--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit-test/tests/stream/bug-1387503-1.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit-test/tests/stream/bug-1387503-1.js@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@+// |jit-test| skip-if: !this.hasOwnProperty("ReadableStream") // Test uncatchable error when a stream source's pull() method is called. // Make `debugger;` raise an uncatchable error.

Let me analyze the diff for potential security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Test Reliability Issue] [js/src/jit-test/tests/stream/bug-1387503-1.js] [Lines 1]
[Old Code]
// Test uncatchable error when a stream source's pull() method is called.
[Fixed Code]
// |jit-test| skip-if: !this.hasOwnProperty("ReadableStream")
// Test uncatchable error when a stream source's pull() method is called.

Additional Details:
The change adds a test directive to skip the test if the environment doesn't have ReadableStream. While this isn't a direct security fix, it improves test reliability by preventing test failures in environments without ReadableStream support. The original bug number (bug-1387503) suggests this might be related to a previous security issue, but the diff itself doesn't show a clear security vulnerability being fixed.

No other vulnerabilities are apparent in this small diff. The change appears to be more about test robustness than security.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/rust_decimal/src/ops/legacy.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/rust_decimal/src/ops/legacy.rs@@ -624,7 +624,7 @@     let mut temp4 = [0u32, 0u32, 0u32, 0u32];     if *quotient_scale != *working_scale {         // TODO: Remove necessity for temp (without performance impact)-        fn div_by_10(target: &mut [u32], temp: &mut [u32], scale: &mut i32, target_scale: i32) {+        fn div_by_10<const N: usize>(target: &mut [u32], temp: &mut [u32; N], scale: &mut i32, target_scale: i32) {             // Copy to the temp array             temp.copy_from_slice(target);             // divide by 10 until target scale is reached@@ -676,7 +676,12 @@     // (ultimately losing significant digits)     if *quotient_scale != *working_scale {         // TODO: Remove necessity for temp (without performance impact)-        fn div_by_10_lossy(target: &mut [u32], temp: &mut [u32], scale: &mut i32, target_scale: i32) {+        fn div_by_10_lossy<const N: usize>(+            target: &mut [u32],+            temp: &mut [u32; N],+            scale: &mut i32,+            target_scale: i32,+        ) {             temp.copy_from_slice(target);             // divide by 10 until target scale is reached             while *scale > target_scale {

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Buffer Overflow/Array Bound Violation] [third_party/rust/rust_decimal/src/ops/legacy.rs] [Lines 624-676]
    [Old Code]
    fn div_by_10(target: &mut [u32], temp: &mut [u32], scale: &mut i32, target_scale: i32) {
    fn div_by_10_lossy(target: &mut [u32], temp: &mut [u32], scale: &mut i32, target_scale: i32) {

    [Fixed Code]
    fn div_by_10<const N: usize>(target: &mut [u32], temp: &mut [u32; N], scale: &mut i32, target_scale: i32) {
    fn div_by_10_lossy<const N: usize>(target: &mut [u32], temp: &mut [u32; N], scale: &mut i32, target_scale: i32) {

Additional Details:
    The changes introduce const generics to enforce array size consistency between the target and temp buffers. While this could potentially prevent buffer-related issues, there's no explicit security vulnerability mentioned in the diff. The modification appears to be more about type safety and preventing potential runtime errors rather than fixing a known security issue. The "not sure" rating is given because while the change improves safety, it's unclear if it was specifically addressing a security vulnerability or just improving code robustness.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/shared/test-helpers/shared-node-helpers.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/shared/test-helpers/shared-node-helpers.js@@ -23,10 +23,15 @@       }       for (const name of names) {-        const value = destructure-          ? require(module)[name]-          : require(module || name);-        global[name] = value;+        Object.defineProperty(global, name, {+          get() {+            const value = destructure+              ? require(module)[name]+              : require(module || name);+            return value;+          },+          configurable: true,+        });       }     },     lazyImporter: () => {},

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   Global Property Pollution Vulnerability [devtools/client/shared/test-helpers/shared-node-helpers.js] [Lines 23-30]
   Old Code:
   ```
   const value = destructure
     ? require(module)[name]
     : require(module || name);
   global[name] = value;
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   Object.defineProperty(global, name, {
     get() {
       const value = destructure
         ? require(module)[name]
         : require(module || name);
       return value;
     },
     configurable: true,
   });
   ```

The fix changes how properties are added to the global object. The old code directly assigned values to global properties, which could lead to:
1. Property pollution/overwriting existing global variables
2. Making the properties non-configurable by default
3. Immediate execution of require() calls

The new version:
1. Uses lazy evaluation via getter
2. Makes properties configurable
3. Prevents immediate module loading
4. Provides better control over property attributes

This appears to be a security hardening change to prevent potential global namespace pollution and provide more controlled access to the required modules.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/ipc/glue/GeckoChildProcessHost.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/ipc/glue/GeckoChildProcessHost.h@@ -39,6 +39,10 @@ #  include "mozilla/Sandbox.h" #endif+#if defined(MOZ_SANDBOX)+#  include "mozilla/ipc/UtilityProcessSandboxing.h"+#endif+ struct _MacSandboxInfo; typedef _MacSandboxInfo MacSandboxInfo;@@ -144,12 +148,6 @@     mLaunchOptions->fds_to_remap.push_back(std::make_pair(aSrcFd, aDstFd));   } #endif--  /**-   * Must run on the IO thread.  Cause the OS process to exit and-   * ensure its OS resources are cleaned up.-   */-  void Join();   // For bug 943174: Skip the EnsureProcessTerminated call in the destructor.   void SetAlreadyDead();@@ -233,6 +231,10 @@ #  endif #endif  // XP_WIN+#if defined(MOZ_SANDBOX)+  SandboxingKind mSandbox;+#endif+   ProcessHandle mChildProcessHandle; #if defined(OS_MACOSX)   task_t mChildTask;

