--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/preferences/tests/browser_cloud_storage.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/preferences/tests/browser_cloud_storage.js@@ -9,11 +9,6 @@   this,   "CloudStorage",   "resource://gre/modules/CloudStorage.jsm"-);-ChromeUtils.defineModuleGetter(-  this,-  "FileUtils",-  "resource://gre/modules/FileUtils.jsm" ); const DROPBOX_DOWNLOAD_FOLDER = "Dropbox";@@ -64,19 +59,20 @@ async function mock_dropbox() {   // Mock Dropbox Download folder in Home directory-  let downloadFolder = FileUtils.getFile("Home", [+  let downloadFolder = PathUtils.join(+    Services.dirsvc.get("Home", Ci.nsIFile).path,     DROPBOX_DOWNLOAD_FOLDER,-    "Downloads",-  ]);-  if (!downloadFolder.exists()) {-    downloadFolder.create(Ci.nsIFile.DIRECTORY_TYPE, FileUtils.PERMS_DIRECTORY);-  }-  console.log(downloadFolder.path);+    "Downloads"+  );-  registerCleanupFunction(() => {-    if (downloadFolder.exists()) {-      downloadFolder.remove(true);-    }+  await IOUtils.makeDirectory(downloadFolder);+  console.log(downloadFolder);++  registerCleanupFunction(async () => {+    await IOUtils.remove(downloadFolder, {+      recursive: true,+      ignoreAbsent: true,+    });   }); }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential File System Permission Issue] [browser/components/preferences/tests/browser_cloud_storage.js] [Lines 9-11 removed, 64-73 modified]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   ChromeUtils.defineModuleGetter(
     this,
     "FileUtils",
     "resource://gre/modules/FileUtils.jsm"
   );
   // ...
   let downloadFolder = FileUtils.getFile("Home", [
     DROPBOX_DOWNLOAD_FOLDER,
     "Downloads",
   ]);
   if (!downloadFolder.exists()) {
     downloadFolder.create(Ci.nsIFile.DIRECTORY_TYPE, FileUtils.PERMS_DIRECTORY);
   }
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   let downloadFolder = PathUtils.join(
     Services.dirsvc.get("Home", Ci.nsIFile).path,
     DROPBOX_DOWNLOAD_FOLDER,
     "Downloads"
   );
   await IOUtils.makeDirectory(downloadFolder);
   ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Resource Cleanup Issue] [browser/components/preferences/tests/browser_cloud_storage.js] [Lines 64-73 modified]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   registerCleanupFunction(() => {
     if (downloadFolder.exists()) {
       downloadFolder.remove(true);
     }
   });
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   registerCleanupFunction(async () => {
     await IOUtils.remove(downloadFolder, {
       recursive: true,
       ignoreAbsent: true,
     });
   });
   ```

The changes appear to modernize the file system operations by:
1. Removing direct FileUtils usage in favor of PathUtils/IOUtils
2. Making cleanup operations more robust with async/await and better error handling
3. Using more modern APIs for directory operations

While these changes improve code quality and maintainability, I can't definitively identify specific security vulnerabilities that were fixed. The modifications might address potential race conditions or file system permission issues, but without more context about the threat model, this is uncertain.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-layout-size-003.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-layout-size-003.html@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-contain-1/#contain-property">   <link rel="match" href="reference/contain-layout-size-003-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <style>   div

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 8]
[Old Code]
  <meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code]
(removed line)

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute
- This appears to be a cleanup change rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerability is associated with empty meta tags or the "flags" attribute
- The change doesn't affect any security-related functionality

Since this is just removing an unused HTML tag with no security implications, I conclude there are no security vulnerabilities being fixed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.clip.destination-in.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.clip.destination-in.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';@@ -24,8 +24,8 @@ ctx.clip(); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 50, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to the variable references in the assertions. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14, 24-25]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't appear to address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.scale.negative.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.scale.negative.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -32,8 +32,8 @@ ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(50, -50, 50, 50); ctx.restore();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely variable name refactoring without any security implications.

Answer for Each Vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.scale.negative.html] [Lines 17-32]
    [Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); etc.]
    [Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); etc.]

