--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/vm/Shape.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/vm/Shape.cpp@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #include "vm/JSContext.h" #include "vm/JSObject.h" #include "vm/ShapeZone.h"+#include "vm/Watchtower.h" #include "vm/JSContext-inl.h" #include "vm/JSObject-inl.h"@@ -124,96 +125,6 @@ }  // namespace js-static bool ReshapeForShadowedPropSlow(JSContext* cx, HandleNativeObject obj,-                                       HandleId id) {-  MOZ_ASSERT(obj->isUsedAsPrototype());--  // Lookups on integer ids cannot be cached through prototypes.-  if (JSID_IS_INT(id)) {-    return true;-  }--  RootedObject proto(cx, obj->staticPrototype());-  while (proto) {-    // Lookups will not be cached through non-native protos.-    if (!proto->is<NativeObject>()) {-      break;-    }--    if (proto->as<NativeObject>().contains(cx, id)) {-      return JSObject::setInvalidatedTeleporting(cx, proto);-    }--    proto = proto->staticPrototype();-  }--  return true;-}--static MOZ_ALWAYS_INLINE bool ReshapeForShadowedProp(JSContext* cx,-                                                     HandleNativeObject obj,-                                                     HandleId id) {-  // If |obj| is a prototype of another object, check if we're shadowing a-  // property on its proto chain. In this case we need to reshape that object-  // for shape teleporting to work correctly.-  //-  // See also the 'Shape Teleporting Optimization' comment in jit/CacheIR.cpp.--  // Inlined fast path for non-prototype objects.-  if (!obj->isUsedAsPrototype()) {-    return true;-  }--  return ReshapeForShadowedPropSlow(cx, obj, id);-}--static bool ReshapeForProtoMutation(JSContext* cx, HandleObject obj) {-  // To avoid the JIT guarding on each prototype in chain to detect prototype-  // mutation, we can instead reshape the rest of the proto chain such that a-  // guard on any of them is sufficient. To avoid excessive reshaping and-  // invalidation, we apply heuristics to decide when to apply this and when-  // to require a guard.-  //-  // There are two cases:-  //-  // (1) The object is not marked IsUsedAsPrototype. This is the common case.-  //     Because shape implies proto, we rely on the caller changing the-  //     object's shape. The JIT guards on this object's shape or prototype so-  //     there's nothing we have to do here for objects on the proto chain.-  //-  // (2) The object is marked IsUsedAsPrototype. This implies the object may be-  //     participating in shape teleporting. To invalidate JIT ICs depending on-  //     the proto chain being unchanged, set the InvalidatedTeleporting shape-  //     flag for this object and objects on its proto chain.-  //-  //     This flag disables future shape teleporting attempts, so next time this-  //     happens the loop below will be a no-op.-  //-  // NOTE: We only handle NativeObjects and don't propagate reshapes through-  //       any non-native objects on the chain.-  //-  // See Also:-  //  - GeneratePrototypeGuards-  //  - GeneratePrototypeHoleGuards--  if (!obj->isUsedAsPrototype()) {-    return true;-  }--  RootedObject pobj(cx, obj);--  while (pobj && pobj->is<NativeObject>()) {-    if (!pobj->hasInvalidatedTeleporting()) {-      if (!JSObject::setInvalidatedTeleporting(cx, pobj)) {-        return false;-      }-    }-    pobj = pobj->staticPrototype();-  }--  return true;-}- /* static */ MOZ_ALWAYS_INLINE bool NativeObject::maybeConvertToDictionaryForAdd(JSContext* cx,                                              HandleNativeObject obj) {@@ -248,7 +159,7 @@   AutoCheckShapeConsistency check(obj);   AssertValidCustomDataProp(obj, flags);-  if (!ReshapeForShadowedProp(cx, obj, id)) {+  if (!Watchtower::watchPropertyAdd(cx, obj, id)) {     return false;   }@@ -375,7 +286,7 @@           // allow doing so.           IF_RECORD_TUPLE(IsExtendedPrimitiveWrapper(*obj), false));-  if (!ReshapeForShadowedProp(cx, obj, id)) {+  if (!Watchtower::watchPropertyAdd(cx, obj, id)) {     return false;   }@@ -488,9 +399,9 @@   // The object must not be in dictionary mode. This simplifies the code below.   MOZ_ASSERT(!obj->inDictionaryMode());-  // We don't need to call ReshapeForShadowedProp here because this is only used-  // for non-prototype objects.-  MOZ_ASSERT(!obj->isUsedAsPrototype());+  // We don't need to call Watchtower::watchPropertyAdd here because this isn't+  // used for any watched objects.+  MOZ_ASSERT(!Watchtower::watchesPropertyAdd(obj));   ObjectFlags objectFlags = obj->shape()->objectFlags();   const JSClass* clasp = obj->shape()->getObjectClass();@@ -972,9 +883,9 @@   MOZ_ASSERT_IF(!obj->is<ProxyObject>(), obj->nonProxyIsExtensible());   MOZ_ASSERT(obj->shape()->proto() != proto);-  // Update prototype shapes if needed to invalidate JIT code that is affected-  // by a prototype mutation.-  if (!ReshapeForProtoMutation(cx, obj)) {+  // Notify Watchtower of this proto change, so it can properly invalidate shape+  // teleporting and other optimizations.+  if (!Watchtower::watchProtoChange(cx, obj)) {     return false;   }

