--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/actions/tests/ast.spec.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/actions/tests/ast.spec.js@@ -8,12 +8,11 @@   selectors,   actions,   makeSource,-  makeOriginalSource,   waitForState, } from "../../utils/test-head"; import readFixture from "./helpers/readFixture";-const { getSymbols, isSymbolsLoading, getFramework } = selectors;+const { getSymbols, isSymbolsLoading } = selectors; const mockCommandClient = {   sourceContents: async ({ source }) => ({@@ -26,16 +25,6 @@     expressions.map(expression => ({ result: evaluationResult[expression] })),   getSourceActorBreakpointPositions: async () => ({}),   getSourceActorBreakableLines: async () => [],-};--const sourceMaps = {-  getOriginalSourceText: async id => ({-    id,-    text: sourceTexts[id],-    contentType: "text/javascript",-  }),-  getGeneratedRangesForOriginal: async () => [],-  getOriginalLocations: async items => items, }; const sourceTexts = {@@ -89,38 +78,5 @@         expect(baseSymbols).toEqual(null);       });     });--    describe("frameworks", () => {-      it("should detect react components", async () => {-        const store = createStore(mockCommandClient, {}, sourceMaps);-        const { cx, dispatch, getState } = store;--        const genSource = await dispatch(-          actions.newGeneratedSource(makeSource("reactComponent.js"))-        );--        const source = await dispatch(-          actions.newOriginalSource(makeOriginalSource(genSource))-        );--        await dispatch(actions.loadSourceText({ cx, source }));-        const loadedSource = selectors.getSourceFromId(getState(), source.id);-        await dispatch(actions.setSymbols({ cx, source: loadedSource }));--        expect(getFramework(getState(), source)).toBe("React");-      });--      it("should not give false positive on non react components", async () => {-        const store = createStore(mockCommandClient);-        const { cx, dispatch, getState } = store;-        const base = await dispatch(-          actions.newGeneratedSource(makeSource("base.js"))-        );-        await dispatch(actions.loadSourceText({ cx, source: base }));-        await dispatch(actions.setSymbols({ cx, source: base }));--        expect(getFramework(getState(), base)).toBe(undefined);-      });-    });   }); });

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines]
   The changes primarily involve test code cleanup and removal of unused functionality (React framework detection tests). No security-related changes were made.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Code simplification [File] [Lines]
   Old Code: Included framework detection tests and source map utilities
   Fixed Code: Removed framework detection tests and unused source map utilities

Additional details:
- The changes appear to be test code cleanup rather than security fixes
- The removed code was related to React framework detection in debugger tests
- No actual security vulnerabilities were addressed in this diff
- The changes suggest the framework detection feature was either moved elsewhere or no longer needed

The diff shows test code being simplified by removing unused functionality, but doesn't indicate any security fixes were made.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.parse.hex.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.parse.hex.html@@ -17,13 +17,13 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-offscreenCanvas.width = '0x100';-offscreenCanvas.height = '0x100';-_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.width, 256, "offscreenCanvas.width", "256");-_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.height, 256, "offscreenCanvas.height", "256");+canvas.width = '0x100';+canvas.height = '0x100';+_assertSame(canvas.width, 256, "canvas.width", "256");+_assertSame(canvas.height, 256, "canvas.height", "256"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily variable renaming and don't involve any security-sensitive modifications. Here's the analysis following the required format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.parse.hex.html] [Lines 17-24]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');

offscreenCanvas.width = '0x100';
offscreenCanvas.height = '0x100';
_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.width, 256, "offscreenCanvas.width", "256");
_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.height, 256, "offscreenCanvas.height", "256");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

canvas.width = '0x100';
canvas.height = '0x100';
_assertSame(canvas.width, 256, "canvas.width", "256");
_assertSame(canvas.height, 256, "canvas.height", "256");

The changes consist of:
1. Renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Updating the variable name in all subsequent references
3. Updating the assertion messages to match the new variable name

These changes don't address any security issues but rather appear to be code style/consistency improvements.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/webrtc/libwebrtcglue/VideoConduit.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/webrtc/libwebrtcglue/VideoConduit.h@@ -70,6 +70,9 @@  public:   // Returns true when both encoder and decoder are HW accelerated.   static bool HasH264Hardware();++  Maybe<int> ActiveSendPayloadType() const override;+  Maybe<int> ActiveRecvPayloadType() const override;   /**    * Function to attach Renderer end-point for the Media-Video conduit.