The changes simply rename the variable 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas' and update all references to it. This doesn't affect security in any way. The functionality remains identical, only the variable names have changed for better clarity or consistency.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/wasm/WasmModule.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/wasm/WasmModule.cpp@@ -186,8 +186,8 @@     const MetadataTier& metadataTier1 = metadata(Tier::Baseline);-    auto stubs1 = code().codeTier(Tier::Baseline).lazyStubs().lock();-    auto stubs2 = borrowedTier2->lazyStubs().lock();+    auto stubs1 = code().codeTier(Tier::Baseline).lazyStubs().readLock();+    auto stubs2 = borrowedTier2->lazyStubs().writeLock();     MOZ_ASSERT(stubs2->entryStubsEmpty());

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities.

Vulnerability Existed: yes
Race Condition Vulnerability [js/src/wasm/WasmModule.cpp] [Lines 186-187]
[Old Code]
auto stubs1 = code().codeTier(Tier::Baseline).lazyStubs().lock();
auto stubs2 = borrowedTier2->lazyStubs().lock();
[Fixed Code]
auto stubs1 = code().codeTier(Tier::Baseline).lazyStubs().readLock();
auto stubs2 = borrowedTier2->lazyStubs().writeLock();

Additional Details:
The vulnerability appears to be related to improper synchronization when accessing shared resources. The original code used simple locks (lock()) for both operations, which could lead to race conditions or deadlocks. The fix introduces proper read-write lock separation (readLock() for read-only access and writeLock() for write access), which is a more granular and safer approach to concurrency control. This change helps prevent potential race conditions that could occur when multiple threads access the lazy stubs simultaneously.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/compositing/mix-blend-mode/mix-blend-mode-with-transform-and-preserve-3D.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/compositing/mix-blend-mode/mix-blend-mode-with-transform-and-preserve-3D.html@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@         <link rel="author" title="Ion Roșca" href="mailto:[email protected]">         <link rel="reviewer" title="Mihai Țică" href="mailto:[email protected]">         <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.fxtf.org/compositing-1/#mix-blend-mode">-        <meta name="flags" content="">         <meta name="assert" content="Test checks that mix-blend-mode overrides the behavior of transform-style:preserve-3d">         <link rel="match" href="reference/mix-blend-mode-with-transform-and-preserve-3D-ref.html">         <style type="text/css">

Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/compositing/mix-blend-mode/mix-blend-mode-with-transform-and-preserve-3D.html] [Lines 7]
[Old Code]
<meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code]
[Removed line]

Additional Details:
1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which appears to be test configuration related
2. There's no security vulnerability being fixed here - this is just a cleanup of test metadata
3. The change doesn't affect any security-related functionality or introduce/remove any security controls
4. The modification is part of test infrastructure maintenance rather than security patching

No other vulnerabilities or potential security issues were identified in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-round-display/polar-origin-left-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-round-display/polar-origin-left-001.html@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@   <title>CSS Test: Origin of Coordinates</title>   <link rel="author" title="Jihye Hong" href="mailto:[email protected]" />   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/2016/WD-css-round-display-1-20160301/#polar-origin-property" />-  <meta name="flags" content="" />   <meta name="assert" content="Test checks that the origin of the coordinate system specified with 'polar-origin'." />   <style type="text/css">     .container {

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-round-display/polar-origin-left-001.html [Lines] 4
    Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="" />
    Fixed Code: (line removed)

