--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.object.update.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.object.update.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var g = ctx.createLinearGradient(-100, 0, 200, 0); g.addColorStop(0, '#f00');@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ g.addColorStop(0.1, '#0f0'); g.addColorStop(0.9, '#0f0'); ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-related modifications. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-23]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);

The changes simply rename the variable 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas' and update all references to it. There are no security implications to this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/feature-policy/reporting/usb-reporting.https.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/feature-policy/reporting/usb-reporting.https.html@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ var check_report_format = (reports, observer) => {   let report = reports[0];-  assert_equals(report.type, "feature-policy-violation");+  assert_equals(report.type, "permissions-policy-violation");   assert_equals(report.url, document.location.href);   assert_equals(report.body.featureId, "usb");   assert_equals(report.body.sourceFile, document.location.href);@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ }; new ReportingObserver(t.step_func_done(check_report_format),-                      {types: ['feature-policy-violation']}).observe();+                      {types: ['permissions-policy-violation']}).observe(); navigator.usb.getDevices().then(   t.unreached_func("USB device access should not be allowed in this document.")

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
Feature Policy to Permissions Policy Renaming [testing/web-platform/tests/feature-policy/reporting/usb-reporting.https.html] [Lines 10,20]
Old Code: 
-  assert_equals(report.type, "feature-policy-violation");
...
-                      {types: ['feature-policy-violation']}).observe();
Fixed Code:
+  assert_equals(report.type, "permissions-policy-violation");
...
+                      {types: ['permissions-policy-violation']}).observe();

Additional Details:
This appears to be a standard update reflecting the renaming of "Feature Policy" to "Permissions Policy" in the web specifications. There's no security vulnerability being fixed here, just a terminology update to match current standards. The change is consistent across both the report type check and the observer configuration.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/docs/contributor/preferences.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/docs/contributor/preferences.md@@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ DevTools relies on Services.pref to handle preferences. You can access the API docs for this service at:-* [API docs for nsIPrefBranch](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Tech/XPCOM/Reference/Interface/nsIPrefBranch)-* [API docs for nsIPrefService](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Tech/XPCOM/Reference/Interface/nsIPrefService)+* [Source for nsIPrefBranch](https://searchfox.org/mozilla-central/source/modules/libpref/nsIPrefBranch.idl)+* [Source for nsIPrefService](https://searchfox.org/mozilla-central/source/modules/libpref/nsIPrefService.idl) If you are using Launchpad, note that only a subset of nsIPrefService methods are implemented (addObserver and removeObserver). Launchpad relies on a Services shim file

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be documentation updates changing the links from MDN documentation to direct source code references.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found]
[File] devtools/docs/contributor/preferences.md [Lines 35-36]
[Old Code]
* [API docs for nsIPrefBranch](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Tech/XPCOM/Reference/Interface/nsIPrefBranch)
* [API docs for nsIPrefService](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Tech/XPCOM/Reference/Interface/nsIPrefService)
[Fixed Code]
* [Source for nsIPrefBranch](https://searchfox.org/mozilla-central/source/modules/libpref/nsIPrefBranch.idl)
* [Source for nsIPrefService](https://searchfox.org/mozilla-central/source/modules/libpref/nsIPrefService.idl)

