--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/webgpu/ObjectModel.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/webgpu/ObjectModel.h@@ -84,6 +84,18 @@   NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE_END                         \   NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRACE_WRAPPERCACHE(T)+#define GPU_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_WRAPPERCACHE_INHERITED(T, P, ...) \+  NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_CLASS(T)                                 \+  NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK_BEGIN_INHERITED(T, P)             \+    tmp->Cleanup();                                                 \+    NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(__VA_ARGS__)                    \+    NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK_PRESERVED_WRAPPER               \+    NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK_WEAK_PTR                        \+  NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK_END                               \+  NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE_BEGIN_INHERITED(T, P)           \+    NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE(__VA_ARGS__)                  \+  NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE_END+ #define GPU_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION(T, ...)            \   NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_ROOT_NATIVE(T, AddRef)    \   NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNROOT_NATIVE(T, Release) \

Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be adding a new macro for cycle collection in the WebGPU object model, which is more of a feature addition/refactoring than a security fix.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] dom/webgpu/ObjectModel.h [Lines] 84-96
[Old Code]
(None - this is a new addition)
[Fixed Code]
#define GPU_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_WRAPPERCACHE_INHERITED(T, P, ...) \
  NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_CLASS(T)                                 \
  NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK_BEGIN_INHERITED(T, P)             \
    tmp->Cleanup();                                                 \
    NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(__VA_ARGS__)                    \
    NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK_PRESERVED_WRAPPER               \
    NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK_WEAK_PTR                        \
  NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK_END                               \
  NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE_BEGIN_INHERITED(T, P)           \
    NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE(__VA_ARGS__)                  \
  NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE_END

Additional Notes:
- The change adds a new macro for handling cycle collection in inherited WebGPU objects
- The `Cleanup()` call might help prevent memory leaks, but this isn't a security fix
- No CVEs or known vulnerability patterns are being addressed here
- This appears to be part of normal code maintenance/improvement

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/rotate_x_45deg.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/rotate_x_45deg.html@@ -5,8 +5,7 @@   <link rel="author" title="Ebay Inc." href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css-transforms-2/#3d-transform-rendering"/>   <link rel="match" href="rotate_x_45deg-ref.html"/>-  <meta name="fuzzy" content="maxDifference=159-255;totalPixels=100-200">-  <meta name="flags" content="" />+  <meta name="fuzzy" content="maxDifference=159-255;totalPixels=50-200">   <meta name="assert" content="Rotate 45 degree in y axis"/>   <style type="text/css">       .container {

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 5-7]
[Old Code]
<meta name="fuzzy" content="maxDifference=159-255;totalPixels=100-200">
<meta name="flags" content="" />
[Fixed Code]
<meta name="fuzzy" content="maxDifference=159-255;totalPixels=50-200">

Additional Details:
1. This appears to be a test file modification adjusting fuzzy matching parameters for visual regression testing.
2. The changes involve adjusting pixel difference thresholds (from 100-200 to 50-200) and removing an empty flags meta tag.
3. These changes don't relate to any known security vulnerabilities.
4. The modification seems to be test configuration refinement rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.html4.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.html4.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'limE'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes (variable renaming) rather than security-related fixes.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found]
[File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.html4.html
[Lines] 17-25
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and update the references to it. There are no security implications to these changes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.basic.nocontext.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.basic.nocontext.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var pattern = ctx.createPattern(offscreenCanvas2, 'no-repeat');@@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = pattern; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to the assertions. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-27]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or clarity.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.zero.2.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.zero.2.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ ctx.moveTo(100, 25); ctx.arcTo(200, 25, 50, 25, 0); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.zero.2.worker.js [Lines] 13-29
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or clarity. There are no security-related changes in this diff. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name. No security vulnerabilities were fixed in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/mediacapture-record/MediaRecorder-destroy-script-execution.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/mediacapture-record/MediaRecorder-destroy-script-execution.html@@ -7,12 +7,15 @@ <body> <iframe src="support/MediaRecorder-iframe.html" id="subFrame-stop" name="subFrameStop"></iframe> <iframe src="support/MediaRecorder-iframe.html" id="subFrame-allTrackEnded" name="subFrameAllTrackEnded"></iframe>+<iframe src="support/MediaRecorder-iframe.html" id="subFrame-audioBitrateMode" name="subFrameAudioBitrateMode"></iframe> <script>     var iframeForCallingStop = document.getElementById('subFrame-stop');     var iframeForAllTrackEnded = document.getElementById('subFrame-allTrackEnded');+    var iframeForAudioBitrateMode = document.getElementById('subFrame-audioBitrateMode');     var testForCallingStop = async_test('MediaRecorder will not fire the stop event when stop() is called and the script execution context is going away');     var testForAllTrackEnded = async_test('MediaRecorder will not fire the stop event when all tracks are ended and the script execution context is going away');+    var testForAudioBitrateMode = async_test('MediaRecorder will not crash on accessing audioBitrateMode when the script execution context is going away');     iframeForCallingStop.onload = function(e) {         subFrameStop.window.prepareForTest(testForCallingStop);@@ -42,6 +45,14 @@         subFrameAllTrackEnded.window.video.getVideoTracks()[0].stop();     };+    iframeForAudioBitrateMode.onload = testForAudioBitrateMode.step_func(function(e) {+        subFrameAudioBitrateMode.window.prepareForTest(testForAudioBitrateMode);+        const recorder = subFrameAudioBitrateMode.window.recorder;+        iframeForAudioBitrateMode.remove();+        recorder.audioBitrateMode;+        testForAudioBitrateMode.done();+    });+ </script> </body> </html>

