--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/push/test/test_multiple_register.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/push/test/test_multiple_register.html@@ -123,8 +123,9 @@     }).then(SimpleTest.finish);   }-  setupPrefsAndMockSocket(new MockWebSocket()).then(_ => runTest());-  SpecialPowers.addPermission("desktop-notification", true, document);+  setupPrefsAndMockSocket(new MockWebSocket())+    .then(_ => setPushPermission(true))+    .then(_ => runTest());   SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish(); </script> </body>

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Permission Handling Issue] [dom/push/test/test_multiple_register.html] [Lines 123-126]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   setupPrefsAndMockSocket(new MockWebSocket()).then(_ => runTest());
   SpecialPowers.addPermission("desktop-notification", true, document);
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   setupPrefsAndMockSocket(new MockWebSocket())
     .then(_ => setPushPermission(true))
     .then(_ => runTest());
   ```  

Additional Details:
- The change appears to modify how permissions are handled in the test, replacing the direct `SpecialPowers.addPermission` call with a `setPushPermission` function called in the promise chain.
- While this doesn't clearly indicate a security vulnerability, it suggests better permission handling practices in the test environment.
- The exact security implications are unclear without seeing the implementation of `setPushPermission`.
- The change might be related to ensuring proper permission states before test execution rather than fixing a specific vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.stroke.prune.closed.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.stroke.prune.closed.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ ctx.lineTo(50, 25); ctx.closePath(); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-related modifications.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.stroke.prune.closed.html] [17-18,31]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.stroke.prune.closed.html] [31]
[Old Code]
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are simply:
1. Renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Updating the references to this variable in the code
3. No security implications were found in these changes

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/subpixel-collapsed-borders-002.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/subpixel-collapsed-borders-002.html@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-tables-3/#border-conflict-resolution-algorithm"> <link rel="help" href="https://github.com/w3c/csswg-drafts/issues/606"> <link rel="match" href="subpixel-collapsed-borders-ref.html">-<meta name="flags" content="" /> <meta name="assert" content="When collapsed border tables have border widths larger than cells', the table border wins even when the cell border is merely 0.01 pixels narrower" /> <style>

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/subpixel-collapsed-borders-002.html] [Lines 4]
   Old Code: `<meta name="flags" content="" />`
   Fixed Code: (removed line)

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag that wasn't serving any purpose
- This appears to be a code cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with empty meta tags
- The modification doesn't introduce any security improvements or fixes

The diff shows no evidence of security-related changes or vulnerability fixes. It's a minor HTML cleanup in a test file.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-017.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-017.html@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@       -ms-column-fill: auto;   -webkit-column-fill: auto;           column-fill: auto;-  border: 2px dashed;+  border: 2px solid salmon;   margin-bottom: 5px; }

Based on the provided code diff, this appears to be a simple styling change rather than a security fix. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-017.html] [Lines 23]
[Old Code] border: 2px dashed;
[Fixed Code] border: 2px solid salmon;

Additional Details:
- The change only modifies the visual appearance of a border (changing from dashed to solid and adding a color)
- This appears to be part of a test case (reftest) for CSS grid fragmentation
- No security implications are evident from this change
- No known vulnerability patterns are present in this modification

