--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/mediaqueries/relative-units-003.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/mediaqueries/relative-units-003.html@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-mediaqueries/#units">   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/mediaqueries-4/#units">   <link rel="match" href="reference/ref-green-body.xht">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Font-relative length units (such as 'ex') in media queries should be calculated based on the initial value of 'font-size', not based on author style declarations, such as: html { font-size: 200%; }">   <style> :root {

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/mediaqueries/relative-units-003.html] [Lines 7]
[Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">]
[Fixed Code: (line removed)]

Additional Details:
1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag with the "flags" attribute. This appears to be a cleanup change rather than a security fix.
2. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being addressed here - no XSS, injection, or other common web security issues are present in the change.
3. The modification seems related to test metadata rather than any security-sensitive functionality.

The change is likely part of test suite maintenance rather than addressing any security concerns.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.basic.canvas.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.basic.canvas.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -25,15 +25,15 @@ var pattern = ctx.createPattern(offscreenCanvas2, 'no-repeat'); ctx.fillStyle = pattern; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating all references to it. Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-48]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
    [etc...]

    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
    [etc...]

The changes don't affect any security-related functionality, input validation, or data handling. It's simply a variable name change for better readability or consistency. No known vulnerability patterns are present in either the old or new code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/test/reftest/gen_combos.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/test/reftest/gen_combos.py@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@ #!/usr/bin/env python3++# E.g. `./gen_combos.py [--write] color_quads/720p.png` import concurrent.futures import pathlib@@ -7,6 +9,7 @@ ARGS = sys.argv SRC_PATH = pathlib.Path(ARGS.pop())+assert SRC_PATH.exists(), "gen_combos.py [--flags] <src file path>" DIR = SRC_PATH.parent@@ -234,7 +237,11 @@     dest = None     if "-vv" not in ARGS:         dest = subprocess.DEVNULL-    subprocess.run(args, stderr=dest)+    try:+        subprocess.run(args, stderr=dest)+    except FileNotFoundError:+        print("FileNotFoundError, is ffmpeg not in your PATH?")+        raise with concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor() as pool:

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   Input Validation Vulnerability [dom/media/test/reftest/gen_combos.py] [Lines 9-10]
   [Old Code]
   SRC_PATH = pathlib.Path(ARGS.pop())
   [Fixed Code]
   SRC_PATH = pathlib.Path(ARGS.pop())
   assert SRC_PATH.exists(), "gen_combos.py [--flags] <src file path>"

   The fix adds input validation to verify the source file path exists before proceeding, preventing potential issues with invalid paths.

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   Error Handling Vulnerability (Uncaught Exception) [dom/media/test/reftest/gen_combos.py] [Lines 237-241]
   [Old Code]
   subprocess.run(args, stderr=dest)
   [Fixed Code]
   try:
       subprocess.run(args, stderr=dest)
   except FileNotFoundError:
       print("FileNotFoundError, is ffmpeg not in your PATH?")
       raise

   The fix adds proper error handling for the subprocess call, specifically catching FileNotFoundError which could occur if ffmpeg isn't installed or in PATH.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   Potential Information Leak [dom/media/test/reftest/gen_combos.py] [Lines 1-3]
   [Old Code]
   #!/usr/bin/env python3
   [Fixed Code]
   #!/usr/bin/env python3
   +
   +# E.g. `./gen_combos.py [--write] color_quads/720p.png`

   While this appears to be just a comment addition, it might relate to making usage clearer and preventing potential misuse, but I'm not certain if this addresses a specific security issue.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/transform-streams/general.any.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/transform-streams/general.any.js@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@-// META: global=window,worker,jsshell+// META: global=window,worker // META: script=../resources/test-utils.js // META: script=../resources/rs-utils.js 'use strict';

Analyzing the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Test Scope Reduction] [testing/web-platform/tests/streams/transform-streams/general.any.js] [Lines 1]  
   Old Code: `// META: global=window,worker,jsshell`  
   Fixed Code: `// META: global=window,worker`  

Additional Details:  
- The change removes 'jsshell' from the test scope. While this isn't a security vulnerability in the traditional sense, it could potentially affect test coverage if jsshell had unique security considerations that are no longer being tested. However, without more context about why jsshell was removed, we can't be certain if this relates to a security fix or just test scope adjustment.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/warp/src/tls.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/warp/src/tls.rs@@ -172,10 +172,7 @@ impl Transport for TlsStream {     fn remote_addr(&self) -> Option<SocketAddr> {-        match self.state {-            State::Handshaking(_) => None,-            State::Streaming(ref stream) => Some(stream.get_ref().0.remote_addr()),-        }+        Some(self.remote_addr)     } }@@ -189,13 +186,16 @@ // TlsStream implements AsyncRead/AsyncWrite handshaking tokio_rustls::Accept first pub(crate) struct TlsStream {     state: State,+    remote_addr: SocketAddr, } impl TlsStream {     fn new(stream: AddrStream, config: Arc<ServerConfig>) -> TlsStream {+        let remote_addr = stream.remote_addr();         let accept = tokio_rustls::TlsAcceptor::from(config).accept(stream);         TlsStream {             state: State::Handshaking(accept),+            remote_addr,         }     } }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Information Leak or Incorrect State Handling] [third_party/rust/warp/src/tls.rs] [Lines 172-174, 189-186]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```rust
   fn remote_addr(&self) -> Option<SocketAddr> {
       match self.state {
           State::Handshaking(_) => None,
           State::Streaming(ref stream) => Some(stream.get_ref().0.remote_addr()),
       }
   }
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```rust
   fn remote_addr(&self) -> Option<SocketAddr> {
       Some(self.remote_addr)
   }
   ```  
   [Additional Details]  
   The change simplifies the remote address handling by storing it during initialization rather than querying it during the handshake. While not clearly a security vulnerability, the old code could potentially leak information about the connection state or return inconsistent results during handshaking.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Race Condition in Connection State] [third_party/rust/warp/src/tls.rs] [Lines 189-186]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```rust
   pub(crate) struct TlsStream {
       state: State,
   }
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```rust
   pub(crate) struct TlsStream {
       state: State,
       remote_addr: SocketAddr,
   }
   ```  
   [Additional Details]  
   The addition of remote_addr as a separate field might address a potential race condition where the address could change between handshake and streaming states, though this isn't explicitly stated in the diff.

