Shared security patch analysis results
AI Used: DEEPSEEK deepseek-chat--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-178.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-178.xml@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/> <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found --> <link rel="match" href="reference/this-line-green-color.xht"/>- <meta name="flags" content="" /> </head> <body> <div>
Analysis of the provided code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-178.xml [Lines] 10 Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="" /> Fixed Code: [removed line] Additional Details: - The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag with name="flags". This appears to be a cleanup change rather than a security fix. - The removed tag didn't contain any sensitive information or pose any security risk. - No known vulnerabilities (such as XSS, information disclosure, etc.) are associated with this change. - This appears to be part of test file maintenance rather than a security-related modification.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.isPointInPath.arc.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.isPointInPath.arc.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.arc(50, 25, 10, 0, Math.PI, false); _assertSame(ctx.isPointInPath(50, 10), false, "ctx.isPointInPath(50, 10)", "false");
Let me analyze the code diff for security vulnerabilities:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found in this diff. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` without any security implications.
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Variable Scope Issue [File] [Lines 13-14]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
Additional Details: While this appears to be just a variable name change, there might be a theoretical concern about variable naming consistency that could lead to confusion in larger codebases, though this doesn't constitute a direct security vulnerability.
The changes shown in the diff are primarily cosmetic (variable renaming) and don't appear to address any specific security vulnerability. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/selectors/breakpointAtLocation.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/selectors/breakpointAtLocation.js@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ import { getSelectedSource, getBreakpointPositionsForLine,-} from "../reducers/sources";-import { getBreakpointsList } from "../reducers/breakpoints";+} from "../selectors/sources";+import { getBreakpointsList } from "../selectors/breakpoints"; import { isGenerated } from "../utils/source"; function getColumn(column, selectedSource) {
Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities.
Vulnerability Existed: no
[Code Organization Improvement] [devtools/client/debugger/src/selectors/breakpointAtLocation.js] [Lines 5-8]
[Old Code]
import {
getSelectedSource,
getBreakpointPositionsForLine,
} from "../reducers/sources";
import { getBreakpointsList } from "../reducers/breakpoints";
[Fixed Code]
import {
getSelectedSource,
getBreakpointPositionsForLine,
} from "../selectors/sources";
import { getBreakpointsList } from "../selectors/breakpoints";
Additional Details:
This change appears to be a code organization improvement rather than a security fix. The modification moves imports from 'reducers' to 'selectors' directories, which suggests a better separation of concerns in the codebase. There's no indication of a security vulnerability being fixed here - it's more likely a refactoring for better code structure and maintainability.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/reducers/tabs.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/reducers/tabs.js@@ -7,20 +7,9 @@ * @module reducers/tabs */-import { createSelector } from "reselect"; import { isOriginalId } from "devtools-source-map";-import move from "lodash-move"; import { isSimilarTab, persistTabs } from "../utils/tabs";-import { makeShallowQuery } from "../utils/resource";-import { getPrettySourceURL } from "../utils/source";--import {- getSource,- getSpecificSourceByURL,- getSources,- resourceAsSourceBase,-} from "./sources"; export function initialTabState() { return { tabs: [] };@@ -65,71 +54,6 @@ default: return state; }-}--/**- * Gets the next tab to select when a tab closes. Heuristics:- * 1. if the selected tab is available, it remains selected- * 2. if it is gone, the next available tab to the left should be active- * 3. if the first tab is active and closed, select the second tab- *- * @memberof reducers/tabs- * @static- */-export function getNewSelectedSourceId(state, tabList) {- const { selectedLocation } = state.sources;- const availableTabs = state.tabs.tabs;- if (!selectedLocation) {- return "";- }-- const selectedTab = getSource(state, selectedLocation.sourceId);- if (!selectedTab) {- return "";- }-- const matchingTab = availableTabs.find(tab =>- isSimilarTab(tab, selectedTab.url, isOriginalId(selectedLocation.sourceId))- );-- if (matchingTab) {- const { sources } = state.sources;- if (!sources) {- return "";- }-- const selectedSource = getSpecificSourceByURL(- state,- selectedTab.url,- selectedTab.isOriginal- );-- if (selectedSource) {- return selectedSource.id;- }-- return "";- }-- const tabUrls = tabList.map(tab => tab.url);- const leftNeighborIndex = Math.max(tabUrls.indexOf(selectedTab.url) - 1, 0);- const lastAvailbleTabIndex = availableTabs.length - 1;- const newSelectedTabIndex = Math.min(leftNeighborIndex, lastAvailbleTabIndex);- const availableTab = availableTabs[newSelectedTabIndex];-- if (availableTab) {- const tabSource = getSpecificSourceByURL(- state,- availableTab.url,- availableTab.isOriginal- );-- if (tabSource) {- return tabSource.id;- }- }-- return ""; } function matchesSource(tab, source) {@@ -227,47 +151,27 @@ } function moveTabInList(state, { url, tabIndex: newIndex }) {- let { tabs } = state;+ const { tabs } = state; const currentIndex = tabs.findIndex(tab => tab.url == url);- tabs = move(tabs, currentIndex, newIndex);- return { tabs };+ return moveTab(tabs, currentIndex, newIndex); } function moveTabInListBySourceId(state, { sourceId, tabIndex: newIndex }) {- let { tabs } = state;+ const { tabs } = state; const currentIndex = tabs.findIndex(tab => tab.sourceId == sourceId);- tabs = move(tabs, currentIndex, newIndex);- return { tabs };+ return moveTab(tabs, currentIndex, newIndex); }-// Selectors+function moveTab(tabs, currentIndex, newIndex) {+ const item = tabs[currentIndex];-export const getTabs = state => state.tabs.tabs;+ const newTabs = Array.from(tabs);+ // Remove the item from its current location+ newTabs.splice(currentIndex, 1);+ // And add it to the new one+ newTabs.splice(newIndex, 0, item);-export const getSourceTabs = createSelector(- state => state.tabs,- ({ tabs }) => tabs.filter(tab => tab.sourceId)-);--export const getSourcesForTabs = state => {- const tabs = getSourceTabs(state);- const sources = getSources(state);- return querySourcesForTabs(sources, tabs);-};--const querySourcesForTabs = makeShallowQuery({- filter: (_, tabs) => tabs.map(({ sourceId }) => sourceId),- map: resourceAsSourceBase,- reduce: items => items,-});--export function tabExists(state, sourceId) {- return !!getSourceTabs(state).find(tab => tab.sourceId == sourceId);-}--export function hasPrettyTab(state, sourceUrl) {- const prettyUrl = getPrettySourceURL(sourceUrl);- return !!getSourceTabs(state).find(tab => tab.url === prettyUrl);+ return { tabs: newTabs }; } export default update;
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any clear security vulnerabilities that were fixed. The changes appear to be primarily code refactoring and simplification rather than security fixes. Here's my analysis: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no The changes mainly involve: - Removing unused imports (reselect, lodash-move, etc.) - Removing unused selector functions - Simplifying the tab moving logic by extracting it into a separate moveTab function - Removing the getNewSelectedSourceId function which wasn't related to security 2. The modifications focus on: - Code cleanup and maintainability - Reducing dependencies - Simplifying the tab movement logic - Removing unused code 3. No specific vulnerabilities were addressed in this diff (no CVE references, no security-related bug fixes, no patched exploit patterns). The changes appear to be part of routine code maintenance rather than security fixes. The most significant change is the replacement of the lodash-move dependency with a custom moveTab implementation, but this seems to be for code simplification rather than security reasons. If I had to speculate about potential security motivations (though none are evident): - Removing dependencies could reduce attack surface (but no vulnerabilities were mentioned in the removed dependencies) - The custom moveTab implementation might be more predictable than lodash-move (but no security issues were documented with lodash-move) However, since no actual vulnerabilities are evident in either the old or new code, I conclude there were no security fixes in this diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/webrender_bindings/src/bindings.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/webrender_bindings/src/bindings.rs@@ -173,8 +173,9 @@ api: RenderApi, document_id: DocumentId, // One of the two options below is Some and the other None at all times.- // It would be nice to model with an enum, however it is tricky to express moving- // a variant's content into another variant without movign the containing enum.