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Crash Vulnerability] [testing/web-platform/tests/mediacapture-record/MediaRecorder-destroy-script-execution.html] [Lines added]  
   [Old Code]  
   (No previous test case for audioBitrateMode access during script execution context destruction)  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```
   <iframe src="support/MediaRecorder-iframe.html" id="subFrame-audioBitrateMode" name="subFrameAudioBitrateMode"></iframe>
   ...
   var iframeForAudioBitrateMode = document.getElementById('subFrame-audioBitrateMode');
   ...
   var testForAudioBitrateMode = async_test('MediaRecorder will not crash on accessing audioBitrateMode when the script execution context is going away');
   ...
   iframeForAudioBitrateMode.onload = testForAudioBitrateMode.step_func(function(e) {
       subFrameAudioBitrateMode.window.prepareForTest(testForAudioBitrateMode);
       const recorder = subFrameAudioBitrateMode.window.recorder;
       iframeForAudioBitrateMode.remove();
       recorder.audioBitrateMode;
       testForAudioBitrateMode.done();
   });
   ```

Additional Details:
- The diff adds a new test case that verifies MediaRecorder won't crash when accessing audioBitrateMode during script execution context destruction
- While not explicitly fixing a vulnerability, this suggests there might have been a potential crash vulnerability related to audioBitrateMode access during context destruction
- The test case was added to ensure proper handling of this scenario
- Without more context about previous crashes or security issues, we can't be certain this was fixing a known vulnerability

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-epoch/CHANGELOG.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-epoch/CHANGELOG.md@@ -1,12 +1,16 @@+# Version 0.9.6++- Add `Atomic::fetch_update`. (#706)+ # Version 0.9.5-- Fix UB in `Pointable` impl of `[MaybeUninit<T>]` (#694)-- Support targets that do not have atomic CAS on stable Rust (#698)-- Fix breakage with nightly feature due to rust-lang/rust#84510 (#692)+- Fix UB in `Pointable` impl of `[MaybeUninit<T>]`. (#694)+- Support targets that do not have atomic CAS on stable Rust. (#698)+- Fix breakage with nightly feature due to rust-lang/rust#84510. (#692) # Version 0.9.4-- Fix UB in `<[MaybeUninit<T>] as Pointable>::init` when global allocator failed allocation (#690)+- Fix UB in `<[MaybeUninit<T>] as Pointable>::init` when global allocator failed allocation. (#690) - Bump `loom` dependency to version 0.5. (#686) # Version 0.9.3

Analyzing the provided diff from the crossbeam-epoch CHANGELOG.md file, here are the security-related findings:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
   Undefined Behavior (UB) in Pointable impl [third_party/rust/crossbeam-epoch/CHANGELOG.md] [Lines mentioning #694, #690]  
   Old Code: Had undefined behavior in `Pointable` implementation for `[MaybeUninit<T>]` and in `<[MaybeUninit<T>] as Pointable>::init`  
   Fixed Code: Patched UB in both cases (versions 0.9.5 and 0.9.4)

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   Potential Atomic Operations Issue [third_party/rust/crossbeam-epoch/CHANGELOG.md] [Line mentioning #698]  
   Old Code: May have had issues with targets lacking atomic CAS support  
   Fixed Code: Added support for targets without atomic CAS on stable Rust  

Note: While the changelog mentions fixes for undefined behavior (which is always a security concern) and atomic operation support, we don't have access to the actual code changes. The UB fixes (#694, #690) are clearly security-related, while #698 might have security implications depending on how atomic operations were previously handled. The other changes appear to be feature additions or dependency updates without clear security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.strokeRect.zero.2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.strokeRect.zero.2.html@@ -17,15 +17,15 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.strokeStyle = '#f00'; ctx.lineWidth = 250; ctx.lineCap = 'round'; ctx.lineJoin = 'round'; ctx.strokeRect(50, 25, 0, 0);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring (variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and corresponding updates to references). Here's the analysis following your format:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-25]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0");
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0");

The changes don't indicate any security fixes - just variable renaming for consistency or clarity. No security-related patterns (like input validation, sanitization, or security-sensitive API changes) were modified.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/mozilla/tests/webdriver/new_session/create.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/mozilla/tests/webdriver/new_session/create.py@@ -1,20 +1,9 @@ # META: timeout=long-import pytest- from tests.support.asserts import assert_success[email protected](-    "headers",-    [-        {"origin": "http://localhost"},-        {"origin": "http://localhost:8000"},-        {"origin": "http://127.0.0.1"},-        {"origin": "http://127.0.0.1:8000"},-        {"content-type": "application/json"},-    ],-)-def test_valid(new_session, configuration, headers):+def test_valid_content_type(new_session, configuration):+    headers = {"content-type": "application/json"}     response, _ = new_session(         {"capabilities": {"alwaysMatch": dict(configuration["capabilities"])}},         headers=headers,

