--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/html/HTMLInputElement.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/html/HTMLInputElement.h@@ -233,8 +233,8 @@   MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT nsresult   SetValueFromSetRangeText(const nsAString& aValue) override;   bool HasCachedSelection() override;-  void SetShowPassword(bool aValue);-  bool ShowPassword() const;+  void SetRevealPassword(bool aValue);+  bool RevealPassword() const;   /**    * TextEditorValueEquals() is designed for internal use so that aValue@@ -1000,7 +1000,7 @@    * MaybeSubmitForm looks for a submit input or a single text control    * and submits the form if either is present.    */-  MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT nsresult MaybeSubmitForm(nsPresContext* aPresContext);+  MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void MaybeSubmitForm(nsPresContext* aPresContext);   /**    * Update mFileList with the currently selected file.

Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis:

1. First change (method renaming):
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Method Renaming for Clarity] [dom/html/HTMLInputElement.h] [Lines 233-234]
    [Old Code]
    void SetShowPassword(bool aValue);
    bool ShowPassword() const;
    [Fixed Code]
    void SetRevealPassword(bool aValue);
    bool RevealPassword() const;

    Additional Details: This appears to be a renaming of methods for better clarity/semantics rather than a security fix. The functionality seems similar but with more accurate naming ("Reveal" instead of "Show").

2. Second change (return type modification):
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Return Type Change] [dom/html/HTMLInputElement.h] [Line 1000]
    [Old Code]
    MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT nsresult MaybeSubmitForm(nsPresContext* aPresContext);
    [Fixed Code]
    MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void MaybeSubmitForm(nsPresContext* aPresContext);

    Additional Details: The change removes the nsresult return type, suggesting the method no longer needs to return error codes. This could indicate either a simplification or that error handling is now done differently, but it's not clear if this relates to a security vulnerability.

No clear security vulnerabilities were identified in these changes. The modifications appear to be API refinements rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/docshell/test/mochitest/test_bug1742865.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/docshell/test/mochitest/test_bug1742865.html@@ -16,8 +16,32 @@     const SJS = new URL("file_bug1742865.sjs", location.href);     const SJS_OUTER = new URL("file_bug1742865_outer.sjs", location.href);+    const SCROLL = 500;-    function openWindowAndCheckRefresh(url, shouldAddToHistory) {+    let tolerance;+    function setup() {+      return SpecialPowers.spawn(window.top, [], () => {+        return SpecialPowers.getDOMWindowUtils(content.window).getResolution();+      }).then(resolution => {+        // Allow a half pixel difference if the top document's resolution is lower+        // than 1.0 because the scroll position is aligned with screen pixels+        // instead of CSS pixels.+        tolerance = resolution < 1.0 ? 0.5 : 0.0;+      });+    }++    function checkScrollPosition(scrollPosition, shouldKeepScrollPosition) {+      isfuzzy(scrollPosition, shouldKeepScrollPosition ? SCROLL : 0, tolerance,+              `Scroll position ${shouldKeepScrollPosition ? "should" : "shouldn't"} be maintained for meta refresh`);+    }++    function openWindowAndCheckRefresh(url, params, shouldAddToHistory, shouldKeepScrollPosition) {+      info(`Running test for ${JSON.stringify(params)}`);++      url = new URL(url);+      Object.entries(params).forEach(([k, v]) => { url.searchParams.append(k, v) });+      url.searchParams.append("scrollTo", SCROLL);+       let resetURL = new URL(SJS);       resetURL.search = "?reset";       return fetch(resetURL).then(() => {@@ -41,14 +65,18 @@             is(commandType, "pageShow", "Unknown command type");-            let { inputValue } = commandData;+            let { inputValue, scrollPosition } = commandData;             switch (++count) {               // file_bug1742865.sjs causes 3 loads:               //  * first load, returns first meta refresh               //  * second load, caused by first meta refresh, returns second meta refresh               //  * third load, caused by second meta refresh, doesn't return a meta refresh+              case 2:+                checkScrollPosition(scrollPosition, shouldKeepScrollPosition);+                break;               case 3:+                checkScrollPosition(scrollPosition, shouldKeepScrollPosition);                 win.postMessage("changeInputValue", "*");                 break;               case 4:@@ -56,6 +84,7 @@                 break;               case 5:                 is(inputValue, "1234", "Entries for auto-refresh should be attached to session history");+                checkScrollPosition(scrollPosition, shouldKeepScrollPosition);                 removeEventListener("message", listener);                 win.close();                 resolve();@@ -67,36 +96,35 @@       });     }-    function doTest(seconds, crossOrigin, shouldAddToHistory) {-      let url = new URL(SJS);-      url.searchParams.append("seconds", seconds);-      url.searchParams.append("crossorigin", crossOrigin);+    function doTest(seconds, crossOrigin, shouldAddToHistory, shouldKeepScrollPosition) {+      let params = {+        seconds,+        crossOrigin,+      };-      let urlOuter = new URL(SJS_OUTER);-      urlOuter.searchParams.append("seconds", seconds);-      urlOuter.searchParams.append("crossorigin", crossOrigin);--      return openWindowAndCheckRefresh(url, shouldAddToHistory).then(() =>-        openWindowAndCheckRefresh(urlOuter, shouldAddToHistory)+      return openWindowAndCheckRefresh(SJS, params, shouldAddToHistory, shouldKeepScrollPosition).then(() =>+        openWindowAndCheckRefresh(SJS_OUTER, params, shouldAddToHistory, shouldKeepScrollPosition)       );     }-    function runTest() {+    async function runTest() {       const FAST = Math.min(1, REFRESH_REDIRECT_TIMER);       const SLOW = REFRESH_REDIRECT_TIMER + 1;       let tests = [-        // [ time, crossOrigin, shouldAddToHistory ]-        [ FAST, false, false ],-        [ FAST, true, false ],-        [ SLOW, false, false ],-        [ SLOW, true, true ],+        // [ time, crossOrigin, shouldAddToHistory, shouldKeepScrollPosition ]+        [ FAST, false, false, true ],+        [ FAST, true, false, false ],+        [ SLOW, false, false, true ],+        [ SLOW, true, true, false ],       ];-      let test = Promise.resolve();-      for (let [ time, crossOrigin, shouldAddToHistory ] of tests) {-        test = test.then(() => doTest(time, crossOrigin, shouldAddToHistory));+      await setup();++      for (let [ time, crossOrigin, shouldAddToHistory, shouldKeepScrollPosition ] of tests) {+        await doTest(time, crossOrigin, shouldAddToHistory, shouldKeepScrollPosition);       }-      test.then(() => SimpleTest.finish());++      SimpleTest.finish();     }   </script> </head>