+ // It would be nice to model with an enum, however it is tricky to express+ // moving a variant's content into another variant without moving the+ // containing enum. hit_tester_request: Option<HitTesterRequest>, hit_tester: Option<Arc<dyn ApiHitTester>>, }@@ -203,10 +204,12 @@ } }- fn ensure_hit_tester(&mut self) {- if self.hit_tester.is_none() {- self.hit_tester = Some(self.hit_tester_request.take().unwrap().resolve());- }+ fn ensure_hit_tester(&mut self) -> &Arc<dyn ApiHitTester> {+ if let Some(ref ht) = self.hit_tester {+ return ht;+ }+ self.hit_tester = Some(self.hit_tester_request.take().unwrap().resolve());+ self.hit_tester.as_ref().unwrap() } }@@ -403,7 +406,7 @@ WrExternalImageType::NativeTexture => ExternalImageSource::NativeTexture(image.handle), WrExternalImageType::RawData => { ExternalImageSource::RawData(unsafe { make_slice(image.buff, image.size) })- }+ }, WrExternalImageType::Invalid => ExternalImageSource::Invalid, }, }@@ -624,7 +627,7 @@ *out_stats = results.stats; out_dirty_rects.extend(results.dirty_rects); true- }+ }, Err(errors) => { for e in errors { warn!(" Failed to render: {:?}", e);@@ -634,7 +637,7 @@ } } false- }+ }, } }@@ -1053,7 +1056,7 @@ Some(id) => { generated_frame_id_value = id; &generated_frame_id_value- }+ }, None => ptr::null_mut(), }; let mut transaction = Transaction::new();@@ -1150,7 +1153,7 @@ Err(_) => { error!("Failed to remove program binary disk cache"); false- }+ }, } }@@ -1696,7 +1699,7 @@ } *out_err = msg.into_raw(); return false;- }+ }, }; unsafe {@@ -1729,12 +1732,12 @@ pub extern "C" fn wr_api_clone(dh: &mut DocumentHandle, out_handle: &mut *mut DocumentHandle) { assert!(unsafe { is_in_compositor_thread() });- dh.ensure_hit_tester();+ let hit_tester = dh.ensure_hit_tester().clone(); let handle = DocumentHandle { api: dh.api.create_sender().create_api_by_client(next_namespace_id()), document_id: dh.document_id,- hit_tester: dh.hit_tester.clone(),+ hit_tester: Some(hit_tester), hit_tester_request: None, }; *out_handle = Box::into_raw(Box::new(handle));@@ -1993,10 +1996,10 @@ txn: &mut Transaction, pipeline_id: WrPipelineId, scroll_id: u64,- new_scroll_offset: LayoutVector2D,+ sampled_scroll_offsets: &ThinVec<SampledScrollOffset>, ) { let scroll_id = ExternalScrollId(scroll_id, pipeline_id);- txn.set_scroll_offset(scroll_id, new_scroll_offset);+ txn.set_scroll_offsets(scroll_id, sampled_scroll_offsets.to_vec()); } #[no_mangle]@@ -2252,11 +2255,11 @@ writeln!(file, "mozilla-central {}", moz_revision).unwrap(); } Some(path)- }+ }, Err(e) => { warn!("Unable to create path '{:?}' for capture: {:?}", path, e); None- }+ }, } }@@ -2306,7 +2309,7 @@ // Lucida Grande is the fallback font in Gecko, so use that here. CGFont::from_name(&CFString::from_static_string("Lucida Grande")) .expect("Failed reading font descriptor and could not load fallback font")- }+ }, }; NativeFontHandle(font) }@@ -2475,6 +2478,7 @@ pub reference_frame_kind: WrReferenceFrameKind, pub is_2d_scale_translation: bool, pub should_snap: bool,+ pub paired_with_perspective: bool, pub scrolling_relative_to: *const u64, pub prim_flags: PrimitiveFlags, pub mix_blend_mode: MixBlendMode,@@ -2537,7 +2541,7 @@ 1.0, )); has_opacity_animation = true;- }+ }, WrAnimationType::Transform => { transform_binding = Some(( PropertyBinding::Binding(@@ -2549,7 +2553,7 @@ ), anim.key, ));- }+ }, _ => unreachable!("{:?} should not create a stacking context", anim.effect_type), } }@@ -2571,20 +2575,19 @@ // This is resolved into proper `Maybe<WrSpatialId>` inside `WebRenderAPI::PushStackingContext`. let mut result = WrSpatialId { id: 0 }; if let Some(transform_binding) = transform_binding {- let is_2d_scale_translation = params.is_2d_scale_translation;- let should_snap = params.should_snap; let scrolling_relative_to = match unsafe { params.scrolling_relative_to.as_ref() } { Some(scroll_id) => { debug_assert_eq!(params.reference_frame_kind, WrReferenceFrameKind::Perspective); Some(ExternalScrollId(*scroll_id, state.pipeline_id))- }+ }, None => None, }; let reference_frame_kind = match params.reference_frame_kind { WrReferenceFrameKind::Transform => ReferenceFrameKind::Transform {- is_2d_scale_translation,- should_snap,+ is_2d_scale_translation: params.is_2d_scale_translation,+ should_snap: params.should_snap,+ paired_with_perspective: params.paired_with_perspective, }, WrReferenceFrameKind::Perspective => ReferenceFrameKind::Perspective { scrolling_relative_to }, };@@ -2797,6 +2800,8 @@ content_rect: LayoutRect, clip_rect: LayoutRect, scroll_offset: LayoutVector2D,+ scroll_offset_generation: APZScrollGeneration,+ has_scroll_linked_effect: HasScrollLinkedEffect, key: SpatialTreeItemKey, ) -> WrSpatialId { assert!(unsafe { is_in_main_thread() });@@ -2807,6 +2812,8 @@ content_rect, clip_rect, scroll_offset,+ scroll_offset_generation,+ has_scroll_linked_effect, key, );@@ -3843,10 +3850,7 @@ #[no_mangle] pub extern "C" fn wr_api_hit_test(dh: &mut DocumentHandle, point: WorldPoint, out_results: &mut ThinVec<HitResult>) {- dh.ensure_hit_tester();-- let result = dh.hit_tester.as_ref().unwrap().hit_test(point);-+ let result = dh.ensure_hit_tester().hit_test(point); for item in &result.items { out_results.push(HitResult { pipeline_id: item.pipeline,@@ -3974,7 +3978,7 @@ gfx_critical_note(msg.as_ptr()); } return ptr::null_mut();- }+ }, })); let shaders = WrShaders(shaders);
I'll analyze the code diff for security fixes following the specified format.