Additional Notes:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag for "flags", which doesn't appear to be security-related
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in this change
- The change is likely related to test configuration rather than security

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit/arm/Trampoline-arm.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit/arm/Trampoline-arm.cpp@@ -926,12 +926,7 @@       break;     case Type_Double:-      if (JitOptions.supportsFloatingPoint) {-        masm.loadDouble(Address(sp, 0), ReturnDoubleReg);-      } else {-        masm.assumeUnreachable(-            "Unable to load into float reg, with no FP support.");-      }+      masm.loadDouble(Address(sp, 0), ReturnDoubleReg);       masm.freeStack(sizeof(double));       break;@@ -980,14 +975,9 @@   masm.pop(temp1);   LiveRegisterSet save;-  if (JitOptions.supportsFloatingPoint) {-    save.set() =-        RegisterSet(GeneralRegisterSet(Registers::VolatileMask),-                    FloatRegisterSet(FloatRegisters::VolatileDoubleMask));-  } else {-    save.set() = RegisterSet(GeneralRegisterSet(Registers::VolatileMask),-                             FloatRegisterSet());-  }+  save.set() =+      RegisterSet(GeneralRegisterSet(Registers::VolatileMask),+                  FloatRegisterSet(FloatRegisters::VolatileDoubleMask));   masm.PushRegsInMask(save);   masm.movePtr(ImmPtr(cx->runtime()), r0);

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Removal of Floating Point Guard] [js/src/jit/arm/Trampoline-arm.cpp] [Lines 926-932]  
   Old Code:  
   ```cpp
   if (JitOptions.supportsFloatingPoint) {
       masm.loadDouble(Address(sp, 0), ReturnDoubleReg);
   } else {
       masm.assumeUnreachable(
           "Unable to load into float reg, with no FP support.");
   }
   ```  
   Fixed Code:  
   ```cpp
   masm.loadDouble(Address(sp, 0), ReturnDoubleReg);
   ```  
   Additional Details: The removal of the floating point support check could potentially lead to issues on systems without FP support, but it's unclear if this constitutes a security vulnerability.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Removal of Floating Point Register Set Guard] [js/src/jit/arm/Trampoline-arm.cpp] [Lines 980-987]  
   Old Code:  
   ```cpp
   if (JitOptions.supportsFloatingPoint) {
       save.set() =
           RegisterSet(GeneralRegisterSet(Registers::VolatileMask),
                       FloatRegisterSet(FloatRegisters::VolatileDoubleMask));
   } else {
       save.set() = RegisterSet(GeneralRegisterSet(Registers::VolatileMask),
                                FloatRegisterSet());
   }
   ```  
   Fixed Code:  
   ```cpp
   save.set() =
       RegisterSet(GeneralRegisterSet(Registers::VolatileMask),
                   FloatRegisterSet(FloatRegisters::VolatileDoubleMask));
   ```  
   Additional Details: Similar to the first case, this removes a conditional check for floating point support when setting up register saves. While this might affect functionality on non-FP systems, it's unclear if this introduces a security vulnerability.

Note: Both changes appear to be related to removing conditional floating point support checks, suggesting the codebase may have moved to requiring FP support. Without more context about the broader changes in Firefox 98, it's difficult to determine if these changes fix or introduce security vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.dirty.rect1.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.dirty.rect1.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50)@@ -26,11 +26,11 @@ ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(40, 20, 20, 20) ctx.putImageData(imgdata, 40, 20, 0, 0, 20, 20);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 35,25, 0,255,0,255, "35,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 65,25, 0,255,0,255, "65,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,15, 0,255,0,255, "50,15", "0,255,0,255", 2);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,45, 0,255,0,255, "50,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 35,25, 0,255,0,255, "35,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 65,25, 0,255,0,255, "65,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,15, 0,255,0,255, "50,15", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,45, 0,255,0,255, "50,45", "0,255,0,255", 2); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't affect the security posture of the code. Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found