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability [File] dom/media/webrtc/libwebrtcglue/VideoConduit.h [Lines 70-73]
   [Old Code]
   // Returns true when both encoder and decoder are HW accelerated.
   static bool HasH264Hardware();
   
   [Fixed Code]
   // Returns true when both encoder and decoder are HW accelerated.
   static bool HasH264Hardware();
   
   Maybe<int> ActiveSendPayloadType() const override;
   Maybe<int> ActiveRecvPayloadType() const override;

Additional Details:
- The diff shows only the addition of two new pure virtual methods (`ActiveSendPayloadType` and `ActiveRecvPayloadType`) to the interface
- There are no security vulnerabilities visible in this change
- The changes appear to be functional additions rather than security fixes
- No old code was removed or modified, only new methods were added
- No specific vulnerability patterns (like buffer overflows, injection risks, etc.) are present in this change

Since this is just an interface extension with new methods, I don't see any security implications in this particular change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/performance/hooks_recording.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/performance/hooks_recording.py@@ -31,7 +31,11 @@     else:         site_list = site_list["desktop"]-    sites = [test_site for test_site in site_list if not test_site.get("login")]+    sites = [+        test_site+        for test_site in site_list+        if not test_site.get("login") or test_site.get("login-test")+    ]     def next_site():         for site in sites:@@ -79,6 +83,7 @@         add_option(env, "browsertime.screenshot", "true")         add_option(env, "browsertime.testName", test_site.get("name"))         add_option(env, "browsertime.testType", test_site.get("type", "pageload"))+        add_option(env, "browsertime.login", test_site.get("login", "false"))         prefs = test_site.get("preferences", {})         for pref, val in prefs.items():

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Exposure] [testing/performance/hooks_recording.py] [Lines 31-35]
[Old Code]
    sites = [test_site for test_site in site_list if not test_site.get("login")]
[Fixed Code]
    sites = [
        test_site
        for test_site in site_list
        if not test_site.get("login") or test_site.get("login-test")
    ]

Additional Details: The change modifies site filtering logic to include sites with "login-test" flag. While not clearly a security fix, it could potentially relate to test credential handling.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Missing Security Flag] [testing/performance/hooks_recording.py] [Lines 79-83]
[Old Code]
        add_option(env, "browsertime.screenshot", "true")
        add_option(env, "browsertime.testName", test_site.get("name"))
        add_option(env, "browsertime.testType", test_site.get("type", "pageload"))
[Fixed Code]
        add_option(env, "browsertime.screenshot", "true")
        add_option(env, "browsertime.testName", test_site.get("name"))
        add_option(env, "browsertime.testType", test_site.get("type", "pageload"))
        add_option(env, "browsertime.login", test_site.get("login", "false"))

Additional Details: The addition of the login flag might be related to security testing configuration, but it's not clear if this fixes a specific vulnerability.

Note: Neither change clearly addresses a known vulnerability, but both appear to relate to test site configuration and login handling, which could have security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/public/Value.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/public/Value.h@@ -738,6 +738,10 @@ #endif   }+  bool isNurseryAllocatableGCThing() const {+    return hasObjectPayload() || isString() || isBigInt();+  }+   bool isBoolean() const { return toTag() == JSVAL_TAG_BOOLEAN; }   bool isTrue() const {@@ -771,6 +775,11 @@     if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(isPrivateGCThing())) {       return JS::GCThingTraceKind(toGCThing());     }+#ifdef ENABLE_RECORD_TUPLE+    if (isExtendedPrimitive()) {+      return JS::TraceKind::Object;+    }+#endif     return JS::TraceKind(toTag() & 0x03);   }

Here's the analysis following the required format:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Memory Safety Issue] [js/public/Value.h] [Lines 738-740]
[Old Code]
[No equivalent function existed]
[Fixed Code]
  bool isNurseryAllocatableGCThing() const {
    return hasObjectPayload() || isString() || isBigInt();
  }

Additional Details:
- The added function appears to be a helper for garbage collection, but without more context about how it's used, it's unclear if this fixes a specific vulnerability or is just a general improvement.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Type Confusion] [js/public/Value.h] [Lines 771-775]
[Old Code]
    if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(isPrivateGCThing())) {
      return JS::GCThingTraceKind(toGCThing());
    }
[Fixed Code]
    if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(isPrivateGCThing())) {
      return JS::GCThingTraceKind(toGCThing());
    }
#ifdef ENABLE_RECORD_TUPLE
    if (isExtendedPrimitive()) {
      return JS::TraceKind::Object;
    }
#endif

Additional Details:
- The addition of extended primitive handling could potentially relate to fixing type confusion issues with Record and Tuple types, but without more context about the vulnerability being fixed, this is speculative.