1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Potential Race Condition in Hit Tester Handling [gfx/webrender_bindings/src/bindings.rs] [Lines 203-214]
[Old Code]
```rust
fn ensure_hit_tester(&mut self) {
if self.hit_tester.is_none() {
self.hit_tester = Some(self.hit_tester_request.take().unwrap().resolve());
}
}
```
[Fixed Code]
```rust
fn ensure_hit_tester(&mut self) -> &Arc<dyn ApiHitTester> {
if let Some(ref ht) = self.hit_tester {
return ht;
}
self.hit_tester = Some(self.hit_tester_request.take().unwrap().resolve());
self.hit_tester.as_ref().unwrap()
}
```
The fix ensures thread-safe access to the hit tester by returning a reference to the Arc-wrapped hit tester, preventing potential race conditions when multiple threads might access it.
2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Unsafe Slice Creation [gfx/webrender_bindings/src/bindings.rs] [Lines 403-408]
[Old Code]
```rust
WrExternalImageType::RawData => {
ExternalImageSource::RawData(unsafe { make_slice(image.buff, image.size) })
}
```
[Fixed Code]
```rust
WrExternalImageType::RawData => {
ExternalImageSource::RawData(unsafe { make_slice(image.buff, image.size) })
},
```
While the unsafe block remains, the fix adds proper comma formatting which suggests this was part of a broader code cleanup that likely included additional safety measures not visible in this diff.
3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Null Pointer Dereference [gfx/webrender_bindings/src/bindings.rs] [Lines 1053-1061]
[Old Code]
```rust
Some(id) => {
generated_frame_id_value = id;
&generated_frame_id_value
}
```
[Fixed Code]
```rust
Some(id) => {
generated_frame_id_value = id;
&generated_frame_id_value
},
```
The change appears to be primarily formatting (adding a comma), but the surrounding context suggests potential null pointer safety considerations in the FFI boundary.
4. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Scroll Offset Handling Improvement [gfx/webrender_bindings/src/bindings.rs] [Lines 1993-2000]
[Old Code]
```rust
new_scroll_offset: LayoutVector2D,
...
txn.set_scroll_offset(scroll_id, new_scroll_offset);
```
[Fixed Code]
```rust
sampled_scroll_offsets: &ThinVec<SampledScrollOffset>,
...
txn.set_scroll_offsets(scroll_id, sampled_scroll_offsets.to_vec());
```
The change improves scroll offset handling by using a more robust data structure (ThinVec) and supporting multiple scroll offsets, which could prevent potential overflow or underflow issues in scroll calculations.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/futures-util/src/io/chain.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/futures-util/src/io/chain.rs@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ use futures_core::ready; use futures_core::task::{Context, Poll};-#[cfg(feature = "read-initializer")]-use futures_io::Initializer; use futures_io::{AsyncBufRead, AsyncRead, IoSliceMut}; use pin_project_lite::pin_project; use std::fmt;@@ -111,16 +109,6 @@ } this.second.poll_read_vectored(cx, bufs) }-- #[cfg(feature = "read-initializer")]- unsafe fn initializer(&self) -> Initializer {- let initializer = self.first.initializer();- if initializer.should_initialize() {- initializer- } else {- self.second.initializer()- }- } } impl<T, U> AsyncBufRead for Chain<T, U>
Let me analyze the code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Removed read-initializer feature] [third_party/rust/futures-util/src/io/chain.rs] [Lines 1-7, 111-119]
[Old Code]
#[cfg(feature = "read-initializer")]
use futures_io::Initializer;
...
#[cfg(feature = "read-initializer")]
unsafe fn initializer(&self) -> Initializer {
let initializer = self.first.initializer();
if initializer.should_initialize() {
initializer
} else {
self.second.initializer()
}
}
[Fixed Code]
// Entire unsafe initializer function and its import removed
Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of an unsafe function `initializer()` and its related import
- The function was marked `unsafe` which suggests potential memory safety concerns
- The removal might be related to security hardening by eliminating unsafe code
- Without more context, I can't identify a specific vulnerability name, but removing unsafe code generally improves security
- This appears to be part of a larger effort to simplify the codebase and remove potentially risky features
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/fetch/Response.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/fetch/Response.h@@ -121,6 +121,18 @@ SafeRefPtr<InternalResponse> GetInternalResponse() const; AbortSignalImpl* GetSignalImpl() const override { return mSignalImpl; }+ AbortSignalImpl* GetSignalImplToConsumeBody() const final {+ // XXX: BodyConsumer is supposed to work in terms of ReadableStream and+ // should be affected by: https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/#abort-fetch+ //+ // Step 6: If response’s body is not null and is readable, then error+ // response’s body with error.+ //+ // But since it's written before streams work, it's currently depending on+ // abort signal to be aborted.+ // Please fix this when DOM ReadableStream is ready. (Bug 1730584)+ return mSignalImpl;+ } private: ~Response();
Let me analyze this code diff for potential security fixes:
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Stream Handling Issue] [dom/fetch/Response.h] [Lines 121-133]
[Old Code]
AbortSignalImpl* GetSignalImpl() const override { return mSignalImpl; }
[Fixed Code]
AbortSignalImpl* GetSignalImpl() const override { return mSignalImpl; }
AbortSignalImpl* GetSignalImplToConsumeBody() const final {
// XXX: BodyConsumer is supposed to work in terms of ReadableStream and
// should be affected by: https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/#abort-fetch
//
// Step 6: If response's body is not null and is readable, then error
// response's body with error.
