Shared security patch analysis results
AI Used: DEEPSEEK deepseek-chat--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-39.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-39.xml@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/> <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/> <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->- <meta name="flags" content="" /> </head> <body>
Analysis of the provided code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability [File] [Lines 6] [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="" /> [Fixed Code] (line removed) Additional details: - The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag with name="flags". This doesn't appear to be a security fix but rather a cleanup of unnecessary markup. - No known vulnerability is associated with this change. - The modification appears to be part of general code maintenance rather than addressing a specific security issue.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/html/input/NumericInputTypes.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/html/input/NumericInputTypes.cpp@@ -95,12 +95,7 @@ bool NumericInputTypeBase::ConvertStringToNumber(nsAString& aValue, Decimal& aResultValue) const {- ICUUtils::LanguageTagIterForContent langTagIter(mInputElement);- aResultValue =- Decimal::fromDouble(ICUUtils::ParseNumber(aValue, langTagIter));- if (!aResultValue.isFinite()) {- aResultValue = HTMLInputElement::StringToDecimal(aValue);- }+ aResultValue = HTMLInputElement::StringToDecimal(aValue); return aResultValue.isFinite(); }@@ -136,6 +131,17 @@ nsAutoString value; GetNonFileValueInternal(value); return !value.IsEmpty() && mInputElement->GetValueAsDecimal().isNaN();+}++bool NumberInputType::ConvertStringToNumber(nsAString& aValue,+ Decimal& aResultValue) const {+ ICUUtils::LanguageTagIterForContent langTagIter(mInputElement);+ aResultValue =+ Decimal::fromDouble(ICUUtils::ParseNumber(aValue, langTagIter));+ if (aResultValue.isFinite()) {+ return true;+ }+ return NumericInputTypeBase::ConvertStringToNumber(aValue, aResultValue); } bool NumberInputType::ConvertNumberToString(Decimal aValue,
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Numeric Parsing Inconsistency] [dom/html/input/NumericInputTypes.cpp] [Lines 95-100]
[Old Code]
ICUUtils::LanguageTagIterForContent langTagIter(mInputElement);
aResultValue =
Decimal::fromDouble(ICUUtils::ParseNumber(aValue, langTagIter));
if (!aResultValue.isFinite()) {
aResultValue = HTMLInputElement::StringToDecimal(aValue);
}
[Fixed Code]
aResultValue = HTMLInputElement::StringToDecimal(aValue);
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Numeric Parsing Fallback Issue] [dom/html/input/NumericInputTypes.cpp] [Lines 136-146]
[Old Code]
nsAutoString value;
GetNonFileValueInternal(value);
return !value.IsEmpty() && mInputElement->GetValueAsDecimal().isNaN();
[New Code Added]
ICUUtils::LanguageTagIterForContent langTagIter(mInputElement);
aResultValue =
Decimal::fromDouble(ICUUtils::ParseNumber(aValue, langTagIter));
if (aResultValue.isFinite()) {
return true;
}
return NumericInputTypeBase::ConvertStringToNumber(aValue, aResultValue);
The changes appear to modify how numeric values are parsed from strings in input fields. The main changes are:
1. Simplified the base class implementation to always use HTMLInputElement::StringToDecimal
2. Added a specialized implementation in NumberInputType that first tries ICUUtils::ParseNumber with language tags before falling back to the base implementation
While I can't identify specific known vulnerabilities being fixed here, these changes could potentially address:
- Inconsistent number parsing between different locales
- Fallback behavior when parsing fails
- Potential precision issues in number conversion
The changes suggest a refactoring of number parsing logic to make it more consistent and reliable, but without more context about specific security issues, I can't definitively identify any vulnerabilities being fixed.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/ch-unit-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/ch-unit-001.html@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ <title>CSS Values and Units Test: support for the ch unit</title> <link rel="author" title="Florian Rivoal" href="http://florian.rivoal.net/"> <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-values-3/#font-relative-lengths">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <link rel="match" href="reference/ch-unit-001-ref.html"> <meta name="assert" content="The ch unit is equal to the used advance measure of the 0 (ZERO, U+0030) glyph found in the font used to render it."> <style>
Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment: Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/ch-unit-001.html [Lines] 3-7 [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content=""> [Fixed Code] (removed line) Additional Details: The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which doesn't appear to have any security implications. This seems to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix. The modification doesn't affect any security-related functionality or introduce any vulnerabilities. The removal of an empty, unused meta tag doesn't impact the security posture of the application. No actual security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change appears to be purely cosmetic or related to test organization rather than addressing any security concerns.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/mediaqueries/device-aspect-ratio-005.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/mediaqueries/device-aspect-ratio-005.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Xin Liu" href="mailto:[email protected]"> <link rel="help" title="4.7. device-aspect-ratio" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-mediaqueries/#device-aspect-ratio"> <link rel="match" href="../reference/ref-filled-green-100px-square.xht">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="The 'device-aspect-ratio' property set '1280/1024' means that the ratio is '1280/1024', only and only if the device value of 'width' to value of 'height' is equals with value of 'device-aspect-ratio', the style sheet will be applied."> <style> div {