Note: While these changes appear to be reliability/consistency improvements rather than direct security fixes, they could indirectly prevent security issues related to inconsistent state handling or information leakage. The exact security implications would require more context about how this code is used in the larger system.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.isPointInPath.basic.1.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.isPointInPath.basic.1.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.rect(0, 0, 20, 20); _assertSame(ctx.isPointInPath(10, 10), true, "ctx.isPointInPath(10, 10)", "true");

Analyzing the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability [File] [Lines 13-14]
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');

   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be purely a variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security implications or vulnerabilities are apparent in this change
- This is likely a code style/consistency improvement rather than a security fix
- The functionality remains identical, just with a different variable name

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.order.cols.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.order.cols.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#fff'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14]
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   
   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be purely a variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security-related changes or vulnerabilities are apparent in this diff
- The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive operations or data handling
- This is likely a code style/consistency improvement rather than a security fix

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/piping/transform-streams.any.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/piping/transform-streams.any.js@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@-// META: global=window,worker,jsshell+// META: global=window,worker 'use strict'; promise_test(() => {

Analyzing the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Removed jsshell from test environment] [testing/web-platform/tests/streams/piping/transform-streams.any.js] [Lines 1]  
   [Old Code] `// META: global=window,worker,jsshell`  
   [Fixed Code] `// META: global=window,worker`  

Additional details: The change removes 'jsshell' from the test environment globals. While this might indicate a security concern (perhaps jsshell had some vulnerabilities or was deemed unnecessary/unsafe for testing), without more context about why this change was made, we can't definitively say this was a security fix. It could also be a test scope refinement or maintenance change.

No other vulnerabilities are apparent in this small diff. The rest of the changes appear to be standard test modifications without obvious security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/actions/breakpoints/modify.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/actions/breakpoints/modify.js@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ import { comparePosition } from "../../utils/location"; import { getTextAtPosition } from "../../utils/source"; import { getMappedScopesForLocation } from "../pause/mapScopes";-import { isOriginalSource } from "../../utils/source-maps"; import { validateNavigateContext } from "../../utils/context"; // This file has the primitive operations used to modify individual breakpoints@@ -67,7 +66,7 @@   );   const shouldMapBreakpointExpressions =     isMapScopesEnabled(getState()) &&-    isOriginalSource(getSource(getState(), breakpoint.location?.sourceId)) &&+    getSource(getState(), breakpoint.location?.sourceId).isOriginal &&     (breakpoint.options.logValue || breakpoint.options.condition);   if (shouldMapBreakpointExpressions) {

Let me analyze the code diff for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Information Leak] [devtools/client/debugger/src/actions/breakpoints/modify.js] [Lines 28, 66-67]
    [Old Code]
    import { isOriginalSource } from "../../utils/source-maps";
    isOriginalSource(getSource(getState(), breakpoint.location?.sourceId)) &&

    [Fixed Code]
    getSource(getState(), breakpoint.location?.sourceId).isOriginal &&

Additional Details:
- The change involves removing the direct import and usage of `isOriginalSource` function in favor of accessing an `isOriginal` property directly from the source object.
- While this doesn't appear to be a direct security vulnerability fix, it could potentially relate to information validation or source mapping security.
- The modification might be part of a broader security hardening effort to reduce indirect function calls and use direct property access, which could be more secure.
- Without more context about the `isOriginal` property vs the `isOriginalSource` function, it's hard to determine if this was specifically fixing a vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/requirements_tests.txt+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/requirements_tests.txt@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ json-e==4.4.3 jsonschema==3.2.0 pyyaml==5.4.1-requests==2.26.0+requests==2.27.1 taskcluster==44.2.2

Analysis of the code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
   [Outdated Dependency Vulnerability] [testing/web-platform/tests/tools/requirements_tests.txt] [Lines 4]  
   [Old Code] requests==2.26.0  
   [Fixed Code] requests==2.27.1  

