--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/tests/iter.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/tests/iter.rs@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@     assert_eq!(iter.next().unwrap(), 1);     assert_eq!(iter.next().unwrap(), 2);-    assert_eq!(iter.next().is_none(), true);+    assert!(iter.next().is_none()); } #[test]@@ -106,5 +106,5 @@     let mut iter = (&r).into_iter();     assert_eq!(iter.next().unwrap(), 1);     assert_eq!(iter.next().unwrap(), 2);-    assert_eq!(iter.next().is_none(), true);+    assert!(iter.next().is_none()); }

Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be stylistic/idiomatic improvements in test assertions rather than security fixes. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Test Assertion Style Improvement [third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/tests/iter.rs] [Lines 93, 106]
    Old Code: `assert_eq!(iter.next().is_none(), true);`
    Fixed Code: `assert!(iter.next().is_none());`

The changes simply replace `assert_eq!(..., true)` with the more idiomatic `assert!(...)` form, which is functionally equivalent but more concise. This doesn't represent a security fix but rather a code quality improvement.

No actual vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The changes are purely about test assertion style and don't affect the security properties of the code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/browsers/android_weblayer.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/browsers/android_weblayer.py@@ -3,9 +3,9 @@ from .base import get_timeout_multiplier  # noqa: F401 from .chrome import executor_kwargs as chrome_executor_kwargs from .chrome_android import ChromeAndroidBrowserBase+from ..executors.base import WdspecExecutor  # noqa: F401 from ..executors.executorwebdriver import (WebDriverTestharnessExecutor,  # noqa: F401                                            WebDriverRefTestExecutor)  # noqa: F401-from ..executors.executorchrome import ChromeDriverWdspecExecutor  # noqa: F401 __wptrunner__ = {"product": "android_weblayer",@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@                              "wdspec": "NullBrowser"},                  "executor": {"testharness": "WebDriverTestharnessExecutor",                               "reftest": "WebDriverRefTestExecutor",-                              "wdspec": "ChromeDriverWdspecExecutor"},+                              "wdspec": "WdspecExecutor"},                  "browser_kwargs": "browser_kwargs",                  "executor_kwargs": "executor_kwargs",                  "env_extras": "env_extras",@@ -55,6 +55,8 @@     capabilities["goog:chromeOptions"]["androidPackage"] = \         "org.chromium.weblayer.shell"     capabilities["goog:chromeOptions"]["androidActivity"] = ".WebLayerShellActivity"+    capabilities["goog:chromeOptions"]["androidKeepAppDataDir"] = \+        kwargs.get("keep_app_data_directory")     # Workaround: driver.quit() cannot quit WeblayerShell.     executor_kwargs["pause_after_test"] = False@@ -87,8 +89,8 @@                  symbols_path=None):         """Creates a new representation of Chrome.  The `binary` argument gives         the browser binary to use for testing."""-        super(WeblayerShell, self).__init__(logger,-                webdriver_binary, remote_queue, device_serial,-                webdriver_args, stackwalk_binary, symbols_path)+        super().__init__(logger,+                         webdriver_binary, remote_queue, device_serial,+                         webdriver_args, stackwalk_binary, symbols_path)         self.binary = binary         self.wptserver_ports = _wptserve_ports

I'll analyze the code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Improper Input Validation] [testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/browsers/android_weblayer.py] [Lines 55-56]
[Old Code]
[No code existed for androidKeepAppDataDir setting]
[Fixed Code]
capabilities["goog:chromeOptions"]["androidKeepAppDataDir"] = \
    kwargs.get("keep_app_data_directory")

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
[Code Style Improvement] [testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/browsers/android_weblayer.py] [Lines 89-91]
[Old Code]
super(WeblayerShell, self).__init__(logger,
        webdriver_binary, remote_queue, device_serial,
        webdriver_args, stackwalk_binary, symbols_path)
[Fixed Code]
super().__init__(logger,
                 webdriver_binary, remote_queue, device_serial,
                 webdriver_args, stackwalk_binary, symbols_path)

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Executor Class Change] [testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/browsers/android_weblayer.py] [Lines 14]
[Old Code]
"wdspec": "ChromeDriverWdspecExecutor"
[Fixed Code]
"wdspec": "WdspecExecutor"

Notes:
1. The addition of androidKeepAppDataDir could potentially relate to security if it affects data persistence, but without more context about how this value is used, I can't be certain.
2. The super() call change is purely a style/optimization improvement with no security implications.
3. The executor class change might have security implications depending on the differences between ChromeDriverWdspecExecutor and WdspecExecutor, but without seeing those implementations, I can't determine if this is security-related.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/vm/Runtime.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/vm/Runtime.cpp@@ -245,6 +245,10 @@   sharedIntlData.ref().destroyInstance(); #endif+  // Caches might hold on ScriptData which are saved in the ScriptDataTable.+  // Clear all stencils from caches to remove ScriptDataTable entries.+  caches().purgeStencils();+   if (gcInitialized) {     /*      * Finish any in-progress GCs first.@@ -265,6 +269,7 @@      */     CancelOffThreadIonCompile(this);     CancelOffThreadParses(this);+    CancelOffThreadDelazify(this);     CancelOffThreadCompressions(this);     /*

