--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/mozbase/mozcrash/tests/conftest.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/mozbase/mozcrash/tests/conftest.py@@ -50,7 +50,6 @@     return wrapper[email protected] def minidump_files(request, tmpdir):     files = []@@ -104,6 +103,11 @@     return files[email protected](name="minidump_files")+def minidump_files_fixture(request, tmpdir):+    return minidump_files(request, tmpdir)++ @pytest.fixture(autouse=True) def mock_popen(monkeypatch):     """Generate a class that can mock subprocess.Popen.

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   The change appears to be a refactoring of pytest fixture declaration rather than a security fix. The functionality was moved from a direct fixture declaration to a separate function with a fixture wrapper.

   File: testing/mozbase/mozcrash/tests/conftest.py
   Lines: 50-104
   Old Code:
   ```python
   @pytest.fixture
   def minidump_files(request, tmpdir):
       files = []
       ...
       return files
   ```

   Fixed Code:
   ```python
   def minidump_files(request, tmpdir):
       files = []
       ...
       return files

   @pytest.fixture(name="minidump_files")
   def minidump_files_fixture(request, tmpdir):
       return minidump_files(request, tmpdir)
   ```

The change separates the core functionality from the pytest fixture declaration, which improves code organization but doesn't appear to address any security vulnerability. The functionality remains the same, just with a different implementation structure.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/framework/toolbox-hosts.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/framework/toolbox-hosts.js@@ -420,6 +420,7 @@   frame.setAttribute("type", "content");   frame.flex = 1; // Required to be able to shrink when the window shrinks   frame.className = className;+  frame.setAttribute("selectmenulist", "ContentSelectDropdown");   const inXULDocument = doc.documentElement.namespaceURI === XUL_NS;   if (inXULDocument) {

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential XSS or UI Redressing] [devtools/client/framework/toolbox-hosts.js] [Lines 420-423]
    [Old Code]
    frame.setAttribute("type", "content");
    frame.flex = 1; // Required to be able to shrink when the window shrinks
    frame.className = className;

    [Fixed Code]
    frame.setAttribute("type", "content");
    frame.flex = 1; // Required to be able to shrink when the window shrinks
    frame.className = className;
    frame.setAttribute("selectmenulist", "ContentSelectDropdown");

Additional Details:
- The change adds a new attribute "selectmenulist" with value "ContentSelectDropdown" to a frame element
- Without more context, it's unclear if this fixes a specific vulnerability
- The change could potentially be related to preventing clickjacking/UI redressing by ensuring proper dropdown behavior
- It might also be related to preventing XSS by ensuring proper content selection behavior
- The commit message or issue tracker reference would help determine the exact security implications

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-transform-origin-1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-transform-origin-1.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="L. David Baron" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=594934">   <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-values/#calc-notation">   <link rel="match" href="calc-transform-origin-1-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content=""> <style type="text/css"> body { margin: 100px }

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-transform-origin-1.html [Lines] 5
   Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">
   Fixed Code: (line removed)
   Additional Details: This appears to be a simple removal of an empty meta tag, which doesn't indicate any security vulnerability. The change seems to be cleanup rather than a security fix.

