--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/glean/docs/dev/updating_parser.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/glean/docs/dev/updating_parser.md@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ ## Version mismatch of the Python dependencies The logic for handling version mismatches is very similar to the one for the Rust crates.-See [Updating the Glean SDK](updating_sdk.html) for details.+See [Updating the Glean SDK](updating_sdk.md) for details. However, updating Python packages also requires to think about Python 3.5 (and Python 2, still) compatibility. ## Keeping versions in sync

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 21]
   Old Code: `See [Updating the Glean SDK](updating_sdk.html) for details.`
   Fixed Code: `See [Updating the Glean SDK](updating_sdk.md) for details.`

Additional Details:
- The change is purely documentation-related, updating a link from .html to .md extension
- No security implications were found in this change
- The modification appears to be part of documentation maintenance rather than a security fix

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/common/dispatcher/dispatcher.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/common/dispatcher/dispatcher.js@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@   //   `execute_script()` returns a rejected Promise with the error's   //   `message`.   //   Note that currently the type of error (e.g. DOMException) is not-  //   preserved.+  //   preserved, except for `TypeError`.   // The values should be able to be serialized by JSON.stringify().   async execute_script(fn, args) {     const receiver = token();@@ -117,6 +117,9 @@     }     // exception+    if (response.name === 'TypeError') {+      throw new TypeError(response.value);+    }     throw new Error(response.value);   }@@ -180,6 +183,7 @@       } catch(e) {         response = JSON.stringify({           status: 'exception',+          name: e.name,           value: e.message         });       }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Information Leakage] [testing/web-platform/tests/common/dispatcher/dispatcher.js] [Lines 117-120, 183]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   throw new Error(response.value);
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   if (response.name === 'TypeError') {
       throw new TypeError(response.value);
   }
   throw new Error(response.value);
   ```  
   Additional Details: The change adds special handling for TypeError while maintaining generic error handling. While not clearly a security fix, it could prevent potential information leakage by properly preserving error types.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Error Handling Improvement] [testing/web-platform/tests/common/dispatcher/dispatcher.js] [Lines 180-183]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   response = JSON.stringify({
       status: 'exception',
       value: e.message
   });
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   response = JSON.stringify({
       status: 'exception',
       name: e.name,
       value: e.message
   });
   ```  
   Additional Details: The change adds error name preservation in exception handling. While this improves error reporting, it's not clear if this fixes a specific vulnerability or is just a general improvement.

Note: The changes appear to be more about improving error handling and type preservation rather than fixing clear security vulnerabilities. The modifications enhance the precision of error reporting but don't obviously address any known vulnerability patterns.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/polygon/shape-outside-polygon-019.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/polygon/shape-outside-polygon-019.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/">   <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#supported-basic-shapes">   <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-polygon-019-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Test the boxes are wrapping around the right float shape defined by the polygon(60px 20px, 100px 60px, 20px 60px, 60px 100px) border-box value under horizontal-tb writing-mode.">   <style>   .container {

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 9]
[Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code] (line removed)

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No actual security vulnerability is being addressed here
- The modification doesn't relate to any known vulnerability patterns