Let me analyze the diff for potential security vulnerabilities: Vulnerability Existed: no [No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/mediaqueries/device-aspect-ratio-005.html] [Lines 5] [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content=""> [Fixed Code] [Removed line] Additional Details: This appears to be a simple test file modification where an empty meta tag for "flags" was removed. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed here - it's likely just test cleanup or maintenance. The change doesn't affect any security-related functionality or introduce/remove any security controls. The modification is in a test file for CSS media queries functionality.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.large.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.large.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var n = 2147483647; // 2^31 - 1, which should be supported by any sensible definition of "long"-offscreenCanvas.width = n;-offscreenCanvas.height = n;-_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.width, n, "offscreenCanvas.width", "n");-_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.height, n, "offscreenCanvas.height", "n");+canvas.width = n;+canvas.height = n;+_assertSame(canvas.width, n, "canvas.width", "n");+_assertSame(canvas.height, n, "canvas.height", "n"); t.done(); });
Here's my analysis following the specified format:
Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.large.worker.js] [Lines 13-21]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
var n = 2147483647; // 2^31 - 1, which should be supported by any sensible definition of "long"
offscreenCanvas.width = n;
offscreenCanvas.height = n;
_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.width, n, "offscreenCanvas.width", "n");
_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.height, n, "offscreenCanvas.height", "n");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
var n = 2147483647; // 2^31 - 1, which should be supported by any sensible definition of "long"
canvas.width = n;
canvas.height = n;
_assertSame(canvas.width, n, "canvas.width", "n");
_assertSame(canvas.height, n, "canvas.height", "n");
Additional Details:
The changes appear to be purely variable name changes (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) without any security implications. The test continues to verify that large canvas dimensions (up to 2^31 - 1) are properly supported, but this is a functional test rather than a security fix. No actual vulnerabilities are being addressed in this diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/ci.sh+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/ci.sh@@ -600,8 +600,8 @@ } cmd_asanfuzz() {- CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS+=" -fsanitize=fuzzer-no-link"- CMAKE_C_FLAGS+=" -fsanitize=fuzzer-no-link"+ CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS+=" -fsanitize=fuzzer-no-link -DFUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION=1"+ CMAKE_C_FLAGS+=" -fsanitize=fuzzer-no-link -DFUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION=1" cmd_asan -DJPEGXL_ENABLE_FUZZERS=ON "$@" }@@ -615,8 +615,8 @@ cmd_msan_install fi- CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS+=" -fsanitize=fuzzer-no-link"- CMAKE_C_FLAGS+=" -fsanitize=fuzzer-no-link"+ CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS+=" -fsanitize=fuzzer-no-link -DFUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION=1"+ CMAKE_C_FLAGS+=" -fsanitize=fuzzer-no-link -DFUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION=1" cmd_msan -DJPEGXL_ENABLE_FUZZERS=ON "$@" }@@ -697,7 +697,7 @@ strip_dead_code cmake_configure "$@" \ -DCMAKE_CROSSCOMPILING=1 -DRUN_HAVE_STD_REGEX=0 -DRUN_HAVE_POSIX_REGEX=0 \- -DJPEGXL_ENABLE_TCMALLOC=OFF+ -DJPEGXL_ENABLE_TCMALLOC=OFF -DJPEGXL_WARNINGS_AS_ERRORS=OFF cmake_build_and_test }
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes: 1. Vulnerability Existed: yes Fuzzing Mode Safety Flag Missing [third_party/jpeg-xl/ci.sh] [Lines 600-601, 615-616] Old Code: `CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS+=" -fsanitize=fuzzer-no-link"` `CMAKE_C_FLAGS+=" -fsanitize=fuzzer-no-link"` Fixed Code: `CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS+=" -fsanitize=fuzzer-no-link -DFUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION=1"` `CMAKE_C_FLAGS+=" -fsanitize=fuzzer-no-link -DFUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION=1"` Additional Details: The fix adds the `-DFUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION=1` flag to explicitly mark fuzzing builds as unsafe for production, which helps prevent accidental use of fuzzing builds in production environments. 2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure Potential Build Warning Configuration Issue [third_party/jpeg-xl/ci.sh] [Lines 697] Old Code: `-DJPEGXL_ENABLE_TCMALLOC=OFF` Fixed Code: `-DJPEGXL_ENABLE_TCMALLOC=OFF -DJPEGXL_WARNINGS_AS_ERRORS=OFF` Additional Details: The addition of `-DJPEGXL_WARNINGS_AS_ERRORS=OFF` might be related to security if warnings were being treated as errors in a way that could mask potential security issues, but this isn't clearly a security fix. Note: The first entry clearly addresses a security-related configuration issue for fuzzing builds, while the second change's security implications are less clear.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/tools/profiler/tests/browser/browser_test_profile_multi_frame_page_info.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/tools/profiler/tests/browser/browser_test_profile_multi_frame_page_info.js@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ // Requesting the complete log to be able to debug Bug 1586105. SimpleTest.requestCompleteLog(); Assert.ok(!Services.profiler.IsActive());- info("Clear the previous pages just in case we still some open tabs.");+ info("Clear the previous pages just in case we still have some open tabs."); await Services.profiler.ClearAllPages(); info(@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ Assert.equal(typeof page.innerWindowID, "number"); // Top level document will have no embedder. Assert.equal(page.embedderInnerWindowID, 0);+ Assert.equal(typeof page.isPrivateBrowsing, "boolean");+ Assert.equal(page.isPrivateBrowsing, false); parentPage = page; foundPage++; break;@@ -81,6 +83,8 @@ Assert.equal(typeof page.embedderInnerWindowID, "number"); Assert.notEqual(typeof parentPage, "undefined"); Assert.equal(page.embedderInnerWindowID, parentPage.innerWindowID);+ Assert.equal(typeof page.isPrivateBrowsing, "boolean");+ Assert.equal(page.isPrivateBrowsing, false); foundPage++; break; }
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
Typo Fix [File] [Lines 13]
[Old Code] "Clear the previous pages just in case we still some open tabs."
[Fixed Code] "Clear the previous pages just in case we still have some open tabs."
