--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.rotate.wrapnegative.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.rotate.wrapnegative.worker.js@@ -13,17 +13,17 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.rotate(-Math.PI * (1 + 4096)); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(-100, -50, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,2, 0,255,0,255, "98,2", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,47, 0,255,0,255, "98,47", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,2, 0,255,0,255, "98,2", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,47, 0,255,0,255, "98,47", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related changes. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring (variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and corresponding updates to assertions). Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.rotate.wrapnegative.worker.js] [Lines 13-26]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes don't affect any security-related functionality or introduce/remove any security controls. It's simply a variable renaming for better code readability or consistency.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/python/glean_parser/glean_parser/lint.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/python/glean_parser/glean_parser/lint.py@@ -543,17 +543,21 @@     if parser_config is None:         parser_config = {}-    if lint_yaml_files(input_filepaths, file=file, parser_config=parser_config):-        return 1+    errors = 0++    nits = lint_yaml_files(input_filepaths, file=file, parser_config=parser_config)+    errors += len(nits)     objs = parser.parse_objects(input_filepaths, parser_config)--    if util.report_validation_errors(objs):-        return 1+    errors += util.report_validation_errors(objs)     nits = lint_metrics(objs.value, parser_config=parser_config, file=file)-    if any(nit.check_type == CheckType.error for nit in nits):-        return 1-    if len(nits) == 0:+    errors += len([nit for nit in nits if nit.check_type == CheckType.error])++    if errors == 0:         print("✨ Your metrics are Glean! ✨", file=file)-    return 0+        return 0++    print(f"❌ Found {errors} errors.")++    return 1

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability [third_party/python/glean_parser/glean_parser/lint.py] [Lines 543-561]
   [Old Code: Returned 1 immediately on first error, didn't count all errors]
   [Fixed Code: Now counts and reports all errors before returning]

Additional notes:
- The change appears to be an improvement in error handling and reporting rather than a security fix
- The modification makes the linter more comprehensive by:
  * Counting all errors before returning
  * Providing a total error count in the output
  * Maintaining the same return behavior (0 for success, 1 for errors)
- No specific vulnerabilities like injection, XSS, etc. are addressed in this change
- The improvement could indirectly help security by ensuring more thorough linting of metrics definitions

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.rgb-1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.rgb-1.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; try { ctx.fillStyle = 'rgb(255.0, 0, 0,)'; } catch (e) { } // this shouldn't throw, but it shouldn't matter here if it does ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily variable renaming and don't involve security-sensitive modifications. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.rgb-1.html [Lines] 17-25
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are:
1. Renaming variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Updating the variable name in the `_assertPixel` call
3. No security-related changes were made to the actual test logic or functionality

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/enc_butteraugli_pnorm.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/enc_butteraugli_pnorm.h@@ -17,7 +17,8 @@ double ComputeDistanceP(const ImageF& distmap, const ButteraugliParams& params,                         double p);-double ComputeDistance2(const ImageBundle& ib1, const ImageBundle& ib2);+double ComputeDistance2(const ImageBundle& ib1, const ImageBundle& ib2,+                        const JxlCmsInterface& cms); }  // namespace jxl

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential API Security Improvement] [third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/enc_butteraugli_pnorm.h] [Lines 17-18]  
   [Old Code]  
   `double ComputeDistance2(const ImageBundle& ib1, const ImageBundle& ib2);`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `double ComputeDistance2(const ImageBundle& ib1, const ImageBundle& ib2, const JxlCmsInterface& cms);`  

Additional Details:  
- The change adds a new parameter `const JxlCmsInterface& cms` to the `ComputeDistance2` function  
- While this could indicate improved security (perhaps adding color management system controls), there's not enough context to determine if this fixes a specific vulnerability  
- The modification suggests better handling of color management, which could prevent potential issues with color space conversions  

