--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.alpha.1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.alpha.1.html@@ -17,15 +17,15 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.shadowColor = 'rgba(255, 0, 0, 0.01)'; ctx.shadowOffsetY = 50; ctx.fillRect(0, -50, 100, 50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 4);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 4); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-sensitive operations. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.alpha.1.html] [17-25]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 4);
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 4);

The changes are:
1. Renamed variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Updated the variable name in the `_assertPixelApprox` call
3. No security-related changes were made

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/grammar-error-003-manual.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/grammar-error-003-manual.html@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-pseudo-4/#highlight-selectors">   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-pseudo-4/#highlight-styling">-  <meta content="" name="flags">   <style>   textarea

Analysis of the code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Information Leak] [File: testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/grammar-error-003-manual.html] [Lines: 10]
    [Old Code: <meta content="" name="flags">]
    [Fixed Code: (removed)]

Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag with name="flags"
- While this doesn't appear to be a direct security vulnerability, empty or unused meta tags could potentially leak information about the application's structure or configuration
- Without more context about what this "flags" meta tag was intended for, we can't be certain if its removal was security-related or just cleanup
- No known vulnerability name directly applies to this change

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/reducers/breakpoints.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/reducers/breakpoints.js@@ -7,13 +7,7 @@  * @module reducers/breakpoints  */-import { isGeneratedId } from "devtools-source-map";-import { isEqual } from "lodash";- import { makeBreakpointId } from "../utils/breakpoint";--// eslint-disable-next-line max-len-import { getBreakpointsList as getBreakpointsListSelector } from "../selectors/breakpoints"; export function initialBreakpointsState(xhrBreakpoints = []) {   return {@@ -107,7 +101,9 @@   return {     ...state,-    xhrBreakpoints: xhrBreakpoints.filter(bp => !isEqual(bp, breakpoint)),+    xhrBreakpoints: xhrBreakpoints.filter(+      bp => bp.path !== breakpoint.path || bp.method !== breakpoint.method+    ),   }; }@@ -135,72 +131,4 @@   return { ...state, breakpoints }; }-function isMatchingLocation(location1, location2) {-  return isEqual(location1, location2);-}--// Selectors-// TODO: these functions should be moved out of the reducer--export function getBreakpointsMap(state) {-  return state.breakpoints.breakpoints;-}--export function getBreakpointsList(state) {-  return getBreakpointsListSelector(state);-}--export function getBreakpointCount(state) {-  return getBreakpointsList(state).length;-}--export function getBreakpoint(state, location) {-  if (!location) {-    return undefined;-  }--  const breakpoints = getBreakpointsMap(state);-  return breakpoints[makeBreakpointId(location)];-}--export function getBreakpointsDisabled(state) {-  const breakpoints = getBreakpointsList(state);-  return breakpoints.every(breakpoint => breakpoint.disabled);-}--export function getBreakpointsForSource(state, sourceId, line) {-  if (!sourceId) {-    return [];-  }--  const isGeneratedSource = isGeneratedId(sourceId);-  const breakpoints = getBreakpointsList(state);-  return breakpoints.filter(bp => {-    const location = isGeneratedSource ? bp.generatedLocation : bp.location;-    return location.sourceId === sourceId && (!line || line == location.line);-  });-}--export function getBreakpointForLocation(state, location) {-  if (!location) {-    return undefined;-  }--  const isGeneratedSource = isGeneratedId(location.sourceId);-  return getBreakpointsList(state).find(bp => {-    const loc = isGeneratedSource ? bp.generatedLocation : bp.location;-    return isMatchingLocation(loc, location);-  });-}--export function getHiddenBreakpoint(state) {-  const breakpoints = getBreakpointsList(state);-  return breakpoints.find(bp => bp.options.hidden);-}--export function hasLogpoint(state, location) {-  const breakpoint = getBreakpoint(state, location);-  return breakpoint?.options.logValue;-}- export default update;

I'll analyze the code diff and provide the security findings following the specified format.

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Potential Insecure Object Comparison [devtools/client/debugger/src/reducers/breakpoints.js] [Lines 107-110]
[Old Code]
xhrBreakpoints: xhrBreakpoints.filter(bp => !isEqual(bp, breakpoint)),
[Fixed Code]
xhrBreakpoints: xhrBreakpoints.filter(
  bp => bp.path !== breakpoint.path || bp.method !== breakpoint.method
),

Details: The old code used lodash's isEqual() for deep object comparison which could be problematic if the objects contain circular references or unexpected properties. The fixed code explicitly compares only the relevant properties (path and method), making it more secure and predictable.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Code Simplification/Removal [devtools/client/debugger/src/reducers/breakpoints.js] [Lines 135-4 (removed)]
[Old Code]
(All the removed selector functions including getBreakpointsMap, getBreakpointsList, etc.)
[Fixed Code]
(All selector functions removed)

Details: While this appears to be primarily a code organization change (moving selectors elsewhere), removing code that was previously exposed could potentially affect security if any of those functions were being used in an unsafe way. However, without seeing where these functions were moved to, I can't be certain if this represents a security improvement.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Dependency Removal [devtools/client/debugger/src/reducers/breakpoints.js] [Lines 7-9]
[Old Code]
import { isGeneratedId } from "devtools-source-map";
import { isEqual } from "lodash";
[Fixed Code]
(These imports were removed)

Details: The removal of external dependencies (lodash and devtools-source-map) could potentially improve security by reducing the attack surface, but without knowing why they were removed or if equivalent functionality was implemented elsewhere, I can't be certain this was a security-focused change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-019.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-019.html@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@       -ms-column-fill: auto;   -webkit-column-fill: auto;           column-fill: auto;-  border: 2px dashed;+  border: 2px solid salmon;   margin-bottom: 5px; }

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-019.html [Lines] 23
    [Old Code] border: 2px dashed;
    [Fixed Code] border: 2px solid salmon;

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be purely cosmetic/visual, modifying the border style from dashed to solid and changing the color to salmon
- This is part of a layout/reftest (reference test) file, which typically tests rendering behavior rather than security functionality
- No security-relevant changes were made in this diff
- The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive attributes or behaviors

No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change is related to test case styling rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/tools/lint/spell/exclude-list.txt+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/tools/lint/spell/exclude-list.txt@@ -14,4 +14,5 @@ dur ue tring+delink

Based on the provided diff, this appears to be a simple update to a spell-check exclusion list rather than a security fix. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [tools/lint/spell/exclude-list.txt] [Lines 14-15]
[Old Code: "tring"]
[Fixed Code: "tring\ndelink"]

Additional Details:
- This is a maintenance change adding "delink" to the spell-check exclusion list
- No security implications are apparent in this change
- The modification doesn't fix any known vulnerability
- This appears to be routine dictionary maintenance for the linter