Additional Details: This is just a grammatical correction with no security implications.
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Privacy Check Addition [File] [Lines 63-64, 83-84]
[Old Code] No checks for isPrivateBrowsing
[Fixed Code] Added assertions checking isPrivateBrowsing is boolean and false
Additional Details: While not a direct security fix, these additions help ensure private browsing status is properly tracked, which could prevent privacy-related issues. However, this appears to be more of a test enhancement than a security fix.
No clear security vulnerabilities were fixed in this diff. The changes primarily consist of:
1. A typo correction in a log message
2. Additional test assertions for private browsing status verification
The additions of isPrivateBrowsing checks suggest improved validation of privacy-related properties, but this doesn't appear to be fixing an existing vulnerability - rather it's adding more comprehensive testing.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/shell/jsshell.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/shell/jsshell.h@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ extern bool enableToSource; extern bool enablePropertyErrorMessageFix; extern bool enableIteratorHelpers;+extern bool enableArrayGrouping; extern bool enablePrivateClassFields; extern bool enablePrivateClassMethods; extern bool enableErgonomicBrandChecks;
Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability] [js/src/shell/jsshell.h] [Lines 132-132]
[Old Code]
extern bool enableToSource;
extern bool enablePropertyErrorMessageFix;
extern bool enableIteratorHelpers;
[Fixed Code]
extern bool enableToSource;
extern bool enablePropertyErrorMessageFix;
extern bool enableIteratorHelpers;
extern bool enableArrayGrouping;
Additional Details:
- This appears to be a feature addition (adding `enableArrayGrouping` flag) rather than a security fix
- No security-related changes are visible in this diff
- The change simply adds a new configuration flag for array grouping functionality
- No vulnerabilities are being patched in this specific diff
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.hsl-clamp-3.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.hsl-clamp-3.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(120, 100%, 200%)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 255,255,255,255, "50,25", "255,255,255,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 255,255,255,255, "50,25", "255,255,255,255"); t.done(); });
Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-sensitive operations. Here's the analysis:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.hsl-clamp-3.html] [Lines 17-25]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(120, 100%, 200%)';
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 255,255,255,255, "50,25", "255,255,255,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(120, 100%, 200%)';
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 255,255,255,255, "50,25", "255,255,255,255");
The changes are:
1. Renamed variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Updated the variable name in `_assertPixel` call
These changes don't appear to address any security issues but rather improve code consistency or readability.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.align.right.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.align.right.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var f = new FontFace("CanvasTest", "url('/fonts/CanvasTest.ttf')"); let fonts = (self.fonts ? self.fonts : document.fonts);@@ -31,12 +31,12 @@ ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.textAlign = 'right'; ctx.fillText('DD', 100, 37.5);- _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 5,5, 0,255,0,255, "5,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);- _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 95,5, 0,255,0,255, "95,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);- _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);- _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);- _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 5,45, 0,255,0,255, "5,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);- _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 95,45, 0,255,0,255, "95,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);+ _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 5,5, 0,255,0,255, "5,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);+ _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 95,5, 0,255,0,255, "95,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);+ _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+ _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+ _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 5,45, 0,255,0,255, "5,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);+ _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 95,45, 0,255,0,255, "95,45", "0,255,0,255", 2); }).then(t_pass, t_fail); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and updating the corresponding references in the test assertions. Here's the analysis following your requested format:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-31]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[...]
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 5,5, 0,255,0,255, "5,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);
[...]
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
[...]
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 5,5, 0,255,0,255, "5,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);
[...]
The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The test functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/src/flavors/zero.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/src/flavors/zero.rs@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ use std::marker::PhantomData; use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering}; use std::time::Instant;+use std::{fmt, ptr}; use crossbeam_utils::Backoff;@@ -16,7 +17,19 @@ use crate::waker::Waker; /// A pointer to a packet.-pub(crate) type ZeroToken = usize;+pub struct ZeroToken(*mut ());++impl Default for ZeroToken {+ fn default() -> Self {+ Self(ptr::null_mut())+ }+}++impl fmt::Debug for ZeroToken {+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {+ fmt::Debug::fmt(&(self.0 as usize), f)+ }+} /// A slot for passing one message from a sender to a receiver. struct Packet<T> {@@ -117,10 +130,10 @@ // If there's a waiting receiver, pair up with it. if let Some(operation) = inner.receivers.try_select() {- token.zero = operation.packet;+ token.zero.0 = operation.packet; true } else if inner.is_disconnected {- token.zero = 0;+ token.zero.0 = ptr::null_mut(); true } else { false@@ -130,11 +143,11 @@ /// Writes a message into the packet. pub(crate) unsafe fn write(&self, token: &mut Token, msg: T) -> Result<(), T> { // If there is no packet, the channel is disconnected.- if token.zero == 0 {+ if token.zero.0.is_null() { return Err(msg); }- let packet = &*(token.zero as *const Packet<T>);+ let packet = &*(token.zero.0 as *const Packet<T>); packet.msg.get().write(Some(msg)); packet.ready.store(true, Ordering::Release); Ok(())@@ -146,10 +159,10 @@ // If there's a waiting sender, pair up with it. if let Some(operation) = inner.senders.try_select() {- token.zero = operation.packet;+ token.zero.0 = operation.packet; true } else if inner.is_disconnected {- token.zero = 0;+ token.zero.0 = ptr::null_mut(); true } else { false@@ -159,11 +172,11 @@ /// Reads a message from the packet. pub(crate) unsafe fn read(&self, token: &mut Token) -> Result<T, ()> { // If there is no packet, the channel is disconnected.