I'll analyze the code diff for security vulnerabilities following the specified format.

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific security vulnerability was fixed in this diff. The changes appear to be functional improvements to test cases, particularly around scroll position handling and test execution flow.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Test Logic Improvement [docshell/test/mochitest/test_bug1742865.html] [Multiple lines]
The changes introduce more robust test verification for scroll position maintenance during meta refreshes, but this doesn't appear to be fixing a security vulnerability, rather improving test coverage.

3. Vulnerability Existed: no
The diff primarily shows:
- Added scroll position testing functionality
- Modified test parameters to include scroll position checks
- Changed test execution from promise chains to async/await
- Added resolution-based tolerance for scroll position checks
These are test improvements rather than security fixes.

No clear security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The changes appear to be test enhancements rather than security patches. The modifications focus on improving test coverage for scroll position behavior during meta refreshes and making the test execution more robust.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/widget/InputData.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/widget/InputData.h@@ -698,7 +698,11 @@   // The following two functions are for auto-dir scrolling. For detailed   // information on auto-dir, @see mozilla::WheelDeltaAdjustmentStrategy-  bool IsAutoDir() const {+  bool IsAutoDir(bool aForce = false) const {+    if (aForce) {+      return true;+    }+     switch (mWheelDeltaAdjustmentStrategy) {       case WheelDeltaAdjustmentStrategy::eAutoDir:       case WheelDeltaAdjustmentStrategy::eAutoDirWithRootHonour:@@ -717,9 +721,10 @@   // not an auto-dir scroll.   // For detailed information on auto-dir,   // @see mozilla::WheelDeltaAdjustmentStrategy-  bool HonoursRoot() const {+  bool HonoursRoot(bool aForce = false) const {     return WheelDeltaAdjustmentStrategy::eAutoDirWithRootHonour ==-           mWheelDeltaAdjustmentStrategy;+               mWheelDeltaAdjustmentStrategy ||+           aForce;   }   // Warning, this class is serialized and sent over IPC. Any change to its

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Logic Bypass] [widget/InputData.h] [Lines 698-721]
[Old Code]
  bool IsAutoDir() const {
    switch (mWheelDeltaAdjustmentStrategy) {
      case WheelDeltaAdjustmentStrategy::eAutoDir:
      case WheelDeltaAdjustmentStrategy::eAutoDirWithRootHonour:
        return true;
      default:
        return false;
    }
  }

  bool HonoursRoot() const {
    return WheelDeltaAdjustmentStrategy::eAutoDirWithRootHonour ==
           mWheelDeltaAdjustmentStrategy;
  }
[Fixed Code]
  bool IsAutoDir(bool aForce = false) const {
    if (aForce) {
      return true;
    }

    switch (mWheelDeltaAdjustmentStrategy) {
      case WheelDeltaAdjustmentStrategy::eAutoDir:
      case WheelDeltaAdjustmentStrategy::eAutoDirWithRootHonour:
        return true;
      default:
        return false;
    }
  }

  bool HonoursRoot(bool aForce = false) const {
    return WheelDeltaAdjustmentStrategy::eAutoDirWithRootHonour ==
               mWheelDeltaAdjustmentStrategy ||
           aForce;
  }

Additional Details:
- The changes introduce a new `aForce` parameter that can override the normal logic checks
- This could potentially be a security fix if the original implementation had strict security checks that could now be bypassed with `aForce=true`
- However, without more context about how these functions are used, it's unclear if this was actually a security vulnerability or just a feature enhancement
- The warning comment about IPC serialization suggests this is security-sensitive code, but we can't determine if the change actually fixes a vulnerability