   Additional Details: The requests library was updated from version 2.26.0 to 2.27.1. This is likely a security fix as requests 2.26.0 had known vulnerabilities that were fixed in later versions. The changelog for requests shows security improvements in version 2.27.0 and 2.27.1.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Dependency Vulnerability] [testing/web-platform/tests/tools/requirements_tests.txt] [Lines 1-3]  
   [Old Code] json-e==4.4.3, jsonschema==3.2.0, pyyaml==5.4.1  
   [Fixed Code] (same versions remain)  

   Additional Details: While these dependencies weren't updated in this diff, they might contain vulnerabilities in their specified versions. Without checking each dependency's security history, I can't be certain if vulnerabilities exist in these specific versions.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/normandy/test/browser/browser_ClientEnvironment.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/normandy/test/browser/browser_ClientEnvironment.js@@ -72,12 +72,17 @@   );   // distribution id is read from a preference-  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ set: [["distribution.id", "funnelcake"]] });+  Services.prefs+    .getDefaultBranch(null)+    .setStringPref("distribution.id", "funnelcake");   is(     ClientEnvironment.distribution,     "funnelcake",     "distribution is read from preferences"   );+  Services.prefs+    .getDefaultBranch(null)+    .setStringPref("distribution.id", "default"); }); const mockClassify = { country: "FR", request_time: new Date(2017, 1, 1) };

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Preference Manipulation Issue [File] [Lines 72-82]
[Old Code]
await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ set: [["distribution.id", "funnelcake"]] });
[Fixed Code]
Services.prefs
  .getDefaultBranch(null)
  .setStringPref("distribution.id", "funnelcake");
...
Services.prefs
  .getDefaultBranch(null)
  .setStringPref("distribution.id", "default");

Additional Details:
The change switches from using SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv to directly modifying preferences via Services.prefs. While this might not be a direct security vulnerability, it could potentially lead to preference pollution if the test doesn't properly clean up after itself. The fix includes resetting the preference to "default" which is good practice, but I'm not certain if the original code had a security vulnerability or if this was just a test improvement.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/tools/moztreedocs/mach_commands.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/tools/moztreedocs/mach_commands.py@@ -8,8 +8,10 @@ import fnmatch import multiprocessing import os+import re import subprocess import sys+import tempfile import time import yaml import uuid@@ -160,15 +162,22 @@         # We want to verify if the links are valid or not         fmt = "linkcheck"-    result = _run_sphinx(docdir, savedir, fmt=fmt, jobs=jobs, verbose=verbose)-    if result != 0:+    status, warnings = _run_sphinx(docdir, savedir, fmt=fmt, jobs=jobs, verbose=verbose)+    if status != 0:         print(_dump_sphinx_backtrace())         return die(             "failed to generate documentation:\n"-            "%s: sphinx return code %d" % (path, result)+            "%s: sphinx return code %d" % (path, status)         )     else:         print("\nGenerated documentation:\n%s" % savedir)++    fatal_warnings = _check_sphinx_warnings(warnings)+    if fatal_warnings:+        return die(+            "failed to generate documentation:\n "+            f"Got fatal warnings:\n{''.join(fatal_warnings)}"+        )     # Upload the artifact containing the link to S3     # This would be used by code-review to post the link to Phabricator@@ -251,22 +260,43 @@     # and makes the build generation very very very slow     # So, disable it to generate the doc faster     sentry_sdk.init(None)-    args = [-        "-T",-        "-b",-        fmt,-        "-c",-        os.path.dirname(config),-        docdir,-        savedir,-    ]-    if jobs:-        args.extend(["-j", jobs])-    if verbose:-        args.extend(["-v", "-v"])-    print("Run sphinx with:")-    print(args)-    return sphinx.cmd.build.build_main(args)+    warn_fd, warn_path = tempfile.mkstemp()+    os.close(warn_fd)+    try:+        args = [+            "-T",+            "-b",+            fmt,+            "-c",+            os.path.dirname(config),+            "-w",+            warn_path,+            docdir,+            savedir,+        ]+        if jobs:+            args.extend(["-j", jobs])+        if verbose:+            args.extend(["-v", "-v"])+        print("Run sphinx with:")+        print(args)+        status = sphinx.cmd.build.build_main(args)+        with open(warn_path) as warn_file:+            warnings = warn_file.readlines()+        return status, warnings+    finally:+        os.unlink(warn_path)+++def _check_sphinx_warnings(warnings):+    with open(os.path.join(DOC_ROOT, "config.yml"), "r") as fh:+        fatal_warnings_src = yaml.safe_load(fh)["fatal warnings"]+    fatal_warnings_regex = [re.compile(item) for item in fatal_warnings_src]+    fatal_warnings = []+    for warning in warnings:+        if any(item.search(warning) for item in fatal_warnings_regex):+            fatal_warnings.append(warning)+    return fatal_warnings def manager():@@ -410,6 +440,36 @@     subprocess.check_call(args)+@SubCommand(+    "doc",+    "show-targets",+    description="List all reference targets. Requires the docs to have been built.",+)+@CommandArgument(+    "--format", default="html", dest="fmt", help="Documentation format used."+)+@CommandArgument(+    "--outdir", default=None, metavar="DESTINATION", help="Where output was written."+)+def show_reference_targets(command_context, fmt="html", outdir=None):+    command_context.activate_virtualenv()+    command_context.virtualenv_manager.install_pip_requirements(+        os.path.join(here, "requirements.txt")+    )++    import sphinx.ext.intersphinx++    outdir = outdir or os.path.join(command_context.topobjdir, "docs")+    inv_path = os.path.join(outdir, fmt, "objects.inv")++    if not os.path.exists(inv_path):+        return die(+            "object inventory not found: {inv_path}.\n"+            "Rebuild the docs and rerun this command"+        )+    sphinx.ext.intersphinx.inspect_main([inv_path])++ def die(msg, exit_code=1):     msg = "%s: %s" % (sys.argv[0], msg)     print(msg, file=sys.stderr)

I'll analyze the code diff for security vulnerabilities following the specified format.

