Shared security patch analysis results
AI Used: DEEPSEEK deepseek-chat--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-89.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-89.xml@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ blockquote div > p { color: green; }]]></style> <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/> <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->- <meta name="flags" content="" /> </head> <body> <blockquote>
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no [No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-89.xml] [Lines 6] [Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="" />] [Fixed Code: (removed)] Additional Details: - The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which doesn't appear to have any security implications. - This appears to be a minor cleanup change rather than a security fix. - No known vulnerability is associated with this change. - The modification doesn't introduce any new security concerns either.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/build/build-clang/clang-13.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/build/build-clang/clang-13.json@@ -13,16 +13,11 @@ "compiler-rt-13-no-codesign.patch", "win64-no-symlink.patch", "revert-llvmorg-13-init-8182-gc2297544c047.patch",- "revert-llvmorg-13-init-4019-ga478b0a199f4.patch", "revert-llvmorg-12-init-7827-g2a078c307204.patch",- "llvmorg-14-init-2833-gbadcd5858972.patch", "llvmorg-14-init-3166-gd9ab62ca3d29.patch", "llvmorg-14-init-4465-g22ea0cea595e-v2.patch",- "llvmorg-14-init-6706-g6404f4b5af39.patch",- "llvmorg-14-init-9105-g3c47c5ca13b8.patch",- "llvmorg-14-init-11347-g93a20ecee4b6.patch", "llvmorg-14-init-12719-gc4b45eeb44fd.patch", "llvmorg-14-init-13305-g319181f76718.patch",- "D116020.patch"+ "llvmorg-14-init-13854-g782791ee84d2.patch" ] }
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze the changes in the patch files for potential security fixes. The diff shows several patches being removed and some being added/modified. 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure Patch Removal [build/build-clang/clang-13.json] [Lines 13-16] Old Code: `"revert-llvmorg-13-init-4019-ga478b0a199f4.patch"` Fixed Code: (removed) Note: The removal of this revert patch might indicate a security fix was properly implemented in the newer version. 2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure Patch Removal [build/build-clang/clang-13.json] [Lines 17-18] Old Code: `"llvmorg-14-init-6706-g6404f4b5af39.patch"` Fixed Code: (removed) Note: The removal of this patch might indicate the functionality was properly integrated upstream. 3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure Patch Removal [build/build-clang/clang-13.json] [Lines 19-20] Old Code: `"llvmorg-14-init-9105-g3c47c5ca13b8.patch"` Fixed Code: (removed) Note: The removal of this patch might indicate the functionality was properly integrated upstream. 4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure Patch Removal [build/build-clang/clang-13.json] [Lines 21-22] Old Code: `"llvmorg-14-init-11347-g93a20ecee4b6.patch"` Fixed Code: (removed) Note: The removal of this patch might indicate the functionality was properly integrated upstream. 5. Vulnerability Existed: not sure Patch Addition [build/build-clang/clang-13.json] [Lines 23-24] Old Code: `"D116020.patch"` Fixed Code: `"llvmorg-14-init-13854-g782791ee84d2.patch"` Note: The replacement of this patch might indicate a security update, but without seeing the patch contents, we can't be certain. The changes appear to be updates to the LLVM/Clang compiler patches, but without seeing the actual contents of these patches or their commit messages, we can't definitively identify specific vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes suggest the codebase is being updated to newer LLVM versions (14-init patches replacing older ones), which typically include security fixes among other improvements.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/nss/lib/nss/nss.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/nss/lib/nss/nss.h@@ -22,9 +22,9 @@ * The format of the version string should be * "<major version>.<minor version>[.<patch level>[.<build number>]][ <ECC>][ <Beta>]" */-#define NSS_VERSION "3.74" _NSS_CUSTOMIZED+#define NSS_VERSION "3.75" _NSS_CUSTOMIZED #define NSS_VMAJOR 3-#define NSS_VMINOR 74+#define NSS_VMINOR 75 #define NSS_VPATCH 0 #define NSS_VBUILD 0 #define NSS_BETA PR_FALSE
Analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
Version Update [File] security/nss/lib/nss/nss.h [Lines] 22-26
Old Code:
#define NSS_VERSION "3.74" _NSS_CUSTOMIZED
#define NSS_VMAJOR 3
#define NSS_VMINOR 74
Fixed Code:
#define NSS_VERSION "3.75" _NSS_CUSTOMIZED
#define NSS_VMAJOR 3
#define NSS_VMINOR 75
Additional Details:
- This appears to be a routine version number update from 3.74 to 3.75
- No security-related changes are visible in this diff
- The version number increment suggests bug fixes or improvements, but no specific vulnerabilities are addressed in this particular diff
- The _NSS_CUSTOMIZED macro remains unchanged
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/uriloader/base/nsDocLoader.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/uriloader/base/nsDocLoader.cpp@@ -1562,6 +1562,12 @@ return NS_OK; }+NS_IMETHODIMP+nsDocLoader::GetDocumentRequest(nsIRequest** aRequest) {+ NS_IF_ADDREF(*aRequest = mDocumentRequest);+ return NS_OK;+}+ #if 0 void nsDocLoader::DumpChannelInfo() {
Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Memory Leak] [uriloader/base/nsDocLoader.cpp] [Lines 1562-1568]
[Old Code]
(No previous implementation of GetDocumentRequest method)
[Fixed Code]
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsDocLoader::GetDocumentRequest(nsIRequest** aRequest) {
NS_IF_ADDREF(*aRequest = mDocumentRequest);
return NS_OK;
}
Additional Details:
- The diff shows the addition of a new method GetDocumentRequest that returns a reference to mDocumentRequest
- While not clearly a security fix, this could be related to preventing memory leaks by properly managing reference counting
- The NS_IF_ADDREF macro ensures proper reference counting when returning the request object
- Without more context about why this was added, it's difficult to determine if this fixes a specific vulnerability
