--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/extensions/test/xpcshell/test_ext_downloads_misc.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/extensions/test/xpcshell/test_ext_downloads_misc.js@@ -254,11 +254,16 @@   }); }-async function clearDownloads(callback) {+async function clearDownloads() {   let list = await Downloads.getList(Downloads.ALL);   let downloads = await list.getAll();-  await Promise.all(downloads.map(download => list.remove(download)));+  await Promise.all(+    downloads.map(async download => {+      await download.finalize(true);+      list.remove(download);+    })+  );   return downloads; }@@ -297,12 +302,11 @@   Services.prefs.setIntPref("browser.download.folderList", 2);   Services.prefs.setComplexValue("browser.download.dir", nsIFile, downloadDir);-  registerCleanupFunction(() => {+  registerCleanupFunction(async () => {     Services.prefs.clearUserPref("browser.download.folderList");     Services.prefs.clearUserPref("browser.download.dir");+    await clearDownloads();     downloadDir.remove(true);--    return clearDownloads();   });   await clearDownloads().then(downloads => {

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
   Resource Cleanup Vulnerability [File] [Lines 254-265]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   async function clearDownloads(callback) {
     let list = await Downloads.getList(Downloads.ALL);
     let downloads = await list.getAll();

     await Promise.all(downloads.map(download => list.remove(download)));

     return downloads;
   }
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   async function clearDownloads() {
     let list = await Downloads.getList(Downloads.ALL);
     let downloads = await list.getAll();

     await Promise.all(
       downloads.map(async download => {
         await download.finalize(true);
         list.remove(download);
       })
     );

     return downloads;
   }
   ```  
   The fix adds proper resource cleanup by calling `download.finalize(true)` before removing downloads, ensuring proper cleanup of download resources.

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
   Asynchronous Cleanup Vulnerability [File] [Lines 297-303]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   registerCleanupFunction(() => {
     Services.prefs.clearUserPref("browser.download.folderList");
     Services.prefs.clearUserPref("browser.download.dir");
     downloadDir.remove(true);

     return clearDownloads();
   });
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   registerCleanupFunction(async () => {
     Services.prefs.clearUserPref("browser.download.folderList");
     Services.prefs.clearUserPref("browser.download.dir");
     await clearDownloads();
     downloadDir.remove(true);
   });
   ```  
   The fix properly handles asynchronous operations in the cleanup function by making it async and properly awaiting the clearDownloads() call, preventing potential race conditions during cleanup.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/serviceworkers/test/test_serviceworker_interfaces.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/serviceworkers/test/test_serviceworker_interfaces.js@@ -37,6 +37,16 @@   { name: "RuntimeError", insecureContext: true },   {     name: "Function",+    insecureContext: true,+    nightly: true,+  },+  {+    name: "Exception",+    insecureContext: true,+    nightly: true,+  },+  {+    name: "Tag",     insecureContext: true,     nightly: true,   },

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be adding new test cases for service worker interfaces with specific context flags. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] dom/serviceworkers/test/test_serviceworker_interfaces.js [Lines] 37-48
[Old Code]
  { name: "RuntimeError", insecureContext: true },
  {
    name: "Function",
    insecureContext: true,
    nightly: true,
  },
[Fixed Code]
  { name: "RuntimeError", insecureContext: true },
  {
    name: "Function",
    insecureContext: true,
    nightly: true,
  },
  {
    name: "Exception",
    insecureContext: true,
    nightly: true,
  },
  {
    name: "Tag",
    insecureContext: true,
    nightly: true,
  },

The changes simply add test cases for "Exception" and "Tag" interfaces with the same flags as the existing "Function" test case. There's no indication of a security fix in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/network/TCPSocketChild.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/network/TCPSocketChild.cpp@@ -90,10 +90,6 @@                               bool aUseArrayBuffers) {   mSocket = aSocket;-  if (mIPCEventTarget) {-    gNeckoChild->SetEventTargetForActor(this, mIPCEventTarget);-  }-   AddIPDLReference();   gNeckoChild->SendPTCPSocketConstructor(this, mHost, mPort);   PTCPSocketChild::SendOpen(mHost, mPort, aUseSSL, aUseArrayBuffers);

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
Potential Race Condition or Improper Actor Initialization [dom/network/TCPSocketChild.cpp] [Lines 90-93]  
[Old Code]  
```
if (mIPCEventTarget) {
    gNeckoChild->SetEventTargetForActor(this, mIPCEventTarget);
}
```
[Fixed Code]  
(Code removed entirely)

Additional Details:
The removed code appears to relate to actor initialization and event target setup in Firefox's networking component. While I can't identify a specific named vulnerability, removing this code might indicate:
1. A potential race condition where setting the event target after actor creation could cause issues
2. A fix for improper initialization sequence where the event target should be set before actor creation
3. A security hardening measure to prevent potential misuse of the actor-target relationship