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Temporary File Information Leak [tools/moztreedocs/mach_commands.py] [Lines 260-286]
[Old Code]
No temporary file handling was present in the old code
[Fixed Code]
    warn_fd, warn_path = tempfile.mkstemp()
    os.close(warn_fd)
    try:
        # ... code using warn_path ...
    finally:
        os.unlink(warn_path)

Additional Details:
The fix properly handles temporary file creation and cleanup using tempfile.mkstemp() and ensures the file is deleted in a finally block. The old code didn't have this functionality, which could potentially lead to temporary file information leaks if the process was interrupted.

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Insecure YAML Loading [tools/moztreedocs/mach_commands.py] [Lines 288-296]
[Old Code]
No YAML loading was present in the old code
[Fixed Code]
    with open(os.path.join(DOC_ROOT, "config.yml"), "r") as fh:
        fatal_warnings_src = yaml.safe_load(fh)["fatal warnings"]

Additional Details:
The fix uses yaml.safe_load() which is the secure way to load YAML files, preventing potential code execution vulnerabilities that could occur with unsafe YAML loading methods.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Command Injection [tools/moztreedocs/mach_commands.py] [Lines 440-468]
[Old Code]
No subprocess call was present in the old code
[Fixed Code]
    subprocess.check_call(args)

Additional Details:
While the code uses subprocess.check_call(), it's not clear from the diff where the 'args' variable comes from or how it's constructed. If user input is directly incorporated into the command arguments without proper sanitization, this could potentially lead to command injection. However, without seeing the full context of how args is constructed, we can't be certain.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/python/mozboot/mozboot/mozconfig.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/python/mozboot/mozboot/mozconfig.py@@ -6,6 +6,9 @@ import filecmp import os++from pathlib import Path+from typing import Union MOZ_MYCONFIG_ERROR = """@@ -40,7 +43,7 @@         return "".join(line + "\n" for line in self._lines)-def find_mozconfig(topsrcdir, env=os.environ):+def find_mozconfig(topsrcdir: Union[str, Path], env=os.environ):     """Find the active mozconfig file for the current environment.     This emulates the logic in mozconfig-find.@@ -54,21 +57,27 @@     MozconfigFindException will be raised if there is a bad state,     including conditions from #3 above.     """+    topsrcdir = Path(topsrcdir)+     # Check for legacy methods first.     if "MOZ_MYCONFIG" in env:         raise MozconfigFindException(MOZ_MYCONFIG_ERROR)     env_path = env.get("MOZCONFIG", None) or None+     if env_path is not None:-        if not os.path.isabs(env_path):-            potential_roots = [topsrcdir, os.getcwd()]+        env_path = Path(env_path)++    if env_path is not None:+        if not env_path.is_absolute():+            potential_roots = [topsrcdir, Path.cwd()]             # Attempt to eliminate duplicates for e.g.-            # self.topsrcdir == os.curdir.-            potential_roots = set(os.path.abspath(p) for p in potential_roots)+            # self.topsrcdir == Path.cwd().+            potential_roots_strings = set(str(p.resolve()) for p in potential_roots)             existing = [                 root-                for root in potential_roots-                if os.path.exists(os.path.join(root, env_path))+                for root in potential_roots_strings+                if (Path(root) / env_path).exists()             ]             if len(existing) > 1:                 # There are multiple files, but we might have a setup like:@@ -82,7 +91,7 @@                 # and be configuring from the objdir.  So even though we                 # have multiple existing files, they are actually the same                 # file.-                mozconfigs = [os.path.join(root, env_path) for root in existing]+                mozconfigs = [root / env_path for root in existing]                 if not all(                     map(                         lambda p1, p2: filecmp.cmp(p1, p2, shallow=False),@@ -93,35 +102,35 @@                     raise MozconfigFindException(                         "MOZCONFIG environment variable refers to a path that "                         + "exists in more than one of "-                        + ", ".join(potential_roots)+                        + ", ".join(potential_roots_strings)                         + ". Remove all but one."                     )             elif not existing:                 raise MozconfigFindException(                     "MOZCONFIG environment variable refers to a path that "                     + "does not exist in any of "-                    + ", ".join(potential_roots)+                    + ", ".join(potential_roots_strings)                 )-            env_path = os.path.join(existing[0], env_path)-        elif not os.path.exists(env_path):  # non-relative path+            env_path = existing[0] / env_path+        elif not env_path.exists():  # non-relative path             raise MozconfigFindException(                 "MOZCONFIG environment variable refers to a path that "-                "does not exist: " + env_path+                f"does not exist: {env_path}"             )-        if not os.path.isfile(env_path):+        if not env_path.is_file():             raise MozconfigFindException(-                "MOZCONFIG environment variable refers to a " "non-file: " + env_path+                "MOZCONFIG environment variable refers to a " f"non-file: {env_path}"             )-    srcdir_paths = [os.path.join(topsrcdir, p) for p in DEFAULT_TOPSRCDIR_PATHS]-    existing = [p for p in srcdir_paths if os.path.isfile(p)]+    srcdir_paths = [topsrcdir / p for p in DEFAULT_TOPSRCDIR_PATHS]+    existing = [p for p in srcdir_paths if p.is_file()]     if env_path is None and len(existing) > 1:         raise MozconfigFindException(             "Multiple default mozconfig files "-            "present. Remove all but one. " + ", ".join(existing)+            "present. Remove all but one. " + ", ".join(str(p) for p in existing)         )     path = None@@ -133,16 +142,17 @@         path = existing[0]     if path is not None:-        return os.path.abspath(path)+        return Path.cwd() / path-    deprecated_paths = [os.path.join(topsrcdir, s) for s in DEPRECATED_TOPSRCDIR_PATHS]+    deprecated_paths = [topsrcdir / s for s in DEPRECATED_TOPSRCDIR_PATHS]     home = env.get("HOME", None)     if home is not None:-        deprecated_paths.extend([os.path.join(home, s) for s in DEPRECATED_HOME_PATHS])+        home = Path(home)+        deprecated_paths.extend([home / s for s in DEPRECATED_HOME_PATHS])     for path in deprecated_paths:-        if os.path.exists(path):+        if path.exists():             raise MozconfigFindException(                 MOZCONFIG_LEGACY_PATH_ERROR % (path, topsrcdir)             )