Note: Without more context about the `JxlCmsInterface` and its security implications, we can't definitively say this fixes a vulnerability, but it appears to be a security-conscious improvement to the API.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.clip.destination-out.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.clip.destination-out.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';@@ -24,8 +24,8 @@ ctx.clip(); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 50, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to the variable references. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No Vulnerability Found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.clip.destination-out.worker.js] [Lines 13-24]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't appear to address any security issues. The functionality remains identical, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.ensuresubpath.1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.ensuresubpath.1.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ctx.beginPath(); ctx.arcTo(100, 50, 200, 50, 0.1); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming for better code clarity. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Variable Renaming [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.ensuresubpath.1.html] [Lines 17-18,27]
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   
   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or clarity, but don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/dav1d/src/x86/looprestoration_init_tmpl.c+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/dav1d/src/x86/looprestoration_init_tmpl.c@@ -84,11 +84,13 @@ #if BITDEPTH == 8     /* With VNNI we don't need a 5-tap version. */     c->wiener[1] = c->wiener[0];-    c->sgr[0] = BF(dav1d_sgr_filter_5x5, avx512icl);-    c->sgr[1] = BF(dav1d_sgr_filter_3x3, avx512icl);-    c->sgr[2] = BF(dav1d_sgr_filter_mix, avx512icl); #else     c->wiener[1] = BF(dav1d_wiener_filter5, avx512icl); #endif+    if (bpc <= 10) {+        c->sgr[0] = BF(dav1d_sgr_filter_5x5, avx512icl);+        c->sgr[1] = BF(dav1d_sgr_filter_3x3, avx512icl);+        c->sgr[2] = BF(dav1d_sgr_filter_mix, avx512icl);+    } #endif }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Integer Overflow/Incorrect Bit Depth Handling] [third_party/dav1d/src/x86/looprestoration_init_tmpl.c] [Lines 84-92]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```c
   #if BITDEPTH == 8
       /* With VNNI we don't need a 5-tap version. */
       c->wiener[1] = c->wiener[0];
       c->sgr[0] = BF(dav1d_sgr_filter_5x5, avx512icl);
       c->sgr[1] = BF(dav1d_sgr_filter_3x3, avx512icl);
       c->sgr[2] = BF(dav1d_sgr_filter_mix, avx512icl);
   #else
       c->wiener[1] = BF(dav1d_wiener_filter5, avx512icl);
   #endif
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```c
   #if BITDEPTH == 8
       /* With VNNI we don't need a 5-tap version. */
       c->wiener[1] = c->wiener[0];
   #else
       c->wiener[1] = BF(dav1d_wiener_filter5, avx512icl);
   #endif
       if (bpc <= 10) {
           c->sgr[0] = BF(dav1d_sgr_filter_5x5, avx512icl);
           c->sgr[1] = BF(dav1d_sgr_filter_3x3, avx512icl);
           c->sgr[2] = BF(dav1d_sgr_filter_mix, avx512icl);
       }
   ```

The main change is the addition of a `bpc <= 10` condition check before assigning the SGR filter functions. This suggests there might have been a potential issue with handling higher bit depths (greater than 10 bits per component) where these AVX-512 optimized functions might not work correctly or could cause undefined behavior. However, without more context about the `bpc` variable and the expected behavior, I can't be certain if this was an actual security vulnerability or just a functional improvement.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/widget/gtk/WindowSurfaceProvider.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/widget/gtk/WindowSurfaceProvider.cpp@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ WindowSurfaceProvider::WindowSurfaceProvider()     : mWindowSurface(nullptr),+      mMutex("WindowSurfaceProvider"),       mWindowSurfaceValid(false) #ifdef MOZ_WAYLAND       ,@@ -52,11 +53,6 @@       mXVisual(nullptr) #endif {-}--WindowSurfaceProvider::~WindowSurfaceProvider() {-  CleanupResources();-  CleanupWindowSurface(); } #ifdef MOZ_WAYLAND@@ -77,6 +73,7 @@ #endif void WindowSurfaceProvider::CleanupResources() {+  MutexAutoLock lock(mMutex);   mWindowSurfaceValid = false; #ifdef MOZ_WAYLAND   mWidget = nullptr;@@ -87,11 +84,6 @@   mXDepth = 0;   mIsShaped = false; #endif-}--void WindowSurfaceProvider::CleanupWindowSurface() {-  mWindowSurface = nullptr;-  mWindowSurfaceValid = true; } RefPtr<WindowSurface> WindowSurfaceProvider::CreateWindowSurface() {@@ -137,8 +129,11 @@     return nullptr;   }+  MutexAutoLock lock(mMutex);+   if (!mWindowSurfaceValid) {-    CleanupWindowSurface();+    mWindowSurface = nullptr;+    mWindowSurfaceValid = true;   }   if (!mWindowSurface) {@@ -166,6 +161,7 @@ void WindowSurfaceProvider::EndRemoteDrawingInRegion(     gfx::DrawTarget* aDrawTarget, const LayoutDeviceIntRegion& aInvalidRegion) {+  MutexAutoLock lock(mMutex);   // Commit to mWindowSurface only when we have a valid one.   if (mWindowSurface && mWindowSurfaceValid) {     mWindowSurface->Commit(aInvalidRegion);

Here's the security analysis following your requested format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Race Condition [File] widget/gtk/WindowSurfaceProvider.cpp [Lines 39,52-54,73,129-131,161]
[Old Code]
No mutex protection for shared resources (mWindowSurface, mWindowSurfaceValid)
[Fixed Code]
Added mMutex member and MutexAutoLock in critical sections

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Use-After-Free Potential [File] widget/gtk/WindowSurfaceProvider.cpp [Lines 52-54,84-86]
[Old Code]
Separate cleanup methods (CleanupResources and CleanupWindowSurface) without mutex protection