    File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.dirty.rect1.worker.js
    Lines: 13-14, 26-30
    Old Code: 
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
    [and similar lines with offscreenCanvas]
    Fixed Code:
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
    [and similar lines with canvas]

The changes simply rename the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` throughout the file, which doesn't impact security. The functionality remains exactly the same.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/version_check/src/lib.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/version_check/src/lib.rs@@ -6,58 +6,68 @@ //! //! # Examples //!-//! Set a `cfg` flag in `build.rs` if the running compiler was determined to be-//! at least version `1.13.0`:-//!-//! ```rust-//! extern crate version_check as rustc;-//!-//! if rustc::is_min_version("1.13.0").unwrap_or(false) {-//!     println!("cargo:rustc-cfg=question_mark_operator");-//! }-//! ```-//!-//! See [`is_max_version`] or [`is_exact_version`] to check if the compiler-//! is _at most_ or _exactly_ a certain version.-//!-//! Check that the running compiler was released on or after `2018-12-18`:-//!-//! ```rust-//! extern crate version_check as rustc;-//!-//! match rustc::is_min_date("2018-12-18") {-//!     Some(true) => "Yep! It's recent!",-//!     Some(false) => "No, it's older.",-//!     None => "Couldn't determine the rustc version."-//! };-//! ```-//!-//! See [`is_max_date`] or [`is_exact_date`] to check if the compiler was-//! released _prior to_ or _exactly on_ a certain date.-//!-//! Check that the running compiler supports feature flags:-//!-//! ```rust-//! extern crate version_check as rustc;-//!-//! match rustc::is_feature_flaggable() {-//!     Some(true) => "Yes! It's a dev or nightly release!",-//!     Some(false) => "No, it's stable or beta.",-//!     None => "Couldn't determine the rustc version."-//! };-//! ```-//!-//! Check that the running compiler is on the stable channel:-//!-//! ```rust-//! extern crate version_check as rustc;-//!-//! match rustc::Channel::read() {-//!     Some(c) if c.is_stable() => format!("Yes! It's stable."),-//!     Some(c) => format!("No, the channel {} is not stable.", c),-//!     None => format!("Couldn't determine the rustc version.")-//! };-//! ```+//! * Set a `cfg` flag in `build.rs` if the running compiler was determined to+//!   be at least version `1.13.0`:+//!+//!   ```rust+//!   extern crate version_check as rustc;+//!+//!   if rustc::is_min_version("1.13.0").unwrap_or(false) {+//!       println!("cargo:rustc-cfg=question_mark_operator");+//!   }+//!   ```+//!+//!   See [`is_max_version`] or [`is_exact_version`] to check if the compiler+//!   is _at most_ or _exactly_ a certain version.+//!+//! * Check that the running compiler was released on or after `2018-12-18`:+//!+//!   ```rust+//!   extern crate version_check as rustc;+//!+//!   match rustc::is_min_date("2018-12-18") {+//!       Some(true) => "Yep! It's recent!",+//!       Some(false) => "No, it's older.",+//!       None => "Couldn't determine the rustc version."+//!   };+//!   ```+//!+//!   See [`is_max_date`] or [`is_exact_date`] to check if the compiler was+//!   released _prior to_ or _exactly on_ a certain date.+//!+//! * Check that the running compiler supports feature flags:+//!+//!   ```rust+//!   extern crate version_check as rustc;+//!+//!   match rustc::is_feature_flaggable() {+//!       Some(true) => "Yes! It's a dev or nightly release!",+//!       Some(false) => "No, it's stable or beta.",+//!       None => "Couldn't determine the rustc version."+//!   };+//!   ```+//!+//! * Check that the running compiler supports a specific feature:+//!+//!   ```rust+//!   extern crate version_check as rustc;+//!+//!   if let Some(true) = rustc::supports_feature("doc_cfg") {+//!      println!("cargo:rustc-cfg=has_doc_cfg");+//!   }+//!   ```+//!+//! * Check that the running compiler is on the stable channel:+//!+//!   ```rust+//!   