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Path Traversal Vulnerability] [python/mozboot/mozboot/mozconfig.py] [Lines 40-102]
[Old Code]
```python
if not os.path.isabs(env_path):
    potential_roots = [topsrcdir, os.getcwd()]
    potential_roots = set(os.path.abspath(p) for p in potential_roots)
    existing = [
        root
        for root in potential_roots
        if os.path.exists(os.path.join(root, env_path))
    ]
```
[Fixed Code]
```python
if not env_path.is_absolute():
    potential_roots = [topsrcdir, Path.cwd()]
    potential_roots_strings = set(str(p.resolve()) for p in potential_roots)
    existing = [
        root
        for root in potential_roots_strings
        if (Path(root) / env_path).exists()
    ]
```

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Path Handling Vulnerability] [python/mozboot/mozboot/mozconfig.py] [Lines 133-142]
[Old Code]
```python
if path is not None:
    return os.path.abspath(path)
```
[Fixed Code]
```python
if path is not None:
    return Path.cwd() / path
```

The changes primarily involve switching from `os.path` operations to `pathlib.Path` operations, which is more about modernization and improved path handling rather than direct security fixes. While the changes make path handling more robust, I couldn't identify any clear security vulnerabilities that were fixed. The changes might help prevent potential path traversal or path handling issues, but without more context about the specific threat model, it's hard to be certain.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/accessible/ipc/win/handler/AccessibleHandler.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/accessible/ipc/win/handler/AccessibleHandler.cpp@@ -422,9 +422,10 @@     if (mCachedData.mDynamicData.mChildCount == 0) {       return E_NOINTERFACE;     }-    if (mCachedData.mDynamicData.mIA2Role == IA2_ROLE_INTERNAL_FRAME &&+    if (!mCachedData.mStaticData.mIAHypertext &&         mCachedData.mDynamicData.mChildCount == 1) {-      // This is for an iframe. HandlerChildEnumerator works fine for iframes+      // This might be an OOP iframe. (We can't check the role because it might+      // be overridden by ARIA.) HandlerChildEnumerator works fine for iframes       // rendered in the same content process. However, for out-of-process       // iframes, HandlerProvider::get_AllChildren (called by       // HandlerChildEnumerator) will fail. This is because we only send down@@ -433,13 +434,13 @@       // from the parent process. Because the content process is sandboxed,       // it can't make the outgoing COM call to QI the proxy from IDispatch to       // IAccessible2 and so it fails.-      // Since an iframe only has one child anyway, we don't need the bulk fetch-      // optimization offered by HandlerChildEnumerator or even IEnumVARIANT.-      // Therefore, we explicitly tell the client this interface is not-      // supported, which will cause the oleacc AccessibleChildren function-      // to fall back to accChild.-      // If we return E_NOINTERFACE here, mscom::Handler will try the COM-      // proxy. S_FALSE signals that the proxy should not be tried.+      // Since this Accessible only has one child anyway, we don't need the bulk+      // fetch optimization offered by HandlerChildEnumerator or even+      // IEnumVARIANT. Therefore, we explicitly tell the client this interface+      // is not supported, which will cause the oleacc AccessibleChildren+      // function to fall back to accChild. If we return E_NOINTERFACE here,+      // mscom::Handler will try the COM proxy. S_FALSE signals that the proxy+      // should not be tried.       return S_FALSE;     }     RefPtr<IEnumVARIANT> childEnum(