Note: The diff shows only one change - the removal of an empty meta tag. This doesn't appear to be related to any security vulnerability. The change is likely part of general code cleanup or test standardization.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/blake2b_simd/src/avx2.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/blake2b_simd/src/avx2.rs@@ -74,32 +74,33 @@     }; }+// These rotations are the "simple version". For the "complicated version", see+// https://github.com/sneves/blake2-avx2/blob/b3723921f668df09ece52dcd225a36d4a4eea1d9/blake2b-common.h#L43-L46.+// For a discussion of the tradeoffs, see+// https://github.com/sneves/blake2-avx2/pull/5. In short:+// - Due to an LLVM bug (https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=44379), this+//   version performs better on recent x86 chips.+// - LLVM is able to optimize this version to AVX-512 rotation instructions+//   when those are enabled.+ #[inline(always)] unsafe fn rot32(x: __m256i) -> __m256i {-    _mm256_shuffle_epi32(x, _MM_SHUFFLE!(2, 3, 0, 1))+    _mm256_or_si256(_mm256_srli_epi64(x, 32), _mm256_slli_epi64(x, 64 - 32)) } #[inline(always)] unsafe fn rot24(x: __m256i) -> __m256i {-    let rotate24 = _mm256_setr_epi8(-        3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 0, 1, 2, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 8, 9, 10, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 0, 1, 2, 11, 12, 13,-        14, 15, 8, 9, 10,-    );-    _mm256_shuffle_epi8(x, rotate24)+    _mm256_or_si256(_mm256_srli_epi64(x, 24), _mm256_slli_epi64(x, 64 - 24)) } #[inline(always)] unsafe fn rot16(x: __m256i) -> __m256i {-    let rotate16 = _mm256_setr_epi8(-        2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 0, 1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 8, 9, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 0, 1, 10, 11, 12,-        13, 14, 15, 8, 9,-    );-    _mm256_shuffle_epi8(x, rotate16)+    _mm256_or_si256(_mm256_srli_epi64(x, 16), _mm256_slli_epi64(x, 64 - 16)) } #[inline(always)] unsafe fn rot63(x: __m256i) -> __m256i {-    _mm256_or_si256(_mm256_srli_epi64(x, 63), add(x, x))+    _mm256_or_si256(_mm256_srli_epi64(x, 63), _mm256_slli_epi64(x, 64 - 63)) } #[inline(always)]

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
[Potential Optimization/Correctness Issue] [third_party/rust/blake2b_simd/src/avx2.rs] [Lines 74-107]  
[Old Code]  
Various rotation implementations using `_mm256_shuffle_epi32` and `_mm256_shuffle_epi8`  
[Fixed Code]  
Consistent implementation using `_mm256_or_si256` with shift operations  

Additional Details:  
The changes modify the rotation operations in the BLAKE2b implementation to use a more consistent approach with shift operations rather than shuffle operations. While not clearly a security vulnerability, the commit message suggests this was changed due to:  
1. Better performance on recent x86 chips due to an LLVM bug  
2. Better optimization potential for AVX-512 instructions  
3. Being the "simple version" of rotations as opposed to the "complicated version"  

The changes could potentially affect:  
- Cryptographic correctness if the rotation operations weren't properly implemented before  
- Side-channel resistance if the shuffle operations had different timing characteristics  
However, without more context, we can't definitively say this was a security fix versus a performance optimization.  

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
[Potential Integer Overflow] [third_party/rust/blake2b_simd/src/avx2.rs] [Line 107]  
[Old Code]  
`_mm256_or_si256(_mm256_srli_epi64(x, 63), add(x, x))`  
[Fixed Code]  
`_mm256_or_si256(_mm256_srli_epi64(x, 63), _mm256_slli_epi64(x, 64 - 63))`  

Additional Details:  
The change in the rot63 implementation replaces an addition operation with a shift operation. While this is likely for consistency with the other rotation functions, it could potentially address:  
- An integer overflow issue if `add(x, x)` could overflow  
- Timing differences between add and shift operations  
Again, without more context this is speculative.  

Note: The changes appear to be primarily about optimization and consistency rather than fixing clear security vulnerabilities, but cryptographic implementations often make such changes to ensure both correctness and security.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/active-selection-016.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/active-selection-016.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-pseudo-4/#highlight-styling">   <link rel="match" href="reference/active-selection-016-ref.html">-  <meta content="" name="flags">   <link rel="stylesheet" href="support/highlights.css">   <style>

Analyzing the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found in this diff. The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which doesn't appear to have any security implications.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential HTML Meta Tag Issue [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/active-selection-016.html] [Lines 9]
Old Code: <meta content="" name="flags">
Fixed Code: (removed)
Note: While this doesn't appear to be a security fix, the removal of an empty meta tag could potentially relate to preventing some edge-case parsing issues, though this is uncertain.