The change seems purely cosmetic/functional rather than security-related.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit/x86-shared/Lowering-x86-shared.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit/x86-shared/Lowering-x86-shared.cpp@@ -846,9 +846,11 @@     case wasm::SimdOp::I16x8LaneSelect:     case wasm::SimdOp::I32x4LaneSelect:     case wasm::SimdOp::I64x2LaneSelect: {-      auto* lir = new (alloc()) LWasmTernarySimd128(-          ins->simdOp(), useRegister(ins->v0()), useRegisterAtStart(ins->v1()),-          useFixed(ins->v2(), vmm0));+      auto mask = Assembler::HasAVX() ? useRegister(ins->v2())+                                      : useFixed(ins->v2(), vmm0);+      auto* lir = new (alloc())+          LWasmTernarySimd128(ins->simdOp(), useRegister(ins->v0()),+                              useRegisterAtStart(ins->v1()), mask);       defineReuseInput(lir, ins, LWasmTernarySimd128::V1);       break;     }@@ -1157,13 +1159,21 @@   MOZ_ASSERT(lhs->type() == MIRType::Simd128);   MOZ_ASSERT(ins->type() == MIRType::Simd128);-  // Always beneficial to reuse the lhs register here, see discussion in-  // visitWasmBinarySimd128() and also code in specializeForConstantRhs().--  LAllocation lhsDestAlloc = useRegisterAtStart(lhs);-  auto* lir =-      new (alloc()) LWasmBinarySimd128WithConstant(lhsDestAlloc, ins->rhs());-  defineReuseInput(lir, ins, LWasmBinarySimd128WithConstant::LhsDest);+  if (isThreeOpAllowed()) {+    // The non-destructive versions of instructions will be available+    // when AVX is enabled.+    LAllocation lhsAlloc = useRegisterAtStart(lhs);+    auto* lir =+        new (alloc()) LWasmBinarySimd128WithConstant(lhsAlloc, ins->rhs());+    define(lir, ins);+  } else {+    // Always beneficial to reuse the lhs register here, see discussion in+    // visitWasmBinarySimd128() and also code in specializeForConstantRhs().+    LAllocation lhsDestAlloc = useRegisterAtStart(lhs);+    auto* lir =+        new (alloc()) LWasmBinarySimd128WithConstant(lhsDestAlloc, ins->rhs());+    defineReuseInput(lir, ins, LWasmBinarySimd128WithConstant::LhsDest);+  } #else   MOZ_CRASH("No SIMD"); #endif@@ -1278,13 +1288,11 @@     case SimdShuffle::Operand::LEFT:     case SimdShuffle::Operand::RIGHT: {       LAllocation src;-      // All permute operators currently favor reusing the input register so-      // we're not currently exercising code paths below that do not reuse.-      // Those paths have been exercised in the past however and are believed-      // to be correct.-      bool useAtStartAndReuse = false;+      bool reuse = false;       switch (*s.permuteOp) {         case SimdPermuteOp::MOVE:+          reuse = true;+          break;         case SimdPermuteOp::BROADCAST_8x16:         case SimdPermuteOp::BROADCAST_16x8:         case SimdPermuteOp::PERMUTE_8x16:@@ -1296,27 +1304,20 @@         case SimdPermuteOp::REVERSE_16x8:         case SimdPermuteOp::REVERSE_32x4:         case SimdPermuteOp::REVERSE_64x2:-          useAtStartAndReuse = true;+          // No need to reuse registers when VEX instructions are enabled.+          reuse = !Assembler::HasAVX();           break;         default:           MOZ_CRASH("Unexpected operator");       }       if (s.opd == SimdShuffle::Operand::LEFT) {-        if (useAtStartAndReuse) {-          src = useRegisterAtStart(ins->lhs());-        } else {-          src = useRegister(ins->lhs());-        }+        src = useRegisterAtStart(ins->lhs());       } else {-        if (useAtStartAndReuse) {-          src = useRegisterAtStart(ins->rhs());-        } else {-          src = useRegister(ins->rhs());-        }+        src = useRegisterAtStart(ins->rhs());       }       auto* lir =           new (alloc()) LWasmPermuteSimd128(src, *s.permuteOp, s.control);-      if (useAtStartAndReuse) {+      if (reuse) {         defineReuseInput(lir, ins, LWasmPermuteSimd128::Src);       } else {         define(lir, ins);@@ -1328,23 +1329,38 @@       LDefinition temp = LDefinition::BogusTemp();       switch (*s.shuffleOp) {         case SimdShuffleOp::BLEND_8x16:-          temp = tempFixed(xmm0);+          temp = Assembler::HasAVX() ? tempSimd128() : tempFixed(xmm0);           break;         default:           break;       }-      LAllocation lhs;-      LAllocation rhs;-      if (s.opd == SimdShuffle::Operand::BOTH) {-        lhs = useRegisterAtStart(ins->lhs());-        rhs = useRegister(ins->rhs());+      if (isThreeOpAllowed()) {+        LAllocation lhs;+        LAllocation rhs;+        if (s.opd == SimdShuffle::Operand::BOTH) {+          lhs = useRegisterAtStart(ins->lhs());+          rhs = useRegisterAtStart(ins->rhs());+        } else {+          lhs = useRegisterAtStart(ins->rhs());+          rhs = useRegisterAtStart(ins->lhs());+        }+        auto* lir = new (alloc())+            LWasmShuffleSimd128(lhs, rhs, temp, *s.shuffleOp, s.control);+        define(lir, ins);       } else {-        lhs = useRegisterAtStart(ins->rhs());-        rhs = useRegister(ins->lhs());+        LAllocation lhs;+        LAllocation rhs;+        if (s.opd == SimdShuffle::Operand::BOTH) {+          lhs = useRegisterAtStart(ins->lhs());+          rhs = useRegister(ins->rhs());+        } else {+          lhs = useRegisterAtStart(ins->rhs());+          rhs = useRegister(ins->lhs());+        }+        auto* lir = new (alloc())+            LWasmShuffleSimd128(lhs, rhs, temp, *s.shuffleOp, s.control);+        defineReuseInput(lir, ins, LWasmShuffleSimd128::LhsDest);       }-      auto* lir = new (alloc())-          LWasmShuffleSimd128(lhs, rhs, temp, *s.shuffleOp, s.control);-      defineReuseInput(lir, ins, LWasmShuffleSimd128::LhsDest);       break;     }   }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Register Allocation Optimization] [js/src/jit/x86-shared/Lowering-x86-shared.cpp] [Lines 846-853]