Here's the analysis following the requested format:

1. First potential vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: yes
    Memory Leak Vulnerability [File] js/src/vm/Runtime.cpp [Lines 245-248]
    [Old Code]
    (No code existed here before)
    [Fixed Code]
    // Caches might hold on ScriptData which are saved in the ScriptDataTable.
    // Clear all stencils from caches to remove ScriptDataTable entries.
    caches().purgeStencils();

2. Second potential vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: yes
    Resource Cleanup Vulnerability [File] js/src/vm/Runtime.cpp [Lines 265-269]
    [Old Code]
    CancelOffThreadIonCompile(this);
    CancelOffThreadParses(this);
    CancelOffThreadCompressions(this);
    [Fixed Code]
    CancelOffThreadIonCompile(this);
    CancelOffThreadParses(this);
    CancelOffThreadDelazify(this);
    CancelOffThreadCompressions(this);

The first fix addresses a potential memory leak by ensuring script data is properly cleaned up from caches during runtime destruction. The second fix adds missing cleanup for off-thread delazification operations, which could have led to resource leaks or dangling references if not properly canceled during shutdown.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.lineTo.nonfinite.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.lineTo.nonfinite.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.moveTo(0, 0); ctx.lineTo(100, 0);@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ ctx.lineTo(0, 50); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 90,45, 0,255,0,255, "90,45", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 90,45, 0,255,0,255, "90,45", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't affect security. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Variable Renaming [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.lineTo.nonfinite.html] [Lines 17-18, 33-34]
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 90,45, 0,255,0,255, "90,45", "0,255,0,255");

   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   _assertPixel(canvas, 90,45, 0,255,0,255, "90,45", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` throughout the file, which doesn't have any security implications. No actual functionality or security-related behavior was modified.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/browsers/servo.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/browsers/servo.py@@ -1,24 +1,26 @@ import os-from .base import NullBrowser, ExecutorBrowser, require_arg+from .base import ExecutorBrowser, NullBrowser, WebDriverBrowser, require_arg from .base import get_timeout_multiplier   # noqa: F401 from ..executors import executor_kwargs as base_executor_kwargs+from ..executors.base import WdspecExecutor  # noqa: F401 from ..executors.executorservo import (ServoCrashtestExecutor,  # noqa: F401                                        ServoTestharnessExecutor,  # noqa: F401-                                       ServoRefTestExecutor,  # noqa: F401-                                       ServoWdspecExecutor)  # noqa: F401+                                       ServoRefTestExecutor)  # noqa: F401+ here = os.path.dirname(__file__) __wptrunner__ = {     "product": "servo",     "check_args": "check_args",-    "browser": "ServoBrowser",+    "browser": {None: "ServoBrowser",+                "wdspec": "ServoWdspecBrowser"},     "executor": {         "crashtest": "ServoCrashtestExecutor",         "testharness": "ServoTestharnessExecutor",         "reftest": "ServoRefTestExecutor",-        "wdspec": "ServoWdspecExecutor",+        "wdspec": "WdspecExecutor",     },     "browser_kwargs": "browser_kwargs",     "executor_kwargs": "executor_kwargs",@@ -49,7 +51,6 @@     rv["pause_after_test"] = kwargs["pause_after_test"]     if test_type == "wdspec":         rv["capabilities"] = {}-        rv["webdriver_binary"] = kwargs["binary"]     return rv@@ -86,3 +87,30 @@             "user_stylesheets": self.user_stylesheets,             "ca_certificate_path": self.ca_certificate_path,         }+++class ServoWdspecBrowser(WebDriverBrowser):+    # TODO: could share an implemenation with servodriver.py, perhaps+    def __init__(self, logger, binary="servo", webdriver_args=None,+                 binary_args=None, host="127.0.0.1", env=None, port=None):++        env = os.environ.copy() if env is None else env+        env["RUST_BACKTRACE"] = "1"++        super().__init__(logger,+                         binary,+                         None,+                         webdriver_args=webdriver_args,+                         host=host,+                         port=port,+                         env=env)+        self.binary_args = binary_args++    def make_command(self):+        command = [self.binary,+                   f"--webdriver={self.port}",+                   "--hard-fail",+                   "--headless"] + self.webdriver_args+        if self.binary_args:+            command += self.binary_args+        return command

I'll analyze the code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential WebDriver Binary Configuration Removal] [testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/browsers/servo.py] [Lines 49-50]
[Old Code]
        rv["capabilities"] = {}
        rv["webdriver_binary"] = kwargs["binary"]
[Fixed Code]
        rv["capabilities"] = {}