- if token.zero == 0 {+ if token.zero.0.is_null() { return Err(()); }- let packet = &*(token.zero as *const Packet<T>);+ let packet = &*(token.zero.0 as *const Packet<T>); if packet.on_stack { // The message has been in the packet from the beginning, so there is no need to wait@@ -177,7 +190,7 @@ // heap-allocated packet. packet.wait_ready(); let msg = packet.msg.get().replace(None).unwrap();- drop(Box::from_raw(packet as *const Packet<T> as *mut Packet<T>));+ drop(Box::from_raw(token.zero.0 as *mut Packet<T>)); Ok(msg) } }@@ -189,7 +202,7 @@ // If there's a waiting receiver, pair up with it. if let Some(operation) = inner.receivers.try_select() {- token.zero = operation.packet;+ token.zero.0 = operation.packet; drop(inner); unsafe { self.write(token, msg).ok().unwrap();@@ -213,7 +226,7 @@ // If there's a waiting receiver, pair up with it. if let Some(operation) = inner.receivers.try_select() {- token.zero = operation.packet;+ token.zero.0 = operation.packet; drop(inner); unsafe { self.write(token, msg).ok().unwrap();@@ -228,10 +241,10 @@ Context::with(|cx| { // Prepare for blocking until a receiver wakes us up. let oper = Operation::hook(token);- let packet = Packet::<T>::message_on_stack(msg);+ let mut packet = Packet::<T>::message_on_stack(msg); inner .senders- .register_with_packet(oper, &packet as *const Packet<T> as usize, cx);+ .register_with_packet(oper, &mut packet as *mut Packet<T> as *mut (), cx); inner.receivers.notify(); drop(inner);@@ -266,7 +279,7 @@ // If there's a waiting sender, pair up with it. if let Some(operation) = inner.senders.try_select() {- token.zero = operation.packet;+ token.zero.0 = operation.packet; drop(inner); unsafe { self.read(token).map_err(|_| TryRecvError::Disconnected) } } else if inner.is_disconnected {@@ -283,7 +296,7 @@ // If there's a waiting sender, pair up with it. if let Some(operation) = inner.senders.try_select() {- token.zero = operation.packet;+ token.zero.0 = operation.packet; drop(inner); unsafe { return self.read(token).map_err(|_| RecvTimeoutError::Disconnected);@@ -297,10 +310,12 @@ Context::with(|cx| { // Prepare for blocking until a sender wakes us up. let oper = Operation::hook(token);- let packet = Packet::<T>::empty_on_stack();- inner- .receivers- .register_with_packet(oper, &packet as *const Packet<T> as usize, cx);+ let mut packet = Packet::<T>::empty_on_stack();+ inner.receivers.register_with_packet(+ oper,+ &mut packet as *mut Packet<T> as *mut (),+ cx,+ ); inner.senders.notify(); drop(inner);@@ -385,7 +400,7 @@ let mut inner = self.0.inner.lock(); inner .receivers- .register_with_packet(oper, packet as usize, cx);+ .register_with_packet(oper, packet as *mut (), cx); inner.senders.notify(); inner.senders.can_select() || inner.is_disconnected }@@ -399,7 +414,7 @@ } fn accept(&self, token: &mut Token, cx: &Context) -> bool {- token.zero = cx.wait_packet();+ token.zero.0 = cx.wait_packet(); true }@@ -435,7 +450,7 @@ let mut inner = self.0.inner.lock(); inner .senders- .register_with_packet(oper, packet as usize, cx);+ .register_with_packet(oper, packet as *mut (), cx); inner.receivers.notify(); inner.receivers.can_select() || inner.is_disconnected }@@ -449,7 +464,7 @@ } fn accept(&self, token: &mut Token, cx: &Context) -> bool {- token.zero = cx.wait_packet();+ token.zero.0 = cx.wait_packet(); true }
Let me analyze the code diff for security vulnerabilities: 1. Vulnerability Existed: yes Null Pointer Dereference [third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/src/flavors/zero.rs] [Lines 117-130, 143-172] [Old Code] Using raw usize (0) to represent null pointers and checking with == 0 [Fixed Code] Using proper null pointer representation (*mut ()) and checking with is_null() 2. Vulnerability Existed: yes Type Confusion [third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/src/flavors/zero.rs] [Lines 117-130, 143-172] [Old Code] Direct casting between usize and pointers without proper type safety [Fixed Code] Using proper pointer types and casts with type safety 3. Vulnerability Existed: yes Memory Safety [third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/src/flavors/zero.rs] [Lines 117-130, 143-172] [Old Code] Unsafe pointer operations without proper null checks and type conversions [Fixed Code] Safer pointer handling with proper null checks and type conversions 4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure Potential Race Condition [third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/src/flavors/zero.rs] [Lines 117-130, 143-172] [Old Code] Direct pointer manipulation could lead to race conditions [Fixed Code] More controlled pointer access patterns The main security improvements appear to be: 1. Replacing raw usize pointer representation with proper pointer types 2. Adding proper null pointer checks 3. Making pointer operations more type-safe 4. Potentially fixing race conditions through better pointer handling The changes make the code more robust against null pointer dereferences and type confusion vulnerabilities that could lead to memory safety issues.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/docshell/base/BrowsingContext.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/docshell/base/BrowsingContext.h@@ -127,6 +127,8 @@ FIELD(ShouldDelayMediaFromStart, bool) \ /* See nsSandboxFlags.h for the possible flags. */ \ FIELD(SandboxFlags, uint32_t) \+ /* The value of SandboxFlags when the BrowsingContext is first created. \+ * Used for sandboxing the initial about:blank document. */ \ FIELD(InitialSandboxFlags, uint32_t) \ /* A non-zero unique identifier for the browser element that is hosting \ * this \@@ -801,7 +803,8 @@ void SessionHistoryCommit(const LoadingSessionHistoryInfo& aInfo, uint32_t aLoadType, nsIURI* aCurrentURI, bool aHadActiveEntry, bool aPersist,- bool aCloneEntryChildren, bool aChannelExpired);+ bool aCloneEntryChildren, bool aChannelExpired,+ uint32_t aCacheKey); // Set a new active entry on this browsing context. This is used for // implementing history.pushState/replaceState and same document navigations.@@ -907,6 +910,8 @@ static bool ShouldAddEntryForRefresh(nsIURI* aCurrentURI, const SessionHistoryInfo& aInfo);+ static bool ShouldAddEntryForRefresh(nsIURI* aCurrentURI, nsIURI* aNewURI,+ bool aHasPostData); private: void Attach(bool aFromIPC, ContentParent* aOriginProcess);
I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Sandbox Flag Initialization] [docshell/base/BrowsingContext.h] [Lines 127-130]
[Old Code]
FIELD(SandboxFlags, uint32_t) \
/* A non-zero unique identifier for the browser element that is hosting \
[Fixed Code]
FIELD(SandboxFlags, uint32_t) \
/* The value of SandboxFlags when the BrowsingContext is first created. \
* Used for sandboxing the initial about:blank document. */ \
FIELD(InitialSandboxFlags, uint32_t) \
Additional Details: The addition of InitialSandboxFlags suggests improved handling of sandbox flags for initial documents, but it's unclear if this fixes a specific vulnerability or is just a general improvement.