[Fixed Code]
Removed separate cleanup methods and integrated cleanup with mutex protection

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Memory Leak Potential [File] widget/gtk/WindowSurfaceProvider.cpp [Lines 52-54]
[Old Code]
Explicit destructor with cleanup calls
[Fixed Code]
Removed explicit destructor
[Note: While this might indicate potential memory leaks, it's unclear if resources are now managed elsewhere]

The main security fixes address:
1) A race condition vulnerability by adding proper mutex synchronization around shared resources
2) Potential use-after-free scenarios by removing separate cleanup methods and protecting all access to shared state
3) The changes suggest possible memory management improvements, though this is less clearly a security fix

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/MediaDevices.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/MediaDevices.h@@ -14,15 +14,22 @@ #include "nsCOMPtr.h" #include "nsID.h" #include "nsISupports.h"-#include "nsITimer.h" #include "nsTHashSet.h" class AudioDeviceInfo; namespace mozilla {+class LocalMediaDevice;+class MediaDevice;+class MediaMgrError; template <typename ResolveValueT, typename RejectValueT, bool IsExclusive> class MozPromise;++namespace media {+template <typename T>+class Refcountable;+}  // namespace media namespace dom {@@ -85,22 +92,33 @@   void BrowserWindowBecameActive() { MaybeResumeDeviceExposure(); }  private:-  class GumResolver;-  class EnumDevResolver;-  class GumRejecter;+  using MediaDeviceSet = nsTArray<RefPtr<MediaDevice>>;+  using MediaDeviceSetRefCnt = media::Refcountable<MediaDeviceSet>;+  using LocalMediaDeviceSet = nsTArray<RefPtr<LocalMediaDevice>>;   virtual ~MediaDevices();   void MaybeResumeDeviceExposure();-  void ResumeEnumerateDevices(RefPtr<Promise> aPromise);+  void ResumeEnumerateDevices(+      nsTArray<RefPtr<Promise>>&& aPromises,+      RefPtr<const MediaDeviceSetRefCnt> aExposedDevices) const;+  RefPtr<MediaDeviceSetRefCnt> FilterExposedDevices(+      const MediaDeviceSet& aDevices) const;+  bool ShouldQueueDeviceChange(const MediaDeviceSet& aExposedDevices) const;+  void ResolveEnumerateDevicesPromise(+      Promise* aPromise, const LocalMediaDeviceSet& aDevices) const;-  nsTHashSet<nsString> mExplicitlyGrantedAudioOutputIds;+  nsTHashSet<nsString> mExplicitlyGrantedAudioOutputRawIds;   nsTArray<RefPtr<Promise>> mPendingEnumerateDevicesPromises;-  nsCOMPtr<nsITimer> mFuzzTimer;   // Connect/Disconnect on main thread only   MediaEventListener mDeviceChangeListener;+  // Ordered set of the system physical devices when devicechange event+  // decisions were last performed.+  RefPtr<const MediaDeviceSetRefCnt> mLastPhysicalDevices;   bool mIsDeviceChangeListenerSetUp = false;+  bool mHaveUnprocessedDeviceListChange = false;   bool mCanExposeMicrophoneInfo = false;+  bool mCanExposeCameraInfo = false;   void RecordAccessTelemetry(const UseCounter counter) const; };

I'll analyze the code diff following the specified format. The changes appear to be related to media device handling in Firefox.

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Device Enumeration Information Leak] [dom/media/MediaDevices.h] [Lines 85-92]
[Old Code]
  void ResumeEnumerateDevices(RefPtr<Promise> aPromise);
[Fixed Code]
  void ResumeEnumerateDevices(
      nsTArray<RefPtr<Promise>>&& aPromises,
      RefPtr<const MediaDeviceSetRefCnt> aExposedDevices) const;
  RefPtr<MediaDeviceSetRefCnt> FilterExposedDevices(
      const MediaDeviceSet& aDevices) const;
  bool ShouldQueueDeviceChange(const MediaDeviceSet& aExposedDevices) const;
Additional Details: The changes introduce more sophisticated handling of device enumeration, potentially addressing timing or information leakage issues when exposing device information.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Race Condition in Device Change Handling] [dom/media/MediaDevices.h] [Lines 100-110]
[Old Code]
  nsTHashSet<nsString> mExplicitlyGrantedAudioOutputIds;
  nsTArray<RefPtr<Promise>> mPendingEnumerateDevicesPromises;
  nsCOMPtr<nsITimer> mFuzzTimer;
[Fixed Code]
  nsTHashSet<nsString> mExplicitlyGrantedAudioOutputRawIds;
  nsTArray<RefPtr<Promise>> mPendingEnumerateDevicesPromises;
  RefPtr<const MediaDeviceSetRefCnt> mLastPhysicalDevices;
  bool mHaveUnprocessedDeviceListChange = false;
Additional Details: The changes add better state tracking for device changes, potentially fixing race conditions where device changes might not be properly processed.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Camera Information Exposure Control] [dom/media/MediaDevices.h] [Lines 110-115]
[Old Code]
  bool mCanExposeMicrophoneInfo = false;
[Fixed Code]
  bool mCanExposeMicrophoneInfo = false;
  bool mCanExposeCameraInfo = false;
Additional Details: The addition of explicit camera info exposure control suggests previous versions might not have properly restricted camera information exposure.

Note: While I can't identify specific CVE-worthy vulnerabilities from this diff alone, the changes suggest improvements in security-related areas including device enumeration control, state management, and information exposure prevention. The modifications appear to strengthen the security model around media device access.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.cone.cylinder.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.cone.cylinder.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,15 +27,15 @@ g.addColorStop(1, '#f00'); ctx.fillStyle = g; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and updating the corresponding references in the `_assertPixel` calls. Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.cone.cylinder.html] [Lines 17-48]
[Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); ... _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, ...)]
[Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); ... _assertPixel(canvas, ...)]