The change simply adds a word ("delink") to the list of words the spell checker should ignore, likely because it's a technical term or identifier that shouldn't be flagged as a spelling error.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/webrtc/jsep/JsepCodecDescription.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/webrtc/jsep/JsepCodecDescription.h@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include "sdp/SdpMediaSection.h" #include "sdp/SdpHelper.h" #include "nsCRT.h"+#include "nsString.h" #include "mozilla/net/DataChannelProtocol.h" namespace mozilla {@@ -19,11 +20,9 @@ // A single entry in our list of known codecs. class JsepCodecDescription {  public:-  JsepCodecDescription(mozilla::SdpMediaSection::MediaType type,-                       const std::string& defaultPt, const std::string& name,+  JsepCodecDescription(const std::string& defaultPt, const std::string& name,                        uint32_t clock, uint32_t channels, bool enabled)-      : mType(type),-        mDefaultPt(defaultPt),+      : mDefaultPt(defaultPt),         mName(name),         mClock(clock),         mChannels(channels),@@ -32,16 +31,31 @@         mDirection(sdp::kSend) {}   virtual ~JsepCodecDescription() {}+  virtual SdpMediaSection::MediaType Type() const = 0;+   virtual JsepCodecDescription* Clone() const = 0;   bool GetPtAsInt(uint16_t* ptOutparam) const {     return SdpHelper::GetPtAsInt(mDefaultPt, ptOutparam);+  }++  // The id used for codec stats, to uniquely identify this codec configuration+  // within a transport.+  const nsString& StatsId() const {+    if (!mStatsId) {+      mStatsId.emplace();+      mStatsId->AppendPrintf(+          "_%s_%s/%s_%u_%u_%s", mDefaultPt.c_str(),+          Type() == SdpMediaSection::kVideo ? "video" : "audio", mName.c_str(),+          mClock, mChannels, mSdpFmtpLine ? mSdpFmtpLine->c_str() : "nothing");+    }+    return *mStatsId;   }   virtual bool Matches(const std::string& fmt,                        const SdpMediaSection& remoteMsection) const {     // note: fmt here is remote fmt (to go with remoteMsection)-    if (mType != remoteMsection.GetMediaType()) {+    if (Type() != remoteMsection.GetMediaType()) {       return false;     }@@ -78,15 +92,26 @@   }   virtual bool Negotiate(const std::string& pt,-                         const SdpMediaSection& remoteMsection, bool isOffer) {-    if (mDirection == sdp::kSend || isOffer) {+                         const SdpMediaSection& remoteMsection,+                         bool remoteIsOffer,+                         Maybe<const SdpMediaSection&> localMsection) {+    // Configuration might change. Invalidate the stats id.+    mStatsId = Nothing();+    if (mDirection == sdp::kSend || remoteIsOffer) {       mDefaultPt = pt;     }+    if (localMsection) {+      // Offer/answer is concluding. Update the sdpFmtpLine.+      MOZ_ASSERT(mDirection == sdp::kSend || mDirection == sdp::kRecv);+      const SdpMediaSection& msection =+          mDirection == sdp::kSend ? remoteMsection : *localMsection;+      UpdateSdpFmtpLine(ToMaybeRef(msection.FindFmtp(mDefaultPt)));+    }     return true;   }   virtual void AddToMediaSection(SdpMediaSection& msection) const {-    if (mEnabled && msection.GetMediaType() == mType) {+    if (mEnabled && msection.GetMediaType() == Type()) {       if (mDirection == sdp::kRecv) {         msection.AddCodec(mDefaultPt, mName, mClock, mChannels);       }@@ -129,9 +154,21 @@     return false;   }-  mozilla::SdpMediaSection::MediaType mType;+  // TODO Bug 1751671: Take a verbatim fmtp line (std::string or eq.) instead+  // of fmtp parameters that have to be (re-)serialized.+  void UpdateSdpFmtpLine(+      const Maybe<const SdpFmtpAttributeList::Parameters&> aParams) {+    mSdpFmtpLine = aParams.map([](const auto& aFmtp) {+      std::stringstream ss;+      aFmtp.Serialize(ss);+      return ss.str();+    });+  }+   std::string mDefaultPt;   std::string mName;+  Maybe<std::string> mSdpFmtpLine;+  mutable Maybe<nsString> mStatsId;   uint32_t mClock;   uint32_t mChannels;   bool mEnabled;@@ -146,8 +183,7 @@   JsepAudioCodecDescription(const std::string& defaultPt,                             const std::string& name, uint32_t clock,                             uint32_t channels, bool enabled = true)-      : JsepCodecDescription(mozilla::SdpMediaSection::kAudio, defaultPt, name,-                             clock, channels, enabled),+      : JsepCodecDescription(defaultPt, name, clock, channels, enabled),         mMaxPlaybackRate(0),         mForceMono(false),         mFECEnabled(false),@@ -159,7 +195,40 @@         mMaxFrameSizeMs(0),         mCbrEnabled(false) {}+  static constexpr SdpMediaSection::MediaType type = SdpMediaSection::kAudio;++  SdpMediaSection::MediaType Type() const override { return type; }+   JSEP_CODEC_CLONE(JsepAudioCodecDescription)++  static UniquePtr<JsepAudioCodecDescription> CreateDefaultOpus() {+    // Per jmspeex on IRC:+    // For 32KHz sampling, 28 is ok, 32 is good, 40 should be really good+    // quality.  Note that 1-2Kbps will be wasted on a stereo Opus channel+    // with mono input compared to configuring it for mono.+    // If we reduce bitrate enough Opus will low-pass us; 16000 will kill a+    // 9KHz tone.  This should be adaptive when we're at the low-end of video+    // bandwidth (say <100Kbps), and if we're audio-only, down to 8 or+    // 12Kbps.+    return MakeUnique<JsepAudioCodecDescription>("109", "opus", 48000, 2);+  }++  static UniquePtr<JsepAudioCodecDescription> CreateDefaultG722() {+    return MakeUnique<JsepAudioCodecDescription>("9", "G722", 8000, 1);+  }++  static UniquePtr<JsepAudioCodecDescription> CreateDefaultPCMU() {+    return MakeUnique<JsepAudioCodecDescription>("0", "PCMU", 8000, 1);+  }++  static UniquePtr<JsepAudioCodecDescription> CreateDefaultPCMA() {+    return MakeUnique<JsepAudioCodecDescription>("8", "PCMA", 8000, 1);+  }++  static UniquePtr<JsepAudioCodecDescription> CreateDefaultTelephoneEvent() {+    return MakeUnique<JsepAudioCodecDescription>("101", "telephone-event", 8000,+                                                 1);+  }   SdpFmtpAttributeList::OpusParameters GetOpusParameters(       const std::string& pt, const SdpMediaSection& msection) const {@@ -223,8 +292,10 @@   }   bool Negotiate(const std::string& pt, const SdpMediaSection& remoteMsection,-                 bool isOffer) override {-    JsepCodecDescription::Negotiate(pt, remoteMsection, isOffer);+                 bool remoteIsOffer,+                 Maybe<const SdpMediaSection&> localMsection) override {+    JsepCodecDescription::Negotiate(pt, remoteMsection, remoteIsOffer,+                                    