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Origin Validation Removal [File] testing/web-platform/mozilla/tests/webdriver/new_session/create.py [Lines] 1-20
[Old Code]
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
    "headers",
    [
        {"origin": "http://localhost"},
        {"origin": "http://localhost:8000"},
        {"origin": "http://127.0.0.1"},
        {"origin": "http://127.0.0.1:8000"},
        {"content-type": "application/json"},
    ],
)
def test_valid(new_session, configuration, headers):
[Fixed Code]
def test_valid_content_type(new_session, configuration):
    headers = {"content-type": "application/json"}

Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of multiple test cases that were validating different origin headers, keeping only the content-type validation
- This could potentially indicate a relaxation of origin validation checks, but without more context about the actual security implementation, we can't be certain
- The change might be related to CORS (Cross-Origin Resource Sharing) security controls, but we'd need to see the actual implementation to confirm

No other obvious vulnerabilities were identified in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.enable.off.1.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.enable.off.1.worker.js@@ -13,13 +13,13 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.shadowColor = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-20]
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ctx.shadowColor = '#f00';
   ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';
   ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ctx.shadowColor = '#f00';
   ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';
   ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed in this change. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been updated for consistency or clarity.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/gmp/GMPVideoDecoderParent.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/gmp/GMPVideoDecoderParent.cpp@@ -287,22 +287,20 @@                   " frameCount=%d",                   this, aDecodedFrame.mTimestamp(), mFrameCount);-  if (!mCallback) {-    return IPC_FAIL_NO_REASON(this);-  }--  if (!GMPVideoi420FrameImpl::CheckFrameData(aDecodedFrame)) {-    GMP_LOG_ERROR(-        "GMPVideoDecoderParent[%p]::RecvDecoded() "-        "timestamp=%" PRId64 " decoded frame corrupt, ignoring",-        this, aDecodedFrame.mTimestamp());-    return IPC_FAIL_NO_REASON(this);-  }-  auto f = new GMPVideoi420FrameImpl(aDecodedFrame, &mVideoHost);--  // Ignore any return code. It is OK for this to fail without killing the-  // process.-  mCallback->Decoded(f);+  if (mCallback) {+    if (GMPVideoi420FrameImpl::CheckFrameData(aDecodedFrame)) {+      auto f = new GMPVideoi420FrameImpl(aDecodedFrame, &mVideoHost);++      mCallback->Decoded(f);+    } else {+      GMP_LOG_ERROR(+          "GMPVideoDecoderParent[%p]::RecvDecoded() "+          "timestamp=%" PRId64 " decoded frame corrupt, ignoring",+          this, aDecodedFrame.mTimestamp());+      // TODO: Verify if we should take more serious the arrival of+      // a corrupted frame, see bug 1750506.+    }+  }   return IPC_OK(); }@@ -310,26 +308,18 @@ mozilla::ipc::IPCResult GMPVideoDecoderParent::RecvReceivedDecodedReferenceFrame(     const uint64_t& aPictureId) {-  if (!mCallback) {-    return IPC_FAIL_NO_REASON(this);-  }--  // Ignore any return code. It is OK for this to fail without killing the-  // process.-  mCallback->ReceivedDecodedReferenceFrame(aPictureId);+  if (mCallback) {+    mCallback->ReceivedDecodedReferenceFrame(aPictureId);+  }   return IPC_OK(); } mozilla::ipc::IPCResult GMPVideoDecoderParent::RecvReceivedDecodedFrame(     const uint64_t& aPictureId) {-  if (!mCallback) {-    return IPC_FAIL_NO_REASON(this);-  }--  // Ignore any return code. It is OK for this to fail without killing the-  // process.-  mCallback->ReceivedDecodedFrame(aPictureId);+  if (mCallback) {+    mCallback->ReceivedDecodedFrame(aPictureId);+  }   return IPC_OK(); }@@ -337,13 +327,9 @@ mozilla::ipc::IPCResult GMPVideoDecoderParent::RecvInputDataExhausted() {   GMP_LOG_VERBOSE("GMPVideoDecoderParent[%p]::RecvInputDataExhausted()", this);-  if (!mCallback) {-    return IPC_FAIL_NO_REASON(this);-  }--  // Ignore any return code. It is OK for this to fail without killing the-  // process.-  mCallback->InputDataExhausted();+  if (mCallback) {+    mCallback->InputDataExhausted();+  }   return IPC_OK(); }@@ -357,21 +343,11 @@   msg.AppendInt(mFrameCount);   LogToBrowserConsole(msg);-  if (!mCallback) {-    // We anticipate shutting down in the middle of a drain in the-    // `UnblockResetAndDrain` method, which is called when we shutdown, so-    // everything is sunny.