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't affect security. The functionality remains identical, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/rust_decimal/src/postgres.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/rust_decimal/src/postgres.rs@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ } #[cfg(any(feature = "db-postgres", feature = "db-tokio-postgres"))]-mod postgres {+mod _postgres {     use super::*;     use ::postgres::types::{to_sql_checked, FromSql, IsNull, ToSql, Type};     use byteorder::{BigEndian, ReadBytesExt};

Let me analyze the code diff for security fixes:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Module Naming Conflict] [third_party/rust/rust_decimal/src/postgres.rs] [Lines 460-463]
[Old Code: `mod postgres {`]
[Fixed Code: `mod _postgres {`]

Additional Details:
The change appears to be a naming convention change rather than a security fix. The module was renamed from `postgres` to `_postgres`, likely to avoid potential naming conflicts or to follow internal naming conventions. There doesn't appear to be any security vulnerability being addressed in this change. The modification is purely structural/organizational in nature.

No other vulnerabilities are apparent in this diff. The change is minimal and doesn't involve any security-sensitive operations or data handling.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/extensions/permissions/PermissionManager.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/extensions/permissions/PermissionManager.cpp@@ -2440,6 +2440,10 @@ NS_IMETHODIMP PermissionManager::GetAllByTypeSince(     const nsACString& aPrefix, int64_t aSince,     nsTArray<RefPtr<nsIPermission>>& aResult) {+  // Check that aSince is a reasonable point in time, not in the future+  if (aSince > (PR_Now() / PR_USEC_PER_MSEC)) {+    return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;+  }   return GetPermissionEntries(       [&](const PermissionEntry& aPermEntry) {         return mTypeArray[aPermEntry.mType].Equals(aPrefix) &&

Here's the analysis following the required format:

Vulnerability Existed: yes
Time-of-Check Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) / Input Validation [extensions/permissions/PermissionManager.cpp] [Lines 2440-2444]
[Old Code]
NS_IMETHODIMP PermissionManager::GetAllByTypeSince(
    const nsACString& aPrefix, int64_t aSince,
    nsTArray<RefPtr<nsIPermission>>& aResult) {
[Fixed Code]
NS_IMETHODIMP PermissionManager::GetAllByTypeSince(
    const nsACString& aPrefix, int64_t aSince,
    nsTArray<RefPtr<nsIPermission>>& aResult) {
  // Check that aSince is a reasonable point in time, not in the future
  if (aSince > (PR_Now() / PR_USEC_PER_MSEC)) {
    return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
  }

Additional Details:
The vulnerability appears to be related to improper input validation of timestamp values. The fix adds a check to ensure the `aSince` parameter (which represents a timestamp) is not in the future. Without this check, future timestamps could potentially cause issues with permission management logic. This could be considered a form of Time-of-Check Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) vulnerability if the timestamp was used for security-sensitive operations without proper validation.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgba-solid-3.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgba-solid-3.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(  0  ,  255  ,  0  , +1  )'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes (variable renaming) rather than security fixes. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-25]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and update the references to it. There are no changes to the actual security-sensitive operations or data handling. The test logic remains the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/gc/Cell.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/gc/Cell.h@@ -543,6 +543,7 @@ template <typename T, typename F> MOZ_ALWAYS_INLINE void PreWriteBarrier(JS::Zone* zone, T* data,                                        const F& traceFn) {+  MOZ_ASSERT(data);   MOZ_ASSERT(!CurrentThreadIsIonCompiling());   MOZ_ASSERT(!CurrentThreadIsGCMarking());@@ -561,6 +562,7 @@ // support a |trace| method. template <typename T> MOZ_ALWAYS_INLINE void PreWriteBarrier(JS::Zone* zone, T* data) {+  MOZ_ASSERT(data);   PreWriteBarrier(zone, data, [](JSTracer* trc, T* data) { data->trace(trc); }); }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
   Null Pointer Dereference [File] js/src/gc/Cell.h [Lines] 543-561  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   template <typename T, typename F>
   MOZ_ALWAYS_INLINE void PreWriteBarrier(JS::Zone* zone, T* data,
                                          const F& traceFn) {
     MOZ_ASSERT(!CurrentThreadIsIonCompiling());
     MOZ_ASSERT(!CurrentThreadIsGCMarking());
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   template <typename T, typename F>
   MOZ_ALWAYS_INLINE void PreWriteBarrier(JS::Zone* zone, T* data,
                                          const F& traceFn) {
     MOZ_ASSERT(data);
     MOZ_ASSERT(!CurrentThreadIsIonCompiling());
     MOZ_ASSERT(!CurrentThreadIsGCMarking());
   ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
   Null Pointer Dereference [File] js/src/gc/Cell.h [Lines] 561-562  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   template <typename T>
   MOZ_ALWAYS_INLINE void PreWriteBarrier(JS::Zone* zone, T* data) {
     PreWriteBarrier(zone, data, [](JSTracer* trc, T* data) { data->trace(trc); });
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   template <typename T>
   MOZ_ALWAYS_INLINE void PreWriteBarrier(JS::Zone* zone, T* data) {
     MOZ_ASSERT(data);
     PreWriteBarrier(zone, data, [](JSTracer* trc, T* data) { data->trace(trc); });
   ```

