--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/darling/tests/multiple.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/darling/tests/multiple.rs@@ -1,11 +1,5 @@-#[macro_use]-extern crate darling;-#[macro_use]-extern crate syn;-#[macro_use]-extern crate quote;--use darling::FromDeriveInput;+use darling::{FromDeriveInput, FromMeta};+use syn::parse_quote; #[derive(FromDeriveInput)] #[darling(attributes(hello))]

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be code style/import optimizations rather than security fixes. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 1-11]
[Old Code]
#[macro_use]
extern crate darling;
#[macro_use]
extern crate syn;
#[macro_use]
extern crate quote;

use darling::FromDeriveInput;
[Fixed Code]
use darling::{FromDeriveInput, FromMeta};
use syn::parse_quote;

The changes:
1. Removed redundant `#[macro_use]` extern crate declarations
2. Consolidated imports
3. Added `FromMeta` to the imports from darling
4. Added `parse_quote` import from syn

These are code quality improvements rather than security fixes. The functionality remains the same, just with more modern Rust import patterns.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/lmdb-rkv-sys/.cargo-checksum.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/lmdb-rkv-sys/.cargo-checksum.json@@ -1 +1 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/root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/java/org/mozilla/geckoview/GeckoWebExecutor.java+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/java/org/mozilla/geckoview/GeckoWebExecutor.java@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@     FETCH_FLAGS_PRIVATE,     FETCH_FLAGS_STREAM_FAILURE_TEST,   })-  /* package */ @interface FetchFlags {}+  public @interface FetchFlags {}   /** No special treatment. */   public static final int FETCH_FLAGS_NONE = 0;

Based on the provided diff content, I'll analyze the changes for security fixes:

1. First diff (lmdb-rkv-sys/.cargo-checksum.json):
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [No specific vulnerability name] [third_party/rust/lmdb-rkv-sys/.cargo-checksum.json] [Entire file]
    [Old checksums]
    [New checksums]
    Note: This appears to be a checksum update for dependency files, but without seeing the actual changes in the source files (particularly mdb.c and src/lib.rs which had checksum changes), we can't determine if there were security fixes.

2. Second diff (GeckoWebExecutor.java):
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Access Control Issue] [mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/java/org/mozilla/geckoview/GeckoWebExecutor.java] [Lines 61-64]
    [Old Code: @interface FetchFlags {} with package visibility]
    [Fixed Code: public @interface FetchFlags {}]
    Note: The change makes the annotation public instead of package-private. While this could be related to security (access control), it's not clear if this was fixing a specific vulnerability or just an API visibility change.

The most significant change appears to be in the LMDB dependency (mdb.c checksum changed), but without seeing the actual source changes, we can't identify specific vulnerabilities that might have been fixed. The checksum update suggests there were likely important changes, possibly including security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-rgba-6.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-rgba-6.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0 255 0 / 20%)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51"); t.done(); });

Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where a variable name was changed from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability, and the corresponding references were updated.

Here's the structured response:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    [No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-rgba-6.html] [Lines 17-25]
    [Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51");]
    [Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51");]

The changes are purely variable naming changes and don't affect security in any way. No actual functionality or security-related behavior was modified.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/xpcom/build/XPCOMInit.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/xpcom/build/XPCOMInit.cpp@@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ #include "jsapi.h" #include "js/Initialization.h"+#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_javascript.h" #include "XPCSelfHostedShmem.h" #include "gfxPlatform.h"@@ -176,7 +177,7 @@     nullptr,     nullptr,     nullptr,-    mozilla::Module::ALLOW_IN_GPU_RDD_VR_AND_SOCKET_PROCESS};+    mozilla::Module::ALLOW_IN_GPU_RDD_VR_SOCKET_AND_UTILITY_PROCESS}; // gDebug will be freed during shutdown. static nsIDebug2* gDebug = nullptr;@@ -248,6 +249,22 @@     mozilla::CountingAllocatorBase<OggReporter>::sAmount(0); static bool sInitializedJS = false;++static void InitializeJS() {+#if defined(ENABLE_WASM_SIMD) && \+    (defined(JS_CODEGEN_X64) || defined(JS_CODEGEN_X86))+  // Update static engine preferences, such as AVX, before+  // `JS_InitWithFailureDiagnostic` is called.+  if (mozilla::StaticPrefs::javascript_options_wasm_simd_avx()) {+    JS::SetAVXEnabled();+  }+#endif++  const char* jsInitFailureReason = JS_InitWithFailureDiagnostic();+  if (jsInitFailureReason) {+    MOZ_CRASH_UNSAFE(jsInitFailureReason);+  }+} // Note that on OSX, aBinDirectory will point to .app/Contents/Resources/browser EXPORT_XPCOM_API(nsresult)@@ -437,10 +454,7 @@       OggReporter::CountingRealloc, OggReporter::CountingFree);   // Initialize the JS engine.-  const char* jsInitFailureReason = JS_InitWithFailureDiagnostic();-  if (jsInitFailureReason) {-    MOZ_CRASH_UNSAFE(jsInitFailureReason);-  }+  InitializeJS();   sInitializedJS = true;   rv = nsComponentManagerImpl::gComponentManager->Init();