Note: The diffs show additions rather than modifications, making it harder to identify specific vulnerabilities that were fixed. The changes appear to be adding new functionality (Record/Tuple support) and GC helpers rather than directly patching security issues. More context about the associated bug reports would be needed for definitive conclusions.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/layers/ImageContainer.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/layers/ImageContainer.cpp@@ -496,7 +496,8 @@   const MemoryOrShmem& memOrShmem = sdb.data();   switch (memOrShmem.type()) {     case MemoryOrShmem::Tuintptr_t:-      gfxCriticalError() << "PlanarYCbCrData::From SurfaceDescriptorBuffer w/uintptr_t unsupported.";+      gfxCriticalError() << "PlanarYCbCrData::From SurfaceDescriptorBuffer "+                            "w/uintptr_t unsupported.";       break;     case MemoryOrShmem::TShmem:       buffer.emplace(memOrShmem.get_Shmem().Range<uint8_t>());@@ -526,34 +527,39 @@   yuvData.mColorRange = yuvDesc.colorRange();   const auto GetPlanePtr = [&](const uint32_t beginOffset,-        const gfx::IntSize size, const int32_t stride) -> uint8_t* {+                               const gfx::IntSize size,+                               const int32_t stride) -> uint8_t* {     if (size.width > stride) return nullptr;-    auto bytesNeeded = CheckedInt<uintptr_t>(stride) * size.height; // Don't accept `stride*(h-1)+w`.+    auto bytesNeeded = CheckedInt<uintptr_t>(stride) *+                       size.height;  // Don't accept `stride*(h-1)+w`.     bytesNeeded += beginOffset;     if (!bytesNeeded.isValid() || bytesNeeded.value() > buffer->length()) {-      gfxCriticalError() << "PlanarYCbCrData::From asked for out-of-bounds plane data.";+      gfxCriticalError()+          << "PlanarYCbCrData::From asked for out-of-bounds plane data.";       return nullptr;     }     return (buffer->begin() + beginOffset).get();   };-  yuvData.mYChannel = GetPlanePtr(yuvDesc.yOffset(), yuvData.mYSize, yuvData.mYStride);-  yuvData.mCbChannel = GetPlanePtr(yuvDesc.cbOffset(), yuvData.mCbCrSize, yuvData.mCbCrStride);-  yuvData.mCrChannel = GetPlanePtr(yuvDesc.crOffset(), yuvData.mCbCrSize, yuvData.mCbCrStride);+  yuvData.mYChannel =+      GetPlanePtr(yuvDesc.yOffset(), yuvData.mYSize, yuvData.mYStride);+  yuvData.mCbChannel =+      GetPlanePtr(yuvDesc.cbOffset(), yuvData.mCbCrSize, yuvData.mCbCrStride);+  yuvData.mCrChannel =+      GetPlanePtr(yuvDesc.crOffset(), yuvData.mCbCrSize, yuvData.mCbCrStride);   if (yuvData.mYSkip || yuvData.mCbSkip || yuvData.mCrSkip ||       yuvData.mYSize.width < 0 || yuvData.mYSize.height < 0 ||       yuvData.mCbCrSize.width < 0 || yuvData.mCbCrSize.height < 0 ||-      yuvData.mYStride < 0 || yuvData.mCbCrStride < 0 ||-      !yuvData.mYChannel || !yuvData.mCbChannel || !yuvData.mCrChannel) {+      yuvData.mYStride < 0 || yuvData.mCbCrStride < 0 || !yuvData.mYChannel ||+      !yuvData.mCbChannel || !yuvData.mCrChannel) {     gfxCriticalError() << "Unusual PlanarYCbCrData: " << yuvData.mYSkip << ","                        << yuvData.mCbSkip << "," << yuvData.mCrSkip << ", "                        << yuvData.mYSize.width << "," << yuvData.mYSize.height                        << ", " << yuvData.mCbCrSize.width << ","                        << yuvData.mCbCrSize.height << ", " << yuvData.mYStride-                       << "," << yuvData.mCbCrStride-                       << ", " << yuvData.mYChannel-                       << "," << yuvData.mCbChannel-                       << "," << yuvData.mCrChannel;+                       << "," << yuvData.mCbCrStride << ", "+                       << yuvData.mYChannel << "," << yuvData.mCbChannel << ","+                       << yuvData.mCrChannel;     return {};   }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   Buffer Overflow Potential [File] gfx/layers/ImageContainer.cpp [Lines] 496-527  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   auto bytesNeeded = CheckedInt<uintptr_t>(stride) * size.height;
   bytesNeeded += beginOffset;
   if (!bytesNeeded.isValid() || bytesNeeded.value() > buffer->length()) {
   ```
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   auto bytesNeeded = CheckedInt<uintptr_t>(stride) * size.height;
   bytesNeeded += beginOffset;
   if (!bytesNeeded.isValid() || bytesNeeded.value() > buffer->length()) {
   ```
   Additional Details: The changes appear to be primarily formatting improvements, but the validation logic for buffer bounds checking remains similar. The original code already had bounds checking, so it's unclear if this was fixing a specific vulnerability or just improving code clarity.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   Input Validation Improvement [File] gfx/layers/ImageContainer.cpp [Lines] 526-547  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   if (yuvData.mYSkip || yuvData.mCbSkip || yuvData.mCrSkip ||
       yuvData.mYSize.width < 0 || yuvData.mYSize.height < 0 ||
       yuvData.mCbCrSize.width < 0 || yuvData.mCbCrSize.height < 0 ||
       yuvData.mYStride < 0 || yuvData.mCbCrStride < 0 ||
       !yuvData.mYChannel || !yuvData.mCbChannel || !yuvData.mCrChannel) {
   ```
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   if (yuvData.mYSkip || yuvData.mCbSkip || yuvData.mCrSkip ||
       yuvData.mYSize.width < 0 || yuvData.mYSize.height < 0 ||
       yuvData.mCbCrSize.width < 0 || yuvData.mCbCrSize.height < 0 ||
       yuvData.mYStride < 0 || yuvData.mCbCrStride < 0 || !yuvData.mYChannel ||
       !yuvData.mCbChannel || !yuvData.mCrChannel) {
   ```
   Additional Details: The changes here are primarily formatting/readability improvements. The input validation logic remains the same, just better formatted. It's unclear if this was fixing a specific security issue or just code maintenance.