localMsection);     if (mName == "opus" && mDirection == sdp::kSend) {       SdpFmtpAttributeList::OpusParameters opusParams(           GetOpusParameters(mDefaultPt, remoteMsection));@@ -276,8 +347,7 @@   JsepVideoCodecDescription(const std::string& defaultPt,                             const std::string& name, uint32_t clock,                             bool enabled = true)-      : JsepCodecDescription(mozilla::SdpMediaSection::kVideo, defaultPt, name,-                             clock, 0, enabled),+      : JsepCodecDescription(defaultPt, name, clock, 0, enabled),         mTmmbrEnabled(false),         mRembEnabled(false),         mFECEnabled(false),@@ -289,6 +359,72 @@     mNackFbTypes.push_back("");     mNackFbTypes.push_back(SdpRtcpFbAttributeList::pli);     mCcmFbTypes.push_back(SdpRtcpFbAttributeList::fir);+  }++  static constexpr SdpMediaSection::MediaType type = SdpMediaSection::kVideo;++  SdpMediaSection::MediaType Type() const override { return type; }++  static UniquePtr<JsepVideoCodecDescription> CreateDefaultVP8(bool aUseRtx) {+    auto codec = MakeUnique<JsepVideoCodecDescription>("120", "VP8", 90000);+    // Defaults for mandatory params+    codec->mConstraints.maxFs = 12288;  // Enough for 2048x1536+    codec->mConstraints.maxFps = 60;+    if (aUseRtx) {+      codec->EnableRtx("124");+    }+    return codec;+  }++  static UniquePtr<JsepVideoCodecDescription> CreateDefaultVP9(bool aUseRtx) {+    auto codec = MakeUnique<JsepVideoCodecDescription>("121", "VP9", 90000);+    // Defaults for mandatory params+    codec->mConstraints.maxFs = 12288;  // Enough for 2048x1536+    codec->mConstraints.maxFps = 60;+    if (aUseRtx) {+      codec->EnableRtx("125");+    }+    return codec;+  }++  static UniquePtr<JsepVideoCodecDescription> CreateDefaultH264_0(+      bool aUseRtx) {+    auto codec = MakeUnique<JsepVideoCodecDescription>("97", "H264", 90000);+    codec->mPacketizationMode = 0;+    // Defaults for mandatory params+    codec->mProfileLevelId = 0x42E00D;+    if (aUseRtx) {+      codec->EnableRtx("98");+    }+    return codec;+  }++  static UniquePtr<JsepVideoCodecDescription> CreateDefaultH264_1(+      bool aUseRtx) {+    auto codec = MakeUnique<JsepVideoCodecDescription>("126", "H264", 90000);+    codec->mPacketizationMode = 1;+    // Defaults for mandatory params+    codec->mProfileLevelId = 0x42E00D;+    if (aUseRtx) {+      codec->EnableRtx("127");+    }+    return codec;+  }++  static UniquePtr<JsepVideoCodecDescription> CreateDefaultUlpFec() {+    return MakeUnique<JsepVideoCodecDescription>(+        "123",     // payload type+        "ulpfec",  // codec name+        90000      // clock rate (match other video codecs)+    );+  }++  static UniquePtr<JsepVideoCodecDescription> CreateDefaultRed() {+    return MakeUnique<JsepVideoCodecDescription>(+        "122",  // payload type+        "red",  // codec name+        90000   // clock rate (match other video codecs)+    );   }   virtual void EnableTmmbr() {@@ -559,8 +695,10 @@   virtual bool Negotiate(const std::string& pt,                          const SdpMediaSection& remoteMsection,-                         bool isOffer) override {-    JsepCodecDescription::Negotiate(pt, remoteMsection, isOffer);+                         bool remoteIsOffer,+                         Maybe<const SdpMediaSection&> localMsection) override {+    JsepCodecDescription::Negotiate(pt, remoteMsection, remoteIsOffer,+                                    localMsection);     if (mName == "H264") {       SdpFmtpAttributeList::H264Parameters h264Params(           GetH264Parameters(mDefaultPt, remoteMsection));@@ -602,7 +740,7 @@       }     }-    if (mRtxEnabled && (mDirection == sdp::kSend || isOffer)) {+    if (mRtxEnabled && (mDirection == sdp::kSend || remoteIsOffer)) {       Maybe<std::string> rtxPt = GetRtxPtByApt(mDefaultPt, remoteMsection);       if (rtxPt.isSome()) {         EnableRtx(*rtxPt);@@ -826,8 +964,7 @@   virtual void UpdateRedundantEncodings(       const std::vector<UniquePtr<JsepCodecDescription>>& codecs) {     for (const auto& codec : codecs) {-      if (codec->mType == SdpMediaSection::kVideo && codec->mEnabled &&-          codec->mName != "red") {+      if (codec->Type() == type && codec->mEnabled && codec->mName != "red") {         uint16_t pt;         if (!SdpHelper::GetPtAsInt(codec->mDefaultPt, &pt)) {           continue;@@ -877,20 +1014,31 @@                                   uint16_t localPort,                                   uint32_t localMaxMessageSize,                                   bool enabled = true)-      : JsepCodecDescription(mozilla::SdpMediaSection::kApplication, "", name,-                             0, channels, enabled),+      : JsepCodecDescription("", name, 0, channels, enabled),         mLocalPort(localPort),         mLocalMaxMessageSize(localMaxMessageSize),         mRemotePort(0),         mRemoteMaxMessageSize(0),         mRemoteMMSSet(false) {}+  static constexpr SdpMediaSection::MediaType type =+      SdpMediaSection::kApplication;++  SdpMediaSection::MediaType Type() const override { return type; }+   JSEP_CODEC_CLONE(JsepApplicationCodecDescription)++  static UniquePtr<JsepApplicationCodecDescription> CreateDefault() {+    return MakeUnique<JsepApplicationCodecDescription>(+        "webrtc-datachannel", WEBRTC_DATACHANNEL_STREAMS_DEFAULT,+        WEBRTC_DATACHANNEL_PORT_DEFAULT,+        WEBRTC_DATACHANNEL_MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE_LOCAL);+  }   // Override, uses sctpport or sctpmap instead of rtpmap   virtual bool Matches(const std::string& fmt,                        const SdpMediaSection& remoteMsection) const override {-    if (mType != remoteMsection.GetMediaType()) {+    if (type != remoteMsection.GetMediaType()) {       return false;     }@@ -914,7 +1062,7 @@   }   virtual void AddToMediaSection(SdpMediaSection& msection) const override {-    if (mEnabled && msection.GetMediaType() == mType) {+    if (mEnabled && msection.GetMediaType() == type) {       if (mDirection == sdp::kRecv) {         msection.AddDataChannel(mName, mLocalPort, mChannels,                                 mLocalMaxMessageSize);@@ -925,8 +1073,10 @@   }   bool Negotiate(const std::string& pt, const SdpMediaSection& remoteMsection,-                 bool isOffer) override {-    JsepCodecDescription::Negotiate(pt, remoteMsection, isOffer);+                 bool remoteIsOffer,+                 Maybe<const SdpMediaSection&> localMsection) override {+    JsepCodecDescription::Negotiate(pt, remoteMsection, remoteIsOffer,+                                    localMsection);     uint32_t message_size;     mRemoteMMSSet = remoteMsection.GetMaxMessageSize(&message_size);