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/metal/src/device.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/metal/src/device.rs@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ #[repr(i64)] #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq, Hash)]+#[non_exhaustive] pub enum MTLGPUFamily {     Common1 = 3001,     Common2 = 3002,@@ -62,6 +63,9 @@     Apple4 = 1004,     Apple5 = 1005,     Apple6 = 1006,+    Apple7 = 1007,+    Apple8 = 1008,+    Apple9 = 1009,     Mac1 = 2001,     Mac2 = 2002,     MacCatalyst1 = 4001,@@ -1391,10 +1395,17 @@ } bitflags! {-    struct MTLPipelineOption: NSUInteger {+    /// Options that determine how Metal prepares the pipeline.+    pub struct MTLPipelineOption: NSUInteger {+        /// Do not provide any reflection information.         const None                      = 0;+        /// An option that requests argument information for buffers, textures, and threadgroup memory.         const ArgumentInfo              = 1 << 0;+        /// An option that requests detailed buffer type information for buffer arguments.         const BufferTypeInfo            = 1 << 1;+        /// An option that specifies that Metal should create the pipeline state object only if the+        /// compiled shader is present inside the binary archive.+        ///         /// Only available on (macos(11.0), ios(14.0))         const FailOnBinaryArchiveMiss   = 1 << 2;     }@@ -1809,44 +1820,27 @@         }     }+    /// Synchronously creates a render pipeline state object and associated reflection information.     pub fn new_render_pipeline_state_with_reflection(         &self,         descriptor: &RenderPipelineDescriptorRef,-        reflection: &RenderPipelineReflectionRef,-    ) -> Result<RenderPipelineState, String> {-        unsafe {-            let reflection_options =-                MTLPipelineOption::ArgumentInfo | MTLPipelineOption::BufferTypeInfo;-+        reflection_options: MTLPipelineOption,+    ) -> Result<(RenderPipelineState, RenderPipelineReflection), String> {+        unsafe {+            let mut reflection: *mut Object = ptr::null_mut();             let pipeline_state: *mut MTLRenderPipelineState = try_objc! { err =>                 msg_send![self, newRenderPipelineStateWithDescriptor:descriptor                                                              options:reflection_options-                                                          reflection:reflection+                                                          reflection:&mut reflection                                                                error:&mut err]             };-            Ok(RenderPipelineState::from_ptr(pipeline_state))-        }-    }--    /// Useful for debugging binary archives.-    pub fn new_render_pipeline_state_with_fail_on_binary_archive_miss(-        &self,-        descriptor: &RenderPipelineDescriptorRef,-    ) -> Result<RenderPipelineState, String> {-        unsafe {-            let pipeline_options = MTLPipelineOption::FailOnBinaryArchiveMiss;--            let reflection: *mut MTLRenderPipelineReflection = std::ptr::null_mut();--            let pipeline_state: *mut MTLRenderPipelineState = try_objc! { err =>-                msg_send![self, newRenderPipelineStateWithDescriptor:descriptor-                                                             options:pipeline_options-                                                          reflection:reflection-                                                               error:&mut err]-            };--            Ok(RenderPipelineState::from_ptr(pipeline_state))+            let state = RenderPipelineState::from_ptr(pipeline_state);++            let () = msg_send![reflection, retain];+            let reflection = RenderPipelineReflection::from_ptr(reflection as _);++            Ok((state, reflection))         }     }@@ -1889,6 +1883,31 @@             };             Ok(ComputePipelineState::from_ptr(pipeline_state))+        }+    }++    /// Synchronously creates a compute pipeline state object and associated reflection information,+    /// using a compute pipeline descriptor.+    pub fn new_compute_pipeline_state_with_reflection(+        &self,+        descriptor: &ComputePipelineDescriptorRef,+        reflection_options: MTLPipelineOption,+    ) -> Result<(ComputePipelineState, ComputePipelineReflection), String> {+        unsafe {+            let mut reflection: *mut Object = ptr::null_mut();+            let pipeline_state: *mut MTLComputePipelineState = try_objc! { err =>+                msg_send![self, newComputePipelineStateWithDescriptor:descriptor+                                                             options:reflection_options+                                                          reflection:&mut reflection+                                                               error:&mut err]+            };++            let state = ComputePipelineState::from_ptr(pipeline_state);++            let () = msg_send![reflection, retain];+            let reflection = ComputePipelineReflection::from_ptr(reflection as _);++            Ok((state, reflection))         }     }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Memory Leak] [third_party/rust/metal/src/device.rs] [Lines 1820-1841]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```rust
   reflection: &RenderPipelineReflectionRef,
   ```
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```rust
   reflection_options: MTLPipelineOption,
   let mut reflection: *mut Object = ptr::null_mut();
   let () = msg_send![reflection, retain];
   ```