-    return IPC_OK();-  }--  if (!mIsAwaitingDrainComplete) {-    return IPC_OK();-  }-  mIsAwaitingDrainComplete = false;--  // Ignore any return code. It is OK for this to fail without killing the-  // process.-  mCallback->DrainComplete();+  if (mCallback && mIsAwaitingDrainComplete) {+    mIsAwaitingDrainComplete = false;++    mCallback->DrainComplete();+  }   return IPC_OK(); }@@ -381,22 +357,12 @@   CancelResetCompleteTimeout();-  if (!mCallback) {-    // We anticipate shutting down in the middle of a reset in the-    // `UnblockResetAndDrain` method, which is called when we shutdown, so-    // everything is good if we reach here.-    return IPC_OK();-  }--  if (!mIsAwaitingResetComplete) {-    return IPC_OK();-  }-  mIsAwaitingResetComplete = false;-  mFrameCount = 0;--  // Ignore any return code. It is OK for this to fail without killing the-  // process.-  mCallback->ResetComplete();+  if (mCallback && mIsAwaitingResetComplete) {+    mIsAwaitingResetComplete = false;+    mFrameCount = 0;++    mCallback->ResetComplete();+  }   return IPC_OK(); }@@ -404,18 +370,14 @@ mozilla::ipc::IPCResult GMPVideoDecoderParent::RecvError(const GMPErr& aError) {   GMP_LOG_DEBUG("GMPVideoDecoderParent[%p]::RecvError(error=%d)", this, aError);-  if (!mCallback) {-    return IPC_FAIL_NO_REASON(this);-  }--  // Ensure if we've received an error while waiting for a ResetComplete-  // or DrainComplete notification, we'll unblock the caller before processing-  // the error.-  UnblockResetAndDrain();--  // Ignore any return code. It is OK for this to fail without killing the-  // process.-  mCallback->Error(aError);+  if (mCallback) {+    // Ensure if we've received an error while waiting for a ResetComplete+    // or DrainComplete notification, we'll unblock the caller before processing+    // the error.+    UnblockResetAndDrain();++    mCallback->Error(aError);+  }   return IPC_OK(); }@@ -445,7 +407,7 @@           ipc::SharedMemory::TYPE_BASIC, &mem)) {     GMP_LOG_ERROR("%s: Failed to get a shared mem buffer for Child! size %u",                   __FUNCTION__, aFrameBufferSize);-    return IPC_FAIL_NO_REASON(this);+    return IPC_FAIL(this, "Failed to get a shared mem buffer for Child!");   }   *aMem = mem;   mem = ipc::Shmem();

Analyzing the provided code diff, I'll identify potential security vulnerabilities following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Null Pointer Dereference [dom/media/gmp/GMPVideoDecoderParent.cpp] [Lines 287-310]
Old Code:
if (!mCallback) {
  return IPC_FAIL_NO_REASON(this);
}
Fixed Code:
if (mCallback) {
  // operations only if callback exists
}

Additional Details:
The original code could potentially lead to null pointer dereference issues if mCallback was null, though it was being checked. The fixed version restructures the logic to be more defensive by only executing callback operations when mCallback exists.

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Input Validation [dom/media/gmp/GMPVideoDecoderParent.cpp] [Lines 287-300]
Old Code:
if (!GMPVideoi420FrameImpl::CheckFrameData(aDecodedFrame)) {
  GMP_LOG_ERROR(...);
  return IPC_FAIL_NO_REASON(this);
}
Fixed Code:
if (mCallback) {
  if (GMPVideoi420FrameImpl::CheckFrameData(aDecodedFrame)) {
    // process frame
  } else {
    GMP_LOG_ERROR(...);
    // TODO comment about handling corrupted frames
  }
}

Additional Details:
The original code would fail completely on corrupted frames, while the new version logs the error but continues processing. The TODO comment suggests this might need more serious handling (potential security issue if corrupted frames could be exploited).

3. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Error Handling Improvement [dom/media/gmp/GMPVideoDecoderParent.cpp] [Lines 445-447]
Old Code:
return IPC_FAIL_NO_REASON(this);
Fixed Code:
return IPC_FAIL(this, "Failed to get a shared mem buffer for Child!");

Additional Details:
The change improves error reporting by adding a descriptive message when shared memory allocation fails, which helps with debugging and security monitoring.

4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Memory Leak [dom/media/gmp/GMPVideoDecoderParent.cpp] [Lines 287-300]
Old Code:
auto f = new GMPVideoi420FrameImpl(aDecodedFrame, &mVideoHost);
mCallback->Decoded(f);
Fixed Code:
Same allocation but within a more controlled conditional block

Additional Details:
While not directly fixed in this diff, the creation of GMPVideoi420FrameImpl objects without clear ownership transfer or cleanup mechanism could potentially lead to memory leaks. However, this might be handled elsewhere in the code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/python/mozbuild/mozbuild/code_analysis/mach_commands.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/python/mozbuild/mozbuild/code_analysis/mach_commands.py@@ -197,14 +197,34 @@ @Command(+    "clang-tidy",+    category="devenv",+    description="Convenience alias for the static-analysis command",+)+def clang_tidy(command_context):+    # If no arguments are provided, just print a help message.+    """Detailed documentation:+    https://firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org/code-quality/static-analysis/index.html+    """+    mach = Mach(os.getcwd())++    def populate_context(key=None):+        if key == "topdir":+            return command_context.topsrcdir++    mach.populate_context_handler = populate_context+    mach.run(["static-analysis", "--help"])+++@Command(     "static-analysis",-    category="testing",-    description="Run C++ static analysis checks",+    category="devenv",+    description="Run C++ static analysis checks using clang-tidy", ) def static_analysis(command_context):     # If no arguments are provided, just print a help message.     """Detailed documentation:-    https://firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org/code-quality/static-analysis.html+    https://firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org/code-quality/static-analysis/index.html     """     mach = Mach(os.getcwd())