Without more context about the broader changes in Firefox 98, I can't definitively name a specific vulnerability, but this appears to be a security-related change in the IPC (Inter-Process Communication) handling for TCP sockets.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/urlbar/tests/browser/browser_canonizeURL.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/urlbar/tests/browser/browser_canonizeURL.js@@ -48,23 +48,27 @@     ],   });+  const win = await BrowserTestUtils.openNewBrowserWindow();+   for (let [inputValue, expectedURL, options] of testcases) {     info(`Testing input string: "${inputValue}" - expected: "${expectedURL}"`);     let promiseLoad = BrowserTestUtils.waitForDocLoadAndStopIt(       expectedURL,-      gBrowser.selectedBrowser+      win.gBrowser.selectedBrowser     );     let promiseStopped = BrowserTestUtils.browserStopped(-      gBrowser.selectedBrowser,+      win.gBrowser.selectedBrowser,       undefined,       true     );-    gURLBar.focus();-    gURLBar.inputField.value = inputValue.slice(0, -1);-    EventUtils.sendString(inputValue.slice(-1));-    EventUtils.synthesizeKey("KEY_Enter", options);+    win.gURLBar.focus();+    win.gURLBar.inputField.value = inputValue.slice(0, -1);+    EventUtils.sendString(inputValue.slice(-1), win);+    EventUtils.synthesizeKey("KEY_Enter", options, win);     await Promise.all([promiseLoad, promiseStopped]);   }++  await BrowserTestUtils.closeWindow(win); }); add_task(async function checkPrefTurnsOffCanonize() {@@ -78,9 +82,11 @@     Services.search.setDefault(oldDefaultEngine)   );+  const win = await BrowserTestUtils.openNewBrowserWindow();+   // Ensure we don't end up loading something in the current tab becuase it's empty:   let initialTab = await BrowserTestUtils.openNewForegroundTab({-    gBrowser,+    gBrowser: win.gBrowser,     opening: "about:mozilla",   });   await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({@@ -92,15 +98,19 @@   // CMD+Enter for that.   let promiseLoaded =     AppConstants.platform == "macosx"-      ? BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(gBrowser.selectedBrowser, false, newURL)-      : BrowserTestUtils.waitForNewTab(gBrowser);--  gURLBar.focus();-  gURLBar.selectionStart = gURLBar.selectionEnd =-    gURLBar.inputField.value.length;-  gURLBar.inputField.value = "exampl";-  EventUtils.sendString("e");-  EventUtils.synthesizeKey("KEY_Enter", { ctrlKey: true });+      ? BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(+          win.gBrowser.selectedBrowser,+          false,+          newURL+        )+      : BrowserTestUtils.waitForNewTab(win.gBrowser);++  win.gURLBar.focus();+  win.gURLBar.selectionStart = win.gURLBar.selectionEnd =+    win.gURLBar.inputField.value.length;+  win.gURLBar.inputField.value = "exampl";+  EventUtils.sendString("e", win);+  EventUtils.synthesizeKey("KEY_Enter", { ctrlKey: true }, win);   await promiseLoaded;   if (AppConstants.platform == "macosx") {@@ -116,14 +126,16 @@       "Original tab shouldn't have navigated"     );     Assert.equal(-      gBrowser.selectedBrowser.currentURI.spec,+      win.gBrowser.selectedBrowser.currentURI.spec,       newURL,       "New tab should have navigated"     );   }-  while (gBrowser.tabs.length > 1) {-    gBrowser.removeTab(gBrowser.selectedTab, { animate: false });-  }+  while (win.gBrowser.tabs.length > 1) {+    win.gBrowser.removeTab(win.gBrowser.selectedTab, { animate: false });+  }++  await BrowserTestUtils.closeWindow(win); }); add_task(async function autofill() {@@ -134,13 +146,15 @@       ["browser.urlbar.ctrlCanonizesURLs", true],     ],   });++  const win = await BrowserTestUtils.openNewBrowserWindow();   // Quantumbar automatically disables autofill when the old search string   // starts with the new search string, so to make sure that doesn't happen and   // that earlier tests don't conflict with this one, start a new search for   // some other string.-  gURLBar.select();-  EventUtils.sendString("blah");+  win.gURLBar.select();+  EventUtils.sendString("blah", win);   // Add a visit that will be autofilled.   await PlacesUtils.history.clear();@@ -160,28 +174,30 @@   ];   function promiseAutofill() {-    return BrowserTestUtils.waitForEvent(gURLBar.inputField, "select");+    return BrowserTestUtils.waitForEvent(win.gURLBar.inputField, "select");   }   for (let [inputValue, expectedURL, options] of testcases) {     let promiseLoad = BrowserTestUtils.waitForDocLoadAndStopIt(       expectedURL,-      gBrowser.selectedBrowser-    );-    gURLBar.select();+      win.gBrowser.selectedBrowser+    );+    win.gURLBar.select();     let autofillPromise = promiseAutofill();-    EventUtils.sendString(inputValue);+    EventUtils.sendString(inputValue, win);     await autofillPromise;-    EventUtils.synthesizeKey("KEY_Enter", options);+    EventUtils.synthesizeKey("KEY_Enter", options, win);     await promiseLoad;     // Here again, make sure autofill isn't disabled for the next search.  See     // the comment above.-    gURLBar.select();-    EventUtils.sendString("blah");+    win.gURLBar.select();+    EventUtils.sendString("blah", win);   }   await PlacesUtils.history.clear();++  await BrowserTestUtils.closeWindow(win); }); add_task(async function() {@@ -193,21 +209,24 @@     set: [["browser.urlbar.ctrlCanonizesURLs", true]],   });+  const win = await BrowserTestUtils.openNewBrowserWindow();+   info("Paste the word to the urlbar");   const testWord = "example";-  simulatePastingToUrlbar(testWord);-  is(gURLBar.value, testWord, "Paste the test word correctly");+  simulatePastingToUrlbar(testWord, win);+  is(win.gURLBar.value, testWord, "Paste the test word correctly");   info("Send enter key while pressing the ctrl key");-  EventUtils.synthesizeKey("VK_RETURN", { type: "keydown", ctrlKey: true });-  await BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(gBrowser.selectedBrowser);+  EventUtils.synthesizeKey("VK_RETURN", { ctrlKey: true }, win);+  await BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(win.gBrowser.selectedBrowser);   is(-    gBrowser.selectedBrowser.documentURI.spec,+    win.gBrowser.selectedBrowser.documentURI.spec,     `http://mochi.test:8888/?terms=${testWord}`,     "The loaded url is not canonized"   );--  EventUtils.synthesizeKey("VK_CONTROL", { type: "keyup" });+  EventUtils.synthesizeKey("VK_CONTROL", { type: "keyup" }, win);++  await BrowserTestUtils.closeWindow(win); }); add_task(async function() {@@ -217,33 +236,46 @@     set: [["browser.urlbar.ctrlCanonizesURLs", true]],   });+  const win = await BrowserTestUtils.openNewBrowserWindow();+   info("Paste the word to the urlbar");   const testWord = "example";-  simulatePastingToUrlbar(testWord);-  is(gURLBar.value, testWord, "Paste the test word correctly");+  simulatePastingToUrlbar(testWord, win);+  is(win.gURLBar.value, testWord, "Paste the test word correctly");   info("Release the ctrl key befoer typing Enter key");-  EventUtils.synthesizeKey("VK_CONTROL", { type: "keyup" });+  EventUtils.synthesizeKey("VK_CONTROL", { type: "keyup" }, win);   info("Send enter key with the ctrl");   const onLoad = BrowserTestUtils.waitForDocLoadAndStopIt(     `https://www.${testWord}.com/`,-    gBrowser.selectedBrowser-  );-  EventUtils.synthesizeKey("VK_RETURN", { type: "keydown", ctrlKey: true });-  await onLoad;+    win.gBrowser.selectedBrowser+  );+  const onStop = BrowserTestUtils.browserStopped(+    win.gBrowser.selectedBrowser,+    undefined,+    true+  );+  EventUtils.synthesizeKey("VK_RETURN", { ctrlKey: true }, win);+  await Promise.all([onLoad, onStop]);   info("The loaded url is canonized");-});--function simulatePastingToUrlbar(text) {-  gURLBar.focus();--  const keyForPaste = document++  await BrowserTestUtils.closeWindow(win);+});++function simulatePastingToUrlbar(text, win) {+  win.gURLBar.focus();++  const keyForPaste = win.document     .getElementById("key_paste")     .getAttribute("key")     .toLowerCase();-  EventUtils.synthesizeKey(keyForPaste, { type: "keydown", ctrlKey: true });--  gURLBar.select();-  EventUtils.sendString(text);+  EventUtils.synthesizeKey(+    keyForPaste,+    { type: "keydown", ctrlKey: true },+    win+  );++  win.gURLBar.select();+  EventUtils.sendString(text, win); }

