--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/test/test_util_chunking.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/test/test_util_chunking.py@@ -158,7 +158,6 @@             "fission": fission,             "headless": headless,             "tsan": tsan,-            "webrender": False,             "appname": "firefox",         }

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 158-158]
[Old Code]
            "webrender": False,
[Fixed Code]
(Line removed)

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes a hardcoded "webrender": False configuration from a test file
- This appears to be a test configuration change rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerability patterns are present in this change
- The modification doesn't affect security-related functionality or introduce any security risks

Since this is just a test file configuration change and doesn't impact production code or security mechanisms, I don't identify any security vulnerabilities being fixed here. The change might be related to test suite maintenance or feature flag updates rather than security.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.cone.shape2.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.cone.shape2.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var tol = 1; // tolerance to avoid antialiasing artifacts ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';@@ -30,15 +30,15 @@ ctx.lineTo(110, -20-tol); ctx.lineTo(110, 100+tol); ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where a variable name was changed from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and all subsequent references were updated accordingly. There are no changes to the actual logic or security-related functionality.

Here's the analysis following the requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.cone.shape2.worker.js] [Lines 13-48]
[Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, ...)]
[Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(canvas, ...)]

The changes are purely variable renaming with no security implications. The functionality remains exactly the same, just using a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/filter-effects/filter-cb-abspos-inline-003-ref.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/filter-effects/filter-cb-abspos-inline-003-ref.html@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ <title>CSS Filter: Establishing containing block for absolutely-positioned elements, on an inline element</title> <link rel="author" title="L. David Baron" href="https://dbaron.org/"> <link rel="author" title="Mozilla Corporation" href="http://mozilla.com/">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <style> #abspos {

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 3-7]
   Old Code:
   <meta name="flags" content="">
   Fixed Code:
   (line removed)

Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta "flags" tag which doesn't appear to have any security implications
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerability patterns are present in this change
- The change is likely related to test infrastructure rather than security

No other changes were present in the diff to analyze. The modification appears to be benign with no security impact.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/CSS2/css21-errata/s-11-1-1b-006.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/CSS2/css21-errata/s-11-1-1b-006.html@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ <title>CSS Test: overflow:hidden on HTML body element table</title> <link rel="author" title="Simon Pieters" href="mailto:[email protected]"> <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/Style/css2-updates/REC-CSS2-20110607-errata.html#s.11.1.1b">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="Test checks that overflow on HTML body table applies to viewport rather than the table box."> <link rel="match" href="s-11-1-1b-005-ref.html"> <style>

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/CSS2/css21-errata/s-11-1-1b-006.html [Lines] 2-7
[Old Code]
<meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code]
(removed line)

Additional Details:
The change simply removes an empty meta tag that wasn't serving any purpose. This appears to be a cleanup change rather than a security fix. There are no apparent security vulnerabilities being addressed in this diff. The modification doesn't affect any security-related functionality or introduce/remove any security controls.

Note: If we were to speculate about potential reasons for removing the empty meta tag, it might be for HTML validation purposes or code cleanliness, but there's no security implication in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/src/vulkan/instance.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/src/vulkan/instance.rs@@ -208,7 +208,11 @@             let vk_info = vk::DebugUtilsMessengerCreateInfoEXT::builder()                 .flags(vk::DebugUtilsMessengerCreateFlagsEXT::empty())                 .message_severity(severity)-                .message_type(vk::DebugUtilsMessageTypeFlagsEXT::all())+                .message_type(+                    vk::DebugUtilsMessageTypeFlagsEXT::GENERAL+                        | vk::DebugUtilsMessageTypeFlagsEXT::VALIDATION+                        | vk::DebugUtilsMessageTypeFlagsEXT::PERFORMANCE,+                )                 .pfn_user_callback(Some(debug_utils_messenger_callback));             let messenger = extension                 .create_debug_utils_messenger(&vk_info, None)@@ -438,7 +442,7 @@ impl crate::Instance<super::Api> for super::Instance {     unsafe fn init(desc: &crate::InstanceDescriptor) -> Result<Self, crate::InstanceError> {-        let entry = match ash::Entry::new() {+        let entry = match ash::Entry::load() {             Ok(entry) => entry,             Err(err) => {                 log::info!("Missing Vulkan entry points: {:?}", err);

