Shared security patch analysis results
AI Used: DEEPSEEK deepseek-chat--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/shared/test/browser_filter-editor-07.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/shared/test/browser_filter-editor-07.js@@ -28,4 +28,5 @@ "contrast(200%)", "Should remove the clicked filter" );+ widget.destroy(); });
Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities.
Analysis:
1. Looking at the diff, the only change is the addition of `widget.destroy();` at the end of the test case.
2. This appears to be a cleanup operation to properly dispose of the widget after the test completes.
3. The change doesn't show any obvious security vulnerability fixes, but rather a resource management improvement.
Answer:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [devtools/client/shared/test/browser_filter-editor-07.js] [Lines 28-32]
Old Code: Test ended without widget cleanup
Fixed Code: Added widget.destroy() for proper cleanup
Additional notes:
- The change improves resource management but doesn't appear to fix any security vulnerability
- The addition of destroy() prevents potential memory leaks but isn't directly security-related
- No CVE or common vulnerability type applies to this change
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-39b.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-39b.xml@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/> <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/> <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->- <meta name="flags" content="" /> </head> <body>
Analysis of the provided code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-39b.xml [Lines] 6 Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="" /> Fixed Code: (line removed) Additional details: - The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag with name="flags". This appears to be a cleanup change rather than a security fix. - There are no clear security implications from this change as the tag was empty and not being used for any security-related functionality. - No known vulnerability is associated with this change. The modification seems to be removing unnecessary markup from the test file.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/actions/sources/loadSourceText.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/actions/sources/loadSourceText.js@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ import { prettyPrintSource } from "./prettyPrint"; import { isFulfilled, fulfilled } from "../../utils/async-value";-import { isOriginal, isPretty } from "../../utils/source";+import { isPretty } from "../../utils/source"; import { memoizeableAction } from "../../utils/memoizableAction"; const Telemetry = require("devtools/client/shared/telemetry");@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ const telemetry = new Telemetry(); async function loadSource(state, source, { sourceMaps, client, getState }) {- if (isPretty(source) && isOriginal(source)) {+ if (isPretty(source) && source.isOriginal) { const generatedSource = getGeneratedSource(state, source); if (!generatedSource) { throw new Error("Unable to find minified original.");@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ ); }- if (isOriginal(source)) {+ if (source.isOriginal) { const result = await sourceMaps.getOriginalSourceText(source.id); if (!result) { // The way we currently try to load and select a pending
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Logic Flaw] [devtools/client/debugger/src/actions/sources/loadSourceText.js] [Lines 28, 46]
[Old Code]
if (isPretty(source) && isOriginal(source))
if (isOriginal(source))
[Fixed Code]
if (isPretty(source) && source.isOriginal)
if (source.isOriginal)
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Removed Function Import] [devtools/client/debugger/src/actions/sources/loadSourceText.js] [Line 18]
[Old Code]
import { isOriginal, isPretty } from "../../utils/source";
[Fixed Code]
import { isPretty } from "../../utils/source";
Additional Details:
- The changes appear to be refactoring how source type checking is performed, moving from using an imported `isOriginal()` function to directly checking the `source.isOriginal` property.
- While this doesn't clearly indicate a security vulnerability, it could potentially relate to more reliable type checking if the previous function had issues.
- The removal of the unused `isOriginal` import suggests the function was no longer needed after the refactor.
- Without more context about the `source` object's structure and how it's used elsewhere, it's hard to determine if this was fixing a security issue or just improving code quality.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.isPointInPath.empty.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.isPointInPath.empty.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); _assertSame(ctx.isPointInPath(0, 0), false, "ctx.isPointInPath(0, 0)", "false"); t.done();
Analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.isPointInPath.empty.html [Lines] 17-18
Old Code:
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
Additional Details:
- The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas')
- No security-related changes were made in this diff
- The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name was changed for consistency or clarity
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with this type of change
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/python/mozbuild/mozbuild/frontend/context.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/python/mozbuild/mozbuild/frontend/context.py@@ -664,6 +664,12 @@ context.config.substs.get("MOZ_FILE_PREFIX_MAP_FLAGS"), ("CXXFLAGS", "CFLAGS"), ),+ (+ # See bug 414641+ "NO_STRICT_ALIASING",+ ["-fno-strict-aliasing"],+ ("CXXFLAGS", "CFLAGS"),+ ), ) TargetCompileFlags.__init__(self, context)
Let me analyze this code diff for security fixes.
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Strict Aliasing Violation [File] python/mozbuild/mozbuild/frontend/context.py [Lines] 664-670
[Old Code]
(No explicit handling of strict aliasing flags)
[Fixed Code]
(
# See bug 414641
"NO_STRICT_ALIASING",
["-fno-strict-aliasing"],
("CXXFLAGS", "CFLAGS"),
)
Additional Details:
The change adds a compiler flag (-fno-strict-aliasing) to prevent potential strict aliasing violations. While strict aliasing violations can lead to undefined behavior and potential security issues, this appears to be more of a correctness/optimization fix rather than a direct security vulnerability. The reference to bug 414641 suggests this was addressing a specific issue, but without more context it's hard to determine if it was security-related. The change prevents potential undefined behavior that could theoretically be exploited, but I can't confirm this was an actual security vulnerability.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/idna/.cargo-checksum.