The change is purely cosmetic/cleanup in nature, removing an unused or unnecessary meta tag from the test file. There's no indication this was related to any security issue.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/accessible/tests/mochitest/events/test_focus_selects.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/accessible/tests/mochitest/events/test_focus_selects.html@@ -100,26 +100,6 @@       synthesizeKey("VK_DOWN");       await p;-      p = waitForEvent(EVENT_FOCUS, "cb_apple");-      // current selected item is focused when combobox is expanded-      synthesizeKey("VK_DOWN", { altKey: true });-      await p;--      p = waitForEvents({-        expected: [-          [EVENT_SELECTION, "cb_orange"],-          stateChangeEventArgs("cb_orange", EXT_STATE_ACTIVE, true, true),-        ],-      });-      // selected item is focused for expanded combobox-      synthesizeKey("VK_UP");-      await p;--      p = waitForEvent(EVENT_FOCUS, "combobox");-      // collapsed combobx keeps a focus-      synthesizeKey("VK_ESCAPE");-      await p;-       // no focus events for unfocused list controls when current item is       // changed@@ -141,14 +121,14 @@       p = waitForEvents({         expected: [-          [EVENT_SELECTION, "cb_apple"],-          stateChangeEventArgs("cb_apple", EXT_STATE_ACTIVE, true, true),+          [EVENT_SELECTION, "cb_orange"],+          stateChangeEventArgs("cb_orange", EXT_STATE_ACTIVE, true, true),         ],         unexpected: [[EVENT_FOCUS]],       });       // An unfocused selectable combobox gets selection change events,       // and active state change events, but not focus.-      getNode("cb_apple").selected = true;+      getNode("cb_orange").selected = true;       await p;       SimpleTest.finish();

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: no
This appears to be a test file modification rather than a security fix. The changes involve:
1. Removing some test cases for combobox focus behavior
2. Changing test expectations from "cb_apple" to "cb_orange"
3. Modifying the test to verify selection changes without focus events

The changes seem to be related to test case refinement rather than addressing any specific security vulnerability. The modifications are focused on adjusting test expectations and removing redundant test cases, not fixing any security issues.

No specific vulnerability names are applicable here as this is test code modification without security implications. The changes appear to be part of normal test maintenance and refinement.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.nonfinite.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.nonfinite.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { ctx.getImageData(Infinity, 10, 10, 10); }); assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { ctx.getImageData(-Infinity, 10, 10, 10); });

Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis following the required format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.nonfinite.html] [Lines 17-18]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Notes:
1. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (offscreenCanvas → canvas) with no security implications.
2. The test continues to check for proper error handling of non-finite values in getImageData calls.
3. No actual security vulnerability is being fixed in this diff - it's likely just a code style/consistency improvement.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.stack.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.stack.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.lineWidth = 1; ctx.save();

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 13-14]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- This appears to be a simple variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security vulnerability is being fixed here, just a code style/consistency change
- The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name changed
- No security-related APIs or patterns were modified

No other vulnerabilities or changes were detected in this diff. The modification is purely cosmetic and doesn't affect the security posture of the code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/tools/profiler/core/PageInformation.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/tools/profiler/core/PageInformation.cpp@@ -10,11 +10,13 @@ PageInformation::PageInformation(uint64_t aTabID, uint64_t aInnerWindowID,                                  const nsCString& aUrl,-                                 uint64_t aEmbedderInnerWindowID)+                                 uint64_t aEmbedderInnerWindowID,+                                 bool aIsPrivateBrowsing)     : mTabID(aTabID),       mInnerWindowID(aInnerWindowID),       mUrl(aUrl),-      mEmbedderInnerWindowID(aEmbedderInnerWindowID) {}+      mEmbedderInnerWindowID(aEmbedderInnerWindowID),+      mIsPrivateBrowsing(aIsPrivateBrowsing) {} bool PageInformation::Equals(PageInformation* aOtherPageInfo) const {   // It's enough to check inner window IDs because they are unique for each@@ -32,6 +34,7 @@   aWriter.DoubleProperty("innerWindowID", InnerWindowID());   aWriter.StringProperty("url", Url());   aWriter.DoubleProperty("embedderInnerWindowID", EmbedderInnerWindowID());+  aWriter.BoolProperty("isPrivateBrowsing", IsPrivateBrowsing());   aWriter.EndObject(); }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Information Leak] [tools/profiler/core/PageInformation.cpp] [Lines 10-16, 32-36]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   PageInformation::PageInformation(uint64_t aTabID, uint64_t aInnerWindowID,
                                    const nsCString& aUrl,
                                    uint64_t aEmbedderInnerWindowID)
       : mTabID(aTabID),
         mInnerWindowID(aInnerWindowID),
         mUrl(aUrl),
         mEmbedderInnerWindowID(aEmbedderInnerWindowID) {}
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   PageInformation::PageInformation(uint64_t aTabID, uint64_t aInnerWindowID,
                                    const nsCString& aUrl,
                                    uint64_t aEmbedderInnerWindowID,
                                    bool aIsPrivateBrowsing)
       : mTabID(aTabID),
         mInnerWindowID(aInnerWindowID),
         mUrl(aUrl),
         mEmbedderInnerWindowID(aEmbedderInnerWindowID),
         mIsPrivateBrowsing(aIsPrivateBrowsing) {}
   ```

   Additional Details: The change adds private browsing information to the profiler's page information. While not a clear vulnerability, this could potentially expose private browsing state information that wasn't previously available. The security impact depends on how this information is used elsewhere in the system.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Information Disclosure] [tools/profiler/core/PageInformation.cpp] [Lines 32-36]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   aWriter.DoubleProperty("innerWindowID", InnerWindowID());
   aWriter.StringProperty("url", Url());
   aWriter.DoubleProperty("embedderInnerWindowID", EmbedderInnerWindowID());
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   aWriter.DoubleProperty("innerWindowID", InnerWindowID());
   aWriter.StringProperty("url", Url());
   aWriter.DoubleProperty("embedderInnerWindowID", EmbedderInnerWindowID());
   aWriter.BoolProperty("isPrivateBrowsing", IsPrivateBrowsing());
   ```  

