--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.attributes.shadowColor.invalid.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.attributes.shadowColor.invalid.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.shadowColor = '#00ff00'; ctx.shadowColor = 'bogus';

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.attributes.shadowColor.invalid.worker.js [Lines] 13-14
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional notes:
- The change appears to be a simple variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security-related changes are evident in this diff
- The modification seems to be for code consistency or readability rather than security fixes
- The test continues to check invalid shadowColor values ('bogus') which is the actual test case, but this part wasn't modified

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/vm/StaticStrings.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/vm/StaticStrings.h@@ -128,17 +128,9 @@          * priority to unit strings for "0" through "9" and length-2 strings for          * "10" through "99".          */-        static_assert(INT_STATIC_LIMIT <= 999,-                      "static int strings assumed below to be at most "-                      "three digits");-        if ('1' <= chars[0] && chars[0] <= '9' && '0' <= chars[1] &&-            chars[1] <= '9' && '0' <= chars[2] && chars[2] <= '9') {-          int i =-              (chars[0] - '0') * 100 + (chars[1] - '0') * 10 + (chars[2] - '0');--          if (unsigned(i) < INT_STATIC_LIMIT) {-            return getInt(i);-          }+        int i;+        if (fitsInLength3Static(chars[0], chars[1], chars[2], &i)) {+          return getInt(i);         }         return nullptr;     }@@ -171,6 +163,22 @@            toSmallCharTable[c] != INVALID_SMALL_CHAR;   }+  template <typename CharT>+  static bool fitsInLength3Static(CharT c1, CharT c2, CharT c3, int* i) {+    static_assert(INT_STATIC_LIMIT <= 299,+                  "static int strings assumed below to be at most "+                  "three digits where the first digit is either 1 or 2");+    if ('1' <= c1 && c1 < '3' && '0' <= c2 && c2 <= '9' && '0' <= c3 &&+        c3 <= '9') {+      *i = (c1 - '0') * 100 + (c2 - '0') * 10 + (c3 - '0');++      if (unsigned(*i) < INT_STATIC_LIMIT) {+        return true;+      }+    }+    return false;+  }+   static constexpr JS::Latin1Char fromSmallChar(SmallChar c);   static constexpr SmallChar toSmallChar(uint32_t c);@@ -184,6 +192,16 @@   }   static constexpr JS::Latin1Char secondCharOfLength2(size_t s) {     return fromSmallChar(s & SMALL_CHAR_MASK);+  }++  static constexpr JS::Latin1Char firstCharOfLength3(uint32_t i) {+    return '0' + (i / 100);+  }+  static constexpr JS::Latin1Char secondCharOfLength3(uint32_t i) {+    return '0' + ((i / 10) % 10);+  }+  static constexpr JS::Latin1Char thirdCharOfLength3(uint32_t i) {+    return '0' + (i % 10);   }   static MOZ_ALWAYS_INLINE size_t getLength2Index(char16_t c1, char16_t c2) {

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   Integer Overflow/Underflow Vulnerability [js/src/vm/StaticStrings.h] [Lines 128-136]
   Old Code:
   ```
   static_assert(INT_STATIC_LIMIT <= 999,
                 "static int strings assumed below to be at most "
                 "three digits");
   if ('1' <= chars[0] && chars[0] <= '9' && '0' <= chars[1] &&
       chars[1] <= '9' && '0' <= chars[2] && chars[2] <= '9') {
     int i =
         (chars[0] - '0') * 100 + (chars[1] - '0') * 10 + (chars[2] - '0');

     if (unsigned(i) < INT_STATIC_LIMIT) {
       return getInt(i);
     }
   }
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   int i;
   if (fitsInLength3Static(chars[0], chars[1], chars[2], &i)) {
     return getInt(i);
   }
   ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   Input Validation Vulnerability [js/src/vm/StaticStrings.h] [Lines 163-174]
   Old Code: (Not present in old version)
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   template <typename CharT>
   static bool fitsInLength3Static(CharT c1, CharT c2, CharT c3, int* i) {
     static_assert(INT_STATIC_LIMIT <= 299,
                   "static int strings assumed below to be at most "
                   "three digits where the first digit is either 1 or 2");
     if ('1' <= c1 && c1 < '3' && '0' <= c2 && c2 <= '9' && '0' <= c3 &&
         c3 <= '9') {
       *i = (c1 - '0') * 100 + (c2 - '0') * 10 + (c3 - '0');

       if (unsigned(*i) < INT_STATIC_LIMIT) {
         return true;
       }
     }
     return false;
   }
   ```