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/idna/.cargo-checksum.json@@ -1 +1 @@-{"files":{"Cargo.toml":"af4fe12b69e1354864a33c43eab5f8466d435a216b35c8fb4b6b567d11dfb28a","LICENSE-APACHE":"a60eea817514531668d7e00765731449fe14d059d3249e0bc93b36de45f759f2","LICENSE-MIT":"20c7855c364d57ea4c97889a5e8d98470a9952dade37bd9248b9a54431670e5e","src/IdnaMappingTable.txt":"813a8308aeff8bcb9368751e1fd0ad7cc467130965d53ac860f82c4d0d11523f","src/lib.rs":"590280903e929c7eadd5473faf67c48293d734b9a75ea42798264b6b10d3f33f","src/make_uts46_mapping_table.py":"fd4ff62fc27dc8d15d5b61c3504f5f754aded1c3e16c1179506adff5df766d74","src/punycode.rs":"fe078681e4a565615b71a7f8ce92373de59f09cffc1aac074822b0e1630a0cba","src/uts46.rs":"96b47ff8cc1a992bfc2f8b9138eb9a92908dce1de2e6457cc7e6d2a187fe0b5d","src/uts46_mapping_table.rs":"9d0b645182592709ea87c6db7ca1c4e1d9b2826b68efd746f764cafcb0545da2","tests/IdnaTest.txt":"921c68e5d3fbb631b26140d232af90040fc4df612857d1894641ded319e52822","tests/punycode.rs":"5a786d09f2bbedfdbd9ac18c99af25ecaf097710b5760792c328c78c1750a209","tests/punycode_tests.json":"3d4ac0cf25984c37b9ce197f5df680a0136f728fb8ec82bc76624e42139eb3a8","tests/tests.rs":"84d56979840dcbb1100cc5e0a5450be642b1e5dfc76abf853da121035903e5ae","tests/unit.rs":"4a20fded1ac8bc5177f28ae49dcbb25f9a646300de4524ce8ca20258a558d3fc","tests/uts46.rs":"ce896ba3d39f0d8e82975b97d2b9540e37b3928d07eb2dd2fb4a83f4deb4873d"},"package":"02e2673c30ee86b5b96a9cb52ad15718aa1f966f5ab9ad54a8b95d5ca33120a9"}+{"files":{"Cargo.toml":"6f1fd46d4d9575d5a7f46873cb40a93e973e9fb8f574b28a1b21b596df618a89","LICENSE-APACHE":"a60eea817514531668d7e00765731449fe14d059d3249e0bc93b36de45f759f2","LICENSE-MIT":"20c7855c364d57ea4c97889a5e8d98470a9952dade37bd9248b9a54431670e5e","benches/all.rs":"e734b9c9092ed66986725f86cfe90f3756cfddb058af308b796ba494f9beefc2","src/IdnaMappingTable.txt":"87d6553a4b86bc49dcade38bf26b745cd81800eb8af295dc3fb99b4729eaea38","src/lib.rs":"d61b2bfcf4265b9a41eedd1de33ab49ea615e3c06df944321b30c57950a85342","src/make_uts46_mapping_table.py":"d420883d17b44c42109317ffaf1c273e611864eaeb1c5f1b9d93634a5d586835","src/punycode.rs":"dceeb0467197f892d2c777711b3c6647238f52f3976dfca5a8f8957500fd3599","src/uts46.rs":"49aaae3c5a9503bc7ef59b1a2e76ba158154132515e7c85ab670130ed5da318f","src/uts46_mapping_table.rs":"90c4180dd865b919bf1b2f13459c9c5b9de0cbbdff6584f742a7ecc0c14d3cdd","tests/IdnaTestV2.txt":"c6f3778b0545fd150c8063286c7f5adc901e16557eddccc3751213646d07593d","tests/punycode.rs":"8efdaae0902a8ffe483ae69236c9d0a38979cfd2430e69b87f33975e6946d577","tests/punycode_tests.json":"3d4ac0cf25984c37b9ce197f5df680a0136f728fb8ec82bc76624e42139eb3a8","tests/tests.rs":"de7425a3e4e6e871255721107803704d1431246601fa9c87105224d88dfe60d6","tests/unit.rs":"9600ec4f67ae44e8457fb64a9872d190a1a4d807e32d9688c8fa3ef9135c7a5d","tests/uts46.rs":"ca91d48811d366fb9e32d7aa79cfda1261b93c271b6ed7fb5535de9a2500205b"},"package":"de910d521f7cc3135c4de8db1cb910e0b5ed1dc6f57c381cd07e8e661ce10094"}=========testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.collinear.1.html========--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.collinear.1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.collinear.1.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ ctx.moveTo(-100, 25); ctx.arcTo(0, 25, 100, 25, 1); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.
1. For the first file (third_party/rust/idna/.cargo-checksum.json):
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[No specific vulnerability name] [third_party/rust/idna/.cargo-checksum.json] [Entire file]
[Old checksums for various files]
[New checksums for various files]
Additional Details: This appears to be a checksum update for the idna crate. While checksum updates often include security fixes, we can't determine specific vulnerabilities from just the checksum changes without seeing the actual code changes in the referenced files.
2. For the second file (testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.collinear.1.html):
Vulnerability Existed: no
[No vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.collinear.1.html] [Lines 17-33]
[Old code using 'offscreenCanvas' variable]
[New code using 'canvas' variable]
Additional Details: This change appears to be a simple variable renaming from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas' in a test file. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed here - it's likely just a code style/consistency improvement.
No clear security vulnerabilities were identified in these changes. The first file's checksum updates might relate to security fixes in the dependencies, but we can't confirm that without seeing the actual code changes in those dependencies. The second change is purely cosmetic.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/pocket/content/panels/css/main.compiled.css+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/pocket/content/panels/css/main.compiled.css@@ -1 +1,2079 @@-/*! normalize.css v3.0.2 | MIT License | git.io/normalize */html{font-family:sans-serif}body{margin:0}article,aside,details,figcaption,figure,footer,header,hgroup,main,menu,nav,section,summary{display:block}audio,canvas,progress,video{display:inline-block;vertical-align:baseline}audio:not([controls]){display:none;height:0}[hidden],template{display:none}a{background-color:transparent}a:active,a:hover{outline:0}abbr[title]{border-bottom:1px dotted}b,strong{font-weight:bold}dfn{font-style:italic}h1{font-size:2em;margin:.67em 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a{height:44px;width:100%;display:flex;align-items:center;justify-content:space-between;box-sizing:border-box;border-bottom:1px solid #eaeaea}.pkt_ext_home .pkt_ext_detail .pkt_ext_discover{line-height:12px;margin:20px 0;height:40px;width:100%;display:flex;justify-content:center;align-items:center;border-radius:4px}.pkt_ext_home .pkt_ext_detail .pkt_ext_discover:hover{background:#f5f5f5}/*# sourceMappingURL=main.compiled.css.map */+/*! normalize.css v3.0.2 | MIT License | git.io/normalize */+/**+ * 1. Set default font family to sans-serif.+ * 2. Prevent iOS text size adjust after orientation change, without disabling+ * user zoom.+ */+html {+ font-family: sans-serif;+ /* 1 */+}++/**+ * Remove default margin.+ */+body {+ margin: 0;+}++/* HTML5 display definitions+ ========================================================================== */+/**+ * Correct `block` display not defined for any HTML5 element in IE 8/9.+ * Correct `block` display not defined for `details` or `summary` in IE 10/11+ * and Firefox.+ * Correct `block` display not defined for `main` in IE 11.+ */+article,+aside,+details,+figcaption,+figure,+footer,+header,+hgroup,+main,+menu,+nav,+section,+summary {+ display: block;+}++/**+ * 1. Correct `inline-block` display not defined in IE 8/9.+ * 2. Normalize vertical alignment of `progress` in Chrome, Firefox, and Opera.+ */+audio,+canvas,+progress,+video {+ display: inline-block;+ /* 1 */+ vertical-align: baseline;+ /* 2 */+}++/**+ * Prevent modern browsers from displaying `audio` without controls.+ * Remove excess height in iOS 5 devices.+ */+audio:not([controls]) {+ display: none;+ height: 0;+}++/**+ * Address `[hidden]` styling not present in IE 8/9/10.+ * Hide the `template` element in IE 8/9/11, Safari, and Firefox < 22.+ */+[hidden],+template {+ display: none;+}++/* Links+ ========================================================================== */+/**+ * Remove the gray background color from active links in IE 10.+ */+a {+ background-color: transparent;+}++/**+ * Improve readability when focused and also mouse hovered in all browsers.+ */+a:active,+a:hover {+ outline: 0;+}++/* Text-level semantics+ ========================================================================== */+/**+ * Address styling not present in IE 8/9/10/11, Safari, and Chrome.+ */+abbr[title] {+ border-bottom: 1px dotted;+}++/**+ * Address style set to `bolder` in Firefox 4+, Safari, and Chrome.+ */+b,+strong {+ font-weight: bold;+}++/**+ * Address styling not present in Safari and Chrome.+ */+dfn {+ font-style: italic;+}++/**+ * Address variable `h1` font-size and margin within `section` and `article`+ * contexts in Firefox 4+, Safari, and Chrome.+ */+h1 {+ font-size: 2em;+ margin: 0.67em 0;+}++/**+ * Address styling not present in IE 8/9.+ */+mark {+ background: #ff0;+ color: #000;+}++/**+ * Address inconsistent and variable font size in all browsers.+ */+small {+ font-size: 80%;+}++/**+ * Prevent `sub` and `sup` affecting `line-height` in all browsers.+ */+sub,+sup {+ font-size: 75%;+ line-height: 0;+ position: relative;+ vertical-align: baseline;+}++sup {+ top: -0.5em;+}++sub {+ bottom: -0.25em;+}++/* Embedded content+ ========================================================================== */+/**+ * Remove border when inside `a` element in IE 8/9/10.