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. First vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Information Exposure through Debug Utils] [third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/src/vulkan/instance.rs] [Lines 208-214]
    [Old Code]
    .message_type(vk::DebugUtilsMessageTypeFlagsEXT::all())
    [Fixed Code]
    .message_type(
        vk::DebugUtilsMessageTypeFlagsEXT::GENERAL
            | vk::DebugUtilsMessageTypeFlagsEXT::VALIDATION
            | vk::DebugUtilsMessageTypeFlagsEXT::PERFORMANCE,
    )
    Additional Details: The change restricts debug message types from all() to specific categories. This might prevent exposure of sensitive debug information, but without more context about the debug callback implementation, we can't be certain.

2. Second vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: yes
    [DLL Preloading/Hijacking Vulnerability] [third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/src/vulkan/instance.rs] [Line 438]
    [Old Code]
    let entry = match ash::Entry::new() {
    [Fixed Code]
    let entry = match ash::Entry::load() {
    Additional Details: The change from new() to load() likely addresses a DLL preloading vulnerability. The new() method might search for the Vulkan library in insecure paths, while load() probably uses a more secure loading mechanism. This is a common fix for DLL hijacking vulnerabilities.

Note: The first vulnerability is marked as "not sure" because while the change could potentially improve security by limiting debug information exposure, we don't have enough context about the debug callback implementation to be certain. The second vulnerability is a clear security improvement against DLL hijacking.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.zerosource.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.zerosource.worker.js@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@         ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 10, 10, 0, 1, 0, 0, 100, 50);         ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 10, 10, 1, 0, 0, 0, 100, 50);         ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 10, 10, 0, 0, 0, 0, 100, 50);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 14-15, 33]
    Old Code:
    ```javascript
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    ```
    ```javascript
    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
    ```
    Fixed Code:
    ```javascript
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    ```
    ```javascript
    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
    ```
    Additional Details: This appears to be a simple variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. No security vulnerability is addressed here - it's likely just a code consistency improvement.

The changes in this diff are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature, involving variable renaming without any security implications. No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/element/drawing-text-to-the-canvas/2d.text.drawing.style.spacing.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/element/drawing-text-to-the-canvas/2d.text.drawing.style.spacing.html@@ -35,6 +35,11 @@ _assertSame(ctx.letterSpacing, '-1px', "ctx.letterSpacing", "'-1px'"); _assertSame(ctx.wordSpacing, '-1px', "ctx.wordSpacing", "'-1px'");+ctx.letterSpacing = '1PX';+ctx.wordSpacing = '1EM';+_assertSame(ctx.letterSpacing, '1px', "ctx.letterSpacing", "'1px'");+_assertSame(ctx.wordSpacing, '1em', "ctx.wordSpacing", "'1em'");+ }); </script>

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis following the required format:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Case Sensitivity in CSS Property Handling] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/element/drawing-text-to-the-canvas/2d.text.drawing.style.spacing.html] [Lines added]
[Old Code]
(No previous test for uppercase unit values)
[Fixed Code]
ctx.letterSpacing = '1PX';
ctx.wordSpacing = '1EM';
_assertSame(ctx.letterSpacing, '1px', "ctx.letterSpacing", "'1px'");
_assertSame(ctx.wordSpacing, '1em', "ctx.wordSpacing", "'1em'");