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze the changes for potential security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Sandboxing Improvement] [ipc/glue/GeckoChildProcessHost.h] [Lines 39-42]
   [Old Code: No inclusion of UtilityProcessSandboxing.h]
   [Fixed Code: Added #include "mozilla/ipc/UtilityProcessSandboxing.h" when MOZ_SANDBOX is defined]

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Resource Management Issue] [ipc/glue/GeckoChildProcessHost.h] [Lines 144-148]
   [Old Code: Had Join() method declaration]
   [Fixed Code: Join() method declaration removed]

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Sandboxing Enhancement] [ipc/glue/GeckoChildProcessHost.h] [Lines 233-235]
   [Old Code: No SandboxingKind member variable]
   [Fixed Code: Added SandboxingKind mSandbox member variable when MOZ_SANDBOX is defined]

Note: While these changes appear to be related to security (particularly sandboxing improvements), without more context about the specific vulnerabilities being addressed or the complete codebase, I can't definitively identify specific vulnerabilities. The changes suggest improvements to the sandboxing infrastructure, which is typically security-related, but I can't determine if they're fixing specific known vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/fissionregressions.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/fissionregressions.py@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@         "sessionHistoryInParent": True,         "swgl": False,         "win10_2004": False,+        "domstreams": False,     },     "linux-debug": {         "os": "linux",@@ -112,6 +113,7 @@         "sessionHistoryInParent": False,         "swgl": False,         "win10_2004": False,+        "domstreams": False,     },     "win-opt": {         "os": "win",@@ -163,6 +165,7 @@         "sessionHistoryInParent": False,         "swgl": False,         "win10_2004": False,+        "domstreams": False,     }, }

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes only involve adding a new configuration flag "domstreams" set to False in multiple platform configurations. This appears to be a feature configuration change rather than a security fix.

Answer for Each Vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found in the diff. The changes only add a new configuration flag "domstreams" set to False in multiple platform configurations.

If we were to strictly follow the format for each case where the flag was added:

1. For linux-debug configuration:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    Configuration update [File] [Lines around 61]
    [Old Code]
        "win10_2004": False,
    },
    [Fixed Code]
        "win10_2004": False,
        "domstreams": False,
    },

2. For macosx-debug configuration:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    Configuration update [File] [Lines around 112]
    [Old Code]
        "win10_2004": False,
    },
    [Fixed Code]
        "win10_2004": False,
        "domstreams": False,
    },

3. For win-opt configuration:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    Configuration update [File] [Lines around 163]
    [Old Code]
        "win10_2004": False,
    },
    [Fixed Code]
        "win10_2004": False,
        "domstreams": False,
    },

These are all purely configuration updates with no apparent security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.shape.2.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.shape.2.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -23,12 +23,12 @@ ctx.beginPath(); ctx.arc(50, 50, 50, 0, Math.PI, true); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 20,48, 0,255,0,255, "20,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 20,48, 0,255,0,255, "20,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related changes. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability. Here's the analysis following your format:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.shape.2.worker.js] [Lines 13-23]
    [Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, ...)]
    [Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(canvas, ...)]

The changes don't address any security issues but rather improve code consistency by renaming a variable. All assertions and canvas operations remain functionally identical.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/strsim/.cargo-checksum.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/strsim/.cargo-checksum.json@@ -1 +1 @@-{"files":{"CHANGELOG.md":"18e89ab18be7d22dd835924a38b1198651e870dfd0a2904a344120d341c4bc0e","Cargo.toml":"dd189fa732c00b7d1b036b43220253ef6ff2a0b1ff5ca7cf13f0669113a2055e","LICENSE":"1738b51502ae831fb59ffbeb22ebdd90bf17e5c72fe57c00b47552415f133fd8","README.md":"cfb01477df60cd0780ba59cbbc388f3f71d83bf51bab77e004fc7b811aff0efd","appveyor.yml":"b41eae9798a9bb250f6046509d9bbd6e63bac9ad2655d342b3d9c8975584f0c0","benches/benches.rs":"e277857c44afdc08b2acf35fc05be6226529c588eb9da397382b0a74c58615ab","dev":"5bd26dc2c86f777627abe96c5992b6c45e6b5dea52f42b7107fa5c106abe2ab4","src/lib.rs":"26a960216567e5dea46033b3383a69e7da498095c092e195e92c05faef52f915","tests/lib.rs":"de2b1181c379a0f55de7b86021a9afb77dbe81053a6acf99623bec3663f9b7c4"},"package":"8ea5119cdb4c55b55d432abb513a0429384878c15dde60cc77b1c99de1a95a6a"}+{"files":{"CHANGELOG.md":"96553d0de79bf911b5ca66c999195f7f4ea6061564e4698d1adcb567060e1bcd","Cargo.toml":"3f0f1737ecbf9c7595b52585d54507f217e66b2b8dfa337934ca427022d810c8","LICENSE":"1e697ce8d21401fbf1bddd9b5c3fd4c4c79ae1e3bdf51f81761c85e11d5a89cd","README.md":"b9fc7a1ac69abed8055b824713bf9ebfb4a07e2b7a356b50d8ed55e7a9accd18","benches/benches.rs":"62c83a5a0948c06ffb54d0bf75a31ee5d9e5acde9e079c3b5cfb755bc634b72c","src/lib.rs":"1300ad81d4b682476e30d361a01a248a93e96426303ffde8bbd585258fa0b02f","tests/lib.rs":"de2b1181c379a0f55de7b86021a9afb77dbe81053a6acf99623bec3663f9b7c4"},"package":"73473c0e59e6d5812c5dfe2a064a6444949f089e20eec9a2e5506596494e4623"}=========third_party/rust/warp/tests/path.rs========--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/warp/tests/path.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/warp/tests/path.rs@@ -303,6 +303,14 @@     // does not modify matching     let m = full_path.and(foo).and(bar);     assert!(warp::test::request().path("/foo/bar").matches(&m).await);++    // doesn't panic on authority-form+    let ex = warp::test::request()+        .path("localhost:1234")+        .filter(&full_path)+        .await+        .unwrap();+    assert_eq!(ex.as_str(), "/"); } #[tokio::test]