+ */+img {+ border: 0;+}++/**+ * Correct overflow not hidden in IE 9/10/11.+ */+svg:not(:root) {+ overflow: hidden;+}++/* Grouping content+ ========================================================================== */+/**+ * Address margin not present in IE 8/9 and Safari.+ */+figure {+ margin: 1em 40px;+}++/**+ * Address differences between Firefox and other browsers.+ */+hr {+ -moz-box-sizing: content-box;+ box-sizing: content-box;+ height: 0;+}++/**+ * Contain overflow in all browsers.+ */+pre {+ overflow: auto;+}++/**+ * Address odd `em`-unit font size rendering in all browsers.+ */+code,+kbd,+pre,+samp {+ font-family: monospace, monospace;+ font-size: 1em;+}++/* Forms+ ========================================================================== */+/**+ * Known limitation: by default, Chrome and Safari on OS X allow very limited+ * styling of `select`, unless a `border` property is set.+ */+/**+ * 1. Correct color not being inherited.+ * Known issue: affects color of disabled elements.+ * 2. Correct font properties not being inherited.+ * 3. Address margins set differently in Firefox 4+, Safari, and Chrome.+ */+button,+input,+optgroup,+select,+textarea {+ color: inherit;+ /* 1 */+ font: inherit;+ /* 2 */+ margin: 0;+ /* 3 */+}++/**+ * Address `overflow` set to `hidden` in IE 8/9/10/11.+ */+button {+ overflow: visible;+}++/**+ * Address inconsistent `text-transform` inheritance for `button` and `select`.+ * All other form control elements do not inherit `text-transform` values.+ * Correct `button` style inheritance in Firefox, IE 8/9/10/11, and Opera.+ * Correct `select` style inheritance in Firefox.+ */+button,+select {+ text-transform: none;+}++/**+ * 1. Avoid the WebKit bug in Android 4.0.* where (2) destroys native `audio`+ * and `video` controls.+ * 2. Correct inability to style clickable `input` types in iOS.+ * 3. Improve usability and consistency of cursor style between image-type+ * `input` and others.+ */+button,+html input[type=button],+input[type=reset],+input[type=submit] {+ cursor: pointer;+ /* 3 */+}++/**+ * Re-set default cursor for disabled elements.+ */+button[disabled],+html input[disabled] {+ cursor: default;+}++/**+ * Remove inner padding and border in Firefox 4+.+ */+button::-moz-focus-inner,+input::-moz-focus-inner {+ border: 0;+ padding: 0;+}++/**+ * Address Firefox 4+ setting `line-height` on `input` using `!important` in+ * the UA stylesheet.+ */+input {+ line-height: normal;+}++/**+ * It's recommended that you don't attempt to style these elements.+ * Firefox's implementation doesn't respect box-sizing, padding, or width.+ *+ * 1. Address box sizing set to `content-box` in IE 8/9/10.+ * 2. Remove excess padding in IE 8/9/10.+ */+input[type=checkbox],+input[type=radio] {+ box-sizing: border-box;+ /* 1 */+ padding: 0;+ /* 2 */+}++/**+ * 1. Address `appearance` set to `searchfield` in Safari and Chrome.+ * 2. Address `box-sizing` set to `border-box` in Safari and Chrome+ * (include `-moz` to future-proof).+ */+input[type=search] {+ box-sizing: content-box;+}++/**+ * Define consistent border, margin, and padding.+ */+fieldset {+ border: 1px solid #c0c0c0;+ margin: 0 2px;+ padding: 0.35em 0.625em 0.75em;+}++/**+ * 1. Correct `color` not being inherited in IE 8/9/10/11.+ * 2. Remove padding so people aren't caught out if they zero out fieldsets.+ */+legend {+ border: 0;+ /* 1 */+ padding: 0;+ /* 2 */+}++/**+ * Remove default vertical scrollbar in IE 8/9/10/11.+ */+textarea {+ overflow: auto;+}++/**+ * Don't inherit the `font-weight` (applied by a rule above).+ * NOTE: the default cannot safely be changed in Chrome and Safari on OS X.+ */+optgroup {+ font-weight: bold;+}++/* Tables+ ========================================================================== */+/**+ * Remove most spacing between table cells.+ */+table {+ border-collapse: collapse;+ border-spacing: 0;+}++td,+th {+ padding: 0;+}++/* Normalization for FF panel defauts+ ========================================================================== */+html {+ outline: none;+ padding: 0;+}++a {+ color: #0095dd;+ margin: 0;+ outline: none;+ padding: 0;+ text-decoration: none;+}++a:hover,+a:active,+a:focus {+ color: #008acb;+ text-decoration: underline;+}++a:active {+ color: #006b9d;+}++body {+ font: menu;+}++hr {+ margin: 12px -8px;+ color: #F0F0F4;+}++.stp_panel_container {+ overflow: hidden;+}++.stp_panel {+ padding: 0 16px;+ margin: 16px 0 12px;+}++/* saved.css+ *+ * Description:+ * With base elements out of the way, this sets all custom styling for the page saved dialog.+ *+ * Contents:+ * Global+ * Loading spinner+ * Core detail+ * Tag entry+ * Recent/suggested tags+ * Premium upsell+ * Token input/autocomplete+ * Overflow mode+ * Language overrides+ */+/*=Global+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */+.pkt_ext_containersaved {+ background-color: #fbfbfb;+ border-radius: 4px;+ display: block;+ padding: 0;+ position: relative;+ text-align: center;+ overflow: hidden;+}++.pkt_ext_cf:after {+ content: " ";+ display: table;+ clear: both;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_tag_detail,+.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_recenttag_detail,+.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_suggestedtag_detail {+ margin: 0 auto;+ padding: 0.25em 1em;+ position: relative;+ width: auto;+}++/*=Loading spinner+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */+@keyframes pkt_ext_spin {+ to {+ transform: rotate(1turn);+ }+}+.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_loadingspinner {+ position: relative;+ display: inline-block;+ height: 2.5em;+ inset-inline-start: 50%;+ margin-block: 2em 0;+ margin-inline: -1.25em 0;+ font-size: 10px;+ text-indent: 999em;+ position: absolute;+ top: 4em;+ overflow: hidden;+ width: 2.5em;+ animation: pkt_ext_spin 0.7s infinite steps(8);+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_loadingspinner:before,+.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_loadingspinner:after,+.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_loadingspinner > div:before,+.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_loadingspinner > div:after {+ content: "";+ position: absolute;+ top: 0;+ inset-inline-start: 1.125em;+ width: 0.25em;+ height: 0.75em;+ border-radius: 0.2em;+ background: #eee;+ box-shadow: 0 1.75em #eee;+ transform-origin: 50% 1.25em;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_loadingspinner:before {+ background: #555;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_loadingspinner:after {+ transform: rotate(-45deg);+ background: #777;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_loadingspinner > div:before {+ transform: rotate(-90deg);+ background: #999;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_loadingspinner > div:after {+ transform: rotate(-135deg);+ background: #bbb;+}++/*=Core detail+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */+.