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Session History Cache Key] [docshell/base/BrowsingContext.h] [Lines 801-803]
[Old Code]
void SessionHistoryCommit(const LoadingSessionHistoryInfo& aInfo,
uint32_t aLoadType, nsIURI* aCurrentURI,
bool aHadActiveEntry, bool aPersist,
bool aCloneEntryChildren, bool aChannelExpired);
[Fixed Code]
void SessionHistoryCommit(const LoadingSessionHistoryInfo& aInfo,
uint32_t aLoadType, nsIURI* aCurrentURI,
bool aHadActiveEntry, bool aPersist,
bool aCloneEntryChildren, bool aChannelExpired,
uint32_t aCacheKey);
Additional Details: The addition of aCacheKey parameter might relate to cache validation or session history security, but without more context, I can't determine if this fixes a specific vulnerability.
3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Refresh Entry Validation] [docshell/base/BrowsingContext.h] [Lines 910-912]
[Old Code]
static bool ShouldAddEntryForRefresh(nsIURI* aCurrentURI,
const SessionHistoryInfo& aInfo);
[Fixed Code]
static bool ShouldAddEntryForRefresh(nsIURI* aCurrentURI, nsIURI* aNewURI,
bool aHasPostData);
Additional Details: The change in method signature suggests improved validation for refresh entries, possibly to prevent certain types of navigation attacks, but the exact security impact is unclear without more context.
Note: While these changes appear to be security-related improvements, I cannot definitively identify specific vulnerabilities being fixed without more context about the threat models or associated bug reports.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/inspector/shared/compatibility-user-settings.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/inspector/shared/compatibility-user-settings.js@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ "safari", "safari_ios", "edge",+ "ie", ]; const TARGET_BROWSER_STATUS = ["esr", "current", "beta", "nightly"];
Let me analyze the code diff according to the provided format. Vulnerability Existed: no [No specific vulnerability] [devtools/client/inspector/shared/compatibility-user-settings.js] [Lines 20-21] [Old Code] "safari", "safari_ios", "edge", ] [Fixed Code] "safari", "safari_ios", "edge", + "ie", ] Additional Details: - This appears to be a simple addition of "ie" (Internet Explorer) to the list of supported browsers - No security vulnerability is evident from this change - The modification seems to be for feature completeness rather than security - No sensitive operations or security-related functions are being modified The change simply adds another browser identifier to an array constant, which doesn't appear to have any security implications. It's likely part of expanding compatibility checking functionality.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-017-ref.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-017-ref.html@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ -ms-column-fill: auto; -webkit-column-fill: auto; column-fill: auto;- border: 2px dashed;+ border: 2px solid salmon; margin-bottom: 5px; }
Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-017-ref.html [Lines] 21
[Old Code] border: 2px dashed;
[Fixed Code] border: 2px solid salmon;
Additional Details:
- This appears to be purely a visual/style change in a test file, changing the border style from dashed to solid and specifying a color (salmon)
- The change doesn't involve any security-sensitive operations, input handling, or potential attack vectors
- The file is a reference test for CSS grid fragmentation, not production code
No security vulnerabilities were identified in this change. The modification is strictly presentational and doesn't affect any security-related functionality.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.clearRect.clip.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.clearRect.clip.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ ctx.clearRect(0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 16, 16);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 13-14, 24]
Old Code:
```
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
```
Fixed Code:
```
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
```
Additional Details: This appears to be a simple variable name change from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas' for consistency or readability. No security implications.
2. Vulnerability Existed: no
Variable Reference Update [File] [Line 24]
Old Code:
```
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
```
Fixed Code:
```
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
```
Additional Details: This is a follow-up change to match the variable renaming above. No security impact.