The changes add assertions to check for null pointers before they're used in the functions. This prevents potential null pointer dereferences, which could lead to crashes or other undefined behavior. The vulnerability in both cases is a Null Pointer Dereference, and the fix adds appropriate null checks.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/syn/src/error.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/syn/src/error.rs@@ -47,10 +47,11 @@ /// ``` /// /// For errors that arise later than the initial parsing stage, the-/// [`.to_compile_error()`] method can be used to perform an explicit conversion-/// to `compile_error!`.+/// [`.to_compile_error()`] or [`.into_compile_error()`] methods can be used to+/// perform an explicit conversion to `compile_error!`. /// /// [`.to_compile_error()`]: Error::to_compile_error+/// [`.into_compile_error()`]: Error::into_compile_error /// /// ``` /// # extern crate proc_macro;@@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ /// ///     // fn(DeriveInput) -> syn::Result<proc_macro2::TokenStream> ///     expand::my_derive(input)-///         .unwrap_or_else(|err| err.to_compile_error())+///         .unwrap_or_else(syn::Error::into_compile_error) ///         .into() /// } /// #

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be documentation improvements and a minor code style change rather than security-related fixes.

Analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Documentation improvement [third_party/rust/syn/src/error.rs] [Lines 47-51]
   Old Code:
   /// [`.to_compile_error()`] method can be used to perform an explicit conversion
   /// to `compile_error!`.
   Fixed Code:
   /// [`.to_compile_error()`] or [`.into_compile_error()`] methods can be used to
   /// perform an explicit conversion to `compile_error!`.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Documentation improvement [third_party/rust/syn/src/error.rs] [Lines 66-67]
   Old Code:
   ///         .unwrap_or_else(|err| err.to_compile_error())
   Fixed Code:
   ///         .unwrap_or_else(syn::Error::into_compile_error)