   The change suggests better memory management by explicitly retaining the reflection object, but it's unclear if this was fixing an actual leak or just improving robustness.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Memory Leak] [third_party/rust/metal/src/device.rs] [Lines 1883-1903]  
   [Old Code]  
   (No previous implementation existed for compute pipeline reflection)  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```rust
   let mut reflection: *mut Object = ptr::null_mut();
   let () = msg_send![reflection, retain];
   ```

   The new compute pipeline reflection implementation follows the same pattern as the render pipeline change, suggesting consistent memory management improvements.

3. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   [Enum Extension] [third_party/rust/metal/src/device.rs] [Lines 52-69]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```rust
   Apple6 = 1006,
   ```
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```rust
   Apple6 = 1006,
   Apple7 = 1007,
   Apple8 = 1008,
   Apple9 = 1009,
   ```

   This appears to be a feature extension adding new GPU families rather than a security fix.

The main changes appear to be around memory management improvements in the pipeline state creation functions, though it's not clear if these were fixing actual vulnerabilities or just improving code robustness. The enum extension is clearly not security-related.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/neqo-http3/src/push_controller.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/neqo-http3/src/push_controller.rs@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ use crate::client_events::{Http3ClientEvent, Http3ClientEvents}; use crate::connection::Http3Connection;-use crate::hframe::HFrame;+use crate::frames::HFrame; use crate::{CloseType, Error, Http3StreamInfo, HttpRecvStreamEvents, RecvStreamEvents, Res}; use neqo_common::{qerror, qinfo, qtrace, Header}; use neqo_transport::{Connection, StreamId};

Let me analyze the diff for potential security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Dependency Confusion] [third_party/rust/neqo-http3/src/push_controller.rs] [Lines 5]
[Old Code]
use crate::hframe::HFrame;
[Fixed Code]
use crate::frames::HFrame;

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be a module path correction from `hframe` to `frames`
- While this could potentially fix a compilation error or module resolution issue, there's no clear evidence this was a security fix
- The change might be part of a larger refactoring or code organization effort
- Without more context, it's unclear if this was addressing a security vulnerability or just code maintenance

Note: The diff shows only this single change, and it doesn't clearly indicate a security fix. The modification appears to be more related to code organization than security.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/docs/performance/dtrace.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/docs/performance/dtrace.md@@ -5,8 +5,7 @@ to it. :::-**Note**: The [power profiling-overview](/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Performance/Power_profiling_overview) is+**Note**: The [power profiling overview](power_profiling_overview.md) is worth reading at this point if you haven't already. It may make parts of this document easier to understand. :::@@ -16,7 +15,7 @@ `dtrace` must be invoked as the super-user. A good starting command for profiling wakeups is the following.-``` +``` sudo dtrace -n 'mach_kernel::wakeup { @[ustack()] = count(); }' -p $FIREFOX_PID > $OUTPUT_FILE ```

Based on the provided diff, this appears to be a documentation change rather than a security fix. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [docs/performance/dtrace.md] [Lines 5-7,16]
Old Code:
**Note**: The [power profiling
overview](/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Performance/Power_profiling_overview) is
Fixed Code:
**Note**: The [power profiling overview](power_profiling_overview.md) is

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [docs/performance/dtrace.md] [Line 16]
Old Code:
``` 
Fixed Code:
```

The changes are purely documentation-related:
1. Changed a documentation link format (from absolute to relative path)
2. Fixed whitespace in a code block (removed extra space before backticks)
3. No security-related changes were made in this diff

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/requirements_sauce.txt+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/requirements_sauce.txt@@ -1,3 +1,2 @@-mozprocess==1.3.0 selenium==3.141.0-requests==2.26.0+requests==2.27.1

Let me analyze the diff for potential security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
    Outdated Dependency (requests) [File: testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/requirements_sauce.txt] [Lines: 3]
    [Old Code]
    requests==2.26.0
    [Fixed Code]
    requests==2.27.1

Additional Details:
- The requests library was updated from 2.26.0 to 2.27.1, which likely includes security fixes. While I can't identify a specific CVE without more context, version updates in security-sensitive libraries like 'requests' often address vulnerabilities.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    Dependency Removal (mozprocess) [File: testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/requirements_sauce.txt] [Lines: 1]
    [Old Code]
    mozprocess==1.3.0
    [Fixed Code]
    (removed entirely)

Additional Details:
- The mozprocess dependency was removed completely. While this could be related to security (if the package had vulnerabilities), it might also be a functional change. Without more context, I can't be certain if this was a security-related removal.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/network/UDPSocket.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/network/UDPSocket.cpp@@ -476,14 +476,9 @@     return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;   }-  nsCOMPtr<nsISerialEventTarget> target;-  if (nsCOMPtr<nsIGlobalObject> global = GetOwnerGlobal()) {-    target = global->EventTargetFor(TaskCategory::Other);-  }-   rv = sock->Bind(mListenerProxy, principal,                   NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aLocalAddress), aLocalPort,-                  mAddressReuse, mLoopback, 0, 0, target);+                  mAddressReuse, mLoopback, 0, 0);   if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {     return rv;

Let me analyze the code diff according to the specified format:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Event Handler Vulnerability [dom/network/UDPSocket.cpp] [Lines 476-484]
[Old Code]
  nsCOMPtr<nsISerialEventTarget> target;