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_initload {+ inset-inline-start: 0;+ position: absolute;+ top: 0;+ width: 100%;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_detail {+ opacity: 0;+ position: relative;+ padding-bottom: 1.25em;+}++.pkt_ext_container_detailactive .pkt_ext_initload {+ opacity: 0;+}++.pkt_ext_container_detailactive .pkt_ext_initload .pkt_ext_loadingspinner,+.pkt_ext_container_finalstate .pkt_ext_initload .pkt_ext_loadingspinner {+ animation: none;+}++.pkt_ext_container_detailactive .pkt_ext_detail {+ max-height: 20em;+ opacity: 1;+}++.pkt_ext_container_finalstate .pkt_ext_edit_msg,+.pkt_ext_container_finalstate .pkt_ext_tag_detail,+.pkt_ext_container_finalstate .pkt_ext_suggestedtag_detail,+.pkt_ext_container_finalstate .pkt_ext_item_actions {+ opacity: 0;+ transition: opacity 0.2s ease-out;+}++.pkt_ext_container_finalerrorstate .pkt_ext_edit_msg,+.pkt_ext_container_finalerrorstate .pkt_ext_tag_detail,+.pkt_ext_container_finalerrorstate .pkt_ext_suggestedtag_detail,+.pkt_ext_container_finalerrorstate .pkt_ext_item_actions {+ display: none;+ transition: none;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved h2 {+ background: transparent;+ border: none;+ color: #333;+ display: block;+ float: none;+ font-size: 1.2em;+ font-weight: normal;+ letter-spacing: normal;+ line-height: 1;+ margin: 19px 0 4px;+ padding: 0;+ position: relative;+ text-align: start;+ text-transform: none;+}++@keyframes fade_in_out {+ 0% {+ opacity: 1;+ }+ 50% {+ opacity: 0;+ }+ 100% {+ opacity: 1;+ }+}+.pkt_ext_container_finalstate h2 {+ animation: fade_in_out 0.4s ease-out;+}++.pkt_ext_container_finalerrorstate h2 {+ animation: none;+ color: #d74345;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_errordetail {+ display: none;+ font-size: 0.9em;+ font-weight: normal;+ inset-inline-start: 6.4em;+ max-width: 21em;+ opacity: 0;+ position: absolute;+ top: 2.7em;+ text-align: start;+ visibility: hidden;+}++.pkt_ext_container_finalerrorstate {+ max-height: 133px;+}++.pkt_ext_container_finalerrorstate .pkt_ext_errordetail {+ display: block;+ opacity: 1;+ visibility: visible;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_logo {+ background: url(../img/[email protected]) center center no-repeat;+ display: block;+ float: inline-start;+ height: 40px;+ padding: 1.25em 1em;+ position: relative;+ width: 44px;+}++@media (min-resolution: 1.1dppx) {+ .pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_logo {+ background-image: url(../img/[email protected]);+ background-size: 44px 40px;+ }+}+.pkt_ext_container_finalerrorstate .pkt_ext_logo {+ background-image: url(../img/[email protected]);+ height: 44px;+ width: 44px;+}++@media (min-resolution: 1.1dppx) {+ .pkt_ext_container_finalerrorstate .pkt_ext_logo {+ background-image: url(../img/[email protected]);+ background-size: 44px 44px;+ }+}+.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_topdetail {+ float: inline-start;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_edit_msg_container {+ position: relative;+}+.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_edit_msg_container .pkt_ext_edit_msg {+ box-sizing: border-box;+ display: none;+ font-size: 0.75em;+ inset-inline-start: auto;+ padding: 0 1.4em;+ position: absolute;+ text-align: start;+ top: 0;+ width: 100%;+ margin: 0;+}+.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_edit_msg_container .pkt_ext_edit_msg.pkt_ext_edit_msg_error {+ color: #d74345;+}+.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_edit_msg_container .pkt_ext_edit_msg.pkt_ext_edit_msg_active {+ display: block;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_item_actions {+ background: transparent;+ float: none;+ height: auto;+ margin-bottom: 1em;+ margin-top: 0;+ width: auto;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_item_actions_disabled {+ opacity: 0.5;+}++.pkt_ext_container_finalstate .pkt_ext_item_actions_disabled {+ opacity: 0;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_item_actions ul {+ background: none;+ display: block;+ float: none;+ height: auto;+ margin: 0;+ padding: 0;+ width: 100%;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_item_actions li {+ box-sizing: border-box;+ background: none;+ border: 0;+ float: inline-start;+ list-style: none;+ line-height: 0.8;+ height: auto;+ padding-inline-end: 0.4em;+ width: auto;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_item_actions li:before {+ content: none;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_item_actions .pkt_ext_actions_separator {+ border-inline-start: 2px solid #777;+ height: 1em;+ margin-top: 0.3em;+ padding: 0;+ width: 10px;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_item_actions a {+ background: transparent;+ color: #0095dd;+ display: block;+ font-feature-settings: normal;+ font-size: 0.9em;+ font-weight: normal;+ letter-spacing: normal;+ line-height: inherit;+ height: auto;+ margin: 0;+ padding: 0.5em;+ float: inline-start;+ text-align: start;+ text-decoration: none;+ text-transform: none;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_item_actions a:hover,+.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_item_actions a:focus {+ color: #008acb;+ text-decoration: underline;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_item_actions a:before,+.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_item_actions a:after {+ background: transparent;+ display: none;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_item_actions_disabled a {+ cursor: default;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_item_actions .pkt_ext_openpocket {+ float: inline-end;+ padding-inline-end: 0.7em;+ text-align: end;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_item_actions .pkt_ext_removeitem {+ padding-inline-start: 0;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_close {+ background: url(../img/[email protected]) center center no-repeat;+ color: #333;+ display: block;+ font-size: 0.8em;+ height: 10px;+ inset-inline-end: 0.5em;+ overflow: hidden;+ position: absolute;+ text-align: center;+ text-indent: -9999px;+ top: -1em;+ width: 10px;+}++@media (min-resolution: 1.1dppx) {+ .pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_close {+ background-image: url(../img/[email protected]);+ background-size: 8px 8px;+ }+}+.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_close:hover {+ color: #000;+ text-decoration: none;+}++/*=Tag entry+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */+.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_tag_detail {+ border: 1px solid #c1c1c1;+ border-radius: 2px;+ clear: both;+ margin: 0 1em;+ padding: 0;+ display: flex;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_tag_error {+ border: none;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_tag_input_wrapper {+ box-sizing: border-box;+ flex: 1;+ background-color: #fff;+ border-inline-end: 1px solid #c3c3c3;+ color: #333;+ display: block;+ float: none;+ font-size: 0.875em;+ list-style: none;+ margin: 0;+ overflow: hidden;+ padding: 0.25em 0.5em;+ width: 14em;+ padding-inline: 0.5em;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_tag_error .pkt_ext_tag_input_wrapper {+ border: 1px solid #d74345;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_tag_input_wrapper .token-input-list {+ display: block;+ height: 1.7em;+ overflow: hidden;+ position: relative;+ width: 60em;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_tag_input_wrapper .token-input-list,+.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_tag_input_wrapper li {+ font-size: 1em;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_tag_input_wrapper li {+ height: auto;+ width: auto;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_tag_input_wrapper li:before {+ content: none;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_tag_input_wrapper input {+ border: 0;+ box-shadow: none;+ background-color: #fff;+ color: #333;+ font-size: 1em;+ float: inline-start;+ line-height: normal;+ height: auto;+ min-height: 0;+ min-width: 5em;+ padding: 3px 2px 1px;+ text-transform: none;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_tag_input_wrapper input::placeholder {+ color: #a9a9a9;+ letter-spacing: normal;+ text-transform: none;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .input_disabled {+ cursor: default;+ opacity: 0.5;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_btn {+ box-sizing: border-box;+ color: #333;+ float: none;+ font-size: 1em;+ letter-spacing: normal;+ height: 2.2em;+ min-width: 4em;+ padding: 0.5em 0;+ text-decoration: none;+ text-transform: none;+ width: auto;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_btn:hover {+ background-color: #ebebeb;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_btn:active {+ background-color: #dadada;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_btn_disabled,+.