   [Old Code]
   auto* lir = new (alloc()) LWasmTernarySimd128(
       ins->simdOp(), useRegister(ins->v0()), useRegisterAtStart(ins->v1()),
       useFixed(ins->v2(), vmm0));
   
   [Fixed Code]
   auto mask = Assembler::HasAVX() ? useRegister(ins->v2())
                                 : useFixed(ins->v2(), vmm0);
   auto* lir = new (alloc())
       LWasmTernarySimd128(ins->simdOp(), useRegister(ins->v0()),
                           useRegisterAtStart(ins->v1()), mask);

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential AVX Instruction Handling Improvement] [js/src/jit/x86-shared/Lowering-x86-shared.cpp] [Lines 1157-1174]
   [Old Code]
   LAllocation lhsDestAlloc = useRegisterAtStart(lhs);
   auto* lir =
       new (alloc()) LWasmBinarySimd128WithConstant(lhsDestAlloc, ins->rhs());
   defineReuseInput(lir, ins, LWasmBinarySimd128WithConstant::LhsDest);
   
   [Fixed Code]
   if (isThreeOpAllowed()) {
     LAllocation lhsAlloc = useRegisterAtStart(lhs);
     auto* lir =
         new (alloc()) LWasmBinarySimd128WithConstant(lhsAlloc, ins->rhs());
     define(lir, ins);
   } else {
     LAllocation lhsDestAlloc = useRegisterAtStart(lhs);
     auto* lir =
         new (alloc()) LWasmBinarySimd128WithConstant(lhsDestAlloc, ins->rhs());
     defineReuseInput(lir, ins, LWasmBinarySimd128WithConstant::LhsDest);
   }

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential SIMD Permute Optimization] [js/src/jit/x86-shared/Lowering-x86-shared.cpp] [Lines 1278-1329]
   [Old Code]
   bool useAtStartAndReuse = false;
   switch (*s.permuteOp) {
     case SimdPermuteOp::MOVE:
     case SimdPermuteOp::BROADCAST_8x16:
     ...
     case SimdPermuteOp::REVERSE_64x2:
       useAtStartAndReuse = true;
       break;
     default:
       MOZ_CRASH("Unexpected operator");
   }
   
   [Fixed Code]
   bool reuse = false;
   switch (*s.permuteOp) {
     case SimdPermuteOp::MOVE:
       reuse = true;
       break;
     case SimdPermuteOp::BROADCAST_8x16:
     ...
     case SimdPermuteOp::REVERSE_64x2:
       reuse = !Assembler::HasAVX();
       break;
     default:
       MOZ_CRASH("Unexpected operator");
   }

4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential SIMD Shuffle Optimization] [js/src/jit/x86-shared/Lowering-x86-shared.cpp] [Lines 1328-1363]
   [Old Code]
   LDefinition temp = LDefinition::BogusTemp();
   switch (*s.shuffleOp) {
     case SimdShuffleOp::BLEND_8x16:
       temp = tempFixed(xmm0);
       break;
     default:
       break;
   }
   
   [Fixed Code]
   LDefinition temp = LDefinition::BogusTemp();
   switch (*s.shuffleOp) {
     case SimdShuffleOp::BLEND_8x16:
       temp = Assembler::HasAVX() ? tempSimd128() : tempFixed(xmm0);
       break;
     default:
       break;
   }

The changes appear to be primarily optimizations related to AVX instruction handling and register allocation in SIMD operations. While these could potentially impact security by affecting memory handling or register states, I couldn't identify any specific vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes seem focused on performance improvements and better handling of AVX-capable processors.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.bitmap.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.bitmap.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.restore();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming for better code clarity. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.bitmap.html] [Lines 17-26]
    Old Code:
    ```javascript
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    // ... rest of the code using offscreenCanvas
    ```
    Fixed Code:
    ```javascript
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    // ... rest of the code using canvas
    ```

The changes simply rename the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or clarity, without any security implications. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-155c.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-155c.xml@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->   <link rel="match" href="reference/this-line-lime-background.xht"/>-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body>  <p class="one.word">This line should have a green background.</p>

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   [No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-155c.xml] [Lines 9]
   [Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="" />]
   [Fixed Code: [removed]]

Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag with name="flags" attribute
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- The removed tag didn't contain any sensitive information or pose any obvious security risk
- No known vulnerability is associated with this change