After analyzing the code diff, I don't find any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily about test isolation and cleanup by:

1. Creating dedicated browser windows for each test case
2. Properly cleaning up those windows after tests
3. Ensuring tests don't interfere with each other

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [browser_canonizeURL.js] [entire file]
The changes are test improvements rather than security fixes

The main changes are:
1. Adding window creation/cleanup with BrowserTestUtils.openNewBrowserWindow()/closeWindow()
2. Using the new window's objects (win.gBrowser, win.gURLBar) instead of global ones
3. Passing window parameter to EventUtils functions

These changes improve test reliability but don't appear to address any security issues. The modifications are focused on test isolation and proper resource cleanup rather than fixing vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/extensions/child/ext-scripting.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/extensions/child/ext-scripting.js@@ -13,15 +13,6 @@     return {       scripting: {         executeScript: async details => {-          if (-            (details.files !== null && details.func !== null) ||-            (!details.files && !details.func)-          ) {-            throw new ExtensionError(-              "Exactly one of files and func must be specified."-            );-          }-           let { func, args, ...parentDetails } = details;           if (details.files) {@@ -30,16 +21,21 @@                 "'args' may not be used with file injections."               );             }-          } else {+          }+          // `files` and `func` are mutually exclusive but that is checked in+          // the parent (in `execute()`).+          if (func) {             try {               const serializedArgs = args                 ? JSON.stringify(args).slice(1, -1)                 : "";               // This is a prop that we compute here and pass to the parent.-              parentDetails.codeToExecute = `(${func.toString()})(${serializedArgs});`;+              parentDetails.func = `(${func.toString()})(${serializedArgs});`;             } catch (e) {               throw new ExtensionError("Unserializable arguments.");             }+          } else {+            parentDetails.func = null;           }           return context.childManager.callParentAsyncFunction(

Here's the analysis following the specified format:

Vulnerability Existed: yes
Insufficient Input Validation [toolkit/components/extensions/child/ext-scripting.js] [Lines 13-21]
[Old Code]
if (
  (details.files !== null && details.func !== null) ||
  (!details.files && !details.func)
) {
  throw new ExtensionError(
    "Exactly one of files and func must be specified."
  );
}
[Fixed Code]
(Validation moved to parent's execute() function)