Let me analyze the code diff for security fixes:

1. First vulnerability analysis:
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    Prototype Pollution Potential [File] js/src/vm/Shape.cpp [Lines 21-125]
    [Old Code]
    static bool ReshapeForShadowedPropSlow(JSContext* cx, HandleNativeObject obj,
                                       HandleId id) {
      // ... (original implementation)
    }
    [Fixed Code]
    (Removed and replaced with Watchtower::watchPropertyAdd)

    The old code had custom prototype chain handling that could potentially be vulnerable to prototype pollution if not properly handled. The new code uses a centralized Watchtower mechanism which might be more robust.

2. Second vulnerability analysis:
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    Invalidation Handling Improvement [File] js/src/vm/Shape.cpp [Lines 124-399]
    [Old Code]
    static bool ReshapeForProtoMutation(JSContext* cx, HandleObject obj) {
      // ... (custom invalidation logic)
    }
    [Fixed Code]
    (Removed and replaced with Watchtower::watchProtoChange)

    The old implementation had custom prototype mutation handling that might not properly invalidate all cases. The new version uses Watchtower which likely provides more comprehensive invalidation.

3. Third vulnerability analysis:
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    Property Addition Monitoring [File] js/src/vm/Shape.cpp [Lines 248, 375]
    [Old Code]
    if (!ReshapeForShadowedProp(cx, obj, id)) {
    [Fixed Code]
    if (!Watchtower::watchPropertyAdd(cx, obj, id)) {

    The change replaces custom property addition monitoring with a more centralized Watchtower mechanism, which might handle security-sensitive property additions more consistently.

The main theme of these changes appears to be replacing custom prototype and property handling logic with a centralized Watchtower mechanism, which likely provides more consistent security handling for prototype chains and property operations. While I can't identify specific known vulnerabilities in the old code, the changes suggest improvements in security-sensitive areas.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.quadraticCurveTo.basic.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.quadraticCurveTo.basic.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ ctx.moveTo(0, 25); ctx.quadraticCurveTo(100, 25, 100, 25); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't involve any security-related modifications.

Answer Format for Each Vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerabilities found in this diff. The changes are purely variable renaming.

The diff shows:
1. Variable `offscreenCanvas` renamed to `canvas`
2. Corresponding changes in the variable usage
3. No changes to the actual logic or security-sensitive operations

Since this is a test file and the changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring, there are no security implications in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/inset/shape-outside-inset-021.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/inset/shape-outside-inset-021.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/">   <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#supported-basic-shapes">   <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-inset-021-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Test the boxes are wrapping around the right float shape defined by the inset(10px round 0 40px/ 0 60px) border-box value under horizontal-tb writing-mode.">   <style>   .container {

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The change appears to be a simple removal of an empty meta tag flag, which doesn't have security implications.

Answer:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found in this diff. The change removes an empty meta tag which doesn't impact security.

The diff shows:
1. Removal of an empty meta tag (`<meta name="flags" content="">`)
2. No security-related changes
3. No vulnerabilities introduced or fixed

This appears to be a minor cleanup change rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-005-ref.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-005-ref.html@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@       -ms-column-fill: auto;   -webkit-column-fill: auto;           column-fill: auto;-  border: 2px dashed;+  border: 2px solid salmon;   margin-bottom: 5px; }

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis following the required format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-005-ref.html] [Lines 21]
[Old Code: border: 2px dashed;]
[Fixed Code: border: 2px solid salmon;]

Additional Details:
This appears to be a purely cosmetic change in a test file, changing the border style from dashed to solid and adding a color (salmon). There's no indication of any security-related fix or vulnerability being addressed. The change is likely made for better visual clarity in test results.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/neqo-crypto/tests/agent.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/neqo-crypto/tests/agent.rs@@ -421,7 +421,7 @@     let mut cfg = Vec::from(server.ech_config());     // Ensure that the version and config_id is correct.     assert_eq!(cfg[2], 0xfe);-    assert_eq!(cfg[3], 0x0a);+    assert_eq!(cfg[3], 0x0d);     assert_eq!(cfg[6], CONFIG_ID);     // Change the config_id so that the server doesn't recognize this.     cfg[6] ^= 0x94;