extern crate version_check as rustc;+//!+//!   match rustc::Channel::read() {+//!       Some(c) if c.is_stable() => format!("Yes! It's stable."),+//!       Some(c) => format!("No, the channel {} is not stable.", c),+//!       None => format!("Couldn't determine the rustc version.")+//!   };+//!   ``` //! //! To interact with the version, release date, and release channel as structs, //! use [`Version`], [`Date`], and [`Channel`], respectively. The [`triple()`]@@ -248,22 +258,76 @@ /// /// In other words, if the channel is either "nightly" or "dev". ///+/// Note that support for specific `rustc` features can be enabled or disabled+/// via the `allow-features` compiler flag, which this function _does not_+/// check. That is, this function _does not_ check whether a _specific_ feature+/// is supported, but instead whether features are supported at all. To check+/// for support for a specific feature, use [`supports_feature()`].+/// /// If the version could not be determined, returns `None`. Otherwise returns /// `true` if the running version supports feature flags and `false` otherwise. pub fn is_feature_flaggable() -> Option<bool> {     Channel::read().map(|c| c.supports_features()) }+/// Checks whether the running or installed `rustc` supports `feature`.+///+/// Returns _true_ _iff_ [`is_feature_flaggable()`] returns `true` _and_ the+/// feature is not disabled via exclusion in `allow-features` via `RUSTFLAGS` or+/// `CARGO_ENCODED_RUSTFLAGS`. If the version could not be determined, returns+/// `None`.+///+/// # Example+///+/// ```rust+/// use version_check as rustc;+///+/// if let Some(true) = rustc::supports_feature("doc_cfg") {+///    println!("cargo:rustc-cfg=has_doc_cfg");+/// }+/// ```+pub fn supports_feature(feature: &str) -> Option<bool> {+    match is_feature_flaggable() {+        Some(true) => { /* continue */ }+        Some(false) => return Some(false),+        None => return None,+    }++    let env_flags = env::var_os("CARGO_ENCODED_RUSTFLAGS")+        .map(|flags| (flags, '\x1f'))+        .or_else(|| env::var_os("RUSTFLAGS").map(|flags| (flags, ' ')));++    if let Some((flags, delim)) = env_flags {+        const ALLOW_FEATURES: &'static str = "allow-features=";++        let rustflags = flags.to_string_lossy();+        let allow_features = rustflags.split(delim)+            .map(|flag| flag.trim_left_matches("-Z").trim())+            .filter(|flag| flag.starts_with(ALLOW_FEATURES))+            .map(|flag| &flag[ALLOW_FEATURES.len()..]);++        if let Some(allow_features) = allow_features.last() {+            return Some(allow_features.split(',').any(|f| f.trim() == feature));+        }+    }++    // If there are no `RUSTFLAGS` or `CARGO_ENCODED_RUSTFLAGS` or they don't+    // contain an `allow-features` flag, assume compiler allows all features.+    Some(true)+}+ #[cfg(test)] mod tests {+    use std::{env, fs};+     use super::version_and_date_from_rustc_version;     use super::version_and_date_from_rustc_verbose_version;     macro_rules! check_parse {         (@ $f:expr, $s:expr => $v:expr, $d:expr) => ({-            if let (Some(v), d) = $f($s) {+            if let (Some(v), d) = $f(&$s) {                 let e_d: Option<&str> = $d.into();-                assert_eq!((v, d), ($v.into(), e_d.map(|s| s.into())));+                assert_eq!((v, d), ($v.to_string(), e_d.map(|s| s.into())));             } else {                 panic!("{:?} didn't parse for version testing.", $s);             }@@ -365,4 +429,65 @@                 release: 1.50.0" => "1.50.0", None,         };     }-}++    fn read_static(verbose: bool, channel: &str, minor: usize) -> String {+        use std::fs::File;+        use std::path::Path;+        use std::io::{BufReader, Read};++        let subdir = if verbose { "verbose" } else { "terse" };+        let path = Path::new(STATIC_PATH)+            .join(channel)+            .join(subdir)+            .join(format!("rustc-1.{}.0", minor));++        let file = File::open(path).unwrap();+        let mut buf_reader = BufReader::new(file);+        let mut contents = String::new();+        buf_reader.read_to_string(&mut contents).unwrap();+        contents+    }++    static STATIC_PATH: &'static str = concat!