The changes appear to be:
1. Moving the numeric string validation logic into a separate function
2. Tightening the validation by restricting the first digit to be either '1' or '2'
3. Reducing the maximum allowed value from 999 to 299

While these changes improve input validation and potentially prevent some edge cases, it's not clear if they were fixing a specific known vulnerability or just improving code robustness. The changes could potentially prevent integer overflow issues or invalid memory accesses, but without more context about the actual security impact, we can't be certain.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.interpolate.colour.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.interpolate.colour.worker.js@@ -13,17 +13,17 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var g = ctx.createLinearGradient(0, 0, 100, 0); g.addColorStop(0, '#ff0'); g.addColorStop(1, '#00f'); ctx.fillStyle = g; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 191,191,63,255, "25,25", "191,191,63,255", 3);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 127,127,127,255, "50,25", "127,127,127,255", 3);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 63,63,191,255, "75,25", "63,63,191,255", 3);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 25,25, 191,191,63,255, "25,25", "191,191,63,255", 3);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 127,127,127,255, "50,25", "127,127,127,255", 3);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 75,25, 63,63,191,255, "75,25", "63,63,191,255", 3); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related changes. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't affect security. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Variable Renaming [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.interpolate.colour.worker.js] [Lines 13-25]
    Old Code:
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 191,191,63,255, "25,25", "191,191,63,255", 3);
    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 127,127,127,255, "50,25", "127,127,127,255", 3);
    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 63,63,191,255, "75,25", "63,63,191,255", 3);

    Fixed Code:
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 25,25, 191,191,63,255, "25,25", "191,191,63,255", 3);
    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 127,127,127,255, "50,25", "127,127,127,255", 3);
    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 75,25, 63,63,191,255, "75,25", "63,63,191,255", 3);

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and update all references to it. This doesn't appear to be a security fix but rather a code style or consistency improvement. No security vulnerabilities are addressed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/filter-effects/filter-cb-abspos-inline-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/filter-effects/filter-cb-abspos-inline-001.html@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ <link rel="match" href="filter-cb-abspos-inline-001-ref.html"> <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.fxtf.org/filter-effects-1/#FilterProperty"> <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.fxtf.org/filter-effects-1/#supported-filter-functions">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="A value other than none for the filter property results in the creation of a containing block for absolute and fixed positioned descendants unless the element it applies to is a document root element in the current browsing context."> <meta name="assert" content="A value of 100% leaves the input unchanged."> <style>

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/filter-effects/filter-cb-abspos-inline-001.html [Lines 6]
[Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code] (line removed)

Additional Details:
1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which appears to be test-related metadata.
2. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed here.
3. The modification doesn't involve any security-sensitive operations or potentially dangerous content.
4. This appears to be a minor cleanup of test file metadata rather than a security fix.

No other vulnerabilities are apparent in this small diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/themes/windows/browser.css+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/themes/windows/browser.css@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ %include ../shared/browser.inc.css %include ../shared/browser-custom-colors.inc.css %filter substitution-%define glassShadowColor hsla(240,5%,5%,0.3) :root {   --toolbar-non-lwt-bgcolor: -moz-dialog;@@ -333,6 +332,15 @@ } @media (-moz-windows-default-theme: 0) {+  /* Windows HCM conventions use these colors for chiclets. We can't use them on+     other platforms because -moz-accent-color can be shown atop SelectedItem,+     which has zero contrast. */+  :root {+    --urlbar-box-hover-bgcolor: SelectedItem;+    --urlbar-box-active-bgcolor: SelectedItem;+    --urlbar-box-hover-text-color: SelectedItemText;+  }+   #urlbar:not(:-moz-lwtheme, [focused="true"]) > #urlbar-background,   #searchbar:not(:-moz-lwtheme, :focus-within) {     border-color: ThreeDShadow;@@ -439,7 +447,7 @@   } }-@media (prefers-color-scheme: dark) {+@media (-moz-content-prefers-color-scheme: dark) {   #statuspanel-label {     background-color: hsl(240, 1%, 20%);     border-color: hsl(240, 1%, 40%);

Based on the provided CSS diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be cosmetic/style-related rather than security-related. Here's my analysis:

1. First change (removal of glassShadowColor definition):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    This is a style variable removal that doesn't impact security.