  if (nsCOMPtr<nsIGlobalObject> global = GetOwnerGlobal()) {
    target = global->EventTargetFor(TaskCategory::Other);
  }

  rv = sock->Bind(mListenerProxy, principal,
                  NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aLocalAddress), aLocalPort,
                  mAddressReuse, mLoopback, 0, 0, target);
[Fixed Code]
  rv = sock->Bind(mListenerProxy, principal,
                  NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aLocalAddress), aLocalPort,
                  mAddressReuse, mLoopback, 0, 0);

Additional Details:
The main change is the removal of the event target parameter from the Bind call. While this might relate to security (as event targets can be involved in race conditions or improper callback handling), I can't definitively identify a specific vulnerability from this change alone. The modification could be related to thread safety or event handling improvements, but without more context about the Bind implementation and its security implications, I can't be certain.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-width-block-intrinsic-1-ref.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-width-block-intrinsic-1-ref.html@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ <head>   <title>CSS Reference: intrinsic width of width: calc() on blocks</title>   <link rel="author" title="L. David Baron" href="https://dbaron.org/">-  <meta name="flags" content=""> <style type="text/css"> body > div { margin: 0 0 1px 0; background: blue; color: white; height: 5px }

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 3-6]
    Old Code:
    <meta name="flags" content="">
    
    Fixed Code:
    (line removed)

Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute. This doesn't appear to be related to any security vulnerability.
- The change is likely a cleanup of unnecessary markup rather than a security fix.
- No known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in this change.
- The modification appears to be test-related rather than security-related.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.shape.end.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.shape.end.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -28,11 +28,11 @@ ctx.moveTo(-100, -100); ctx.arcTo(-100, 25, 200, 25, 10); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where the variable name `offscreenCanvas` was renamed to `canvas` and all subsequent references were updated accordingly. The functionality remains the same.

Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.shape.end.html] [17-28]
[Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); ... _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, ...)]
[Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); ... _assertPixel(canvas, ...)]

The changes are purely variable naming improvements with no security implications. The test assertions and canvas operations remain identical in functionality.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/marker-line-height-ref.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/marker-line-height-ref.html@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ <title>CSS Reftest Reference</title> <link rel="author" title="Oriol Brufau" href="mailto:[email protected]" /> <style>+::marker { font-family: inherit; } ol {   float: left;   width: 50px;

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities.

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/marker-line-height-ref.html [Lines] 3-6
[Old Code]
<style>
[Fixed Code]
<style>
::marker { font-family: inherit; }

Additional Details:
- This appears to be a purely functional/rendering change in a CSS test file
- The change adds a CSS rule for ::marker pseudo-element to inherit font-family
- No security implications are visible in this change
- This is likely a test case update rather than a security fix

No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change is related to CSS styling in a test file and doesn't involve any security-sensitive operations.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/frontend/ObjLiteral.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/frontend/ObjLiteral.h@@ -719,6 +719,9 @@ class ObjLiteralStencil {   friend class frontend::StencilXDR;+  // CompilationStencil::clone has to update the code pointer.+  friend struct frontend::CompilationStencil;+   mozilla::Span<uint8_t> code_;   ObjLiteralKindAndFlags kindAndFlags_;   uint32_t propertyCount_ = 0;

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Access Control Issue] [js/src/frontend/ObjLiteral.h] [Lines 719-722]
[Old Code]
class ObjLiteralStencil {
  friend class frontend::StencilXDR;

[Fixed Code]
class ObjLiteralStencil {
  friend class frontend::StencilXDR;

  // CompilationStencil::clone has to update the code pointer.
  friend struct frontend::CompilationStencil;

Additional Details:
1. The change adds a new friend declaration for CompilationStencil, allowing it to access private members of ObjLiteralStencil.
2. While this could potentially be related to fixing an access control issue, there's not enough context to confirm if this was fixing a security vulnerability or just a design change.
3. The comment suggests this is needed for clone operations to update code pointers, which might be related to memory safety, but we can't be certain without more context.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/webrender_bindings/DCLayerTree.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/webrender_bindings/DCLayerTree.cpp@@ -15,8 +15,10 @@ #include "mozilla/webrender/RenderD3D11TextureHost.h" #include "mozilla/webrender/RenderTextureHost.h" #include "mozilla/webrender/RenderThread.h"+#include "mozilla/WindowsVersion.h" #include "mozilla/Telemetry.h" #include "nsPrintfCString.h"+#include "WinUtils.h" #undef _WIN32_WINNT #define _WIN32_WINNT _WIN32_WINNT_WINBLUE@@ -33,6 +35,8 @@ extern LazyLogModule gRenderThreadLog; #define LOG(...) MOZ_LOG(gRenderThreadLog, LogLevel::Debug, (__VA_ARGS__))++UniquePtr<GpuOverlayInfo> DCLayerTree::sGpuOverlayInfo; /* static */ UniquePtr<DCLayerTree> DCLayerTree::Create(gl::GLContext* aGL,@@ -56,6 +60,8 @@   return layerTree; }+void DCLayerTree::Shutdown() { DCLayerTree::sGpuOverlayInfo = nullptr; }+ DCLayerTree::DCLayerTree(gl::GLContext* aGL, EGLConfig aEGLConfig,                          ID3D11Device* aDevice, ID3D11DeviceContext* aCtx,                          IDCompositionDevice2* aCompositionDevice)@@ -64,7 +70,6 @@       mDevice(aDevice),       mCtx(aCtx),       mCompositionDevice(aCompositionDevice),-      mVideoOverlaySupported(false),       mDebugCounter(false),       mDebugVisualRedrawRegions(false),       mEGLImage(EGL_NO_IMAGE),@@ -130,6 +135,10 @@     if (!InitializeVideoOverlaySupport()) {       RenderThread::Get()->HandleWebRenderError(WebRenderError::VIDEO_OVERLAY);     }+  }+  if (!sGpuOverlayInfo) {+    // Set default if sGpuOverlayInfo was not set.