- The modification seems to be part of general code maintenance rather than security patching

No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change appears to be a benign removal of an unused or unnecessary meta tag from a test file.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/widget/android/AndroidBridge.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/widget/android/AndroidBridge.cpp@@ -16,27 +16,20 @@ #include <prthread.h> #include "AndroidBridge.h" #include "AndroidBridgeUtilities.h"-#include "AndroidRect.h" #include "nsAlertsUtils.h" #include "nsAppShell.h" #include "nsOSHelperAppService.h" #include "nsWindow.h" #include "mozilla/Preferences.h" #include "nsThreadUtils.h"-#include "gfxPlatform.h"-#include "gfxContext.h"-#include "mozilla/gfx/2D.h"-#include "gfxUtils.h" #include "nsPresContext.h" #include "nsPIDOMWindow.h" #include "mozilla/ClearOnShutdown.h"+#include "mozilla/Mutex.h" #include "nsPrintfCString.h" #include "nsContentUtils.h" #include "EventDispatcher.h"-#include "MediaCodec.h"-#include "SurfaceTexture.h"-#include "GLContextProvider.h" #include "mozilla/TimeStamp.h" #include "mozilla/UniquePtr.h"@@ -45,10 +38,8 @@ #include "mozilla/java/EventDispatcherWrappers.h" #include "mozilla/java/GeckoAppShellWrappers.h" #include "mozilla/java/GeckoThreadWrappers.h"-#include "mozilla/java/HardwareCodecCapabilityUtilsWrappers.h" using namespace mozilla;-using namespace mozilla::gfx; AndroidBridge* AndroidBridge::sBridge = nullptr; static jobject sGlobalContext = nullptr;@@ -159,54 +150,6 @@                                            "Landroid/os/Message;"); }-bool AndroidBridge::HasHWVP8Encoder() {-  ALOG_BRIDGE("AndroidBridge::HasHWVP8Encoder");--  bool value = java::GeckoAppShell::HasHWVP8Encoder();--  return value;-}--bool AndroidBridge::HasHWVP8Decoder() {-  ALOG_BRIDGE("AndroidBridge::HasHWVP8Decoder");--  bool value = java::GeckoAppShell::HasHWVP8Decoder();--  return value;-}--bool AndroidBridge::HasHWH264() {-  ALOG_BRIDGE("AndroidBridge::HasHWH264");--  return java::HardwareCodecCapabilityUtils::HasHWH264();-}--gfx::Rect AndroidBridge::getScreenSize() {-  ALOG_BRIDGE("AndroidBridge::getScreenSize");--  java::sdk::Rect::LocalRef screenrect = java::GeckoAppShell::GetScreenSize();-  gfx::Rect screensize(screenrect->Left(), screenrect->Top(),-                       screenrect->Width(), screenrect->Height());--  return screensize;-}--int AndroidBridge::GetScreenDepth() {-  ALOG_BRIDGE("%s", __PRETTY_FUNCTION__);--  static int sDepth = 0;-  if (sDepth) return sDepth;--  const int DEFAULT_DEPTH = 16;--  if (jni::IsAvailable()) {-    sDepth = java::GeckoAppShell::GetScreenDepth();-  }-  if (!sDepth) return DEFAULT_DEPTH;--  return sDepth;-}- void AndroidBridge::Vibrate(const nsTArray<uint32_t>& aPattern) {   ALOG_BRIDGE("%s", __PRETTY_FUNCTION__);

Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily code cleanup and removal of unused functionality rather than security fixes. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Code Cleanup [File] [Lines 16-38]
   [Old Code]
   #include "AndroidRect.h"
   #include "gfxPlatform.h"
   #include "gfxContext.h"
   #include "mozilla/gfx/2D.h"
   #include "gfxUtils.h"
   #include "MediaCodec.h"
   #include "SurfaceTexture.h"
   #include "GLContextProvider.h"
   using namespace mozilla::gfx;

   [Fixed Code]
   (These includes and namespace declaration were removed)

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Functionality Removal [File] [Lines 159-195]
   [Old Code]
   bool AndroidBridge::HasHWVP8Encoder() {...}
   bool AndroidBridge::HasHWVP8Decoder() {...}
   bool AndroidBridge::HasHWH264() {...}
   gfx::Rect AndroidBridge::getScreenSize() {...}
   int AndroidBridge::GetScreenDepth() {...}

   [Fixed Code]
   (These functions were completely removed)

The changes appear to be:
1. Removal of unused graphics-related headers and namespace
2. Removal of hardware codec capability checking functions
3. Removal of screen size/depth related functions

These changes don't appear to address any specific security vulnerabilities, but rather represent code cleanup and removal of unused functionality. No CVE or specific vulnerability names are associated with these changes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/darling/tests/happy_path.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/darling/tests/happy_path.rs@@ -1,11 +1,5 @@-#[macro_use]-extern crate darling;-#[macro_use]-extern crate syn;-#[macro_use]-extern crate quote;--use darling::FromDeriveInput;+use darling::{FromDeriveInput, FromMeta};+use syn::parse_quote; #[derive(Default, FromMeta, PartialEq, Debug)] #[darling(default)]

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be related to code organization and modernization rather than security fixes. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Dependency Cleanup and Modernization [third_party/rust/darling/tests/happy_path.rs] [Lines 1-11]
   Old Code:
   ```
   #[macro_use]
   extern crate darling;
   #[macro_use]
   extern crate syn;
   #[macro_use]
   extern crate quote;
   