Additional Details:
- The vulnerability was a case of insufficient input validation being performed at the wrong level (child process instead of parent)
- The validation check for mutual exclusivity of 'files' and 'func' was removed from the child process and moved to the parent's execute() function
- This change improves security by ensuring validation happens at a more authoritative level (parent process)

Vulnerability Existed: yes
Code Injection Risk [toolkit/components/extensions/child/ext-scripting.js] [Lines 30-32]
[Old Code]
parentDetails.codeToExecute = `(${func.toString()})(${serializedArgs});`;
[Fixed Code]
parentDetails.func = `(${func.toString()})(${serializedArgs});`;
Additional Details:
- The change from 'codeToExecute' to 'func' suggests a security improvement in how executable code is handled
- While the exact vulnerability isn't named in the diff, this appears to be addressing potential code injection risks by changing how the executable code is passed between processes
- The new implementation suggests better encapsulation of the executable code

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-break/widows-orphans-004.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-break/widows-orphans-004.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-break/#widows-orphans"> <link rel="match" href="reference/widows-orphans-001-ref.html"> <meta name="assert" content="The orphans property affects block containers that establish an inline formatting context">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <style> div p { margin: 0; }

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be related to test file maintenance rather than security vulnerabilities. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-break/widows-orphans-004.html [Lines 5]
[Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code] (line removed)

The change simply removes an empty meta tag that was likely unnecessary for the test. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being addressed in this diff. The modification appears to be a minor cleanup of test metadata rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/src/metal/mod.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/src/metal/mod.rs@@ -144,6 +144,9 @@     msl_version: mtl::MTLLanguageVersion,     fragment_rw_storage: bool,     read_write_texture_tier: mtl::MTLReadWriteTextureTier,+    msaa_desktop: bool,+    msaa_apple3: bool,+    msaa_apple7: bool,     resource_heaps: bool,     argument_buffers: bool,     shared_textures: bool,@@ -524,6 +527,7 @@     bind_group_infos: ArrayVec<BindGroupLayoutInfo, { crate::MAX_BIND_GROUPS }>,     push_constants_infos: MultiStageData<Option<PushConstantsInfo>>,     total_counters: MultiStageResourceCounters,+    total_push_constants: u32, } trait AsNative {@@ -709,6 +713,7 @@     stage_infos: MultiStageData<PipelineStageInfo>,     storage_buffer_length_map: fxhash::FxHashMap<naga::ResourceBinding, wgt::BufferSize>,     work_group_memory_sizes: Vec<u32>,+    push_constants: Vec<u32>, } pub struct CommandEncoder {

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Memory Safety Issue] [third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/src/metal/mod.rs] [Lines 144-146, 524, 709]
    [Old Code]
    - Missing fields: msaa_desktop, msaa_apple3, msaa_apple7
    - Missing field: total_push_constants
    - Missing field: push_constants
    [Fixed Code]
    - Added fields: msaa_desktop, msaa_apple3, msaa_apple7
    - Added field: total_push_constants
    - Added field: push_constants

Note: While these changes appear to be feature additions rather than direct security fixes, the addition of fields related to memory allocation (like push_constants and total_push_constants) could potentially relate to memory safety if they were previously causing undefined behavior by being uninitialized. However, without more context about how these fields are used, I can't be certain if they were actually fixing a security vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/xpcom/threads/ThreadEventQueue.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/xpcom/threads/ThreadEventQueue.cpp@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@   void Disconnect(const MutexAutoLock& aProofOfLock) final { mQueue = nullptr; }-  size_t SizeOfExcludingThis(mozilla::MallocSizeOf aMallocSizeOf) const {+  size_t SizeOfExcludingThis(mozilla::MallocSizeOf aMallocSizeOf) {     if (mQueue) {       return mQueue->SizeOfIncludingThis(aMallocSizeOf);     }@@ -237,14 +237,17 @@ } size_t ThreadEventQueue::SizeOfExcludingThis(-    mozilla::MallocSizeOf aMallocSizeOf) const {+    mozilla::MallocSizeOf aMallocSizeOf) {   size_t n = 0;   n += mBaseQueue->SizeOfIncludingThis(aMallocSizeOf);-  n += mNestedQueues.ShallowSizeOfExcludingThis(aMallocSizeOf);-  for (auto& queue : mNestedQueues) {-    n += queue.mEventTarget->SizeOfIncludingThis(aMallocSizeOf);+  {+    MutexAutoLock lock(mLock);+    n += mNestedQueues.ShallowSizeOfExcludingThis(aMallocSizeOf);+    for (auto& queue : mNestedQueues) {+      n += queue.mEventTarget->SizeOfIncludingThis(aMallocSizeOf);+    }   }   return SynchronizedEventQueue::SizeOfExcludingThis(aMallocSizeOf) + n;@@ -256,10 +259,12 @@ } already_AddRefed<nsIThreadObserver> ThreadEventQueue::GetObserverOnThread() {+  // only written on this thread   return do_AddRef(mObserver); } void ThreadEventQueue::SetObserver(nsIThreadObserver* aObserver) {+  // Always called from the thread - single writer   MutexAutoLock lock(mLock);   nsCOMPtr observer = aObserver;   mObserver.swap(observer);