+    sGpuOverlayInfo = MakeUnique<GpuOverlayInfo>();   }   mCompositionTarget->SetRoot(mRootVisual);@@ -142,7 +151,37 @@   return true; }+bool FlagsSupportsOverlays(UINT flags) {+  return (flags & (DXGI_OVERLAY_SUPPORT_FLAG_DIRECT |+                   DXGI_OVERLAY_SUPPORT_FLAG_SCALING));+}++// A warpper of IDXGIOutput4::CheckOverlayColorSpaceSupport()+bool CheckOverlayColorSpaceSupport(DXGI_FORMAT aDxgiFormat,+                                   DXGI_COLOR_SPACE_TYPE aDxgiColorSpace,+                                   RefPtr<IDXGIOutput> aOutput,+                                   RefPtr<ID3D11Device> aD3d11Device) {+  UINT colorSpaceSupportFlags = 0;+  RefPtr<IDXGIOutput4> output4;++  if (FAILED(aOutput->QueryInterface(__uuidof(IDXGIOutput4),+                                     getter_AddRefs(output4)))) {+    return false;+  }++  if (FAILED(output4->CheckOverlayColorSpaceSupport(+          aDxgiFormat, aDxgiColorSpace, aD3d11Device,+          &colorSpaceSupportFlags))) {+    return false;+  }++  return (colorSpaceSupportFlags &+          DXGI_OVERLAY_COLOR_SPACE_SUPPORT_FLAG_PRESENT);+}+ bool DCLayerTree::InitializeVideoOverlaySupport() {+  MOZ_ASSERT(IsWin10AnniversaryUpdateOrLater());+   HRESULT hr;   hr = mDevice->QueryInterface(@@ -159,12 +198,76 @@     return false;   }-  // XXX When video is rendered to DXGI_FORMAT_B8G8R8A8_UNORM SwapChain with-  // VideoProcessor, it seems that we do not need to check-  // IDXGIOutput3::CheckOverlaySupport().-  // If we want to yuv at DecodeSwapChain, its support seems necessary.--  mVideoOverlaySupported = true;+  if (sGpuOverlayInfo) {+    return true;+  }++  UniquePtr<GpuOverlayInfo> info = MakeUnique<GpuOverlayInfo>();++  RefPtr<IDXGIDevice> dxgiDevice;+  RefPtr<IDXGIAdapter> adapter;+  mDevice->QueryInterface((IDXGIDevice**)getter_AddRefs(dxgiDevice));+  dxgiDevice->GetAdapter(getter_AddRefs(adapter));++  unsigned int i = 0;+  while (true) {+    RefPtr<IDXGIOutput> output;+    if (FAILED(adapter->EnumOutputs(i++, getter_AddRefs(output)))) {+      break;+    }+    RefPtr<IDXGIOutput3> output3;+    if (FAILED(output->QueryInterface(__uuidof(IDXGIOutput3),+                                      getter_AddRefs(output3)))) {+      break;+    }++    output3->CheckOverlaySupport(DXGI_FORMAT_NV12, mDevice,+                                 &info->mNv12OverlaySupportFlags);+    output3->CheckOverlaySupport(DXGI_FORMAT_YUY2, mDevice,+                                 &info->mYuy2OverlaySupportFlags);+    output3->CheckOverlaySupport(DXGI_FORMAT_R10G10B10A2_UNORM, mDevice,+                                 &info->mRgb10a2OverlaySupportFlags);++    if (FlagsSupportsOverlays(info->mNv12OverlaySupportFlags)) {+      // NV12 format is preferred if it's supported.+      info->mOverlayFormatUsed = DXGI_FORMAT_NV12;+      info->mSupportsHardwareOverlays = true;+    }++    if (!info->mSupportsHardwareOverlays &&+        FlagsSupportsOverlays(info->mYuy2OverlaySupportFlags)) {+      // If NV12 isn't supported, fallback to YUY2 if it's supported.+      info->mOverlayFormatUsed = DXGI_FORMAT_YUY2;+      info->mSupportsHardwareOverlays = true;+    }++    // RGB10A2 overlay is used for displaying HDR content. In Intel's+    // platform, RGB10A2 overlay is enabled only when+    // DXGI_COLOR_SPACE_RGB_FULL_G2084_NONE_P2020 is supported.+    if (FlagsSupportsOverlays(info->mRgb10a2OverlaySupportFlags)) {+      if (!CheckOverlayColorSpaceSupport(+              DXGI_FORMAT_R10G10B10A2_UNORM,+              DXGI_COLOR_SPACE_RGB_FULL_G2084_NONE_P2020, output, mDevice))+        info->mRgb10a2OverlaySupportFlags = 0;+    }++    // Early out after the first output that reports overlay support. All+    // outputs are expected to report the same overlay support according to+    // Microsoft's WDDM documentation:+    // https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/display/multiplane-overlay-hardware-requirements+    if (info->mSupportsHardwareOverlays) {+      break;+    }+  }++  if (!StaticPrefs::gfx_webrender_dcomp_video_yuv_overlay_win_AtStartup()) {+    info->mOverlayFormatUsed = DXGI_FORMAT_B8G8R8A8_UNORM;+    info->mSupportsHardwareOverlays = false;+  }++  info->mSupportsOverlays = info->mSupportsHardwareOverlays;++  sGpuOverlayInfo = std::move(info);   return true; }@@ -578,6 +681,14 @@   return true; }+bool DCLayerTree::SupportsHardwareOverlays() {+  return sGpuOverlayInfo->mSupportsHardwareOverlays;+}++DXGI_FORMAT DCLayerTree::GetOverlayFormatForSDR() {+  return sGpuOverlayInfo->mOverlayFormatUsed;+}+ DCSurface::DCSurface(wr::DeviceIntSize aTileSize,                      wr::DeviceIntPoint aVirtualOffset, bool aIsOpaque,                      DCLayerTree* aDCLayerTree)@@ -717,6 +828,21 @@   mPrevTexture = texture; }+bool IsYUVSwapChainFormat(DXGI_FORMAT aFormat) {+  if (aFormat == DXGI_FORMAT_NV12 || aFormat == DXGI_FORMAT_YUY2) {+    return true;+  }+  return false;+}++DXGI_FORMAT DCSurfaceVideo::GetSwapChainFormat() {+  if (mFailedToCreateYuvSwapChain ||+      !mDCLayerTree->SupportsHardwareOverlays()) {+    return DXGI_FORMAT_B8G8R8A8_UNORM;+  }+  return mDCLayerTree->GetOverlayFormatForSDR();+}+ bool DCSurfaceVideo::CreateVideoSwapChain(RenderTextureHost* aTexture) {   const auto device = mDCLayerTree->GetDevice();@@ -738,21 +864,23 @@   }   gfx::IntSize size = aTexture->AsRenderDXGITextureHost()->GetSize(0);-  DXGI_ALPHA_MODE alpha_mode =-      mIsOpaque ? DXGI_ALPHA_MODE_IGNORE : DXGI_ALPHA_MODE_PREMULTIPLIED;+  auto swapChainFormat = GetSwapChainFormat();   DXGI_SWAP_CHAIN_DESC1 desc = {};   desc.Width = size.width;   desc.Height = size.height;-  desc.Format = DXGI_FORMAT_B8G8R8A8_UNORM;+  desc.Format = swapChainFormat;   desc.Stereo = FALSE;   desc.SampleDesc.Count = 1;   desc.BufferCount = 2;   desc.BufferUsage = DXGI_USAGE_RENDER_TARGET_OUTPUT;   desc.Scaling = DXGI_SCALING_STRETCH;   desc.SwapEffect = DXGI_SWAP_EFFECT_FLIP_SEQUENTIAL;-  desc.Flags = 0;-  desc.AlphaMode = alpha_mode;+  desc.Flags = DXGI_SWAP_CHAIN_FLAG_FULLSCREEN_VIDEO;+  if (IsYUVSwapChainFormat(swapChainFormat)) {+    desc.Flags |= DXGI_SWAP_CHAIN_FLAG_YUV_VIDEO;+  }+  desc.AlphaMode = DXGI_ALPHA_MODE_IGNORE;   HRESULT hr;   hr = dxgiFactoryMedia->CreateSwapChainForCompositionSurfaceHandle(@@ -760,11 +888,13 @@       getter_AddRefs(mVideoSwapChain));   if (FAILED(hr)) {+    mFailedToCreateYuvSwapChain = true;     gfxCriticalNote << "Failed to create video SwapChain: " << gfx::hexa(hr);     return false;   }   mSwapChainSize = size;+  mSwapChainFormat = swapChainFormat;   return true; }@@ -854,9 +984,11 @@   DXGI_COLOR_SPACE_TYPE inputColorSpace = sourceColorSpace.ref();   videoContext1->VideoProcessorSetStreamColorSpace1(videoProcessor, 0,                                                     inputColorSpace);-  // XXX when content is hdr or yuv swapchain, it need to use other color space.