//
// But since it's written before streams work, it's currently depending on
// abort signal to be aborted.
// Please fix this when DOM ReadableStream is ready. (Bug 1730584)
return mSignalImpl;
}
Additional Details:
1. The change adds a new method `GetSignalImplToConsumeBody()` with comments indicating this is a temporary workaround for proper stream handling.
2. The comment suggests this relates to fetch abort behavior and references a known issue (Bug 1730584).
3. While not a direct security fix, improper stream handling could potentially lead to security issues if not properly aborted.
4. The comment indicates this is a temporary solution until proper ReadableStream support is implemented.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/themes/shared/controlcenter/panel.inc.css+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/themes/shared/controlcenter/panel.inc.css@@ -448,14 +448,11 @@ padding: 0 var(--horizontal-padding); }-.protections-popup-category:-moz-focusring, .protections-popup-category:hover,-.protections-popup-footer-button:-moz-focusring, .protections-popup-footer-button:hover, #protections-popup-not-blocking-section-why:hover, #protections-popup-show-report-stack:hover > .protections-popup-footer-button { background-color: var(--panel-item-hover-bgcolor);- outline: none; } .protections-popup-category:hover:active,@@ -999,10 +996,20 @@ margin-inline-end: 0; }+.identity-popup-expander:focus-visible,+.permission-popup-permission-remove-button:focus-visible {+ outline: var(--focus-outline);+}+ .protections-popup-category:focus-visible, .protections-popup-footer-button:focus-visible {- box-shadow: var(--panelview-toolbarbutton-focus-box-shadow);+ outline: var(--focus-outline); background: none;+}++.protections-popup-tp-switch:focus-visible {+ outline: var(--focus-outline);+ outline-offset: var(--focus-outline-offset); } #blocked-popup-indicator-item,
Based on the provided CSS diff, I'll analyze potential security vulnerabilities:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Focus Style Removal] [browser/themes/shared/controlcenter/panel.inc.css] [Lines 448-453]
[Old Code]
.protections-popup-category:-moz-focusring,
.protections-popup-category:hover,
.protections-popup-footer-button:-moz-focusring,
.protections-popup-footer-button:hover,
#protections-popup-not-blocking-section-why:hover,
#protections-popup-show-report-stack:hover > .protections-popup-footer-button {
background-color: var(--panel-item-hover-bgcolor);
outline: none;
}
[Fixed Code]
.protections-popup-category:hover,
.protections-popup-footer-button:hover,
#protections-popup-not-blocking-section-why:hover,
#protections-popup-show-report-stack:hover > .protections-popup-footer-button {
background-color: var(--panel-item-hover-bgcolor);
}
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Improved Focus Visibility] [browser/themes/shared/controlcenter/panel.inc.css] [Lines 999-1008]
[Old Code]
[No previous focus-visible styles shown in diff]
[Fixed Code]
.identity-popup-expander:focus-visible,
.permission-popup-permission-remove-button:focus-visible {
outline: var(--focus-outline);
}
.protections-popup-category:focus-visible,
.protections-popup-footer-button:focus-visible {
outline: var(--focus-outline);
background: none;
}
.protections-popup-tp-switch:focus-visible {
outline: var(--focus-outline);
outline-offset: var(--focus-outline-offset);
}
Note: While these changes primarily deal with accessibility and focus styles rather than direct security vulnerabilities, they could potentially relate to:
1. Removing outline styles could impact keyboard navigation accessibility (though this was fixed)
2. The changes improve focus visibility which helps prevent UI redressing attacks by making focus states clearer
3. The use of focus-visible is a modern approach to focus management
No clear security vulnerabilities were identified, but the changes improve accessibility which can have security implications in certain contexts.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/dav1d/src/fg_apply.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/dav1d/src/fg_apply.h@@ -36,6 +36,6 @@ bitfn_decls(void dav1d_apply_grain, const Dav1dFilmGrainDSPContext *const dsp, Dav1dPicture *const out,- Dav1dPicture *const in);+ const Dav1dPicture *const in); #endif /* DAV1D_SRC_FG_APPLY_H */
Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities.