2. Second change (adding Windows HCM conventions):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    This adds new CSS variables for high contrast mode styling, which is an accessibility improvement, not a security fix.

3. Third change (media query change):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    Changed from `prefers-color-scheme: dark` to `-moz-content-prefers-color-scheme: dark` - this is a browser-specific prefix change for dark mode support.

None of these changes appear to address security vulnerabilities. They are all related to styling, theming, and accessibility improvements.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/debugger/DebuggerMemory.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/debugger/DebuggerMemory.cpp@@ -413,14 +413,14 @@   }   {-    Maybe<JS::AutoCheckCannotGC> maybeNoGC;-    JS::ubi::RootList rootList(cx, maybeNoGC);-    if (!rootList.init(dbgObj)) {+    JS::ubi::RootList rootList(cx);+    auto [ok, nogc] = rootList.init(dbgObj);+    if (!ok) {       ReportOutOfMemory(cx);       return false;     }-    JS::ubi::CensusTraversal traversal(cx, handler, maybeNoGC.ref());+    JS::ubi::CensusTraversal traversal(cx, handler, nogc);     traversal.wantNames = false;     if (!traversal.addStart(JS::ubi::Node(&rootList)) ||

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Memory Safety Issue [File] js/src/debugger/DebuggerMemory.cpp [Lines 413-423]
[Old Code]
    Maybe<JS::AutoCheckCannotGC> maybeNoGC;
    JS::ubi::RootList rootList(cx, maybeNoGC);
    if (!rootList.init(dbgObj)) {
[Fixed Code]
    JS::ubi::RootList rootList(cx);
    auto [ok, nogc] = rootList.init(dbgObj);
    if (!ok) {

Analysis:
1. The change modifies how garbage collection (GC) safety is handled during memory debugging operations.
2. The old code created a Maybe<JS::AutoCheckCannotGC> object before initializing the rootList, which could potentially lead to GC-related safety issues if the initialization failed.
3. The new code moves the GC safety handling inside the initialization process, returning it as part of a tuple.
4. While this appears to be a memory safety improvement, I cannot definitively identify a specific named vulnerability being fixed.

The changes suggest improved handling of garbage collection safety during memory debugging operations, but without more context about potential exploit scenarios, I can't confirm if this was fixing a known vulnerability or just improving code robustness.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.canvas.source-atop.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.canvas.source-atop.worker.js@@ -13,11 +13,11 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(offscreenCanvas.width, offscreenCanvas.height);+var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(canvas.width, canvas.height); var ctx2 = offscreenCanvas2.getContext('2d'); var promise = new Promise(function(resolve, reject) {     var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@         ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);         ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'source-atop';         ctx.drawImage(offscreenCanvas2, 0, 0);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 191,255,64,128, "50,25", "191,255,64,128", 5);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 191,255,64,128, "50,25", "191,255,64,128", 5);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and code style improvements. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 13-14, 17, 35]
    Old Code:
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(offscreenCanvas.width, offscreenCanvas.height);
    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 191,255,64,128, "50,25", "191,255,64,128", 5);
    
    Fixed Code:
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(canvas.width, canvas.height);
    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 191,255,64,128, "50,25", "191,255,64,128", 5);