I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

1. For the first file (third_party/rust/strsim/.cargo-checksum.json):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    [No specific vulnerability found in checksum file update]
    [This appears to be a routine update of checksums for dependency files without any security implications]

2. For the second file (third_party/rust/warp/tests/path.rs):
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential URI parsing vulnerability] [third_party/rust/warp/tests/path.rs] [Lines 303-314]
    [Old code didn't test authority-form URI handling]
    [Fixed code adds test for authority-form URI ("localhost:1234") handling]

Additional Details:
- The change in the warp test file adds handling for authority-form URIs (like "localhost:1234")
- This might indicate a fix for potential URI parsing issues or panic scenarios
- Without more context about the actual implementation changes, I can't be certain if this was fixing a security vulnerability or just improving robustness
- The test ensures the router doesn't panic when receiving authority-form URIs and returns "/" as expected

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.nonfinite.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.nonfinite.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.moveTo(0, 0); ctx.lineTo(100, 0);@@ -45,8 +45,8 @@ ctx.lineTo(0, 50); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 90,45, 0,255,0,255, "90,45", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 90,45, 0,255,0,255, "90,45", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.nonfinite.worker.js [Lines] 13-14, 45-46
   Old Code:
   ```
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 90,45, 0,255,0,255, "90,45", "0,255,0,255");
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   _assertPixel(canvas, 90,45, 0,255,0,255, "90,45", "0,255,0,255");
   ```

The changes appear to be purely variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` throughout the file. There are no security-related fixes or vulnerability remediations in this diff. The modification is likely for code consistency or readability purposes rather than addressing any security concerns.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/thiserror/src/aserror.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/thiserror/src/aserror.rs@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ use std::error::Error;+use std::panic::UnwindSafe; pub trait AsDynError<'a> {     fn as_dyn_error(&self) -> &(dyn Error + 'a);@@ -31,3 +32,10 @@         self     } }++impl<'a> AsDynError<'a> for dyn Error + Send + Sync + UnwindSafe + 'a {+    #[inline]+    fn as_dyn_error(&self) -> &(dyn Error + 'a) {+        self+    }+}