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily documentation and command structure updates. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Documentation Update [File] [python/mozbuild/mozbuild/code_analysis/mach_commands.py] [Lines 197-234]
   [Old Code]
   @Command(
       "static-analysis",
       category="testing",
       description="Run C++ static analysis checks",
   )
   def static_analysis(command_context):
       """Detailed documentation:
       https://firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org/code-quality/static-analysis.html
       """
   [Fixed Code]
   @Command(
       "clang-tidy",
       category="devenv",
       description="Convenience alias for the static-analysis command",
   )
   def clang_tidy(command_context):
       """Detailed documentation:
       https://firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org/code-quality/static-analysis/index.html
       """
   @Command(
       "static-analysis",
       category="devenv",
       description="Run C++ static analysis checks using clang-tidy",
   )
   def static_analysis(command_context):
       """Detailed documentation:
       https://firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org/code-quality/static-analysis/index.html
       """

The changes include:
1. Adding a new `clang-tidy` command alias
2. Updating the category from "testing" to "devenv"
3. Improving the command descriptions
4. Updating documentation URLs
5. Adding index.html to documentation paths

These appear to be usability and documentation improvements rather than security fixes. No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.translate.nonfinite.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.translate.nonfinite.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ ctx.translate(Infinity, Infinity); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(-100, -10, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be variable renaming and consistency improvements rather than security fixes. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.translate.nonfinite.worker.js] [Lines 13-28]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency, without any security implications. The functionality remains the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/public/RealmOptions.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/public/RealmOptions.h@@ -231,6 +231,14 @@     iteratorHelpers_ = flag;     return *this;   }++#ifdef NIGHTLY_BUILD+  bool getArrayGroupingEnabled() const { return arrayGrouping_; }+  RealmCreationOptions& setArrayGroupingEnabled(bool flag) {+    arrayGrouping_ = flag;+    return *this;+  }+#endif #ifdef ENABLE_NEW_SET_METHODS   bool getNewSetMethodsEnabled() const { return newSetMethods_; }@@ -278,6 +286,9 @@   bool toSource_ = false;   bool propertyErrorMessageFix_ = false;   bool iteratorHelpers_ = false;+#ifdef NIGHTLY_BUILD+  bool arrayGrouping_ = true;+#endif #ifdef ENABLE_NEW_SET_METHODS   bool newSetMethods_ = false; #endif

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security vulnerabilities.

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
This appears to be a feature addition rather than a security fix. The diff adds new functionality for array grouping in nightly builds, but doesn't show any security-related changes.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
The changes introduce a new configuration option `arrayGrouping_` guarded by `NIGHTLY_BUILD`, which is a standard practice for experimental features. No security vulnerabilities are being fixed here.

The diff shows:
- Addition of new methods `getArrayGroupingEnabled()` and `setArrayGroupingEnabled()`
- Addition of a new member variable `arrayGrouping_` initialized to `true`
- All changes are properly guarded by `NIGHTLY_BUILD` preprocessor directives

No security vulnerabilities are being addressed in this diff. The changes appear to be purely additive functionality for experimental features in nightly builds.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/java/org/mozilla/gecko/util/EventCallback.java+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/java/org/mozilla/gecko/util/EventCallback.java@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ package org.mozilla.gecko.util;-import javax.annotation.Nullable;+import androidx.annotation.Nullable; import org.mozilla.gecko.annotation.RobocopTarget; import org.mozilla.gecko.annotation.WrapForJNI; import org.mozilla.geckoview.GeckoResult;