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Race Condition Vulnerability [xpcom/threads/ThreadEventQueue.cpp] [Lines 237-247]
[Old Code]
size_t ThreadEventQueue::SizeOfExcludingThis(
    mozilla::MallocSizeOf aMallocSizeOf) const {
  size_t n = 0;

  n += mBaseQueue->SizeOfIncludingThis(aMallocSizeOf);

  n += mNestedQueues.ShallowSizeOfExcludingThis(aMallocSizeOf);
  for (auto& queue : mNestedQueues) {
    n += queue.mEventTarget->SizeOfIncludingThis(aMallocSizeOf);
  }
[Fixed Code]
size_t ThreadEventQueue::SizeOfExcludingThis(
    mozilla::MallocSizeOf aMallocSizeOf) {
  size_t n = 0;

  n += mBaseQueue->SizeOfIncludingThis(aMallocSizeOf);

  {
    MutexAutoLock lock(mLock);
    n += mNestedQueues.ShallowSizeOfExcludingThis(aMallocSizeOf);
    for (auto& queue : mNestedQueues) {
      n += queue.mEventTarget->SizeOfIncludingThis(aMallocSizeOf);
    }
  }
Additional Details: The fix adds proper mutex locking when accessing mNestedQueues to prevent race conditions during memory size calculations.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Thread Safety Annotation Missing [xpcom/threads/ThreadEventQueue.cpp] [Lines 31, 256-267]
[Old Code]
  size_t SizeOfExcludingThis(mozilla::MallocSizeOf aMallocSizeOf) const {
[Fixed Code]
  size_t SizeOfExcludingThis(mozilla::MallocSizeOf aMallocSizeOf) {
[Old Code]
already_AddRefed<nsIThreadObserver> ThreadEventQueue::GetObserverOnThread() {
  return do_AddRef(mObserver);
}

void ThreadEventQueue::SetObserver(nsIThreadObserver* aObserver) {
  MutexAutoLock lock(mLock);
[Fixed Code]
already_AddRefed<nsIThreadObserver> ThreadEventQueue::GetObserverOnThread() {
  // only written on this thread
  return do_AddRef(mObserver);
}

void ThreadEventQueue::SetObserver(nsIThreadObserver* aObserver) {
  // Always called from the thread - single writer
  MutexAutoLock lock(mLock);
Additional Details: The changes include adding thread safety annotations (comments) and removing const qualifiers, which might indicate thread safety improvements, but it's not clear if this was fixing an actual vulnerability or just improving code documentation.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/wr/webrender/src/prim_store/mod.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/wr/webrender/src/prim_store/mod.rs@@ -89,12 +89,6 @@     pub fn from_alpha(alpha: f32) -> PrimitiveOpacity {         PrimitiveOpacity {             is_opaque: alpha >= 1.0,-        }-    }--    pub fn combine(self, other: PrimitiveOpacity) -> PrimitiveOpacity {-        PrimitiveOpacity{-            is_opaque: self.is_opaque && other.is_opaque         }     } }@@ -1117,8 +1111,8 @@         if self.is_chased() {             #[cfg(debug_assertions)] // needed for ".id" part-            println!("\tpreparing {:?}", self.id);-            println!("\t{:?}", self.kind);+            info!("\tpreparing {:?}", self.id);+            info!("\t{:?}", self.kind);         }     }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Information Leak] [gfx/wr/webrender/src/prim_store/mod.rs] [Lines 1117-1118]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```rust
   println!("\tpreparing {:?}", self.id);
   println!("\t{:?}", self.kind);
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```rust
   info!("\tpreparing {:?}", self.id);
   info!("\t{:?}", self.kind);
   ```  
   Additional Details: The change from `println!` to `info!` might indicate a move from direct stdout logging to a more controlled logging mechanism, potentially addressing information exposure concerns in production builds. However, this is speculative without more context.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   [Removed Functionality] [gfx/wr/webrender/src/prim_store/mod.rs] [Lines 89-95]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```rust
   pub fn combine(self, other: PrimitiveOpacity) -> PrimitiveOpacity {
       PrimitiveOpacity{
           is_opaque: self.is_opaque && other.is_opaque
       }
   }
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```rust
   // Function completely removed
   ```  
   Additional Details: The removal of the `combine` method appears to be a refactoring or simplification change rather than a security fix, as there's no clear vulnerability pattern in the removed code.

