--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.space.collapse.nonspace.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.space.collapse.nonspace.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var f = new FontFace("CanvasTest", "url('/fonts/CanvasTest.ttf')"); let fonts = (self.fonts ? self.fonts : document.fonts);@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@     ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);     ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';     ctx.fillText('E\x0b EE', -150, 37.5);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);   }).then(t_pass, t_fail); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't involve any security-related modifications.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.space.collapse.nonspace.worker.js] [Lines 13-14, 26-27]
Old Code:
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);

Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or clarity.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgb-percent.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgb-percent.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgb(0% ,100% ,0%)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis following the specified format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgb-percent.html] [Lines 17-25]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
ctx.fillStyle = 'rgb(0% ,100% ,0%)';
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
ctx.fillStyle = 'rgb(0% ,100% ,0%)';
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

Additional Details:
The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating the corresponding references. There are no security-related changes or vulnerability fixes in this diff. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.miter.invalid.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.miter.invalid.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.miterLimit = 1.5; _assertSame(ctx.miterLimit, 1.5, "ctx.miterLimit", "1.5");

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No Vulnerability Found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.miter.invalid.worker.js] [Lines 13-14]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be a simple variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security-related changes were made in this diff
- The modification doesn't affect any security controls or introduce/remove any security-relevant functionality
- This is likely a code style/readability improvement rather than a security fix