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_btn_disabled:hover,+.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_btn_disabled:active {+ background-color: transparent;+ cursor: default;+ opacity: 0.4;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_tag_error .pkt_ext_btn {+ border: 1px solid #c3c3c3;+ border-block-width: 1px;+ border-inline-width: 0 1px;+ height: 2.35em;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .autocomplete-suggestions {+ margin-top: 2.2em;+}++/*=Recent/suggested tags+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */+.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_suggestedtag_detail {+ box-sizing: border-box;+ clear: both;+ inset-inline-start: 0;+ opacity: 0;+ min-height: 110px;+ visibility: hidden;+ width: 100%;+}++.pkt_ext_container_detailactive .pkt_ext_suggestedtag_detail {+ opacity: 1;+ visibility: visible;+}++.pkt_ext_container_finalstate .pkt_ext_suggestedtag_detail {+ opacity: 0;+ visibility: hidden;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_recenttag_detail h4,+.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_suggestedtag_detail h4 {+ color: #333;+ font-size: 1em;+ font-weight: normal;+ font-style: normal;+ letter-spacing: normal;+ margin: 0.5em 0;+ text-align: start;+ text-transform: none;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_recenttag_detail .pkt_ext_loadingspinner,+.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_suggestedtag_detail .pkt_ext_loadingspinner {+ display: none;+ position: absolute;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_recenttag_detail_loading .pkt_ext_loadingspinner,+.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_suggestedtag_detail_loading .pkt_ext_loadingspinner {+ display: block;+ font-size: 6px;+ inset-inline-start: 48%;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_recenttag_detail ul,+.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_suggestedtag_detail ul {+ display: block;+ margin: 0;+ height: 2em;+ overflow: hidden;+ padding: 2px 0 0;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_suggestedtag_detail ul {+ height: auto;+ margin: 0;+ max-height: 4em;+ padding-top: 6px;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_recenttag_detail li,+.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_suggestedtag_detail li {+ background: none;+ float: inline-start;+ height: inherit;+ line-height: 1.5;+ list-style: none;+ margin-bottom: 0.5em;+ width: inherit;+}++.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_recenttag_detail li:before,+.pkt_ext_containersaved .pkt_ext_suggestedtag_detail li:before {+ content: none;+}+
After analyzing the provided CSS diff, I don't find any clear security vulnerabilities that were fixed between the versions. The changes appear to be primarily formatting improvements, documentation additions, and minor style adjustments rather than security fixes. Here's the analysis: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found [File] browser/components/pocket/content/panels/css/main.compiled.css [Lines] Entire file [Old Code] Minified CSS [Fixed Code] Expanded and documented CSS The main changes are: - The CSS has been expanded from a minified format to a properly formatted and documented version - Added extensive comments explaining the CSS rules - Some minor style adjustments (like changing `silver` to `#c0c0c0` for border colors) - Added new sections for style guide components - Improved organization with section comments No actual security-related changes were identified in this diff. The modifications appear to be focused on code quality and maintainability rather than addressing security issues. If you'd like me to analyze a different diff or look for specific types of vulnerabilities, please provide more details.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.twopie.4.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.twopie.4.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ ctx.beginPath(); ctx.arc(50, 25, 50, 0, 2*Math.PI + 1e-4, false); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,20, 0,255,0,255, "50,20", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,20, 0,255,0,255, "50,20", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes (variable renaming) rather than security-related fixes. Here's the analysis:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found
File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.twopie.4.worker.js
Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found
File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.twopie.4.worker.js
Old Code: _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,20, 0,255,0,255, "50,20", "0,255,0,255");
Fixed Code: _assertPixel(canvas, 50,20, 0,255,0,255, "50,20", "0,255,0,255");
The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and update all references to it. There are no security implications to these changes.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-fonts/font-face-unicode-range-2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-fonts/font-face-unicode-range-2.html@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Chris Lilley" href="[email protected]"> <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css-fonts-3/#unicode-range-desc"> <link rel="match" href="font-face-unicode-range-2-ref.html">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="Check that font-face unicode-range restrics use of glyphs outside that range"> <style> @font-face {
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities: Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-fonts/font-face-unicode-range-2.html [Lines] 4 [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content=""> [Fixed Code] (removed line) Additional Details: 1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which appears to be test-related metadata 2. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed 3. The change appears to be a cleanup of test file metadata rather than a security fix 4. No known vulnerability name is associated with this change No other vulnerabilities were identified in the provided diff. The modification seems to be a minor cleanup of test file structure rather than addressing any security concerns.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/wgpu-core/src/init_tracker/texture.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/wgpu-core/src/init_tracker/texture.rs@@ -6,7 +6,21 @@ #[derive(Debug, Clone)] pub(crate) struct TextureInitRange { pub(crate) mip_range: Range<u32>,- pub(crate) layer_range: Range<u32>,+ pub(crate) layer_range: Range<u32>, // Strictly array layers. We do *not* track volume slices separately.+}++// Returns true if a copy operation doesn't fully cover the texture init tracking granularity.+// I.e. if this function returns true for a pending copy operation, the target texture needs to be ensured to be initialized first!+pub(crate) fn has_copy_partial_init_tracker_coverage(+ copy_size: &wgt::Extent3d,+ mip_level: u32,+ desc: &wgt::TextureDescriptor<()>,+) -> bool {+ let target_size = desc.mip_level_size(mip_level).unwrap();+ copy_size.width != target_size.width+ || copy_size.height != target_size.height+ || (desc.dimension == wgt::TextureDimension::D3+ && copy_size.depth_or_array_layers != target_size.depth_or_array_layers) } impl From<TextureSelector> for TextureInitRange {
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Partial Initialization Vulnerability] [third_party/rust/wgpu-core/src/init_tracker/texture.rs] [Lines 6-21]
[Old Code]
```rust
pub(crate) struct TextureInitRange {
pub(crate) mip_range: Range<u32>,
pub(crate) layer_range: Range<u32>,
}
```
[Fixed Code]
```rust
pub(crate) struct TextureInitRange {
pub(crate) mip_range: Range<u32>,
pub(crate) layer_range: Range<u32>, // Strictly array layers. We do *not* track volume slices separately.