Additional Details:
- The removal of `webdriver_binary` configuration might be related to security hardening, but without more context, I can't be certain if this was fixing a specific vulnerability or just a configuration cleanup.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[WebDriver Executor Change] [testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/browsers/servo.py] [Lines 20-21]
[Old Code]
        "wdspec": "ServoWdspecExecutor",
[Fixed Code]
        "wdspec": "WdspecExecutor",

Additional Details:
- The change from a custom ServoWdspecExecutor to a more generic WdspecExecutor might indicate a security improvement by using a more standardized implementation, but this isn't clearly a vulnerability fix.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[New WebDriver Browser Implementation] [testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/browsers/servo.py] [Lines 89-108]
[Old Code]
[N/A - New code added]
[Fixed Code]
class ServoWdspecBrowser(WebDriverBrowser):
    def __init__(self, logger, binary="servo", webdriver_args=None,
                 binary_args=None, host="127.0.0.1", env=None, port=None):
        env = os.environ.copy() if env is None else env
        env["RUST_BACKTRACE"] = "1"
        super().__init__(logger,
                         binary,
                         None,
                         webdriver_args=webdriver_args,
                         host=host,
                         port=port,
                         env=env)
        self.binary_args = binary_args

Additional Details:
- The new implementation includes security-conscious defaults like binding to 127.0.0.1 and environment isolation, but it's unclear if this is fixing a specific vulnerability or just improving the implementation.

Note: While there are several changes in the diff, none clearly indicate specific vulnerability fixes. The changes appear to be more about architectural improvements and code organization rather than direct security patches.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-169.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-169.xml@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->   <link rel="match" href="reference/this-test-has-passed-desc.xht"/>-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body>    <p>This test has <span></span>.</p>

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-169.xml] [Lines 9]
[Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="" />]
[Fixed Code: (removed)]

Explanation:
1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute. This doesn't appear to be related to any security vulnerability.
2. The "flags" meta tag in this context was likely used for test configuration and isn't security-sensitive.
3. There's no evidence of XSS, injection, or other common web vulnerabilities in this change.
4. The removal might be part of test cleanup or standardization, not a security fix.

No known vulnerability name applies to this change, and it doesn't appear to be security-related.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/xre/GeckoArgs.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/xre/GeckoArgs.h@@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ static CommandLineArg<uint64_t> sChildID{"-childID", "childid"};+static CommandLineArg<uint64_t> sSandboxingKind{"-sandboxingKind",+                                                "sandboxingkind"};+ static CommandLineArg<bool> sSafeMode{"-safeMode", "safemode"}; static CommandLineArg<bool> sIsForBrowser{"-isForBrowser", "isforbrowser"};

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Sandboxing Control] [File: toolkit/xre/GeckoArgs.h] [Lines: Added after 121]  
   [Old Code: (none)]  
   [Fixed Code: static CommandLineArg<uint64_t> sSandboxingKind{"-sandboxingKind", "sandboxingkind"};]  

Additional Details:  
- The diff shows the addition of a new command line argument for sandboxing control, but without more context about how this argument is used, we can't definitively determine if this fixes a vulnerability or is just a new feature.  
- If this was added to address a sandbox escape vulnerability or improve sandboxing controls, it could be security-related, but we'd need more information about the threat model and previous behavior to confirm.  
- The argument appears to allow control over sandboxing levels/types via command line, which could be security-relevant if not properly validated.  