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/anyhow/.cargo-checksum.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/anyhow/.cargo-checksum.json@@ -1 +1 @@-{"files":{"Cargo.toml":"5e3414ce23940106f95102f85e643cb5bed5e8ed9027557963c728d5f46d5586","LICENSE-APACHE":"a60eea817514531668d7e00765731449fe14d059d3249e0bc93b36de45f759f2","LICENSE-MIT":"23f18e03dc49df91622fe2a76176497404e46ced8a715d9d2b67a7446571cca3","README.md":"f6bffe3676b128afe14aaf91c972d69c37f2e5afe4e02b99a974f7b7393f4cda","build.rs":"b6ee548cb30aba0a4a7ff92379478fcf94ef246b892da8e2134ee2d9575bf08c","rust-toolchain.toml":"6bbb61302978c736b2da03e4fb40e3beab908f85d533ab46fd541e637b5f3e0f","src/backtrace.rs":"a1a52f9874f0aa1382fb404f029c6fa88e53afe38fb2417877d5711f1f2b90c9","src/chain.rs":"6edefc5f3c7d69683095862e54e3bb56faba5b3387bf2eeaed429da090007a0a","src/context.rs":"559478ae785ce913523aa21358cc1561ef4b0b95c5c87675a77890364c0162fe","src/ensure.rs":"98b2f4a7923e06cf6558b0a15f39a7c7ff3d36711e217475c6a93690cd58b7a1","src/error.rs":"33a0f6c49d2c5d08b8d027aa930be75ece822331d6e6b28db74520ea69587cbc","src/fmt.rs":"c2d4aad6ce20625a70a7c091e3087b6a2c19a4a87c7a12edb4c98978307245ea","src/kind.rs":"b21b15dbee77d50abe88684a9571b39659076465dd4b1956f366af8fdd26e95a","src/lib.rs":"f39d4684ce6ce473b585d2f9bc8b7a355cf28e5b5c936431d8072ac5c4fe94fd","src/macros.rs":"5a735a3fa919de58729be54976678c0a386e8e9af947987f17fd988c531974c7","src/ptr.rs":"f4e28bc9feba1e84160ca9d185008a51b5d72e168e6546f3e942f4258c361e19","src/wrapper.rs":"1229beca67dbd95ca77c9ecce282272acc55276c267c58cb73a75388b4693dda","tests/common/mod.rs":"f9088c2d7afafa64ff730b629272045b776bfafc2f5957508242da630635f2e1","tests/compiletest.rs":"022a8e400ef813d7ea1875b944549cee5125f6a995dc33e93b48cba3e1b57bd1","tests/drop/mod.rs":"382956f4bd3dcd1f6036efb8f11193595a7c60e0a5dbf5f2da149f1f25183abf","tests/test_autotrait.rs":"981e792db353be2f14c7a1cabe43b5f1329c168cb7679077cc2be786a0920d48","tests/test_backtrace.rs":"0e50edbb33b6bd07ba89ff3db72fb7c688ba2a4371fccdbbb20309ab02948b6a","tests/test_boxed.rs":"6b26db0e2eb72afe9af7352ea820837aab90f8d486294616dd5dc34c1b94038c","tests/test_chain.rs":"d5e90e3eba58abc60d241d3aade39e0b8d4006d9a14f3cf015d3d925160b5812","tests/test_context.rs":"8409c53b328562c11e822bd6c3cd17e0d4d50b9bbb8fc3617333fd77303a6a33","tests/test_convert.rs":"7e7a8b4772a427a911014ac4d1083f9519000e786177f898808980dd9bdfde61","tests/test_downcast.rs":"ce8438cb58a1b7f3599740c261f6ef05855127ccde20c83c82db15eaf51c57ad","tests/test_ensure.rs":"45331ef18c4c69acf4b80f5f55d2cefb55cc82f00e854b81d54c3df36a639003","tests/test_ffi.rs":"d0cb4c1d6d9154090982dee72ae3ebe05a5981f976058c3250f1c9da5a45edef","tests/test_fmt.rs":"17572596f257aac9aa2ec4620e292ca6a954128b94772bb948399fab53832e70","tests/test_macros.rs":"3f808b3050fc2b18c5b9058fe71b6b464d70e3658ff9b1daa379cd58c6874296","tests/test_repr.rs":"dbb9b04ddbe1ab31eb5331ea69f05bb3a147299da2275a3d4dcc92947b5591b9","tests/test_source.rs":"b80723cf635a4f8c4df21891b34bfab9ed2b2aa407e7a2f826d24e334cd5f88e","tests/ui/chained-comparison.rs":"6504b03d95b5acc232a7f4defc9f343b2be6733bf475fa0992e8e6545b912bd4","tests/ui/chained-comparison.stderr":"7f1d0a8c251b0ede2d30b3087ec157fc660945c97a642c4a5acf5a14ec58de34","tests/ui/empty-ensure.rs":"ab5bf37c846a0d689f26ce9257a27228411ed64154f9c950f1602d88a355d94b","tests/ui/empty-ensure.stderr":"0fa39de3edadb86382d8cd147c2640771e080338be2f4b067650258e3150f181","tests/ui/no-impl.rs":"fab6cbf2f6ea510b86f567dfb3b7c31250a9fd71ae5d110dbb9188be569ec593","tests/ui/no-impl.stderr":"9d2d9cdf441f1c4a0ccbc4a7433013166425b98cd8dd8738381e8fd070c1aed9","tests/ui/temporary-value.rs":"4dcc96271b2403e6372cf4cfc813445e5ce4365fc6e156b6bc38274098499a70","tests/ui/temporary-value.stderr":"64e448b6759cf51d41b1360307a638452bbe53ffa706f93e4a503b712d7b89a8","tests/ui/wrong-interpolation.rs":"9c44d4674c2dccd27b9dedd03341346ec02d993b41793ee89b5755202e7e367e","tests/ui/wrong-interpolation.stderr":"301e60e2eb9401782c7dc0b3580613a4cb2aafd4cc8065734a630a62e1161aa5"},"package":"8b26702f315f53b6071259e15dd9d64528213b44d61de1ec926eca7715d62203"}+{"files":{"Cargo.toml":"ce2fb7f23073f4f0bd58bae44baab86fa6c3d3595f32d28b410ec52394b3f64c","LICENSE-APACHE":"a60eea817514531668d7e00765731449fe14d059d3249e0bc93b36de45f759f2","LICENSE-MIT":"23f18e03dc49df91622fe2a76176497404e46ced8a715d9d2b67a7446571cca3","README.md":"f6bffe3676b128afe14aaf91c972d69c37f2e5afe4e02b99a974f7b7393f4cda","build.rs":"b6ee548cb30aba0a4a7ff92379478fcf94ef246b892da8e2134ee2d9575bf08c","rust-toolchain.toml":"6bbb61302978c736b2da03e4fb40e3beab908f85d533ab46fd541e637b5f3e0f","src/backtrace.rs":"5a60bd1fe1717c044c7ab34c062ce6651c0cb08596a5878e391c2755ecac07f9","src/chain.rs":"6edefc5f3c7d69683095862e54e3bb56faba5b3387bf2eeaed429da090007a0a","src/context.rs":"559478ae785ce913523aa21358cc1561ef4b0b95c5c87675a77890364c0162fe","src/ensure.rs":"98b2f4a7923e06cf6558b0a15f39a7c7ff3d36711e217475c6a93690cd58b7a1","src/error.rs":"33a0f6c49d2c5d08b8d027aa930be75ece822331d6e6b28db74520ea69587cbc","src/fmt.rs":"c2d4aad6ce20625a70a7c091e3087b6a2c19a4a87c7a12edb4c98978307245ea","src/kind.rs":"b21b15dbee77d50abe88684a9571b39659076465dd4b1956f366af8fdd26e95a","src/lib.rs":"3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/root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.image.source-over.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.image.source-over.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 255, 0.5)';@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ promise.then(function(response) {     createImageBitmap(response).then(bitmap => {         ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 0, 0);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 219,255,36,223, "50,25", "219,255,36,223", 5);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 219,255,36,223, "50,25", "219,255,36,223", 5);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