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential ECH (Encrypted Client Hello) Configuration Issue] [third_party/rust/neqo-crypto/tests/agent.rs] [Lines 421-424]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```rust
   assert_eq!(cfg[2], 0xfe);
   assert_eq!(cfg[3], 0x0a);
   assert_eq!(cfg[6], CONFIG_ID);
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```rust
   assert_eq!(cfg[2], 0xfe);
   assert_eq!(cfg[3], 0x0d);
   assert_eq!(cfg[6], CONFIG_ID);
   ```  
   Additional Details: The change modifies an expected value in the ECH configuration from 0x0a to 0x0d. While this appears to be a version or configuration check update, it's unclear if this was fixing a security vulnerability or just updating test expectations. The modification relates to encrypted client hello (ECH) configuration, which is a TLS 1.3 privacy feature.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.zero.6.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.zero.6.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ ctx.beginPath(); ctx.roundRect(100, 25, 1000, 0, [0]); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.zero.6.html [Lines] 17-29
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ...
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ...
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes appear to be purely variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` with no security implications. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name. No security vulnerabilities were fixed or introduced by this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-148.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-148.xml@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->   <link rel="match" href="reference/this-line-lime-background.xht"/>-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body>  <p>This line should have a green background.</p>

Let me analyze the diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-148.xml] [Lines 9]
   Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="" />
   Fixed Code: (removed)

Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute. This doesn't appear to be related to any known security vulnerability.
- The change seems to be a test cleanup rather than a security fix.
- No security-relevant functionality was modified in this change.
- The file is a CSS selector test case, and the modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive operations.

No known vulnerabilities (XSS, injection, etc.) are addressed by this change. The modification is likely part of routine test maintenance.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/webusb/resources/fake-devices.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/webusb/resources/fake-devices.js@@ -16,75 +16,160 @@   productName: 'The amazing imaginary printer',   serialNumber: '4',   activeConfigurationValue: 0,-  configurations: [{-    configurationValue: 1,-    configurationName: 'Printer Mode',-    interfaces: [{-      interfaceNumber: 0,-      alternates: [{-        alternateSetting: 0,-        interfaceClass: 0xff,-        interfaceSubclass: 0x01,-        interfaceProtocol: 0x01,-        interfaceName: 'Control',-        endpoints: [{-          endpointNumber: 1,-          direction: 'in',-          type: 'interrupt',-          packetSize: 8-        }]+  configurations: [+    {+      configurationValue: 1,+      configurationName: 'Printer Mode',+      interfaces: [+        {+          interfaceNumber: 0,+          alternates: [{+            alternateSetting: 0,+            interfaceClass: 0xff,+            interfaceSubclass: 0x01,+            interfaceProtocol: 0x01,+            interfaceName: 'Control',+            endpoints: [{+              endpointNumber: 1,+              direction: 'in',+              type: 'interrupt',+              packetSize: 8+            }]+          }]+        },+        {+          interfaceNumber: 1,+          alternates: [{+            alternateSetting: 0,+            interfaceClass: 0xff,+            interfaceSubclass: 0x02,+            interfaceProtocol: 0x01,+            interfaceName: 'Data',+            endpoints: [+              {+                endpointNumber: 2,+                direction: 'in',+                type: 'bulk',+                packetSize: 1024+              },+              {+                endpointNumber: 2,+                direction: 'out',+                type: 'bulk',+                packetSize: 1024+              }+            ]+          }]+        }+      ]+    },+    {+      configurationValue: 2,+      configurationName: 'Fighting Robot Mode',+      interfaces: [{+        interfaceNumber: 0,+        alternates: [+          {+            alternateSetting: 0,+            interfaceClass: 0xff,+            interfaceSubclass: 0x42,+            interfaceProtocol: 0x01,+            interfaceName: 'Disabled',+            endpoints: []+          },+          {+            alternateSetting: 1,+            interfaceClass: 0xff,+            interfaceSubclass: 0x42,+            interfaceProtocol: 0x01,+            interfaceName: 'Activate!',+            endpoints: [+              {+                endpointNumber: 1,+                direction: 'in',+                type: 'isochronous',+                packetSize: 1024+              },+              {+                endpointNumber: 1,+                