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Thread Safety Improvement] [third_party/rust/thiserror/src/aserror.rs] [Lines added]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```rust
   // No implementation for dyn Error + Send + Sync + UnwindSafe
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```rust
   impl<'a> AsDynError<'a> for dyn Error + Send + Sync + UnwindSafe + 'a {
       #[inline]
       fn as_dyn_error(&self) -> &(dyn Error + 'a) {
           self
       }
   }
   ```

Additional Details:
- The diff adds an implementation of `AsDynError` for error types that are `Send + Sync + UnwindSafe`
- This appears to be adding support for thread-safe error types that can be unwound safely during panics
- While not a direct security fix, this could be related to making error handling more robust in concurrent contexts
- The change doesn't appear to fix a specific known vulnerability but rather improves safety characteristics
- No CVE or specific vulnerability name is associated with this change

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/network/UDPSocketChild.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/network/UDPSocketChild.h@@ -61,8 +61,7 @@   nsresult Bind(nsIUDPSocketInternal* aSocket, nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,                 const nsACString& aHost, uint16_t aPort, bool aAddressReuse,                 bool aLoopback, uint32_t recvBufferSize,-                uint32_t sendBufferSize,-                nsISerialEventTarget* aMainThreadEventTarget);+                uint32_t sendBufferSize);   // Tell the chrome process to connect the UDP socket to a given remote host   // and port

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Parameter Sanitization Issue] [dom/network/UDPSocketChild.h] [Lines 61-63]
[Old Code]
nsresult Bind(nsIUDPSocketInternal* aSocket, nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
                const nsACString& aHost, uint16_t aPort, bool aAddressReuse,
                bool aLoopback, uint32_t recvBufferSize,
                uint32_t sendBufferSize,
                nsISerialEventTarget* aMainThreadEventTarget);
[Fixed Code]
nsresult Bind(nsIUDPSocketInternal* aSocket, nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
                const nsACString& aHost, uint16_t aPort, bool aAddressReuse,
                bool aLoopback, uint32_t recvBufferSize,
                uint32_t sendBufferSize);

Additional Details:
The main change is the removal of the `nsISerialEventTarget* aMainThreadEventTarget` parameter from the Bind method. While this doesn't directly indicate a specific vulnerability, it could be related to:
1. Simplifying the interface to prevent potential misuse of event targets
2. Removing a parameter that could potentially be misused for thread safety issues
3. Consolidating event handling to a more controlled path

Without more context, I can't be certain if this was fixing a specific vulnerability, but removing parameters from security-sensitive functions often indicates hardening of the interface.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-78.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-78.xml@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/>   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body>  <div>

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 10]
    [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="" />
    [Fixed Code] (line removed)

Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute. This doesn't appear to be security-related but rather a cleanup of unnecessary markup.
- No known vulnerability is associated with this change.
- The modification appears to be test-related (part of web platform tests) rather than addressing a security issue.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.solid.lighter.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.solid.lighter.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 255, 1.0)';@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'lighter'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(255, 255, 0, 1.0)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 255,255,255,255, "50,25", "255,255,255,255", 5);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 255,255,255,255, "50,25", "255,255,255,255", 5); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't involve any security-related modifications.

Here's the structured response:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.solid.lighter.html] [Lines 17-26]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    [...]
    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 255,255,255,255, "50,25", "255,255,255,255", 5);
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    [...]
    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 255,255,255,255, "50,25", "255,255,255,255", 5);

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or readability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/netwerk/test/unit_ipc/test_trr_httpssvc_wrap.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/netwerk/test/unit_ipc/test_trr_httpssvc_wrap.js@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@   prefs.clearUserPref("network.trr.useGET");   prefs.clearUserPref("network.trr.confirmationNS");   prefs.clearUserPref("network.trr.bootstrapAddr");-  prefs.clearUserPref("network.trr.blacklist-duration");+  prefs.clearUserPref("network.trr.temp_blocklist_duration_sec");   prefs.clearUserPref("network.trr.request-timeout");   prefs.clearUserPref("network.trr.clear-cache-on-pref-change"); });

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Pref Name Change] [netwerk/test/unit_ipc/test_trr_httpssvc_wrap.js] [Lines 61]
[Old Code]
  prefs.clearUserPref("network.trr.blacklist-duration");
[Fixed Code]
  prefs.clearUserPref("network.trr.temp_blocklist_duration_sec");

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be a renaming of a preference from "network.trr.blacklist-duration" to "network.trr.temp_blocklist_duration_sec"
- While this could be related to security (as it involves a blocklist duration setting), there's no clear evidence of a security vulnerability being fixed
- The change might be part of a larger refactoring or terminology update
- The new name is more descriptive ("temp_blocklist" instead of "blacklist", and "_sec" suffix indicating seconds)
- Without more context about the broader changes, it's hard to determine if this was fixing a specific security issue