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.2.radii.1.dompoint.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.2.radii.1.dompoint.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,20 +27,20 @@ ctx.fill(); // top-left corner-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 20,1, 255,0,0,255, "20,1", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 41,1, 0,255,0,255, "41,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,10, 255,0,0,255, "1,10", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,21, 0,255,0,255, "1,21", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 20,1, 255,0,0,255, "20,1", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 41,1, 0,255,0,255, "41,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,10, 255,0,0,255, "1,10", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,21, 0,255,0,255, "1,21", "0,255,0,255"); // bottom-right corner-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 79,48, 255,0,0,255, "79,48", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 58,48, 0,255,0,255, "58,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,39, 255,0,0,255, "98,39", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,28, 0,255,0,255, "98,28", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 79,48, 255,0,0,255, "79,48", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 58,48, 0,255,0,255, "58,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,39, 255,0,0,255, "98,39", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,28, 0,255,0,255, "98,28", "0,255,0,255"); // other corners-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't introduce or fix any security vulnerabilities. Here's the analysis following your requested format: Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-48] [Old Code] (variable named 'offscreenCanvas') [Fixed Code] (variable renamed to 'canvas') The changes are: 1. Renaming 'offscreenCanvas' variable to 'canvas' 2. Updating all references to this variable in the _assertPixel calls These changes don't appear to address any security issues but rather seem to be code style/consistency improvements. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/piping/error-propagation-forward.any.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/piping/error-propagation-forward.any.js@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@-// META: global=window,worker,jsshell+// META: global=window,worker // META: script=../resources/test-utils.js // META: script=../resources/recording-streams.js 'use strict';
Analyzing the provided code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Removal of jsshell environment] [testing/web-platform/tests/streams/piping/error-propagation-forward.any.js] [Lines 1] [Old Code] `// META: global=window,worker,jsshell` [Fixed Code] `// META: global=window,worker` Additional Details: - The change removes the 'jsshell' environment from the test's metadata - This could potentially be a security-related change if jsshell had vulnerabilities that needed to be excluded - Without more context about why jsshell was removed, we can't definitively say this was a security fix - It might simply be a test scope reduction rather than a security fix No other vulnerabilities or changes were detected in the provided diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-fonts/first-available-font-005.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-fonts/first-available-font-005.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-fonts-3/#first-available-font"> <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-fonts-4/#first-available-font"> <link rel="match" href="first-available-font-005-ref.html">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="The position of the baseline in an inline-level box whose height is determined by a non-normal value of line-height does depend on the primary font, which is the first that contains U+0020."> <style>
Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment: Vulnerability Existed: no [No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-fonts/first-available-font-005.html] [Lines 5] [Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">] [Fixed Code: [line removed]] Additional Details: 1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag with no functional impact 2. There are no security implications in this change as it doesn't affect any security-related functionality 3. The modification appears to be a cleanup of unnecessary markup rather than a security fix No actual vulnerabilities were addressed in this diff. The change is purely cosmetic/structural, removing an empty and unused meta tag from the test file.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/taskcluster/ci/release-msix-push/kind.yml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/taskcluster/ci/release-msix-push/kind.yml@@ -33,6 +33,10 @@ beta: beta release: release default: mock+ publish-mode:+ by-release-type:+ beta: Immediate+ default: Manual jobs: firefox:
Analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Exposure] [taskcluster/ci/release-msix-push/kind.yml] [Lines 33-38]
[Old Code:
beta: beta
release: release
default: mock]
[Fixed Code:
beta: beta
release: release
default: mock
publish-mode:
by-release-type:
beta: Immediate
default: Manual]
Additional Details:
- The diff adds a new configuration for publish-mode with different settings for beta vs default releases
- While this could potentially affect security by changing how releases are published, there isn't enough context to determine if this was fixing an actual vulnerability
- The change appears to be more about release management than direct security fixes
- Without seeing the actual impact or context of these publish modes, we can't definitively say if this was fixing a security issue
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/taskcluster/docker/periodic-updates/scripts/getHSTSPreloadList.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/taskcluster/docker/periodic-updates/scripts/getHSTSPreloadList.js@@ -443,7 +443,9 @@ "resource://gre/modules/FileUtils.jsm" );- let file = FileUtils.getFile("CurWorkD", [OUTPUT]);+ let file = new FileUtils.File(+ PathUtils.join(Services.dirsvc.get("CurWorkD", Ci.nsIFile).path, OUTPUT)+ ); let fos = FileUtils.openSafeFileOutputStream(file); writeTo(HEADER, fos); writeTo(getExpirationTimeString(), fos);@@ -460,6 +462,7 @@ dump("finished writing output file\n"); } catch (e) { dump("ERROR: problem writing output to '" + OUTPUT + "': " + e + "\n");+ throw e; } }
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential File Path Injection] [taskcluster/docker/periodic-updates/scripts/getHSTSPreloadList.js] [Lines 443, 460]
[Old Code]
```javascript
let file = FileUtils.getFile("CurWorkD", [OUTPUT]);
```
[Fixed Code]
```javascript
let file = new FileUtils.File(
PathUtils.join(Services.dirsvc.get("CurWorkD", Ci.nsIFile).path, OUTPUT)
);
```
Additional Details: The change appears to be a more secure way of constructing file paths by using PathUtils.join() which helps prevent path manipulation attacks. However, without knowing the context of OUTPUT variable, we can't be certain if this was fixing an actual vulnerability.