   use darling::FromDeriveInput;
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   use darling::{FromDeriveInput, FromMeta};
   use syn::parse_quote;
   ```

The changes show:
1. Removal of old-style `#[macro_use]` extern crate declarations in favor of modern Rust 2018 module system
2. Addition of `FromMeta` to the imports from darling
3. Addition of `parse_quote` import from syn
4. No security-related changes were made in this diff

These are typical maintenance changes rather than security fixes. The diff shows modernization of the code to use newer Rust features but doesn't indicate any vulnerability fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/darling/tests/enums_struct.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/darling/tests/enums_struct.rs@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@+#![allow(dead_code)]+ //! Test expansion of enums which have struct variants.-#[macro_use]-extern crate darling;-extern crate syn;-+use darling::FromMeta; #[derive(Debug, FromMeta)] #[darling(rename_all = "snake_case")] enum Message {

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Dependency Cleanup [third_party/rust/darling/tests/enums_struct.rs] [Lines 1-9]
   Old Code:
   ```
   #[macro_use]
   extern crate darling;
   extern crate syn;
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   #![allow(dead_code)]
   
   use darling::FromMeta;
   ```

The changes appear to be code style and modernization improvements rather than security fixes. The main changes are:
1. Added `#![allow(dead_code)]` pragma
2. Removed old-style `extern crate` declarations in favor of modern `use` statement
3. Kept the core functionality (enum definition) unchanged

No actual security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The changes are related to Rust modernization and code organization rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-39a.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-39a.xml@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/>   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body>

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Meta Tag Removal [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-39a.xml [Lines] 7
    Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="" />
    Fixed Code: [line removed]

Additional details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute. This doesn't appear to be security-related.
- The meta tag wasn't serving any apparent purpose (empty content) and its removal doesn't indicate any security fix.
- No known vulnerability is associated with this change.
- This appears to be a simple cleanup of unnecessary markup rather than a security fix.

No other changes were present in the diff to analyze.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.self.2.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.self.2.worker.js@@ -14,20 +14,20 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 1, 100, 49); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 1);-ctx.drawImage(offscreenCanvas, 0, 1);+ctx.drawImage(canvas, 0, 1); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 2);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 0,0, 0,255,0,255, "0,0", "0,255,0,255", 2);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 99,0, 0,255,0,255, "99,0", "0,255,0,255", 2);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 0,49, 0,255,0,255, "0,49", "0,255,0,255", 2);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 99,49, 0,255,0,255, "99,49", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 0,0, 0,255,0,255, "0,0", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 99,0, 0,255,0,255, "99,0", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 0,49, 0,255,0,255, "0,49", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 99,49, 0,255,0,255, "99,49", "0,255,0,255", 2); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable name refactoring from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` without any security implications.

Here's the structured response:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 14-20]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    ctx.drawImage(offscreenCanvas, 0, 1);
    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 0,0, 0,255,0,255, "0,0", "0,255,0,255", 2);

    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    ctx.drawImage(canvas, 0, 1);
    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 0,0, 0,255,0,255, "0,0", "0,255,0,255", 2);

The changes are purely variable name changes with no security impact. The functionality remains identical, just using a more concise variable name. No security vulnerabilities were addressed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.path.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.path.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50)@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ctx.putImageData(imgdata, 0, 0); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fill();-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't involve any security-related modifications.

Here's the structured response:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.path.html] [Lines 17-27]
    [Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); ... _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, ...)]
    [Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); ... _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, ...)]

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or clarity.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.order.alpha.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.order.alpha.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.5)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14]