Additional Details:
The diff shows new test cases being added to verify case insensitivity in CSS unit values (PX/EM vs px/em). While this isn't a direct security fix, it could potentially relate to security if inconsistent case handling could lead to parsing issues or CSS injection vulnerabilities. However, without more context about the actual implementation changes, this is speculative. The test appears to ensure consistent normalization of CSS unit values.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/transform-streams/properties.any.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/transform-streams/properties.any.js@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@-// META: global=window,worker,jsshell+// META: global=window,worker 'use strict'; const transformerMethods = {

Analysis of the code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Test Scope Reduction] [testing/web-platform/tests/streams/transform-streams/properties.any.js] [Lines 1]  
   Old Code: `// META: global=window,worker,jsshell`  
   Fixed Code: `// META: global=window,worker`  
   Additional Details: The removal of 'jsshell' from the test scope might indicate a security-related change, but without more context about why jsshell was removed, it's unclear if this was fixing a specific vulnerability or just a test scope adjustment.  

No other vulnerabilities were identified in this small diff. The change appears to be primarily about modifying the test environment scope rather than fixing a specific security issue.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.uncovered.fill.source-in.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.uncovered.fill.source-in.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 0, 0.5)';@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 0, 255, 0.75)'; ctx.translate(0, 25); ctx.fillRect(0, 50, 100, 50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't involve any security-sensitive operations or patterns. Here's the structured response:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.uncovered.fill.source-in.worker.js] [Lines 13-23]
    [Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, ...)]
    [Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixelApprox(canvas, ...)]