Additional Details:
The change simply updates documentation links to point directly to source code rather than MDN documentation. This appears to be a maintenance change rather than a security fix. No actual code changes were made to the preference handling system itself.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.canvas.destination-in.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.canvas.destination-in.html@@ -17,11 +17,11 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(offscreenCanvas.width, offscreenCanvas.height);+var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(canvas.width, canvas.height); var ctx2 = offscreenCanvas2.getContext('2d'); var promise = new Promise(function(resolve, reject) {     var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@         ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);         ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'destination-in';         ctx.drawImage(offscreenCanvas2, 0, 0);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,255,96, "50,25", "0,255,255,96", 5);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,255,96, "50,25", "0,255,255,96", 5);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 17-18, 21, 39]
   Old Code:
   ```javascript
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```javascript
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Variable Reference Update [File] [Lines 21]
   Old Code:
   ```javascript
   var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(offscreenCanvas.width, offscreenCanvas.height);
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```javascript
   var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(canvas.width, canvas.height);
   ```

3. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Assertion Update [File] [Lines 39]
   Old Code:
   ```javascript
   _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,255,96, "50,25", "0,255,255,96", 5);
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```javascript
   _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,255,96, "50,25", "0,255,255,96", 5);
   ```

The changes appear to be purely refactoring-related, involving variable renaming and subsequent reference updates. No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The modifications maintain the same functionality while improving code consistency.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.equal.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.equal.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -23,15 +23,15 @@ g.addColorStop(1, '#f00'); ctx.fillStyle = g; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where a variable name was changed from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`, along with corresponding updates to all references to this variable.

Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.equal.worker.js] [Lines 13-48]
[Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, ...)]
[Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(canvas, ...)]

The changes are purely variable naming improvements and don't affect security in any way. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a more concise variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.dirty.rect2.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.dirty.rect2.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50)@@ -26,11 +26,11 @@ ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(40, 20, 20, 20) ctx.putImageData(imgdata, -20, -10, 60, 30, 20, 20);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 35,25, 0,255,0,255, "35,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 65,25, 0,255,0,255, "65,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,15, 0,255,0,255, "50,15", "0,255,0,255", 2);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,45, 0,255,0,255, "50,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 35,25, 0,255,0,255, "35,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 65,25, 0,255,0,255, "65,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,15, 0,255,0,255, "50,15", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,45, 0,255,0,255, "50,45", "0,255,0,255", 2); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't affect security. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 13-14, 26-30]
   Old Code:
   ```
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
   ```

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and update all references to it. This is a code style/readability change rather than a security fix. The functionality remains identical, and there are no security implications in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/extensions/parent/ext-proxy.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/extensions/parent/ext-proxy.js@@ -138,11 +138,8 @@       proxy: {         onRequest: new EventManager({           context,-          name: `proxy.onRequest`,-          persistent: {-            module: "proxy",-            event: "onRequest",-          },+          module: "proxy",+          event: "onRequest",           register: (fire, filter, info) => {             return registerProxyFilterEvent(               context,

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Event Listener Security Issue [File] [Lines 138-146]
[Old Code]
onRequest: new EventManager({
  context,
  name: `proxy.onRequest`,
  persistent: {
    module: "proxy",
    event: "onRequest",
  },
[Fixed Code]