Note: The first entry is marked "not sure" because while the logging change could have security implications (e.g., preventing accidental stdout leaks in production), it might also simply be a logging standardization improvement. The second entry is clearly not security-related.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.enable.y.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.enable.y.worker.js@@ -13,15 +13,15 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'destination-atop'; ctx.shadowColor = '#0f0'; ctx.shadowOffsetY = 0.1; ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-15, 21]
   Old Code:
   ```javascript
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   [...]
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```javascript
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   [...]
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   ```

The changes appear to be purely variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability purposes. There are no security-related changes in this diff, and no known vulnerabilities are being addressed by this modification. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has changed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/pin-project/tests/ui/unstable-features/trivial_bounds.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/pin-project/tests/ui/unstable-features/trivial_bounds.rs@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@-// NB: If you change this test, change 'trivial_bounds-feature-gate.rs' at the same time.+// Note: If you change this test, change 'trivial_bounds-feature-gate.rs' at the same time. // trivial_bounds // Tracking issue: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/48214@@ -10,25 +10,29 @@ fn inner() {     struct Inner(PhantomPinned);-    struct A(Inner);+    struct A(PhantomPinned);-    impl Unpin for A where Inner: Unpin {} //~ ERROR std::marker::Unpin does not depend on any type or lifetime parameters+    impl Unpin for A where PhantomPinned: Unpin {} //~ ERROR Unpin does not depend on any type or lifetime parameters++    struct B(Inner);++    impl Unpin for B where Inner: Unpin {} //~ ERROR Unpin does not depend on any type or lifetime parameters     struct Wrapper<T>(T);     impl<T> Unpin for Wrapper<T> where T: Unpin {}-    struct B(Inner);+    struct C(Inner);-    impl Unpin for B where Wrapper<Inner>: Unpin {} //~ ERROR std::marker::Unpin does not depend on any type or lifetime parameters+    impl Unpin for C where Wrapper<Inner>: Unpin {} //~ ERROR Unpin does not depend on any type or lifetime parameters     struct WrapperWithLifetime<'a, T>(PhantomData<&'a ()>, T);     impl<T> Unpin for WrapperWithLifetime<'_, T> where T: Unpin {}-    struct C(Inner);+    struct D(Inner);-    impl<'a> Unpin for C where WrapperWithLifetime<'a, Inner>: Unpin {} // Ok+    impl<'a> Unpin for D where WrapperWithLifetime<'a, Inner>: Unpin {} // Ok } fn main() {}

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Comment change only [File] third_party/rust/pin-project/tests/ui/unstable-features/trivial_bounds.rs [Lines] 1
   [Old Code]
   // NB: If you change this test, change 'trivial_bounds-feature-gate.rs' at the same time.
   [Fixed Code]
   // Note: If you change this test, change 'trivial_bounds-feature-gate.rs' at the same time.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Test restructure [File] third_party/rust/pin-project/tests/ui/unstable-features/trivial_bounds.rs [Lines] 10-33
   [Old Code]
   struct A(Inner);
   impl Unpin for A where Inner: Unpin {} //~ ERROR std::marker::Unpin does not depend on any type or lifetime parameters
   struct B(Inner);
   impl Unpin for B where Wrapper<Inner>: Unpin {} //~ ERROR std::marker::Unpin does not depend on any type or lifetime parameters
   struct C(Inner);
   impl<'a> Unpin for C where WrapperWithLifetime<'a, Inner>: Unpin {} // Ok
   [Fixed Code]
   struct A(PhantomPinned);
   impl Unpin for A where PhantomPinned: Unpin {} //~ ERROR Unpin does not depend on any type or lifetime parameters
   struct B(Inner);
   impl Unpin for B where Inner: Unpin {} //~ ERROR Unpin does not depend on any type or lifetime parameters
   struct C(Inner);
   impl Unpin for C where Wrapper<Inner>: Unpin {} //~ ERROR Unpin does not depend on any type or lifetime parameters
   struct D(Inner);
   impl<'a> Unpin for D where WrapperWithLifetime<'a, Inner>: Unpin {} // Ok

The changes appear to be:
1. A simple comment change from "NB" to "Note"
2. A restructuring of test cases to add more test coverage and clarify error messages (removing "std::marker::" from error messages)

No security vulnerabilities were identified in these changes. The modifications are related to test code improvements and error message clarifications rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/2d.getcontext.unique.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/2d.getcontext.unique.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); _assertSame(offscreenCanvas2.getContext('2d'), offscreenCanvas2.getContext('2d'), "offscreenCanvas2.getContext('2d')", "offscreenCanvas2.getContext('2d')");

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18]
    Old Code:
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    
    Fixed Code:
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be a simple variable renaming from "offscreenCanvas" to "canvas" for consistency or clarity.
- There are no security-related changes in this diff.
- The functionality remains identical, only the variable name has changed.
- The test case continues to verify that getContext('2d') returns the same context when called multiple times on the same canvas.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/cross-origin-embedder-policy/anonymous-iframe/resources/common.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/cross-origin-embedder-policy/anonymous-iframe/resources/common.js@@ -8,3 +8,46 @@   document.body.appendChild(iframe);   return sub_document_token; };++// Create a normal iframe. The new document will execute any scripts sent+// toward the token it returns.+const newIframe = (child_origin) => {+  const sub_document_token = token();+  let iframe = document.createElement('iframe');+  iframe.src = child_origin + executor_path + `&uuid=${sub_document_token}`;+  iframe.anonymous = false+  document.body.appendChild(iframe);+  return sub_document_token;+};++// Create a popup. The new document will execute any scripts sent toward the+// token it returns.+const newPopup = (test, origin) => {+  const popup_token = token();+  const popup = window.open(origin + executor_path + `&uuid=${popup_token}`);+  test.add_cleanup(() => popup.close());+  return popup_token;+}++// Create a fenced frame. The new document will execute any scripts sent+// toward the token it returns.+const newFencedFrame = (child_origin) => {+  const support_loading_mode_fenced_frame =+    "|header(Supports-Loading-Mode,fenced-frame)";+  const sub_document_token = token();+  const fencedframe = document.createElement('fencedframe');+  fencedframe.src = child_origin + executor_path ++    support_loading_mode_fenced_frame ++    `&uuid=${sub_document_token}`;+  document.body.appendChild(fencedframe);+  return sub_document_token;+};++const importScript = (url) => {+  const script = document.createElement("script");+  script.type = "text/javascript";+  script.src = url;+  const loaded = new Promise(resolve => script.onload = resolve);+  document.body.appendChild(script);+  return loaded;+}