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains identical, just with a renamed variable for consistency or clarity.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.uncovered.fill.source-out.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.uncovered.fill.source-out.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 0, 0.5)';@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 0, 255, 0.75)'; ctx.translate(0, 25); ctx.fillRect(0, 50, 100, 50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes (variable renaming) rather than security-related fixes. Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    [No security vulnerability found]
    [Old Code] var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    [Fixed Code] var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    [No security vulnerability found]
    [Old Code] _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);
    [Fixed Code] _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and update the references to this variable. There are no changes to security-sensitive operations, no changes to input validation, and no changes to how potentially dangerous operations are handled. The changes are purely about code style and variable naming consistency.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/framework/toolbox-host-manager.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/framework/toolbox-host-manager.js@@ -59,6 +59,16 @@ function ToolboxHostManager(descriptor, hostType, hostOptions) {   this.descriptor = descriptor;+  // When debugging a local tab, we keep a reference of the current tab into which the toolbox is displayed.+  // This will only change from the descriptor's localTab when we start debugging popups (i.e. window.open).+  this.currentTab = this.descriptor.localTab;++  // Keep the previously instantiated Host for all tabs where we displayed the Toolbox.+  // This will only be useful when we start debugging popups (i.e. window.open).+  // This is used to re-use the previous host instance when we re-select the original tab+  // we were debugging before the popup opened.+  this.hostPerTab = new Map();+   this.frameId = ID_COUNTER++;   if (!hostType) {@@ -69,6 +79,7 @@       hostType = Services.prefs.getCharPref(LAST_HOST);     }   }+  this.eventController = new AbortController();   this.host = this.createHost(hostType, hostOptions);   this.hostType = hostType;   this.telemetry = new Telemetry();@@ -81,11 +92,15 @@ ToolboxHostManager.prototype = {   async create(toolId) {     await this.host.create();+    if (this.currentTab) {+      this.hostPerTab.set(this.currentTab, this.host);+    }     this.host.frame.setAttribute("aria-label", L10N.getStr("toolbox.label"));     this.host.frame.ownerDocument.defaultView.addEventListener(       "message",-      this._onMessage+      this._onMessage,+      { signal: this.eventController.signal }     );     const msSinceProcessStart = parseInt(@@ -162,6 +177,9 @@       case "switch-host":         this.switchHost(msg.hostType);         break;+      case "switch-host-to-tab":+        this.switchHostToTab(msg.tabBrowsingContextID);+        break;       case "raise-host":         this.host.raise();         break;@@ -178,7 +196,15 @@   destroy() {     Services.prefs.removeObserver(ZOOM_VALUE_PREF, this.setMinWidthWithZoom);+    this.eventController.abort();+    this.eventController = null;     this.destroyHost();+    // When we are debugging popup, we created host for each popup opened+    // in some other tabs. Ensure destroying them here.+    for (const host of this.hostPerTab.values()) {+      host.destroy();+    }+    this.hostPerTab.clear();     this.host = null;     this.hostType = null;     this.descriptor = null;@@ -201,11 +227,27 @@     if (!Hosts[hostType]) {       throw new Error("Unknown hostType: " + hostType);     }-    const newHost = new Hosts[hostType](this.descriptor.localTab, options);+    const newHost = new Hosts[hostType](this.currentTab, options);     return newHost;   },-  async switchHost(hostType) {+  /**+   * Migrate the toolbox to a new host, while keeping it fully functional.+   * The toolbox's iframe will be moved as-is to the new host.+   *+   * @param {String} hostType+   *        The new type of host to spawn+   * @param {Boolean} destroyPreviousHost+   *        Defaults to true. If false is passed, we will avoid destroying+   *        the previous host. This is helpful for popup debugging,+   *        where we migrate the toolbox between two tabs. In this scenario+   *        we are reusing previously instantiated hosts. This is especially+   *        useful when we close the current tab and have to have an+   *        already instantiated host to migrate to. If we don't have one,+   *        the toolbox iframe will already be destroyed before we have a chance+   *        to migrate it.+   */+  async switchHost(hostType, destroyPreviousHost = true) {     if (hostType == "previous") {       // Switch to the last used host for the toolbox UI.       // This is determined by the devtools.toolbox.previousHost pref.@@ -234,8 +276,9 @@     // change toolbox document's parent to the new host     newIframe.swapFrameLoaders(iframe);--    this.destroyHost();+    if (destroyPreviousHost) {+      this.destroyHost();+    }     if (       this.hostType !== Toolbox.HostType.BROWSERTOOLBOX &&@@ -245,11 +288,15 @@     }     this.host = newHost;+    if (this.currentTab) {+      this.hostPerTab.set(this.currentTab, newHost);+    }     this.hostType = hostType;     this.host.setTitle(this.host.frame.contentWindow.document.title);     this.host.frame.ownerDocument.defaultView.addEventListener(       "message",-      this._onMessage+      this._onMessage,+      { signal: this.eventController.signal }     );     this.setMinWidthWithZoom();@@ -269,20 +316,51 @@   },   /**+   * When we are debugging popup, we are moving around the toolbox between original tab+   * and popup tabs. This method will only move the host to a new tab, while+   * keeping the same host type.+   *+   * @param {String} tabBrowsingContextID+   *        The ID of the browsing context of the tab we want to move to.+   */+  async switchHostToTab(tabBrowsingContextID) {+    const { gBrowser } = this.host.frame.ownerDocument.defaultView;++    const previousTab = this.currentTab;+    const newTab = gBrowser.tabs.find(+      tab => tab.linkedBrowser.browsingContext.id == tabBrowsingContextID+    );+    // Note that newTab will be undefined when the popup opens in a new top level window.+    if (newTab && newTab != previousTab) {+      this.currentTab = newTab;+      const newHost = this.hostPerTab.get(this.currentTab);+      if (newHost) {+        newHost.frame.swapFrameLoaders(this.host.frame);+        this.host = newHost;+      } else {+        await this.switchHost(this.hostType, false);+      }+      previousTab.addEventListener(+        "TabSelect",+        event => {+          this.switchHostToTab(event.target.linkedBrowser.browsingContext.id);+        },+        { once: true, signal: this.eventController.signal }+      );+    }++    this.postMessage({+      name: "switched-host-to-tab",+      browsingContextID: tabBrowsingContextID,+    });+  },++  /**    * Destroy the current host, and remove event listeners from its frame.    *    * @return {promise} to be resolved when the host is destroyed.    */   destroyHost() {-    // When Firefox toplevel is closed, the frame may already be detached and-    // the top level document gone-    if (this.host.frame.ownerDocument.defaultView) {-      this.host.frame.ownerDocument.defaultView.removeEventListener(-        "message",-        this._onMessage-      );-    }-     return this.host.destroy();   }, };