   Additional Details: The change adds private browsing status to the profiler's JSON output. This could be considered an information disclosure if the profiler output is accessible to unauthorized parties, though this would depend on the broader system context.

Note: These are not clear-cut vulnerabilities but rather potential information exposure issues. The actual security impact would depend on how this information is used and who has access to the profiler data.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.baseline.default.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.baseline.default.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); _assertSame(ctx.textBaseline, 'alphabetic', "ctx.textBaseline", "'alphabetic'"); t.done();

Analyzing the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.baseline.default.worker.js [Lines] 13-14
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   
   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) with no security implications. No known vulnerabilities are addressed by this change. The modification seems to be for code consistency or readability rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.repeat.case.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.repeat.case.html@@ -17,10 +17,10 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-assert_throws_dom("SYNTAX_ERR", function() { ctx.createPattern(offscreenCanvas, "Repeat"); });+assert_throws_dom("SYNTAX_ERR", function() { ctx.createPattern(canvas, "Repeat"); }); t.done(); });

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-20]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   assert_throws_dom("SYNTAX_ERR", function() { ctx.createPattern(offscreenCanvas, "Repeat"); });
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   assert_throws_dom("SYNTAX_ERR", function() { ctx.createPattern(canvas, "Repeat"); });
   ```

The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) with no security implications. The test continues to check for the same expected behavior (SYNTAX_ERR when using "Repeat" instead of the correct "repeat" case). No security vulnerabilities are addressed in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/nss/tests/cipher/cipher.sh+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/nss/tests/cipher/cipher.sh@@ -52,6 +52,22 @@   fi }+############################## cipher_ecdsa #############################+# local shell function to test NSS ciphers+# it is a modified version of the cipher_main function+# the function does not use the -1 -2 offsets+# because ./bltest -T -m ecdsa -S -d returns the self-test of all test vectors provided+########################################################################+cipher_ecdsa()+{+  echo "bltest -T -m $PARAM -d $CIPHERTESTDIR"+  ${PROFTOOL} ${BINDIR}/bltest${PROG_SUFFIX} -T -m $PARAM -d $CIPHERTESTDIR+  if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then+      html_msg 1 $EXP_RET "$TESTNAME"+      echo "$failedStr"+  fi+}    + ############################## cipher_main ############################# # local shell function to test NSS ciphers ########################################################################@@ -64,27 +80,31 @@           TESTNAME=`echo $TESTNAME | sed -e "s/_/ /g"`           echo "$SCRIPTNAME: $TESTNAME --------------------------------"           failedStr=""-          inOff=0           res=0-          while [ $inOff -lt 8 ]-          do-             outOff=0-             while [ $outOff -lt 8 ]-             do-                 echo "bltest -T -m $PARAM -d $CIPHERTESTDIR -1 $inOff -2 $outOff"-                 ${PROFTOOL} ${BINDIR}/bltest${PROG_SUFFIX} -T -m $PARAM -d $CIPHERTESTDIR -1 $inOff -2 $outOff-                 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then-                     failedStr="$failedStr[$inOff:$outOff]"-                 fi-                 outOff=`expr $outOff + 1`-             done-             inOff=`expr $inOff + 1`-          done-          if [ -n "$failedStr" ]; then-              html_msg 1 $EXP_RET "$TESTNAME (Failed in/out offset pairs:" \-                        " $failedStr)"+          if [[ "$TESTNAME" == "ECDSA Sign"  || "$TESTNAME" == "ECDSA Verify" ]] ; then+              cipher_ecdsa           else-              html_msg $res $EXP_RET "$TESTNAME"+              inOff=0+              while [ $inOff -lt 8 ]+              do+                 outOff=0+                 while [ $outOff -lt 8 ]+                 do+                     echo "bltest -T -m $PARAM -d $CIPHERTESTDIR -1 $inOff -2 $outOff"+                     ${PROFTOOL} ${BINDIR}/bltest${PROG_SUFFIX} -T -m $PARAM -d $CIPHERTESTDIR -1 $inOff -2 $outOff+                     if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then+                         failedStr="$failedStr[$inOff:$outOff]"+                     fi+                     outOff=`expr $outOff + 1`+                 done+                 inOff=`expr $inOff + 1`+              done+              if [ -n "$failedStr" ]; then+                  html_msg 1 $EXP_RET "$TESTNAME (Failed in/out offset pairs:" \+                            " $failedStr)"+              else+                  html_msg $res $EXP_RET "$TESTNAME"+              fi           fi       fi   done < ${CIPHER_TXT}

Analyzing the provided code diff, here are the potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential ECDSA Testing Improvement] [security/nss/tests/cipher/cipher.sh] [Lines 52-80]
   [Old Code]
   The original code tested all ciphers with offset parameters (-1 and -2) without special handling for ECDSA
   
   [Fixed Code]
   Added special handling for ECDSA tests (cipher_ecdsa function) that doesn't use offsets, and modified cipher_main to use this function for ECDSA tests

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Offset Testing Issue] [security/nss/tests/cipher/cipher.sh] [Lines 64-80]
   [Old Code]
   The code tested all cipher operations with varying input/output offsets (0-7) without exception
   
   [Fixed Code]
   Modified to skip offset testing for ECDSA operations while maintaining it for other cipher operations

Note: While these changes appear to be test improvements rather than direct security fixes, they might relate to:
- More accurate testing of ECDSA operations (which could have security implications if the original tests were inadequate)
- Removal of potentially problematic offset testing for ECDSA (which might have caused false negatives)
However, without additional context about why these changes were made, I can't definitively identify specific vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-cascade/revert-val-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-cascade/revert-val-001.html@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-cascade-4/#default">   <link rel="help" href="https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/rendering.html#flow-content-3">   <link rel="match" href="reference/ref-filled-green-100px-square.xht">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="On a <div>, display:revert should compute to display:block per the default styles for <div>s in the UA stylesheet.">   <style> #outer {

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-cascade/revert-val-001.html [Lines 7]
Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">
Fixed Code: (line removed)

Additional Details:
- This appears to be a simple test file modification where an empty meta tag was removed
- The change doesn't relate to any security-sensitive functionality
- No known vulnerability patterns are present in this change
- The modification seems to be a cleanup of test metadata rather than a security fix

The diff shows only the removal of an empty meta tag that wasn't serving any security-relevant purpose, so no security vulnerability was addressed here.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/netmonitor/src/actions/http-custom-request.