The diff shows a very minor change that doesn't clearly indicate any security vulnerabilities. The removal of the empty meta tag appears to be more of a cleanup rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/canvas/SanitizeRenderer.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/canvas/SanitizeRenderer.cpp@@ -93,8 +93,7 @@   static const std::string GEFORCE_480 = "GeForce GTX 480";   static const std::string GEFORCE_980 = "GeForce GTX 980";-  if (Contains(str, "NVIDIA") ||-      Contains(str, "GeForce") ||+  if (Contains(str, "NVIDIA") || Contains(str, "GeForce") ||       Contains(str, "Quadro")) {     auto ret = std::invoke([&]() {       static const std::regex kGeForce("GeForce.*?([0-9][0-9][0-9]+)");@@ -276,7 +275,8 @@ std::string SanitizeRenderer(const std::string& str) {   std::smatch m;-  // e.g. "ANGLE (AMD, AMD Radeon(TM) Graphics Direct3D11 vs_5_0 ps_5_0, D3D11-27.20.1020.2002)"+  // e.g. "ANGLE (AMD, AMD Radeon(TM) Graphics Direct3D11 vs_5_0 ps_5_0,+  // D3D11-27.20.1020.2002)"   static const std::regex kReAngle(       "ANGLE [(]([^,]*), ([^,]*)( Direct3D[^,]*), .*[)]");   if (std::regex_match(str, m, kReAngle)) {

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze the changes for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. First change (lines 93-94):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    Code Style Improvement [File] [Lines 93-94]
    [Old Code]
    if (Contains(str, "NVIDIA") ||
        Contains(str, "GeForce") ||
    [Fixed Code]
    if (Contains(str, "NVIDIA") || Contains(str, "GeForce") ||

    This appears to be purely a code style/formatting change with no security implications.

2. Second change (lines 276-278):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    Comment Formatting Improvement [File] [Lines 276-278]
    [Old Code]
    // e.g. "ANGLE (AMD, AMD Radeon(TM) Graphics Direct3D11 vs_5_0 ps_5_0, D3D11-27.20.1020.2002)"
    [Fixed Code]
    // e.g. "ANGLE (AMD, AMD Radeon(TM) Graphics Direct3D11 vs_5_0 ps_5_0,
    // D3D11-27.20.1020.2002)"

    This is just a comment formatting change, splitting a long comment line into two lines for better readability. No security impact.

No actual security vulnerabilities were identified in these changes. Both modifications appear to be cosmetic/formatting improvements rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/extensions/test/xpcshell/webidl-api/test_ext_webidl_api_event_callback.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/extensions/test/xpcshell/webidl-api/test_ext_webidl_api_event_callback.js@@ -14,13 +14,6 @@ add_task(async function setup() {   await AddonTestUtils.promiseStartupManager();-  // Ensure that the profile-after-change message has been notified,-  // so that ServiceWokerRegistrar is going to be initialized.-  Services.obs.notifyObservers(-    null,-    "profile-after-change",-    "force-serviceworkerrestart-init"-  ); }); add_task(async function test_api_event_manager_methods() {

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Timing Issue in Service Worker Initialization [toolkit/components/extensions/test/xpcshell/webidl-api/test_ext_webidl_api_event_callback.js] [Lines 14-20]
[Old Code]
  await AddonTestUtils.promiseStartupManager();
  // Ensure that the profile-after-change message has been notified,
  // so that ServiceWokerRegistrar is going to be initialized.
  Services.obs.notifyObservers(
    null,
    "profile-after-change",
    "force-serviceworkerrestart-init"
  );
[Fixed Code]
  await AddonTestUtils.promiseStartupManager();

Additional Details:
- The removed code was manually triggering a "profile-after-change" notification to force ServiceWorker initialization
- This change suggests the initialization timing was modified to be handled automatically
- While this doesn't directly show a security vulnerability, changes in Service Worker initialization timing could potentially affect security if not properly synchronized
- Without more context about why this was changed, it's hard to determine if this was fixing a specific security issue