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
Memory Leak Vulnerability [File] devtools/client/framework/toolbox-host-manager.js [Lines] 59-196  
[Old Code]  
No cleanup of event listeners or host instances when switching hosts or destroying the manager  
[Fixed Code]  
Added `eventController` to manage event listeners and cleanup with `AbortController`, added `hostPerTab` map to track and clean up host instances, and improved cleanup in `destroy()` method

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
Event Listener Leak Vulnerability [File] devtools/client/framework/toolbox-host-manager.js [Lines] 81-102  
[Old Code]  
Event listeners were added without proper cleanup mechanism  
[Fixed Code]  
Added event listener cleanup using `AbortController` signal in all `addEventListener` calls

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
Potential Cross-Origin Resource Sharing Issue [File] devtools/client/framework/toolbox-host-manager.js [Lines] 81-102  
[Old Code]  
Message event listener without origin validation  
[Fixed Code]  
Still no explicit origin validation in message event listener, but the impact is uncertain since this is internal devtools code

4. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
Resource Management Vulnerability [File] devtools/client/framework/toolbox-host-manager.js [Lines] 162-196  
[Old Code]  
No proper cleanup of host instances when switching between tabs  
[Fixed Code]  
Added `hostPerTab` map to manage host instances and proper cleanup in `destroy()` method

The main security improvements in this diff relate to proper resource management and cleanup, particularly:
1. Adding proper cleanup of event listeners using AbortController
2. Managing host instances properly when switching between tabs
3. Ensuring all resources are cleaned up when destroying the manager

While there might be other potential security considerations, these are the most evident improvements in the provided diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.name-3.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.name-3.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; try { ctx.fillStyle = 'red blue'; } catch (e) { } // this shouldn't throw, but it shouldn't matter here if it does ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-25]
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';
   try { ctx.fillStyle = 'red blue'; } catch (e) { }
   ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';
   try { ctx.fillStyle = 'red blue'; } catch (e) { }
   ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring (variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and corresponding updates to references). There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed in this diff. The test logic remains exactly the same, only the variable naming has changed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.parse.em.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.parse.em.html@@ -17,10 +17,10 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { offscreenCanvas.width = '100em'; });+assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { canvas.width = '100em'; }); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis following the required format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No Vulnerability Found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.parse.em.html] [Lines 17-22]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { offscreenCanvas.width = '100em'; });
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { canvas.width = '100em'; });

Additional Details:
The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. The security test (asserting that setting width with 'em' units throws TypeError) remains functionally identical. No security vulnerability is being fixed here.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.enable.off.2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.enable.off.2.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'destination-atop'; ctx.shadowColor = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring (variable renaming) rather than security-related.

Answer for Each Vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found
    File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.enable.off.2.html
    [Lines 17-25]
    Old Code:
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    [...]
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    
    Fixed Code:
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    [...]
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability, without any security implications. No actual functionality or security-related behavior was modified.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit-test/tests/basic/bug1445854.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit-test/tests/basic/bug1445854.js@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@+// |jit-test| skip-if: !this.hasOwnProperty("ReadableStream") load(libdir + "asserts.js");-if (typeof ReadableStream == "function") {-    assertThrowsInstanceOf(() => ReadableStream.prototype.tee(),-                           TypeError);-}+assertThrowsInstanceOf(() => ReadableStream.prototype.tee(),+    TypeError);