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or clarity, without any security implications. The functionality remains exactly the same. No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/base/test/copypaste.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/base/test/copypaste.js@@ -332,15 +332,15 @@     var ul = $("ul1");     var parent = ul.parentNode;     r.setStart(parent, 0);-    r.setEnd(parent.firstChild, 15); // the end of "Copy..."-    sel.addRange(r);+    r.setEnd(parent.firstChild, 15);+    sel.addRange(r); // <div>{Copy1then Paste]<ul id="ul1"><li>LI</li>\n</ul></div>     r = document.createRange();-    r.setStart(ul, 1); // before the space inside the UL-    r.setEnd(parent, 2); // after the UL-    sel.addRange(r);+    r.setStart(ul, 1);+    r.setEnd(parent, 2);+    sel.addRange(r); // <div>Copy1then Paste<ul id="ul1"><li>LI{</li>\n</ul>}</div>     await copySelectionToClipboard(true);-    testPasteHTML("contentEditable1", "Copy1then Paste");+    testPasteHTML("contentEditable1", "Copy1then Paste"); // The <ul> should not appear because it has no <li>s     // with text end node     var sel = window.getSelection();@@ -349,15 +349,15 @@     var ul = $("ul2");     var parent = ul.parentNode;     r.setStart(parent, 0);-    r.setEnd(ul, 1); // after the space-    sel.addRange(r);+    r.setEnd(ul, 1);+    sel.addRange(r); // <div>{<ul id="ul2">\n}<li>LI</li></ul>Copy2then Paste</div>     r = document.createRange();-    r.setStart(parent.childNodes[1], 0); // the start of "Copy..."+    r.setStart(parent.childNodes[1], 0);     r.setEnd(parent, 2);-    sel.addRange(r);+    sel.addRange(r); // <div><ul id="ul2">\n<li>LI</li></ul>[Copy2then Paste}</div>     await copySelectionToClipboard(true);-    testPasteHTML("contentEditable2", "Copy2then Paste");+    testPasteHTML("contentEditable2", "Copy2then Paste"); // The <ul> should not appear because it has no <li>s     // with text end node and non-empty start     var sel = window.getSelection();@@ -366,17 +366,17 @@     var ul = $("ul3");     var parent = ul.parentNode;     r.setStart(parent, 0);-    r.setEnd(ul, 1); // after the space-    sel.addRange(r);+    r.setEnd(ul, 1);+    sel.addRange(r); // <div>{<ul id="ul3"><li>\n</li>}<li>LI</li></ul>Copy3then Paste</div>     r = document.createRange();-    r.setStart(parent.childNodes[1], 0); // the start of "Copy..."+    r.setStart(parent.childNodes[1], 0);     r.setEnd(parent, 2);-    sel.addRange(r);+    sel.addRange(r); // <div><ul id="ul3"><li>\n</li><li>LI</li></ul>[Copy3then Paste}</div>     await copySelectionToClipboard(true);     testPasteHTML(       "contentEditable3",-      '<ul id="ul3"><li>\n<br></li></ul>Copy3then Paste'+      '<ul id="ul3"><li>\n<br></li></ul>Copy3then Paste' // The <ul> should appear because it has a <li>     );     // with elements of different depth@@ -432,17 +432,17 @@     var r = document.createRange();     r.setStart(t1, 1);     r.setEnd(e2, 0);-    sel.addRange(r);+    sel.addRange(r); // <div>\n<span id="1127835crash1">1[</span><div id="1127835crash2">}<div>\n</div></div><a href="..." id="1127835crash3">3</a>\n</div>     r = document.createRange();     r.setStart(e2, 1);     r.setEnd(t3, 0);-    sel.addRange(r);+    sel.addRange(r); // <div>\n<span id="1127835crash1">1</span><div id="1127835crash2"><div>\n</div>{</div><a href="..." id="1127835crash3">]3</a>\n</div>     await copySelectionToClipboard(true);     testPasteHTML(       "contentEditable6",-      '<span id="1127835crash1"></span><div id="1127835crash2"><div>\n</div></div><br>'-    );+      '<span id="1127835crash1"></span><div id="1127835crash2"><div>\n</div></div><a href="http://www.mozilla.org/" id="1127835crash3"><br></a>'+    ); // Don't strip the empty `<a href="...">` element because of avoiding any dataloss provided by the element   }   // ============ copy/paste test from/to a textarea

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily focused on test case adjustments and comments rather than security fixes. Here's my analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerabilities found in the diff. The changes are mainly:
- Added more descriptive comments about test cases
- Modified test expectations (like handling of empty UL elements)
- Adjusted test case formatting

The changes seem to be related to test case improvements and documentation rather than security fixes. The main modifications are:
1. Adding more detailed comments about the expected DOM state during selection
2. Adjusting test expectations for how empty list elements should be handled
3. Ensuring test cases properly account for all elements (including empty ones) to avoid data loss

No specific vulnerability names can be associated with these changes as they appear to be test improvements rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.transparent.source-atop.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.transparent.source-atop.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 0, 0.5)';@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'source-atop'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 0, 255, 0.75)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,64,191,128, "50,25", "0,64,191,128", 5);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,64,191,128, "50,25", "0,64,191,128", 5); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't involve any security-related modifications.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found
File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.transparent.source-atop.html
Lines: 17-26
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,64,191,128, "50,25", "0,64,191,128", 5);
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,64,191,128, "50,25", "0,64,191,128", 5);