Note: The diff shows mostly formatting changes (line breaks, indentation) and some minor code reorganization, but no clear security vulnerability fixes. The existing security checks (buffer bounds validation and parameter validation) were already present in the original code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.ensuresubpath.2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.ensuresubpath.2.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ ctx.arcTo(0, 25, 50, 250, 0.1); // adds (x1,y1), draws nothing ctx.lineTo(100, 25); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-sensitive operations. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18, 28]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or clarity, but this doesn't represent a security fix. The functionality remains exactly the same.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/canvas/DrawTargetWebgl.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/canvas/DrawTargetWebgl.h@@ -25,14 +25,15 @@ class DataSourceSurface; class DrawTargetSkia; class DrawTargetWebgl;+class PathSkia; class SourceSurfaceSkia; class TextureHandle; class SharedTexture; class SharedTextureHandle; class StandaloneTexture;-class GlyphCacheEntry; class GlyphCache;+class PathCache; // DrawTargetWebgl implements a subset of the DrawTarget API suitable for use // by CanvasRenderingContext2D. It maps these to a client WebGL context so that@@ -55,6 +56,8 @@   RefPtr<DataSourceSurface> mSnapshot;   // Whether or not the Skia target has valid contents and is being drawn to   bool mSkiaValid = false;+  // Whether or not Skia layering over the WebGL context is enabled+  bool mSkiaLayer = false;   // Whether or not the WebGL context has valid contents and is being drawn to   bool mWebglValid = false;@@ -82,6 +85,8 @@   UserDataKey mGlyphCacheKey = {0};   // List of all GlyphCaches currently allocated to fonts.   LinkedList<GlyphCache> mGlyphCaches;+  // Cache of rasterized paths.+  UniquePtr<PathCache> mPathCache;   // Collection of allocated shared texture pages that may be shared amongst   // many handles.   std::vector<RefPtr<SharedTexture>> mSharedTextures;@@ -220,19 +225,28 @@                 Maybe<DeviceColor> aMaskColor = Nothing(),                 RefPtr<TextureHandle>* aHandle = nullptr,                 bool aTransformed = true, bool aClipped = true,-                bool aAccelOnly = false, bool aForceUpdate = false);+                bool aAccelOnly = false, bool aForceUpdate = false,+                const StrokeOptions* aStrokeOptions = nullptr);+  void DrawPath(const Path* aPath, const Pattern& aPattern,+                const DrawOptions& aOptions,+                const StrokeOptions* aStrokeOptions = nullptr);   void MarkChanged();   void ReadIntoSkia();+  void FlattenSkia();   bool FlushFromSkia();   void MarkSkiaChanged() {     if (!mSkiaValid) {       ReadIntoSkia();+    } else if (mSkiaLayer) {+      FlattenSkia();     }     mWebglValid = false;   }++  void MarkSkiaChanged(const DrawOptions& aOptions);   bool ReadInto(uint8_t* aDstData, int32_t aDstStride);

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Memory Management Issue] [dom/canvas/DrawTargetWebgl.h] [Lines 85]
   [Old Code]
   // List of all GlyphCaches currently allocated to fonts.
   LinkedList<GlyphCache> mGlyphCaches;
   [Fixed Code]
   // List of all GlyphCaches currently allocated to fonts.
   LinkedList<GlyphCache> mGlyphCaches;
   // Cache of rasterized paths.
   UniquePtr<PathCache> mPathCache;