1. First diff (rust/anyhow/.cargo-checksum.json):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability found in checksum file update
    [This appears to be a routine dependency version update with checksum changes, not a security fix]

2. Second diff (canvas test file):
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    Potential Variable Shadowing Issue testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.image.source-over.html [Lines 17-36]
    Old Code:
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    [...]
    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 219,255,36,223, "50,25", "219,255,36,223", 5);
    
    Fixed Code:
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    [...]
    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 219,255,36,223, "50,25", "219,255,36,223", 5);

Additional Notes:
- The changes in the rust checksum file appear to be routine dependency updates rather than security fixes
- The canvas test change appears to be a variable name standardization (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`), which might be related to avoiding potential shadowing issues or improving code consistency, but doesn't clearly indicate a security vulnerability
- No CVE or specific vulnerability patterns are evident in either diff

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/taskcluster/ci/toolchain/kind.yml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/taskcluster/ci/toolchain/kind.yml@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ jobs-from:     - android.yml     - cbindgen.yml-    - cctools-port.yml     - clang-tidy.yml     - clang.yml     - compiler-rt.yml

Let me analyze the diff for potential security fixes:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Dependency Removal] [taskcluster/ci/toolchain/kind.yml] [Lines 26-29]
[Old Code]
jobs-from:
    - android.yml
    - cbindgen.yml
    - cctools-port.yml
    - clang-tidy.yml
[Fixed Code]
jobs-from:
    - android.yml
    - cbindgen.yml
    - clang-tidy.yml

Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of 'cctools-port.yml' from the jobs list
- Without more context about what cctools-port.yml contained, it's difficult to determine if this was a security fix
- Possible reasons could be: security concerns with the tool, deprecation, or simply not needed anymore
- The removal could potentially be security-related if cctools-port contained vulnerable components, but this is speculative without more information

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/manager/ssl/TransportSecurityInfo.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/manager/ssl/TransportSecurityInfo.h@@ -78,11 +78,13 @@   void SetCanceled(PRErrorCode errorCode);   bool IsCanceled();-  void SetStatusErrorBits(nsNSSCertificate* cert, uint32_t collected_errors);+  void SetStatusErrorBits(const nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert>& cert,+                          uint32_t collected_errors);   nsresult SetFailedCertChain(nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>&& certList);-  void SetServerCert(nsNSSCertificate* aServerCert, EVStatus aEVStatus);+  void SetServerCert(const nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert>& aServerCert,+                     EVStatus aEVStatus);   nsresult SetSucceededCertChain(nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>&& certList);

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Memory Safety Improvement] [security/manager/ssl/TransportSecurityInfo.h] [Lines 78,83]  
   [Old Code]  
   `void SetStatusErrorBits(nsNSSCertificate* cert, uint32_t collected_errors);`  
   `void SetServerCert(nsNSSCertificate* aServerCert, EVStatus aEVStatus);`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `void SetStatusErrorBits(const nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert>& cert, uint32_t collected_errors);`  
   `void SetServerCert(const nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert>& aServerCert, EVStatus aEVStatus);`  

Additional Details:  
The changes involve switching from raw pointers (`nsNSSCertificate*`) to reference-counted smart pointers (`nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert>`). While this isn't directly fixing a known vulnerability, it improves memory safety by:
1. Using reference counting to prevent use-after-free scenarios
2. Using a more abstract interface (`nsIX509Cert`) instead of concrete implementation
3. Adding const correctness
4. Ensuring proper ownership semantics