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/netmonitor/src/actions/http-custom-request.js@@ -8,15 +8,33 @@   OPEN_ACTION_BAR,   SELECT_ACTION_BAR_TAB,   PANELS,+  RIGHT_CLICK_REQUEST,+  PRESELECT_REQUEST, } = require("devtools/client/netmonitor/src/constants");+const {+  selectRequest,+} = require("devtools/client/netmonitor/src/actions/selection");++const {+  openNetworkDetails,+} = require("devtools/client/netmonitor/src/actions/ui");++const {+  getRequestByChannelId,+} = require("devtools/client/netmonitor/src/selectors/index"); /**  * Open the entire HTTP Custom Request panel  * @returns {Function}  */-function openHTTPCustomRequest() {+function openHTTPCustomRequest(isOpen) {   return ({ dispatch, getState }) => {-    dispatch({ type: OPEN_ACTION_BAR, open: true });+    dispatch({ type: OPEN_ACTION_BAR, open: isOpen });++    dispatch({+      type: SELECT_ACTION_BAR_TAB,+      id: PANELS.HTTP_CUSTOM_REQUEST,+    });   }; }@@ -32,6 +50,9 @@       state.ui.selectedActionBarTabId === PANELS.HTTP_CUSTOM_REQUEST;     dispatch({ type: OPEN_ACTION_BAR, open: !shouldClose });+    // reset the right clicked request+    dispatch({ type: RIGHT_CLICK_REQUEST, id: null });+     dispatch({       type: SELECT_ACTION_BAR_TAB,       id: PANELS.HTTP_CUSTOM_REQUEST,@@ -39,7 +60,50 @@   }; }+/**+ * Send a new HTTP request using the data in the custom request form.+ */+function sendHTTPCustomRequest(connector, request) {+  return async ({ dispatch, getState }) => {+    if (!request) {+      return;+    }++    // Send a new HTTP request using the data in the custom request form+    const data = {+      cause: request.cause || {},+      url: request.url,+      method: request.method,+      httpVersion: request.httpVersion,+    };++    if (request.headers) {+      data.headers = request.headers;+    }++    if (request.requestPostData) {+      data.body = request.requestPostData.postData?.text;+    }++    const { channelId } = await connector.sendHTTPRequest(data);++    const newRequest = getRequestByChannelId(getState(), channelId);+    // If the new custom request is available already select the request, else+    // preselect the request.+    if (newRequest) {+      await dispatch(selectRequest(newRequest.id));+    } else {+      await dispatch({+        type: PRESELECT_REQUEST,+        id: channelId,+      });+    }+    dispatch(openNetworkDetails(true));+  };+}+ module.exports = {   openHTTPCustomRequest,   toggleHTTPCustomRequestPanel,+  sendHTTPCustomRequest, };

I'll analyze the code diff for security vulnerabilities following the specified format.

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Insecure Direct Object Reference] [devtools/client/netmonitor/src/actions/http-custom-request.js] [Lines 63-97]  
   [Old Code] (No previous implementation of sendHTTPCustomRequest existed)  
   [Fixed Code] (New implementation that handles HTTP requests with channel IDs)  
   Additional Details: The new sendHTTPCustomRequest function handles channel IDs which could potentially be manipulated if not properly validated, though the actual risk depends on the connector implementation.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Missing Input Validation] [devtools/client/netmonitor/src/actions/http-custom-request.js] [Lines 63-97]  
   [Old Code] (No previous implementation)  
   [Fixed Code] (New implementation that accepts request object without explicit validation)  
   Additional Details: The function accepts a request object but doesn't show explicit validation of the URL, headers, or body content which could potentially lead to security issues if malicious input is provided.

3. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   [No specific vulnerability] [devtools/client/netmonitor/src/actions/http-custom-request.js] [Lines 8-15]  
   [Old Code] (Basic constants import)  
   [Fixed Code] (Added new constants and action imports)  
   Additional Details: These changes appear to be functional additions rather than security fixes.

The analysis shows no clear security vulnerabilities that were fixed, but there are some potential security considerations in the new code that would depend on how the connector and other components handle the data. The changes appear to be primarily functional additions rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/media/libwebp/src/utils/utils.c+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/media/libwebp/src/utils/utils.c@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ // alloc/free etc) is printed. For debugging/tuning purpose only (it's slow, // and not multi-thread safe!). // An interesting alternative is valgrind's 'massif' tool:-//    http://valgrind.org/docs/manual/ms-manual.html+//    https://valgrind.org/docs/manual/ms-manual.html // Here is an example command line: /*    valgrind --tool=massif --massif-out-file=massif.out \                --stacks=yes --alloc-fn=WebPSafeMalloc --alloc-fn=WebPSafeCalloc