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/inspector/markup/test/helper_events_test_runner.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/inspector/markup/test/helper_events_test_runner.js@@ -169,6 +169,19 @@       ok     );+    const checkbox = header.querySelector("input[type=checkbox]");+    ok(checkbox, "The event toggling checkbox is displayed");+    const disabled = checkbox.hasAttribute("disabled");+    // We can't disable React/jQuery events at the moment, so ensure that for those,+    // the checkbox is disabled.+    const shouldBeDisabled =+      expected[i].attributes?.includes("React") ||+      expected[i].attributes?.includes("jQuery");+    ok(+      disabled === shouldBeDisabled,+      `The checkbox is ${shouldBeDisabled ? "disabled" : "enabled"}\n`+    );+     info(`${label} END`);   }

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be related to test functionality and UI behavior rather than security fixes. Here's my analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [devtools/client/inspector/markup/test/helper_events_test_runner.js] [Lines 169-182]
    [Old Code] - No code existed here previously
    [Fixed Code] - Added test verification for checkbox disabled state

The changes are:
1. Adding a check for the presence of a checkbox element
2. Verifying whether the checkbox should be disabled based on whether the event is from React/jQuery
3. Adding an assertion to validate the disabled state matches expectations

This appears to be purely test-related functionality with no security implications. The changes are focused on ensuring proper UI behavior in test cases rather than fixing any security vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/transform-origin-008.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/transform-origin-008.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Jieqiong Cui" href="mailto:[email protected]"> <link rel="help" title="8. The 'transform-origin' Property" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css-transforms-1/#transform-origin-property"> <link rel="match" href="transform-origin-007-ref.html">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="The 'transform-origin' property set 'center' computes to 50%(left 50%) for the horizontal position."> <style>   .div1 {

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 5-6]
   Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">
   Fixed Code: (line removed)

Additional Details:
- The diff shows only the removal of a meta tag with empty "flags" attribute
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No actual security vulnerability is being addressed here
- The change is likely related to test configuration rather than security

Note: The diff provided is very limited in scope and doesn't show any security-relevant changes. The removal of an empty meta tag doesn't indicate any security vulnerability being fixed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-layout-cell-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-layout-cell-001.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="match" href="reference/contain-layout-cell-001-ref.html">   <meta content="In this test, the div#contain should act as the containing block for div#abs-pos ." name="assert">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <style>   div#table

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-layout-cell-001.html] [Lines 9]
[Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">]
[Fixed Code: (line removed)]

Additional Details:
The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which appears to be test-related metadata. This doesn't appear to be a security fix but rather a cleanup of test configuration. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being addressed here. The modification is purely removing unused or unnecessary test metadata.

No security-related changes were made in this diff. The modification is related to test configuration rather than any security vulnerability fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-fonts/first-available-font-007.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-fonts/first-available-font-007.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-fonts-3/#first-available-font"> <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-fonts-4/#first-available-font"> <link rel="match" href="first-available-font-005-ref.html">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="The height of the content area of an inline-level depends only on the first available font, which is the first one to include U+0020."> <style> /* Two Arbitrary fonts with different metrics. One has a taller ascender, the other a deeper descender. */

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-fonts/first-available-font-007.html [Lines] 5
   Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">
   Fixed Code: (line removed)

Additional Details:
- The diff shows only the removal of an empty meta tag with name="flags", which doesn't appear to be security-related
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with this change
- The change doesn't affect any security-sensitive functionality

Note: The diff provided is very limited in scope and doesn't show any security-relevant changes. The removal of an empty meta tag doesn't indicate any security vulnerability being fixed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.canvas.lighter.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.canvas.lighter.worker.js@@ -13,11 +13,11 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(offscreenCanvas.width, offscreenCanvas.height);+var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(canvas.width, canvas.height); var ctx2 = offscreenCanvas2.getContext('2d'); var promise = new Promise(function(resolve, reject) {     var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@         ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);         ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'lighter';         ctx.drawImage(offscreenCanvas2, 0, 0);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 191,255,128,255, "50,25", "191,255,128,255", 5);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 191,255,128,255, "50,25", "191,255,128,255", 5);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   No specific vulnerability found  
   File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.canvas.lighter.worker.js  
   Lines: 13-14, 35  
   Old Code:  
   ```javascript
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ```
   Fixed Code:  
   ```javascript
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   No specific vulnerability found  
   File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.canvas.lighter.worker.js  
   Lines: 17  
   Old Code:  
   ```javascript
   var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(offscreenCanvas.width, offscreenCanvas.height);
   ```
   Fixed Code:  
   ```javascript
   var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(canvas.width, canvas.height);
   ```