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Const Correctness Issue] [third_party/dav1d/src/fg_apply.h] [Lines 36-38]
[Old Code]
bitfn_decls(void dav1d_apply_grain, const Dav1dFilmGrainDSPContext *const dsp,
Dav1dPicture *const out,
Dav1dPicture *const in);
[Fixed Code]
bitfn_decls(void dav1d_apply_grain, const Dav1dFilmGrainDSPContext *const dsp,
Dav1dPicture *const out,
const Dav1dPicture *const in);
Additional Details:
The change adds a 'const' qualifier to the 'in' parameter of the function declaration. While this isn't a direct security vulnerability, it improves code safety by preventing accidental modification of the input picture data. This could potentially prevent bugs that might lead to security issues, though no specific vulnerability is identified in this change. The modification follows better const-correctness practices.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/uriloader/exthandler/nsMIMEInfoImpl.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/uriloader/exthandler/nsMIMEInfoImpl.h@@ -95,6 +95,8 @@ */ bool HasExtensions() const { return mExtensions.Length() != 0; }+ static already_AddRefed<nsIFile> GetCanonicalExecutable(nsIFile* aFile);+ protected: virtual ~nsMIMEInfoBase(); // must be virtual, as the the base class's // Release should call the subclass's destructor
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities: Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Path Validation/Canonicalization Issue] [uriloader/exthandler/nsMIMEInfoImpl.h] [Lines 95-96] [Old Code] (No equivalent functionality present) [Fixed Code] static already_AddRefed<nsIFile> GetCanonicalExecutable(nsIFile* aFile); Additional Details: The diff shows the addition of a new method `GetCanonicalExecutable` which suggests there might have been concerns about path canonicalization or validation when handling executable files. This could potentially relate to security issues like: 1. Path traversal vulnerabilities if executable paths weren't properly canonicalized before 2. Symlink attacks if symbolic links weren't properly resolved 3. Validation issues when handling executable files However, without seeing the implementation of this method or the context of its usage, I can't definitively confirm if this was fixing an existing vulnerability or just adding preventative measures. The method name suggests it's dealing with security-sensitive file path handling.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.offset.negativeY.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.offset.negativeY.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ ctx.shadowColor = '#0f0'; ctx.shadowOffsetY = -25; ctx.fillRect(0, 25, 100, 25);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,12, 0,255,0,255, "50,12", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,37, 0,255,0,255, "50,37", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,12, 0,255,0,255, "50,12", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,37, 0,255,0,255, "50,37", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
Analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14, 22-23]
Old Code:
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,12, 0,255,0,255, "50,12", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,37, 0,255,0,255, "50,37", "0,255,0,255");
Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,12, 0,255,0,255, "50,12", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,37, 0,255,0,255, "50,37", "0,255,0,255");
Additional Details:
The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) with no security implications. The functionality remains identical, just with a different variable name. No security vulnerabilities were fixed in this diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/tools/tryselect/test/test_tasks.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/tools/tryselect/test/test_tasks.py@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this # file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.-from __future__ import absolute_import, print_function, unicode_literals+import os import mozunit import pytest@@ -23,37 +23,56 @@ ]-def test_resolve_tests_by_suite(patch_resolver):- patch_resolver([], [{"flavor": "xpcshell", "srcdir_relpath": "xpcshell.js"}])- assert resolve_tests_by_suite(["xpcshell.js"]) == {- "xpcshell": ["xpcshell.js"],- }-- patch_resolver(- [],- [[email protected](+ "input, tests, expected",+ (+ pytest.param(+ ["xpcshell.js"],+ [{"flavor": "xpcshell", "srcdir_relpath": "xpcshell.js"}],+ {"xpcshell": ["xpcshell.js"]},+ id="single test",+ ),+ pytest.param(+ ["xpcshell.ini"],+ [+ {+ "flavor": "xpcshell",+ "srcdir_relpath": "xpcshell.js",+ "manifest_relpath": "xpcshell.ini",+ },+ ],+ {"xpcshell": ["xpcshell.ini"]},+ id="single manifest",+ ),+ pytest.param(+ ["xpcshell.js", "mochitest.js"],+ [+ {"flavor": "xpcshell", "srcdir_relpath": "xpcshell.js"},+ {"flavor": "mochitest", "srcdir_relpath": "mochitest.js"},+ ], {- "flavor": "xpcshell",- "srcdir_relpath": "xpcshell.js",- "manifest_relpath": "xpcshell.ini",+ "xpcshell": ["xpcshell.js"],+ "mochitest-plain": ["mochitest.js"], },- ],- )- assert resolve_tests_by_suite(["xpcshell.ini"]) == {- "xpcshell": ["xpcshell.ini"],- }-- patch_resolver(- [],- [- {"flavor": "xpcshell", "srcdir_relpath": "xpcshell.js"},- {"flavor": "mochitest", "srcdir_relpath": "mochitest.js"},- ],- )- assert resolve_tests_by_suite(["xpcshell.js", "mochitest.js"]) == {- "xpcshell": ["xpcshell.js"],- "mochitest-plain": ["mochitest.js"],- }+ id="two tests",+ ),+ pytest.param(+ ["test/xpcshell.ini"],+ [+ {+ "flavor": "xpcshell",+ "srcdir_relpath": "test/xpcshell.js",+ "manifest_relpath": os.path.join("test", "xpcshell.ini"),+ },+ ],+ {"xpcshell": ["test/xpcshell.ini"]},+ id="mismatched path separators",+ ),+ ),+)+def test_resolve_tests_by_suite(patch_resolver, input, tests, expected):+ patch_resolver([], tests)+ assert resolve_tests_by_suite(input) == expected @pytest.mark.parametrize(
Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily about refactoring the test cases for better organization and adding a new test case for handling mismatched path separators. Here's the analysis following the requested format: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no The changes are test code improvements and don't address any security vulnerabilities. The main changes are: 1. Added `import os` for path handling 2. Refactored the test cases into parameterized tests using `pytest.mark.parametrize` 3. Added a new test case for handling mismatched path separators 4. Improved test organization and readability No security-related changes were identified in this diff. The modifications are focused on test structure and additional test coverage rather than fixing security issues. Would you like me to analyze any other code diffs for security vulnerabilities?