   Note: The addition of a new UniquePtr member suggests potential memory management changes, but no clear vulnerability is evident.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Drawing Operation Security] [dom/canvas/DrawTargetWebgl.h] [Lines 225-228]
   [Old Code]
   bool aAccelOnly = false, bool aForceUpdate = false);
   [Fixed Code]
   bool aAccelOnly = false, bool aForceUpdate = false,
   const StrokeOptions* aStrokeOptions = nullptr);
   void DrawPath(const Path* aPath, const Pattern& aPattern,
           const DrawOptions& aOptions,
           const StrokeOptions* aStrokeOptions = nullptr);

   Note: The addition of new drawing functions with pointer parameters could potentially introduce security issues if not properly validated, but no specific vulnerability is evident in the diff.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Skia Layer Handling] [dom/canvas/DrawTargetWebgl.h] [Lines 56]
   [Old Code]
   bool mSkiaValid = false;
   [Fixed Code]
   bool mSkiaValid = false;
   // Whether or not Skia layering over the WebGL context is enabled
   bool mSkiaLayer = false;

   Note: The addition of new state management for Skia layering could potentially affect security if not properly handled, but no specific vulnerability is evident.

The diff shows several additions and modifications, but none clearly indicate specific security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be functional enhancements (adding path support, Skia layering) rather than security fixes. Without more context about how these new features are implemented and used, it's difficult to identify specific vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.transformation.multiple.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.transformation.multiple.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ ctx.stroke(); ctx.translate(0, 50); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-related modifications.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.transformation.multiple.html] [Lines 17-18, 37]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or clarity, without any security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-27.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-27.xml@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ *:root { background-color: lime }]]></style>   <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body> <p>The background of the document should be green</p>

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be related to test file maintenance rather than security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-27.xml] [Lines 6]
[Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="" />]
[Fixed Code: [removed line]]

Additional notes:
1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag that wasn't serving any purpose
2. The modification appears to be test file cleanup rather than a security fix
3. No known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in either the old or new code
4. The file is a test case for CSS selectors and doesn't contain executable code that could be exploited

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit/CodeGenerator.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit/CodeGenerator.cpp@@ -8017,11 +8017,13 @@ #ifdef ENABLE_WASM_EXCEPTIONS   // If this call is in Wasm try code block, initialise a WasmTryNote for this   // call.-  bool inTry_ = mir->inTry();+  bool inTry = mir->inTry();   size_t tryNoteIndex = 0;--  if (inTry_) {-    tryNoteIndex = masm.wasmStartTry();+  if (inTry && !masm.wasmStartTry(&tryNoteIndex)) {+    // Handle an OOM in allocating a try note by forcing inTry to false, this+    // will skip the logic below that uses the try note. This is okay as+    // compilation will be aborted after this.+    inTry = false;   } #endif@@ -8096,7 +8098,7 @@   } #ifdef ENABLE_WASM_EXCEPTIONS-  if (inTry_) {+  if (inTry) {     // A call that threw will not return here normally, but will jump to this     // WasmCall's WasmTryNote entryPoint below. To make exceptional control flow     // easier to track, we set the entry point in this very call. The exception

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Memory Allocation Failure Handling [js/src/jit/CodeGenerator.cpp] [Lines 8017-8026]
[Old Code]
  bool inTry_ = mir->inTry();
  size_t tryNoteIndex = 0;

  if (inTry_) {
    tryNoteIndex = masm.wasmStartTry();
  }
[Fixed Code]
  bool inTry = mir->inTry();
  size_t tryNoteIndex = 0;
  if (inTry && !masm.wasmStartTry(&tryNoteIndex)) {
    // Handle an OOM in allocating a try note by forcing inTry to false, this
    // will skip the logic below that uses the try note. This is okay as
    // compilation will be aborted after this.
    inTry = false;
  }

Additional Details:
- The vulnerability was related to improper handling of memory allocation failures (OOM - Out Of Memory) in WebAssembly exception handling.
- The old code didn't check the return value of masm.wasmStartTry(), which could fail during memory allocation.
- The fix adds proper error handling by checking the return value and gracefully handling the OOM case.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Null Pointer Dereference [js/src/jit/CodeGenerator.cpp] [Lines 8096-8098]
[Old Code]
  if (inTry_) {
[Fixed Code]
  if (inTry) {