+   DXGI_COLOR_SPACE_TYPE outputColorSpace =-      DXGI_COLOR_SPACE_RGB_FULL_G22_NONE_P709;+      IsYUVSwapChainFormat(mSwapChainFormat)+          ? inputColorSpace+          : DXGI_COLOR_SPACE_RGB_FULL_G22_NONE_P709;   hr = swapChain3->SetColorSpace1(outputColorSpace);   if (FAILED(hr)) {     gfxCriticalNote << "SetColorSpace1 failed: " << gfx::hexa(hr);@@ -986,8 +1118,10 @@   hr = aCompositionSurface->BeginDraw(&update_rect, __uuidof(ID3D11Texture2D),                                       (void**)getter_AddRefs(backBuf), &offset);   if (FAILED(hr)) {+    LayoutDeviceIntRect rect = widget::WinUtils::ToIntRect(update_rect);+     gfxCriticalNote << "DCompositionSurface::BeginDraw failed: "-                    << gfx::hexa(hr);+                    << gfx::hexa(hr) << " " << rect;     RenderThread::Get()->HandleWebRenderError(WebRenderError::BEGIN_DRAW);     return false;   }

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Memory Leak] [gfx/webrender_bindings/DCLayerTree.cpp] [Lines 56-60]
   [Old Code]
   (No explicit shutdown handling)
   [Fixed Code]
   void DCLayerTree::Shutdown() { DCLayerTree::sGpuOverlayInfo = nullptr; }

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Uninitialized Memory Access] [gfx/webrender_bindings/DCLayerTree.cpp] [Lines 130-135]
   [Old Code]
   (No initialization check for sGpuOverlayInfo)
   [Fixed Code]
   if (!sGpuOverlayInfo) {
     // Set default if sGpuOverlayInfo was not set.
     sGpuOverlayInfo = MakeUnique<GpuOverlayInfo>();
   }

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Race Condition] [gfx/webrender_bindings/DCLayerTree.cpp] [Lines 33-35]
   [Old Code]
   (No static GpuOverlayInfo member)
   [Fixed Code]
   UniquePtr<GpuOverlayInfo> DCLayerTree::sGpuOverlayInfo;

4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Error Handling Improvement] [gfx/webrender_bindings/DCLayerTree.cpp] [Lines 717-721]
   [Old Code]
   (No detailed error information in BeginDraw failure)
   [Fixed Code]
   LayoutDeviceIntRect rect = widget::WinUtils::ToIntRect(update_rect);
   gfxCriticalNote << "DCompositionSurface::BeginDraw failed: "
                   << gfx::hexa(hr) << " " << rect;

Note: While these changes appear to be improvements in memory management, error handling, and initialization, I couldn't identify any clear security vulnerabilities (like buffer overflows, injection vulnerabilities, etc.) in the diff. The changes seem more focused on functionality improvements and robustness rather than fixing specific security issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.scale.multiple.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.scale.multiple.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ ctx.scale(Math.sqrt(2), Math.sqrt(2)); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 50, 25);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 90,40, 0,255,0,255, "90,40", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 90,40, 0,255,0,255, "90,40", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-related modifications.

Analysis for each change:

1. First change:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 13-14]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

2. Second change:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    Variable Renaming [File] [Line 22]
    [Old Code]
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 90,40, 0,255,0,255, "90,40", "0,255,0,255");
    [Fixed Code]
    _assertPixel(canvas, 90,40, 0,255,0,255, "90,40", "0,255,0,255");

These changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature, changing the variable name from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability. There are no security implications in these changes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/piping/general.any.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/piping/general.any.js@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@-// META: global=window,worker,jsshell+// META: global=window,worker // META: script=../resources/test-utils.js // META: script=../resources/recording-streams.js 'use strict';

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Removal of Test Environment] [testing/web-platform/tests/streams/piping/general.any.js] [Lines 1]  
   [Old Code]  
   `// META: global=window,worker,jsshell`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `// META: global=window,worker`  

Additional Details:  
- The diff shows removal of "jsshell" from the test environment globals. While this doesn't appear to be a direct security vulnerability, it could potentially affect test coverage if jsshell-specific behaviors were being tested.  
- Without more context about why "jsshell" was removed, we can't be certain if this relates to a security fix or just a test scope adjustment.  
- No specific vulnerability name is associated with this change, but it's worth noting as it reduces the testing surface area.  

No other vulnerabilities are apparent in this small diff. The change appears to be focused on test environment configuration rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/circle/shape-outside-circle-043.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/circle/shape-outside-circle-043.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/">   <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#supported-basic-shapes">   <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-circle-042-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Test the boxes are wrapping around the right float shape defined by the basic shape circle(closest-side at center) border-box value.">   <style>   .container {

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 9]
   Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">
   Fixed Code: (line removed)

Additional Notes:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which doesn't appear to have any security implications
- This appears to be a minor cleanup/optimization rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerability patterns are present in this change
- The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive functionality

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.uncovered.pattern.source-out.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.uncovered.pattern.source-out.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 255, 0.5)';@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@     createImageBitmap(response).then(bitmap => {         ctx.fillStyle = ctx.createPattern(bitmap, 'no-repeat');         ctx.fillRect(0, 50, 100, 50);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-related modifications.