Here's the analysis following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Process Isolation Issue] [xpcom/build/XPCOMInit.cpp] [Lines 176-177]
[Old Code]
    nullptr,
    nullptr,
    nullptr,
    mozilla::Module::ALLOW_IN_GPU_RDD_VR_AND_SOCKET_PROCESS};
[Fixed Code]
    nullptr,
    nullptr,
    nullptr,
    mozilla::Module::ALLOW_IN_GPU_RDD_VR_SOCKET_AND_UTILITY_PROCESS};

Additional Details: The change adds UTILITY_PROCESS to the allowed processes. While this might be a security-related change (process isolation), it's not clear if this fixes a specific vulnerability or just extends functionality.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential JS Engine Initialization Issue] [xpcom/build/XPCOMInit.cpp] [Lines 249-264, 454]
[Old Code]
  const char* jsInitFailureReason = JS_InitWithFailureDiagnostic();
  if (jsInitFailureReason) {
    MOZ_CRASH_UNSAFE(jsInitFailureReason);
  }
[Fixed Code]
static void InitializeJS() {
#if defined(ENABLE_WASM_SIMD) && \
    (defined(JS_CODEGEN_X64) || defined(JS_CODEGEN_X86))
  // Update static engine preferences, such as AVX, before
  // `JS_InitWithFailureDiagnostic` is called.
  if (mozilla::StaticPrefs::javascript_options_wasm_simd_avx()) {
    JS::SetAVXEnabled();
  }
#endif

  const char* jsInitFailureReason = JS_InitWithFailureDiagnostic();
  if (jsInitFailureReason) {
    MOZ_CRASH_UNSAFE(jsInitFailureReason);
  }
}

Additional Details: The change adds proper AVX initialization before JS engine initialization. While this could be related to security (proper initialization of WASM SIMD features), it's not clear if this fixes a specific vulnerability or just improves functionality.

Note: Neither change clearly indicates a specific vulnerability being fixed, but both appear to be security-related improvements (process isolation and proper feature initialization). Without more context from bug reports or commit messages, we can't be certain about specific vulnerabilities being addressed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.lineTo.nonfinite.details.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.lineTo.nonfinite.details.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); for (var arg1 of [Infinity, -Infinity, NaN]) {   var converted = false;

Analyzing the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14]
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional details:
- The change appears to be a simple variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security implications are evident in this change
- The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive operations or introduce/remove any security controls
- The test case continues to check for non-finite number handling in canvas path operations

This appears to be a purely cosmetic or code style change rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-size-041.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-size-041.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="match" href="reference/contain-size-025-ref.html">   <meta content="This test checks that when laying out an inline replaced element with 'contain: size', the inline replaced element must be treated as having an intrinsic width and height of 0." name="assert">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <style>   img#blue-test

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-size-041.html [Lines 9]
   [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="">
   [Fixed Code] (line removed)

Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag with "flags" attribute. This doesn't appear to be security-related.
- The change seems to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix.
- No known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in this change.
- The modification is in a test file for CSS containment behavior, which typically doesn't involve security-sensitive operations.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/src/select.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/src/select.rs@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ /// `read` or `write`. /// /// Each field contains data associated with a specific channel flavor.+// This is a private API that is used by the select macro. #[derive(Debug, Default)] pub struct Token {     pub at: flavors::at::AtToken,@@ -93,6 +94,7 @@ /// /// This is a handle that assists select in executing an operation, registration, deciding on the /// appropriate deadline for blocking, etc.+// This is a private API (exposed inside crossbeam_channel::internal module) that is used by the select macro. pub trait SelectHandle {     /// Attempts to select an operation and returns `true` on success.     fn try_select(&self, token: &mut Token) -> bool;@@ -442,6 +444,7 @@ } /// Attempts to select one of the operations without blocking.+// This is a private API (exposed inside crossbeam_channel::internal module) that is used by the select macro. #[inline] pub fn try_select<'a>(     handles: &mut [(&'a dyn SelectHandle, usize, *const u8)],@@ -458,6 +461,7 @@ } /// Blocks until one of the operations becomes ready and selects it.+// This is a private API (exposed inside crossbeam_channel::internal module) that is used by the select macro. #[inline] pub fn select<'a>(     handles: &mut [(&'a dyn SelectHandle, usize, *const u8)],@@ -476,6 +480,7 @@ } /// Blocks for a limited time until one of the operations becomes ready and selects it.+// This is a private API (exposed inside crossbeam_channel::internal module) that is used by the select macro. #[inline] pub fn select_timeout<'a>(     handles: &mut [(&'a dyn SelectHandle, usize, *const u8)],

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be documentation updates clarifying that certain APIs are private/internal. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found in the diff. The changes are documentation-only updates clarifying that certain APIs are private/internal to the crossbeam-channel crate.

Additional Details:
- The diff only adds comments (starting with "// This is a private API") to several structs and functions
- No actual code changes or security fixes are present
- The changes appear to be for better documentation/clarity rather than security fixes

For completeness, here's the format for one of the documentation changes (though it's not a security fix):

Vulnerability Existed: no
Documentation clarification [third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/src/select.rs] [19-20]
[Old Code: No comment]
[Fixed Code: +// This is a private API that is used by the select macro.]

Similar documentation-only changes were made at lines 94-95, 444-445, 461-462, and 480-481. None of these represent security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.twopie.3.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.twopie.3.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ctx.beginPath(); ctx.arc(50, 25, 50, 0, 2*Math.PI + 1e-4, true); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,20, 0,255,0,255, "50,20", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,20, 0,255,0,255, "50,20", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.twopie.3.html [Lines] 17-27
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ...
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,20, 0,255,0,255, "50,20", "0,255,0,255");
   
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ...
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,20, 0,255,0,255, "50,20", "0,255,0,255");

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or clarity. There are no security-related changes in this diff, no vulnerability fixes, and no changes to the actual functionality or security properties of the code. The test logic remains identical, only the variable name was changed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.zero.5.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.zero.5.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ctx.moveTo(0, 0); ctx.rect(100, 25, 0, 0); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where a variable name was changed from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability purposes.

Here's the structured response:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18, 27]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes don't affect any security-related functionality, input validation, or data handling. It's simply a variable renaming with no security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-max-height-block-1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-max-height-block-1.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="L. David Baron" href="https://dbaron.org/">   <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-values/#calc-notation">   <link rel="match" href="calc-max-height-block-1-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content=""> <style type="text/css"> body { margin: 0 } body > div { float: left; height: 100px; width: 1px; }

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 5]
    [Old Code]
    <meta name="flags" content="">
    [Fixed Code]
    (line removed)

Additional Details:
- The diff shows only the removal of an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute. This doesn't appear to be a security-related change but rather a cleanup of unnecessary markup.
- There are no visible security vulnerabilities being fixed in this change.
- The modification is part of a test file for CSS calculations, which typically wouldn't contain security-sensitive code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.cone.behind.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.cone.behind.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -23,15 +23,15 @@ g.addColorStop(1, '#f00'); ctx.fillStyle = g; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where the variable name `offscreenCanvas` was renamed to `canvas`. The functionality remains exactly the same.