Additional Details:
- While this change appears to be part of the same fix, it's not clear if there was a separate null pointer vulnerability being addressed.
- The change from inTry_ to inTry seems to be part of the naming consistency update rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/decision.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/decision.py@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import yaml from redo import retry+from taskgraph.parameters import Parameters from taskgraph.util.yaml import load_yaml from voluptuous import Required, Optional, Any@@ -19,7 +20,7 @@ from .actions import render_actions_json from .create import create_tasks from .generator import TaskGraphGenerator-from .parameters import Parameters, get_version, get_app_version+from .parameters import get_version, get_app_version from .taskgraph import TaskGraph from .try_option_syntax import parse_message from .util.backstop import is_backstop, BACKSTOP_INDEX@@ -274,11 +275,13 @@             "head_repository",             "head_rev",             "head_ref",+            "head_tag",             "project",             "pushlog_id",             "pushdate",             "owner",             "level",+            "repository_type",             "target_tasks_method",             "tasks_for",         ]

Let me analyze the code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Information Exposure] [taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/decision.py] [Lines 274-284]
   [Old Code]
            "head_repository",
            "head_rev",
            "head_ref",
            "project",
            "pushlog_id",
            "pushdate",
            "owner",
            "level",
            "target_tasks_method",
            "tasks_for",
   [Fixed Code]
            "head_repository",
            "head_rev",
            "head_ref",
            "head_tag",
            "project",
            "pushlog_id",
            "pushdate",
            "owner",
            "level",
            "repository_type",
            "target_tasks_method",
            "tasks_for",

   Additional Details: The diff shows two new parameters being added ("head_tag" and "repository_type"). While not clearly a security fix, this could be related to better information handling or access control. The addition might help prevent information exposure by properly classifying repository types or tags.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Import Restructuring] [taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/decision.py] [Lines 12-20]
   [Old Code]
   import yaml
   from redo import retry
   from taskgraph.util.yaml import load_yaml
   from voluptuous import Required, Optional, Any

   from .actions import render_actions_json
   from .create import create_tasks
   from .generator import TaskGraphGenerator
   from .parameters import Parameters, get_version, get_app_version
   [Fixed Code]
   import yaml
   from redo import retry
   from taskgraph.parameters import Parameters
   from taskgraph.util.yaml import load_yaml
   from voluptuous import Required, Optional, Any

   from .actions import render_actions_json
   from .create import create_tasks
   from .generator import TaskGraphGenerator
   from .parameters import get_version, get_app_version

   Additional Details: The Parameters import was moved from a local import to a taskgraph.parameters import. This could potentially be related to security if it's part of fixing a module loading vulnerability or preventing import hijacking, but there's no clear evidence of this being a security fix.

Note: While these changes don't clearly indicate specific security vulnerabilities being fixed, they show potential improvements in information handling and code organization that might have security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/taskcluster/ci/fetch/visual-metrics.yml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/taskcluster/ci/fetch/visual-metrics.yml@@ -6,6 +6,6 @@     description: "Browsertime visual metrics analsyis script"     fetch:         type: static-url-        url: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/sitespeedio/browsertime/f27fdac113108f0da72c347b5585f0e49da0f54a/browsertime/visualmetrics.py-        sha256: bf179468dff2572e9ad8ec6c32c793521536c4e9bebeeadd8aab0954b1a4f28c-        size: 91634+        url: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/sitespeedio/browsertime/c547875d4b5e2982c2b3a7fc823bde2d6a59aed6/browsertime/visualmetrics.py+        sha256: 8063f3428e2824a2dbad5b474baf364e4816827a93337bf0c63d1ed606f1022b+        size: 93169

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   Dependency Update with Hash Verification [File] taskcluster/ci/fetch/visual-metrics.yml [Lines 6-8]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```
   url: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/sitespeedio/browsertime/f27fdac113108f0da72c347b5585f0e49da0f54a/browsertime/visualmetrics.py
   sha256: bf179468dff2572e9ad8ec6c32c793521536c4e9bebeeadd8aab0954b1a4f28c
   size: 91634
   ```
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```
   url: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/sitespeedio/browsertime/c547875d4b5e2982c2b3a7fc823bde2d6a59aed6/browsertime/visualmetrics.py
   sha256: 8063f3428e2824a2dbad5b474baf364e4816827a93337bf0c63d1ed606f1022b
   size: 93169
   ```

Additional Details:
- The diff shows an update to a dependency file (visualmetrics.py) from the browsertime repository
- The changes include a new commit hash, new SHA256 checksum, and increased file size
- While this could potentially address security vulnerabilities in the dependency, there's no explicit security-related information in the diff
- The update follows secure practices by including hash verification, which helps prevent tampering
- Without knowing the specific changes in the browsertime repository between these commits, we can't be certain if this was a security update or just a general improvement

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/FileAPI/blob/Blob-in-worker.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/FileAPI/blob/Blob-in-worker.worker.js@@ -1,14 +1,9 @@ importScripts("/resources/testharness.js");-async_test(function() {-  var data = "TEST";-  var blob = new Blob([data], {type: "text/plain"});-  var reader = new FileReader();-  reader.onload = this.step_func_done(function() {-    assert_equals(reader.result, data);-  });-  reader.onerror = this.unreached_func("Unexpected error event");-  reader.readAsText(blob);-}, "Create Blob in Worker");+promise_test(async () => {+  const data = "TEST";+  const blob = new Blob([data], {type: "text/plain"});+  assert_equals(await blob.text(), data);+}, 'Create Blob in Worker'); done();