onRequest: new EventManager({
  context,
  module: "proxy",
  event: "onRequest",

Additional Details:
The change involves removing the `name` property and restructuring how the persistent event listener is registered. While this appears to be a security-related change (simplifying the event registration mechanism), I cannot definitively identify a specific named vulnerability that was fixed. The modification suggests a tightening of the event listener registration process, potentially to prevent some form of event spoofing or unauthorized event registration, but without more context about the EventManager implementation, I can't be certain.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.norepeat.outside.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.norepeat.outside.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -41,10 +41,10 @@         ctx.fillRect(-100, 0, 100, 50);         ctx.fillRect(0, 50, 100, 50);         ctx.fillRect(100, 0, 100, 50);-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to the variable name in the assertions. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found
   File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.norepeat.outside.html
   Lines: 17-18, 41-44
   Old Code: 
   ```
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ...
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
   ```
   Fixed Code: 
   ```
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ...
   _assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
   ```

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't appear to address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/webrtc-sdp/CHANGELOG.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/webrtc-sdp/CHANGELOG.md@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ # Changelog+## [0.3.9] - 2022-01-12+- Add support for RFC8858 rtcp-mux-only+- Correct seperation of tokens in FMTP parameters+- Do not emit an empty line after a media description ## [0.3.8] - 2021-01-16 - fmt numbers 35 to 63 are now usable for dynamic allocation - parse extmap-allow-mixed as per RFC 8285

Based on the provided CHANGELOG.md diff, I can't directly identify security vulnerabilities since it only lists feature additions and fixes without specific code changes. However, I can analyze the changelog entries for potential security implications:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
[Potential parsing vulnerability] [third_party/rust/webrtc-sdp/CHANGELOG.md] [Lines mentioning "Correct seperation of tokens in FMTP parameters"]  
[Old Code: Not shown in diff]  
[Fixed Code: Not shown in diff]  
Note: The correction of token separation in FMTP parameters might indicate a previous parsing issue that could have led to security problems, but without seeing the actual code changes, we can't be certain.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
[Potential protocol compliance issue] [third_party/rust/webrtc-sdp/CHANGELOG.md] [Lines mentioning "Add support for RFC8858 rtcp-mux-only"]  
[Old Code: Not shown in diff]  
[Fixed Code: Not shown in diff]  
Note: Adding support for RFC8858 might indicate previous non-compliance that could have security implications, but this is speculative without code context.

The changelog doesn't explicitly mention security fixes, so I can't definitively identify any vulnerabilities from this diff alone. The changes appear to be feature additions and bug fixes that might have indirect security benefits.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/pin-project/tests/ui/pin_project/safe_packed_borrows.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/pin-project/tests/ui/pin_project/safe_packed_borrows.rs@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@-#![forbid(safe_packed_borrows)]+#![deny(renamed_and_removed_lints)]+#![deny(safe_packed_borrows)] //~ ERROR has been renamed to `unaligned_references` #![allow(unaligned_references)] // This lint was removed in https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/pull/82525 (nightly-2021-03-28).@@ -18,10 +19,8 @@ fn main() {     let a = Packed { f: 1 };-    &a.f; //~ ERROR borrow of packed field is unsafe and requires unsafe function or block-    let _ = &a.f; //~ ERROR borrow of packed field is unsafe and requires unsafe function or block+    let _ = &a.f;     let b = PackedN { f: 1 };-    &b.f; //~ ERROR borrow of packed field is unsafe and requires unsafe function or block-    let _ = &b.f; //~ ERROR borrow of packed field is unsafe and requires unsafe function or block+    let _ = &b.f; }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
   Packed Field Unsafe Borrow [third_party/rust/pin-project/tests/ui/pin_project/safe_packed_borrows.rs] [Lines 18-21]  
   Old Code:  
   ```rust
   &a.f; //~ ERROR borrow of packed field is unsafe and requires unsafe function or block
   let _ = &a.f; //~ ERROR borrow of packed field is unsafe and requires unsafe function or block
   ```  
   Fixed Code:  
   ```rust
   let _ = &a.f;
   ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
   Packed Field Unsafe Borrow [third_party/rust/pin-project/tests/ui/pin_project/safe_packed_borrows.rs] [Lines 23-24]  
   Old Code:  
   ```rust
   &b.f; //~ ERROR borrow of packed field is unsafe and requires unsafe function or block
   let _ = &b.f; //~ ERROR borrow of packed field is unsafe and requires unsafe function or block
   ```  
   Fixed Code:  
   ```rust
   let _ = &b.f;
   ```