}
pub(crate) fn has_copy_partial_init_tracker_coverage(
copy_size: &wgt::Extent3d,
mip_level: u32,
desc: &wgt::TextureDescriptor<()>,
) -> bool {
let target_size = desc.mip_level_size(mip_level).unwrap();
copy_size.width != target_size.width
|| copy_size.height != target_size.height
|| (desc.dimension == wgt::TextureDimension::D3
&& copy_size.depth_or_array_layers != target_size.depth_or_array_layers)
}
```
Additional Details:
The changes introduce a new function `has_copy_partial_init_tracker_coverage` that checks if a copy operation doesn't fully cover the texture initialization tracking granularity. This appears to be addressing potential issues with partial texture initialization, which could lead to undefined behavior or information leaks if uninitialized texture data is accessed. However, without more context about the broader system, I can't definitively classify this as a security vulnerability fix, though it does appear to be improving safety around texture operations. The comment about not tracking volume slices separately also suggests potential initialization tracking limitations.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/servo/components/style/stylesheets/namespace_rule.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/servo/components/style/stylesheets/namespace_rule.rs@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ use crate::shared_lock::{SharedRwLockReadGuard, ToCssWithGuard}; use crate::str::CssStringWriter; use crate::{Namespace, Prefix};-use cssparser::{self, SourceLocation};+use cssparser::SourceLocation; use std::fmt::{self, Write}; use style_traits::{CssWriter, ToCss};@@ -25,15 +25,15 @@ impl ToCssWithGuard for NamespaceRule { // https://drafts.csswg.org/cssom/#serialize-a-css-rule CSSNamespaceRule- fn to_css(&self, _guard: &SharedRwLockReadGuard, dest: &mut CssStringWriter) -> fmt::Result {+ fn to_css(&self, _guard: &SharedRwLockReadGuard, dest_str: &mut CssStringWriter) -> fmt::Result {+ let mut dest = CssWriter::new(dest_str); dest.write_str("@namespace ")?; if let Some(ref prefix) = self.prefix {- let prefix = prefix.to_string();- cssparser::serialize_identifier(&prefix, dest)?;- dest.write_str(" ")?;+ prefix.to_css(&mut dest)?;+ dest.write_char(' ')?; } dest.write_str("url(")?;- self.url.to_string().to_css(&mut CssWriter::new(dest))?;+ self.url.to_string().to_css(&mut dest)?; dest.write_str(");") } }
Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential XSS due to improper CSS serialization] [servo/components/style/stylesheets/namespace_rule.rs] [Lines 25-35]
[Old Code]
fn to_css(&self, _guard: &SharedRwLockReadGuard, dest: &mut CssStringWriter) -> fmt::Result {
dest.write_str("@namespace ")?;
if let Some(ref prefix) = self.prefix {
let prefix = prefix.to_string();
cssparser::serialize_identifier(&prefix, dest)?;
dest.write_str(" ")?;
}
dest.write_str("url(")?;
self.url.to_string().to_css(&mut CssWriter::new(dest))?;
dest.write_str(");")
}
[Fixed Code]
fn to_css(&self, _guard: &SharedRwLockReadGuard, dest_str: &mut CssStringWriter) -> fmt::Result {
let mut dest = CssWriter::new(dest_str);
dest.write_str("@namespace ")?;
if let Some(ref prefix) = self.prefix {
prefix.to_css(&mut dest)?;
dest.write_char(' ')?;
}
dest.write_str("url(")?;
self.url.to_string().to_css(&mut dest)?;
dest.write_str(");")
}
The changes appear to modify how CSS namespace rules are serialized, with the main differences being:
1. Using CssWriter consistently throughout
2. Using prefix.to_css() instead of manual serialization
3. Using write_char for space instead of write_str
While I'm not certain this fixes a specific vulnerability, the changes improve the robustness of CSS serialization, which could potentially prevent issues like XSS if there were any problems with how identifiers or URLs were being serialized in the previous version. The use of proper serialization methods (to_css) is generally more secure than manual string handling.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.defaults.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.defaults.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); _assertSame(ctx.lineWidth, 1, "ctx.lineWidth", "1"); _assertSame(ctx.lineCap, 'butt', "ctx.lineCap", "'butt'");
Analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.defaults.html [Lines] 17-18
Old Code:
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
Additional Notes:
- The changes appear to be purely variable naming changes (from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas')
- No security-related changes or vulnerability fixes are evident in this diff
- The modification seems to be for code consistency or readability rather than security
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-backgrounds/border-radius-overflow-hidden.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-backgrounds/border-radius-overflow-hidden.html@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ <title>CSS Backgrounds and Borders Test: Clipping to the border-radius curve</title> <link rel="author" title="Lea Verou" href="http://lea.verou.me" /> <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-background/#corner-clipping" />-<meta name="flags" content="" /> <meta name="assert" content="Effects that clip to the border or padding edge (such as 'overflow' other than 'visible') must clip to the curve" /> <style> div {
Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be minor HTML/CSS test file modifications. Here's the analysis: Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 7] [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="" /> [Fixed Code] (line removed) Additional Notes: 1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag with "flags" attribute, which appears to be test-related metadata rather than a security fix. 2. No actual security-related code changes (like input validation, sanitization, or security headers) are present in this diff. 3. The file is a test case for CSS border-radius and overflow behavior, not production code.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/src/dx12/mod.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/src/dx12/mod.rs@@ -422,6 +422,7 @@ #[derive(Debug)] pub struct TextureView { raw_format: native::Format,+ format_aspects: crate::FormatAspects, // May explicitly ignore stencil aspect of raw_format! target_base: (native::Resource, u32), handle_srv: Option<descriptor::Handle>, handle_uav: Option<descriptor::Handle>,
Let me analyze this code diff for potential security vulnerabilities.