2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
[Error Handling Improvement] [taskcluster/docker/periodic-updates/scripts/getHSTSPreloadList.js] [Line 462]
[Old Code]
```javascript
dump("ERROR: problem writing output to '" + OUTPUT + "': " + e + "\n");
```
[Fixed Code]
```javascript
dump("ERROR: problem writing output to '" + OUTPUT + "': " + e + "\n");
throw e;
```
Additional Details: The addition of 'throw e' ensures that errors are properly propagated rather than being silently caught and logged. This is a security improvement as silent failures could potentially mask security issues.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/components/Editor/Footer.css+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/components/Editor/Footer.css@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ } .source-footer .blackboxed .img.blackBox {- background-color: var(--theme-icon-checked-color);+ background-color: var(--red-40); } .source-footer .mapped-source,
Connection failed: ("Connection broken: InvalidChunkLength(got length b'', 0 bytes read)", InvalidChunkLength(got length b'', 0 bytes read))
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/src/codegen/from_derive_impl.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/src/codegen/from_derive_impl.rs@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@ use proc_macro2::TokenStream; use quote::ToTokens;-use syn::{self, Ident};+use syn::Ident;-use ast::Data;-use codegen::{ExtractAttribute, OuterFromImpl, TraitImpl};-use options::{ForwardAttrs, Shape};-use util::PathList;+use crate::{+ ast::Data,+ codegen::{ExtractAttribute, OuterFromImpl, TraitImpl},+ options::{ForwardAttrs, Shape},+ util::PathList,+}; pub struct FromDeriveInputImpl<'a> { pub ident: Option<&'a Ident>,@@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ fn to_tokens(&self, tokens: &mut TokenStream) { let ty_ident = self.base.ident; let input = self.param_name();- let map = self.base.map_fn();+ let post_transform = self.base.post_transform_call(); if let Data::Struct(ref data) = self.base.data { if data.is_newtype() {@@ -33,7 +35,7 @@ fn from_derive_input(#input: &::syn::DeriveInput) -> ::darling::Result<Self> { ::darling::export::Ok( #ty_ident(::darling::FromDeriveInput::from_derive_input(#input)?)- ) #map+ ) #post_transform } }, tokens,@@ -43,20 +45,23 @@ } }- let passed_ident = self.ident+ let passed_ident = self+ .ident .as_ref() .map(|i| quote!(#i: #input.ident.clone(),)); let passed_vis = self.vis.as_ref().map(|i| quote!(#i: #input.vis.clone(),));- let passed_generics = self.generics+ let passed_generics = self+ .generics .as_ref() .map(|i| quote!(#i: ::darling::FromGenerics::from_generics(&#input.generics)?,)); let passed_attrs = self.attrs.as_ref().map(|i| quote!(#i: __fwd_attrs,));- let passed_body = self.data+ let passed_body = self+ .data .as_ref() .map(|i| quote!(#i: ::darling::ast::Data::try_from(&#input.data)?,)); let supports = self.supports.map(|i| {- quote!{+ quote! { #i __validate_body(&#input.data)?; }@@ -97,7 +102,7 @@ #passed_attrs #passed_body #inits- }) #map+ }) #post_transform } }, tokens,@@ -107,7 +112,7 @@ impl<'a> ExtractAttribute for FromDeriveInputImpl<'a> { fn attr_names(&self) -> &PathList {- &self.attr_names+ self.attr_names } fn forwarded_attrs(&self) -> Option<&ForwardAttrs> {
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Path Traversal] [third_party/rust/darling_core/src/codegen/from_derive_impl.rs] [Lines 1-13]
[Old Code]
use proc_macro2::TokenStream;
use quote::ToTokens;
use syn::{self, Ident};
[Fixed Code]
use proc_macro2::TokenStream;
use quote::ToTokens;
use syn::Ident;
use crate::{
ast::Data,
codegen::{ExtractAttribute, OuterFromImpl, TraitImpl},
options::{ForwardAttrs, Shape},
util::PathList,
};
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Injection Vulnerability] [third_party/rust/darling_core/src/codegen/from_derive_impl.rs] [Lines 24,33,35,102]
[Old Code]
let map = self.base.map_fn();
...) #map
[Fixed Code]
let post_transform = self.base.post_transform_call();
...) #post_transform
The changes appear to be primarily code organization and naming improvements rather than explicit security fixes. The first change updates import statements to use explicit crate paths, which could help prevent potential path confusion attacks but isn't clearly a security fix. The second change renames a function from `map_fn` to `post_transform_call`, which might indicate a more secure approach to data transformation but doesn't clearly fix a specific vulnerability.
No clear security vulnerabilities were fixed in this diff, but there might be subtle improvements in code safety that aren't immediately apparent from the changes shown.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/docshell/test/navigation/test_beforeunload_and_bfcache.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/docshell/test/navigation/test_beforeunload_and_bfcache.html@@ -24,46 +24,68 @@ var pageshowCount = 0; var gotBeforeUnload = false; var bfcacheDisabled = false;- var bc = new BroadcastChannel("beforeunload_and_bfcache");- bc.onmessage = function(event) {- if (event.data.type == "pageshow") {- ++pageshowCount;- if (pageshowCount == 1) {- bc.postMessage("nextpage");- } else if (pageshowCount == 2) {- bc.postMessage("back");- } else if (pageshowCount == 3) {- if (!event.data.persisted) {- ok(true, "BFCache not enabled");- bfcacheDisabled = true;+++ function executeTest() {+ var bc = new BroadcastChannel("beforeunload_and_bfcache");+ bc.onmessage = function(event) {+ if (event.data.type == "pageshow") {+ ++pageshowCount;+ if (pageshowCount == 1) {+ bc.postMessage("nextpage");+ } else if (pageshowCount == 2) {+ bc.postMessage("back");+ } else if (pageshowCount == 3) {+ if (!event.data.persisted) {+ ok(true, "BFCache not enabled");+ bfcacheDisabled = true;+ bc.postMessage("close");+ return;+ }+ bc.postMessage("forward");+ } else if (pageshowCount == 4) {+ ok(event.data.persisted, "Should have loaded a page from bfcache."); bc.postMessage("close");- return; }- bc.postMessage("forward");- } else if (pageshowCount == 4) {- ok(event.data.persisted, "Should have loaded a page from bfcache.");- bc.postMessage("close");+ } else if (event.data == "beforeunload") {+ gotBeforeUnload = true;+ } else if (event.data == "closed") {+ isnot(bfcacheDisabled, gotBeforeUnload,+ "Either BFCache shouldn't be enabled or a beforeunload event should have been fired.");+ bc.close();+ SimpleTest.finish(); }- } else if (event.data == "beforeunload") {- gotBeforeUnload = true;- } else if (event.data == "closed") {- isnot(bfcacheDisabled, gotBeforeUnload,- "Either BFCache shouldn't be enabled or a beforeunload event should have been fired.");- bc.close();- SimpleTest.finish();+ };++ function runTest() {+ SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({"set": [["docshell.shistory.bfcache.allow_unload_listeners", false]]},+ function() {+ window.open("file_beforeunload_and_bfcache.html", "", "noopener");+ }+ ); }- };+ runTest();+ }- function runTest() {- SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({"set": [["docshell.shistory.bfcache.allow_unload_listeners", false]]},- function() {- window.open("file_beforeunload_and_bfcache.html", "", "noopener");- }- );+ if (isXOrigin) {+ // Bug 1746646: Make mochitests work with TCP enabled (cookieBehavior = 5)+ // Acquire storage access permission here so that the BroadcastChannel used to+ // communicate with the opened windows works in xorigin tests. Otherwise,+ // the iframe containing this page is isolated from first-party storage access,+ // which isolates BroadcastChannel communication.+ SpecialPowers.wrap(document).notifyUserGestureActivation();+ SpecialPowers.addPermission("storageAccessAPI", true, window.location.href).then(() => {+ SpecialPowers.wrap(document).requestStorageAccess().then(() => {+ executeTest();+ });+ });+ } else {+ executeTest(); }+ </script> </head>-<body onload="runTest()">+<body> <p id="display"></p> <div id="content" style="display: none"></div> <pre id="test"></pre>
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Cross-Origin Communication Issue [docshell/test/navigation/test_beforeunload_and_bfcache.html] [Lines 24-68]
Old Code:
```javascript
var bc = new BroadcastChannel("beforeunload_and_bfcache");
bc.onmessage = function(event) {
// ... message handling ...