The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't indicate any security fixes. The modifications are likely for code consistency or readability rather than addressing security vulnerabilities. No known vulnerability patterns are present in either the old or new code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/extensions/test/xpcshell/test_ext_pkcs11_management.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/extensions/test/xpcshell/test_ext_pkcs11_management.js@@ -3,28 +3,39 @@ XPCOMUtils.defineLazyModuleGetters(this, {   ctypes: "resource://gre/modules/ctypes.jsm",   MockRegistry: "resource://testing-common/MockRegistry.jsm",-  OS: "resource://gre/modules/osfile.jsm", }); do_get_profile();-let tmpDir = FileUtils.getDir("TmpD", ["PKCS11"]);++let tmpDir;+let baseDir; let slug =   AppConstants.platform === "linux" ? "pkcs11-modules" : "PKCS11Modules";-tmpDir.createUnique(Ci.nsIFile.DIRECTORY_TYPE, FileUtils.PERMS_DIRECTORY);-let baseDir = OS.Path.join(tmpDir.path, slug);-OS.File.makeDir(baseDir);--registerCleanupFunction(() => {-  tmpDir.remove(true);++add_task(async function setupTest() {+  tmpDir = await IOUtils.createUniqueDirectory(+    Services.dirsvc.get("TmpD", Ci.nsIFile).path,+    "PKCS11"+  );++  baseDir = PathUtils.join(tmpDir, slug);+  await IOUtils.makeDirectory(baseDir); });-function getPath(filename) {-  return OS.Path.join(baseDir, filename);-}--const testmodule =-  "../../../../../security/manager/ssl/tests/unit/pkcs11testmodule/" +-  ctypes.libraryName("pkcs11testmodule");+registerCleanupFunction(async () => {+  await IOUtils.remove(tmpDir, { recursive: true });+});++const testmodule = PathUtils.join(+  PathUtils.parent(Services.dirsvc.get("CurWorkD", Ci.nsIFile).path, 5),+  "security",+  "manager",+  "ssl",+  "tests",+  "unit",+  "pkcs11testmodule",+  ctypes.libraryName("pkcs11testmodule")+); // This function was inspired by the native messaging test under // toolkit/components/extensions@@ -39,8 +50,8 @@       allowed_extensions: [module.id],     };-    let manifestPath = getPath(`${module.name}.json`);-    await OS.File.writeAtomic(manifestPath, JSON.stringify(manifest));+    let manifestPath = PathUtils.join(baseDir, `${module.name}.json`);+    await IOUtils.writeJSON(manifestPath, manifest);     return manifestPath;   }@@ -50,10 +61,11 @@     case "linux":       let dirProvider = {         getFile(property) {-          if (property == "XREUserNativeManifests") {-            return tmpDir.clone();-          } else if (property == "XRESysNativeManifests") {-            return tmpDir.clone();+          if (+            property == "XREUserNativeManifests" ||+            property == "XRESysNativeManifests"+          ) {+            return new FileUtils.File(tmpDir);           }           return null;         },@@ -78,10 +90,6 @@       });       for (let module of modules) {-        if (!OS.Path.winIsAbsolute(module.path)) {-          let cwd = await OS.File.getCurrentDirectory();-          module.path = OS.Path.join(cwd, module.path);-        }         let manifestPath = await writeManifest(module);         registry.setValue(           Ci.nsIWindowsRegKey.ROOT_KEY_CURRENT_USER,@@ -103,6 +111,17 @@ add_task(async function test_pkcs11() {   async function background() {     try {+      const { os } = await browser.runtime.getPlatformInfo();+      if (os !== "win") {+        // Expect this call to not throw (explicitly cover regression fixed in Bug 1759162).+        let isInstalledNonAbsolute = await browser.pkcs11.isModuleInstalled(+          "testmoduleNonAbsolutePath"+        );+        browser.test.assertFalse(+          isInstalledNonAbsolute,+          "PKCS#11 module with non absolute path expected to not be installed"+        );+      }       let isInstalled = await browser.pkcs11.isModuleInstalled("testmodule");       browser.test.assertFalse(         isInstalled,@@ -240,6 +259,12 @@       id: "[email protected]",     },     {+      name: "testmoduleNonAbsolutePath",+      description: "PKCS#11 Test Module",+      path: ctypes.libraryName("pkcs11testmodule"),+      id: "[email protected]",+    },+    {       name: "othermodule",       description: "PKCS#11 Test Module",       path: testmodule,@@ -248,13 +273,16 @@     {       name: "internalmodule",       description: "Builtin Roots Module",-      path: ctypes.libraryName("nssckbi"),+      path: PathUtils.join(+        Services.dirsvc.get("CurWorkD", Ci.nsIFile).path,+        ctypes.libraryName("nssckbi")+      ),       id: "[email protected]",     },     {       name: "osclientcerts",       description: "OS Client Cert Module",-      path: OS.Path.join(libDir.path, ctypes.libraryName("osclientcerts")),+      path: PathUtils.join(libDir.path, ctypes.libraryName("osclientcerts")),       id: "[email protected]",     },   ]);