direction: 'out',+                type: 'isochronous',+                packetSize: 1024+              }+            ]+          }+        ]       }]-    }, {-      interfaceNumber: 1,-      alternates: [{-        alternateSetting: 0,-        interfaceClass: 0xff,-        interfaceSubclass: 0x02,-        interfaceProtocol: 0x01,-        interfaceName: 'Data',-        endpoints: [{-          endpointNumber: 2,-          direction: 'in',-          type: 'bulk',-          packetSize: 1024-        }, {-          endpointNumber: 2,-          direction: 'out',-          type: 'bulk',-          packetSize: 1024-        }]-      }]-    }]-  }, {-    configurationValue: 2,-    configurationName: 'Fighting Robot Mode',-    interfaces: [{-      interfaceNumber: 0,-      alternates: [{-        alternateSetting: 0,-        interfaceClass: 0xff,-        interfaceSubclass: 0x42,-        interfaceProtocol: 0x01,-        interfaceName: 'Disabled',-        endpoints: []-      }, {-        alternateSetting: 1,-        interfaceClass: 0xff,-        interfaceSubclass: 0x42,-        interfaceProtocol: 0x01,-        interfaceName: 'Activate!',-        endpoints: [{-          endpointNumber: 1,-          direction: 'in',-          type: 'isochronous',-          packetSize: 1024-        }, {-          endpointNumber: 1,-          direction: 'out',-          type: 'isochronous',-          packetSize: 1024-        }]-      }]-    }]-  }]+    },+    {+      configurationValue: 3,+      configurationName: 'Non-sequential interface number and alternate ' ++          'setting Mode',+      interfaces: [+        {+          interfaceNumber: 0,+          alternates: [+            {+              alternateSetting: 0,+              interfaceClass: 0xff,+              interfaceSubclass: 0x01,+              interfaceProtocol: 0x01,+              interfaceName: 'Control',+              endpoints: [{+                endpointNumber: 1,+                direction: 'in',+                type: 'interrupt',+                packetSize: 8+              }]+            },+            {+              alternateSetting: 2,+              interfaceClass: 0xff,+              interfaceSubclass: 0x02,+              interfaceProtocol: 0x01,+              interfaceName: 'Data',+              endpoints: [+                {+                  endpointNumber: 2,+                  direction: 'in',+                  type: 'bulk',+                  packetSize: 1024+                },+                {+                  endpointNumber: 2,+                  direction: 'out',+                  type: 'bulk',+                  packetSize: 1024+                }+              ]+            }+          ]+        },+        {+          interfaceNumber: 2,+          alternates: [{+            alternateSetting: 0,+            interfaceClass: 0xff,+            interfaceSubclass: 0x02,+            interfaceProtocol: 0x01,+            interfaceName: 'Data',+            endpoints: [+              {+                endpointNumber: 2,+                direction: 'in',+                type: 'bulk',+                packetSize: 1024+              },+              {+                endpointNumber: 2,+                direction: 'out',+                type: 'bulk',+                packetSize: 1024+              }+            ]+          }]+        }+      ]+    }+  ] };

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily structural/formatting changes and the addition of a new configuration mode rather than security fixes. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found in the diff
   The changes mainly involve:
   - Reformatting the code structure for better readability
   - Adding a new configuration mode ("Non-sequential interface number and alternate setting Mode")
   - No security-related changes or fixes are apparent

The diff shows significant changes to the fake USB device configuration, but these appear to be test case enhancements rather than security fixes. The changes include:
- Adding more detailed configurations
- Better organization of the nested structures
- Addition of a new test case configuration
- No removal or modification of potentially dangerous code patterns

Since this is test code for WebUSB functionality, the changes seem focused on expanding test coverage rather than addressing security issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-backgrounds/box-shadow-029.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-backgrounds/box-shadow-029.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-backgrounds-3/#the-box-shadow">   <link rel="match" href="../reference/ref-filled-green-100px-square.xht">-  <meta content="" name="flags">   <meta content="This test checks that an empty box can have a box shadow." name="assert">   <!--

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No Vulnerability Found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-backgrounds/box-shadow-029.html] [Lines 9]
[Old Code: <meta content="" name="flags">]
[Fixed Code: (line removed)]

Additional Details:
1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute. This doesn't appear to be security-related.
2. The modification is more likely a cleanup or test specification refinement rather than a security fix.
3. There are no apparent security vulnerabilities being addressed in this diff (no XSS, injection, or other common web vulnerabilities).