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');

   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- The changes appear to be purely variable naming changes (from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas')
- No security-related changes or fixes were made in this diff
- The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive operations or introduce/remove any security controls
- This appears to be a code style/readability improvement rather than a security fix

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/tps/create_venv.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/tps/create_venv.py@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@-#!/usr/bin/env python+#!/usr/bin/env python3 # This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public # License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this # file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.@@ -9,15 +9,11 @@ all the virtualenv files will show up in e.g. hg status. """-from __future__ import absolute_import, print_function--import six import optparse import os-import shutil import subprocess import sys-import zipfile+import venv here = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))@@ -38,58 +34,18 @@ *********************************************************************** """-# Link to the folder, which contains the zip archives of virtualenv-URL_VIRTUALENV = "https://codeload.github.com/pypa/virtualenv/zip/"-VERSION_VIRTUALENV = "15.0.0"-- if sys.platform == "win32":     bin_name = os.path.join("Scripts", "activate.bat")-    activate_env = os.path.join("Scripts", "activate_this.py")     python_env = os.path.join("Scripts", "python.exe") else:     bin_name = os.path.join("bin", "activate")-    activate_env = os.path.join("bin", "activate_this.py")     python_env = os.path.join("bin", "python")-def download(url, target):-    """Downloads the specified url to the given target."""-    response = six.moves.urllib.request.urlopen(url)-    with open(target, "wb") as f:-        f.write(response.read())--    return target---def setup_virtualenv(target, python_bin=None):-    script_path = os.path.join(-        here, "virtualenv-%s" % VERSION_VIRTUALENV, "virtualenv.py"-    )--    print("Downloading virtualenv {}".format(VERSION_VIRTUALENV))-    zip_path = download(-        URL_VIRTUALENV + VERSION_VIRTUALENV, os.path.join(here, "virtualenv.zip")-    )--    try:-        with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "r") as f:-            f.extractall(here)--        print("Creating new virtual environment")-        cmd_args = [sys.executable, script_path, target]--        if python_bin:-            cmd_args.extend(["-p", python_bin])--        subprocess.check_call(cmd_args)-    finally:-        try:-            os.remove(zip_path)-        except OSError:-            pass--        shutil.rmtree(os.path.dirname(script_path), ignore_errors=True)+def setup_virtualenv(target):+    print("Creating new virtual environment:", os.path.abspath(target))+    # system_site_packages=True so we have access to setuptools.+    venv.create(target, system_site_packages=True) def update_configfile(source, target, replacements):@@ -97,7 +53,7 @@     with open(source) as config:         for line in config:-            for source_string, target_string in six.iteritems(replacements):+            for source_string, target_string in replacements.items():                 if target_string:                     line = line.replace(source_string, target_string)             lines.append(line)@@ -172,11 +128,10 @@     target = args[0]     assert target-    setup_virtualenv(target, python_bin=options.python)+    setup_virtualenv(target)     # Activate tps environment-    tps_env = os.path.join(target, activate_env)-    exec(open(tps_env).read(), dict(__file__=tps_env))+    activate(target)     # Install TPS in environment     subprocess.check_call(@@ -217,5 +172,34 @@     print(usage_message.format(TARGET=target, BIN_NAME=bin_name))+def activate(target):+    # This is a lightly modified copy of `activate_this.py`, which existed when+    # venv was an external package, but doesn't come with the builtin venv support.+    old_os_path = os.environ.get("PATH", "")+    os.environ["PATH"] = (+        os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)) + os.pathsep + old_os_path+    )+    base = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))+    if sys.platform == "win32":+        site_packages = os.path.join(base, "Lib", "site-packages")+    else:+        site_packages = os.path.join(+            base, "lib", "python%s" % sys.version[:3], "site-packages"+        )+    prev_sys_path = list(sys.path)+    import site++    site.addsitedir(site_packages)+    sys.real_prefix = sys.prefix+    sys.prefix = base+    # Move the added items to the front of the path:+    new_sys_path = []+    for item in list(sys.path):+        if item not in prev_sys_path:+            new_sys_path.append(item)+            sys.path.remove(item)+    sys.path[:0] = new_sys_path++ if __name__ == "__main__":     main()

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   Dependency on Outdated Virtualenv Version [testing/tps/create_venv.py] [Lines 38-58]
   Old Code:
   ```
   # Link to the folder, which contains the zip archives of virtualenv
   URL_VIRTUALENV = "https://codeload.github.com/pypa/virtualenv/zip/"
   VERSION_VIRTUALENV = "15.0.0"
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   (Removed entirely, replaced with built-in venv module)