This could potentially prevent memory-related vulnerabilities, though there's no specific CVE or vulnerability name associated with this change. The modification appears to be a proactive improvement rather than a fix for a known security issue.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsla-1.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsla-1.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(120 100.0% 50.0%)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis following the required format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Variable Renaming] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsla-1.worker.js] [13-20]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(120 100.0% 50.0%)';
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(120 100.0% 50.0%)';
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

Additional Details:
The changes appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. There are no security-related changes or vulnerabilities being fixed in this diff. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or clarity.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.clearRect.shadow.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.clearRect.shadow.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ctx.shadowOffsetX = 0; ctx.shadowOffsetY = 50; ctx.clearRect(0, -50, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't involve any security-related modifications.

Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.clearRect.shadow.html] [17-27]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains identical, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or clarity.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.canvas.destination-over.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.canvas.destination-over.worker.js@@ -13,11 +13,11 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(offscreenCanvas.width, offscreenCanvas.height);+var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(canvas.width, canvas.height); var ctx2 = offscreenCanvas2.getContext('2d'); var promise = new Promise(function(resolve, reject) {     var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@         ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);         ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'destination-over';         ctx.drawImage(offscreenCanvas2, 0, 0);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 109,255,146,223, "50,25", "109,255,146,223", 5);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 109,255,146,223, "50,25", "109,255,146,223", 5);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily variable renaming and consistency improvements rather than security-related fixes. Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found
    File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.canvas.destination-over.worker.js
    Changes:
    - Renamed variable 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas'
    - Updated references to use the new variable name
    - No security-related changes detected

The diff shows:
1. Variable renaming from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas'
2. Updated property access from 'offscreenCanvas.width' to 'canvas.width'
3. Updated parameter in _assertPixelApprox call to use the new variable name

These changes appear to be code style/consistency improvements rather than security fixes. No security vulnerabilities or potential security issues are being addressed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/util.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/util.rs@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@         let padding = calc_padding(size_of::<T>() as vk::DeviceSize, alignment);         let elem_size = size_of::<T>() as vk::DeviceSize + padding;         assert!(calc_padding(size, alignment) == 0, "size must be aligned");-        Align {+        Self {             ptr,             elem_size,             size,

Let me analyze this code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Alignment Check] [third_party/rust/ash/src/util.rs] [Lines 51]
[Old Code]
        Align {
[Fixed Code]
        Self {

Additional Details:
- The change is simply replacing `Align` with `Self` in the struct initialization, which is a Rust syntax improvement rather than a security fix
- The alignment check assertion remains unchanged, maintaining the same safety guarantees
- No known vulnerability is being addressed here, just a code style/consistency improvement

No other vulnerabilities are apparent in this diff. The change appears to be purely stylistic with no security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/CSS2/visudet/line-height-202.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/CSS2/visudet/line-height-202.html@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Florian Rivoal" href="https://florian.rivoal.net"> <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css2/visudet.html#line-height"> <link rel="match" href="reference/line-height-202-ref.html">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="The position of the baseline in an inline-level box whose height is determined by a non-normal value of line-height                              does not depend on fonts other than the first available font"> <style>

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/CSS2/visudet/line-height-202.html] [Lines 4]
[Old Code]
<meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code]
[Removed line]

Additional Details:
1. This appears to be a test file modification rather than a security fix.
2. The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which doesn't appear to have any security implications.
3. The modification seems related to test configuration rather than addressing any security vulnerability.
4. No known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in this change.

The change is more likely related to test cleanup or standardization rather than addressing a security issue.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/base/BodyConsumer.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/base/BodyConsumer.cpp@@ -400,7 +400,8 @@     aPromise->AppendNativeHandler(handler);   }-  void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override {+  void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+                        ErrorResult& aRv) override {     AssertIsOnMainThread();     if (NS_WARN_IF(!aValue.isObject())) {@@ -417,7 +418,8 @@     mConsumer->OnBlobResult(blob->Impl(), mWorkerRef);   }-  void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override {+  void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+                        ErrorResult& aRv) override {     AssertIsOnMainThread();     mConsumer->OnBlobResult(nullptr, mWorkerRef);

Here's the analysis following the specified format:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Error Handling Improvement] [dom/base/BodyConsumer.cpp] [Lines 400-418]
[Old Code]
void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override {
void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override {
[Fixed Code]
void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue, ErrorResult& aRv) override {
void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue, ErrorResult& aRv) override {