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/themes/osx/downloads/downloads.css+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/themes/osx/downloads/downloads.css@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ /*** Panel and outer controls ***/-@keyfocus@ #downloadsSummary:focus {+#downloadsPanel[keyfocus] #downloadsSummary:focus {   outline: 2px -moz-mac-focusring solid;   outline-offset: -2px; }@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ /*** Highlighted list items ***/-@keyfocus@ @itemFocused@ {+#downloadsPanel[keyfocus] #downloadsListBox:focus > richlistitem[selected] {   outline: 2px -moz-mac-focusring solid;   outline-offset: -2px; }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    CSS Selector Injection / Styling Vulnerability [browser/themes/osx/downloads/downloads.css] [Lines 6,27]
    Old Code:
    ```
    @keyfocus@ #downloadsSummary:focus {
    ```
    Fixed Code:
    ```
    #downloadsPanel[keyfocus] #downloadsSummary:focus {
    ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    CSS Selector Injection / Styling Vulnerability [browser/themes/osx/downloads/downloads.css] [Lines 6,27]
    Old Code:
    ```
    @keyfocus@ @itemFocused@ {
    ```
    Fixed Code:
    ```
    #downloadsPanel[keyfocus] #downloadsListBox:focus > richlistitem[selected] {
    ```

Additional Notes:
The changes appear to be replacing custom CSS at-rules (`@keyfocus@` and `@itemFocused@`) with standard CSS attribute selectors and more specific selectors. While this improves code maintainability and standardization, I'm not certain if the old syntax posed any actual security vulnerabilities. The changes might have been made for better CSS compatibility or to remove non-standard syntax rather than for security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.isPointInPath.nonfinite.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.isPointInPath.nonfinite.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.rect(-100, -50, 200, 100); _assertSame(ctx.isPointInPath(Infinity, 0), false, "ctx.isPointInPath(Infinity, 0)", "false");

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) without any security implications.

Here's the structured response:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.isPointInPath.nonfinite.worker.js] [Lines 13-14]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

The change is simply a variable name refactoring and doesn't appear to address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/base/ChromeUtils.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/base/ChromeUtils.cpp@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ #include "mozilla/dom/UnionTypes.h" #include "mozilla/dom/WindowBinding.h"  // For IdleRequestCallback/Options #include "mozilla/dom/WindowGlobalParent.h"-#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerPrivate.h"+#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerScope.h" #include "mozilla/ipc/GeckoChildProcessHost.h" #include "mozilla/net/UrlClassifierFeatureFactory.h" #include "IOActivityMonitor.h"@@ -1314,7 +1314,7 @@     JS::Rooted<JS::Value> err(cx);     if (!JS::CreateError(cx, JSEXN_ERR, stack, fileName, line, column, nullptr,-                         message, &err)) {+                         message, JS::NothingHandleValue, &err)) {       return;     }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. First Change (Header Inclusion):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability - Header update [File] dom/base/ChromeUtils.cpp [Lines] ~42
    [Old Code]
    #include "mozilla/dom/WorkerPrivate.h"
    [Fixed Code]
    #include "mozilla/dom/WorkerScope.h"

    Additional Details: This appears to be a routine header update with no direct security implications.

2. Second Change (Error Handling):
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    Potential Error Handling Vulnerability [File] dom/base/ChromeUtils.cpp [Lines] 1314
    [Old Code]
    if (!JS::CreateError(cx, JSEXN_ERR, stack, fileName, line, column, nullptr,
                         message, &err)) {
    [Fixed Code]
    if (!JS::CreateError(cx, JSEXN_ERR, stack, fileName, line, column, nullptr,
                         message, JS::NothingHandleValue, &err)) {

    Additional Details: The change adds JS::NothingHandleValue as an additional parameter to JS::CreateError. While this appears to be a bug fix, I'm not certain if it addresses a specific security vulnerability or just improves error handling robustness. The additional parameter might help prevent undefined behavior in certain edge cases.

Note: Without more context about the specific security implications of the JS::CreateError change, I can't definitively identify a vulnerability, but the change does appear to make the error handling more complete.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.uncovered.pattern.source-in.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.uncovered.pattern.source-in.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 255, 0.5)';@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@     createImageBitmap(response).then(bitmap => {         ctx.fillStyle = ctx.createPattern(bitmap, 'no-repeat');         ctx.fillRect(0, 50, 100, 50);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't affect security aspects of the code.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.uncovered.pattern.source-in.worker.js] [Lines 13-14, 33]
Old Code:
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);
Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);

The changes simply rename the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability, without any security implications. The functionality remains identical.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit/MacroAssembler.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit/MacroAssembler.cpp@@ -3751,9 +3751,9 @@ } #ifdef ENABLE_WASM_EXCEPTIONS-size_t MacroAssembler::wasmStartTry() {+[[nodiscard]] bool MacroAssembler::wasmStartTry(size_t* tryNoteIndex) {   wasm::WasmTryNote tryNote = wasm::WasmTryNote(currentOffset(), 0, 0);-  return append(tryNote);+  return append(tryNote, tryNoteIndex); } #endif