Note: Without seeing the actual security issue being fixed or more context about how this parameter is used, this analysis remains speculative. The change could be either security-related or simply adding new functionality.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/base/content/test/performance/browser_tabopen.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/base/content/test/performance/browser_tabopen.js@@ -61,6 +61,82 @@     .getBoundingClientRect();   let inRange = (val, min, max) => min <= val && val <= max;++  info(`tabStripRect=${JSON.stringify(tabStripRect)}`);+  info(`firstTabRect=${JSON.stringify(firstTabRect)}`);+  info(`tabPaddingStart=${JSON.stringify(tabPaddingStart)}`);+  info(`firstTabLabelRect=${JSON.stringify(firstTabLabelRect)}`);+  info(`newTabButtonRect=${JSON.stringify(newTabButtonRect)}`);+  info(`textBoxRect=${JSON.stringify(textBoxRect)}`);++  let inTabStrip = function(r) {+    return (+      r.y1 >= tabStripRect.top &&+      r.y2 <= tabStripRect.bottom &&+      r.x1 >= tabStripRect.left &&+      r.x2 <= tabStripRect.right+    );+  };++  const kTabCloseIconWidth = 13;++  let isExpectedChange = function(r) {+    // We expect all changes to be within the tab strip.+    if (!inTabStrip(r)) {+      return false;+    }++    // The first tab should get deselected at the same time as the next tab+    // starts appearing, so we should have one rect that includes the first tab+    // but is wider.+    if (+      inRange(r.w, minTabWidth, maxTabWidth * 2) &&+      inRange(r.x1, firstTabRect.x, firstTabRect.x + tabPaddingStart)+    ) {+      return true;+    }++    // The second tab gets painted several times due to tabopen animation.+    let isSecondTabRect =+      inRange(+        r.x1,+        // When the animation starts the tab close icon overflows.+        // -1 for the border on Win7+        firstTabRect.right - kTabCloseIconWidth - 1,+        firstTabRect.right + firstTabRect.width+      ) &&+      r.x2 <+        firstTabRect.right ++          firstTabRect.width ++          // Sometimes the '+' is in the same rect.+          newTabButtonRect.width;++    if (isSecondTabRect) {+      return true;+    }+    // The '+' icon moves with an animation. At the end of the animation+    // the former and new positions can touch each other causing the rect+    // to have twice the icon's width.+    if (+      r.h == kTabCloseIconWidth &&+      r.w <= 2 * kTabCloseIconWidth + kMaxEmptyPixels+    ) {+      return true;+    }++    // We sometimes have a rect for the right most 2px of the '+' button.+    if (r.h == 2 && r.w == 2) {+      return true;+    }++    // Same for the 'X' icon.+    if (r.h == 10 && r.w <= 2 * 10) {+      return true;+    }++    // Other changes are unexpected.+    return false;+  };   // Add a reflow observer and open a new tab.   await withPerfObserver(@@ -76,46 +152,7 @@     {       expectedReflows: EXPECTED_REFLOWS,       frames: {-        filter: rects =>-          rects.filter(-            r =>-              !(-                // We expect all changes to be within the tab strip.-                (-                  r.y1 >= tabStripRect.top &&-                  r.y2 <= tabStripRect.bottom &&-                  r.x1 >= tabStripRect.left &&-                  r.x2 <= tabStripRect.right &&-                  // The first tab should get deselected at the same time as the next-                  // tab starts appearing, so we should have one rect that includes the-                  // first tab but is wider.-                  ((inRange(r.w, minTabWidth, maxTabWidth * 2) &&-                    inRange(-                      r.x1,-                      firstTabRect.x,-                      firstTabRect.x + tabPaddingStart-                    )) ||-                  // The second tab gets painted several times due to tabopen animation.-                  (inRange(-                    r.x1,-                    firstTabRect.right - 1, // -1 for the border on Win7-                    firstTabRect.right + firstTabRect.width-                  ) &&-                    r.x2 <-                      firstTabRect.right +-                        firstTabRect.width +-                        newTabButtonRect.width) || // Sometimes the '+' is in the same rect.-                    // The '+' icon moves with an animation. At the end of the animation-                    // the former and new positions can touch each other causing the rect-                    // to have twice the icon's width.-                    (r.h == 13 && r.w <= 2 * 13 + kMaxEmptyPixels) ||-                    // We sometimes have a rect for the right most 2px of the '+' button.-                    (r.h == 2 && r.w == 2) ||-                    // Same for the 'X' icon.-                    (r.h == 10 && r.w <= 2 * 10))-                )-              )-          ),+        filter: rects => rects.filter(r => !isExpectedChange(r)),         exceptions: [           {             name:

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be focused on refactoring and improving the performance test code for tab opening behavior in Firefox. Here's my analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
The changes are purely structural/refactoring changes to improve code organization and readability. The functionality remains the same, just moved into separate functions.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
The diff shows:
- Added info logging statements for debugging
- Extracted the rect filtering logic into separate functions (inTabStrip and isExpectedChange)
- Made the code more modular and readable
- No security-related changes were made

The changes are focused on:
1. Better code organization by breaking down a complex filter into smaller functions
2. Added debug logging
3. No changes to security-related functionality
4. No changes to input handling or data processing that could introduce vulnerabilities

Since this is test code for performance measurement of tab opening, and the changes are purely structural, there are no security vulnerabilities being addressed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.hsla-3.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.hsla-3.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; try { ctx.fillStyle = 'hsla(0, 0, 50%, 1,)'; } catch (e) { } // this shouldn't throw, but it shouldn't matter here if it does ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14, 20]
   Old Code: 
   ```
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ```
   Additional Details: This appears to be a simple variable name change from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas'. No security implications are evident in this change.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Line 20]
   Old Code:
   ```
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   ```
   Additional Details: This change is consistent with the variable name change above and doesn't represent a security fix.

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic (variable renaming) rather than security-related. The test logic remains the same, only the variable name used to reference the OffscreenCanvas object has been changed from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas'. No security vulnerabilities were addressed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-cascade/important-prop.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-cascade/important-prop.html@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@   <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-cascade/#importance">   <link rel="match" href="important-prop-ref.html">   <meta name="assert" content="Test passes if normal rules are overridden by animations, important rules override animations, and !important declarations are ignored in animations.">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <style>   @keyframes override {     from, to {

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-cascade/important-prop.html] [Lines 8]
[Old Code]
  <meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code]
[Line removed]

Additional Details:
1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag with name="flags". This appears to be a cleanup change rather than a security fix.
2. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being addressed here - no XSS, injection, or other common web vulnerabilities are affected by this change.
3. The empty flags meta tag doesn't appear to have any security implications in either its presence or removal.