Additional Details:
- The main change is the addition of ErrorResult& aRv parameter to both callback methods
- This appears to be an improvement in error handling, but it's not clear if this fixes a specific security vulnerability
- The change allows for better error propagation, which could potentially prevent some error cases from being silently ignored
- Without more context about how these methods are used, it's difficult to determine if this was fixing an actual security issue or just improving code quality

Note: There isn't enough information to identify a specific CVE or vulnerability name, but the change does improve error handling which could have security implications in some scenarios.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.hsl-1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.hsl-1.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; try { ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(0%, 100%, 50%)'; } catch (e) { } // this shouldn't throw, but it shouldn't matter here if it does ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.hsl-1.html] [Lines 17-25]
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   
   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or clarity. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed in this change. The test logic and assertions remain the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.clamp.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.clamp.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgb(-100, -200, -300)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Variable Renaming] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.clamp.worker.js] [Lines 13-14]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be purely a variable name refactoring from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas'
- No security vulnerability is addressed in this change
- The functionality remains identical, only the variable name is changed
- This is likely a code style/consistency improvement rather than a security fix

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/vm/UbiNode.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/vm/UbiNode.cpp@@ -361,38 +361,35 @@ namespace JS { namespace ubi {-RootList::RootList(JSContext* cx, Maybe<AutoCheckCannotGC>& noGC,-                   bool wantNames /* = false */)-    : noGC(noGC), cx(cx), edges(), wantNames(wantNames) {}--bool RootList::init() {+RootList::RootList(JSContext* cx, bool wantNames /* = false */)+    : cx(cx), edges(), wantNames(wantNames), inited(false) {}++std::pair<bool, JS::AutoCheckCannotGC> RootList::init() {   EdgeVectorTracer tracer(cx->runtime(), &edges, wantNames);   js::TraceRuntime(&tracer);-  if (!tracer.okay) {-    return false;-  }-  noGC.emplace();-  return true;-}--bool RootList::init(CompartmentSet& debuggees) {+  inited = tracer.okay;+  return {tracer.okay, JS::AutoCheckCannotGC(cx)};+}++std::pair<bool, JS::AutoCheckCannotGC> RootList::init(+    CompartmentSet& debuggees) {   EdgeVector allRootEdges;   EdgeVectorTracer tracer(cx->runtime(), &allRootEdges, wantNames);   ZoneSet debuggeeZones;   for (auto range = debuggees.all(); !range.empty(); range.popFront()) {     if (!debuggeeZones.put(range.front()->zone())) {-      return false;+      return {false, JS::AutoCheckCannotGC(cx)};     }   }   js::TraceRuntime(&tracer);   if (!tracer.okay) {-    return false;+    return {false, JS::AutoCheckCannotGC(cx)};   }   js::gc::TraceIncomingCCWs(&tracer, debuggees);   if (!tracer.okay) {-    return false;+    return {false, JS::AutoCheckCannotGC(cx)};   }   for (EdgeVector::Range r = allRootEdges.all(); !r.empty(); r.popFront()) {@@ -409,15 +406,15 @@     }     if (!edges.append(std::move(edge))) {-      return false;-    }-  }--  noGC.emplace();-  return true;-}--bool RootList::init(HandleObject debuggees) {+      return {false, JS::AutoCheckCannotGC(cx)};+    }+  }++  inited = true;+  return {true, JS::AutoCheckCannotGC(cx)};+}++std::pair<bool, JS::AutoCheckCannotGC> RootList::init(HandleObject debuggees) {   MOZ_ASSERT(debuggees && JS::dbg::IsDebugger(*debuggees));   js::Debugger* dbg = js::Debugger::fromJSObject(debuggees.get());@@ -426,12 +423,13 @@   for (js::WeakGlobalObjectSet::Range r = dbg->allDebuggees(); !r.empty();        r.popFront()) {     if (!debuggeeCompartments.put(r.front()->compartment())) {-      return false;-    }-  }--  if (!init(debuggeeCompartments)) {-    return false;+      return {false, JS::AutoCheckCannotGC(cx)};+    }+  }++  auto [ok, nogc] = init(debuggeeCompartments);+  if (!ok) {+    return {false, nogc};   }   // Ensure that each of our debuggee globals are in the root list.@@ -439,15 +437,15 @@        r.popFront()) {     if (!addRoot(JS::ubi::Node(static_cast<JSObject*>(r.front())),                  u"debuggee global")) {-      return false;-    }-  }--  return true;+      return {false, nogc};+    }+  }++  inited = true;+  return {true, nogc}; } bool RootList::addRoot(Node node, const char16_t* edgeName) {-  MOZ_ASSERT(noGC.isSome());   MOZ_ASSERT_IF(wantNames, edgeName);   UniqueTwoByteChars name;