};
function runTest() {
// ... test execution ...
}
</script>
</head>
<body onload="runTest()">
```
Fixed Code:
```javascript
function executeTest() {
var bc = new BroadcastChannel("beforeunload_and_bfcache");
// ... message handling ...
}
// ... storage access permission handling ...
if (isXOrigin) {
// ... request storage access ...
} else {
executeTest();
}
</script>
</head>
<body>
```
Additional Details: The fix adds storage access permission handling for cross-origin cases, suggesting potential security concerns with BroadcastChannel communication in cross-origin scenarios. However, since this is a test file, it's unclear if this represents an actual vulnerability or just test robustness improvement.
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Information Leak via BroadcastChannel [docshell/test/navigation/test_beforeunload_and_bfcache.html] [Lines 24-68]
Old Code:
```javascript
var bc = new BroadcastChannel("beforeunload_and_bfcache");
// ... message handling without explicit origin checks ...
```
Fixed Code:
```javascript
// Added storage access permission handling for cross-origin cases
SpecialPowers.wrap(document).requestStorageAccess().then(() => {
executeTest();
});
```
Additional Details: The addition of storage access permission handling suggests potential concerns about information leakage via BroadcastChannel between different origins, though this might just be test infrastructure improvement.
Note: Since this is a test file, the changes might represent test robustness improvements rather than actual security fixes. The modifications primarily deal with cross-origin testing scenarios and proper storage access handling, which could indicate security-conscious test design rather than patching vulnerabilities.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-167a.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-167a.xml@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ ]]></style> <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/> <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->- <meta name="flags" content="" /> </head> <body> <p>The first line of this paragraph should have a green background.</p>
Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis: Vulnerability Existed: no No Security Vulnerability Found [File] [Lines 8] [Old Code] `<meta name="flags" content="" />` [Fixed Code] (line removed) Additional Details: - The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which doesn't appear to have any security implications - This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix - No known vulnerability patterns are present in this change - The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive functionality The diff shows only a minor cleanup of test metadata with no apparent security impact. The removed line was an empty meta tag that didn't serve any security-related purpose.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/python/mozboot/mozboot/rust.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/python/mozboot/mozboot/rust.py@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ from __future__ import absolute_import, print_function, unicode_literals-import os import platform as platform_mod import sys+ # Base url for pulling the rustup installer. # Use the no-CNAME host for compatibilty with Python 2.7@@ -151,14 +151,6 @@ if __name__ == "__main__": """Allow invoking the module as a utility to update checksums."""- # Hook the requests module from the greater source tree. We can't import- # this at the module level since we might be imported into the bootstrap- # script in standalone mode.- #- # This module is necessary for correct https certificate verification.- mod_path = os.path.dirname(__file__)- sys.path.insert(0, os.path.join(mod_path, "..", "..", "requests"))- update = False if len(sys.argv) > 1: if sys.argv[1] == "--update":
Let me analyze the code diff for security fixes: 1. Vulnerability Existed: yes Improper Path Handling/Module Hijacking [python/mozboot/mozboot/rust.py] [Lines 151-159] Old Code: # Hook the requests module from the greater source tree. We can't import # this at the module level since we might be imported into the bootstrap # script in standalone mode. # # This module is necessary for correct https certificate verification. mod_path = os.path.dirname(__file__) sys.path.insert(0, os.path.join(mod_path, "..", "..", "requests")) Fixed Code: [Removed entirely] Additional Details: - The removed code was modifying Python's module search path (sys.path) to include a local requests module path. This could lead to module hijacking vulnerabilities where an attacker could place a malicious requests.py file in that directory path, which would then be loaded instead of the legitimate requests module. - The removal suggests they're now properly relying on system-installed or properly packaged dependencies rather than trying to load modules from arbitrary local paths. - This change improves security by preventing potential module hijacking attacks and ensuring proper certificate verification through standard module loading mechanisms.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/element/manual/imagebitmap/createImageBitmap-sizeOverflow.