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/media/libwebp/src/enc/vp8i_enc.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/media/libwebp/src/enc/vp8i_enc.h@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ // version numbers #define ENC_MAJ_VERSION 1 #define ENC_MIN_VERSION 2-#define ENC_REV_VERSION 1+#define ENC_REV_VERSION 2 enum { MAX_LF_LEVELS = 64,       // Maximum loop filter level        MAX_VARIABLE_LEVEL = 67,  // last (inclusive) level with variable cost

Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
[Version Update] [media/libwebp/src/enc/vp8i_enc.h] [Lines 32]  
[Old Code]  
#define ENC_REV_VERSION 1  
[Fixed Code]  
#define ENC_REV_VERSION 2  

Additional Details:  
The diff shows a version number update from 1.2.1 to 1.2.2. While version updates often include security fixes, the diff itself doesn't provide enough context to determine if this specific version bump addresses any particular vulnerability. The change could be for bug fixes, performance improvements, or other non-security related changes. Without access to the changelog or commit message associated with this change, we can't definitively say whether this was a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/dav1d/tests/checkasm/filmgrain.c+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/dav1d/tests/checkasm/filmgrain.c@@ -47,8 +47,8 @@ }; static void check_gen_grny(const Dav1dFilmGrainDSPContext *const dsp) {-    entry grain_lut_c[GRAIN_HEIGHT][GRAIN_WIDTH];-    entry grain_lut_a[GRAIN_HEIGHT + 1][GRAIN_WIDTH];+    ALIGN_STK_16(entry, grain_lut_c, GRAIN_HEIGHT,[GRAIN_WIDTH]);+    ALIGN_STK_16(entry, grain_lut_a, GRAIN_HEIGHT + 1,[GRAIN_WIDTH]);     declare_func(void, entry grain_lut[][GRAIN_WIDTH],                  const Dav1dFilmGrainData *data HIGHBD_DECL_SUFFIX);

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: yes
Stack Alignment Vulnerability [third_party/dav1d/tests/checkasm/filmgrain.c] [Lines 47-48]
[Old Code]
    entry grain_lut_c[GRAIN_HEIGHT][GRAIN_WIDTH];
    entry grain_lut_a[GRAIN_HEIGHT + 1][GRAIN_WIDTH];
[Fixed Code]
    ALIGN_STK_16(entry, grain_lut_c, GRAIN_HEIGHT,[GRAIN_WIDTH]);
    ALIGN_STK_16(entry, grain_lut_a, GRAIN_HEIGHT + 1,[GRAIN_WIDTH]);

Additional Details:
The fix adds proper 16-byte alignment to stack-allocated arrays using the ALIGN_STK_16 macro. This addresses potential performance and security issues related to unaligned memory access, which could lead to crashes or undefined behavior on some architectures. While not a direct security vulnerability in the traditional sense, unaligned memory access can be exploited in some cases to cause program instability or crashes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/vm/HelperThreadState.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/vm/HelperThreadState.h@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ class AutoUnlockHelperThreadState; class CompileError; struct ParseTask;+struct DelazifyTask;+struct FreeDelazifyTask; struct PromiseHelperTask; class PromiseObject;@@ -108,6 +110,9 @@       Vector<js::UniquePtr<jit::IonFreeTask>, 0, SystemAllocPolicy>;   typedef Vector<UniquePtr<ParseTask>, 0, SystemAllocPolicy> ParseTaskVector;   using ParseTaskList = mozilla::LinkedList<ParseTask>;+  using DelazifyTaskList = mozilla::LinkedList<DelazifyTask>;+  using FreeDelazifyTaskVector =+      Vector<js::UniquePtr<FreeDelazifyTask>, 1, SystemAllocPolicy>;   typedef Vector<UniquePtr<SourceCompressionTask>, 0, SystemAllocPolicy>       SourceCompressionTaskVector;   using GCParallelTaskList = mozilla::LinkedList<GCParallelTask>;@@ -145,6 +150,19 @@   // Script parsing/emitting worklist and finished jobs.   ParseTaskVector parseWorklist_;   ParseTaskList parseFinishedList_;++  // Script worklist, which might still have function to delazify.+  DelazifyTaskList delazifyWorklist_;+  // Ideally an instance should not have a method to free it-self as, the method+  // has a this pointer, which aliases the deleted instance, and that the method+  // might have some of its fields aliased on the stack.+  //+  // Delazification task are complex and have a lot of fields. To reduce the+  // risk of having aliased fields on the stack while deleting instances of a+  // DelazifyTask, we have FreeDelazifyTask. While FreeDelazifyTask suffer from+  // the same problem, the limited scope of their actions should mitigate the+  // risk.+  FreeDelazifyTaskVector freeDelazifyTaskVector_;   // Source compression worklist of tasks that we do not yet know can start.   SourceCompressionTaskVector compressionPendingList_;@@ -299,6 +317,15 @@     return parseFinishedList_;   }+  DelazifyTaskList& delazifyWorklist(const AutoLockHelperThreadState&) {+    return delazifyWorklist_;+  }++  FreeDelazifyTaskVector& freeDelazifyTaskVector(+      const AutoLockHelperThreadState&) {+    return freeDelazifyTaskVector_;+  }+   SourceCompressionTaskVector& compressionPendingList(       const AutoLockHelperThreadState&) {     return compressionPendingList_;@@ -339,6 +366,8 @@   bool canStartIonCompileTask(const AutoLockHelperThreadState& lock);   bool canStartIonFreeTask(const AutoLockHelperThreadState& lock);   bool canStartParseTask(const AutoLockHelperThreadState& lock);+  bool canStartFreeDelazifyTask(const AutoLockHelperThreadState& lock);+  bool canStartDelazifyTask(const AutoLockHelperThreadState& lock);   bool canStartCompressionTask(const AutoLockHelperThreadState& lock);   bool canStartGCParallelTask(const AutoLockHelperThreadState& lock);@@ -359,6 +388,9 @@       const AutoLockHelperThreadState& lock);   HelperThreadTask* maybeGetIonFreeTask(const AutoLockHelperThreadState& lock);   HelperThreadTask* maybeGetParseTask(const AutoLockHelperThreadState& lock);+  HelperThreadTask* maybeGetFreeDelazifyTask(+      const AutoLockHelperThreadState& lock);+  HelperThreadTask* maybeGetDelazifyTask(const AutoLockHelperThreadState& lock);   HelperThreadTask* maybeGetCompressionTask(       const AutoLockHelperThreadState& lock);   HelperThreadTask* maybeGetGCParallelTask(@@ -441,6 +473,9 @@                   const AutoLockHelperThreadState& locked);   bool submitTask(JSRuntime* rt, UniquePtr<ParseTask> task,                   const AutoLockHelperThreadState& locked);+  void submitTask(DelazifyTask* task, const AutoLockHelperThreadState& locked);+  bool submitTask(UniquePtr<FreeDelazifyTask> task,+                  const AutoLockHelperThreadState& locked);   bool submitTask(PromiseHelperTask* task);   bool submitTask(GCParallelTask* task,                   const AutoLockHelperThreadState& locked);@@ -540,7 +575,124 @@   void runHelperThreadTask(AutoLockHelperThreadState& locked) override;   void runTask(AutoLockHelperThreadState& lock);+  void scheduleDelazifyTask(AutoLockHelperThreadState& lock);   ThreadType threadType() override { return ThreadType::THREAD_TYPE_PARSE; }+};++// Base class for implementing the various strategies to iterate over the+// functions to be delazified, or to decide when to stop doing any+// delazification.