The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature, updating variable names for consistency. There are no apparent security vulnerabilities being fixed in this diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.image.xor.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.image.xor.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 255, 0.5)';@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ promise.then(function(response) { createImageBitmap(response).then(bitmap => { ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 0, 0);- _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 191,255,64,128, "50,25", "191,255,64,128", 5);+ _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 191,255,64,128, "50,25", "191,255,64,128", 5); }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability [File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.image.xor.html] [Lines: 17-18, 36]
Old Code:
```javascript
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
```
Fixed Code:
```javascript
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
```
2. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability [File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.image.xor.html] [Lines: 36]
Old Code:
```javascript
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 191,255,64,128, "50,25", "191,255,64,128", 5);
```
Fixed Code:
```javascript
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 191,255,64,128, "50,25", "191,255,64,128", 5);
```
The changes appear to be purely variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability purposes, with no security implications. There are no actual security vulnerabilities being fixed in this diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/nss/tests/cipher/cipher.txt+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/nss/tests/cipher/cipher.txt@@ -48,10 +48,12 @@ 0 rsa_-K RSA_Populate 0 dsa_-S DSA_Sign 0 dsa_-V DSA_Verify+ 0 ecdsa_-S ECDSA_Sign+ 0 ecdsa_-V ECDSA_Verify 0 md2_-H MD2_Hash 0 md5_-H MD5_Hash 0 sha1_-H SHA1_Hash 0 sha224_-H SHA224_Hash 0 sha256_-H SHA256_Hash 0 sha384_-H SHA384_Hash- 0 sha512_-H SHA512_Hash+ 0 sha512_-H SHA512_Hash=========accessible/ipc/RemoteAccessibleBase.cpp========--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/accessible/ipc/RemoteAccessibleBase.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/accessible/ipc/RemoteAccessibleBase.cpp@@ -270,12 +270,12 @@ } template <class Derived>-nsIntRect RemoteAccessibleBase<Derived>::Bounds() const {+LayoutDeviceIntRect RemoteAccessibleBase<Derived>::Bounds() const { if (mCachedFields) { Maybe<nsRect> maybeBounds = RetrieveCachedBounds(); if (maybeBounds) { nsRect bounds = *maybeBounds;- nsIntRect devPxBounds;+ LayoutDeviceIntRect devPxBounds; dom::CanonicalBrowsingContext* cbc = static_cast<dom::BrowserParent*>(mDoc->Manager()) ->GetBrowsingContext()@@ -290,11 +290,11 @@ const_cast<Accessible*>(acc)->AsLocal()) { // LocalAccessible::Bounds returns screen-relative bounds in // dev pixels.- nsIntRect localBounds = localAcc->Bounds();+ LayoutDeviceIntRect localBounds = localAcc->Bounds(); // Convert our existing `bounds` rect from app units to dev pixels- devPxBounds =- bounds.ToNearestPixels(presContext->AppUnitsPerDevPixel());+ devPxBounds = LayoutDeviceIntRect::FromAppUnitsToNearest(+ bounds, presContext->AppUnitsPerDevPixel()); // We factor in our zoom level before offsetting by // `localBounds`, which has already taken zoom into account.@@ -351,14 +351,14 @@ // viewport. We calculate the difference and translate our bounds here. nsPoint viewportOffset = presShell->GetVisualViewportOffset() - presShell->GetLayoutViewportOffset();- devPxBounds.MoveBy(-(- viewportOffset.ToNearestPixels(presContext->AppUnitsPerDevPixel())));+ devPxBounds.MoveBy(-(LayoutDeviceIntPoint::FromAppUnitsToNearest(+ viewportOffset, presContext->AppUnitsPerDevPixel()))); return devPxBounds; } }- return nsIntRect();+ return LayoutDeviceIntRect(); } template <class Derived>@@ -487,13 +487,13 @@ GroupPos groupPos = GroupPosition(); nsAccUtils::SetAccGroupAttrs(attributes, groupPos.level, groupPos.setSize,- groupPos.posInSet);+ groupPos.posInSet); bool hierarchical = false; uint32_t itemCount = AccGroupInfo::TotalItemCount(this, &hierarchical); if (itemCount) { attributes->SetAttribute(nsGkAtoms::child_item_count,- static_cast<int32_t>(itemCount));+ static_cast<int32_t>(itemCount)); } if (hierarchical) {@@ -519,6 +519,61 @@ } return nullptr;+}++template <class Derived>+uint8_t RemoteAccessibleBase<Derived>::ActionCount() const {+ uint8_t actionCount = 0;+ if (mCachedFields) {+ if (mCachedFields->HasAttribute(nsGkAtoms::action)) {+ actionCount++;+ }++ if (mCachedFields->HasAttribute(nsGkAtoms::longdesc)) {+ actionCount++;+ }+ VERIFY_CACHE(CacheDomain::Actions);+ }++ return actionCount;+}++template <class Derived>+void RemoteAccessibleBase<Derived>::ActionNameAt(uint8_t aIndex,+ nsAString& aName) {+ if (mCachedFields) {+ aName.Truncate();+ auto action =+ mCachedFields->GetAttribute<RefPtr<nsAtom>>(nsGkAtoms::action);+ bool haslongdesc = mCachedFields->HasAttribute(nsGkAtoms::longdesc);+ switch (aIndex) {+ case 0:+ if (action) {+ (*action)->ToString(aName);+ } else if (haslongdesc) {+ aName.AssignLiteral("showlongdesc");+ }+ break;+ case 1:+ if (action && haslongdesc) {+ aName.AssignLiteral("showlongdesc");+ }+ break;+ default:+ break;+ }+ }+ VERIFY_CACHE(CacheDomain::Actions);+}++template <class Derived>+bool RemoteAccessibleBase<Derived>::DoAction(uint8_t aIndex) const {+ if (ActionCount() < aIndex + 1) {+ return false;+ }++ Unused << mDoc->SendDoActionAsync(mID, aIndex);+ return true; } template <class Derived>
I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format:
1. For the cipher.txt changes:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability - this appears to be a test file update adding ECDSA test cases and fixing a formatting issue with SHA512_Hash.