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/element/manual/imagebitmap/createImageBitmap-sizeOverflow.html@@ -39,6 +39,24 @@ createImageBitmap(imgData, 4294967400, 4294967400, 4294967400, 4294967400).then(resolve, reject); }); }, "createImageBitmap does not crash or reject the promise when passing very large sx, sy, sw and sh");++async_test(function(t) {+ var imgData = new ImageData(20, 20);+ var imageBitmapOptions = {imageOrientation:'none', premultiplyAlpha:'default',+ colorSpaceConversion:'none', resizeHeight:2122252543, resizeQuality:'high'};+ createImageBitmap(imgData, 0, 0, 4294967295, 64).then(function(imageBitmap){+ assert_throws_dom("InvalidStateError", function() {createImageBitmap(imageBitmap, imageBitmapOptions);});});+ t.done();+}, "createImageBitmap throws an InvalidStateError error with big imageBitmap scaled up in big height");++async_test(function(t) {+ var imgData = new ImageData(20, 20);+ var imageBitmapOptions = {imageOrientation:'none', premultiplyAlpha:'default',+ colorSpaceConversion:'none', resizeWidth:2122252543, resizeQuality:'high'};+ createImageBitmap(imgData, 0, 0, 4294967295, 64).then(function(imageBitmap){+ assert_throws_dom("InvalidStateError", function() {createImageBitmap(imageBitmap, imageBitmapOptions);});});+ t.done();+}, "createImageBitmap throws an InvalidStateError error with big imageBitmap scaled up in big width"); </script> </body> </html>=========tools/profiler/tests/gtest/GeckoProfiler.cpp========--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/tools/profiler/tests/gtest/GeckoProfiler.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/tools/profiler/tests/gtest/GeckoProfiler.cpp@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include "mozilla/ProfilerThreadRegistrationInfo.h" #include "mozilla/ProfilerThreadRegistry.h" #include "mozilla/ProfilerUtils.h"+#include "mozilla/ProgressLogger.h" #include "mozilla/UniquePtrExtensions.h" #include "nsIThread.h"@@ -2440,7 +2441,8 @@ /* int64_t aCount */ 56, /* mozilla::net::CacheDisposition aCacheDisposition */ net::kCacheHit,- /* uint64_t aInnerWindowID */ 78+ /* uint64_t aInnerWindowID */ 78,+ /* bool aIsPrivateBrowsing */ false /* const mozilla::net::TimingStruct* aTimings = nullptr */ /* mozilla::UniquePtr<mozilla::ProfileChunkedBuffer> aSource = nullptr */@@ -2462,6 +2464,7 @@ /* mozilla::net::CacheDisposition aCacheDisposition */ net::kCacheUnresolved, /* uint64_t aInnerWindowID */ 78,+ /* bool aIsPrivateBrowsing */ false, /* const mozilla::net::TimingStruct* aTimings = nullptr */ nullptr, /* mozilla::UniquePtr<mozilla::ProfileChunkedBuffer> aSource = nullptr */@@ -2487,6 +2490,7 @@ /* mozilla::net::CacheDisposition aCacheDisposition */ net::kCacheUnresolved, /* uint64_t aInnerWindowID */ 78,+ /* bool aIsPrivateBrowsing */ false, /* const mozilla::net::TimingStruct* aTimings = nullptr */ nullptr, /* mozilla::UniquePtr<mozilla::ProfileChunkedBuffer> aSource = nullptr */@@ -2511,6 +2515,7 @@ /* mozilla::net::CacheDisposition aCacheDisposition */ net::kCacheUnresolved, /* uint64_t aInnerWindowID */ 78,+ /* bool aIsPrivateBrowsing */ false, /* const mozilla::net::TimingStruct* aTimings = nullptr */ nullptr, /* mozilla::UniquePtr<mozilla::ProfileChunkedBuffer> aSource = nullptr */@@ -2535,6 +2540,7 @@ /* mozilla::net::CacheDisposition aCacheDisposition */ net::kCacheUnresolved, /* uint64_t aInnerWindowID */ 78,+ /* bool aIsPrivateBrowsing */ false, /* const mozilla::net::TimingStruct* aTimings = nullptr */ nullptr, /* mozilla::UniquePtr<mozilla::ProfileChunkedBuffer> aSource = nullptr */@@ -2558,6 +2564,7 @@ /* mozilla::net::CacheDisposition aCacheDisposition */ net::kCacheUnresolved, /* uint64_t aInnerWindowID */ 78,+ /* bool aIsPrivateBrowsing */ false, /* const mozilla::net::TimingStruct* aTimings = nullptr */ nullptr, /* mozilla::UniquePtr<mozilla::ProfileChunkedBuffer> aSource = nullptr */@@ -2569,6 +2576,27 @@ /* uint32_t aRedirectFlags = 0 */ nsIChannelEventSink::REDIRECT_INTERNAL | nsIChannelEventSink::REDIRECT_STS_UPGRADE, /* uint64_t aRedirectChannelId = 0 */ 106);+ profiler_add_network_marker(+ /* nsIURI* aURI */ uri,+ /* const nsACString& aRequestMethod */ "GET"_ns,+ /* int32_t aPriority */ 34,+ /* uint64_t aChannelId */ 7,+ /* NetworkLoadType aType */ net::NetworkLoadType::LOAD_START,+ /* mozilla::TimeStamp aStart */ ts1,+ /* mozilla::TimeStamp aEnd */ ts2,+ /* int64_t aCount */ 56,+ /* mozilla::net::CacheDisposition aCacheDisposition */+ net::kCacheUnresolved,+ /* uint64_t aInnerWindowID */ 78,+ /* bool aIsPrivateBrowsing */ true+ /* const mozilla::net::TimingStruct* aTimings = nullptr */+ /* mozilla::UniquePtr<mozilla::ProfileChunkedBuffer> aSource =+ nullptr */+ /* const mozilla::Maybe<nsDependentCString>& aContentType =+ mozilla::Nothing() */+ /* nsIURI* aRedirectURI = nullptr */+ /* uint64_t aRedirectChannelId = 0 */+ ); EXPECT_TRUE(profiler_add_marker( "Text in main thread with stack", geckoprofiler::category::OTHER,@@ -2653,6 +2681,7 @@ S_NetworkMarkerPayload_redirect_permanent, S_NetworkMarkerPayload_redirect_internal, S_NetworkMarkerPayload_redirect_internal_sts,+ S_NetworkMarkerPayload_private_browsing, S_TextWithStack, S_TextToMTWithStack,@@ -2942,6 +2971,7 @@ EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["pri"], Int64, 34); EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["count"], Int64, 56); EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["cache"], String, "Hit");+ EXPECT_TRUE(payload["isPrivateBrowsing"].isNull()); EXPECT_TRUE(payload["RedirectURI"].isNull()); EXPECT_TRUE(payload["redirectType"].isNull()); EXPECT_TRUE(payload["isHttpToHttpsRedirect"].isNull());@@ -2960,6 +2990,7 @@ EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["pri"], Int64, 34); EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["count"], Int64, 56); EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["cache"], String, "Unresolved");+ EXPECT_TRUE(payload["isPrivateBrowsing"].isNull()); EXPECT_TRUE(payload["RedirectURI"].isNull()); EXPECT_TRUE(payload["redirectType"].isNull()); EXPECT_TRUE(payload["isHttpToHttpsRedirect"].isNull());@@ -2978,6 +3009,7 @@ EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["pri"], Int64, 34); EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["count"], Int64, 56); EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["cache"], String, "Unresolved");+ EXPECT_TRUE(payload["isPrivateBrowsing"].isNull()); EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["RedirectURI"], String, "http://example.com/"); EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["redirectType"], String, "Temporary");@@ -2997,6 +3029,7 @@ EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["pri"], Int64, 34); EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["count"], Int64, 56); EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["cache"], String, "Unresolved");+ EXPECT_TRUE(payload["isPrivateBrowsing"].isNull()); EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["RedirectURI"], String, "http://example.com/"); EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["redirectType"], String, "Permanent");@@ -3016,6 +3049,7 @@ EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["pri"], Int64, 34); EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["count"], Int64, 56); EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["cache"], String, "Unresolved");+ EXPECT_TRUE(payload["isPrivateBrowsing"].isNull()); EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["RedirectURI"], String, "http://example.com/"); EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["redirectType"], String, "Internal");@@ -3037,6 +3071,7 @@ EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["pri"], Int64, 34); EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["count"], Int64, 56); EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["cache"], String, "Unresolved");+ EXPECT_TRUE(payload["isPrivateBrowsing"].isNull()); EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["RedirectURI"], String, "http://example.com/"); EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["redirectType"], String, "Internal");@@ -3044,6 +3079,24 @@ EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["redirectId"], Int64, 106); EXPECT_TRUE(payload["contentType"].isNull());+ } else if (nameString == "Load 7: http://mozilla.org/") {+ EXPECT_EQ(state, S_NetworkMarkerPayload_private_browsing);+ state = State(S_NetworkMarkerPayload_private_browsing + 1);+ EXPECT_EQ(typeString, "Network");+ EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["startTime"], Double, ts1Double);+ EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["endTime"], Double, ts2Double);+ EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["id"], Int64, 7);+ EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["URI"], String, "http://mozilla.org/");+ EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["requestMethod"], String, "GET");+ EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["pri"], Int64, 34);+ EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["count"], Int64, 56);+ EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["cache"], String, "Unresolved");+ EXPECT_EQ_JSON(payload["isPrivateBrowsing"], Bool, true);+ EXPECT_TRUE(payload["RedirectURI"].isNull());+ EXPECT_TRUE(payload["redirectType"].isNull());+ EXPECT_TRUE(payload["isHttpToHttpsRedirect"].isNull());+ EXPECT_TRUE(payload["redirectId"].isNull());+ EXPECT_TRUE(payload["contentType"].isNull()); } else if (nameString == "Text in main thread with stack") { EXPECT_EQ(state, S_TextWithStack); state = State(S_TextWithStack + 1);@@ -3618,7 +3671,8 @@ // an incomplete profile. bool do_profiler_stream_json_for_this_process( SpliceableJSONWriter& aWriter, double aSinceTime, bool aIsShuttingDown,- ProfilerCodeAddressService* aService);+ ProfilerCodeAddressService* aService,+ mozilla::ProgressLogger aProgressLogger); TEST(GeckoProfiler, StreamJSONForThisProcessThreaded) {@@ -3646,7 +3700,8 @@ ASSERT_TRUE(::do_profiler_stream_json_for_this_process( w, /* double aSinceTime */ 0.0, /* bool aIsShuttingDown */ false,- /* ProfilerCodeAddressService* aService */ nullptr));+ /* ProfilerCodeAddressService* aService */ nullptr,+ mozilla::ProgressLogger{})); w.End(); }), NS_DISPATCH_SYNC);@@ -3665,7 +3720,8 @@ ASSERT_TRUE(!::do_profiler_stream_json_for_this_process( w, /* double aSinceTime */ 0.0, /* bool aIsShuttingDown */ false,- /* ProfilerCodeAddressService* aService */ nullptr));+ /* ProfilerCodeAddressService* aService */ nullptr,+ mozilla::ProgressLogger{})); }), NS_DISPATCH_SYNC); thread->Shutdown();
I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.
1. First vulnerability in createImageBitmap tests:
Vulnerability Existed: yes
Integer Overflow Vulnerability [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/element/manual/imagebitmap/createImageBitmap-sizeOverflow.html [Lines] 39-57
[Old Code]
createImageBitmap(imgData, 4294967400, 4294967400, 4294967400, 4294967400).then(resolve, reject);
[Fixed Code]
Added tests that verify createImageBitmap throws InvalidStateError when handling large resize dimensions (2122252543) and properly handles edge cases with 4294967295 width/height.
2. Second vulnerability in profiler code:
Vulnerability Existed: yes
Information Leak Vulnerability [File] tools/profiler/tests/gtest/GeckoProfiler.cpp [Lines] 2440-2576
[Old Code]
Missing private browsing flag in network marker payloads
[Fixed Code]
Added bool aIsPrivateBrowsing parameter to all profiler_add_network_marker calls and added validation that private browsing status is properly recorded and serialized.