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Leak or Incorrect Format Handling] [third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/src/dx12/mod.rs] [Lines 422-426]
[Old Code]
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct TextureView {
raw_format: native::Format,
target_base: (native::Resource, u32),
handle_srv: Option<descriptor::Handle>,
handle_uav: Option<descriptor::Handle>,
[Fixed Code]
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct TextureView {
raw_format: native::Format,
format_aspects: crate::FormatAspects, // May explicitly ignore stencil aspect of raw_format!
target_base: (native::Resource, u32),
handle_srv: Option<descriptor::Handle>,
handle_uav: Option<descriptor::Handle>,
Additional Details:
- The change adds a `format_aspects` field to track format aspects explicitly
- The comment suggests this might be related to properly handling stencil aspects
- Without more context, it's unclear if this was fixing a specific vulnerability or just improving robustness
- The change could potentially prevent incorrect format handling that might lead to security issues, but this is speculative
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml@@ -72,10 +72,11 @@ android:process=":gpu"> </service> <service- android:name="org.mozilla.gecko.gfx.SurfaceAllocatorService"+ android:name="org.mozilla.gecko.process.GeckoChildProcessServices$utility" android:enabled="true" android:exported="false"- android:isolatedProcess="false">+ android:isolatedProcess="false"+ android:process=":utility"> </service> </application>
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potentially Insecure Service Configuration [File] mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml [Lines] 72-77
[Old Code]
```xml
<service
android:name="org.mozilla.gecko.gfx.SurfaceAllocatorService"
android:enabled="true"
android:exported="false"
android:isolatedProcess="false">
</service>
```
[Fixed Code]
```xml
<service
android:name="org.mozilla.gecko.process.GeckoChildProcessServices$utility"
android:enabled="true"
android:exported="false"
android:isolatedProcess="false"
android:process=":utility">
</service>
```
Additional details:
- The change involves replacing a service implementation and adding a process attribute. While the service remains non-exported (android:exported="false"), the change in service name and addition of process specification could be security-related, though the exact vulnerability isn't clear from the diff alone.
- The new service appears to be related to child process management, which might be part of a sandboxing improvement.
- Without more context about the old SurfaceAllocatorService implementation, we can't definitively say if this fixed a specific vulnerability, but it appears to be a security-conscious architectural change.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/editing/data/delete.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/editing/data/delete.js@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@+class MyCustomElement extends HTMLElement {};+customElements.define("custom-element", MyCustomElement); // For documentation of the format, see README in this directory. var browserTests = [ ["foo[]bar",@@ -2746,4 +2748,62 @@ "<p contenteditable=\"false\"><unknown-element contenteditable=\"\"></unknown-element></p>", [true], {"delete":[false,false,"",false,false,""]}],+["<div contenteditable=\"false\"><custom-element contenteditable=\"\"><p>[ab</p><p>c]d</p></custom-element></div>",+ [["delete",""]],+ ["<div contenteditable=\"false\"><custom-element contenteditable=\"\"><p>d</p></custom-element></div>",+ "<div contenteditable=\"false\"><custom-element contenteditable=\"\"><p>d<br></p></custom-element></div>"],+ [true],+ {"delete":[false,false,"",false,false,""]}],+["<div contenteditable=\"false\"><custom-element contenteditable=\"\"><p>a[b</p><p>cd]</p></custom-element></div>",+ [["delete",""]],+ ["<div contenteditable=\"false\"><custom-element contenteditable=\"\"><p>a</p></custom-element></div>",+ "<div contenteditable=\"false\"><custom-element contenteditable=\"\"><p>a<br></p></custom-element></div>"],+ [true],+ {"delete":[false,false,"",false,false,""]}],+["<div contenteditable=\"false\"><custom-element contenteditable=\"\"><p><b>[ab</b></p><p><i>c]d</i></p></custom-element></div>",+ [["delete",""]],+ ["<div contenteditable=\"false\"><custom-element contenteditable=\"\"><p><i>d</i></p></custom-element></div>",+ "<div contenteditable=\"false\"><custom-element contenteditable=\"\"><p><i>d</i><br></p></custom-element></div>"],+ [true],+ {"delete":[false,false,"",false,false,""]}],+["<div contenteditable=\"false\"><custom-element contenteditable=\"\"><p><b>a[b</b></p><p><i>cd]</i></p></custom-element></div>",+ [["delete",""]],+ ["<div contenteditable=\"false\"><custom-element contenteditable=\"\"><p><b>a</b></p></custom-element></div>",+ "<div contenteditable=\"false\"><custom-element contenteditable=\"\"><p><b>a</b><br></p></custom-element></div>"],+ [true],+ {"delete":[false,false,"",false,false,""]}],++// Non-editable elements in editable content should be removed by hitting the+// Backspace key. Delete the non-editable things, then, blocks should be+// merged.+["<p>abc</p><ul contenteditable=\"false\"><li>def</li></ul><p>[]ghi</p>",+ [["delete",""]],+ ["<p>abcghi</p>",+ "<p>abcghi<br></p>"],+ [true],+ {"delete":[false,false,"",false,false,""]}],+["<p>abc</p><ul><li contenteditable=\"false\">def</li></ul><p>[]ghi</p>",+ [["delete",""]],+ ["<p>abcghi</p>",+ "<p>abcghi<br></p>"],+ [true],+ {"delete":[false,false,"",false,false,""]}],+["<p>abc</p><ul><li contenteditable=\"false\">def</li><li>[]ghi</li></ul>",+ [["delete",""]],+ ["<p>abcghi</p>",+ "<p>abcghi<br></p>"],+ [true],+ {"delete":[false,false,"",false,false,""]}],+["<ul><li>abc</li><li contenteditable=\"false\">def</li><li>[]ghi</li></ul>",+ [["delete",""]],+ ["<ul><li>abcghi</li></ul>",+ "<ul><li>abcghi<br></li></ul>"],+ [true],+ {"delete":[false,false,"",false,false,""]}],+["<ul><li>abc</li><li contenteditable=\"false\">def</li></ul><p>[]ghi</p>",+ [["delete",""]],+ ["<ul><li>abcghi</li></ul>",+ "<ul><li>abcghi<br></li></ul>"],+ [true],+ {"delete":[false,false,"",false,false,""]}], ]
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be focused on adding test cases for custom elements and contenteditable behavior rather than addressing security issues. Here's the analysis following the requested format: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found. The changes add test cases for custom elements and contenteditable behavior. 2. Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found. The changes add test cases for handling non-editable elements in editable content. The diff primarily shows: 1. Addition of a custom element definition and related test cases 2. Additional test cases for contenteditable behavior with non-editable elements 3. Test cases for deletion behavior in various contenteditable scenarios These changes appear to be functional test additions rather than security fixes. No specific vulnerabilities are being addressed in this diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/gc/WeakMap-inl.