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   Lint Renaming/Deprecation [third_party/rust/pin-project/tests/ui/pin_project/safe_packed_borrows.rs] [Lines 1-2]  
   Old Code:  
   ```rust
   #![forbid(safe_packed_borrows)]
   ```  
   Fixed Code:  
   ```rust
   #![deny(renamed_and_removed_lints)]
   #![deny(safe_packed_borrows)] //~ ERROR has been renamed to `unaligned_references`
   ```

The main security fixes address unsafe borrows of packed fields, which could lead to undefined behavior due to potential unaligned memory accesses. The lint changes appear to be related to deprecation/renaming rather than direct security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/tests/list.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/tests/list.rs@@ -41,29 +41,29 @@     let (s, r) = unbounded();     assert_eq!(s.len(), 0);-    assert_eq!(s.is_empty(), true);-    assert_eq!(s.is_full(), false);+    assert!(s.is_empty());+    assert!(!s.is_full());     assert_eq!(r.len(), 0);-    assert_eq!(r.is_empty(), true);-    assert_eq!(r.is_full(), false);+    assert!(r.is_empty());+    assert!(!r.is_full());     s.send(()).unwrap();     assert_eq!(s.len(), 1);-    assert_eq!(s.is_empty(), false);-    assert_eq!(s.is_full(), false);+    assert!(!s.is_empty());+    assert!(!s.is_full());     assert_eq!(r.len(), 1);-    assert_eq!(r.is_empty(), false);-    assert_eq!(r.is_full(), false);+    assert!(!r.is_empty());+    assert!(!r.is_full());     r.recv().unwrap();     assert_eq!(s.len(), 0);-    assert_eq!(s.is_empty(), true);-    assert_eq!(s.is_full(), false);+    assert!(s.is_empty());+    assert!(!s.is_full());     assert_eq!(r.len(), 0);-    assert_eq!(r.is_empty(), true);-    assert_eq!(r.is_full(), false);+    assert!(r.is_empty());+    assert!(!r.is_full()); } #[test]@@ -239,6 +239,9 @@ #[test] fn spsc() {+    #[cfg(miri)]+    const COUNT: usize = 100;+    #[cfg(not(miri))]     const COUNT: usize = 100_000;     let (s, r) = unbounded();@@ -261,6 +264,9 @@ #[test] fn mpmc() {+    #[cfg(miri)]+    const COUNT: usize = 100;+    #[cfg(not(miri))]     const COUNT: usize = 25_000;     const THREADS: usize = 4;@@ -295,6 +301,9 @@ #[test] fn stress_oneshot() {+    #[cfg(miri)]+    const COUNT: usize = 100;+    #[cfg(not(miri))]     const COUNT: usize = 10_000;     for _ in 0..COUNT {@@ -310,6 +319,9 @@ #[test] fn stress_iter() {+    #[cfg(miri)]+    const COUNT: usize = 100;+    #[cfg(not(miri))]     const COUNT: usize = 100_000;     let (request_s, request_r) = unbounded();@@ -371,8 +383,11 @@     .unwrap(); }+#[cfg_attr(miri, ignore)] // Miri is too slow #[test] fn drops() {+    const RUNS: usize = 100;+     static DROPS: AtomicUsize = AtomicUsize::new(0);     #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]@@ -386,7 +401,7 @@     let mut rng = thread_rng();-    for _ in 0..100 {+    for _ in 0..RUNS {         let steps = rng.gen_range(0..10_000);         let additional = rng.gen_range(0..1000);@@ -421,6 +436,9 @@ #[test] fn linearizable() {+    #[cfg(miri)]+    const COUNT: usize = 100;+    #[cfg(not(miri))]     const COUNT: usize = 25_000;     const THREADS: usize = 4;@@ -441,6 +459,9 @@ #[test] fn fairness() {+    #[cfg(miri)]+    const COUNT: usize = 100;+    #[cfg(not(miri))]     const COUNT: usize = 10_000;     let (s1, r1) = unbounded::<()>();@@ -463,6 +484,9 @@ #[test] fn fairness_duplicates() {+    #[cfg(miri)]+    const COUNT: usize = 100;+    #[cfg(not(miri))]     const COUNT: usize = 10_000;     let (s, r) = unbounded();@@ -496,6 +520,9 @@ #[test] fn channel_through_channel() {+    #[cfg(miri)]+    const COUNT: usize = 100;+    #[cfg(not(miri))]     const COUNT: usize = 1000;     type T = Box<dyn Any + Send>;

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily test-related improvements and optimizations for different execution environments (particularly for Miri, Rust's interpreter for checking undefined behavior).

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/tests/list.rs] [Various lines]
The changes consist of:
1. Replacing assert_eq!(bool_expr, true/false) with assert!(bool_expr) or assert!(!bool_expr)
2. Adding Miri-specific test configurations with lower iteration counts
3. Adding #[cfg_attr(miri, ignore)] for slow tests
4. General test improvements without security implications

The changes are focused on:
- Test code style improvements
- Performance optimizations for Miri execution
- Better test organization
- No security-related fixes were identified in this diff

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/tests/list.rs] [Various lines]
The changes to test constants (adding Miri-specific lower values) are performance optimizations rather than security fixes. The original high values remain for non-Miri execution.

The diff shows quality improvements to the test suite but no identifiable security vulnerabilities being addressed. The changes are test-specific and don't affect the actual channel implementation's security characteristics.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/server/tests/browser/browser_navigateEvents.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/server/tests/browser/browser_navigateEvents.js@@ -51,7 +51,6 @@       );       is(data.state, "start", "state is start");       is(data.url, URL2, "url property is correct");-      is(data.nativeConsoleAPI, true, "nativeConsoleAPI is correct");       break;     case isE10s ? 5 : 4:       is(@@ -80,7 +79,6 @@       is(event, "tabNavigated", "Finally, the receive the client event");       is(data.state, "stop", "state is stop");       is(data.url, URL2, "url property is correct");-      is(data.nativeConsoleAPI, true, "nativeConsoleAPI is correct");       signalAllEventsReceived();       break;

Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Information Leak] [devtools/server/tests/browser/browser_navigateEvents.js] [Lines 51,80]
    [Old Code]
      is(data.nativeConsoleAPI, true, "nativeConsoleAPI is correct");
    [Fixed Code]
      (removed)

Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of checks for `nativeConsoleAPI` property in test assertions
- While this doesn't directly indicate a security vulnerability, removing these checks might be related to:
  1) Preventing potential information leakage about internal implementation details
  2) Removing unnecessary test assertions that might expose internal state
- Without more context about why these checks were removed, we can't be certain if this was a security fix or just test cleanup
- The property being checked (`nativeConsoleAPI`) suggests it might relate to console API implementation details that shouldn't be exposed

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/webcodecs/videoFrame-drawImage.any.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/webcodecs/videoFrame-drawImage.any.js@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@   let ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');   let init = {alpha: 'discard', timestamp: 33090};-  let frame = new VideoFrame(canvas);+  let frame = new VideoFrame(canvas, {timestamp: 0});   let frame2 = new VideoFrame(frame, init);   let frame3 = new VideoFrame(frame2, init);

Analyzing the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential VideoFrame Initialization Issue] [testing/web-platform/tests/webcodecs/videoFrame-drawImage.any.js] [Lines 64]
    [Old Code]
    let frame = new VideoFrame(canvas);
    [Fixed Code]
    let frame = new VideoFrame(canvas, {timestamp: 0});

Additional Details:
- The change involves modifying how a VideoFrame is initialized, adding an explicit timestamp option.
- While this doesn't appear to be fixing a known security vulnerability, it might be addressing potential timing-related issues or ensuring consistent behavior.
- Without more context about the VideoFrame API's security implications, I can't definitively say if this fixes a security issue.
- The change could be related to preventing undefined behavior rather than fixing an exploitable vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/python/mozbuild/mozbuild/base.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/python/mozbuild/mozbuild/base.py@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@     HgRepository,     InvalidRepoPath,     MissingConfigureInfo,+    MissingVCSTool, ) from .backend.configenvironment import (@@ -456,7 +457,11 @@         # If we don't have a configure context, fall back to auto-detection.         try:             return get_repository_from_build_config(self)-        except (BuildEnvironmentNotFoundException, MissingConfigureInfo):+        except (+            BuildEnvironmentNotFoundException,+            MissingConfigureInfo,+            MissingVCSTool,+        ):             pass         return get_repository_object(self.topsrcdir)

Let me analyze the code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Error Handling Improvement] [python/mozbuild/mozbuild/base.py] [Lines 456-463]
[Old Code]
        try:
            return get_repository_from_build_config(self)
        except (BuildEnvironmentNotFoundException, MissingConfigureInfo):
            pass
[Fixed Code]
        try:
            return get_repository_from_build_config(self)
        except (
            BuildEnvironmentNotFoundException,
            MissingConfigureInfo,
            MissingVCSTool,
        ):
            pass

Additional Details:
- The change adds `MissingVCSTool` to the list of caught exceptions
- This appears to be improving error handling robustness rather than fixing a specific security vulnerability
- The change could potentially prevent unhandled exceptions, but doesn't appear to address any known vulnerability
- Without more context about the potential impact of uncaught MissingVCSTool exceptions, it's hard to determine if this was a security fix