2. For the RemoteAccessibleBase.cpp changes:
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Type Safety Issue [File] accessible/ipc/RemoteAccessibleBase.cpp [Lines] 270-351
[Old Code]
nsIntRect RemoteAccessibleBase<Derived>::Bounds() const {
...
nsIntRect devPxBounds;
...
nsIntRect localBounds = localAcc->Bounds();
...
devPxBounds = bounds.ToNearestPixels(presContext->AppUnitsPerDevPixel());
[Fixed Code]
LayoutDeviceIntRect RemoteAccessibleBase<Derived>::Bounds() const {
...
LayoutDeviceIntRect devPxBounds;
...
LayoutDeviceIntRect localBounds = localAcc->Bounds();
...
devPxBounds = LayoutDeviceIntRect::FromAppUnitsToNearest(bounds, presContext->AppUnitsPerDevPixel());
3. For the attribute setting changes:
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Integer Handling Issue [File] accessible/ipc/RemoteAccessibleBase.cpp [Lines] 487-493
[Old Code]
nsAccUtils::SetAccGroupAttrs(attributes, groupPos.level, groupPos.setSize,
groupPos.posInSet);
...
attributes->SetAttribute(nsGkAtoms::child_item_count,
static_cast<int32_t>(itemCount));
[Fixed Code]
nsAccUtils::SetAccGroupAttrs(attributes, groupPos.level, groupPos.setSize,
groupPos.posInSet);
...
attributes->SetAttribute(nsGkAtoms::child_item_count,
static_cast<int32_t>(itemCount));
4. For the new Action-related methods:
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Input Validation Issue [File] accessible/ipc/RemoteAccessibleBase.cpp [Lines] 519-568
[New Code]
Added ActionCount(), ActionNameAt(), and DoAction() methods with bounds checking and input validation.
Note: The changes appear to be primarily about type safety improvements (nsIntRect → LayoutDeviceIntRect), formatting fixes, and adding new functionality rather than fixing specific known vulnerabilities. The potential issues noted are speculative based on the nature of the changes.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.1.radius.double.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.1.radius.double.worker.js@@ -13,18 +13,18 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.roundRect(0, 0, 100, 50, [20]); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 255,0,0,255, "1,1", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 255,0,0,255, "98,1", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 255,0,0,255, "98,48", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 255,0,0,255, "1,48", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 255,0,0,255, "1,1", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 255,0,0,255, "98,1", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 255,0,0,255, "98,48", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 255,0,0,255, "1,48", "255,0,0,255"); t.done(); });
Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to the assertions. Here's the analysis:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-18]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[...]
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 255,0,0,255, "1,1", "255,0,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
[...]
_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 255,0,0,255, "1,1", "255,0,0,255");
The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/intl/lwbrk/Segmenter.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/intl/lwbrk/Segmenter.cpp@@ -10,6 +10,11 @@ #include "mozilla/intl/LineBreaker.h" #include "mozilla/intl/WordBreaker.h"+#include "mozilla/intl/UnicodeProperties.h"+#include "nsUnicodeProperties.h"+#include "nsCharTraits.h"++using namespace mozilla::unicode; namespace mozilla::intl {@@ -50,10 +55,158 @@ return Some(mPos); }+GraphemeClusterBreakIteratorUtf16::GraphemeClusterBreakIteratorUtf16(+ Span<const char16_t> aText)+ : SegmentIteratorUtf16(aText) {}++enum HSType {+ HST_NONE = U_HST_NOT_APPLICABLE,+ HST_L = U_HST_LEADING_JAMO,+ HST_V = U_HST_VOWEL_JAMO,+ HST_T = U_HST_TRAILING_JAMO,+ HST_LV = U_HST_LV_SYLLABLE,+ HST_LVT = U_HST_LVT_SYLLABLE+};++static HSType GetHangulSyllableType(uint32_t aCh) {+ return HSType(UnicodeProperties::GetIntPropertyValue(+ aCh, UnicodeProperties::IntProperty::HangulSyllableType));+}++Maybe<uint32_t> GraphemeClusterBreakIteratorUtf16::Next() {+ const auto len = mText.Length();+ if (mPos >= len) {+ // The iterator has already reached the end.+ return Nothing();+ }++ uint32_t ch = mText[mPos++];++ if (mPos < len && NS_IS_SURROGATE_PAIR(ch, mText[mPos])) {+ ch = SURROGATE_TO_UCS4(ch, mText[mPos++]);+ } else if ((ch & ~0xff) == 0x1100 || (ch >= 0xa960 && ch <= 0xa97f) ||+ (ch >= 0xac00 && ch <= 0xd7ff)) {+ // Handle conjoining Jamo that make Hangul syllables+ HSType hangulState = GetHangulSyllableType(ch);+ while (mPos < len) {+ ch = mText[mPos];+ HSType hangulType = GetHangulSyllableType(ch);+ switch (hangulType) {+ case HST_L:+ case HST_LV:+ case HST_LVT:+ if (hangulState == HST_L) {+ hangulState = hangulType;+ mPos++;+ continue;+ }+ break;+ case HST_V:+ if ((hangulState != HST_NONE) && (hangulState != HST_T) &&+ (hangulState != HST_LVT)) {+ hangulState = hangulType;+ mPos++;+ continue;+ }+ break;+ case HST_T:+ if (hangulState != HST_NONE && hangulState != HST_L) {+ hangulState = hangulType;+ mPos++;+ continue;+ }+ break;+ default:+ break;+ }+ break;+ }+ }++ const uint32_t kVS16 = 0xfe0f;+ const uint32_t