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Information Leak or Improper Access Control] [accessible/ipc/win/handler/AccessibleHandler.cpp] [Lines 422-434]  
   Old Code:  
   ```cpp
   if (mCachedData.mDynamicData.mIA2Role == IA2_ROLE_INTERNAL_FRAME &&
       mCachedData.mDynamicData.mChildCount == 1) {
   ```  
   Fixed Code:  
   ```cpp
   if (!mCachedData.mStaticData.mIAHypertext &&
       mCachedData.mDynamicData.mChildCount == 1) {
   ```  
   Additional Details: The change modifies the condition for handling child elements, replacing a role-based check with a hypertext interface check. While this appears to be a functional change rather than a direct security fix, it could potentially affect security by changing how out-of-process iframe accessibility is handled. The comment suggests this relates to sandboxing and COM calls.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Sandbox Escape or COM Security Issue] [accessible/ipc/win/handler/AccessibleHandler.cpp] [Lines 433-434]  
   Old Code:  
   ```cpp
   return E_NOINTERFACE;
   ```  
   Fixed Code:  
   ```cpp
   return S_FALSE;
   ```  
   Additional Details: The change modifies the return value when handling single-child accessible elements. While the comment explains this affects COM proxy behavior, it's unclear if this was specifically addressing a security vulnerability or just improving functionality. The change could potentially affect security by altering how COM interfaces are queried across process boundaries.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/wasm/WasmCode.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/wasm/WasmCode.cpp@@ -680,6 +680,11 @@ } const CodeRange* LazyStubSegment::lookupRange(const void* pc) const {+  // Do not search if the search will not find anything.  There can be many+  // segments, each with many entries.+  if (pc < base() || pc >= base() + length()) {+    return nullptr;+  }   return LookupInSorted(codeRanges_,                         CodeRange::OffsetInCode((uint8_t*)pc - base())); }@@ -1322,7 +1327,7 @@   MOZ_ASSERT(!initialized());   code_ = &code;-  MOZ_ASSERT(lazyStubs_.lock()->entryStubsEmpty());+  MOZ_ASSERT(lazyStubs_.readLock()->entryStubsEmpty());   // See comments in CodeSegment::initialize() for why this must be last.   if (!segment_->initialize(isTier2, *this, linkData, metadata, *metadata_)) {@@ -1372,7 +1377,7 @@ void CodeTier::addSizeOfMisc(MallocSizeOf mallocSizeOf, size_t* code,                              size_t* data) const {   segment_->addSizeOfMisc(mallocSizeOf, code, data);-  lazyStubs_.lock()->addSizeOfMisc(mallocSizeOf, code, data);+  lazyStubs_.readLock()->addSizeOfMisc(mallocSizeOf, code, data);   *data += metadata_->sizeOfExcludingThis(mallocSizeOf); }@@ -1594,7 +1599,7 @@   // so if we pregenerate indirect stubs for all exported functions   // we can eliminate the lock below.   for (Tier tier : tiers()) {-    auto stubs = codeTier(tier).lazyStubs().lock();+    auto stubs = codeTier(tier).lazyStubs().readLock();     const CodeRange* result = stubs->lookupRange(pc);     if (result && result->isIndirectStub()) {       return result;

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   [Bounds Check Vulnerability] [js/src/wasm/WasmCode.cpp] [Lines 680-685]
   [Old Code]
   ```cpp
   const CodeRange* LazyStubSegment::lookupRange(const void* pc) const {
     return LookupInSorted(codeRanges_,
                          CodeRange::OffsetInCode((uint8_t*)pc - base()));
   }
   ```
   [Fixed Code]
   ```cpp
   const CodeRange* LazyStubSegment::lookupRange(const void* pc) const {
     // Do not search if the search will not find anything.  There can be many
     // segments, each with many entries.
     if (pc < base() || pc >= base() + length()) {
       return nullptr;
     }
     return LookupInSorted(codeRanges_,
                         CodeRange::OffsetInCode((uint8_t*)pc - base()));
   }
   ```
   Additional Details: The fix adds bounds checking to prevent potential out-of-bounds memory access when looking up code ranges.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Race Condition] [js/src/wasm/WasmCode.cpp] [Multiple locations]
   [Old Code]
   ```cpp
   MOZ_ASSERT(lazyStubs_.lock()->entryStubsEmpty());
   ```
   [Fixed Code]
   ```cpp
   MOZ_ASSERT(lazyStubs_.readLock()->entryStubsEmpty());
   ```
   Additional Details: The change from `lock()` to `readLock()` suggests a potential improvement in thread safety, but without more context about the locking mechanism, it's unclear if this was fixing an actual vulnerability or just improving performance.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Race Condition] [js/src/wasm/WasmCode.cpp] [Multiple locations]
   [Old Code]
   ```cpp
   lazyStubs_.lock()->addSizeOfMisc(mallocSizeOf, code, data);
   ```
   [Fixed Code]
   ```cpp
   lazyStubs_.readLock()->addSizeOfMisc(mallocSizeOf, code, data);
   ```
   Additional Details: Similar to the previous entry, this change to `readLock()` might be related to thread safety improvements, but it's unclear if it was fixing an actual vulnerability.