The changes are:
1. Adding documentation about an additional method (`into_compile_error`)
2. Changing the example code to use the more concise method reference syntax

Neither change appears to address any security vulnerability, but rather improves documentation and code style.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsla-9.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsla-9.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(0.3333333333turn, 100.0%, 50.0%)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes (variable renaming) rather than security-related fixes.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsla-9.worker.js] [Lines 13-21]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes only involve:
1. Renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Updating the variable name in the `_assertPixel` call
3. No functional or security-related changes were made

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/nss/cmd/addbuiltin/addbuiltin.c+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/nss/cmd/addbuiltin/addbuiltin.c@@ -552,7 +552,9 @@     nickname = strdup(addbuiltin.options[opt_Nickname].arg);-    NSS_NoDB_Init(NULL);+    if (NSS_NoDB_Init(NULL) != SECSuccess) {+        exit(1);+    }     if (addbuiltin.options[opt_Distrust].activated ||         addbuiltin.options[opt_DistrustCRL].activated) {

Let me analyze the code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: yes
Unchecked Return Value Vulnerability [security/nss/cmd/addbuiltin/addbuiltin.c] [Lines 552-554]
[Old Code]
nickname = strdup(addbuiltin.options[opt_Nickname].arg);

NSS_NoDB_Init(NULL);
[Fixed Code]
nickname = strdup(addbuiltin.options[opt_Nickname].arg);

if (NSS_NoDB_Init(NULL) != SECSuccess) {
    exit(1);
}

Additional Details:
The vulnerability was an unchecked return value from NSS_NoDB_Init(). The original code didn't verify if the initialization succeeded, which could lead to undefined behavior if the function failed. The fix properly checks the return value and exits if initialization fails. This is a security improvement as it prevents potential issues from continuing execution after a failed initialization.