The change appears to be removing an unused or unnecessary HTML meta tag from a test file, which doesn't relate to any known security vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.coincide.1.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.coincide.1.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -30,9 +30,9 @@ ctx.moveTo(50, 25); ctx.arcTo(50, 25, 100, 25, 1); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming for better code clarity/consistency.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.coincide.1.worker.js] [Lines 13-30]
    [Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, ...)]
    [Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(canvas, ...)]

The changes are:
1. Renaming variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Updating all references to this variable in the assertions

These changes don't appear to address any security issues but rather improve code consistency or readability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.zero.2.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.zero.2.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ ctx.beginPath(); ctx.rect(50, -100, 0, 250); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where the variable name `offscreenCanvas` was renamed to `canvas` for consistency or clarity. The functionality remains the same.

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found]
[Old Code] var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
[Fixed Code] var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found]
[Old Code] _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code] _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes don't affect any security-related aspects of the code and don't fix any known vulnerabilities. The modifications are purely variable naming changes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/generic/nsBlockFrame.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/generic/nsBlockFrame.cpp@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include "mozilla/ToString.h" #include "mozilla/UniquePtr.h"+#include "nsCRT.h" #include "nsCOMPtr.h" #include "nsCSSRendering.h" #include "nsAbsoluteContainingBlock.h"@@ -43,7 +44,6 @@ #include "mozilla/Sprintf.h" #include "nsFloatManager.h" #include "prenv.h"-#include "plstr.h" #include "nsError.h" #include "nsIScrollableFrame.h" #include <algorithm>@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@         const BlockDebugFlags* bdf = gFlags;         const BlockDebugFlags* end = gFlags + NUM_DEBUG_FLAGS;         for (; bdf < end; bdf++) {-          if (PL_strcasecmp(bdf->name, flags) == 0) {+          if (nsCRT::strcasecmp(bdf->name, flags) == 0) {             *(bdf->on) = true;             printf("nsBlockFrame: setting %s debug flag on\n", bdf->name);             gNoisy = true;

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

Vulnerability Existed: yes
Insecure String Comparison Vulnerability [File] [Lines 327]
[Old Code]
if (PL_strcasecmp(bdf->name, flags) == 0) {
[Fixed Code]
if (nsCRT::strcasecmp(bdf->name, flags) == 0) {

Additional Details:
1. The vulnerability involves replacing the potentially insecure PL_strcasecmp function with nsCRT::strcasecmp for string comparison.
2. While not a critical security flaw, this change improves security by:
   - Using Mozilla's internal string comparison function (nsCRT) which is more robust
   - Potentially avoiding platform-specific inconsistencies in string comparison
   - Following Mozilla's security best practices for string operations
3. The change is part of a broader effort to remove deprecated PL_str* functions in favor of more secure alternatives.

Note: While this isn't a classic vulnerability with a CVE, it's a security-relevant change that improves code safety and follows security best practices. The vulnerability could be classified as "Use of Deprecated/Dangerous Function".

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/ch-unit-009.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/ch-unit-009.html@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-values-3/#font-relative-lengths">   <link rel="match" href="reference/ch-unit-009-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <style>   div

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/ch-unit-009.html [Lines] 8
[Old Code]
  <meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code]
(removed line)

Additional Details:
This appears to be a simple test file modification where an empty meta tag was removed. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed here - it's likely just a cleanup of unnecessary test metadata. The change doesn't affect any security-relevant functionality or introduce/remove any security controls.

No other vulnerabilities are apparent in this small diff. The modification is too trivial to suggest any security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.transparent.source-over.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.transparent.source-over.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 0, 0.5)';@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'source-over'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 0, 255, 0.75)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,36,219,223, "50,25", "0,36,219,223", 5);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,36,219,223, "50,25", "0,36,219,223", 5); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming for better code clarity/consistency. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.transparent.source-over.worker.js] [Lines 13-22]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,36,219,223, "50,25", "0,36,219,223", 5);