Here's the structured response:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.cone.behind.worker.js] [Lines 13-48]
    [var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); ... _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");]
    [var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); ... _assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");]

The changes are purely variable renaming with no security implications. The test assertions and canvas operations remain identical in functionality.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/active-selection-031.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/active-selection-031.html@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-pseudo-4/#highlight-styling">   <link rel="match" href="reference/active-selection-031-ref.html">-  <meta content="" name="flags">   <link rel="stylesheet" href="support/highlights.css">   <style>

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Meta Tag Removal [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/active-selection-031.html] [Lines 8]
    Old Code: `<meta content="" name="flags">`
    Fixed Code: (removed)

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" name attribute. This doesn't appear to be security-related.
- The "flags" meta tag isn't a standard HTML meta tag and its removal doesn't indicate any security fix.
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with this change.
- The modification appears to be a cleanup of unused or unnecessary code rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.isPointInPath.unclosed.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.isPointInPath.unclosed.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.moveTo(0, 0); ctx.lineTo(20, 0);

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.isPointInPath.unclosed.html [Lines] 17-18
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   
   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Notes:
- The changes appear to be purely variable naming changes (from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas')
- No security-related changes or fixes are evident in this diff
- The modification is likely for code consistency or readability rather than security

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.transparent.destination-over.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.transparent.destination-over.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 0, 0.5)';@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'destination-over'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 0, 255, 0.75)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,146,109,223, "50,25", "0,146,109,223", 5);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,146,109,223, "50,25", "0,146,109,223", 5); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't affect security aspects. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18,26]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,146,109,223, "50,25", "0,146,109,223", 5);
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,146,109,223, "50,25", "0,146,109,223", 5);

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability, without altering any security-relevant functionality. The canvas operations and assertions remain the same.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/editor/libeditor/HTMLStyleEditor.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/editor/libeditor/HTMLStyleEditor.cpp@@ -970,7 +970,8 @@   // If it did split nodes, but topmost ancestor inline element is split   // at start of it, we don't need the empty inline element.  Let's remove   // it now.-  if (HTMLEditUtils::IsEmptyNode(+  if (splitResult.GetPreviousContent() &&+      HTMLEditUtils::IsEmptyNode(           *splitResult.GetPreviousContent(),           {EmptyCheckOption::TreatSingleBRElementAsVisible,            EmptyCheckOption::TreatListItemAsVisible,

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Null Pointer Dereference [File] [Lines 970-973]
[Old Code]
if (HTMLEditUtils::IsEmptyNode(
        *splitResult.GetPreviousContent(),
        {EmptyCheckOption::TreatSingleBRElementAsVisible,
         EmptyCheckOption::TreatListItemAsVisible,
[Fixed Code]
if (splitResult.GetPreviousContent() &&
    HTMLEditUtils::IsEmptyNode(
        *splitResult.GetPreviousContent(),
        {EmptyCheckOption::TreatSingleBRElementAsVisible,
         EmptyCheckOption::TreatListItemAsVisible,

Additional Details:
The fix adds a null check before dereferencing splitResult.GetPreviousContent(). While this prevents a potential null pointer dereference, it's unclear if this was an actual security vulnerability or just defensive programming. The original code could crash if GetPreviousContent() returned null, but we don't have enough context to determine if this was exploitable. The change improves code safety regardless.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/height-distribution/percentage-sizing-of-table-cell-children-006.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/height-distribution/percentage-sizing-of-table-cell-children-006.html@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-tables-3/#row-layout"> <link rel="match" href="../../reference/ref-filled-green-100px-square.xht"> <link rel="bookmark" href="https://crbug.com/982312" />-<meta name="flags" content="" /> <meta name="assert" content="table cell descendant retains its min-height when the descendant and cell both have unresolvable percentage heights and the descendant has overflow:auto, and the cell's sibling has a fixed height greater than the descendant's min-height." /> <title>table cell percent height descendant with overflow:auto</title>

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/height-distribution/percentage-sizing-of-table-cell-children-006.html] [Lines 3-6]
    [Old Code]
    <link rel="bookmark" href="https://crbug.com/982312" />
    <meta name="flags" content="" />
    <meta name="assert" content="table cell descendant retains its min-height when the descendant and cell both have unresolvable percentage heights and the descendant has overflow:auto, and the cell's sibling has a fixed height greater than the descendant's min-height." />
    [Fixed Code]
    <link rel="bookmark" href="https://crbug.com/982312" />
    <meta name="assert" content="table cell descendant retains its min-height when the descendant and cell both have unresolvable percentage heights and the descendant has overflow:auto, and the cell's sibling has a fixed height greater than the descendant's min-height." />

The change simply removes an empty `meta name="flags"` tag, which doesn't appear to be security-related. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed in this change. The modification is purely a cleanup of test metadata.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsla-2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsla-2.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(120 100.0% 50.0% / 0.2)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes (variable renaming) rather than security fixes.