Analyzing the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Test Reliability Issue] [js/src/jit-test/tests/basic/bug1445854.js] [Lines 1-5]  
   Old Code:  
   ```javascript
   load(libdir + "asserts.js");
   if (typeof ReadableStream == "function") {
       assertThrowsInstanceOf(() => ReadableStream.prototype.tee(),
                              TypeError);
   }
   ```  
   Fixed Code:  
   ```javascript
   // |jit-test| skip-if: !this.hasOwnProperty("ReadableStream")
   load(libdir + "asserts.js");
   assertThrowsInstanceOf(() => ReadableStream.prototype.tee(),
       TypeError);
   ```  
   Additional Details: The change appears to be more about test reliability than security. The old code would silently pass if ReadableStream wasn't available, while the new version explicitly skips the test if ReadableStream isn't available. This makes the test behavior more explicit but doesn't appear to fix a security vulnerability.

Note: I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed in this diff. The change seems to be about improving test reliability and clarity rather than addressing a security issue. The test continues to verify that calling `tee()` on ReadableStream prototype throws a TypeError, which is expected behavior.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.stroke.unaffected.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.stroke.unaffected.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ ctx.closePath(); ctx.strokeStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where a variable name was changed from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or clarity.

Here's the structured analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Variable Renaming Refactor [File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.stroke.unaffected.html] [Lines: 17-18, 32]
    Old Code:
    ```javascript
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    ```
    Fixed Code:
    ```javascript
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    ```
    Additional Details: This is a simple variable renaming with no security implications.

No other vulnerabilities or potential issues were identified in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/system/IOUtils.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/system/IOUtils.h@@ -124,6 +124,24 @@   static already_AddRefed<Promise> Exists(GlobalObject& aGlobal,                                           const nsAString& aPath);+  static already_AddRefed<Promise> CreateUniqueFile(+      GlobalObject& aGlobal, const nsAString& aParent, const nsAString& aPrefix,+      const uint32_t aPermissions);+  static already_AddRefed<Promise> CreateUniqueDirectory(+      GlobalObject& aGlobal, const nsAString& aParent, const nsAString& aPrefix,+      const uint32_t aPermissions);++ private:+  /**+   * A helper method for CreateUniqueFile and CreateUniqueDirectory.+   */+  static already_AddRefed<Promise> CreateUnique(GlobalObject& aGlobal,+                                                const nsAString& aParent,+                                                const nsAString& aPrefix,+                                                const uint32_t aFileType,+                                                const uint32_t aPermissions);++ public: #if defined(XP_WIN)   static already_AddRefed<Promise> GetWindowsAttributes(GlobalObject& aGlobal,                                                         const nsAString& aPath);@@ -398,6 +416,19 @@    */   static Result<bool, IOError> ExistsSync(nsIFile* aFile);+  /**+   * Create a file or directory with a unique path.+   *+   * @param aFile     The location of the file or directory (including prefix)+   * @param aFileType One of |nsIFile::NORMAL_FILE_TYPE| or+   *                  |nsIFile::DIRECTORY_TYPE|.+   * @param aperms    The permissions to create the file or directory with.+   *+   * @return A unique path.+   */+  static Result<nsString, IOError> CreateUniqueSync(+      nsIFile* aFile, const uint32_t aFileType, const uint32_t aPermissions);+ #if defined(XP_WIN)   /**    * Return the Windows-specific attributes of the file.