Analyzing the provided code diff, I can identify one clear security-related change and one potential improvement:

1. First vulnerability fix:
    Vulnerability Existed: yes
    [Memory Safety Issue - Improper GC Handling] [js/src/vm/UbiNode.cpp] [Lines 361-437]
    [Old Code]
    The old code used a Maybe<AutoCheckCannotGC> reference parameter and manually called emplace(), which could lead to improper garbage collection handling if init() failed.
    
    [Fixed Code]
    The new code returns a pair with a boolean success flag and an AutoCheckCannotGC object, ensuring proper RAII handling of GC suppression.

2. Potential improvement (not clearly a vulnerability):
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [State Management Improvement] [js/src/vm/UbiNode.cpp] [Lines 361-437]
    [Old Code]
    The old code didn't track initialization state explicitly.
    
    [Fixed Code]
    The new code adds an 'inited' member variable to explicitly track initialization state, which could help prevent use-after-initialization bugs.

The main security fix appears to be around proper handling of garbage collection suppression, which could have led to memory safety issues if GC occurred at inappropriate times. The change to return an AutoCheckCannotGC object directly ensures proper RAII semantics.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/CSS2/visudet/line-height-203.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/CSS2/visudet/line-height-203.html@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Florian Rivoal" href="https://florian.rivoal.net"> <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css2/visudet.html#line-height"> <link rel="mismatch" href="reference/line-height-203-ref.html">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="The position of the baseline in an inline-level box whose height is determined by a non-normal value of line-height                              does depend on the first available font."> <style>

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/CSS2/visudet/line-height-203.html [Lines] 4
   Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">
   Fixed Code: (line removed)

Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag with name="flags". This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix.
- No actual security vulnerability is being addressed here (no XSS, injection, or other common web vulnerabilities in the changes).
- The change is likely related to test configuration cleanup rather than security.