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/widget/gtk/nsLookAndFeel.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/widget/gtk/nsLookAndFeel.h@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ enum WidgetNodeType : int; struct _GtkStyle;+typedef struct _GDBusProxy GDBusProxy; class nsLookAndFeel final : public nsXPLookAndFeel {  public:@@ -34,11 +35,6 @@   bool GetDefaultDrawInTitlebar() override;-  template <typename Callback>-  void WithAltThemeConfigured(const Callback&);--  void InitializeAltTheme();-   void GetGtkContentTheme(LookAndFeelTheme&) override;   void GetThemeInfo(nsACString&) override;@@ -51,6 +47,7 @@   static bool WidgetUsesImage(WidgetNodeType aNodeType);   void RecordLookAndFeelSpecificTelemetry() override;   static bool ShouldHonorThemeScrollbarColors();+  mozilla::Maybe<ColorScheme> ComputeColorSchemeSetting();   // We use up to two themes (one light, one dark), which might have different   // sets of fonts and colors.@@ -154,6 +151,8 @@     return mSystemThemeOverridden ? mAltTheme : mSystemTheme;   }+  GDBusProxy* mDBusSettingsProxy = nullptr;+  mozilla::Maybe<ColorScheme> mColorSchemePreference;   int32_t mCaretBlinkTime = 0;   int32_t mCaretBlinkCount = -1;   bool mCSDMaximizeButton = false;@@ -167,10 +166,19 @@   int32_t mCSDMinimizeButtonPosition = 0;   int32_t mCSDCloseButtonPosition = 0;-  void EnsureInit();+  void EnsureInit() {+    if (mInitialized) {+      return;+    }+    Initialize();+  }++  void Initialize();   void RestoreSystemTheme();-  bool MatchFirefoxThemeIfNeeded();+  void InitializeGlobalSettings();+  void ConfigureAndInitializeAltTheme();+  void ConfigureFinalEffectiveTheme(); }; #endif

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Memory Management Issue] [widget/gtk/nsLookAndFeel.h] [Lines 47, 151]  
   [Old Code]  
   No explicit handling of GDBusProxy or color scheme preference  
   [Fixed Code]  
   Added `GDBusProxy* mDBusSettingsProxy = nullptr;` and `mozilla::Maybe<ColorScheme> mColorSchemePreference;` with potential proper initialization  

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Race Condition] [widget/gtk/nsLookAndFeel.h] [Lines 166-172]  
   [Old Code]  
   `void EnsureInit();` (declaration only)  
   [Fixed Code]  
   Added inline implementation with initialization check and separate `Initialize()` function  

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Theme Configuration Issue] [widget/gtk/nsLookAndFeel.h] [Lines 34-36]  
   [Old Code]  
   `WithAltThemeConfigured` and `InitializeAltTheme` methods  
   [Fixed Code]  
   Removed these methods, replaced with more comprehensive theme handling functions (`ConfigureAndInitializeAltTheme`, `ConfigureFinalEffectiveTheme`)  

Note: The changes appear to be more about architectural improvements and proper initialization patterns rather than clear security fixes. The additions of null initialization for pointers and more robust initialization patterns could potentially prevent null pointer dereferences or race conditions, but without seeing the implementation details of the new methods, this is speculative.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/filter-effects/filter-hue_rotate-001-test.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/filter-effects/filter-hue_rotate-001-test.html@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@     <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/filter-effects-1/#funcdef-filter-hue-rotate">     <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/filter-effects-1/#huerotateEquivalent">     <link rel="match" href="filter-hue_rotate-001-ref.html">-    <meta name="flags" content="">     <meta name="assert" content="CSS hue rotate filter will apply a matrix to rotate the hue. Since angle is 0, it has     no affect on the rectangle.">     <style type="text/css">

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 8]
   Old Code: `<meta name="flags" content="">`
   Fixed Code: (line removed)

Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta "flags" tag, which doesn't appear to be security-related
- This appears to be a minor cleanup or test file modification rather than a security fix
- No CVE or known vulnerability patterns are present in this change
- The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive functionality

The change is likely related to test infrastructure or documentation rather than addressing any security concern. The removed meta tag was empty and didn't serve any apparent security purpose.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgba-num-2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgba-num-2.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(  0  ,  255  ,  0  ,  0.499  )'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,127, "50,25", "0,255,0,127");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,127, "50,25", "0,255,0,127"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring (variable renaming) with no security implications.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines]
Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,127, "50,25", "0,255,0,127");
Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,127, "50,25", "0,255,0,127");

The changes are:
1. Renaming variable 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas'
2. Updating the variable name in the _assertPixel call
3. No functional changes to the actual test logic or security-related operations

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/inset/shape-outside-inset-022.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/inset/shape-outside-inset-022.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/">   <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#supported-basic-shapes">   <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-inset-022-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Test the boxes are wrapping around the left float shape defined by the inset(10px round 60px 0/ 40px 0) border-box value under vertical-rl writing-mode.">   <style>   .container {

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 9]
    Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">
    Fixed Code: (line removed)

Additional Notes:
- The diff shows only the removal of an empty meta tag with "flags" attribute, which doesn't appear to be security-related
- This change seems to be a cleanup of test metadata rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with this type of change
- The modification is in a test file (HTML) and doesn't affect runtime behavior or security controls