I'll analyze the code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Information Leak [dom/media/webrtc/jsep/JsepCodecDescription.h] [Lines: 19-31, 154-168]
[Old Code]
  JsepCodecDescription(mozilla::SdpMediaSection::MediaType type,
                       const std::string& defaultPt, const std::string& name,
                       uint32_t clock, uint32_t channels, bool enabled)
      : mType(type),
        mDefaultPt(defaultPt),
        mName(name),
        mClock(clock),
        mChannels(channels),
        mEnabled(enabled),
        mDirection(sdp::kSend) {}
[Fixed Code]
  JsepCodecDescription(const std::string& defaultPt, const std::string& name,
                       uint32_t clock, uint32_t channels, bool enabled)
      : mDefaultPt(defaultPt),
        mName(name),
        mClock(clock),
        mChannels(channels),
        mEnabled(enabled),
        mDirection(sdp::kSend) {}

Additional Details:
The change removes the direct storage of media type (mType) and makes it a pure virtual function instead. This could potentially be related to preventing type confusion vulnerabilities, but without more context about how this class is used, I can't be certain if this was an actual security fix or just a refactoring.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Format String Vulnerability [dom/media/webrtc/jsep/JsepCodecDescription.h] [Lines: 41-49]
[Old Code]
(No equivalent code existed before)
[Fixed Code]
  const nsString& StatsId() const {
    if (!mStatsId) {
      mStatsId.emplace();
      mStatsId->AppendPrintf(
          "_%s_%s/%s_%u_%u_%s", mDefaultPt.c_str(),
          Type() == SdpMediaSection::kVideo ? "video" : "audio", mName.c_str(),
          mClock, mChannels, mSdpFmtpLine ? mSdpFmtpLine->c_str() : "nothing");
    }
    return *mStatsId;
  }

Additional Details:
The new code introduces a format string that includes several string parameters. While the code appears safe (using c_str() for std::string and checking for null), format string vulnerabilities are a common security concern. Without knowing the exact context of how this string is used later, I can't be certain if this poses a risk.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential SDP Parsing Vulnerability [dom/media/webrtc/jsep/JsepCodecDescription.h] [Lines: 92-106]
[Old Code]
  virtual bool Negotiate(const std::string& pt,
                         const SdpMediaSection& remoteMsection, bool isOffer) {
    if (mDirection == sdp::kSend || isOffer) {
      mDefaultPt = pt;
    }
    return true;
  }
[Fixed Code]
  virtual bool Negotiate(const std::string& pt,
                         const SdpMediaSection& remoteMsection,
                         bool remoteIsOffer,
                         Maybe<const SdpMediaSection&> localMsection) {
    // Configuration might change. Invalidate the stats id.
    mStatsId = Nothing();
    if (mDirection == sdp::kSend || remoteIsOffer) {
      mDefaultPt = pt;
    }
    if (localMsection) {
      // Offer/answer is concluding. Update the sdpFmtpLine.
      MOZ_ASSERT(mDirection == sdp::kSend || mDirection == sdp::kRecv);
      const SdpMediaSection& msection =
          mDirection == sdp::kSend ? remoteMsection : *localMsection;
      UpdateSdpFmtpLine(ToMaybeRef(msection.FindFmtp(mDefaultPt)));
    }
    return true;
  }

Additional Details:
The enhanced negotiation logic now handles SDP fmtp lines more carefully, which could be related to preventing malformed SDP attacks. However, without seeing the actual vulnerability being fixed, I can't be certain if this was a security fix or just a feature enhancement.

Note: The diff shows significant refactoring and enhancement of the codec description handling, but without explicit security bug references or more context, it's difficult to definitively identify security fixes versus general improvements. The changes do appear to make the code more robust, which often has security benefits.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.uncovered.image.destination-atop.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.uncovered.image.destination-atop.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 255, 0.5)';@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@ promise.then(function(response) {     createImageBitmap(response).then(bitmap => {         ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 40, 40, 10, 10, 40, 50, 10, 10);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 15,15, 0,0,0,0, "15,15", "0,0,0,0", 5);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 15,15, 0,0,0,0, "15,15", "0,0,0,0", 5);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's my assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.uncovered.image.destination-atop.html [Lines 17-18, 36-37]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 15,15, 0,0,0,0, "15,15", "0,0,0,0", 5);
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 15,15, 0,0,0,0, "15,15", "0,0,0,0", 5);
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. There are no security-related changes or vulnerability fixes in this diff. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or clarity.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/netwerk/test/perf/perftest_http3_controlled.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/netwerk/test/perf/perftest_http3_controlled.js@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ /* eslint-env node */ /*-Ensure the `--firefox.preference=network.http.http3.enabled:true` is+Ensure the `--firefox.preference=network.http.http3.enable:true` is set for this test. */

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Preference Name Correction] [netwerk/test/perf/perftest_http3_controlled.js] [Lines 4-7]
[Old Code]
Ensure the `--firefox.preference=network.http.http3.enabled:true` is
[Fixed Code]
Ensure the `--firefox.preference=network.http.http3.enable:true` is

Additional Details:
This appears to be a simple correction of a preference name from "network.http.http3.enabled" to "network.http.http3.enable". There's no indication of a security vulnerability being fixed here - it's just updating documentation to match the correct preference name. The change doesn't involve any actual code execution or security-sensitive operations.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/darling/tests/from_variant.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/darling/tests/from_variant.rs@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@-#[macro_use]-extern crate darling;-extern crate syn;+use darling::FromVariant;+use syn::{spanned::Spanned, Expr, ExprLit, LitInt}; #[derive(FromVariant)] #[darling(from_ident, attributes(hello))]@@ -9,6 +8,7 @@     ident: syn::Ident,     into: Option<bool>,     skip: Option<bool>,+    discriminant: Option<syn::Expr>,     fields: darling::ast::Fields<syn::Type>, }@@ -18,10 +18,40 @@             ident,             into: Default::default(),             skip: Default::default(),+            discriminant: None,             fields: darling::ast::Style::Unit.into(),         }     } } #[test]-fn expansion() {}+fn discriminant() {+    let input: syn::DeriveInput = syn::parse_str(+        r#"+    pub enum Test {+        Works = 1,+        AlsoWorks = 2,+    }+    "#,+    )+    .unwrap();++    let span = input.span();+    if let syn::Data::Enum(enm) = input.data {+        let lorem = Lorem::from_variant(+            enm.variants+                .first()+                .expect("Hardcoded input has one variant"),+        )+        .expect("FromVariant can process the discriminant");+        assert_eq!(+            lorem.discriminant,+            Some(Expr::Lit(ExprLit {+                attrs: vec![],+                lit: LitInt::new("1", span).into(),+            }))+        )+    } else {+        panic!("Data should be enum");+    }+}

I've analyzed the provided code diff. Here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific security vulnerability was found in this diff. The changes appear to be functional improvements and test additions rather than security fixes.