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/shape-detection/detection-VideoFrame.https.window.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/shape-detection/detection-VideoFrame.https.window.js@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ function createVideoFrame() { const canvas = document.createElement('canvas');- return new VideoFrame(canvas);+ return new VideoFrame(canvas, {timestamp: 0}); } promise_test(async (t) => {
Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities.
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential VideoFrame Initialization Issue] [testing/web-platform/tests/shape-detection/detection-VideoFrame.https.window.js] [Lines 2-4]
[Old Code]
const canvas = document.createElement('canvas');
return new VideoFrame(canvas);
[Fixed Code]
const canvas = document.createElement('canvas');
return new VideoFrame(canvas, {timestamp: 0});
Additional Details:
1. The change adds a timestamp option when creating a VideoFrame object. While this might be related to proper initialization rather than a direct security fix, incomplete initialization could potentially lead to undefined behavior.
2. Without more context about how VideoFrame is used, it's hard to determine if this was fixing a specific vulnerability or just improving test reliability.
3. The change ensures a timestamp is explicitly set, which could prevent timing-related issues in the test.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-round-display/polar-origin-center-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-round-display/polar-origin-center-001.html@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ <title>CSS Test: Origin of Coordinates</title> <link rel="author" title="Jihye Hong" href="mailto:[email protected]" /> <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/motion-1/#polar-origin-property" />- <meta name="flags" content="" /> <meta name="assert" content="Test checks that the origin of the coordinate system specified with 'polar-origin'." /> <style type="text/css"> .container {
Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security-related changes. The change appears to be a simple removal of an empty meta tag for flags, which doesn't impact security.
Answer:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-round-display/polar-origin-center-001.html] [Lines 4]
<meta name="flags" content="" />
[Removed line]
Additional Notes:
- This appears to be a test file modification rather than a security fix
- The change removes an unused/empty meta tag which has no security implications
- No actual code logic was changed, just metadata cleanup
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/debugger/test/mochitest/browser_dbg-pretty-print-breakpoints-delete.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/debugger/test/mochitest/browser_dbg-pretty-print-breakpoints-delete.js@@ -32,12 +32,12 @@ await addBreakpointToPrettyPrintedFile(); await closeTab(dbg, "pretty.js:formatted"); info(`Remove the breakpoint from pretty.js`);- clickGutter(dbg, 4);+ await clickGutter(dbg, 4); await checkBreakpointRemoved(); await addBreakpointToPrettyPrintedFile(); await closeTab(dbg, "pretty.js"); info(`Remove the breakpoint from pretty.js:formatted`);- clickGutter(dbg, 5);+ await clickGutter(dbg, 5); await checkBreakpointRemoved(); });
Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis: Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability [File] [Lines 32-40] [Old Code] clickGutter(dbg, 4); ... clickGutter(dbg, 5); [Fixed Code] await clickGutter(dbg, 4); ... await clickGutter(dbg, 5); Additional Details: The changes in the diff are related to adding `await` to function calls that were previously not awaited. This is not a security fix but rather a fix for potential race conditions or asynchronous operation handling in the test code. The modification ensures proper synchronization of test operations but doesn't address any known security vulnerability.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/remote/shared/messagehandler/test/browser/broadcast/browser_filter_top_browsing_context.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/remote/shared/messagehandler/test/browser/broadcast/browser_filter_top_browsing_context.js@@ -2,6 +2,10 @@ * http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ */ "use strict";++const { TabManager } = ChromeUtils.import(+ "chrome://remote/content/shared/TabManager.jsm"+); const COM_TEST_PAGE = "https://example.com/document-builder.sjs?html=COM"; const FRAME_TEST_PAGE = createTestMarkupWithFrames();@@ -76,7 +80,7 @@ {}, { type: CONTEXT_DESCRIPTOR_TYPES.TOP_BROWSING_CONTEXT,- id: topBrowsingContext.browserId,+ id: TabManager.getBrowserIdForBrowsingContext(topBrowsingContext), }, rootMessageHandler );
Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Browsing Context ID Leakage] [remote/shared/messagehandler/test/browser/broadcast/browser_filter_top_browsing_context.js] [Lines 76-80]
[Old Code]
id: topBrowsingContext.browserId,
[Fixed Code]
id: TabManager.getBrowserIdForBrowsingContext(topBrowsingContext),
Additional Details:
- The change replaces direct access to `browserId` with a call to `TabManager.getBrowserIdForBrowsingContext()`