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   Potential Zip File Handling Vulnerability [testing/tps/create_venv.py] [Lines 60-80]
   Old Code:
   ```
   def setup_virtualenv(target, python_bin=None):
       script_path = os.path.join(
           here, "virtualenv-%s" % VERSION_VIRTUALENV, "virtualenv.py"
       )
       ...
       with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "r") as f:
           f.extractall(here)
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   def setup_virtualenv(target):
       print("Creating new virtual environment:", os.path.abspath(target))
       # system_site_packages=True so we have access to setuptools.
       venv.create(target, system_site_packages=True)
   ```

3. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   Potential Code Injection via exec() [testing/tps/create_venv.py] [Lines 131-132]
   Old Code:
   ```
   tps_env = os.path.join(target, activate_env)
   exec(open(tps_env).read(), dict(__file__=tps_env))
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   activate(target)
   ```

4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   Python 2 vs Python 3 Shebang Change [testing/tps/create_venv.py] [Line 1]
   Old Code:
   ```
   #!/usr/bin/env python
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   #!/usr/bin/env python3
   ```

The most significant security improvements are:
1. Removal of the external virtualenv download and zip file handling, which could have been vulnerable to zip bomb attacks or MITM attacks during download
2. Replacement of the potentially dangerous exec() call with a safer activate() function
3. Moving from Python 2 (which is EOL and no longer receives security updates) to Python 3

The changes significantly reduce the attack surface by removing several potentially vulnerable components (external downloads, zip handling, exec usage) and replacing them with built-in, more secure alternatives.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/inspector/rules/test/browser_rules_content_01.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/inspector/rules/test/browser_rules_content_01.js@@ -41,17 +41,21 @@   await selectNode("#testid", inspector);   let linkText = getRuleViewLinkTextByIndex(view, 1);+  is(linkText, "inline:3", "link text at index 1 has expected content.");++  const mediaText = getRuleViewAncestorRulesDataTextByIndex(view, 1);   is(-    linkText,-    "inline:3 @screen and (min-width: 10px)",-    "link text at index 1 contains media query text."+    mediaText,+    "@media screen and (min-width: 10px)",+    "media text at index 1 has expected content"   );   linkText = getRuleViewLinkTextByIndex(view, 2);+  is(linkText, "inline:7", "link text at index 2 has expected content.");   is(-    linkText,-    "inline:7",-    "link text at index 2 contains no media query text."+    getRuleViewAncestorRulesDataElementByIndex(view, 2),+    null,+    "There is no media text element for rule at index 2"   );   const selector = getRuleViewRuleEditor(view, 2).selectorText;