The main changes are:
1. Removal of `#[macro_use]` and `extern crate` in favor of modern Rust `use` statements
2. Addition of a `discriminant` field to the `Lorem` struct
3. Addition of a new test case `discriminant()` to verify enum discriminant handling

While these changes improve the code's functionality and maintainability, they don't appear to address any security vulnerabilities. The changes are primarily focused on:
- Modernizing Rust syntax
- Adding support for enum discriminants
- Adding test coverage for the new functionality

No CVEs or common vulnerability patterns are evident in this diff. The changes seem to be part of normal code evolution rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.measure.width.basic.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.measure.width.basic.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var f = new FontFace("CanvasTest", "url('/fonts/CanvasTest.ttf')"); let fonts = (self.fonts ? self.fonts : document.fonts);

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.measure.width.basic.worker.js] [Lines 13-16]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature, simply renaming the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. There is no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed in this change. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name. No security-related patterns (like XSS, injection, etc.) are involved in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/darling/tests/defaults.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/darling/tests/defaults.rs@@ -1,11 +1,5 @@-#[macro_use]-extern crate darling;-#[macro_use]-extern crate quote;-#[macro_use]-extern crate syn;- use darling::FromDeriveInput;+use syn::parse_quote; mod foo {     pub mod bar {@@ -18,7 +12,7 @@ #[derive(FromDeriveInput)] #[darling(attributes(speak))] pub struct SpeakerOpts {-    #[darling(default="foo::bar::init")]+    #[darling(default = "foo::bar::init")]     first_word: String, }@@ -26,7 +20,8 @@ fn path_default() {     let speaker: SpeakerOpts = FromDeriveInput::from_derive_input(&parse_quote! {         struct Foo;-    }).expect("Unit struct with no attrs should parse");+    })+    .expect("Unit struct with no attrs should parse");     assert_eq!(speaker.first_word, "hello");-}+}

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily code style and organization improvements. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Code Style Improvements [third_party/rust/darling/tests/defaults.rs] [Lines 1-5, 18, 26-27]
   Old Code:
   ```rust
   #[macro_use]
   extern crate darling;
   #[macro_use]
   extern crate quote;
   #[macro_use]
   extern crate syn;
   
   #[darling(default="foo::bar::init")]
   
       struct Foo;
   }).expect("Unit struct with no attrs should parse");
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```rust
   use darling::FromDeriveInput;
   use syn::parse_quote;
   
   #[darling(default = "foo::bar::init")]
   
       struct Foo;
   })
   .expect("Unit struct with no attrs should parse");
   ```

The changes include:
1. Removing old-style macro imports and replacing them with direct use statements
2. Adding whitespace around the equals sign in attribute parameters
3. Formatting the test assertion to be more readable

These changes don't appear to address any security vulnerabilities but rather improve code style and maintainability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-45b.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-45b.xml@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/>   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body>  <div class="stub">

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability [File] [Lines 8]
    [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="" />
    [Fixed Code] (line removed)

Additional details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute
- This doesn't appear to be security-related but rather a cleanup of unnecessary markup
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with this change
- The modification is likely for code hygiene rather than security fixes