+//+// When created, the `add` function should be called with the top-level+// ScriptIndex.+struct DelazifyStrategy {+  using ScriptIndex = frontend::ScriptIndex;+  virtual ~DelazifyStrategy() = default;++  // Returns true if no more functions should be delazified. Note, this does not+  // imply that every function got delazified.+  virtual bool done() const = 0;++  // Return a function identifier which represent the next function to be+  // delazified. If no more function should be delazified, then return 0.+  virtual ScriptIndex next() = 0;++  // Empty the list of functions to be processed next. done() should return true+  // after this call.+  virtual void clear() = 0;++  // Add the inner functions of a delazified function. This function should only+  // be called with a function which has some bytecode associated with it, and+  // register functions which parent are already delazified.+  //+  // This function is called with the script index of:+  //  - top-level script, when starting the off-thread delazification.+  //  - functions added by `add` and delazified by `DelazifyTask`.+  [[nodiscard]] virtual bool add(JSContext* cx,+                                 const frontend::CompilationStencil& stencil,+                                 ScriptIndex index) = 0;+};++// Delazify all functions using a Depth First traversal of the function-tree+// ordered, where each functions is visited in source-order.+//+// When `add` is called with the top-level ScriptIndex. This will push all inner+// functions to a stack such that they are popped in source order. Each+// function, once delazified, would be used to schedule their inner functions+// the same way.+//+// Hypothesis: This strategy parses all functions in source order, with the+// expectation that calls will follow the same order, and that helper thread+// would always be ahead of the execution.+struct DepthFirstDelazification final : public DelazifyStrategy {+  Vector<ScriptIndex, 0, SystemAllocPolicy> stack;++  bool done() const override { return stack.empty(); }+  ScriptIndex next() override { return stack.popCopy(); }+  void clear() override { return stack.clear(); }+  [[nodiscard]] bool add(JSContext* cx,+                         const frontend::CompilationStencil& stencil,+                         ScriptIndex index) override;+};++// Eagerly delazify functions, and send the result back to the runtime which+// requested the stencil to be parsed, by filling the stencil cache.+//+// This task is scheduled multiple times, each time it is scheduled, it+// delazifies a single function. Once the function is delazified, it schedules+// the inner functions of the delazified function for delazification using the+// DelazifyStrategy. The DelazifyStrategy is responsible for ordering and+// filtering functions to be delazified.+//+// When no more function have to be delazified, a FreeDelazifyTask is scheduled+// to remove the memory held by the DelazifyTask.+struct DelazifyTask : public mozilla::LinkedListElement<DelazifyTask>,+                      public HelperThreadTask {+  // HelperThreads are shared between all runtimes in the process so explicitly+  // track which one we are associated with.+  JSRuntime* runtime = nullptr;++  // Queue of functions to be processed while delazifying.+  UniquePtr<DelazifyStrategy> strategy;++  // Every delazified function is merged back to provide context for delazifying+  // even more functions.+  frontend::CompilationStencilMerger merger;++  // Record any errors happening while parsing or generating bytecode.+  OffThreadFrontendErrors errors_;++  explicit DelazifyTask(JSRuntime* runtime);++  [[nodiscard]] bool init(+      JSContext* cx, const JS::ReadOnlyCompileOptions& options,+      UniquePtr<frontend::ExtensibleCompilationStencil>&& initial);++  bool runtimeMatches(JSRuntime* rt) { return runtime == rt; }++  size_t sizeOfExcludingThis(mozilla::MallocSizeOf mallocSizeOf) const;+  size_t sizeOfIncludingThis(mozilla::MallocSizeOf mallocSizeOf) const {+    return mallocSizeOf(this) + sizeOfExcludingThis(mallocSizeOf);+  }++  void runHelperThreadTask(AutoLockHelperThreadState& locked) override;+  [[nodiscard]] bool runTask(JSContext* cx);+  ThreadType threadType() override { return ThreadType::THREAD_TYPE_DELAZIFY; }+};++// The FreeDelazifyTask exists as this is a bad practice to `js_delete(this)`,+// as fields might be aliased across the destructor, such as with RAII guards.+// The FreeDelazifyTask limits the risk of adding these kind of issues by+// limiting the number of fields to the DelazifyTask pointer, before deleting+// it-self.+struct FreeDelazifyTask : public HelperThreadTask {+  DelazifyTask* task;++  explicit FreeDelazifyTask(DelazifyTask* t) : task(t) {}+  void runHelperThreadTask(AutoLockHelperThreadState& locked) override;+  ThreadType threadType() override {+    return ThreadType::THREAD_TYPE_DELAZIFY_FREE;+  } }; // It is not desirable to eagerly compress: if lazy functions that are tied to

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Memory Safety Issue] [js/src/vm/HelperThreadState.h] [Lines 150-163]  
   [Old Code]  
   (No previous code for delazifyWorklist_ and freeDelazifyTaskVector_)  
   [Fixed Code]  
   Added new task management structures (DelazifyTaskList and FreeDelazifyTaskVector) with detailed comments about memory safety concerns when deleting instances. The comments suggest this was added to mitigate potential aliasing issues during deletion.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Race Condition] [js/src/vm/HelperThreadState.h] [Lines 317-324]  
   [Old Code]  
   (No previous methods for delazify task management)  
   [Fixed Code]  
   Added new thread-safe accessors (delazifyWorklist() and freeDelazifyTaskVector()) that require AutoLockHelperThreadState lock, suggesting these were added to prevent race conditions in multi-threaded access.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Resource Management Issue] [js/src/vm/HelperThreadState.h] [Lines 575-680]  
   [Old Code]  
   (No previous DelazifyTask implementation)  
   [Fixed Code]  
   Added comprehensive DelazifyTask and FreeDelazifyTask implementations with explicit memory management and error handling, including runtime association tracking and size accounting.

The diff primarily adds new functionality for delazification task management rather than fixing existing code. While no specific vulnerabilities are clearly fixed, the added code includes several defensive programming measures:
- Explicit locking for thread safety
- Careful memory management patterns
- Separation of concerns between task execution and cleanup
- Detailed documentation about potential hazards