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Information Disclosure] [devtools/client/inspector/rules/test/browser_rules_content_01.js] [Lines 41-55]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   is(
     linkText,
     "inline:3 @screen and (min-width: 10px)",
     "link text at index 1 contains media query text."
   );
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   is(linkText, "inline:3", "link text at index 1 has expected content.");

   const mediaText = getRuleViewAncestorRulesDataTextByIndex(view, 1);
   is(
     mediaText,
     "@media screen and (min-width: 10px)",
     "media text at index 1 has expected content"
   );
   ```  
   Additional Details: The change separates media query information from the link text, which might indicate a fix for potential information mixing or leakage, though it's not clearly a security vulnerability.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Information Validation] [devtools/client/inspector/rules/test/browser_rules_content_01.js] [Lines 50-55]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   is(
     linkText,
     "inline:7",
     "link text at index 2 contains no media query text."
   );
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   is(linkText, "inline:7", "link text at index 2 has expected content.");
   is(
     getRuleViewAncestorRulesDataElementByIndex(view, 2),
     null,
     "There is no media text element for rule at index 2"
   );
   ```  
   Additional Details: The change adds explicit validation for media text element presence, which might be related to preventing potential XSS or information leakage, though this is speculative.

Note: The changes appear to be more about test accuracy and separation of concerns rather than clear security fixes. No obvious security vulnerabilities were identified in this test file diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.broken.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.broken.html@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var promise = new Promise(function(resolve, reject) {     var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@         ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';         ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);         ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 0, 0);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 18-19,35]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);

Additional Details:
- The changes appear to be purely variable name refactoring (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`)
- No security-related changes were made to the XHR request handling or image drawing functionality
- The test assertion remains the same, just using the renamed variable
- No actual security vulnerabilities were fixed in this diff

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.3.radii.2.dompoint.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.3.radii.2.dompoint.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,20 +27,20 @@ ctx.fill(); // top-right corner-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 79,1, 255,0,0,255, "79,1", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 58,1, 0,255,0,255, "58,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,10, 255,0,0,255, "98,10", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,21, 0,255,0,255, "98,21", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 79,1, 255,0,0,255, "79,1", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 58,1, 0,255,0,255, "58,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,10, 255,0,0,255, "98,10", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,21, 0,255,0,255, "98,21", "0,255,0,255"); // bottom-left corner-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 20,48, 255,0,0,255, "20,48", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 41,48, 0,255,0,255, "41,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,39, 255,0,0,255, "1,39", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,28, 0,255,0,255, "1,28", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 20,48, 255,0,0,255, "20,48", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 41,48, 0,255,0,255, "41,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,39, 255,0,0,255, "1,39", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,28, 0,255,0,255, "1,28", "0,255,0,255"); // other corners-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where a variable name was changed from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and all subsequent references were updated accordingly. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    [No security vulnerability found]
    [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.3.radii.2.dompoint.html
    [Lines] 17-48
    [Old Code] Used variable name 'offscreenCanvas'
    [Fixed Code] Changed to variable name 'canvas'

The changes are:
1. Variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` (lines 17-18)
2. Corresponding updates to all `_assertPixel` calls to use the new variable name (lines 27-48)

No security implications are apparent in these changes. The modification appears to be purely for code consistency or readability purposes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.hsla-2.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.hsla-2.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; try { ctx.fillStyle = 'hsla(0, 0, 50%, 1)'; } catch (e) { } // this shouldn't throw, but it shouldn't matter here if it does ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-related modifications.

Analysis:
1. The main change is renaming `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating the references accordingly.
2. The test logic remains the same - it's still testing canvas fillStyle parsing behavior.
3. No security-related patterns (like input validation, sanitization, or security checks) were modified.

Answer:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found
    File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.hsla-2.worker.js
    Changes were purely variable renaming with no security implications

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/semantics/forms/the-selectmenu-element/selectmenu-many-options.tentative.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/semantics/forms/the-selectmenu-element/selectmenu-many-options.tentative.html@@ -13,6 +13,15 @@     position: absolute;     top: 0px;     left: 0px;+  }++  #selectMenu0-popup {+    border: 1px solid rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.15);+    border-radius: 4px;+    box-shadow: 0px 12.8px 28.8px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.13), 0px 0px 9.2px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.11);+    box-sizing: border-box;+    overflow: auto;+    padding: 4px;   } </style>

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's my assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/semantics/forms/the-selectmenu-element/selectmenu-many-options.tentative.html] [Lines 13-22]
[Old Code: No styling for #selectMenu0-popup]
[Fixed Code: Added CSS styling for #selectMenu0-popup]

Additional Details:
The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/style-related, adding border, shadow, and padding to a select menu popup. There are no security-related changes in this diff. The modifications are focused on visual presentation rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.