kZWJ = 0x200d;+ // UTF-16 surrogate values for Fitzpatrick type modifiers+ const uint32_t kFitzpatrickHigh = 0xD83C;+ const uint32_t kFitzpatrickLowFirst = 0xDFFB;+ const uint32_t kFitzpatrickLowLast = 0xDFFF;++ bool baseIsEmoji = (GetEmojiPresentation(ch) == EmojiDefault) ||+ (GetEmojiPresentation(ch) == TextDefault &&+ ((mPos < len && mText[mPos] == kVS16) ||+ (mPos + 1 < len && mText[mPos] == kFitzpatrickHigh &&+ mText[mPos + 1] >= kFitzpatrickLowFirst &&+ mText[mPos + 1] <= kFitzpatrickLowLast)));+ bool prevWasZwj = false;++ while (mPos < len) {+ ch = mText[mPos];+ size_t chLen = 1;++ // Check for surrogate pairs; note that isolated surrogates will just+ // be treated as generic (non-cluster-extending) characters here,+ // which is fine for cluster-iterating purposes+ if (mPos < len - 1 && NS_IS_SURROGATE_PAIR(ch, mText[mPos + 1])) {+ ch = SURROGATE_TO_UCS4(ch, mText[mPos + 1]);+ chLen = 2;+ }++ bool extendCluster =+ IsClusterExtender(ch) ||+ (baseIsEmoji && prevWasZwj &&+ ((GetEmojiPresentation(ch) == EmojiDefault) ||+ (GetEmojiPresentation(ch) == TextDefault && mPos + chLen < len &&+ mText[mPos + chLen] == kVS16)));+ if (!extendCluster) {+ break;+ }++ prevWasZwj = (ch == kZWJ);+ mPos += chLen;+ }++ MOZ_ASSERT(mPos <= len, "Next() has overshot the string!");+ return Some(mPos);+}++GraphemeClusterBreakReverseIteratorUtf16::+ GraphemeClusterBreakReverseIteratorUtf16(Span<const char16_t> aText)+ : SegmentIteratorUtf16(aText) {+ mPos = mText.Length();+}++Maybe<uint32_t> GraphemeClusterBreakReverseIteratorUtf16::Next() {+ if (mPos == 0) {+ return Nothing();+ }++ uint32_t ch;+ do {+ ch = mText[--mPos];++ if (mPos > 0 && NS_IS_SURROGATE_PAIR(mText[mPos - 1], ch)) {+ ch = SURROGATE_TO_UCS4(mText[--mPos], ch);+ }++ if (!IsClusterExtender(ch)) {+ break;+ }+ } while (mPos > 0);++ // XXX May need to handle conjoining Jamo++ return Some(mPos);+}++Maybe<uint32_t> GraphemeClusterBreakReverseIteratorUtf16::Seek(uint32_t aPos) {+ if (mPos > aPos) {+ mPos = aPos;+ }+ return Next();+}+ Result<UniquePtr<Segmenter>, ICUError> Segmenter::TryCreate( Span<const char> aLocale, const SegmenterOptions& aOptions) {- if (aOptions.mGranularity == SegmenterGranularity::Grapheme ||- aOptions.mGranularity == SegmenterGranularity::Sentence) {+ if (aOptions.mGranularity == SegmenterGranularity::Sentence) { // Grapheme and Sentence iterator are not yet implemented. return Err(ICUError::InternalError); }@@ -64,6 +217,7 @@ Span<const char16_t> aText) const { switch (mOptions.mGranularity) { case SegmenterGranularity::Grapheme:+ return MakeUnique<GraphemeClusterBreakIteratorUtf16>(aText); case SegmenterGranularity::Sentence: MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Unimplemented yet!"); return nullptr;
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily feature additions and improvements to grapheme cluster handling in text segmentation. Here's my analysis: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines] The changes mainly add new functionality for grapheme cluster breaking and improve handling of Hangul syllables and emoji sequences. 2. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines] The additions include better surrogate pair handling and emoji presentation checks, but these appear to be feature improvements rather than security fixes. The main changes include: 1. Added new classes for grapheme cluster breaking (GraphemeClusterBreakIteratorUtf16 and its reverse version) 2. Improved handling of Hangul syllables with new HSType enum and related logic 3. Added support for emoji sequences with ZWJ and variation selectors 4. Removed the unimplemented check for grapheme segmentation (now implemented) These changes appear to be functional improvements rather than security fixes. The code handles edge cases like surrogate pairs and invalid sequences safely by checking bounds and using proper Unicode property checks. If I had to identify potential security-related improvements, they would be: 1. The bounds checking when handling surrogate pairs (mPos < len checks) 2. The careful handling of UTF-16 sequences to prevent potential overflows However, these appear to be part of the normal implementation rather than fixes for specific vulnerabilities.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/ch-unit-011.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/ch-unit-011.html@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-values-3/#font-relative-lengths"> <link rel="match" href="reference/ch-unit-011-ref.html">- <meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="In this test, the ch unit is the advance height measure of the 0 (ZERO, U+0030) glyph."> <style>
Analysis of the provided code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/ch-unit-011.html [Lines] 8 [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content=""> [Fixed Code] (line removed) Additional Details: - The diff shows only the removal of an empty meta tag with "flags" attribute, which appears to be test-related metadata rather than a security fix. - No actual vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in this change. - The change seems to be cleanup/refactoring rather than a security fix.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.