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Dependency Vulnerability/Annotation Change] [mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/java/org/mozilla/gecko/util/EventCallback.java] [Lines 4]
    [Old Code] import javax.annotation.Nullable;
    [Fixed Code] import androidx.annotation.Nullable;

Additional Details:
- The change involves switching from javax.annotation to androidx.annotation for the @Nullable annotation
- This appears to be a dependency update rather than a direct security fix
- While not clearly a security fix, using androidx annotations could potentially improve null safety and prevent null pointer exceptions
- The change might be part of a larger security-related update to modern Android dependencies, but no specific vulnerability is addressed here

No other vulnerabilities were identified in this small diff. The change seems primarily focused on dependency maintenance rather than fixing a specific security issue.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13exthandle.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13exthandle.h@@ -88,15 +88,18 @@ PRUint32 tls13_SizeOfKeyShareEntry(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey); SECStatus tls13_EncodeKeyShareEntry(sslBuffer *buf, SSLNamedGroup group,                                     SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey);-SECStatus tls13_ServerHandleEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,-                                   SECItem *data);+SECStatus tls13_ServerHandleInnerEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,+                                        SECItem *data);+SECStatus tls13_ServerHandleOuterEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,+                                        SECItem *data);+SECStatus tls13_ServerSendHrrEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,+                                    sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added); SECStatus tls13_ServerSendEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,                                  sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added);+SECStatus tls13_ClientHandleHrrEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,+                                      SECItem *data); SECStatus tls13_ClientHandleEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,                                    SECItem *data);-SECStatus tls13_ServerHandleEchIsInnerXtn(const sslSocket *ss,-                                          TLSExtensionData *xtnData,-                                          SECItem *data); SECStatus tls13_ClientSendPostHandshakeAuthXtn(const sslSocket *ss,                                                TLSExtensionData *xtnData,                                                sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added);

Here is the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [ECH (Encrypted Client Hello) Handling Changes] [security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13exthandle.h] [Lines 88-98]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```c
   SECStatus tls13_ServerHandleEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
                                    SECItem *data);
   SECStatus tls13_ServerSendEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
                                    sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added);
   SECStatus tls13_ClientHandleEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
                                    SECItem *data);
   SECStatus tls13_ServerHandleEchIsInnerXtn(const sslSocket *ss,
                                         TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
                                         SECItem *data);
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```c
   SECStatus tls13_ServerHandleInnerEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
                                        SECItem *data);
   SECStatus tls13_ServerHandleOuterEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
                                        SECItem *data);
   SECStatus tls13_ServerSendHrrEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
                                    sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added);
   SECStatus tls13_ServerSendEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
                                 sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added);
   SECStatus tls13_ClientHandleHrrEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
                                      SECItem *data);
   SECStatus tls13_ClientHandleEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
                                   SECItem *data);
   ```  
   Additional Details: The changes involve splitting ECH (Encrypted Client Hello) handling into separate functions for inner/outer contexts and adding HRR (HelloRetryRequest) handling. While this appears to be a security-related refactoring, the exact vulnerability (if any) being fixed is unclear from the diff alone. The changes suggest improved handling of ECH states, which could relate to previously flawed state management.  