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze the changes for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential File Creation Permission Issue] [dom/system/IOUtils.h] [Lines 124-416]
[Old Code]
(No previous file creation functionality with permissions)
[Fixed Code]
Added new methods for creating files/directories with explicit permission parameters:
```
static already_AddRefed<Promise> CreateUniqueFile(
    GlobalObject& aGlobal, const nsAString& aParent, const nsAString& aPrefix,
    const uint32_t aPermissions);
static already_AddRefed<Promise> CreateUniqueDirectory(
    GlobalObject& aGlobal, const nsAString& aParent, const nsAString& aPrefix,
    const uint32_t aPermissions);
```

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Race Condition in File Creation] [dom/system/IOUtils.h] [Lines 124-416]
[Old Code]
(No previous unique file creation functionality)
[Fixed Code]
Added new synchronous method for creating unique files:
```
static Result<nsString, IOError> CreateUniqueSync(
    nsIFile* aFile, const uint32_t aFileType, const uint32_t aPermissions);
```

The changes introduce new functionality for creating files and directories with specific permissions and unique names. While these changes don't show a clear vulnerability, there are potential security considerations:
1. The permission handling needs to ensure proper default/restrictive permissions are applied
2. The unique file creation needs to be atomic to prevent race conditions
3. The parent directory parameter needs proper validation to prevent directory traversal

Without seeing the implementation details, I can't confirm if these potential issues were properly addressed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/nimbus/lib/NimbusFeatures.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/nimbus/lib/NimbusFeatures.h@@ -14,7 +14,13 @@ class NimbusFeatures {  private:-  static void GetPrefName(const nsACString& aFeatureId,+  // This branch is used to store experiment data+  static constexpr auto kSyncDataPrefBranch = "nimbus.syncdatastore."_ns;+  // This branch is used to store rollouts data+  static constexpr auto kSyncRolloutsPrefBranch =+      "nimbus.syncdefaultsstore."_ns;+  static void GetPrefName(const nsACString& branchPrefix,+                          const nsACString& aFeatureId,                           const nsACString& aVariable, nsACString& aPref);   static nsresult GetExperimentSlug(const nsACString& aFeatureId,

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Exposure] [File: toolkit/components/nimbus/lib/NimbusFeatures.h] [Lines: 14-20]
[Old Code]
  static void GetPrefName(const nsACString& aFeatureId,
                          const nsACString& aVariable, nsACString& aPref);
[Fixed Code]
  // This branch is used to store experiment data
  static constexpr auto kSyncDataPrefBranch = "nimbus.syncdatastore."_ns;
  // This branch is used to store rollouts data
  static constexpr auto kSyncRolloutsPrefBranch =
      "nimbus.syncdefaultsstore."_ns;
  static void GetPrefName(const nsACString& branchPrefix,
                          const nsACString& aFeatureId,
                          const nsACString& aVariable, nsACString& aPref);

Additional Details:
The change adds explicit branch prefixes for storing experiment and rollout data, which could be related to better data isolation. While this might help prevent accidental data mixing, I can't determine if this was fixing an actual security vulnerability or just improving code organization. The modification could potentially relate to preventing information leakage between different data stores, but without more context about how these branches are used, it's unclear if this was addressing a specific security issue.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/libc/src/unix/bsd/freebsdlike/freebsd/freebsd14/mod.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/libc/src/unix/bsd/freebsdlike/freebsd/freebsd14/mod.rs@@ -28,17 +28,6 @@         pub data: ::intptr_t,         pub udata: *mut ::c_void,         pub ext: [u64; 4],-    }--    pub struct sockcred2 {-        pub sc_version: ::c_int,-        pub sc_pid: ::pid_t,-        pub sc_uid: ::uid_t,-        pub sc_euid: ::uid_t,-        pub sc_gid: ::gid_t,-        pub sc_egid: ::gid_t,-        pub sc_ngroups: ::c_int,-        pub sc_groups: [::gid_t; 1],     }     pub struct kvm_page {@@ -479,17 +468,6 @@ pub const MINCORE_SUPER: ::c_int = 0x60;-f! {-    pub fn SOCKCRED2SIZE(ngrps: usize) -> usize {-        let ngrps = if ngrps > 0 {-            ngrps - 1-        } else {-            0-        };-        ::mem::size_of::<sockcred2>() + ::mem::size_of::<::gid_t>() * ngrps-    }-}- extern "C" {     pub fn aio_readv(aiocbp: *mut ::aiocb) -> ::c_int;     pub fn aio_writev(aiocbp: *mut ::aiocb) -> ::c_int;@@ -555,7 +533,8 @@ cfg_if! {     if #[cfg(any(target_arch = "x86_64",-                 target_arch = "aarch64"))] {+                 target_arch = "aarch64",+                 target_arch = "riscv64"))] {         mod b64;         pub use self::b64::*;     }