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze the security implications of the changes. The diff shows entirely new code being added (no old code being modified), so we're looking at potential vulnerabilities in the newly added functions.

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Potential [File] [Lines 11-18 (newIframe function)]
   [Old Code] - N/A (new code)
   [Fixed Code] 
   const newIframe = (child_origin) => {
     const sub_document_token = token();
     let iframe = document.createElement('iframe');
     iframe.src = child_origin + executor_path + `&uuid=${sub_document_token}`;
     iframe.anonymous = false
     document.body.appendChild(iframe);
     return sub_document_token;
   };

   Note: The function dynamically constructs a URL without input validation/sanitization, which could potentially lead to XSS if child_origin is attacker-controlled.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Potential [File] [Lines 21-26 (newPopup function)]
   [Old Code] - N/A (new code)
   [Fixed Code]
   const newPopup = (test, origin) => {
     const popup_token = token();
     const popup = window.open(origin + executor_path + `&uuid=${popup_token}`);
     test.add_cleanup(() => popup.close());
     return popup_token;
   }

   Note: Similar to newIframe, this constructs a URL without input validation, which could be dangerous if origin is untrusted.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Potential [File] [Lines 29-38 (newFencedFrame function)]
   [Old Code] - N/A (new code)
   [Fixed Code]
   const newFencedFrame = (child_origin) => {
     const support_loading_mode_fenced_frame =
       "|header(Supports-Loading-Mode,fenced-frame)";
     const sub_document_token = token();
     const fencedframe = document.createElement('fencedframe');
     fencedframe.src = child_origin + executor_path +
       support_loading_mode_fenced_frame +
       `&uuid=${sub_document_token}`;
     document.body.appendChild(fencedframe);
     return sub_document_token;
   };

   Note: Again, URL construction without input validation could be risky if child_origin is untrusted.

4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Potential [File] [Lines 40-46 (importScript function)]
   [Old Code] - N/A (new code)
   [Fixed Code]
   const importScript = (url) => {
     const script = document.createElement("script");
     script.type = "text/javascript";
     script.src = url;
     const loaded = new Promise(resolve => script.onload = resolve);
     document.body.appendChild(script);
     return loaded;
   }

   Note: This function directly loads and executes a script from an arbitrary URL without validation, which could be dangerous if the URL is attacker-controlled.

The main security concern across all new functions is the potential for XSS vulnerabilities if untrusted input is passed to these functions. However, since this appears to be test code and we don't have context about how these functions are used or where the inputs come from, we can't be certain about actual vulnerabilities. The functions might be used in a controlled test environment where inputs are trusted.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/java/org/mozilla/geckoview/WebRequestError.java+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/java/org/mozilla/geckoview/WebRequestError.java@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@     ERROR_CATEGORY_PROXY,     ERROR_CATEGORY_SAFEBROWSING   })-  /* package */ @interface ErrorCategory {}+  public @interface ErrorCategory {}   @Retention(RetentionPolicy.SOURCE)   @IntDef({@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@     ERROR_DATA_URI_TOO_LONG,     ERROR_HTTPS_ONLY   })-  /* package */ @interface Error {}+  public @interface Error {}   /**    * This is normally used for error codes that don't currently fit into any of the other

Here's my analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Increased Interface Visibility] [mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/java/org/mozilla/geckoview/WebRequestError.java] [Lines 35, 68]
[Old Code]
/* package */ @interface ErrorCategory {}
[Fixed Code]
public @interface ErrorCategory {}

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Increased Interface Visibility] [mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/java/org/mozilla/geckoview/WebRequestError.java] [Lines 35, 68]
[Old Code]
/* package */ @interface Error {}
[Fixed Code]
public @interface Error {}

Additional Details:
The changes involve modifying the visibility of two annotation interfaces from package-private to public. While this isn't directly a security vulnerability, it could potentially impact security if:
1. These interfaces were intentionally kept package-private for security reasons
2. Making them public exposes internal error handling details that could be exploited
3. It allows broader access to error states that might be used in information disclosure

However, without more context about how these interfaces are used, I can't definitively say this was a security fix. It might simply be an API visibility change to support new functionality.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/perspective-origin-005.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/perspective-origin-005.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Jieqiong Cui" href="mailto:[email protected]"> <link rel="help" title="11. The 'perspective-origin' Property" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css-transforms-2/#propdef-perspective-origin"> <link rel="match" href="../reference/ref-filled-green-100px-square.xht">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="The 'perspective-origin' property set 'left' computes to 0% for the horizontal position."> <style>   div {

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 5]
[Old Code]
<meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code]
(removed line)

Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta "flags" tag which doesn't appear to have any security implications
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in this change
- The change doesn't affect any security-relevant functionality

No other vulnerabilities were detected in this small diff. The modification seems to be purely related to test file maintenance.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/perspective-origin-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/perspective-origin-001.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Jieqiong Cui" href="mailto:[email protected]"> <link rel="help" title="11. The 'perspective-origin' Property" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css-transforms-2/#propdef-perspective-origin"> <link rel="match" href="../reference/ref-filled-green-100px-square.xht">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="The 'perspective-origin' property set 'center' computes to 50% for the vertical position."> <style>   div {

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found in this diff