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/xre/nsXREDirProvider.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/xre/nsXREDirProvider.cpp@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ #if defined(MOZ_SANDBOX) #  include "mozilla/SandboxSettings.h"-#  include "nsIUUIDGenerator.h"+#  include "nsID.h" #  include "mozilla/Unused.h" #  if defined(XP_WIN) #    include "sandboxBroker.h"@@ -721,15 +721,10 @@   nsresult rv;   nsAutoString tempDirSuffix;   mozilla::Preferences::GetString(pref, tempDirSuffix);+   if (tempDirSuffix.IsEmpty()) {-    nsCOMPtr<nsIUUIDGenerator> uuidgen =-        do_GetService("@mozilla.org/uuid-generator;1", &rv);-    if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {-      return nullptr;-    }-     nsID uuid;-    rv = uuidgen->GenerateUUIDInPlace(&uuid);+    rv = nsID::GenerateUUIDInPlace(uuid);     if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {       return nullptr;     }

Here's the analysis following the required format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential UUID Generation Improvement] [toolkit/xre/nsXREDirProvider.cpp] [Lines 721-731]
   [Old Code]
     nsCOMPtr<nsIUUIDGenerator> uuidgen =
         do_GetService("@mozilla.org/uuid-generator;1", &rv);
     if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
       return nullptr;
     }

     nsID uuid;
     rv = uuidgen->GenerateUUIDInPlace(&uuid);
   [Fixed Code]
     nsID uuid;
     rv = nsID::GenerateUUIDInPlace(uuid);

Additional Details:
- The change replaces service-based UUID generation with direct static method call
- While not clearly a security vulnerability, this could potentially improve security by:
  * Removing dependency on external service
  * Reducing attack surface
  * Using a more direct/controlled generation method
- However, without more context about the nsID implementation, we can't be certain if this fixes a specific vulnerability

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/nimbus/test/unit/test_ExperimentManager_lifecycle.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/nimbus/test/unit/test_ExperimentManager_lifecycle.js@@ -61,6 +61,41 @@       `should call setExperimentActive for rollout: ${r.slug}`     )   );+});++add_task(async function test_startup_unenroll() {+  Services.prefs.setBoolPref("app.shield.optoutstudies.enabled", false);+  const store = ExperimentFakes.store();+  const sandbox = sinon.createSandbox();+  let recipe = ExperimentFakes.experiment("startup_unenroll", {+    experimentType: "unittest",+    source: "test",+  });+  // Test initializing ExperimentManager with an active+  // recipe in the store. If the user has opted out it should+  // unenroll.+  await store.init();+  let enrollmentPromise = new Promise(resolve =>+    store.on(`update:${recipe.slug}`, resolve)+  );+  store.addEnrollment(recipe);+  await enrollmentPromise;++  const manager = ExperimentFakes.manager(store);+  const unenrollStub = sandbox.stub(manager, "unenroll");++  await manager.onStartup();++  Assert.ok(+    unenrollStub.calledOnce,+    "Unenrolled from active experiment if user opt out is true"+  );+  Assert.ok(+    unenrollStub.calledWith("startup_unenroll", "studies-opt-out"),+    "Called unenroll for expected recipe"+  );++  Services.prefs.clearUserPref("app.shield.optoutstudies.enabled"); }); /**

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Improper Access Control] [toolkit/components/nimbus/test/unit/test_ExperimentManager_lifecycle.js] [Lines 61-102]
   [Old Code: No test for startup unenrollment]
   [Fixed Code: Added test case for unenrollment when user opts out]

The diff shows the addition of a test case that verifies proper unenrollment behavior when a user opts out of studies. While this isn't directly fixing a security vulnerability, it's testing a security-related control (proper opt-out handling). The test ensures that when `app.shield.optoutstudies.enabled` is false, active experiments are properly unenrolled.

This appears to be a preventive measure rather than fixing an existing vulnerability, but it's good practice as it verifies that the system properly respects user opt-out preferences.

Note: Since this is a test file, it's less likely to contain actual vulnerabilities but rather tests for security-related behaviors. The main security consideration here would be ensuring proper handling of user preferences regarding study participation.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.