The diff shows no evidence of any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The change is minor and doesn't affect security functionality.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/taskcluster/ci/toolchain/clang.yml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/taskcluster/ci/toolchain/clang.yml@@ -101,6 +101,29 @@             - linux64-toolchain-sysroot             - wasm32-wasi-compiler-rt+linux64-clang-13-stage1:+    description: "Clang 13 toolchain build"+    treeherder:+        symbol: TL(clang13-stage1)+    run-on-projects: [trunk]+    run:+        using: toolchain-script+        script: build-clang.sh+        arguments:+            - 'build/build-clang/linux64.json'+            - 'build/build-clang/clang-13.json'+            - 'build/build-clang/1stage.json'+        resources:+            - 'build/build-clang/linux64.json'+            - 'build/build-clang/clang-13.json'+            - 'build/build-clang/1stage.json'+        toolchain-alias:+            - linux64-clang-toolchain+        toolchain-artifact: public/build/clang.tar.zst+    fetches:+        fetch:+            - clang-13+ linux64-clang-13:     description: "Clang 13 toolchain build"     attributes:@@ -114,15 +137,19 @@         arguments:             - 'build/build-clang/linux64.json'             - 'build/build-clang/clang-13.json'-        resources:-            - 'build/build-clang/linux64.json'-            - 'build/build-clang/clang-13.json'-        toolchain-alias: linux64-clang-        toolchain-artifact: public/build/clang.tar.zst-    fetches:-        fetch:-            - clang-13-        toolchain:+            - 'build/build-clang/skip-stage-1.json'+        resources:+            - 'build/build-clang/linux64.json'+            - 'build/build-clang/clang-13.json'+            - 'build/build-clang/skip-stage-1.json'+        toolchain-alias:+            - linux64-clang+        toolchain-artifact: public/build/clang.tar.zst+    fetches:+        fetch:+            - clang-13+        toolchain:+            - linux64-clang-13-stage1             - linux64-toolchain-sysroot             - wasm32-wasi-compiler-rt-13@@ -196,7 +223,7 @@         macosx64-x64-compiler-rt-13: toolchain-macosx64-x64-compiler-rt-13     fetches:         toolchain:-            - linux64-cctools-port-clang-13+            - linux64-cctools-port             - linux64-clang-13         macosx64-aarch64-compiler-rt-13:             - artifact: compiler-rt.tar.zst@@ -217,27 +244,25 @@         toolchain-alias: linux64-clang-win-cross         toolchain-artifact: public/build/clang.tar.zst     dependencies:-        win64-clang-13-2stage: toolchain-win64-clang-13-2stage-    fetches:-        toolchain:-            - linux64-clang-13-        win64-clang-13-2stage:-            # Put this into a new directory so it doesn't conflict with the linux toolchain-            - artifact: clang.tar.zst-              dest: clang-cl-              extract: false--macosx64-clang-13:+        win32-compiler-rt-13: toolchain-win32-compiler-rt-13+        win64-compiler-rt-13: toolchain-win64-compiler-rt-13+    fetches:+        toolchain:+            - linux64-clang-13+        win32-compiler-rt-13:+            - artifact: compiler-rt.tar.zst+              dest: x86+        win64-compiler-rt-13:+            - artifact: compiler-rt.tar.zst+              dest: x86_64++macosx64-clang-13-raw:     description: "Clang 13 toolchain build"-    attributes:-        local-toolchain: true-    treeherder:-        symbol: TM(clang-13)+    treeherder:+        symbol: TM(clang-13-raw)     worker-type: b-linux-large     worker:         max-run-time: 3600-    run-on-projects:-        - trunk     run:         script: build-clang.sh         arguments:@@ -246,47 +271,132 @@         resources:             - 'build/build-clang/macosx64.json'             - 'build/build-clang/clang-13.json'-        toolchain-alias: macosx64-clang-        toolchain-artifact: public/build/clang.tar.zst-    fetches:-        fetch:-            - clang-13-        toolchain:-            - linux64-cctools-port-clang-13+        toolchain-artifact: public/build/clang.tar.zst+    fetches:+        fetch:+            - clang-13+        toolchain:+            - linux64-cctools-port             - linux64-clang-13-macosx-cross             - macosx64-sdk-11.0             - wasm32-wasi-compiler-rt-13-macosx64-aarch64-clang-13:-    description: "Clang 13 toolchain build"+macosx64-clang-13:+    description: "Clang 13 toolchain repack with MacOS Compiler RT libs"     attributes:         local-toolchain: true     treeherder:-        symbol: TM(clang-13-aarch64)+        symbol: TM(clang-13)+    worker-type: b-linux+    worker:+        max-run-time: 600+    run-on-projects:+        - trunk+    run:+        script: repack-clang-linux-macosx-cross.sh+        toolchain-alias:+            - macosx64-clang+            - macosx64-clang-toolchain+        toolchain-artifact: public/build/clang.tar.zst+    dependencies:+        macosx64-aarch64-compiler-rt-13: toolchain-macosx64-aarch64-compiler-rt-13+        macosx64-x64-compiler-rt-13: toolchain-macosx64-x64-compiler-rt-13+    fetches:+        toolchain:+            - linux64-cctools-port+            - macosx64-clang-13-raw+        macosx64-aarch64-compiler-rt-13:+            - artifact: compiler-rt.tar.zst+              dest: aarch64+        macosx64-x64-compiler-rt-13:+            - artifact: compiler-rt.tar.zst+              dest: x86_64++macosx64-aarch64-clang-13-raw:+    description: "Clang 13 toolchain build"+    treeherder:+        symbol: TM(clang-13-aarch64-raw)     worker-type: b-linux-large     worker:         env:             OSX_ARCH: arm64         max-run-time: 3600+    run:+        script: build-clang.sh+        arguments:+            - 'build/build-clang/macosx64.json'+            - 'build/build-clang/clang-13.json'+        resources:+            - 'build/build-clang/macosx64.json'+            - 'build/build-clang/clang-13.json'+        toolchain-artifact: public/build/clang.tar.zst+    fetches:+        fetch:+            - clang-13+        toolchain:+            - linux64-cctools-port+            - linux64-clang-13-macosx-cross+            - macosx64-sdk-11.0+            - wasm32-wasi-compiler-rt-13++macosx64-aarch64-clang-13:+    description: "Clang 13 toolchain repack with MacOS Compiler RT libs"+    attributes:+        local-toolchain: true+    treeherder:+        symbol: TM(clang-13-aarch64)+    worker-type: b-linux+    worker:+        max-run-time: 600     run-on-projects:         - trunk     run:-        script: build-clang.sh-        arguments:-            - 'build/build-clang/macosx64.json'-            - 'build/build-clang/clang-13.json'-        resources:-            - 'build/build-clang/macosx64.json'-            - 'build/build-clang/clang-13.json'+        script: repack-clang-linux-macosx-cross.sh         toolchain-alias: macosx64-aarch64-clang         toolchain-artifact: public/build/clang.tar.zst-    fetches:-        fetch:-            - clang-13-        toolchain:-            - linux64-cctools-port-clang-13-            - linux64-clang-13-macosx-cross-            - macosx64-sdk-11.0+    dependencies:+        macosx64-aarch64-compiler-rt-13: toolchain-macosx64-aarch64-compiler-rt-13+        macosx64-x64-compiler-rt-13: toolchain-macosx64-x64-compiler-rt-13+    fetches:+        toolchain:+            - linux64-cctools-port+            - macosx64-aarch64-clang-13-raw+        macosx64-aarch64-compiler-rt-13:+            - artifact: compiler-rt.tar.zst+              dest: aarch64+        macosx64-x64-compiler-rt-13:+            - artifact: compiler-rt.tar.zst+              dest: x86_64++win64-clang-13-raw:+    description: "Clang-cl 13 toolchain build"+    treeherder:+        symbol: TW64(clang-13-raw)+    worker-type: b-win2012+    worker:+        env:+            TOOLTOOL_MANIFEST: "browser/config/tooltool-manifests/vs2017-15.9.manifest"+        max-run-time: 9000+    run:+        script: build-clang.sh+        arguments:+            - 'build/build-clang/win64.json'+            - 'build/build-clang/clang-13.json'+            - 'build/build-clang/skip-stage-1-win64.json'+        resources:+            - 'build/build-clang/win64.json'+            - 'build/build-clang/clang-13.json'+            - 'build/build-clang/skip-stage-1-win64.json'+            - 'taskcluster/scripts/misc/tooltool-download.sh'+        toolchain-artifact: public/build/clang.tar.zst+        tooltool-downloads: internal+    fetches:+        fetch:+            - clang-13+            - cmake+            - ninja+        toolchain:+            - win64-clang-13-stage1             - wasm32-wasi-compiler-rt-13 win64-clang-13:@@ -295,23 +405,48 @@         local-toolchain: true     treeherder:         symbol: TW64(clang-13)+    worker-type: b-linux+    worker:+        max-run-time: 600+    run-on-projects:+        - trunk+    run:+        script: repack-clang-linux-win-cross.sh+        toolchain-alias: win64-clang+        toolchain-artifact: public/build/clang.tar.zst+    dependencies:+        win32-compiler-rt-13: toolchain-win32-compiler-rt-13+        win64-compiler-rt-13: toolchain-win64-compiler-rt-13+    fetches:+        toolchain:+            - win64-clang-13-raw+        win32-compiler-rt-13:+            - artifact: compiler-rt.tar.zst+              dest: x86+        win64-compiler-rt-13:+            - artifact: compiler-rt.tar.zst+              dest: x86_64++win64-clang-13-stage1:+    description: "Clang-cl 13 toolchain build stage 1"+    treeherder:+        symbol: TW64(clang-13-stage1)     worker-type: b-win2012     worker:         env:             TOOLTOOL_MANIFEST: "browser/config/tooltool-manifests/vs2017-15.9.manifest"-        max-run-time: 9000-    run-on-projects:-        - trunk     run:         script: build-clang.sh         arguments:             - 'build/build-clang/win64.json'             - 'build/build-clang/clang-13.json'+            - 'build/build-clang/1stage.json'         resources:             - 'build/build-clang/win64.json'             - 'build/build-clang/clang-13.json'+            - 'build/build-clang/1stage.json'             - 'taskcluster/scripts/misc/tooltool-download.sh'-        toolchain-alias: win64-clang+        toolchain-alias: win64-clang-toolchain         toolchain-artifact: public/build/clang.tar.zst         tooltool-downloads: internal     fetches:@@ -319,33 +454,3 @@             - clang-13             - cmake             - ninja-        toolchain:-            - wasm32-wasi-compiler-rt-13--win64-clang-13-2stage:-    description: "Clang-cl 13 toolchain 2-stage quick build"-    treeherder:-        symbol: TW64(clang-13-2stage)-    worker-type: b-win2012-    worker:-        env:-            TOOLTOOL_MANIFEST: "browser/config/tooltool-manifests/vs2017-15.9.manifest"-    run:-        script: build-clang.sh-        arguments:-            - 'build/build-clang/win64.json'-            - 'build/build-clang/clang-13.json'-            - 'build/build-clang/2stages.json'-        resources:-            - 'build/build-clang/win64.json'-            - 'build/build-clang/clang-13.json'-            - 'build/build-clang/2stages.json'-            - 'taskcluster/scripts/misc/tooltool-download.sh'-        toolchain-alias: win64-clang-2stage-        toolchain-artifact: public/build/clang.tar.zst-        tooltool-downloads: internal-    fetches:-        fetch:-            - clang-13-            - cmake-            - ninja