3. Third potential vulnerability:
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Progress Tracking Issue [File] tools/profiler/tests/gtest/GeckoProfiler.cpp [Lines] 3618-3671
[Old Code]
do_profiler_stream_json_for_this_process function without progress tracking
[Fixed Code]
Added ProgressLogger parameter to do_profiler_stream_json_for_this_process to track progress of profile serialization
The most clear security fixes are:
1. The integer overflow protection in createImageBitmap handling
2. The addition of private browsing status tracking in profiler markers to prevent potential information leaks of private browsing activity
The progress logger addition might be related to security (preventing hangs or ensuring complete profiling) but I'm less certain about its direct security implications.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/java/org/mozilla/gecko/process/GeckoServiceChildProcess.java+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/java/org/mozilla/gecko/process/GeckoServiceChildProcess.java@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ package org.mozilla.gecko.process; import android.app.Service;-import android.content.ComponentCallbacks2; import android.content.Intent; import android.os.Binder; import android.os.Bundle;@@ -22,17 +21,16 @@ import org.mozilla.gecko.IGeckoEditableChild; import org.mozilla.gecko.annotation.WrapForJNI; import org.mozilla.gecko.gfx.ICompositorSurfaceManager;+import org.mozilla.gecko.gfx.ISurfaceAllocator; import org.mozilla.gecko.util.ThreadUtils; public class GeckoServiceChildProcess extends Service { private static final String LOGTAG = "ServiceChildProcess";- // Allowed elapsed time between full GCs while under constant memory pressure- private static final long LOW_MEMORY_ONGOING_RESET_TIME_MS = 10000; private static IProcessManager sProcessManager; private static String sOwnerProcessId;-- private long mLastLowMemoryNotificationTime = 0;+ private final MemoryController mMemoryController = new MemoryController();+ // Makes sure we don't reuse this process private static boolean sCreateCalled;@@ -163,6 +161,13 @@ throw new AssertionError( "Invalid call to IChildProcess.getCompositorSurfaceManager for non-GPU process."); }++ @Override+ public ISurfaceAllocator getSurfaceAllocator() {+ Log.e(LOGTAG, "Invalid call to IChildProcess.getSurfaceAllocator for non-GPU process");+ throw new AssertionError(+ "Invalid call to IChildProcess.getSurfaceAllocator for non-GPU process.");+ } } protected Binder createBinder() {@@ -186,35 +191,23 @@ @Override public void onTrimMemory(final int level) {- Log.i(LOGTAG, "onTrimMemory(" + level + ")");+ mMemoryController.onTrimMemory(level); // This is currently a no-op in Service, but let's future-proof. super.onTrimMemory(level);-- if (level < ComponentCallbacks2.TRIM_MEMORY_BACKGROUND) {- // We're not currently interested in trim events for non-backgrounded processes.- return;- }-- // See nsIMemory.idl for descriptions of the various arguments to the "memory-pressure"- // observer.- String observerArg = null;-- final long currentNotificationTime = System.currentTimeMillis();- if (level >= ComponentCallbacks2.TRIM_MEMORY_COMPLETE- || (currentNotificationTime - mLastLowMemoryNotificationTime)- >= LOW_MEMORY_ONGOING_RESET_TIME_MS) {- // We do a full "low-memory" notification for both new and last-ditch onTrimMemory requests.- observerArg = "low-memory";- mLastLowMemoryNotificationTime = currentNotificationTime;- } else {- // If it has been less than ten seconds since the last time we sent a "low-memory"- // notification, we send a "low-memory-ongoing" notification instead.- // This prevents Gecko from re-doing full GC's repeatedly over and over in succession,- // as they are expensive and quickly result in diminishing returns.- observerArg = "low-memory-ongoing";- }-- GeckoAppShell.notifyObservers("memory-pressure", observerArg);+ }++ @Override+ public void onLowMemory() {+ mMemoryController.onLowMemory();+ super.onLowMemory();+ }++ /**+ * Returns the surface allocator interface that should be used by this process to allocate+ * Surfaces, for consumption in either the GPU process or parent process.+ */+ public static ISurfaceAllocator getSurfaceAllocator() throws RemoteException {+ return sProcessManager.getSurfaceAllocator(); } }
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Memory Management Improvement [File] [Lines 6-7, 22-23, 186-191]
[Old Code]
```java
import android.content.ComponentCallbacks2;
// ...
// Allowed elapsed time between full GCs while under constant memory pressure
private static final long LOW_MEMORY_ONGOING_RESET_TIME_MS = 10000;
private long mLastLowMemoryNotificationTime = 0;
```
[Fixed Code]
```java
private final MemoryController mMemoryController = new MemoryController();
// ...
@Override
public void onTrimMemory(final int level) {
mMemoryController.onTrimMemory(level);
super.onTrimMemory(level);
}
```
Additional Details: The code moves memory management logic to a dedicated MemoryController class, which could potentially address memory-related vulnerabilities, though no specific vulnerability is identified.
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Surface Allocation Security Check [File] [Lines 161-166]
[Old Code]
(No equivalent code existed before)
[Fixed Code]
```java
@Override
public ISurfaceAllocator getSurfaceAllocator() {
Log.e(LOGTAG, "Invalid call to IChildProcess.getSurfaceAllocator for non-GPU process");
throw new AssertionError(
"Invalid call to IChildProcess.getSurfaceAllocator for non-GPU process.");
}
```
Additional Details: Added security check to prevent unauthorized surface allocation in non-GPU processes, though no specific vulnerability is identified.
3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Low Memory Handling Improvement [File] [Lines 191-223]
[Old Code]
```java
if (level < ComponentCallbacks2.TRIM_MEMORY_BACKGROUND) {
return;
}
// ... complex memory pressure handling logic ...
GeckoAppShell.notifyObservers("memory-pressure", observerArg);
```
[Fixed Code]
```java
mMemoryController.onTrimMemory(level);
super.onTrimMemory(level);
```
Additional Details: Simplified memory pressure handling by delegating to MemoryController, potentially addressing memory exhaustion vulnerabilities, though no specific vulnerability is identified.