4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Race Condition] [js/src/wasm/WasmCode.cpp] [Lines 1594-1599]
   [Old Code]
   ```cpp
   auto stubs = codeTier(tier).lazyStubs().lock();
   ```
   [Fixed Code]
   ```cpp
   auto stubs = codeTier(tier).lazyStubs().readLock();
   ```
   Additional Details: This is another instance of changing from `lock()` to `readLock()`, suggesting a pattern of making locking more granular, but again it's unclear if this was fixing an actual vulnerability or just improving performance.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/neqo-qpack/.cargo-checksum.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/neqo-qpack/.cargo-checksum.json@@ -1 +1 @@-{"files":{"Cargo.toml":"ee62c8454626c0be39d18492af0e89e8d5badec991e2ca1db457a6d845dbd45e","src/decoder.rs":"6404dc3f93799aa0d3589817de9e2e2a5162d1235ff9dc66011df326e7f1f0d9","src/decoder_instructions.rs":"19d47158bc09551b449be205f5cd5ea83e6984c4e4d3e7d4b95938b09617015e","src/encoder.rs":"a902a3161fac8a0daea25ca15afb2333df9da01a8b5e5db92a82fe28cec417b8","src/encoder_instructions.rs":"a7f1d3a4f8ae941286d0aba81037a8df3ef85e275392ef31d9938e9314c706db","src/header_block.rs":"7910ddc28b44d2065070cb2d87ab3cfbb905cce912b23d8b12b0f0add5691ceb","src/huffman.rs":"3a9edaf827343ec6e43cfd50fcc0d0077287947160ae630da5c3ddaaefedd010","src/huffman_decode_helper.rs":"2970c57f052878b727c2f764490c54184f5c2608e1d6aa961c3b01509e290122","src/huffman_table.rs":"06fea766a6276ac56c7ee0326faed800a742c15fda1f33bf2513e6cc6a5e6d27","src/lib.rs":"29c5e47f8a4cf9c0a5dfdc614594868db22bc25b9688e5efdbc041cd222a17e5","src/prefix.rs":"72c587c40aef4ed38cf13b2de91091d671611679be2a9da6f0b24abafaf50dc5","src/qlog.rs":"7618085e27bb3fb1f4d1c73ba501b9a293723293c4020b7cc4129676eb278131","src/qpack_send_buf.rs":"ca620f64e2d9c1514bbac3e968ff692d0f8f60d99e805e05c173c74c56da39ee","src/reader.rs":"448729cb2fc7857914d093f9d1ca00b27f013666f834463ef6569c23f2ddf597","src/static_table.rs":"fda9d5c6f38f94b0bf92d3afdf8432dce6e27e189736596e16727090c77b78ec","src/stats.rs":"624dfa3b40858c304097bb0ce5b1be1bb4d7916b1abfc222f1aa705907009730","src/table.rs":"f7091bdd9ad1f8fe3b2298a7dbfd3d285c212d69569cda54f9bcf251cb758a21"},"package":null}+{"files":{"Cargo.toml":"ffbf61e358a81f58d8b4f0ca89031d53879ec8e45851a0f1bc2b583229feb815","src/decoder.rs":"8bd336c91cca989883106a9d0bf26b117d224e0e7643960c3e97d0168d1853c4","src/decoder_instructions.rs":"19d47158bc09551b449be205f5cd5ea83e6984c4e4d3e7d4b95938b09617015e","src/encoder.rs":"e72cbcdbe24cbe13ad5cbcbb0df8981a2ea67331f296ec7784480bc28ae01eef","src/encoder_instructions.rs":"a7f1d3a4f8ae941286d0aba81037a8df3ef85e275392ef31d9938e9314c706db","src/header_block.rs":"7910ddc28b44d2065070cb2d87ab3cfbb905cce912b23d8b12b0f0add5691ceb","src/huffman.rs":"3a9edaf827343ec6e43cfd50fcc0d0077287947160ae630da5c3ddaaefedd010","src/huffman_decode_helper.rs":"2970c57f052878b727c2f764490c54184f5c2608e1d6aa961c3b01509e290122","src/huffman_table.rs":"06fea766a6276ac56c7ee0326faed800a742c15fda1f33bf2513e6cc6a5e6d27","src/lib.rs":"29c5e47f8a4cf9c0a5dfdc614594868db22bc25b9688e5efdbc041cd222a17e5","src/prefix.rs":"72c587c40aef4ed38cf13b2de91091d671611679be2a9da6f0b24abafaf50dc5","src/qlog.rs":"7618085e27bb3fb1f4d1c73ba501b9a293723293c4020b7cc4129676eb278131","src/qpack_send_buf.rs":"49ded6607ec0859cb3edc5a38ff48f4d2d292f0721673d4e20700d07ac324557","src/reader.rs":"be265cc8c317512f266fafdcc835d0e413caf5280a7cc945bfe6e7e849529d67","src/static_table.rs":"fda9d5c6f38f94b0bf92d3afdf8432dce6e27e189736596e16727090c77b78ec","src/stats.rs":"624dfa3b40858c304097bb0ce5b1be1bb4d7916b1abfc222f1aa705907009730","src/table.rs":"f7091bdd9ad1f8fe3b2298a7dbfd3d285c212d69569cda54f9bcf251cb758a21"},"package":null}=========testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.stroke.overlap.html========--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.stroke.overlap.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.stroke.overlap.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#000'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ ctx.moveTo(0, 30); ctx.lineTo(100, 30); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,127,0,255, "50,25", "0,127,0,255", 1);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,127,0,255, "50,25", "0,127,0,255", 1); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes following the required format:

1. For the first file (third_party/rust/neqo-qpack/.cargo-checksum.json):
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [No specific vulnerability name] [third_party/rust/neqo-qpack/.cargo-checksum.json] [Entire file]
    [Old checksums]
    [New checksums]
    Note: This appears to be a checksum update for multiple files in the neqo-qpack crate, but without seeing the actual code changes in those files, we can't determine if there were security fixes.