Note: No specific vulnerability name is identified in the diff, but the changes are security-relevant as they modify ECH handling logic, which is a critical TLS 1.3 privacy feature. The removal of `tls13_ServerHandleEchIsInnerXtn` and addition of more granular functions may indicate fixes for edge cases in ECH state transitions.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-81b.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-81b.xml@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/>   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body>  <p class="green">This paragraph should have a green background.</p>

Let me analyze the diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-81b.xml [Lines] 9
    [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="" />
    [Fixed Code] (removed)

Analysis:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag with name="flags"
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- The removed tag didn't contain any sensitive information or pose a security risk
- No known vulnerability is associated with this change
- The modification seems to be related to test infrastructure maintenance

No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change appears to be a benign cleanup of test metadata.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/src/options/core.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/src/options/core.rs@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@ use ident_case::RenameRule;-use syn;-use ast::{Data, Fields, Style};-use codegen;-use options::{DefaultExpression, InputField, InputVariant, ParseAttribute, ParseData};-use util::Flag;-use {Error, FromMeta, Result};+use crate::ast::{Data, Fields, Style};+use crate::codegen;+use crate::codegen::PostfixTransform;+use crate::options::{DefaultExpression, InputField, InputVariant, ParseAttribute, ParseData};+use crate::util::Flag;+use crate::{Error, FromMeta, Result}; /// A struct or enum which should have `FromMeta` or `FromDeriveInput` implementations /// generated.@@ -25,9 +25,13 @@     /// The rule that should be used to rename all fields/variants in the container.     pub rename_rule: RenameRule,-    /// An infallible function with the signature `FnOnce(T) -> T` which will be called after the-    /// target instance is successfully constructed.-    pub map: Option<syn::Path>,+    /// A transform which will be called on `darling::Result<Self>`. It must either be+    /// an `FnOnce(T) -> T` when `map` is used, or `FnOnce(T) -> darling::Result<T>` when+    /// `and_then` is used.+    ///+    /// `map` and `and_then` are mutually-exclusive to avoid confusion about the order in+    /// which the two are applied.+    pub post_transform: Option<codegen::PostfixTransform>,     /// The body of the _deriving_ type.     pub data: Data<InputVariant, InputField>,@@ -41,11 +45,11 @@ impl Core {     /// Partially initializes `Core` by reading the identity, generics, and body shape.-    pub fn start(di: &syn::DeriveInput) -> Self {-        Core {+    pub fn start(di: &syn::DeriveInput) -> Result<Self> {+        Ok(Core {             ident: di.ident.clone(),             generics: di.generics.clone(),-            data: Data::empty_from(&di.data),+            data: Data::try_empty_from(&di.data)?,             default: Default::default(),             // See https://github.com/TedDriggs/darling/issues/10: We default to snake_case             // for enums to help authors produce more idiomatic APIs.@@ -54,13 +58,13 @@             } else {                 Default::default()             },-            map: Default::default(),+            post_transform: Default::default(),             bound: Default::default(),             allow_unknown_fields: Default::default(),-        }+        })     }-    fn as_codegen_default<'a>(&'a self) -> Option<codegen::DefaultExpression<'a>> {+    fn as_codegen_default(&self) -> Option<codegen::DefaultExpression<'_>> {         self.default.as_ref().map(|expr| match *expr {             DefaultExpression::Explicit(ref path) => codegen::DefaultExpression::Explicit(path),             DefaultExpression::Inherit | DefaultExpression::Trait => {@@ -76,7 +80,7 @@         if path.is_ident("default") {             if self.default.is_some() {-                return Err(Error::duplicate_field("default").with_span(mi))+                return Err(Error::duplicate_field("default").with_span(mi));             }             self.default = FromMeta::from_meta(mi)?;@@ -84,22 +88,34 @@             // WARNING: This may have been set based on body shape previously,             // so an overwrite may be permissible.             self.rename_rule = FromMeta::from_meta(mi)?;-        } else if path.is_ident("map") {-            if self.map.is_some() {-                return Err(Error::duplicate_field("map").with_span(mi))+        } else if path.is_ident("map") || path.is_ident("and_then") {+            // This unwrap is safe because we just called is_ident above+            let transformer = path.get_ident().unwrap().clone();++            if let Some(post_transform) = &self.post_transform {+                if transformer == post_transform.transformer {+                    return Err(Error::duplicate_field(&transformer.to_string()).with_span(mi));+                } else {+                    return Err(Error::custom(format!(+                        "Options `{}` and `{}` are mutually exclusive",+                        transformer, post_transform.transformer+                    ))+                    .with_span(mi));+                }             }-            self.map = FromMeta::from_meta(mi)?;+            self.post_transform =+                Some(PostfixTransform::new(transformer, FromMeta::from_meta(mi)?));         } else if path.is_ident("bound") {             self.bound = FromMeta::from_meta(mi)?;         } else if path.is_ident("allow_unknown_fields") {             if self.allow_unknown_fields.is_some() {-                return Err(Error::duplicate_field("allow_unknown_fields").with_span(mi))+                return Err(Error::duplicate_field("allow_unknown_fields").with_span(mi));             }             self.allow_unknown_fields = FromMeta::from_meta(mi)?;         } else {-            return Err(Error::unknown_field_path(&path).with_span(mi))+            return Err(Error::unknown_field_path(path).with_span(mi));         }         Ok(())@@ -108,7 +124,7 @@ impl ParseData for Core {     fn parse_variant(&mut self, variant: &syn::Variant) -> Result<()> {-        let v = InputVariant::from_variant(variant, Some(&self))?;+        let v = InputVariant::from_variant(variant, Some(self))?;         match self.data {             Data::Enum(ref mut variants) => {@@ -120,7 +136,7 @@     }     fn parse_field(&mut self, field: &syn::Field) -> Result<()> {-        let f = InputField::from_field(field, Some(&self))?;+        let f = InputField::from_field(field, Some(self))?;         match self.data {             Data::Struct(Fields {@@ -146,7 +162,7 @@                 .map_struct_fields(InputField::as_codegen_field)                 .map_enum_variants(|variant| variant.as_codegen_variant(&v.ident)),             default: v.as_codegen_default(),-            map: v.map.as_ref(),+            post_transform: v.post_transform.as_ref(),             bound: v.bound.as_ref().map(|i| i.as_slice()),             allow_unknown_fields: v.allow_unknown_fields.into(),         }