The diff shows only this single change, and I don't see any other modifications that might indicate security fixes. The change seems to be purely about test file maintenance rather than addressing any security concerns.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/webauthn/WinWebAuthnManager.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/webauthn/WinWebAuthnManager.cpp@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@   // MakeCredentialOptions   WEBAUTHN_AUTHENTICATOR_MAKE_CREDENTIAL_OPTIONS WebAuthNCredentialOptions = {-      WEBAUTHN_AUTHENTICATOR_MAKE_CREDENTIAL_OPTIONS_CURRENT_VERSION,+      WEBAUTHN_AUTHENTICATOR_MAKE_CREDENTIAL_OPTIONS_VERSION_4,       aInfo.TimeoutMS(),       {0, NULL},       {0, NULL},@@ -371,7 +371,11 @@       winAttestation,       0,     // Flags       NULL,  // CancellationId-      pExcludeCredentialList};+      pExcludeCredentialList,+      WEBAUTHN_ENTERPRISE_ATTESTATION_NONE,+      WEBAUTHN_LARGE_BLOB_SUPPORT_NONE,+      FALSE,  // PreferResidentKey+  };   GUID cancellationId = {0};   if (gWinWebauthnGetCancellationId(&cancellationId) == S_OK) {@@ -398,11 +402,6 @@   mCancellationIds.erase(aTransactionId);   if (hr == S_OK) {-    nsTArray<uint8_t> attObject;-    attObject.AppendElements(-        pWebAuthNCredentialAttestation->pbAttestationObject,-        pWebAuthNCredentialAttestation->cbAttestationObject);-     nsTArray<uint8_t> credentialId;     credentialId.AppendElements(pWebAuthNCredentialAttestation->pbCredentialId,                                 pWebAuthNCredentialAttestation->cbCredentialId);@@ -451,6 +450,23 @@                                        attestation->pX5c->cbData);       authenticatorData.AppendElements(attestation->pbSignature,                                        attestation->cbSignature);+    }++    nsTArray<uint8_t> attObject;+    if (winAttestation == WEBAUTHN_ATTESTATION_CONVEYANCE_PREFERENCE_NONE) {+      // Zero AAGuid+      authenticatorData.ReplaceElementsAt(32 + 1 + 4 /*AAGuid offset*/, 16,+                                          0x0);++      CryptoBuffer authData;+      authData.Assign(authenticatorData);+      CryptoBuffer noneAttObj;+      CBOREncodeNoneAttestationObj(authData, noneAttObj);+      attObject.AppendElements(noneAttObj);+    } else {+      attObject.AppendElements(+          pWebAuthNCredentialAttestation->pbAttestationObject,+          pWebAuthNCredentialAttestation->cbAttestationObject);     }     nsTArray<WebAuthnExtensionResult> extensions;

Here's the analysis following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
WEBAUTHN_VERSION_MISMATCH dom/webauthn/WinWebAuthnManager.cpp [Lines 361-371]
[Old Code]
WEBAUTHN_AUTHENTICATOR_MAKE_CREDENTIAL_OPTIONS WebAuthNCredentialOptions = {
      WEBAUTHN_AUTHENTICATOR_MAKE_CREDENTIAL_OPTIONS_CURRENT_VERSION,
[Fixed Code]
WEBAUTHN_AUTHENTICATOR_MAKE_CREDENTIAL_OPTIONS WebAuthNCredentialOptions = {
      WEBAUTHN_AUTHENTICATOR_MAKE_CREDENTIAL_OPTIONS_VERSION_4,
Additional Details: The change updates the WebAuthn API version from CURRENT_VERSION to explicit VERSION_4, which could prevent potential version-related security issues.

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
MISSING_WEBAUTHN_OPTIONS dom/webauthn/WinWebAuthnManager.cpp [Lines 371-375]
[Old Code]
      0,     // Flags
      NULL,  // CancellationId
      pExcludeCredentialList};
[Fixed Code]
      0,     // Flags
      NULL,  // CancellationId
      pExcludeCredentialList,
      WEBAUTHN_ENTERPRISE_ATTESTATION_NONE,
      WEBAUTHN_LARGE_BLOB_SUPPORT_NONE,
      FALSE,  // PreferResidentKey
  };
Additional Details: The fix adds important security-related options that were missing in the original structure initialization.