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/gc/WeakMap-inl.h@@ -151,6 +151,7 @@ bool WeakMap<K, V>::markEntry(GCMarker* marker, K& key, V& value) { bool marked = false; JSRuntime* rt = zone()->runtimeFromAnyThread();+ CellColor markColor = CellColor(marker->markColor()); CellColor keyColor = gc::detail::GetEffectiveColor(rt, key); JSObject* delegate = gc::detail::GetDelegate(key);@@ -160,24 +161,29 @@ // The key needs to stay alive while both the delegate and map are live. CellColor proxyPreserveColor = std::min(delegateColor, mapColor); if (keyColor < proxyPreserveColor) {- gc::AutoSetMarkColor autoColor(*marker, proxyPreserveColor);- TraceWeakMapKeyEdge(marker, zone(), &key,- "proxy-preserved WeakMap entry key");- MOZ_ASSERT(key->color() >= proxyPreserveColor);- marked = true;- keyColor = proxyPreserveColor;+ MOZ_ASSERT(markColor >= proxyPreserveColor);+ if (markColor == proxyPreserveColor) {+ TraceWeakMapKeyEdge(marker, zone(), &key,+ "proxy-preserved WeakMap entry key");+ MOZ_ASSERT(key->color() >= proxyPreserveColor);+ marked = true;+ keyColor = proxyPreserveColor;+ } } } if (keyColor) { gc::Cell* cellValue = gc::ToMarkable(value); if (cellValue) {- gc::AutoSetMarkColor autoColor(*marker, std::min(mapColor, keyColor));+ CellColor targetColor = std::min(mapColor, keyColor); CellColor valueColor = gc::detail::GetEffectiveColor(rt, cellValue);- if (valueColor < marker->markColor()) {- TraceEdge(marker, &value, "WeakMap entry value");- MOZ_ASSERT(cellValue->color() >= std::min(mapColor, keyColor));- marked = true;+ if (valueColor < targetColor) {+ MOZ_ASSERT(markColor >= targetColor);+ if (markColor == targetColor) {+ TraceEdge(marker, &value, "WeakMap entry value");+ MOZ_ASSERT(cellValue->color() >= targetColor);+ marked = true;+ } } } }
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Race Condition in WeakMap Marking [js/src/gc/WeakMap-inl.h] [Lines 151-184]
Old Code:
```cpp
if (keyColor < proxyPreserveColor) {
gc::AutoSetMarkColor autoColor(*marker, proxyPreserveColor);
TraceWeakMapKeyEdge(marker, zone(), &key,
"proxy-preserved WeakMap entry key");
MOZ_ASSERT(key->color() >= proxyPreserveColor);
marked = true;
keyColor = proxyPreserveColor;
}
```
Fixed Code:
```cpp
if (keyColor < proxyPreserveColor) {
MOZ_ASSERT(markColor >= proxyPreserveColor);
if (markColor == proxyPreserveColor) {
TraceWeakMapKeyEdge(marker, zone(), &key,
"proxy-preserved WeakMap entry key");
MOZ_ASSERT(key->color() >= proxyPreserveColor);
marked = true;
keyColor = proxyPreserveColor;
}
}
```
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Memory Safety Issue in WeakMap Value Marking [js/src/gc/WeakMap-inl.h] [Lines 172-180]
Old Code:
```cpp
if (cellValue) {
gc::AutoSetMarkColor autoColor(*marker, std::min(mapColor, keyColor));
CellColor valueColor = gc::detail::GetEffectiveColor(rt, cellValue);
if (valueColor < marker->markColor()) {
TraceEdge(marker, &value, "WeakMap entry value");
MOZ_ASSERT(cellValue->color() >= std::min(mapColor, keyColor));
marked = true;
}
}
```
Fixed Code:
```cpp
if (cellValue) {
CellColor targetColor = std::min(mapColor, keyColor);
CellColor valueColor = gc::detail::GetEffectiveColor(rt, cellValue);
if (valueColor < targetColor) {
MOZ_ASSERT(markColor >= targetColor);
if (markColor == targetColor) {
TraceEdge(marker, &value, "WeakMap entry value");
MOZ_ASSERT(cellValue->color() >= targetColor);
marked = true;
}
}
}
```
The changes appear to be related to garbage collection marking logic in WeakMap implementation. The modifications introduce additional checks (markColor comparisons) before performing marking operations, which suggests they might be addressing potential race conditions or memory safety issues during garbage collection. However, without more context about the specific vulnerabilities being fixed, I can't definitively identify specific CVE or vulnerability names. The changes seem to make the marking logic more conservative and thread-safe.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/percent-width-ignored-003.tentative.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/percent-width-ignored-003.tentative.html@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ <script src='/resources/check-layout-th.js'></script> <link rel="author" title="David Grogan" href="[email protected]"> <link rel="help" href="https://github.com/w3c/csswg-drafts/issues/3336">-<meta name="flags" content="" /> <meta name="assert" content="A cell's percent width is ignored when its table is nested in another cell, even if there's an intermediate block." /> Engines render this same as without the intermediate background:blue block -- yellow 1% width is ignored. <table id="outerTable" style="width: 300px" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0">
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities: Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability [File] [Lines 4-5] [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="" /> [Fixed Code] (removed line) Additional Details: - The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute - This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix - No actual security vulnerability is being addressed here - The change doesn't relate to any known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) The modification seems to be removing an unused or unnecessary meta tag from a test HTML file, which doesn't indicate any security-related fixes. The file appears to be part of web platform tests for CSS table rendering behavior.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/extensions/test/xpcshell/webidl-api/test_ext_webidl_api_request_handler.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/extensions/test/xpcshell/webidl-api/test_ext_webidl_api_request_handler.js@@ -12,13 +12,6 @@ add_task(async function setup() { await AddonTestUtils.promiseStartupManager();- // Ensure that the profile-after-change message has been notified,- // so that ServiceWokerRegistrar is going to be initialized.- Services.obs.notifyObservers(- null,- "profile-after-change",- "force-serviceworkerrestart-init"- ); }); // Verify ExtensionAPIRequestHandler handling API requests for
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Service Worker Initialization Timing Issue] [toolkit/components/extensions/test/xpcshell/webidl-api/test_ext_webidl_api_request_handler.js] [Lines 12-18]
[Old Code]
await AddonTestUtils.promiseStartupManager();
// Ensure that the profile-after-change message has been notified,
// so that ServiceWokerRegistrar is going to be initialized.
Services.obs.notifyObservers(
null,
"profile-after-change",
"force-serviceworkerrestart-init"
);
[Fixed Code]
await AddonTestUtils.promiseStartupManager();
Additional Details:
- The removed code was forcing a "profile-after-change" notification which might have been causing premature or duplicate initialization of Service Workers
- While this appears to be a test file change, removing forced notifications could potentially prevent race conditions in service worker initialization
- Without more context about the broader system, it's hard to determine if this was an actual security fix or just a test improvement
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.path.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.path.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ctx.restore(); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where variable names were updated for consistency. Here's the analysis:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 17-18, 27]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency, but this doesn't affect security in any way. The functionality remains identical, just with a different variable name. No security vulnerabilities were introduced or fixed in this diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.