No other vulnerabilities were identified in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/extensions/formautofill/test/browser/creditCard/browser_creditCard_doorhanger.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/extensions/formautofill/test/browser/creditCard/browser_creditCard_doorhanger.js@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@ /* eslint-disable mozilla/no-arbitrary-setTimeout */ "use strict";-+/*+  We use arbitrary timeouts here to ensure that the input event queue is cleared+  before we assert any information about the UI, otherwise there's a reasonable chance+  that the UI won't be ready and we will get an invalid test result.+*/ add_task(async function test_submit_creditCard_cancel_saving() {   await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({     set: [[CREDITCARDS_USED_STATUS_PREF, 0]],@@ -949,3 +953,195 @@   SpecialPowers.clearUserPref(CREDITCARDS_USED_STATUS_PREF);   await removeAllRecords(); });++/*+  The next four tests look very similar because if we try to do multiple+  credit card operations in one test, there's a good chance the test will timeout+  and produce an invalid result.+  We mitigate this issue by having each test only deal with one credit card in storage+  and one credit card operation.+*/+add_task(async function test_submit_third_party_creditCard_logo() {+  const amexCard = {+    "cc-number": "374542158116607",+    "cc-type": "amex",+    "cc-name": "John Doe",+  };+  await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab(+    { gBrowser, url: CREDITCARD_FORM_URL },+    async function(browser) {+      let promiseShown = BrowserTestUtils.waitForEvent(+        PopupNotifications.panel,+        "popupshown"+      );+      await SpecialPowers.spawn(browser, [amexCard], async function(card) {+        let form = content.document.getElementById("form");+        let name = form.querySelector("#cc-name");+        name.focus();+        name.setUserInput("User 1");++        let number = form.querySelector("#cc-number");+        number.setUserInput(card["cc-number"]);++        // Wait 100ms before submission to make sure the input value applied+        await new Promise(resolve => content.setTimeout(resolve, 100));+        form.querySelector("input[type=submit]").click();+      });++      await promiseShown;+      let doorhanger = getNotification();+      let creditCardLogo = doorhanger.querySelector(".desc-message-box image");+      let creditCardLogoWithoutExtension = creditCardLogo.src.split(".", 1)[0];++      is(+        creditCardLogoWithoutExtension,+        "chrome://formautofill/content/third-party/cc-logo-amex",+        "CC logo should be amex"+      );++      await clickDoorhangerButton(SECONDARY_BUTTON);+    }+  );+});++add_task(async function test_update_third_party_creditCard_logo() {+  const amexCard = {+    "cc-number": "374542158116607",+    "cc-type": "amex",+    "cc-name": "John Doe",+  };++  await saveCreditCard(amexCard);+  let creditCards = await getCreditCards();+  is(creditCards.length, 1, "1 credit card in storage");++  await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab(+    { gBrowser, url: CREDITCARD_FORM_URL },+    async function(browser) {+      let promiseShown = BrowserTestUtils.waitForEvent(+        PopupNotifications.panel,+        "popupshown"+      );+      await SpecialPowers.spawn(browser, [amexCard], async function(card) {+        let form = content.document.getElementById("form");+        let name = form.querySelector("#cc-name");++        name.focus();+        name.setUserInput("Mark Smith");+        form.querySelector("#cc-number").setUserInput(card["cc-number"]);+        form.querySelector("#cc-exp-month").setUserInput("4");+        form+          .querySelector("#cc-exp-year")+          .setUserInput(new Date().getFullYear());+        // Wait 100ms before submission to make sure the input value applied+        await new Promise(resolve => content.setTimeout(resolve, 100));+        form.querySelector("input[type=submit").click();+      });++      await promiseShown;++      let doorhanger = getNotification();+      let creditCardLogo = doorhanger.querySelector(".desc-message-box image");+      let creditCardLogoWithoutExtension = creditCardLogo.src.split(".", 1)[0];+      is(+        creditCardLogoWithoutExtension,+        `chrome://formautofill/content/third-party/cc-logo-amex`,+        `CC Logo should be amex`+      );+      await clickDoorhangerButton(SECONDARY_BUTTON);+    }+  );+  await removeAllRecords();+});++add_task(async function test_submit_generic_creditCard_logo() {+  const genericCard = {+    "cc-number": "937899583135",+    "cc-name": "John Doe",+  };+  await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab(+    { gBrowser, url: CREDITCARD_FORM_URL },+    async function(browser) {+      let promiseShown = BrowserTestUtils.waitForEvent(+        PopupNotifications.panel,+        "popupshown"+      );+      await SpecialPowers.spawn(browser, [genericCard], async function(card) {+        let form = content.document.getElementById("form");+        let name = form.querySelector("#cc-name");+        name.focus();+        name.setUserInput("User 1");++        let number = form.querySelector("#cc-number");+        number.setUserInput(card["cc-number"]);++        // Wait 100ms before submission to make sure the input value applied+        await new Promise(resolve => content.setTimeout(resolve, 100));+        form.querySelector("input[type=submit]").click();+      });++      await promiseShown;+      let doorhanger = getNotification();+      let creditCardLogo = doorhanger.querySelector(".desc-message-box image");+      let creditCardLogoWithoutExtension = creditCardLogo.src.split(".", 1)[0];++      is(+        creditCardLogoWithoutExtension,+        "chrome://formautofill/content/icon-credit-card-generic",+        "CC logo should be generic"+      );++      await clickDoorhangerButton(SECONDARY_BUTTON);+    }+  );+  await removeAllRecords();+});++add_task(async function test_update_generic_creditCard_logo() {+  const genericCard = {+    "cc-number": "937899583135",+    "cc-name": "John Doe",+  };++  await saveCreditCard(genericCard);+  let creditCards = await getCreditCards();+  is(creditCards.length, 1, "1 credit card in storage");++  await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab(+    { gBrowser, url: CREDITCARD_FORM_URL },+    async function(browser) {+      let promiseShown = BrowserTestUtils.waitForEvent(+        PopupNotifications.panel,+        "popupshown"+      );+      await SpecialPowers.spawn(browser, [genericCard], async function(card) {+        let form = content.document.getElementById("form");+        let name = form.querySelector("#cc-name");++        name.focus();+        name.setUserInput("Mark Smith");+        form.querySelector("#cc-number").setUserInput(card["cc-number"]);+        form.querySelector("#cc-exp-month").setUserInput("4");+        form+          .querySelector("#cc-exp-year")+          .setUserInput(new Date().getFullYear());+        // Wait 100ms before submission to make sure the input value applied+        await new Promise(resolve => content.setTimeout(resolve, 100));+        form.querySelector("input[type=submit").click();+      });++      await promiseShown;++      let doorhanger = getNotification();+      let creditCardLogo = doorhanger.querySelector(".desc-message-box image");+      let creditCardLogoWithoutExtension = creditCardLogo.src.split(".", 1)[0];+      is(+        creditCardLogoWithoutExtension,+        `chrome://formautofill/content/icon-credit-card-generic`,+        `CC Logo should be generic`+      );+      await clickDoorhangerButton(SECONDARY_BUTTON);+    }+  );+  await removeAllRecords();+});