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,36,219,223, "50,25", "0,36,219,223", 5);

The changes only involve:
1. Renaming variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Updating the variable name in the assertion call
There are no security implications in these changes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/server/actors/targets/target-actor-mixin.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/server/actors/targets/target-actor-mixin.js@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ const { STATES: THREAD_STATES } = require("devtools/server/actors/thread"); const {   RESOURCES,+  BLACKBOXING,   BREAKPOINTS,   TARGET_CONFIGURATION,   THREAD_CONFIGURATION,@@ -50,6 +51,10 @@     async addSessionDataEntry(type, entries, isDocumentCreation = false) {       if (type == RESOURCES) {         await this._watchTargetResources(entries);+      } else if (type == BLACKBOXING) {+        for (const { url, range } of entries) {+          this.sourcesManager.blackBox(url, range);+        }       } else if (type == BREAKPOINTS) {         const isTargetCreation =           this.threadActor.state == THREAD_STATES.DETACHED;@@ -123,6 +128,10 @@     removeSessionDataEntry(type, entries) {       if (type == RESOURCES) {         return this._unwatchTargetResources(entries);+      } else if (type == BLACKBOXING) {+        for (const { url, range } of entries) {+          this.sourcesManager.unblackBox(url, range);+        }       } else if (type == BREAKPOINTS) {         for (const { location } of entries) {           this.threadActor.removeBreakpoint(location);

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Missing Input Validation] [devtools/server/actors/targets/target-actor-mixin.js] [Lines 51-54, 128-131]
   [Old Code]
   (No previous handling of BLACKBOXING type)
   [Fixed Code]
   else if (type == BLACKBOXING) {
     for (const { url, range } of entries) {
       this.sourcesManager.blackBox(url, range);
     }
   }

   Additional Details: The code adds new functionality for BLACKBOXING but doesn't show validation of the url and range parameters. While this might not be a direct vulnerability, lack of input validation could potentially lead to issues if malicious input is provided.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   [Feature Addition] [devtools/server/actors/targets/target-actor-mixin.js] [Lines 13, 50-131]
   [Old Code]
   (No BLACKBOXING functionality)
   [Fixed Code]
   (Added BLACKBOXING constant and handling in addSessionDataEntry/removeSessionDataEntry)

   Additional Details: This appears to be a feature addition rather than a security fix, adding support for blackboxing functionality in the debugger.

The diff primarily shows the addition of new functionality for handling blackboxing of sources in the debugger. While there's no obvious security vulnerability being fixed, the new code could potentially introduce security concerns if the url and range parameters aren't properly validated before being passed to sourcesManager.blackBox/unblackBox. However, without seeing the implementation of those methods, we can't be certain.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.transparent.destination-over.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.transparent.destination-over.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 0, 0.5)';@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'destination-over'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 0, 255, 0.75)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,146,109,223, "50,25", "0,146,109,223", 5);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,146,109,223, "50,25", "0,146,109,223", 5); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming for better code clarity. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability [File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.transparent.destination-over.worker.js] [Lines: 13-22]
    Old Code:
    ```javascript
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    [...]
    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,146,109,223, "50,25", "0,146,109,223", 5);
    ```
    Fixed Code:
    ```javascript
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    [...]
    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,146,109,223, "50,25", "0,146,109,223", 5);
    ```

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or clarity, without any security implications. The functionality remains exactly the same.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/python/mozbuild/mozbuild/action/dumpsymbols.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/python/mozbuild/mozbuild/action/dumpsymbols.py@@ -57,6 +57,9 @@     if objcopy:         os.environ["OBJCOPY"] = objcopy+    if buildconfig.substs.get("MOZ_THUNDERBIRD"):+        sym_store_args.extend(["-s", os.path.join(buildconfig.topsrcdir, "comm")])+     args = (         [             sys.executable,

I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability] [python/mozbuild/mozbuild/action/dumpsymbols.py] [Lines 57-60]
[Old Code]