(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"), "/static");++    static DATES: [&'static str; 51] = [+        "2015-05-13", "2015-06-19", "2015-08-03", "2015-09-15", "2015-10-27",+        "2015-12-04", "2016-01-19", "2016-02-29", "2016-04-11", "2016-05-18",+        "2016-07-03", "2016-08-15", "2016-09-23", "2016-11-07", "2016-12-16",+        "2017-01-19", "2017-03-10", "2017-04-24", "2017-06-06", "2017-07-17",+        "2017-08-27", "2017-10-09", "2017-11-20", "2018-01-01", "2018-02-12",+        "2018-03-25", "2018-05-07", "2018-06-19", "2018-07-30", "2018-09-11",+        "2018-10-24", "2018-12-04", "2019-01-16", "2019-02-28", "2019-04-10",+        "2019-05-20", "2019-07-03", "2019-08-13", "2019-09-23", "2019-11-04",+        "2019-12-16", "2020-01-27", "2020-03-09", "2020-04-20", "2020-06-01",+        "2020-07-13", "2020-08-24", "2020-10-07", "2020-11-16", "2020-12-29",+        "2021-02-10",+    ];++    #[test]+    fn test_stable_compatibility() {+        if env::var_os("FORCE_STATIC").is_none() && fs::metadata(STATIC_PATH).is_err() {+            // We exclude `/static` when we package `version_check`, so don't+            // run if static files aren't present unless we know they should be.+            return;+        }++        // Ensure we can parse all output from all Linux stable releases.+        for v in 0..DATES.len() {+            let (version, date) = (&format!("1.{}.0", v), Some(DATES[v]));+            check_terse_parse!(read_static(false, "stable", v) => version, date,);+            check_verbose_parse!(read_static(true, "stable", v) => version, date,);+        }+    }++    #[test]+    fn test_parse_current() {+        let (version, channel) = (::Version::read(), ::Channel::read());+        assert!(version.is_some());+        assert!(channel.is_some());++        if let Ok(known_channel) = env::var("KNOWN_CHANNEL") {+            assert_eq!(channel, ::Channel::parse(&known_channel));+        }+    }+}

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any direct security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be documentation improvements and feature additions rather than security patches. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Documentation Improvements [third_party/rust/version_check/src/lib.rs] [Lines 6-68]
   [Old documentation format]
   [Improved documentation format with better examples]

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Feature Addition [third_party/rust/version_check/src/lib.rs] [Lines 248-314]
   [Old code without feature-specific checking]
   [Added new supports_feature() function]

The main changes are:
1. Reformatted documentation with better examples and structure
2. Added a new `supports_feature()` function to check for specific Rust feature support
3. Added test cases and infrastructure for more comprehensive testing

These changes appear to be feature enhancements and documentation improvements rather than security fixes. The new `supports_feature()` function adds functionality to check for specific Rust feature support while considering compiler flags, but this doesn't appear to address any specific vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/shared/test/browser_filter-editor-01.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/shared/test/browser_filter-editor-01.js@@ -145,4 +145,6 @@   ok(verifyURL(dataurl), "data URL is valid");   widget.setCssValue(dataurl);   is(widget.getCssValue(), dataurl, "setCssValue should not mangle data urls");++  widget.destroy(); });

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Memory Leak Fix] [devtools/client/shared/test/browser_filter-editor-01.js] [Lines 145-146]
[Old Code]
  ok(verifyURL(dataurl), "data URL is valid");
  widget.setCssValue(dataurl);
  is(widget.getCssValue(), dataurl, "setCssValue should not mangle data urls");
[Fixed Code]
  ok(verifyURL(dataurl), "data URL is valid");
  widget.setCssValue(dataurl);
  is(widget.getCssValue(), dataurl, "setCssValue should not mangle data urls");
  
  widget.destroy();

The change adds a `widget.destroy()` call at the end of the test case. This appears to be a cleanup/fix for potential memory leaks rather than a security vulnerability. The addition ensures proper cleanup of the widget object after the test completes, which is a good practice but doesn't address a specific security issue.