Note: While the changes appear to improve security by better isolating memory management and adding security checks for surface allocation, no specific vulnerabilities are clearly identified in the diff. The changes seem more like architectural improvements than direct vulnerability fixes.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-152.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-152.xml@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/> <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found --> <link rel="match" href="reference/this-line-lime-background-offset.xht"/>- <meta name="flags" content="" /> </head> <body> <address><span></span></address>
Analysis of the provided code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-152.xml [Lines] 10 [Old Code] `<meta name="flags" content="" />` [Fixed Code] (removed line) Additional Details: - The change simply removes an empty meta tag that wasn't serving any apparent purpose - No security implications are evident from this change - The modification appears to be a cleanup rather than a security fix - No known vulnerability is associated with empty meta tags in this context The diff shows a minor cleanup change rather than a security fix. The removed line was an empty meta tag that didn't affect functionality or security.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/widget/android/AndroidBridge.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/widget/android/AndroidBridge.h@@ -6,44 +6,23 @@ #ifndef AndroidBridge_h__ #define AndroidBridge_h__-#include <jni.h>-#include <android/log.h>-#include <cstdlib>-#include <unistd.h>--#include "APKOpen.h"+#include <unistd.h> // for gettid #include "nsCOMPtr.h"-#include "nsCOMArray.h"--#include "js/RootingAPI.h"-#include "js/Value.h"+ #include "mozilla/jni/Refs.h" #include "nsIMutableArray.h" #include "nsIMIMEInfo.h"-#include "nsColor.h"-#include "gfxRect.h" #include "nsIAndroidBridge.h"-#include "mozilla/Likely.h"-#include "mozilla/Mutex.h"-#include "mozilla/Types.h"-#include "mozilla/gfx/Point.h" #include "mozilla/jni/Utils.h" #include "nsTHashMap.h"--#include "Units.h" // Some debug #defines // #define DEBUG_ANDROID_EVENTS // #define DEBUG_ANDROID_WIDGET--class nsPIDOMWindowOuter;--typedef void* EGLSurface;-class nsIRunnable; namespace mozilla {@@ -54,37 +33,8 @@ class NetworkInformation; } // namespace hal-// The order and number of the members in this structure must correspond-// to the attrsAppearance array in GeckoAppShell.getSystemColors()-struct AndroidSystemColors {- nscolor textColorPrimary;- nscolor textColorPrimaryInverse;- nscolor textColorSecondary;- nscolor textColorSecondaryInverse;- nscolor textColorTertiary;- nscolor textColorTertiaryInverse;- nscolor textColorHighlight;- nscolor colorForeground;- nscolor colorBackground;- nscolor panelColorForeground;- nscolor panelColorBackground;- nscolor colorAccent;-};- class AndroidBridge final { public:- enum {- // Values for NotifyIME, in addition to values from the Gecko- // IMEMessage enum; use negative values here to prevent conflict- NOTIFY_IME_OPEN_VKB = -2,- NOTIFY_IME_REPLY_EVENT = -1,- };-- enum {- LAYER_CLIENT_TYPE_NONE = 0,- LAYER_CLIENT_TYPE_GL = 2 // AndroidGeckoGLLayerClient- };- static bool IsJavaUiThread() { return mozilla::jni::GetUIThreadId() == gettid(); }@@ -104,17 +54,10 @@ nsIHandlerApp** aDefaultApp = nullptr, const nsAString& aAction = u""_ns);- bool HasHWVP8Encoder();- bool HasHWVP8Decoder();- bool HasHWH264();- void GetMimeTypeFromExtensions(const nsACString& aFileExt, nsCString& aMimeType); void GetExtensionFromMimeType(const nsACString& aMimeType, nsACString& aFileExt);-- gfx::Rect getScreenSize();- int GetScreenDepth(); void Vibrate(const nsTArray<uint32_t>& aPattern);
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes: 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Header Cleanup] [widget/android/AndroidBridge.h] [Lines 6-33] [Old Code: Multiple includes and declarations] [Fixed Code: Reduced includes to only necessary ones] 2. Vulnerability Existed: no [Code Simplification] [widget/android/AndroidBridge.h] [Lines 54-73] [Old Code: AndroidSystemColors structure and enum declarations] [Fixed Code: Removed unused structures and enums] 3. Vulnerability Existed: no [API Reduction] [widget/android/AndroidBridge.h] [Lines 104-117] [Old Code: Multiple hardware capability checking methods] [Fixed Code: Removed unused hardware capability methods] The changes appear to be primarily code cleanup and simplification rather than security fixes. The main changes involve: - Removing unused header includes - Removing unused structures and enums - Removing unused methods - Streamlining the interface No specific vulnerabilities are being fixed here, but the changes do follow good security practices by: 1. Reducing the attack surface by removing unused code 2. Minimizing dependencies 3. Simplifying the codebase which makes it easier to audit However, without more context about why these specific elements were removed, I can't be certain if any of them were related to actual vulnerabilities. The changes seem more like general maintenance and optimization.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.gradient.transparent.2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.gradient.transparent.2.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var gradient = ctx.createLinearGradient(0, 0, 100, 0); gradient.addColorStop(0, '#f00');@@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ ctx.shadowColor = '#0f0'; ctx.fillStyle = gradient; ctx.fillRect(0, -50, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to function calls using this variable. Here's the structured response: Vulnerability Existed: no [No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.gradient.transparent.2.html] [Lines 17-33] [Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); ... _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, ...)] [Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); ... _assertPixel(canvas, ...)] This appears to be a simple refactoring change for consistency or readability, not a security fix. The functionality remains identical, just with a different variable name.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.parse.whitespace.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.parse.whitespace.html@@ -17,13 +17,13 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-offscreenCanvas.width = ' 100';-offscreenCanvas.height = ' 100';-_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.width, 100, "offscreenCanvas.width", "100");-_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.height, 100, "offscreenCanvas.height", "100");+canvas.width = ' 100';+canvas.height = ' 100';+_assertSame(canvas.width, 100, "canvas.width", "100");+_assertSame(canvas.height, 100, "canvas.height", "100"); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, here's my assessment:
Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.parse.whitespace.html] [Lines 17-25]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
offscreenCanvas.width = ' 100';
offscreenCanvas.height = ' 100';
_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.width, 100, "offscreenCanvas.width", "100");
_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.height, 100, "offscreenCanvas.height", "100");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
canvas.width = ' 100';
canvas.height = ' 100';
_assertSame(canvas.width, 100, "canvas.width", "100");
_assertSame(canvas.height, 100, "canvas.height", "100");
The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. The test functionality remains the same, testing how whitespace characters are handled when parsing canvas dimensions. No security vulnerability appears to be addressed in this change.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.