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't identify any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily structural and organizational, including:

1. Adding a new stage1 build configuration for Clang 13
2. Reorganizing build dependencies and artifacts
3. Splitting some builds into "raw" and repackaged versions
4. Updating toolchain references and dependencies

Here's the structured response:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability identified in the changes
    File: taskcluster/ci/toolchain/clang.yml
    The changes appear to be build system improvements rather than security fixes

The modifications seem focused on improving the build process organization and adding new build stages rather than addressing security vulnerabilities. The changes include:
- Adding linux64-clang-13-stage1 configuration
- Modifying linux64-clang-13 to use skip-stage-1.json
- Reorganizing win64-clang-13 dependencies
- Adding raw/repack variants for macosx64 builds
- Adding stage1 configuration for win64 builds

Without any clear security-related changes (like removing hardcoded credentials, fixing insecure dependencies, or addressing code injection risks), I don't identify any security vulnerabilities being fixed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.fillRect.path.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.fillRect.path.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.beginPath(); ctx.rect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 16, 16); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

Vulnerability Existed: no  
[Variable Renaming] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.fillRect.path.worker.js] [Lines 13,14,22]  
[Old Code]  
```javascript
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
```  
[Fixed Code]  
```javascript
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
```  
Additional Details:  
The changes appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. There are no security implications or vulnerabilities being fixed in this diff. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or clarity.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/extensions/schemas/geckoProfiler.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/extensions/schemas/geckoProfiler.json@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@           "samplingallthreads",           "markersallthreads",           "unregisteredthreads",+          "processcpu",           "responsiveness"         ]       },

Let me analyze the diff for potential security vulnerabilities.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Missing Permission] [toolkit/components/extensions/schemas/geckoProfiler.json] [Lines 46-54]
[Old Code]
          "samplingallthreads",
          "markersallthreads",
          "unregisteredthreads",
          "responsiveness"
[Fixed Code]
          "samplingallthreads",
          "markersallthreads",
          "unregisteredthreads",
          "processcpu",
          "responsiveness"

Additional Details:
- The diff shows an addition of "processcpu" to the list of allowed permissions in the geckoProfiler schema
- While this appears to be a permission addition rather than a direct security fix, it could be related to fixing a potential permission oversight
- Without more context, it's unclear if this was fixing a security vulnerability or just adding functionality
- The change could be security-related if the missing permission was allowing unintended access to CPU process information

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/browsers/edge.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/browsers/edge.py@@ -1,20 +1,18 @@ import time import subprocess-from .base import Browser, ExecutorBrowser, require_arg-from .base import NullBrowser  # noqa: F401-from ..webdriver_server import EdgeDriverServer+from .base import require_arg+from .base import WebDriverBrowser from ..executors import executor_kwargs as base_executor_kwargs+from ..executors.base import WdspecExecutor  # noqa: F401 from ..executors.executorselenium import (SeleniumTestharnessExecutor,  # noqa: F401                                           SeleniumRefTestExecutor)  # noqa: F401-from ..executors.executoredge import EdgeDriverWdspecExecutor  # noqa: F401 __wptrunner__ = {"product": "edge",                  "check_args": "check_args",-                 "browser": {None: "EdgeBrowser",-                             "wdspec": "NullBrowser"},+                 "browser": "EdgeBrowser",                  "executor": {"testharness": "SeleniumTestharnessExecutor",                               "reftest": "SeleniumRefTestExecutor",-                              "wdspec": "EdgeDriverWdspecExecutor"},+                              "wdspec": "WdspecExecutor"},                  "browser_kwargs": "browser_kwargs",                  "executor_kwargs": "executor_kwargs",                  "env_extras": "env_extras",@@ -64,30 +62,20 @@     return {"supports_debugger": False}-class EdgeBrowser(Browser):+class EdgeBrowser(WebDriverBrowser):     init_timeout = 60-    def __init__(self, logger, webdriver_binary,-            timeout_multiplier=None, webdriver_args=None, **kwargs):-        Browser.__init__(self, logger)-        self.server = EdgeDriverServer(self.logger,-                                       binary=webdriver_binary,-                                       args=webdriver_args)-        self.webdriver_host = "localhost"-        self.webdriver_port = self.server.port-        if timeout_multiplier:-            self.init_timeout = self.init_timeout * timeout_multiplier---    def start(self, **kwargs):-        print(self.server.url)-        self.server.start()+    def __init__(self, logger, binary, webdriver_binary, webdriver_args=None,+                 host="localhost", port=None, base_path="/", env=None, **kwargs):+        super().__init__(logger, binary, webdriver_binary, webdriver_args=webdriver_args,+                         host=host, port=port, base_path=base_path, env=env, **kwargs)+        self.host = "localhost"     def stop(self, force=False):-        self.server.stop(force=force)+        super(self).stop(force)         # Wait for Edge browser process to exit if driver process is found         edge_proc_name = 'MicrosoftEdge.exe'-        for i in range(0,5):+        for i in range(0, 5):             procs = subprocess.check_output(['tasklist', '/fi', 'ImageName eq ' + edge_proc_name])             if b'MicrosoftWebDriver.exe' not in procs:                 # Edge driver process already exited, don't wait for browser process to exit@@ -101,20 +89,8 @@             # close Edge process if it is still running             subprocess.call(['taskkill.exe', '/f', '/im', 'microsoftedge*'])-    def pid(self):-        return self.server.pid--    def is_alive(self):-        # TODO(ato): This only indicates the server is alive,-        # and doesn't say anything about whether a browser session-        # is active.-        return self.server.is_alive()--    def cleanup(self):-        self.stop()--    def executor_browser(self):-        return ExecutorBrowser, {"webdriver_url": self.server.url}+    def make_command(self):+        return [self.webdriver_binary, f"--port={self.port}"] + self.webdriver_args def run_info_extras(**kwargs):

I'll analyze the code diff for security vulnerabilities following the specified format.