Here's the analysis following your format:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.uncovered.pattern.source-out.worker.js] [Lines 13-14, 33]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);

The changes are:
1. Renaming variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Updating the references to this variable in the assertions

These changes don't appear to address any security issues but rather improve code consistency or readability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/streams/ReadableStreamBYOBRequest.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/streams/ReadableStreamBYOBRequest.h@@ -31,13 +31,10 @@   NS_DECL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_SCRIPT_HOLDER_CLASS(ReadableStreamBYOBRequest)  public:-  explicit ReadableStreamBYOBRequest(nsIGlobalObject* aGlobal)-      : mGlobal(aGlobal) {-    mozilla::HoldJSObjects(this);-  }+  explicit ReadableStreamBYOBRequest(nsIGlobalObject* aGlobal);  protected:-  ~ReadableStreamBYOBRequest() { mozilla::DropJSObjects(this); };+  ~ReadableStreamBYOBRequest();  public:   nsIGlobalObject* GetParentObject() const { return mGlobal; }@@ -55,9 +52,7 @@                                              ErrorResult& aRv);   ReadableByteStreamController* Controller() { return mController; }-  void SetController(ReadableByteStreamController* aController) {-    mController = aController;-  }+  void SetController(ReadableByteStreamController* aController);   JSObject* View() { return mView; }   void SetView(JS::HandleObject aView) { mView = aView; }

I'll analyze the code diff following the specified format. The changes appear to be related to memory management and object lifecycle handling in the ReadableStreamBYOBRequest class.

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Memory Management Issue] [dom/streams/ReadableStreamBYOBRequest.h] [Lines 31-34, 36]
   [Old Code]
   explicit ReadableStreamBYOBRequest(nsIGlobalObject* aGlobal)
       : mGlobal(aGlobal) {
     mozilla::HoldJSObjects(this);
   }
   ~ReadableStreamBYOBRequest() { mozilla::DropJSObjects(this); };
   
   [Fixed Code]
   explicit ReadableStreamBYOBRequest(nsIGlobalObject* aGlobal);
   ~ReadableStreamBYOBRequest();
   
   Additional Details: The change moves the implementation of constructor and destructor out of the header file. While this might improve code organization, it's unclear if there was an actual security vulnerability being fixed.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Controller Management Issue] [dom/streams/ReadableStreamBYOBRequest.h] [Lines 55-57]
   [Old Code]
   void SetController(ReadableByteStreamController* aController) {
     mController = aController;
   }
   
   [Fixed Code]
   void SetController(ReadableByteStreamController* aController);
   
   Additional Details: The change moves the implementation of SetController out of the header file. This could be related to potential security concerns around controller management, but without seeing the actual implementation changes, it's impossible to determine if this fixes a specific vulnerability.

Note: The diff shows a pattern of moving implementations from header files to source files (likely .cpp files), which is generally good practice for encapsulation and compilation efficiency, but doesn't necessarily indicate specific security vulnerabilities were fixed. The actual security impact would depend on the implementations in the corresponding source files, which aren't shown in the diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.parse.decimal.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.parse.decimal.worker.js@@ -13,13 +13,13 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-offscreenCanvas.width = '100.999';-offscreenCanvas.height = '100.999';-_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.width, 100, "offscreenCanvas.width", "100");-_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.height, 100, "offscreenCanvas.height", "100");+canvas.width = '100.999';+canvas.height = '100.999';+_assertSame(canvas.width, 100, "canvas.width", "100");+_assertSame(canvas.height, 100, "canvas.height", "100"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.parse.decimal.worker.js] [Lines 13-21]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');

offscreenCanvas.width = '100.999';
offscreenCanvas.height = '100.999';
_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.width, 100, "offscreenCanvas.width", "100");
_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.height, 100, "offscreenCanvas.height", "100");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

canvas.width = '100.999';
canvas.height = '100.999';
_assertSame(canvas.width, 100, "canvas.width", "100");
_assertSame(canvas.height, 100, "canvas.height", "100");

Additional Details:
The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. The functionality remains the same - testing how decimal values are parsed when setting canvas dimensions. No security vulnerability is being addressed in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslcert.c+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslcert.c@@ -204,6 +204,11 @@                    const sslNamedGroupDef *namedCurve) {     PRCList *cursor;++    /* Bug 1749475: avoid UB while fuzzing session tickets */+    if ((unsigned)authType >= ssl_auth_size) {+        return NULL;+    }     for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->serverCerts);          cursor != &ss->serverCerts;

Here's the analysis following the required format:

Vulnerability Existed: yes
Buffer Overflow / Undefined Behavior [security/nss/lib/ssl/sslcert.c] [Lines 204-208]
[Old Code]
                   const sslNamedGroupDef *namedCurve)
{
    PRCList *cursor;

[Fixed Code]
                   const sslNamedGroupDef *namedCurve)
{
    PRCList *cursor;

    /* Bug 1749475: avoid UB while fuzzing session tickets */
    if ((unsigned)authType >= ssl_auth_size) {
        return NULL;
    }

Additional Details:
1. The vulnerability appears to be related to undefined behavior (UB) that could occur during fuzzing of session tickets, as referenced in Bug 1749475.
2. The fix adds a bounds check on the authType parameter before it's used, preventing potential buffer overflow or undefined behavior if an invalid authType value is provided.
3. While the exact vulnerability type isn't named in the diff, based on the fix and the comment, it's clearly addressing a security issue related to improper input validation that could lead to undefined behavior.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.