No other vulnerabilities are apparent in this diff. The change is focused on test case maintenance rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-6.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-6.xml@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/>   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body> <address title="foo">

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-6.xml [Lines] 8
   [Old Code]
   <meta name="flags" content="" />
   [Fixed Code]
   (line removed)

Additional details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with this change
- The modification doesn't introduce any security improvements or fixes

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.conic.negative.rotation.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.conic.negative.rotation.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); const g = ctx.createConicGradient(-Math.PI/2, 50, 25); // It's red in the upper right region and green on the lower left region@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ g.addColorStop(0.75, "#f00"); ctx.fillStyle = g; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,15, 255,0,0,255, "25,15", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,40, 0,255,0,255, "75,40", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,15, 255,0,0,255, "25,15", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,40, 0,255,0,255, "75,40", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found
   File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.conic.negative.rotation.html
   Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found
   File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.conic.negative.rotation.html
   Old Code: _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,15, 255,0,0,255, "25,15", "255,0,0,255");
   Fixed Code: _assertPixel(canvas, 25,15, 255,0,0,255, "25,15", "255,0,0,255");

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability. There are no security-related changes or vulnerabilities being addressed in this diff. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has changed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/darling/tests/supports.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/darling/tests/supports.rs@@ -1,16 +1,10 @@-#[macro_use]-extern crate darling;-#[macro_use]-extern crate syn;-#[macro_use]-extern crate quote;--use darling::ast;-use darling::FromDeriveInput;+use darling::{ast, FromDeriveInput, FromVariant}; #[derive(Debug, FromDeriveInput)] #[darling(attributes(from_variants), supports(enum_any))] pub struct Container {+    // The second type parameter can be anything that implements FromField, since+    // FromDeriveInput will produce an error if given a struct.     data: ast::Data<Variant, ()>, }@@ -24,14 +18,16 @@ #[derive(Debug, FromDeriveInput)] #[darling(attributes(from_struct), supports(struct_named))] pub struct StructContainer {+    // The second type parameter can be anything that implements FromVariant, since+    // FromDeriveInput will produce an error if given an enum.     data: ast::Data<(), syn::Field>, } mod source {-    use syn::DeriveInput;+    use syn::{parse_quote, DeriveInput};     pub fn newtype_enum() -> DeriveInput {-        parse_quote!{+        parse_quote! {             enum Hello {                 World(bool),                 String(String),@@ -66,7 +62,8 @@ #[test] fn enum_newtype_or_unit() {     // Should pass-    Container::from_derive_input(&source::newtype_enum()).unwrap();+    let container = Container::from_derive_input(&source::newtype_enum()).unwrap();+    assert!(container.data.is_enum());     // Should error     Container::from_derive_input(&source::named_field_enum()).unwrap_err();@@ -76,7 +73,8 @@ #[test] fn struct_named() {     // Should pass-    StructContainer::from_derive_input(&source::named_struct()).unwrap();+    let container = StructContainer::from_derive_input(&source::named_struct()).unwrap();+    assert!(container.data.is_struct());     // Should fail     StructContainer::from_derive_input(&source::tuple_struct()).unwrap_err();

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any clear security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be primarily code cleanup, documentation improvements, and test enhancements rather than security fixes. Here's my analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability [third_party/rust/darling/tests/supports.rs] [Various lines]
   The changes include:
   - Removal of redundant macro imports
   - Added documentation comments
   - Improved test assertions
   - Code formatting changes

The diff shows improvements in code quality and test robustness, but no security-related fixes. The changes are focused on:
1. Removing unnecessary macro imports
2. Adding clearer documentation about type parameters
3. Making test assertions more explicit
4. Code style improvements (like consistent formatting)

These are all positive changes but don't appear to address any specific security vulnerabilities. The file is a test file for a Rust crate (darling), and the changes are focused on test improvements rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-76b.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-76b.xml@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/>   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body> <p>This paragraph should be unstyled.</p>

Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 9]
[Old Code]
<meta name="flags" content="" />
[Fixed Code]
(removed line)

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which doesn't appear to have any security implications
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerability patterns are present in this change
- The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive functionality

Note: While this doesn't represent a security fix, it's good practice to remove unnecessary tags from HTML documents for maintainability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/naga/src/span.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/naga/src/span.rs@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ pub type SpanContext = (Span, String); /// Wrapper class for [`Error`], augmenting it with a list of [`SpanContext`]s.-#[derive(Debug)]+#[derive(Debug, Clone)] pub struct WithSpan<E> {     inner: E,     #[cfg(feature = "span")]