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Insecure Subprocess Calls] [testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/browsers/edge.py] [Lines 75-76, 88]
[Old Code]
subprocess.check_output(['tasklist', '/fi', 'ImageName eq ' + edge_proc_name])
subprocess.call(['taskkill.exe', '/f', '/im', 'microsoftedge*'])
[Fixed Code]
(same code remains in both versions)

Details: The code uses subprocess calls with shell commands that concatenate strings, which could potentially lead to command injection if edge_proc_name were controllable by an attacker. However, since edge_proc_name is hardcoded in this case, the risk appears minimal.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Inheritance Security] [testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/browsers/edge.py] [Lines 64-70]
[Old Code]
class EdgeBrowser(Browser):
    def __init__(self, logger, webdriver_binary,
            timeout_multiplier=None, webdriver_args=None, **kwargs):
        Browser.__init__(self, logger)
        self.server = EdgeDriverServer(self.logger,
                                       binary=webdriver_binary,
                                       args=webdriver_args)
[Fixed Code]
class EdgeBrowser(WebDriverBrowser):
    def __init__(self, logger, binary, webdriver_binary, webdriver_args=None,
                 host="localhost", port=None, base_path="/", env=None, **kwargs):
        super().__init__(logger, binary, webdriver_binary, webdriver_args=webdriver_args,
                         host=host, port=port, base_path=base_path, env=env, **kwargs)

Details: The change in inheritance from Browser to WebDriverBrowser and the modified initialization could potentially address security issues related to proper browser initialization and resource management, but without more context about these base classes, it's hard to determine if this was specifically a security fix.

3. Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [N/A] [N/A]
[Old Code]
[N/A]
[Fixed Code]
[N/A]

The changes appear to be primarily architectural, switching from a custom EdgeDriverServer implementation to inheriting from WebDriverBrowser, which likely provides better security through established patterns. The subprocess calls remain but don't appear to introduce new vulnerabilities. No clear security vulnerabilities were fixed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.image.destination-atop.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.image.destination-atop.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 255, 0.5)';@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ promise.then(function(response) {     createImageBitmap(response).then(bitmap => {         ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 0, 0);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 128,255,128,191, "50,25", "128,255,128,191", 5);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 128,255,128,191, "50,25", "128,255,128,191", 5);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) without any security implications.

Here's the structured response:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.image.destination-atop.worker.js] [Lines 13-32]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 128,255,128,191, "50,25", "128,255,128,191", 5);
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 128,255,128,191, "50,25", "128,255,128,191", 5);

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature, improving variable naming consistency without affecting security. No vulnerabilities were introduced or fixed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/filters/2d.filter.canvasFilterObject.componentTransfer.linear.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/filters/2d.filter.canvasFilterObject.componentTransfer.linear.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); // From https://www.w3.org/TR/SVG11/filters.html#feComponentTransferElement function getColor(inputColor, slopes, intercepts) {@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@     let outputColor = getColor(color, slopes, intercepts);     ctx.fillStyle = `rgb(${color[0]}, ${color[1]}, ${color[2]})`;     ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 10, 10);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 5, 5, outputColor[0],outputColor[1],outputColor[2],255, "5,5", `${outputColor[0]},${outputColor[1]},${outputColor[2]}`, 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 5, 5, outputColor[0],outputColor[1],outputColor[2],255, "5,5", `${outputColor[0]},${outputColor[1]},${outputColor[2]}`, 2); } t.done();

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and updating the references accordingly. Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18, 49]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 5, 5, outputColor[0],outputColor[1],outputColor[2],255, "5,5", `${outputColor[0]},${outputColor[1]},${outputColor[2]}`, 2);
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 5, 5, outputColor[0],outputColor[1],outputColor[2],255, "5,5", `${outputColor[0]},${outputColor[1]},${outputColor[2]}`, 2);

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/pocket/content/panels/js/main.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/pocket/content/panels/js/main.js@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import HomeOverlay from "./home/overlay.js"; import SignupOverlay from "./signup/overlay.js"; import SavedOverlay from "./saved/overlay.js";+import StyleGuideOverlay from "./style-guide/overlay.js"; import pktPanelMessaging from "./messages.js"; var PKT_PANEL = function() {};@@ -22,6 +23,11 @@   initSaved() {     this.overlay = new SavedOverlay();+    this.init();+  },++  initStyleGuide() {+    this.overlay = new StyleGuideOverlay();     this.init();   },

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   No specific vulnerability found [File] browser/components/pocket/content/panels/js/main.js [Lines] 5,22-23  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   import SavedOverlay from "./saved/overlay.js";
   ```
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   import StyleGuideOverlay from "./style-guide/overlay.js";
   ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   No specific vulnerability found [File] browser/components/pocket/content/panels/js/main.js [Lines] 22-28  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   initSaved() {
     this.overlay = new SavedOverlay();
     this.init();
   },
   ```
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   initSaved() {
     this.overlay = new SavedOverlay();
     this.init();
   },

   initStyleGuide() {
     this.overlay = new StyleGuideOverlay();
     this.init();
   },
   ```

The changes appear to be adding new functionality (a StyleGuideOverlay) rather than fixing security vulnerabilities. No security-related changes were detected in this diff. The modifications simply extend the codebase with additional overlay initialization capabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/toggle-row-display-property-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/toggle-row-display-property-001.html@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/CSS2/visuren.html#display-prop"> <link rel="help" href="https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=764031"> <link rel="match" href="toggle-row-display-property-001-ref.html">-<meta name="flags" content="" /> <meta name="assert" content="After setting display:table-row on tr elements with display:none, the table should look same as if display:none were never used." /> <style>

Analyzing the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found in this diff. The change simply removes an empty `meta` tag with `flags` attribute, which doesn't appear to have any security implications. This seems to be a cleanup change rather than a security fix.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential HTML Injection (General) [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/toggle-row-display-property-001.html] [Lines 3-6]
Old Code:
`<meta name="flags" content="" />`
Fixed Code:
(removed)
Additional Details: While this doesn't appear to be a security fix, removing unused meta tags could theoretically reduce attack surface by removing potential injection points, though there's no evidence this was the motivation for the change.

Note: The diff shows only minor HTML cleanup with no obvious security implications. The removed meta tag had an empty content attribute and wasn't being used for any security-related purposes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.