Here's the analysis following the specified format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability] [testing/web-platform/tests/FileAPI/blob/Blob-in-worker.worker.js] [Lines 1-14]
[Old Code]
async_test(function() {
  var data = "TEST";
  var blob = new Blob([data], {type: "text/plain"});
  var reader = new FileReader();
  reader.onload = this.step_func_done(function() {
    assert_equals(reader.result, data);
  });
  reader.onerror = this.unreached_func("Unexpected error event");
  reader.readAsText(blob);
}, "Create Blob in Worker");
[Fixed Code]
promise_test(async () => {
  const data = "TEST";
  const blob = new Blob([data], {type: "text/plain"});
  assert_equals(await blob.text(), data);
}, 'Create Blob in Worker');

Additional Details:
The change appears to be a test modernization rather than a security fix. The update:
1. Changes from `async_test` to `promise_test` (modern test API)
2. Replaces FileReader with the more modern `blob.text()` method
3. Uses const instead of var
4. Uses arrow functions
5. Simplifies the test logic

No security vulnerabilities are apparent in either version of the code. The change is primarily about code style and using newer APIs.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/examples/jxlinfo.c+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/examples/jxlinfo.c@@ -106,6 +106,8 @@         printf("num_loops: %u\n", info.animation.num_loops);         printf("have_timecodes: %d\n", info.animation.have_timecodes);       }+      printf("intrinsic xsize: %u\n", info.intrinsic_xsize);+      printf("intrinsic ysize: %u\n", info.intrinsic_ysize);       const char* const orientation_string[8] = {           "Normal",          "Flipped horizontally",           "Upside down",     "Flipped vertically",@@ -153,8 +155,8 @@             free(name);             break;           }+          printf("  name: %s\n", name);           free(name);-          printf("  name: %s\n", name);         }         if (extra.type == JXL_CHANNEL_ALPHA)           printf("  alpha_premultiplied: %d (%s)\n", extra.alpha_premultiplied,@@ -268,8 +270,8 @@           free(name);           break;         }+        printf("  name: %s\n", name);         free(name);-        printf("  name: %s\n", name);       }       float ms = frame_header.duration * 1000.f *                  info.animation.tps_denominator / info.animation.tps_numerator;

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Use-After-Free Vulnerability] [third_party/jpeg-xl/examples/jxlinfo.c] [Lines 153-155, 268-270]
    [Old Code]
    free(name);
    printf("  name: %s\n", name);
    [Fixed Code]
    printf("  name: %s\n", name);
    free(name);

Additional Details:
    The diff shows two instances where the order of operations was changed - printing the name before freeing it instead of after. While this could potentially prevent use-after-free issues if the printf implementation were to access the freed memory, it's not clear if this was actually causing a security vulnerability or just fixing a potential issue. The change is good practice regardless, but without more context about whether this was actually exploitable, we can't be certain it was fixing a security vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/enc_external_image.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/enc_external_image.h@@ -31,6 +31,11 @@              : xsize * channels * DivCeil(bits_per_sample, kBitsPerByte); }+Status ConvertFromExternal(Span<const uint8_t> bytes, size_t xsize,+                           size_t ysize, size_t bits_per_sample,+                           JxlEndianness endianness, ThreadPool* pool,+                           ImageF* channel, bool float_in);+ // Convert an interleaved pixel buffer to the internal ImageBundle // representation. This is the opposite of ConvertToExternal(). Status ConvertFromExternal(Span<const uint8_t> bytes, size_t xsize,@@ -39,7 +44,9 @@                            size_t bits_per_sample, JxlEndianness endianness,                            bool flipped_y, ThreadPool* pool, ImageBundle* ib,                            bool float_in);-+Status BufferToImageF(const JxlPixelFormat& pixel_format, size_t xsize,+                      size_t ysize, const void* buffer, size_t size,+                      ThreadPool* pool, ImageF* channel); Status BufferToImageBundle(const JxlPixelFormat& pixel_format, uint32_t xsize,                            uint32_t ysize, const void* buffer, size_t size,                            jxl::ThreadPool* pool,