The changes appear to be proactive security measures rather than reactive fixes to known vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/tools/profiler/rust-api/build.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/tools/profiler/rust-api/build.rs@@ -24,24 +24,16 @@ lazy_static! {     static ref BINDGEN_FLAGS: Vec<String> = {         // Load build-specific config overrides.-        let path = PathBuf::from(env::var_os("MOZ_TOPOBJDIR").unwrap())-            .join("tools/profiler/rust-api/extra-bindgen-flags");+        let path = mozbuild::TOPOBJDIR.join("tools/profiler/rust-api/extra-bindgen-flags");         println!("cargo:rerun-if-changed={}", path.to_str().unwrap());         fs::read_to_string(path).expect("Failed to read extra-bindgen-flags file")             .split_whitespace()             .map(std::borrow::ToOwned::to_owned)             .collect()     };-    static ref DISTDIR_PATH: PathBuf = {-        let path = PathBuf::from(env::var_os("MOZ_DIST").unwrap());-        if !path.is_absolute() || !path.is_dir() {-            panic!("MOZ_DIST must be an absolute directory, was: {}", path.display());-        }-        path-    };     static ref SEARCH_PATHS: Vec<PathBuf> = vec![-        DISTDIR_PATH.join("include"),-        DISTDIR_PATH.join("include/nspr"),+        mozbuild::TOPOBJDIR.join("dist/include"),+        mozbuild::TOPOBJDIR.join("dist/include/nspr"),     ]; }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
Potential Path Traversal Vulnerability [File] tools/profiler/rust-api/build.rs [Lines] 24-32  
[Old Code]  
```rust
let path = PathBuf::from(env::var_os("MOZ_TOPOBJDIR").unwrap())
    .join("tools/profiler/rust-api/extra-bindgen-flags");
```  
[Fixed Code]  
```rust
let path = mozbuild::TOPOBJDIR.join("tools/profiler/rust-api/extra-bindgen-flags");
```  
Details: The change moves from using environment variables to a more controlled mozbuild constant, which could prevent potential path manipulation if MOZ_TOPOBJDIR was controlled by an attacker.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
Potential Path Validation Vulnerability [File] tools/profiler/rust-api/build.rs [Lines] 33-39  
[Old Code]  
```rust
static ref DISTDIR_PATH: PathBuf = {
    let path = PathBuf::from(env::var_os("MOZ_DIST").unwrap());
    if !path.is_absolute() || !path.is_dir() {
        panic!("MOZ_DIST must be an absolute directory, was: {}", path.display());
    }
    path
};
```  
[Fixed Code]  
(Removed entirely)  
Details: The removal of environment variable-based path configuration and validation suggests the original code might have been vulnerable to path manipulation attacks if MOZ_DIST was controlled by an attacker.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
Potential Insecure Path Construction [File] tools/profiler/rust-api/build.rs [Lines] 40-43  
[Old Code]  
```rust
static ref SEARCH_PATHS: Vec<PathBuf> = vec![
    DISTDIR_PATH.join("include"),
    DISTDIR_PATH.join("include/nspr"),
];
```  
[Fixed Code]  
```rust
static ref SEARCH_PATHS: Vec<PathBuf> = vec![
    mozbuild::TOPOBJDIR.join("dist/include"),
    mozbuild::TOPOBJDIR.join("dist/include/nspr"),
];
```  
Details: The change moves from using a potentially user-controlled environment variable to a more controlled build system constant, which could prevent path manipulation attacks.

Note: While these changes appear to improve security by reducing reliance on environment variables, I can't be certain about actual vulnerabilities without more context about the build environment and potential attack vectors. The changes suggest the developers were concerned about path-related security issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.union.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.union.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -31,12 +31,12 @@ ctx.lineTo(0, 26); ctx.closePath(); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,1, 0,255,0,255, "25,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 48,1, 0,255,0,255, "48,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,1, 0,255,0,255, "25,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 48,48, 0,255,0,255, "48,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,1, 0,255,0,255, "25,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 48,1, 0,255,0,255, "48,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,1, 0,255,0,255, "25,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 48,48, 0,255,0,255, "48,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and the corresponding updates to function calls. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found
   File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.union.html
   Lines: 17-31
   Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found
   File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.union.html
   Lines: 31-48
   Old Code: _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
   Fixed Code: _assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't affect security. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/server/actors/watcher.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/server/actors/watcher.js@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@   WatcherRegistry, } = require("devtools/server/actors/watcher/WatcherRegistry.jsm"); const Targets = require("devtools/server/actors/targets/index");+const {+  getAllBrowsingContextsForContext,+} = require("devtools/server/actors/watcher/browsing-context-helpers.jsm"); const TARGET_HELPERS = {}; loader.lazyRequireGetter(@@ -36,6 +39,12 @@   this,   "NetworkParentActor",   "devtools/server/actors/network-monitor/network-parent",+  true+);+loader.lazyRequireGetter(+  this,+  "BlackboxingActor",+  "devtools/server/actors/blackboxing",   true ); loader.lazyRequireGetter(@@ -73,22 +82,15 @@    *    * @param {DevToolsServerConnection} conn    *        The connection to use in order to communicate back to the client.-   * @param {Object} sessionContext-   *        Mandatory argument to define the debugged context of this actor.-   *        Note that as this object is passed to other processes and thread,-   *        this should be a serializable object.-   * @param {String} sessionContext.type: The type of debugged context.-   *        Can be:-   *        - "all", to debug everything in the browser.-   *        - "browser-element", to focus on one given <browser> element-   *          and all its children resources (workers, iframes,...)+   * @param {object} sessionContext+   *        The Session Context to help know what is debugged.+   *        See devtools/server/actors/watcher/session-context.js    * @param {Number} sessionContext.browserId: If this is a "browser-element" context type,    *        the "browserId" of the <browser> element we would like to debug.