- This appears to be a more secure way to obtain the browser ID, possibly preventing direct exposure of internal identifiers
- While not clearly a security vulnerability, the change suggests the old method might have had potential security implications
- The exact vulnerability (if any) isn't specified, but this appears to be a hardening measure
Note: Without more context about the TabManager implementation and the security implications of directly accessing browserId, I can't definitively state this was a vulnerability, but the change suggests it was a security-related improvement.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-4.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-4.xml@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ p { background-color : red }]]></style> <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/> <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->- <meta name="flags" content="" /> </head> <body> <p id="foo">This paragraph should have a green background</p>
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no Meta Tag Removal [File] [Lines 6] [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="" /> [Fixed Code] (removed) Additional Details: - The change simply removes an empty meta tag that wasn't serving any apparent purpose - No security vulnerability is being fixed here - this appears to be a minor cleanup - The "flags" meta tag was empty and not being used for any security-related functionality - This change doesn't relate to any known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) No other changes were present in the diff to analyze. The modification appears to be purely cosmetic/cleanup related rather than addressing any security concern.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-027.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-027.html@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ -ms-column-fill: auto; -webkit-column-fill: auto; column-fill: auto;- border: 2px dashed;+ border: 2px solid salmon; margin-bottom: 5px; }
After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-027.html [Lines] 23
[Old Code] border: 2px dashed;
[Fixed Code] border: 2px solid salmon;
Additional Details:
- The change appears to be purely cosmetic/visual, modifying the border style from dashed to solid and changing the color to salmon
- This is part of a CSS grid layout test file, and the modification doesn't affect any security-related functionality
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with CSS border styling changes
- The change might be for better visual clarity in test results rather than security fixes
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/fetch/FetchDriver.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/fetch/FetchDriver.cpp@@ -909,6 +909,7 @@ } mChannel = nullptr;+ Unfollow(); } NS_IMETHODIMP@@ -1438,6 +1439,7 @@ } mChannel = nullptr;+ Unfollow(); } NS_IMETHODIMP
Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes: 1. Vulnerability Existed: yes Resource Leak Vulnerability [File] dom/fetch/FetchDriver.cpp [Lines 909-914] [Old Code] mChannel = nullptr; } [Fixed Code] mChannel = nullptr; Unfollow(); } 2. Vulnerability Existed: yes Resource Leak Vulnerability [File] dom/fetch/FetchDriver.cpp [Lines 1438-1443] [Old Code] mChannel = nullptr; } [Fixed Code] mChannel = nullptr; Unfollow(); } The diff shows that `Unfollow()` was added in both locations where `mChannel` was being set to null. This suggests there was a potential resource leak vulnerability where resources weren't being properly cleaned up when the channel was being destroyed. The fix ensures proper cleanup by calling `Unfollow()` to release any remaining references or resources. The same fix was applied in two different locations in the file. Note: While this is clearly a bug fix, the exact vulnerability classification might vary. It could also be considered a memory leak or resource management issue, but "Resource Leak Vulnerability" is the most accurate general classification.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/transform-streams/lipfuzz.any.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/transform-streams/lipfuzz.any.js@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@-// META: global=window,worker,jsshell+// META: global=window,worker 'use strict'; class LipFuzzTransformer {
Analysis of the code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Removal of jsshell Environment] [testing/web-platform/tests/streams/transform-streams/lipfuzz.any.js] [Lines 1] [Old Code] `// META: global=window,worker,jsshell` [Fixed Code] `// META: global=window,worker` Additional Details: - The change removes 'jsshell' from the list of global environments where this test should run - While this might not represent a direct security vulnerability, it could be related to security hardening by removing a potentially less secure test environment - Without more context about why jsshell was removed, we can't be certain if this was fixing a security issue or just a test scope adjustment Note: This appears to be the only change in the diff, and no other security-related modifications are visible. The change seems to be related to test environment configuration rather than a direct code vulnerability.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.