Let me analyze the diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Removal of sockcred2 struct and related function] [third_party/rust/libc/src/unix/bsd/freebsdlike/freebsd/freebsd14/mod.rs] [Lines 28-38, 479-487]
[Old Code]
    pub struct sockcred2 {
        pub sc_version: ::c_int,
        pub sc_pid: ::pid_t,
        pub sc_uid: ::uid_t,
        pub sc_euid: ::uid_t,
        pub sc_gid: ::gid_t,
        pub sc_egid: ::gid_t,
        pub sc_ngroups: ::c_int,
        pub sc_groups: [::gid_t; 1],
    }

    pub fn SOCKCRED2SIZE(ngrps: usize) -> usize {
        let ngrps = if ngrps > 0 {
            ngrps - 1
        } else {
            0
        };
        ::mem::size_of::<sockcred2>() + ::mem::size_of::<::gid_t>() * ngrps
    }
[Fixed Code]
[Removed entirely]

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Architecture support addition] [third_party/rust/libc/src/unix/bsd/freebsdlike/freebsd/freebsd14/mod.rs] [Lines 555-557]
[Old Code]
    if #[cfg(any(target_arch = "x86_64",
                 target_arch = "aarch64"))] {
[Fixed Code]
    if #[cfg(any(target_arch = "x86_64",
                 target_arch = "aarch64",
                 target_arch = "riscv64"))] {

The analysis shows two main changes, but I'm not certain about specific vulnerabilities:
1. Removal of sockcred2 struct and its related size calculation function - this might be related to removing potentially unsafe socket credential handling, but without more context it's unclear.
2. Addition of riscv64 architecture support - this appears to be a feature addition rather than a security fix.

Neither change clearly indicates a specific known vulnerability, though the removal of sockcred2 might be related to security hardening. More context would be needed to determine if these were actual security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/xpcom/threads/SchedulerGroup.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/xpcom/threads/SchedulerGroup.cpp@@ -41,11 +41,7 @@   // May be called on any thread when a vsync is received and scheduled to be   // processed. This may occur on the main thread due to queued messages when   // the channel is connected.-  bool inconsistent = false;-  TimeStamp creation = TimeStamp::ProcessCreation(&inconsistent);-  if (inconsistent) {-    return;-  }+  TimeStamp creation = TimeStamp::ProcessCreation();   // Attempt to set gEarliestUnprocessedVsync to our new value. If we've seen a   // vsync already, but haven't handled it, the `compareExchange` will fail and

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Time Handling Vulnerability] [xpcom/threads/SchedulerGroup.cpp] [Lines 41-45]
[Old Code]
  bool inconsistent = false;
  TimeStamp creation = TimeStamp::ProcessCreation(&inconsistent);
  if (inconsistent) {
    return;
  }
[Fixed Code]
  TimeStamp creation = TimeStamp::ProcessCreation();

Additional Details:
1. The change removes a consistency check for the process creation timestamp. While this might indicate a fix for a potential race condition or timing issue, I'm not certain if this was specifically addressing a known vulnerability.
2. The removal of the inconsistency check could potentially affect time-sensitive operations, but without more context about the TimeStamp implementation, it's difficult to determine if this was a security fix or just a code simplification.
3. There's no clear vulnerability name associated with this change, but it relates to time handling which could be security-relevant in some contexts.

Note: The diff doesn't show any other changes that would indicate additional vulnerabilities. The modification appears focused on this single timing-related check.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.