I'll analyze the code diff and provide the security findings following the specified format.

Vulnerability Existed: yes
Path Traversal Vulnerability [browser/components/extensions/test/xpcshell/test_ext_pkcs11_management.js] [Lines 78-82]
[Old Code]
if (!OS.Path.winIsAbsolute(module.path)) {
  let cwd = await OS.File.getCurrentDirectory();
  module.path = OS.Path.join(cwd, module.path);
}
[Fixed Code]
(Removed - no longer joining paths with current directory)

Additional Details:
- The old code could potentially allow path traversal attacks by joining untrusted paths with the current working directory
- The fix removes this potentially dangerous path joining operation
- This appears to be related to Bug 1759162 mentioned in the test case

Vulnerability Existed: yes
Insecure Temporary Directory Handling [browser/components/extensions/test/xpcshell/test_ext_pkcs11_management.js] [Lines 3-14]
[Old Code]
let tmpDir = FileUtils.getDir("TmpD", ["PKCS11"]);
tmpDir.createUnique(Ci.nsIFile.DIRECTORY_TYPE, FileUtils.PERMS_DIRECTORY);
[Fixed Code]
tmpDir = await IOUtils.createUniqueDirectory(
  Services.dirsvc.get("TmpD", Ci.nsIFile).path,
  "PKCS11"
);
[Additional Details]
- The new code uses more secure methods for temporary directory creation
- Uses async IOUtils API which is generally more robust
- Better handles directory creation and cleanup

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential File Path Handling Improvement [browser/components/extensions/test/xpcshell/test_ext_pkcs11_management.js] [Lines 20-28]
[Old Code]
function getPath(filename) {
  return OS.Path.join(baseDir, filename);
}
[Fixed Code]
let manifestPath = PathUtils.join(baseDir, `${module.name}.json`);
[Additional Details]
- The change from OS.Path to PathUtils might have security implications
- PathUtils is generally considered more secure for path manipulation
- However, without more context, it's unclear if this was fixing a specific vulnerability

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-color/t424-hsl-values-b-9.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-color/t424-hsl-values-b-9.html@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Intel" href="http://www.intel.com"> <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-color/#hsl-color" /> <link rel="match" href="t424-hsl-values-b-9-ref.html" />-<meta name="flags" content="" /> <meta name="assert" content="Implementation of algorithm for converting hsl() colors to rgb() colors." /> <style>   table { border-spacing: 0; padding: 0; border: none; }

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-color/t424-hsl-values-b-9.html [Lines 6]
[Old Code]
<meta name="flags" content="" />
[Fixed Code]
(removed line)

Additional Details:
1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which doesn't appear to have any security implications.
2. There's no evidence of any security vulnerability being fixed here - this appears to be a simple cleanup of test metadata.
3. The "flags" meta tag was commonly used in web platform tests for test configuration, but its removal doesn't indicate any security fix.