3. Vulnerability Existed: yes
ATTESTATION_OBJECT_HANDLING dom/webauthn/WinWebAuthnManager.cpp [Lines 398-450]
[Old Code]
    nsTArray<uint8_t> attObject;
    attObject.AppendElements(
        pWebAuthNCredentialAttestation->pbAttestationObject,
        pWebAuthNCredentialAttestation->cbAttestationObject);
[Fixed Code]
    nsTArray<uint8_t> attObject;
    if (winAttestation == WEBAUTHN_ATTESTATION_CONVEYANCE_PREFERENCE_NONE) {
      // Zero AAGuid
      authenticatorData.ReplaceElementsAt(32 + 1 + 4 /*AAGuid offset*/, 16,
                                          0x0);

      CryptoBuffer authData;
      authData.Assign(authenticatorData);
      CryptoBuffer noneAttObj;
      CBOREncodeNoneAttestationObj(authData, noneAttObj);
      attObject.AppendElements(noneAttObj);
    } else {
      attObject.AppendElements(
          pWebAuthNCredentialAttestation->pbAttestationObject,
          pWebAuthNCredentialAttestation->cbAttestationObject);
    }
Additional Details: The change adds proper handling for "none" attestation preference, including zeroing the AAGuid and proper encoding, which is important for security when attestation isn't required.

Note: The changes appear to be security improvements related to WebAuthn implementation, particularly around version specification, option completeness, and attestation handling. These could prevent potential security issues in the WebAuthn authentication flow.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-77b.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-77b.xml@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/>   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body>  <div>

Analyzing the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Information Disclosure] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-77b.xml] [Lines 10]  
   [Old Code] `<meta name="flags" content="" />`  
   [Fixed Code] [removed]  

Additional Details:  
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute. While this doesn't appear to be a direct security vulnerability, empty or unused metadata could potentially leak information about the testing environment or configuration.  
- Without more context about what the "flags" meta tag was intended for, we can't be certain if this posed an actual security risk.  
- The change appears to be cleaning up unnecessary markup rather than fixing a specific vulnerability.  

No other security-relevant changes were found in the diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.solid.destination-over.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.solid.destination-over.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 255, 1.0)';@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'destination-over'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(255, 255, 0, 1.0)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,255,255, "50,25", "0,255,255,255", 5);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,255,255, "50,25", "0,255,255,255", 5); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't involve any security-related modifications.

Here's the analysis following the requested format:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.solid.destination-over.html] [Lines 17-26]
    [Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); ... _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, ...)]
    [Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); ... _assertPixelApprox(canvas, ...)]

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or clarity.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/circle/shape-outside-circle-034.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/circle/shape-outside-circle-034.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/">   <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#supported-basic-shapes">   <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-circle-034-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Test the boxes are wrapping around the right float shape defined by the basic shape circle(50% at right top) value.">   <style>   .container {

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 9]
   Old Code: `<meta name="flags" content="">`
   Fixed Code: (line removed)

Additional details:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta "flags" tag, which doesn't appear to have any security implications
- This appears to be a simple cleanup of test metadata rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with this change
- The change is in a test file (HTML test case) which typically doesn't contain security-sensitive code

No other changes were present in the diff that would indicate security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.zero.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.zero.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); assert_throws_dom("INDEX_SIZE_ERR", function() { ctx.getImageData(1, 1, 10, 0); }); assert_throws_dom("INDEX_SIZE_ERR", function() { ctx.getImageData(1, 1, 0, 10); });

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Variable Renaming [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.zero.worker.js] [Lines 13-14]
    Old Code:
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    
    Fixed Code:
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- This appears to be a simple variable name change from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas'
- The functionality remains exactly the same
- No security implications were found in this change
- The test assertions and behavior remain unchanged
- This is likely a code style/consistency improvement rather than a security fix

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.4.radii.4.double.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.4.radii.4.double.html@@ -17,18 +17,18 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.roundRect(0, 0, 100, 50, [0, 0, 0, 20]); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 255,0,0,255, "1,48", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 255,0,0,255, "1,48", "255,0,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating the corresponding assertions. Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found
    File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.4.radii.4.double.html
    Lines: 17-18 (variable rename) and 25-28 (assertion updates)
    Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
             var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
             _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, ...)
    Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
              var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
              _assertPixel(canvas, ...)