Note: If this were a security-related meta tag (like CSP), its removal might be significant, but "flags" in this context appears to be test-related metadata.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/uriloader/exthandler/tests/unit/test_handlerService.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/uriloader/exthandler/tests/unit/test_handlerService.js@@ -21,8 +21,6 @@   const env = Cc["@mozilla.org/process/environment;1"].getService(     Ci.nsIEnvironment   );--  const rootPrefBranch = prefSvc.getBranch("");   let noMailto = false;   if (mozinfo.os == "win") {@@ -119,18 +117,6 @@   Assert.equal(handlerInfo.hasDefaultHandler, false);   Assert.equal(handlerInfo.defaultDescription, "");-  // test some default protocol info properties-  var haveDefaultHandlersVersion = false;-  try {-    // If we have a defaultHandlersVersion pref, then assume that we're in the-    // firefox tree and that we'll also have default handlers.-    // Bug 395131 has been filed to make this test work more generically-    // by providing our own prefs for this test rather than this icky-    // special casing.-    rootPrefBranch.getCharPref("gecko.handlerService.defaultHandlersVersion");-    haveDefaultHandlersVersion = true;-  } catch (ex) {}-   const kExternalWarningDefault =     "network.protocol-handler.warn-external-default";   prefSvc.setBoolPref(kExternalWarningDefault, true);@@ -169,10 +155,10 @@   // OS default exists, injected default exists, explicit warning pref: false   prefSvc.setBoolPref(kExternalWarningPrefPrefix + "mailto", false);   protoInfo = protoSvc.getProtocolHandlerInfo("mailto");-  if (haveDefaultHandlersVersion) {-    Assert.equal(2, protoInfo.possibleApplicationHandlers.length);+  if (AppConstants.MOZ_APP_NAME == "thunderbird") {+    Assert.equal(0, protoInfo.possibleApplicationHandlers.length);   } else {-    Assert.equal(0, protoInfo.possibleApplicationHandlers.length);+    Assert.equal(1, protoInfo.possibleApplicationHandlers.length);   }   // Win7+ or Linux's GIO might not have a default mailto: handler@@ -185,8 +171,10 @@   // OS default exists, injected default exists, explicit warning pref: true   prefSvc.setBoolPref(kExternalWarningPrefPrefix + "mailto", true);   protoInfo = protoSvc.getProtocolHandlerInfo("mailto");-  if (haveDefaultHandlersVersion) {-    Assert.equal(2, protoInfo.possibleApplicationHandlers.length);+  if (AppConstants.MOZ_APP_NAME == "thunderbird") {+    Assert.equal(0, protoInfo.possibleApplicationHandlers.length);+  } else {+    Assert.equal(1, protoInfo.possibleApplicationHandlers.length);     // Win7+ or Linux's GIO may have no default mailto: handler, so we'd ask     // anyway. Otherwise, the default handlers will not have stored preferred     // actions etc., so re-requesting them after the warning pref has changed@@ -195,20 +183,18 @@     Assert.ok(protoInfo.alwaysAskBeforeHandling);     // As soon as anyone actually stores updated defaults into the profile     // database, that default will stop tracking the warning pref.+  }+  // Now set the value stored in RDF to true, and the pref to false, to make+  // sure we still get the right value. (Basically, same thing as above but+  // with the values reversed.)+  prefSvc.setBoolPref(kExternalWarningPrefPrefix + "mailto", false);+  protoInfo.alwaysAskBeforeHandling = true;+  handlerSvc.store(protoInfo);+  protoInfo = protoSvc.getProtocolHandlerInfo("mailto");+  if (AppConstants.MOZ_APP_NAME == "thunderbird") {+    Assert.equal(0, protoInfo.possibleApplicationHandlers.length);   } else {-    Assert.equal(0, protoInfo.possibleApplicationHandlers.length);-    Assert.ok(protoInfo.alwaysAskBeforeHandling);-  }--  if (haveDefaultHandlersVersion) {-    // Now set the value stored in RDF to true, and the pref to false, to make-    // sure we still get the right value. (Basically, same thing as above but-    // with the values reversed.)-    prefSvc.setBoolPref(kExternalWarningPrefPrefix + "mailto", false);-    protoInfo.alwaysAskBeforeHandling = true;-    handlerSvc.store(protoInfo);-    protoInfo = protoSvc.getProtocolHandlerInfo("mailto");-    Assert.equal(2, protoInfo.possibleApplicationHandlers.length);+    Assert.equal(1, protoInfo.possibleApplicationHandlers.length);     Assert.ok(protoInfo.alwaysAskBeforeHandling);   }@@ -244,11 +230,7 @@   var handlerInfo2 = mimeSvc.getFromTypeAndExtension("nonexistent/type2", null);   handlerSvc.store(handlerInfo2);   var handlerTypes = ["nonexistent/type", "nonexistent/type2"];-  if (haveDefaultHandlersVersion) {-    handlerTypes.push("mailto");-    handlerTypes.push("irc");-    handlerTypes.push("ircs");-  }+  handlerTypes.push("mailto");   for (let handler of handlerSvc.enumerate()) {     Assert.notEqual(handlerTypes.indexOf(handler.type), -1);     handlerTypes.splice(handlerTypes.indexOf(handler.type), 1);

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily test logic modifications and cleanup. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Code Cleanup [File] uriloader/exthandler/tests/unit/test_handlerService.js [Lines 21-23]
   Old Code:
   ```
   const rootPrefBranch = prefSvc.getBranch("");
   ```
   Fixed Code: (removed)

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Test Logic Update [File] uriloader/exthandler/tests/unit/test_handlerService.js [Lines 119-129]
   Old Code:
   ```
   var haveDefaultHandlersVersion = false;
   try {
     rootPrefBranch.getCharPref("gecko.handlerService.defaultHandlersVersion");
     haveDefaultHandlersVersion = true;
   } catch (ex) {}
   ```
   Fixed Code: (removed)

3. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Test Condition Update [File] uriloader/exthandler/tests/unit/test_handlerService.js [Lines 169-173]
   Old Code:
   ```
   if (haveDefaultHandlersVersion) {
     Assert.equal(2, protoInfo.possibleApplicationHandlers.length);
   } else {
     Assert.equal(0, protoInfo.possibleApplicationHandlers.length);
   }
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   if (AppConstants.MOZ_APP_NAME == "thunderbird") {
     Assert.equal(0, protoInfo.possibleApplicationHandlers.length);
   } else {
     Assert.equal(1, protoInfo.possibleApplicationHandlers.length);
   }
   ```