No other vulnerabilities are apparent in this diff. The change is purely related to test metadata cleanup rather than any security-related fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/platforms/wmf/WMFDecoderModule.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/platforms/wmf/WMFDecoderModule.cpp@@ -177,8 +177,6 @@ already_AddRefed<MediaDataDecoder> WMFDecoderModule::CreateVideoDecoder(     const CreateDecoderParams& aParams) {-  ReportUsageForTelemetry();-   // In GPU process, only support decoding if an accelerated compositor is   // known.   if (XRE_IsGPUProcess() &&@@ -215,8 +213,6 @@ already_AddRefed<MediaDataDecoder> WMFDecoderModule::CreateAudioDecoder(     const CreateDecoderParams& aParams) {-  ReportUsageForTelemetry();-   if (XRE_IsGPUProcess()) {     // Only allow video in the GPU process.     return nullptr;@@ -291,8 +287,6 @@ bool WMFDecoderModule::Supports(const SupportDecoderParams& aParams,                                 DecoderDoctorDiagnostics* aDiagnostics) const {-  ReportUsageForTelemetry();-   // In GPU process, only support decoding if video. This only gives a hint of   // what the GPU decoder *may* support. The actual check will occur in   // CreateVideoDecoder.@@ -336,12 +330,6 @@   return false; }-void WMFDecoderModule::ReportUsageForTelemetry() const {-  if (XRE_IsParentProcess() || XRE_IsContentProcess()) {-    Telemetry::ScalarSet(Telemetry::ScalarID::MEDIA_WMF_PROCESS_USAGE, true);-  }-}- }  // namespace mozilla #undef WFM_DECODER_MODULE_STATUS_MARKER

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Telemetry Data Collection Removal] [dom/media/platforms/wmf/WMFDecoderModule.cpp] [Lines 177, 213, 287, and entire function removal]
[Old Code]
ReportUsageForTelemetry();
...
void WMFDecoderModule::ReportUsageForTelemetry() const {
  if (XRE_IsParentProcess() || XRE_IsContentProcess()) {
    Telemetry::ScalarSet(Telemetry::ScalarID::MEDIA_WMF_PROCESS_USAGE, true);
  }
}
[Fixed Code]
(All telemetry reporting code removed)

Note: While this isn't a direct security vulnerability, the removal of telemetry reporting could be related to privacy/security concerns. The change removes the collection of usage data about WMF decoder module usage in parent and content processes. This might have been done to address privacy concerns or reduce data collection, but without additional context, we can't be certain about the exact motivation.

No other clear security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The changes appear to be focused on removing telemetry reporting functionality rather than fixing security issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/preferences/dialogs/languages.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/preferences/dialogs/languages.js@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@  * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this  * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */-/* import-globals-from ../../../../toolkit/content/preferencesBindings.js */+/* import-globals-from /toolkit/content/preferencesBindings.js */ var { Services } = ChromeUtils.import("resource://gre/modules/Services.jsm");

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
[Potential Path Traversal or Incorrect Resource Loading] [browser/components/preferences/dialogs/languages.js] [Lines 3]  
[Old Code]  
`/* import-globals-from ../../../../toolkit/content/preferencesBindings.js */`  
[Fixed Code]  
`/* import-globals-from /toolkit/content/preferencesBindings.js */`  

Additional Details:  
The change involves modifying the path to an imported file from a relative path (`../../../../toolkit/content/`) to an absolute path (`/toolkit/content/`). While this doesn't appear to be fixing a known vulnerability, it could potentially address:  
1. A path traversal risk if the relative path could be manipulated  
2. A reliability issue in resource loading  
3. A maintainability improvement by using clearer paths  

Without more context about how this path is used, I can't definitively say if this was fixing a security vulnerability, but it's a security-relevant change as it affects resource loading.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.measure.advances.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.measure.advances.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var f = new FontFace("CanvasTest", "url('/fonts/CanvasTest.ttf')"); let fonts = (self.fonts ? self.fonts : document.fonts);

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.measure.advances.worker.js [Lines] 13-16
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');

   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Notes:
- The changes appear to be purely variable naming changes (offscreenCanvas → canvas)
- No security-related changes were identified in this diff
- The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive operations or introduce/remove any security controls
- The font loading operation remains unchanged in its security implications

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-42a.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-42a.xml@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ ]]></style>   <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body> <p>You should see after this paragraph the words GENERATED CONTENT over green background</p>

Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 6]
[Old Code]
<meta name="flags" content="" />
[Fixed Code]
(removed line)

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which doesn't appear to have any security implications
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerability is associated with this change
- The modification doesn't involve any security-sensitive operations or data handling

The change seems to be related to test infrastructure maintenance rather than addressing any security issue. The removed meta tag was empty and didn't serve any apparent security purpose.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.