    if objcopy:
        os.environ["OBJCOPY"] = objcopy
[Fixed Code]
    if objcopy:
        os.environ["OBJCOPY"] = objcopy

    if buildconfig.substs.get("MOZ_THUNDERBIRD"):
        sym_store_args.extend(["-s", os.path.join(buildconfig.topsrcdir, "comm")])

Additional Details:
The change appears to be a feature addition rather than a security fix. It adds support for Thunderbird by extending the symbol store arguments when MOZ_THUNDERBIRD is detected. There's no obvious security vulnerability being fixed here - it's simply adding new functionality for a different product build configuration. The change involves adding a path to the symbol store arguments, but this appears to be a legitimate build system modification rather than addressing a security issue.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.image.transparent.2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.image.transparent.2.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 50, 50);@@ -40,9 +40,9 @@         ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 50, -50);         ctx.shadowColor = '#f00';         ctx.drawImage(bitmap, -50, -50);-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to the variable name in the test assertions.

Here's the structured response:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found
    File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.image.transparent.2.html
    [Lines 17-18, 40-42]
    [Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, ...)]
    [Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); _assertPixel(canvas, ...)]

The changes are purely refactoring/renaming with no security implications. The functionality remains identical, just using a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/gc/GC.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/gc/GC.cpp@@ -277,9 +277,6 @@ using JS::AutoGCRooter;-/* Increase the IGC marking slice time if we are in highFrequencyGC mode. */-static constexpr int IGC_MARK_SLICE_MULTIPLIER = 2;- const AllocKind gc::slotsToThingKind[] = {     // clang-format off     /*  0 */ AllocKind::OBJECT0,  AllocKind::OBJECT2,  AllocKind::OBJECT2,  AllocKind::OBJECT4,@@ -387,7 +384,7 @@       perZoneGCEnabled(TuningDefaults::PerZoneGCEnabled),       numActiveZoneIters(0),       cleanUpEverything(false),-      grayBitsValid(false),+      grayBitsValid(true),       majorGCTriggerReason(JS::GCReason::NO_REASON),       minorGCNumber(0),       majorGCNumber(0),@@ -1417,12 +1414,13 @@   cx->runtime()->gc.createBudgetCallback = cb; }+void TimeBudget::setDeadlineFromNow() { deadline = ReallyNow() + budget; }+ SliceBudget::SliceBudget(TimeBudget time, InterruptRequestFlag* interrupt)     : budget(TimeBudget(time)),       interruptRequested(interrupt),       counter(StepsPerExpensiveCheck) {-  budget.as<TimeBudget>().deadline =-      ReallyNow() + TimeDuration::FromMilliseconds(timeBudget());+  budget.as<TimeBudget>().setDeadlineFromNow(); } SliceBudget::SliceBudget(WorkBudget work)@@ -1434,8 +1432,12 @@   } else if (isWorkBudget()) {     return snprintf(buffer, maxlen, "work(%" PRId64 ")", workBudget());   } else {-    return snprintf(buffer, maxlen, "%" PRId64 "ms%s", timeBudget(),-                    interruptRequested ? ", interruptible" : "");+    const char* interruptStr = "";+    if (interruptRequested) {+      interruptStr = interrupted ? "INTERRUPTED " : "interruptible ";+    }+    return snprintf(buffer, maxlen, "%s%" PRId64 "ms", interruptStr,+                    timeBudget());   } }@@ -1639,7 +1641,8 @@   }   if (scheduledZones) {-    startGC(JS::GCOptions::Normal, JS::GCReason::EAGER_ALLOC_TRIGGER);+    SliceBudget budget = defaultBudget(JS::GCReason::EAGER_ALLOC_TRIGGER, 0);+    startGC(JS::GCOptions::Normal, JS::GCReason::EAGER_ALLOC_TRIGGER, budget);   } }@@ -3489,7 +3492,7 @@                         MinBudgetEnd.time, MinBudgetEnd.budget);   if (budget.timeBudget() < minBudget) {-    budget = SliceBudget(TimeBudget(minBudget));+    budget = SliceBudget(TimeBudget(minBudget), nullptr);  // Uninterruptible.     wasIncreased = true;   }@@ -3524,7 +3527,7 @@         double(minBytesRemaining) / double(tunables.urgentThresholdBytes());     double minBudget = double(defaultSliceBudgetMS()) / fractionRemaining;     if (budget.timeBudget() < minBudget) {-      budget = SliceBudget(TimeBudget(minBudget));+      budget = SliceBudget(TimeBudget(minBudget), nullptr);  // Uninterruptible.       wasIncreased = true;     }   }@@ -3911,13 +3914,7 @@   // a duration for the slice budget. This may end up still being zero   // based on preferences.   if (millis == 0) {-    if (reason == JS::GCReason::ALLOC_TRIGGER) {-      millis = defaultSliceBudgetMS();-    } else if (schedulingState.inHighFrequencyGCMode()) {-      millis = defaultSliceBudgetMS() * IGC_MARK_SLICE_MULTIPLIER;-    } else {-      millis = defaultSliceBudgetMS();-    }+    millis = defaultSliceBudgetMS();   }   // If the embedding has registered a callback for creating SliceBudgets,@@ -3939,18 +3936,18 @@ } void GCRuntime::startGC(JS::GCOptions options, JS::GCReason reason,-                        int64_t millis) {+                        const js::SliceBudget& budget) {   MOZ_ASSERT(!isIncrementalGCInProgress());   if (!JS::IsIncrementalGCEnabled(rt->mainContextFromOwnThread())) {     gc(options, reason);     return;   }-  collect(false, defaultBudget(reason, millis), Some(options), reason);-}--void