I'll analyze the code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Input Validation Improvement] [third_party/rust/darling_core/src/options/core.rs] [Lines 88-104]
[Old Code]
} else if path.is_ident("map") {
    if self.map.is_some() {
        return Err(Error::duplicate_field("map").with_span(mi))
    }

    self.map = FromMeta::from_meta(mi)?;
[Fixed Code]
} else if path.is_ident("map") || path.is_ident("and_then") {
    // This unwrap is safe because we just called is_ident above
    let transformer = path.get_ident().unwrap().clone();

    if let Some(post_transform) = &self.post_transform {
        if transformer == post_transform.transformer {
            return Err(Error::duplicate_field(&transformer.to_string()).with_span(mi));
        } else {
            return Err(Error::custom(format!(
                "Options `{}` and `{}` are mutually exclusive",
                transformer, post_transform.transformer
            ))
            .with_span(mi));
        }
    }

    self.post_transform =
        Some(PostfixTransform::new(transformer, FromMeta::from_meta(mi)?));
}

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Error Handling Improvement] [third_party/rust/darling_core/src/options/core.rs] [Lines 41-43]
[Old Code]
pub fn start(di: &syn::DeriveInput) -> Self {
    Core {
[Fixed Code]
pub fn start(di: &syn::DeriveInput) -> Result<Self> {
    Ok(Core {

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Type Safety Improvement] [third_party/rust/darling_core/src/options/core.rs] [Lines 25-27]
[Old Code]
    /// An infallible function with the signature `FnOnce(T) -> T` which will be called after the
    /// target instance is successfully constructed.
    pub map: Option<syn::Path>,
[Fixed Code]
    /// A transform which will be called on `darling::Result<Self>`. It must either be
    /// an `FnOnce(T) -> T` when `map` is used, or `FnOnce(T) -> darling::Result<T>` when
    /// `and_then` is used.
    ///
    /// `map` and `and_then` are mutually-exclusive to avoid confusion about the order in
    /// which the two are applied.
    pub post_transform: Option<codegen::PostfixTransform>,

The changes appear to be primarily focused on improving code safety and error handling rather than fixing specific security vulnerabilities. The modifications include:
1. Better input validation for mutually exclusive options
2. Improved error handling in the start function
3. More precise type definitions for transformations
4. Better error messages for duplicate fields

While these changes improve the robustness of the code, I couldn't identify any specific security vulnerabilities that were being fixed. The improvements seem more focused on general code quality and safety.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.interpolate.vertical.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.interpolate.vertical.html@@ -17,17 +17,17 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var g = ctx.createLinearGradient(0, 0, 0, 50); g.addColorStop(0, '#ff0'); g.addColorStop(1, '#00f'); ctx.fillStyle = g; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,12, 191,191,63,255, "50,12", "191,191,63,255", 10);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 127,127,127,255, "50,25", "127,127,127,255", 5);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,37, 63,63,191,255, "50,37", "63,63,191,255", 10);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,12, 191,191,63,255, "50,12", "191,191,63,255", 10);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 127,127,127,255, "50,25", "127,127,127,255", 5);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,37, 63,63,191,255, "50,37", "63,63,191,255", 10); t.done(); });

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-28]  
[Old Code]  
```javascript
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,12, 191,191,63,255, "50,12", "191,191,63,255", 10);
```  
[Fixed Code]  
```javascript
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,12, 191,191,63,255, "50,12", "191,191,63,255", 10);
```  

The changes in this diff appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, changing the variable name from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. There are no security-related changes or vulnerability fixes in this diff. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.width.basic.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.width.basic.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -39,20 +39,20 @@ ctx.lineTo(75, 35); ctx.stroke(); ctx.fillRect(65, 15, 20, 20);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 14,25, 0,255,0,255, "14,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 15,25, 0,255,0,255, "15,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 16,25, 0,255,0,255, "16,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 34,25, 0,255,0,255, "34,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 35,25, 0,255,0,255, "35,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 36,25, 0,255,0,255, "36,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 64,25, 0,255,0,255, "64,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 65,25, 0,255,0,255, "65,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 66,25, 0,255,0,255, "66,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 84,25, 0,255,0,255, "84,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 85,25, 0,255,0,255, "85,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 86,25, 0,255,0,255, "86,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 14,25, 0,255,0,255, "14,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 15,25, 0,255,0,255, "15,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 16,25, 0,255,0,255, "16,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 34,25, 0,255,0,255, "34,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 35,25, 0,255,0,255, "35,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 36,25, 0,255,0,255, "36,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 64,25, 0,255,0,255, "64,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 65,25, 0,255,0,255, "65,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 66,25, 0,255,0,255, "66,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 84,25, 0,255,0,255, "84,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 85,25, 0,255,0,255, "85,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 86,25, 0,255,0,255, "86,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where a variable name was changed from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability purposes. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no  
No security vulnerability found  
File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.width.basic.html  
Lines: Throughout the file  
Old Code: Used variable name `offscreenCanvas`  
Fixed Code: Changed to variable name `canvas`  

The changes don't affect any security-related functionality, input validation, or data handling. It's simply a variable renaming throughout the file with no impact on security.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.