Here's the analysis following the required format:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Insecure URL][File] media/libwebp/src/utils/utils.c [Lines 23]
[Old Code]
    //    http://valgrind.org/docs/manual/ms-manual.html
[Fixed Code]
    //    https://valgrind.org/docs/manual/ms-manual.html

Additional Details:
- The change involves updating a URL reference from HTTP to HTTPS
- While this isn't a direct security vulnerability in the code itself, it improves security by using encrypted connections when referencing external documentation
- The original HTTP link could potentially be subject to man-in-the-middle attacks if someone followed it
- This is more of a security best practice improvement than a vulnerability fix

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.fill.maxWidth.negative.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.fill.maxWidth.negative.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);

Analyzing the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.fill.maxWidth.negative.worker.js] [Lines 13-14]
    Old Code:
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    
    Fixed Code:
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Notes:
- The change appears to be purely a variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security-related changes or vulnerability fixes are evident in this diff
- The modification seems to be for code consistency or readability rather than security

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/java/org/mozilla/gecko/process/GeckoProcessType.java+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/java/org/mozilla/gecko/process/GeckoProcessType.java@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@   RDD("rdd"),   SOCKET("socket"),   REMOTESANDBOXBROKER("sandboxbroker"),-  FORKSERVER("forkserver");+  FORKSERVER("forkserver"),+  UTILITY("utility");   private final String mGeckoName;

Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security fixes being made. The change appears to be simply adding a new enum value "UTILITY" to the GeckoProcessType class. Here's my analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No Security Vulnerability Found [File] [Lines 19-20]
[Old Code]
  FORKSERVER("forkserver");
[Fixed Code]
  FORKSERVER("forkserver"),
  UTILITY("utility");

This appears to be a feature addition rather than a security fix. The change simply extends the enum to include a new process type called "utility" without modifying any existing security-related functionality. No vulnerabilities are being addressed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/layers/ipc/ImageBridgeChild.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/layers/ipc/ImageBridgeChild.cpp@@ -822,7 +822,7 @@ PTextureChild* ImageBridgeChild::CreateTexture(     const SurfaceDescriptor& aSharedData, ReadLockDescriptor&& aReadLock,     LayersBackend aLayersBackend, TextureFlags aFlags, uint64_t aSerial,-    wr::MaybeExternalImageId& aExternalImageId, nsISerialEventTarget* aTarget) {+    wr::MaybeExternalImageId& aExternalImageId) {   MOZ_ASSERT(CanSend());   return SendPTextureConstructor(aSharedData, std::move(aReadLock),                                  aLayersBackend, aFlags, aSerial,

I'll analyze the provided code diff according to the specified format.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Parameter Removal Vulnerability] [gfx/layers/ipc/ImageBridgeChild.cpp] [Lines 822-827]
[Old Code]
PTextureChild* ImageBridgeChild::CreateTexture(
    const SurfaceDescriptor& aSharedData, ReadLockDescriptor&& aReadLock,
    LayersBackend aLayersBackend, TextureFlags aFlags, uint64_t aSerial,
    wr::MaybeExternalImageId& aExternalImageId, nsISerialEventTarget* aTarget) {
[Fixed Code]
PTextureChild* ImageBridgeChild::CreateTexture(
    const SurfaceDescriptor& aSharedData, ReadLockDescriptor&& aReadLock,
    LayersBackend aLayersBackend, TextureFlags aFlags, uint64_t aSerial,
    wr::MaybeExternalImageId& aExternalImageId) {

Additional Details:
- The change removes the `nsISerialEventTarget* aTarget` parameter from the function signature
- Without more context about how this parameter was used, it's difficult to determine if this was a security fix