   File: testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/perspective-origin-001.html
   Lines: 5
   Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">
   Fixed Code: (line removed)

Additional details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which appears to be test-related metadata
- This doesn't appear to be a security fix but rather a cleanup of test code
- No actual security vulnerability is being addressed here
- The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive functionality

Note: While this doesn't represent a security fix, removing unnecessary code is generally good practice as it reduces potential attack surface and makes the codebase cleaner. However, in this specific case, the removed line was just an empty meta tag that didn't pose any security risk.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/writable-streams/aborting.any.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/writable-streams/aborting.any.js@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@-// META: global=window,worker,jsshell+// META: global=window,worker // META: script=../resources/test-utils.js // META: script=../resources/recording-streams.js 'use strict';

Analysis of the code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Test Scope Reduction] [testing/web-platform/tests/streams/writable-streams/aborting.any.js] [Lines 1]  
   Old Code: `// META: global=window,worker,jsshell`  
   Fixed Code: `// META: global=window,worker`  

Additional Details:  
- The change removes 'jsshell' from the test scope. While this isn't a security vulnerability in the traditional sense, it could potentially affect test coverage for JavaScript shell environments.  
- The impact is unclear without more context about why 'jsshell' was removed and whether it was intentionally excluded from testing.  
- This might be related to test environment configuration rather than a security fix.  

Note: No clear security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change appears to be a test scope modification rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/shared/specs/perf.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/shared/specs/perf.js@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@     "profiler-stopped": {       type: "profiler-stopped",     },+    // @backward-compat { version 98 } These 2 events are not used anymore since+    // Firefox 98. Instead we expose the information about private browsing in+    // captured profile and show a warning in the profiler frontend UI. We can+    // remove these 2 events once Firefox 98 hits release.     "profile-locked-by-private-browsing": {       type: "profile-locked-by-private-browsing",     },@@ -82,6 +86,8 @@       response: { value: RetVal("boolean") },     },+    // @backward-compat { version 98 } This method is not used since Firefox 98.+    // We can remove it once Firefox 98 hits release.     isLockedForPrivateBrowsing: {       request: {},       response: { value: RetVal("boolean") },

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be related to backward compatibility and deprecation of unused features rather than security fixes.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [devtools/shared/specs/perf.js] [Lines 31-42, 82-85]
[Old Code]
    "profile-locked-by-private-browsing": {
      type: "profile-locked-by-private-browsing",
    },
    "profile-unlocked-from-private-browsing": {
      type: "profile-unlocked-from-private-browsing",
    },
...
    isLockedForPrivateBrowsing: {
      request: {},
      response: { value: RetVal("boolean") },
    },
[Fixed Code]
[Same code but with added deprecation comments]

The changes consist of adding comments indicating these features will be deprecated in Firefox 98, with no apparent security implications. The functionality remains the same, just marked for future removal.

No other vulnerabilities were identified in the provided diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-77.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-77.xml@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/>   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body>  <div>

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Information Disclosure] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-77.xml] [Lines 10]
    [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="" />
    [Fixed Code] [removed]

Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag with name="flags". While this doesn't appear to be a direct security vulnerability, empty or unused metadata tags could potentially leak information about test configurations or internal flags if they were populated in other contexts.
- Without more context about how this "flags" meta tag was used in the testing framework, it's difficult to determine if this was an actual security issue or just a cleanup of unused code.
- The removal could be part of a general cleanup to reduce potential attack surface or information leakage vectors.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/CSS2/css21-errata/s-11-1-1b-008.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/CSS2/css21-errata/s-11-1-1b-008.html@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ <title>CSS Test: overflow:hidden on fixed layout table with caption overflowing upwards</title> <link rel="author" title="Simon Pieters" href="mailto:[email protected]"> <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/Style/css2-updates/REC-CSS2-20110607-errata.html#s.11.1.1b">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="Test checks that overflow:hidden on fixed layout table applies to the table box rather than the table wrapper box."> <link rel="match" href="s-11-1-1b-001-ref.html"> <style>

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/CSS2/css21-errata/s-11-1-1b-008.html] [Lines 2-7]
[Old Code]
<title>CSS Test: overflow:hidden on fixed layout table with caption overflowing upwards</title>
<link rel="author" title="Simon Pieters" href="mailto:[email protected]">
<link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/Style/css2-updates/REC-CSS2-20110607-errata.html#s.11.1.1b">
<meta name="flags" content="">
<meta name="assert" content="Test checks that overflow:hidden on fixed layout table applies to the table box rather than the table wrapper box.">
<link rel="match" href="s-11-1-1b-001-ref.html">
[Fixed Code]
<title>CSS Test: overflow:hidden on fixed layout table with caption overflowing upwards</title>
<link rel="author" title="Simon Pieters" href="mailto:[email protected]">
<link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/Style/css2-updates/REC-CSS2-20110607-errata.html#s.11.1.1b">
<meta name="assert" content="Test checks that overflow:hidden on fixed layout table applies to the table box rather than the table wrapper box.">
<link rel="match" href="s-11-1-1b-001-ref.html">

Additional Details:
The only change in this diff is the removal of an empty `<meta name="flags" content="">` tag. This appears to be a cleanup change rather than a security fix. There are no visible security vulnerabilities being addressed in this change, and the modification doesn't introduce any new security concerns either. The change is likely related to test metadata cleanup rather than security.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.