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Missing Clone Implementation [third_party/rust/naga/src/span.rs] [Lines 73-77]
[Old Code]
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct WithSpan<E> {
    inner: E,
    #[cfg(feature = "span")]
[Fixed Code]
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct WithSpan<E> {
    inner: E,
    #[cfg(feature = "span")]

Additional Details:
- The change adds the Clone trait derivation to the WithSpan struct
- While not directly a security vulnerability, missing Clone implementation could potentially lead to workarounds that might introduce security issues in derived code
- The exact security impact depends on how this struct is used in the codebase
- The change appears to be more of a functionality improvement than a direct security fix

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/quote/src/format.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/quote/src/format.rs@@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ /// of format types to traits is: /// /// * `{}` ⇒ [`IdentFragment`]-/// * `{:o}` ⇒ [`Octal`](`std::fmt::Octal`)-/// * `{:x}` ⇒ [`LowerHex`](`std::fmt::LowerHex`)-/// * `{:X}` ⇒ [`UpperHex`](`std::fmt::UpperHex`)-/// * `{:b}` ⇒ [`Binary`](`std::fmt::Binary`)+/// * `{:o}` ⇒ [`Octal`](std::fmt::Octal)+/// * `{:x}` ⇒ [`LowerHex`](std::fmt::LowerHex)+/// * `{:X}` ⇒ [`UpperHex`](std::fmt::UpperHex)+/// * `{:b}` ⇒ [`Binary`](std::fmt::Binary) /// /// See [`std::fmt`] for more information. ///@@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ ///    unsigned integers and strings. /// * [`Ident`] arguments will have their `r#` prefixes stripped, if present. ///-/// [`Ident`]: `proc_macro2::Ident`+/// [`IdentFragment`]: crate::IdentFragment+/// [`Ident`]: proc_macro2::Ident /// /// <br> ///@@ -59,8 +60,8 @@ /// format_ident!("MyIdent", span = my_span); /// ``` ///-/// [`Span`]: `proc_macro2::Span`-/// [`Span::call_site`]: `proc_macro2::Span::call_site`+/// [`Span`]: proc_macro2::Span+/// [`Span::call_site`]: proc_macro2::Span::call_site /// /// <p><br></p> ///

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be documentation improvements and formatting updates rather than security-related fixes.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Documentation formatting improvements] [third_party/rust/quote/src/format.rs] [Multiple lines]
[Old Code with backtick-wrapped links]
[Fixed Code with standard markdown links]

The changes consist of:
1. Updating documentation link formatting from backtick-wrapped to standard markdown syntax
2. Adding missing documentation for IdentFragment
3. Standardizing link formatting throughout the documentation

These are purely documentation improvements with no security implications. The functionality of the code remains unchanged.

No other vulnerabilities were identified in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-170a.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-170a.xml@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->   <link rel="match" href="reference/this-line-green-color.xht"/>-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body>    <p class="span">This line should be green.</p>

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 9]
   [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="" />
   [Fixed Code] (line removed)

Additional details:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute. This doesn't appear to be a security-related change.
- The change seems to be a cleanup of unnecessary markup rather than a security fix.
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with this change.
- The file appears to be a CSS selector test case, and the modification doesn't affect security aspects.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/docs/performance/automated_performance_testing_and_sheriffing.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/docs/performance/automated_performance_testing_and_sheriffing.md@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ -   [Talos](https://wiki.mozilla.org/TestEngineering/Performance/Talos): The main     performance system, run on virtually every check-in to an     integration branch--   [build_metrics](/setup/configuring_build_options.html):+-   [build_metrics](/setup/configuring_build_options.rst):     A grab bag of performance metrics generated by the build system -   [AreWeFastYet](https://arewefastyet.com/): A generic JavaScript and     Web benchmarking system

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   File Extension Change [File] docs/performance/automated_performance_testing_and_sheriffing.md [Lines] 15
   Old Code: `[build_metrics](/setup/configuring_build_options.html):`
   Fixed Code: `[build_metrics](/setup/configuring_build_options.rst):`
   
   Additional Details: This appears to be a simple documentation update changing a file extension reference from .html to .rst (reStructuredText). There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed here - it's likely just a documentation maintenance change to reflect the actual file format being used.

The change doesn't show any signs of fixing security issues. It's purely a documentation link update with no security implications. No known vulnerabilities are associated with this type of change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-025.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-025.html@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@       -ms-column-fill: auto;   -webkit-column-fill: auto;           column-fill: auto;-  border: 2px dashed;+  border: 2px solid salmon;   margin-bottom: 5px; }

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The change appears to be purely cosmetic/style-related, modifying the border style from dashed to solid salmon color. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-025.html] [Lines 23]
[Old Code: border: 2px dashed;]
[Fixed Code: border: 2px solid salmon;]

This change doesn't appear to address any security issues but rather modifies the visual presentation of the element. The modification is in a test file (reftest) which typically doesn't contain security-sensitive code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.