- The removal could potentially affect thread safety or event handling, but we can't confirm a specific vulnerability from this diff alone
- This might be related to thread synchronization or resource management improvements

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.shape.4.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.shape.4.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,11 +27,11 @@ ctx.beginPath(); ctx.arc(-50, 50, 100, 0, -Math.PI/2, true); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where a variable name was changed from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability. Here's the analysis following your format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.shape.4.html] [Lines 17-27]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes don't affect security in any way - they're just variable renaming and don't modify any security-relevant behavior or functionality. The test assertions remain the same, just using the new variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/intl/l10n/Localization.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/intl/l10n/Localization.cpp@@ -458,8 +458,10 @@   NS_DECL_ISUPPORTS   explicit PromiseResolver(Promise* aPromise);-  void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override;-  void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override;+  void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+                        ErrorResult& aRv) override;+  void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+                        ErrorResult& aRv) override;  protected:   virtual ~PromiseResolver();@@ -477,12 +479,14 @@ PromiseResolver::PromiseResolver(Promise* aPromise) { mPromise = aPromise; } void PromiseResolver::ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx,-                                       JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) {+                                       JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+                                       ErrorResult& aRv) {   mPromise->MaybeResolveWithClone(aCx, aValue); } void PromiseResolver::RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx,-                                       JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) {+                                       JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+                                       ErrorResult& aRv) {   mPromise->MaybeRejectWithClone(aCx, aValue); }

Here's the analysis following the requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Error Handling Improvement] [intl/l10n/Localization.cpp] [Lines 458-459, 477-485]
[Old Code]
void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override;
void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override;

void PromiseResolver::ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx,
                                       JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) {
  mPromise->MaybeResolveWithClone(aCx, aValue);
}

void PromiseResolver::RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx,
                                       JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) {
  mPromise->MaybeRejectWithClone(aCx, aValue);
}
[Fixed Code]
void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,
                        ErrorResult& aRv) override;
void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,
                        ErrorResult& aRv) override;

void PromiseResolver::ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx,
                                       JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,
                                       ErrorResult& aRv) {
  mPromise->MaybeResolveWithClone(aCx, aValue);
}

void PromiseResolver::RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx,
                                       JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,
                                       ErrorResult& aRv) {
  mPromise->MaybeRejectWithClone(aCx, aValue);
}

Additional Details:
The main change is the addition of ErrorResult& parameters to the callback methods. While this doesn't appear to fix a specific known vulnerability, it improves error handling which could potentially prevent uncaught exceptions or error conditions. The change suggests better error propagation in promise resolution/rejection scenarios, which might help prevent edge cases where errors could be silently ignored. However, without more context about the specific issues this was meant to address, we can't definitively say this fixes a security vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/localstorage/LSValue.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/localstorage/LSValue.cpp@@ -69,19 +69,26 @@     if (CompressionType::UNCOMPRESSED != compressionType) {       nsCString buffer;       MOZ_ASSERT(CompressionType::SNAPPY == compressionType);-      MOZ_ALWAYS_TRUE(SnappyUncompress(aValue.mBuffer, buffer));+      if (NS_WARN_IF(!SnappyUncompress(aValue.mBuffer, buffer))) {+        buffer.Truncate();+      }       return buffer;     }+     return aValue.mBuffer;   }();   if (ConversionType::NONE != conversionType) {     MOZ_ASSERT(ConversionType::UTF16_UTF8 == conversionType);-    MOZ_ALWAYS_TRUE(CopyUTF8toUTF16(uncompressed, mBuffer, fallible));+    if (NS_WARN_IF(!CopyUTF8toUTF16(uncompressed, mBuffer, fallible))) {+      mBuffer.SetIsVoid(true);+    }     return;   }-  MOZ_ALWAYS_TRUE(PutCStringBytesToString(uncompressed, mBuffer));+  if (NS_WARN_IF(!PutCStringBytesToString(uncompressed, mBuffer))) {+    mBuffer.SetIsVoid(true);+  } } bool LSValue::InitFromString(const nsAString& aBuffer) {

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
   Error Handling Vulnerability [dom/localstorage/LSValue.cpp] [Lines 69-98]  
   Old Code:  
   ```cpp
   MOZ_ALWAYS_TRUE(SnappyUncompress(aValue.mBuffer, buffer));
   MOZ_ALWAYS_TRUE(CopyUTF8toUTF16(uncompressed, mBuffer, fallible));
   MOZ_ALWAYS_TRUE(PutCStringBytesToString(uncompressed, mBuffer));
   ```  
   Fixed Code:  
   ```cpp
   if (NS_WARN_IF(!SnappyUncompress(aValue.mBuffer, buffer))) {
     buffer.Truncate();
   }
   if (NS_WARN_IF(!CopyUTF8toUTF16(uncompressed, mBuffer, fallible))) {
     mBuffer.SetIsVoid(true);
   }
   if (NS_WARN_IF(!PutCStringBytesToString(uncompressed, mBuffer))) {
     mBuffer.SetIsVoid(true);
   }
   ```

Additional Details:  
The vulnerability addressed here is related to improper error handling. The original code used `MOZ_ALWAYS_TRUE` which would crash the application if the operations failed (via MOZ_CRASH). The fixed version properly handles error cases by:
1. Truncating the buffer when decompression fails
2. Setting the buffer to void when string conversion fails
3. Setting the buffer to void when string copy fails

This prevents potential crashes from malformed input data and provides more graceful failure handling, which is important for security as it prevents denial of service scenarios and potential memory corruption issues that could arise from unhandled error conditions.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/manager/ssl/VerifySSLServerCertParent.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/manager/ssl/VerifySSLServerCertParent.h@@ -30,8 +30,7 @@   VerifySSLServerCertParent();-  bool Dispatch(const ByteArray& aServerCert,-                nsTArray<ByteArray>&& aPeerCertChain,+  bool Dispatch(nsTArray<ByteArray>&& aPeerCertChain,                 const nsCString& aHostName, const int32_t& aPort,                 const OriginAttributes& aOriginAttributes,                 const Maybe<ByteArray>& aStapledOCSPResponse,

Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Parameter Removal] [security/manager/ssl/VerifySSLServerCertParent.h] [Lines 30-31]
[Old Code]
bool Dispatch(const ByteArray& aServerCert,
                nsTArray<ByteArray>&& aPeerCertChain,
[Fixed Code]
bool Dispatch(nsTArray<ByteArray>&& aPeerCertChain,

Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of the `aServerCert` parameter from the `Dispatch` method
- Without more context about how this parameter was used, it's unclear if this was fixing a security vulnerability
- Possible reasons could include: removing redundant data, fixing improper certificate handling, or refactoring certificate verification logic
- The change might be related to certificate chain validation improvements, but we can't confirm a specific vulnerability from this limited diff

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.