The changes appear to be test improvements and cleanup rather than security fixes. The main changes involve:
1. Removing unused preference branch code
2. Removing the special case for default handlers version
3. Updating test conditions to check for Thunderbird specifically
4. Simplifying the test assertions

No security vulnerabilities were identified in these changes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/tps/tps/testrunner.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/tps/tps/testrunner.py@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ # License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this # file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.-from __future__ import absolute_import, division, print_function import json import yaml@@ -12,7 +11,7 @@ import time import traceback-from mozhttpd import MozHttpd+from wptserve import server import mozinfo from mozprofile import Profile import mozversion@@ -341,7 +340,7 @@         tmplogfile = None         if logdata:             tmplogfile = TempFile(prefix="tps_log_")-            tmplogfile.write(logdata)+            tmplogfile.write(logdata.encode("utf-8"))             tmplogfile.close()             self.errorlogs[testname] = tmplogfile@@ -477,8 +476,8 @@             testlist = [os.path.basename(self.testfile)]         testdir = os.path.dirname(self.testfile)-        self.mozhttpd = MozHttpd(port=4567, docroot=testdir)-        self.mozhttpd.start()+        self.server = server.WebTestHttpd(port=4567, doc_root=testdir)+        self.server.start()         # run each test, and save the results         for test in testlist:@@ -508,7 +507,7 @@                     )                     break-        self.mozhttpd.stop()+        self.server.stop()         # generate the postdata we'll use to post the results to the db         self.postdata = {

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Encoding Issue] [testing/tps/tps/testrunner.py] [Lines 341]
   Old Code:
            tmplogfile.write(logdata)
   Fixed Code:
            tmplogfile.write(logdata.encode("utf-8"))
   Additional Details: The change adds explicit UTF-8 encoding when writing log data. While not a clear vulnerability fix, it could prevent potential encoding-related issues.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Server Implementation Change] [testing/tps/tps/testrunner.py] [Lines 477,478,508]
   Old Code:
        self.mozhttpd = MozHttpd(port=4567, docroot=testdir)
        self.mozhttpd.start()
        ...
        self.mozhttpd.stop()
   Fixed Code:
        self.server = server.WebTestHttpd(port=4567, doc_root=testdir)
        self.server.start()
        ...
        self.server.stop()
   Additional Details: The change replaces MozHttpd with WebTestHttpd from wptserve. While this might include security improvements, the diff doesn't show enough context to determine if it fixes a specific vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.transformation.basic.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.transformation.basic.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ctx.translate(0, -100); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-related modifications. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines]
[Old Code]
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or clarity, without any security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/netwerk/ipc/SocketProcessChild.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/netwerk/ipc/SocketProcessChild.h@@ -89,6 +89,10 @@   mozilla::ipc::IPCResult RecvUpdateDeviceModelId(const nsCString& aModelId);   mozilla::ipc::IPCResult RecvOnHttpActivityDistributorActivated(       const bool& aIsActivated);+  mozilla::ipc::IPCResult RecvOnHttpActivityDistributorObserveProxyResponse(+      const bool& aIsEnabled);+  mozilla::ipc::IPCResult RecvOnHttpActivityDistributorObserveConnection(+      const bool& aIsEnabled);   already_AddRefed<PInputChannelThrottleQueueChild>   AllocPInputChannelThrottleQueueChild(const uint32_t& aMeanBytesPerSecond,

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Missing Security Checks] [netwerk/ipc/SocketProcessChild.h] [Lines 89+]
   [Old Code - No functions for proxy response/connection observation]
   [Fixed Code - Added RecvOnHttpActivityDistributorObserveProxyResponse and RecvOnHttpActivityDistributorObserveConnection functions]

The diff shows the addition of two new message handlers for HTTP activity observation. While this doesn't directly show a security vulnerability being fixed, it could be related to security improvements in HTTP activity monitoring. Without more context about the implementation details or previous vulnerabilities, I can't definitively identify a specific vulnerability being addressed.

The changes appear to be adding new functionality rather than fixing existing code, so there may not be a direct security vulnerability being patched here. However, the addition of proxy response and connection observation capabilities could be part of a broader security improvement initiative.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.