call to use new variable name
- No security implications in these changes

The modifications are purely for code style/readability and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/rust_decimal/tests/decimal_tests.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/rust_decimal/tests/decimal_tests.rs@@ -2893,6 +2893,8 @@             "8097370036018690744.259037116",         ),         ("1.234567890123456789012345678949999", "1.2345678901234567890123456789"),+        (".00000000000000000000000000001", "0.0000000000000000000000000000"),+        (".10000000000000000000000000000", "0.1000000000000000000000000000"),     ];     for &(value, expected) in tests {         assert_eq!(expected, Decimal::from_str(value).unwrap().to_string());

Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be test case additions for decimal number parsing and formatting.

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] third_party/rust/rust_decimal/tests/decimal_tests.rs [Lines] 2893-2898
[Old Code]
        ("1.234567890123456789012345678949999", "1.2345678901234567890123456789"),
[Fixed Code]
        ("1.234567890123456789012345678949999", "1.2345678901234567890123456789"),
        (".00000000000000000000000000001", "0.0000000000000000000000000000"),
        (".10000000000000000000000000000", "0.1000000000000000000000000000"),

Additional Details:
The changes simply add two more test cases for edge cases in decimal number parsing:
1. A very small decimal number starting with a decimal point
2. A decimal number with trailing zeros after the decimal point
These appear to be test coverage improvements rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.