The changes don't appear to address any security issues but rather improve code consistency or readability. No security-related functionality was modified.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/themes/shared/downloads/download-blockedStates.inc.css+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/themes/shared/downloads/download-blockedStates.inc.css@@ -12,29 +12,29 @@ #downloadsPanel-blockedSubview[verdict="Insecure"] .downloadsPanel-blockedSubview-image, #downloadsPanel-blockedSubview[verdict="Malware"] .downloadsPanel-blockedSubview-image,-@item@[verdict="Insecure"] .downloadBlockedBadge,-@item@[verdict="Malware"] .downloadBlockedBadge {+#downloadsListBox > richlistitem[verdict="Insecure"] .downloadBlockedBadge,+#downloadsListBox > richlistitem[verdict="Malware"] .downloadBlockedBadge {   background-image: url("chrome://global/skin/icons/error.svg");   -moz-context-properties: fill;   fill: #e22850; } :root[lwt-popup-brighttext] #downloadsPanel-blockedSubview[verdict="Insecure"] .downloadsPanel-blockedSubview-image,-:root[lwt-popup-brighttext] @item@[verdict="Insecure"] .downloadBlockedBadge,+:root[lwt-popup-brighttext] #downloadsListBox > richlistitem[verdict="Insecure"] .downloadBlockedBadge, :root[lwt-popup-brighttext] #downloadsPanel-blockedSubview[verdict="Malware"] .downloadsPanel-blockedSubview-image,-:root[lwt-popup-brighttext] @item@[verdict="Malware"] .downloadBlockedBadge {+:root[lwt-popup-brighttext] #downloadsListBox > richlistitem[verdict="Malware"] .downloadBlockedBadge {   fill: #FF9AA2; } #downloadsPanel-blockedSubview[verdict="Uncommon"] .downloadsPanel-blockedSubview-image,-@item@[verdict="Uncommon"] .downloadBlockedBadge {+#downloadsListBox > richlistitem[verdict="Uncommon"] .downloadBlockedBadge {   -moz-context-properties: fill;   fill: #0090ED;   background-image: url("chrome://global/skin/icons/info-filled.svg"); } :root[lwt-popup-brighttext] #downloadsPanel-blockedSubview[verdict="Uncommon"] .downloadsPanel-blockedSubview-image,-:root[lwt-popup-brighttext] @item@[verdict="Uncommon"] .downloadBlockedBadge {+:root[lwt-popup-brighttext] #downloadsListBox > richlistitem[verdict="Uncommon"] .downloadBlockedBadge {   fill: #80EBFF; }@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ #downloadsPanel-blockedSubview[verdict="PotentiallyUnwanted"] .downloadsPanel-blockedSubview-image, #downloadsPanel-blockedSubview[verdict="DownloadSpam"] .downloadsPanel-blockedSubview-image,-@item@[verdict="PotentiallyUnwanted"] .downloadBlockedBadge,-@item@[verdict="DownloadSpam"] .downloadBlockedBadge  {+#downloadsListBox > richlistitem[verdict="PotentiallyUnwanted"] .downloadBlockedBadge,+#downloadsListBox > richlistitem[verdict="DownloadSpam"] .downloadBlockedBadge  {   -moz-context-properties: fill;   fill: #ffbf00;   background-image: url("chrome://global/skin/icons/warning.svg");

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   CSS Selector Specificity Issue [browser/themes/shared/downloads/download-blockedStates.inc.css] [Lines 12-16, 19-23, 26-29, 54-58]  
   Old Code:  
   ```css
   @item@[verdict="Insecure"] .downloadBlockedBadge,
   @item@[verdict="Malware"] .downloadBlockedBadge
   ```  
   Fixed Code:  
   ```css
   #downloadsListBox > richlistitem[verdict="Insecure"] .downloadBlockedBadge,
   #downloadsListBox > richlistitem[verdict="Malware"] .downloadBlockedBadge
   ```  

   Additional Details: The change replaces generic `@item@` placeholder with a more specific selector. While this improves CSS specificity and maintainability, it's unclear if this was fixing a security vulnerability or just a code quality improvement.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   CSS Selector Consistency Fix [browser/themes/shared/downloads/download-blockedStates.inc.css] [Lines 26-29]  
   Old Code:  
   ```css
   @item@[verdict="Uncommon"] .downloadBlockedBadge
   ```  
   Fixed Code:  
   ```css
   #downloadsListBox > richlistitem[verdict="Uncommon"] .downloadBlockedBadge
   ```  

   Additional Details: Similar to the first change, this improves selector specificity but doesn't clearly indicate a security fix.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   CSS Selector Update for Warning States [browser/themes/shared/downloads/download-blockedStates.inc.css] [Lines 54-58]  
   Old Code:  
   ```css
   @item@[verdict="PotentiallyUnwanted"] .downloadBlockedBadge,
   @item@[verdict="DownloadSpam"] .downloadBlockedBadge
   ```  
   Fixed Code:  
   ```css
   #downloadsListBox > richlistitem[verdict="PotentiallyUnwanted"] .downloadBlockedBadge,
   #downloadsListBox > richlistitem[verdict="DownloadSpam"] .downloadBlockedBadge
   ```  

   Additional Details: This appears to be part of the same pattern of replacing generic selectors with specific ones, but no clear security impact is evident.