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily focused on adding new test cases for credit card form autofill functionality, particularly testing the display of credit card logos (both third-party and generic) in doorhanger notifications.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 1-10]
   [Old Code] (comment about arbitrary setTimeout only)
   [Fixed Code] (added more detailed comments about timeout usage)

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 949-953, added new tests]
   [Old Code] (end of previous test cases)
   [Fixed Code] (added four new test cases for credit card logo display)

The changes are:
1. Added more explanatory comments about the use of arbitrary timeouts in tests
2. Added four new test cases that verify:
   - Display of third-party credit card logos (AMEX) when submitting new cards
   - Display of third-party logos when updating existing cards
   - Display of generic credit card logos for non-recognized card types
   - Display of generic logos when updating existing generic cards

These appear to be test improvements rather than security fixes. The code continues to handle credit card information in the same way as before, just with additional test coverage for the visual display aspects.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/selectors/visibleBreakpoints.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/selectors/visibleBreakpoints.js@@ -3,10 +3,9 @@  * file, You can obtain one at <http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/>. */ import { createSelector } from "reselect";-import { uniqBy } from "lodash";-import { getBreakpointsList } from "../reducers/breakpoints";-import { getSelectedSource } from "../reducers/sources";+import { getBreakpointsList } from "./breakpoints";+import { getSelectedSource } from "../selectors/sources"; import { sortSelectedBreakpoints } from "../utils/breakpoint"; import { getSelectedLocation } from "../utils/selected-location";@@ -41,9 +40,16 @@       return [];     }-    return uniqBy(-      sortSelectedBreakpoints(breakpoints, selectedSource),-      bp => getSelectedLocation(bp, selectedSource).line-    );+    // Filter the array so it only return the first breakpoint when there's multiple+    // breakpoints on the same line.+    const handledLines = new Set();+    return sortSelectedBreakpoints(breakpoints, selectedSource).filter(bp => {+      const line = getSelectedLocation(bp, selectedSource).line;+      if (handledLines.has(line)) {+        return false;+      }+      handledLines.add(line);+      return true;+    });   } );

Here's the analysis following the specified format:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
Potential Code Improvement [File] devtools/client/debugger/src/selectors/visibleBreakpoints.js [Lines] 3-41  
[Old Code]  
```javascript
return uniqBy(
  sortSelectedBreakpoints(breakpoints, selectedSource),
  bp => getSelectedLocation(bp, selectedSource).line
);
```  
[Fixed Code]  
```javascript
// Filter the array so it only return the first breakpoint when there's multiple
// breakpoints on the same line.
const handledLines = new Set();
return sortSelectedBreakpoints(breakpoints, selectedSource).filter(bp => {
  const line = getSelectedLocation(bp, selectedSource).line;
  if (handledLines.has(line)) {
    return false;
  }
  handledLines.add(line);
  return true;
});
```

Additional Details:
1. The change replaces lodash's `uniqBy` with a native JavaScript implementation using Set
2. While this isn't a security vulnerability fix, it's a code improvement that:
   - Removes a lodash dependency
   - Uses more performant native Set operations
   - Makes the deduplication logic more explicit
3. The functionality remains the same (filtering breakpoints by unique lines)
4. No actual security vulnerability was identified in either version of the code

Note: There are no clear security vulnerabilities being fixed in this diff. The changes appear to be focused on code quality and dependency reduction rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.fill.winding.subtract.1.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.fill.winding.subtract.1.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ ctx.lineTo(100, 50); ctx.lineTo(100, 0); ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't involve any security-related modifications.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14, 29]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.