Here's the analysis following your format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsla-2.html] [Lines 17-25]
[Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51");]
[Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51");]

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and update the references to it. There are no security implications to this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/metal/examples/reflection/main.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/metal/examples/reflection/main.rs@@ -60,16 +60,16 @@         println!("{:?}", desc);-        #[cfg(features = "private")]-        let _reflection = unsafe {-            RenderPipelineReflection::new(-                desc.serialize_vertex_data(),-                desc.serialize_fragment_data(),-                vertex_desc.serialize_descriptor(),-                &device,-                0x8,-                0x0,-            )-        };+        let reflect_options = MTLPipelineOption::ArgumentInfo | MTLPipelineOption::BufferTypeInfo;+        let (_, reflection) = device+            .new_render_pipeline_state_with_reflection(&desc, reflect_options)+            .unwrap();++        println!("Vertex arguments: ");+        let vertex_arguments = reflection.vertex_arguments();+        for index in 0..vertex_arguments.count() {+            let argument = vertex_arguments.object_at(index).unwrap();+            println!("{:?}", argument);+        }     }); }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
   Unsafe Reflection API Usage [third_party/rust/metal/examples/reflection/main.rs] [Lines 60-68]  
   Old Code:  
   ```rust
   #[cfg(features = "private")]
   let _reflection = unsafe {
       RenderPipelineReflection::new(
           desc.serialize_vertex_data(),
           desc.serialize_fragment_data(),
           vertex_desc.serialize_descriptor(),
           &device,
           0x8,
           0x0,
       )
   };
   ```  
   Fixed Code:  
   ```rust
   let reflect_options = MTLPipelineOption::ArgumentInfo | MTLPipelineOption::BufferTypeInfo;
   let (_, reflection) = device
       .new_render_pipeline_state_with_reflection(&desc, reflect_options)
       .unwrap();
   ```  
   Additional Details: The old code used an unsafe API with hardcoded magic numbers (0x8, 0x0) for reflection, which could lead to undefined behavior or memory safety issues. The new code uses a safer, official API with proper options flags.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   Potential Information Exposure [third_party/rust/metal/examples/reflection/main.rs] [Lines 70-73]  
   Old Code: (No equivalent functionality)  
   Fixed Code:  
   ```rust
   println!("Vertex arguments: ");
   let vertex_arguments = reflection.vertex_arguments();
   for index in 0..vertex_arguments.count() {
       let argument = vertex_arguments.object_at(index).unwrap();
       println!("{:?}", argument);
   }
   ```  
   Additional Details: While not clearly a vulnerability, the new code prints detailed reflection information which might expose sensitive implementation details if this were production code. However, since this is an example file, the security impact is unclear.

The main security improvement is the replacement of an unsafe, private API with a proper, safe reflection mechanism. The additional debug printing might be considered an information disclosure issue in production code, but is likely acceptable in an example file.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.uncovered.pattern.copy.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.uncovered.pattern.copy.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 255, 0.5)';@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@     createImageBitmap(response).then(bitmap => {         ctx.fillStyle = ctx.createPattern(bitmap, 'no-repeat');         ctx.fillRect(0, 50, 100, 50);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't affect security aspects. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 17-18, 37]
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);
   
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or clarity, but this doesn't represent a security fix. The functionality remains identical, and there are no security implications to this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.cone.shape1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.cone.shape1.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var tol = 1; // tolerance to avoid antialiasing artifacts ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';@@ -34,15 +34,15 @@ g.addColorStop(1, '#0f0'); ctx.fillStyle = g; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating all references to it. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no  
[No Vulnerability Found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.cone.shape1.html] [Lines 17-48]  
[Old Code]  
```javascript
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
```
[Fixed Code]  
```javascript
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
```
The changes are purely variable naming improvements with no security implications. The functionality remains exactly the same.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.