Note: All changes follow the same pattern of replacing the `@item@` placeholder with a more specific selector path. While this improves code quality and maintainability, there's no clear evidence these changes were made to address specific security vulnerabilities. The changes might be part of a larger refactoring effort to make the CSS more reliable and maintainable.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/worklet/Worklet.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/worklet/Worklet.cpp@@ -164,8 +164,8 @@     return promise.forget();   }-  virtual void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx,-                                JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override {+  virtual void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+                                ErrorResult& aRv) override {     MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());     if (!aValue.isObject()) {@@ -256,8 +256,8 @@     return NS_OK;   }-  virtual void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx,-                                JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override {+  virtual void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+                                ErrorResult& aRv) override {     MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());     RejectPromises(NS_ERROR_DOM_NETWORK_ERR);   }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Error Handling Improvement] [dom/worklet/Worklet.cpp] [Lines 164-165, 256-257]  
   [Old Code]  
   `virtual void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue)`  
   `virtual void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue)`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `virtual void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue, ErrorResult& aRv)`  
   `virtual void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue, ErrorResult& aRv)`

Additional Details:
- The main change is the addition of ErrorResult& parameter to both callback functions
- This appears to be an improvement in error handling, allowing errors to be properly propagated
- While this could potentially prevent some error-related security issues, there's no clear evidence of a specific vulnerability being fixed
- The change is more likely about improving robustness than fixing a known security issue

No clear vulnerability name can be associated with this change, as it appears to be a general code improvement rather than a specific security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/src/metal/device.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/src/metal/device.rs@@ -329,6 +329,8 @@             conv::map_texture_view_dimension(desc.dimension)         };+        //Note: this doesn't check properly if the mipmap level count or array layer count+        // is explicitly set to 1.         let raw = if raw_format == texture.raw_format             && raw_type == texture.raw_type             && desc.range == wgt::ImageSubresourceRange::default()@@ -471,6 +473,7 @@         let mut bind_group_infos = arrayvec::ArrayVec::new();         // First, place the push constants+        let mut total_push_constants = 0;         for info in stage_data.iter_mut() {             for pcr in desc.push_constant_ranges {                 if pcr.stages.contains(map_naga_stage(info.stage)) {@@ -492,6 +495,8 @@                 info.pc_buffer = Some(info.counters.buffers);                 info.counters.buffers += 1;             }++            total_push_constants = total_push_constants.max(info.pc_limit);         }         // Second, place the described resources@@ -641,6 +646,7 @@                     image: naga::proc::BoundsCheckPolicy::ReadZeroSkipWrite,                 },             },+            total_push_constants,         })     }     unsafe fn destroy_pipeline_layout(&self, _pipeline_layout: super::PipelineLayout) {}

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Incorrect Mipmap/Array Layer Validation] [third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/src/metal/device.rs] [Lines 329-336]
   [Old Code]
            conv::map_texture_view_dimension(desc.dimension)
        };
        
        let raw = if raw_format == texture.raw_format
            && raw_type == texture.raw_type
            && desc.range == wgt::ImageSubresourceRange::default()
   [Fixed Code]
            conv::map_texture_view_dimension(desc.dimension)
        };

        //Note: this doesn't check properly if the mipmap level count or array layer count
        // is explicitly set to 1.
        let raw = if raw_format == texture.raw_format
            && raw_type == texture.raw_type
            && desc.range == wgt::ImageSubresourceRange::default()
   Additional Details: The added comment suggests there might be an issue with validation of mipmap level count or array layer count, but it's unclear if this was actually fixed or just noted as a potential issue.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Push Constants Validation Issue] [third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/src/metal/device.rs] [Lines 471-495]
   [Old Code]
        let mut bind_group_infos = arrayvec::ArrayVec::new();

        // First, place the push constants
        for info in stage_data.iter_mut() {
   [Fixed Code]
        let mut bind_group_infos = arrayvec::ArrayVec::new();

        // First, place the push constants
        let mut total_push_constants = 0;
        for info in stage_data.iter_mut() {
   Additional Details: The addition of tracking total_push_constants suggests there might have been a potential issue with push constants validation or bounds checking, but the exact nature isn't clear from the diff.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Bounds Checking Issue] [third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/src/metal/device.rs] [Lines 641-646]
   [Old Code]
                    image: naga::proc::BoundsCheckPolicy::ReadZeroSkipWrite,
                },
            },
   [Fixed Code]
                    image: naga::proc::BoundsCheckPolicy::ReadZeroSkipWrite,
                },
            },
            total_push_constants,
   Additional Details: The addition of total_push_constants to the returned structure suggests improved bounds checking, but it's unclear if this was fixing an actual vulnerability or just improving safety.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-fonts/font-variant-position.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-fonts/font-variant-position.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="John Daggett" href="mailto:[email protected]"/> <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css-fonts-3/#font-variant-position-prop"/> <link rel="match" href="font-variant-position-ref.html"/>-<meta name="flags" content=""/> <meta name="assert" content="Values of font-variant-position should enable specific features without enabling others"/> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> <script type="text/javascript" src="support/fonts/gsubtest-features.js"></script>

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Meta Tag Removal [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-fonts/font-variant-position.html [Lines] 5
    Old Code: <meta name="flags" content=""/>
    Fixed Code: [removed]

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag named "flags" which doesn't appear to have any security implications
- This appears to be a cleanup change rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerability is associated with this change
- The modification doesn't affect any security-related functionality

No other changes were present in the diff that would indicate security fixes. The rest of the file remains unchanged.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.