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Function Signature Change/Addition] [third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/enc_external_image.h] [Lines 31-44]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   // Only the BytesPerRow function was present
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   // Added new function declarations:
   Status ConvertFromExternal(Span<const uint8_t> bytes, size_t xsize,
                            size_t ysize, size_t bits_per_sample,
                            JxlEndianness endianness, ThreadPool* pool,
                            ImageF* channel, bool float_in);
   Status BufferToImageF(const JxlPixelFormat& pixel_format, size_t xsize,
                       size_t ysize, const void* buffer, size_t size,
                       ThreadPool* pool, ImageF* channel);
   ```  
   Additional Details: The diff shows new function declarations being added, but without seeing the implementation or context, it's unclear if this fixes a security vulnerability or just adds functionality.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Parameter Change] [third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/enc_external_image.h] [Lines 39-44]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   Status ConvertFromExternal(Span<const uint8_t> bytes, size_t xsize,
                            size_t ysize, size_t bits_per_sample,
                            JxlEndianness endianness, bool flipped_y,
                            ThreadPool* pool, ImageBundle* ib, bool float_in);
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   // Same function signature appears to be maintained
   ```  
   Additional Details: The function signature appears unchanged in the visible portion of the diff, but there might be changes in the implementation that aren't visible here.

Note: The diff primarily shows additions of new function declarations rather than modifications to existing code. Without seeing the implementation changes or more context about what security issues might have been addressed, it's difficult to identify specific vulnerabilities that were fixed. The changes could be related to memory safety, input validation, or other security aspects, but this cannot be determined from the given diff alone.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.basic.image.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.basic.image.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -32,10 +32,10 @@         var pattern = ctx.createPattern(bitmap, 'no-repeat');         ctx.fillStyle = pattern;         ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.basic.image.worker.js] [Lines 13-32]
   Old Code: Used variable name 'offscreenCanvas'
   Fixed Code: Changed variable name to 'canvas'

Additional Details:
- The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming a variable from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas' for consistency or clarity
- No security-related changes were made in this diff
- The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name
- All assertions and canvas operations remain unchanged in their logic
- No security vulnerabilities were fixed in this change

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.baseline.bottom.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.baseline.bottom.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var f = new FontFace("CanvasTest", "url('/fonts/CanvasTest.ttf')"); let fonts = (self.fonts ? self.fonts : document.fonts);@@ -27,12 +27,12 @@     ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';     ctx.textBaseline = 'bottom';     ctx.fillText('CC', 0, 50);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 5,5, 0,255,0,255, "5,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 95,5, 0,255,0,255, "95,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 5,45, 0,255,0,255, "5,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 95,45, 0,255,0,255, "95,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 5,5, 0,255,0,255, "5,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 95,5, 0,255,0,255, "95,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 5,45, 0,255,0,255, "5,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 95,45, 0,255,0,255, "95,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);   }).then(t_pass, t_fail); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and updating the references accordingly. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14, 27-32]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 5,5, 0,255,0,255, "5,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 5,5, 0,255,0,255, "5,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.negativesource.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.negativesource.html@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -36,16 +36,16 @@     createImageBitmap(response).then(bitmap => {         ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 100, 78, -100, 50, 0, 0, 50, 50);         ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 100, 128, -100, -50, 50, 0, 50, 50);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 48,1, 0,255,0,255, "48,1", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 48,48, 0,255,0,255, "48,48", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 51,1, 0,255,0,255, "51,1", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 51,48, 0,255,0,255, "51,48", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 48,1, 0,255,0,255, "48,1", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 48,48, 0,255,0,255, "48,48", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 51,1, 0,255,0,255, "51,1", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 51,48, 0,255,0,255, "51,48", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and updating the references accordingly. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.negativesource.html [Lines] 18-36
   Old Code: `var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');`
   Fixed Code: `var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');`

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.negativesource.html [Lines] 36-48
   Old Code: Multiple instances of `_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, ...)`
   Fixed Code: Multiple instances of `_assertPixelApprox(canvas, ...)`

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security vulnerabilities. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or clarity.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.interpolate.overlap2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.interpolate.overlap2.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var g = ctx.createLinearGradient(0, 0, 100, 0); var ps = [ 0, 1/10, 1/4, 1/3, 1/2, 3/4, 1 ];@@ -31,11 +31,11 @@ } ctx.fillStyle = g; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 30,25, 0,255,0,255, "30,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 40,25, 0,255,0,255, "40,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 60,25, 0,255,0,255, "60,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 80,25, 0,255,0,255, "80,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 30,25, 0,255,0,255, "30,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 40,25, 0,255,0,255, "40,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 60,25, 0,255,0,255, "60,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 80,25, 0,255,0,255, "80,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where a variable name was changed from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability purposes. Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found]
[Variable renaming only]
[Old variable name: offscreenCanvas]
[New variable name: canvas]

Additional Notes:
1. The changes are limited to variable renaming and don't affect any security-related functionality
2. All assertions and canvas operations remain functionally identical
3. No security-related patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in either version
4. This appears to be a test file modification with no security implications

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.