-   * @param {Object|null} config: Optional configuration object.-   * @param {Boolean} config.isServerTargetSwitchingEnabled: Flag to to know if we should+   * @param {Boolean} sessionContext.isServerTargetSwitchingEnabled: Flag to to know if we should    *        spawn new top level targets for the debugged context.    */-  initialize: function(conn, sessionContext, config = {}) {+  initialize: function(conn, sessionContext) {     protocol.Actor.prototype.initialize.call(this, conn);     this._sessionContext = sessionContext;     if (sessionContext.type == "browser-element") {@@ -104,7 +106,6 @@       }       this._browserElement = browsingContext.embedderElement;     }-    this._config = config;     // Sometimes we get iframe targets before the top-level targets     // mostly when doing bfcache navigations, lets cache the early iframes targets and@@ -145,6 +146,10 @@     return this._browserElement;   },+  getAllBrowsingContexts(options) {+    return getAllBrowsingContextsForContext(this.sessionContext, options);+  },+   /**    * Helper to know if the context we are debugging has been already destroyed    */@@ -159,10 +164,6 @@     throw new Error(       "Unsupported session context type: " + this.sessionContext.type     );-  },--  get isServerTargetSwitchingEnabled() {-    return !!this._config.isServerTargetSwitchingEnabled;   },   destroy: function() {@@ -240,6 +241,9 @@           [Resources.TYPES.SERVER_SENT_EVENT]: shouldEnableAllWatchers,           [Resources.TYPES.WEBSOCKET]: shouldEnableAllWatchers,         },+        // @backward-compat { version 98 } Introduced the Blackboxing actor+        //                  The traits can be removed when removing 97 support.+        blackboxing: true,       },     };   },@@ -382,7 +386,7 @@     // so there is no reason to delay target-destroy for remote iframes.     if (       documentEventWatcher &&-      this.isServerTargetSwitchingEnabled &&+      this.sessionContext.isServerTargetSwitchingEnabled &&       actor.isTopLevelTarget     ) {       await documentEventWatcher.onceWillNavigateIsEmitted(actor.innerWindowId);@@ -659,6 +663,20 @@   },   /**+   * Returns the blackboxing actor.+   *+   * @return {Object} actor+   *        The blackboxing actor.+   */+  getBlackboxingActor() {+    if (!this._blackboxingActor) {+      this._blackboxingActor = new BlackboxingActor(this);+    }++    return this._blackboxingActor;+  },++  /**    * Returns the breakpoint list actor.    *    * @return {Object} actor

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Session Context Validation Issue] [devtools/server/actors/watcher.js] [Lines 73-82]
   [Old Code]
   ```
   @param {Object} sessionContext
         Mandatory argument to define the debugged context of this actor.
         Note that as this object is passed to other processes and thread,
         this should be a serializable object.
   @param {String} sessionContext.type: The type of debugged context.
         Can be:
         - "all", to debug everything in the browser.
         - "browser-element", to focus on one given <browser> element
           and all its children resources (workers, iframes,...)
   ```
   [Fixed Code]
   ```
   @param {object} sessionContext
         The Session Context to help know what is debugged.
         See devtools/server/actors/watcher/session-context.js
   ```

   The change moves session context documentation to a separate file, but it's unclear if this was related to a security fix or just documentation improvement.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Configuration Handling Issue] [devtools/server/actors/watcher.js] [Lines 86-89, 159-163]
   [Old Code]
   ```
   @param {Object|null} config: Optional configuration object.
   @param {Boolean} config.isServerTargetSwitchingEnabled: Flag to to know if we should
         spawn new top level targets for the debugged context.
   ```
   [Fixed Code]
   ```
   @param {Boolean} sessionContext.isServerTargetSwitchingEnabled: Flag to to know if we should
         spawn new top level targets for the debugged context.
   ```
   [Removed Code]
   ```
   get isServerTargetSwitchingEnabled() {
     return !!this._config.isServerTargetSwitchingEnabled;
   },
   ```

   The change moves the configuration flag into sessionContext and removes the separate config object. This could potentially be related to security hardening by reducing attack surface, but it's not explicitly clear.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Browsing Context Access Control] [devtools/server/actors/watcher.js] [Lines 145-148]
   [New Code]
   ```
   getAllBrowsingContexts(options) {
     return getAllBrowsingContextsForContext(this.sessionContext, options);
   },
   ```

   The addition of this method could be related to security by providing a controlled way to access browsing contexts, but without seeing the implementation of `getAllBrowsingContextsForContext`, it's hard to determine if this fixes a vulnerability.

4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Blackboxing Security Feature] [devtools/server/actors/watcher.js] [Lines 663-677]
   [New Code]
   ```
   getBlackboxingActor() {
     if (!this._blackboxingActor) {
       this._blackboxingActor = new BlackboxingActor(this);
     }

     return this._blackboxingActor;
   },
   ```

   The addition of blackboxing functionality could be a security feature to prevent debugging of sensitive code, but without more context about the BlackboxingActor implementation, it's unclear if this fixes a specific vulnerability.

Note: While several changes were made, none clearly indicate fixes for known vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be more architectural improvements and feature additions rather than direct security fixes. The most security-relevant changes seem to be around session context handling and the addition of blackboxing functionality.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.nonpremul.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.nonpremul.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.5)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18]
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   
   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be purely a variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security implications are evident in this change
- The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable naming was improved
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with this type of change

This appears to be a code style/readability improvement rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.