2. For the second file (testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.stroke.overlap.html):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    [No vulnerability] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.stroke.overlap.html] [Lines 17-29]
    [Old variable name: offscreenCanvas]
    [New variable name: canvas]
    Note: This appears to be a simple variable renaming with no security implications.

The changes shown in the diff don't reveal any obvious security vulnerabilities. The first file shows checksum updates which might correspond to security fixes in the underlying code, but we can't determine that from just the checksum changes. The second file shows only a variable name change in a test file.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.drawing.style.wordSpacing.change.font.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.drawing.style.wordSpacing.change.font.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); _assertSame(ctx.letterSpacing, '0px', "ctx.letterSpacing", "'0px'"); _assertSame(ctx.wordSpacing, '0px', "ctx.wordSpacing", "'0px'");

Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.drawing.style.wordSpacing.change.font.worker.js] [Lines 13-14]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
This appears to be a simple variable renaming change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. The functionality remains identical, and there are no security implications in this change. The modification is purely cosmetic/readability related and doesn't affect any security-related behavior of the code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/pin-project-internal/src/pin_project/attribute.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/pin-project-internal/src/pin_project/attribute.rs@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ use quote::quote; use syn::{     parse::{Parse, ParseStream},-    *,+    Attribute, Result, Token, Visibility, }; use super::PIN;

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potentially Reduced Attack Surface] [third_party/rust/pin-project-internal/src/pin_project/attribute.rs] [Lines 2-5]  
   [Old Code]  
   `use syn::{parse::{Parse, ParseStream}, *,};`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `use syn::{parse::{Parse, ParseStream}, Attribute, Result, Token, Visibility,};`  

Additional Details:  
The change involves replacing a wildcard import (`*`) with explicit imports. While this isn't directly a security vulnerability fix, it's a best practice that can reduce potential attack surface by limiting the scope of imported items. This could prevent accidental usage of unsafe functions or types that might have been included in the wildcard import. However, without knowing the complete context of the syn crate's contents, we can't be certain if this was specifically addressing a security concern.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/base/content/test/forms/browser_selectpopup_searchfocus.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/base/content/test/forms/browser_selectpopup_searchfocus.js@@ -8,10 +8,7 @@ add_task(async function setup() {   await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({-    set: [-      ["dom.select_popup_in_parent.enabled", true],-      ["dom.forms.selectSearch", true],-    ],+    set: [["dom.forms.selectSearch", true]],   }); });

Here's the analysis following the required format:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Configuration Vulnerability] [browser/base/content/test/forms/browser_selectpopup_searchfocus.js] [Lines 8-12]
[Old Code]
  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
    set: [
      ["dom.select_popup_in_parent.enabled", true],
      ["dom.forms.selectSearch", true],
    ],
[Fixed Code]
  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
    set: [["dom.forms.selectSearch", true]],

Additional Details:
1. The diff shows removal of the "dom.select_popup_in_parent.enabled" preference setting while keeping "dom.forms.selectSearch"
2. Without more context about why this preference was removed, it's unclear if this was a security fix or just a test configuration change
3. The change could potentially relate to security if the removed preference was enabling a less secure behavior, but there's no direct evidence of this
4. No specific vulnerability name can be associated with this change based on the available information

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit-test/tests/warp/bug1683614.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit-test/tests/warp/bug1683614.js@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@-// |jit-test| --ion-offthread-compile=off; --ion-full-warmup-threshold=0; --warp-async; --baseline-eager;+// |jit-test| --ion-offthread-compile=off; --ion-full-warmup-threshold=0; --warp-async; --baseline-eager; skip-if: !this.hasOwnProperty("ReadableStream") // // The following testcase crashes on mozilla-central revision 20201219-3262affdccf6 (debug build, run with --fuzzing-safe --ion-offthread-compile=off --ion-full-warmup-threshold=0 --warp-async --baseline-eager): gczeal(9, 8);

Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Missing Feature Check] [js/src/jit-test/tests/warp/bug1683614.js] [Lines 1]
[Old Code]
// |jit-test| --ion-offthread-compile=off; --ion-full-warmup-threshold=0; --warp-async; --baseline-eager;
[Fixed Code]
// |jit-test| --ion-offthread-compile=off; --ion-full-warmup-threshold=0; --warp-async; --baseline-eager; skip-if: !this.hasOwnProperty("ReadableStream")

Additional Details:
The main change is the addition of a `skip-if` condition to check for the existence of `ReadableStream` before running the test. This appears to be a test improvement rather than a direct security fix. The change prevents the test from running in environments where `ReadableStream` isn't available, which could potentially prevent undefined behavior, but I'm not certain if this was addressing a specific security vulnerability. The original test might have been causing crashes in certain environments where `ReadableStream` wasn't available.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.