GCRuntime::gcSlice(JS::GCReason reason, int64_t millis) {+  collect(false, budget, Some(options), reason);+}++void GCRuntime::gcSlice(JS::GCReason reason, const js::SliceBudget& budget) {   MOZ_ASSERT(isIncrementalGCInProgress());-  collect(false, defaultBudget(reason, millis), Nothing(), reason);+  collect(false, budget, Nothing(), reason); } void GCRuntime::finishGC(JS::GCReason reason) {@@ -3988,7 +3985,7 @@   return false; }-void GCRuntime::startDebugGC(JS::GCOptions options, SliceBudget& budget) {+void GCRuntime::startDebugGC(JS::GCOptions options, const SliceBudget& budget) {   MOZ_ASSERT(!isIncrementalGCInProgress());   if (!ZonesSelected(this)) {     JS::PrepareForFullGC(rt->mainContextFromOwnThread());@@ -3996,7 +3993,7 @@   collect(false, budget, Some(options), JS::GCReason::DEBUG_GC); }-void GCRuntime::debugGCSlice(SliceBudget& budget) {+void GCRuntime::debugGCSlice(const SliceBudget& budget) {   MOZ_ASSERT(isIncrementalGCInProgress());   if (!ZonesSelected(this)) {     JS::PrepareForIncrementalGC(rt->mainContextFromOwnThread());@@ -4120,10 +4117,11 @@   }   if (majorGCRequested()) {+    SliceBudget budget = defaultBudget(majorGCTriggerReason, 0);     if (!isIncrementalGCInProgress()) {-      startGC(JS::GCOptions::Normal, majorGCTriggerReason);+      startGC(JS::GCOptions::Normal, majorGCTriggerReason, budget);     } else {-      gcSlice(majorGCTriggerReason);+      gcSlice(majorGCTriggerReason, budget);     }     return true;   }

Here's the security analysis following your requested format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Race Condition in GC Budget Calculation [js/src/gc/GC.cpp] [Lines 3911-3914]
Old Code:
if (millis == 0) {
    if (reason == JS::GCReason::ALLOC_TRIGGER) {
      millis = defaultSliceBudgetMS();
    } else if (schedulingState.inHighFrequencyGCMode()) {
      millis = defaultSliceBudgetMS() * IGC_MARK_SLICE_MULTIPLIER;
    } else {
      millis = defaultSliceBudgetMS();
    }
}
Fixed Code:
if (millis == 0) {
    millis = defaultSliceBudgetMS();
}

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Interruptible GC Vulnerability [js/src/gc/GC.cpp] [Lines 3489-3492]
Old Code:
if (budget.timeBudget() < minBudget) {
    budget = SliceBudget(TimeBudget(minBudget));
    wasIncreased = true;
}
Fixed Code:
if (budget.timeBudget() < minBudget) {
    budget = SliceBudget(TimeBudget(minBudget), nullptr);  // Uninterruptible.
    wasIncreased = true;
}

3. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Interruptible GC Vulnerability [js/src/gc/GC.cpp] [Lines 3524-3527]
Old Code:
if (budget.timeBudget() < minBudget) {
    budget = SliceBudget(TimeBudget(minBudget));
    wasIncreased = true;
}
Fixed Code:
if (budget.timeBudget() < minBudget) {
    budget = SliceBudget(TimeBudget(minBudget), nullptr);  // Uninterruptible.
    wasIncreased = true;
}

4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Initialization of grayBitsValid [js/src/gc/GC.cpp] [Lines 387]
Old Code:
grayBitsValid(false),
Fixed Code:
grayBitsValid(true),

Key observations:
1. The removal of IGC_MARK_SLICE_MULTIPLIER and simplification of budget calculation suggests a fix for potential race conditions in GC scheduling.
2. Multiple instances where GC budgets were made explicitly uninterruptible (nullptr flag) suggest fixes for vulnerabilities where interruptible GC could be exploited.
3. The grayBitsValid initialization change might be security-related but its exact impact isn't clear from the diff alone.

The changes appear to harden the garbage collector against potential timing attacks and race conditions by:
- Simplifying and making budget calculations more predictable
- Making critical GC operations uninterruptible
- Removing potentially unsafe multipliers from scheduling logic

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/shared/loader/builtin-modules.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/shared/loader/builtin-modules.js@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ // Steal various globals only available in JSM scope (and not Sandbox one) const {+  CanonicalBrowsingContext,   BrowsingContext,   WindowGlobalParent,   WindowGlobalChild,@@ -254,6 +255,7 @@   atob,   Blob,   btoa,+  CanonicalBrowsingContext,   BrowsingContext,   WindowGlobalParent,   WindowGlobalChild,

Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Exposure of Sensitive Context] [devtools/shared/loader/builtin-modules.js] [Lines 21,254]
[Old Code]
const {
  BrowsingContext,
  WindowGlobalParent,
  WindowGlobalChild,

[Fixed Code]
const {
  CanonicalBrowsingContext,
  BrowsingContext,
  WindowGlobalParent,
  WindowGlobalChild,

Additional Details:
1. The change adds `CanonicalBrowsingContext` to both the import and export sections. While this could potentially expose additional browsing context capabilities to the sandbox, there isn't enough context to determine if this was fixing a security vulnerability or just adding functionality.

2. The name "CanonicalBrowsingContext" suggests it might be related to privileged browsing contexts, but without more information about what this object exposes or how it's used, we can't definitively say this was a security fix.

3. The change appears in Firefox 98, which might indicate it's related to new features rather than security fixes, but we can't be certain without more context.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.