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
Potential Return Value Ignored Vulnerability [File] js/src/jit/MacroAssembler.cpp [Lines] 3751-3754  
[Old Code]  
```cpp
size_t MacroAssembler::wasmStartTry() {
  wasm::WasmTryNote tryNote = wasm::WasmTryNote(currentOffset(), 0, 0);
  return append(tryNote);
}
```  
[Fixed Code]  
```cpp
[[nodiscard]] bool MacroAssembler::wasmStartTry(size_t* tryNoteIndex) {
  wasm::WasmTryNote tryNote = wasm::WasmTryNote(currentOffset(), 0, 0);
  return append(tryNote, tryNoteIndex);
}
```

The main changes are:
1. Added `[[nodiscard]]` attribute to ensure the return value isn't ignored
2. Changed return type from `size_t` to `bool`
3. Added output parameter `tryNoteIndex`

While this doesn't clearly match a known vulnerability pattern, the changes suggest the developers wanted to enforce proper error handling (via the `[[nodiscard]]` attribute) and potentially fix a case where return values were being ignored. The exact security impact is unclear without more context about how this function is used.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/perspective-origin-006.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/perspective-origin-006.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Jieqiong Cui" href="mailto:[email protected]"> <link rel="help" title="11. The 'perspective-origin' Property" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css-transforms-2/#propdef-perspective-origin"> <link rel="match" href="../reference/ref-filled-green-100px-square.xht">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="The 'perspective-origin' property set 'right' computes to 100% for the horizontal position."> <style>   div {

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 5-6]
    [Old Code]
    <meta name="flags" content="">
    [Fixed Code]
    (line removed)

The diff shows only the removal of an empty meta tag with name="flags". This doesn't appear to be related to any security vulnerability. The change seems to be a cleanup of unnecessary metadata in a test file. No known vulnerability is associated with this change.

No other changes were detected in the provided diff that would indicate security fixes. The rest of the diff shows standard test file content (author, help link, match reference, and assertion) which remain unchanged.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/ipc/glue/BackgroundParentImpl.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/ipc/glue/BackgroundParentImpl.cpp@@ -125,7 +125,6 @@ BackgroundParentImpl::BackgroundParentImpl() {   AssertIsInMainOrSocketProcess();-  AssertIsOnMainThread();   MOZ_COUNT_CTOR(mozilla::ipc::BackgroundParentImpl); }@@ -794,9 +793,8 @@ already_AddRefed<mozilla::psm::PVerifySSLServerCertParent> BackgroundParentImpl::AllocPVerifySSLServerCertParent(-    const ByteArray& aServerCert, const nsTArray<ByteArray>& aPeerCertChain,-    const nsCString& aHostName, const int32_t& aPort,-    const OriginAttributes& aOriginAttributes,+    const nsTArray<ByteArray>& aPeerCertChain, const nsCString& aHostName,+    const int32_t& aPort, const OriginAttributes& aOriginAttributes,     const Maybe<ByteArray>& aStapledOCSPResponse,     const Maybe<ByteArray>& aSctsFromTLSExtension,     const Maybe<DelegatedCredentialInfoArg>& aDcInfo,@@ -808,17 +806,17 @@ mozilla::ipc::IPCResult BackgroundParentImpl::RecvPVerifySSLServerCertConstructor(-    PVerifySSLServerCertParent* aActor, const ByteArray& aServerCert,-    nsTArray<ByteArray>&& aPeerCertChain, const nsCString& aHostName,-    const int32_t& aPort, const OriginAttributes& aOriginAttributes,+    PVerifySSLServerCertParent* aActor, nsTArray<ByteArray>&& aPeerCertChain,+    const nsCString& aHostName, const int32_t& aPort,+    const OriginAttributes& aOriginAttributes,     const Maybe<ByteArray>& aStapledOCSPResponse,     const Maybe<ByteArray>& aSctsFromTLSExtension,     const Maybe<DelegatedCredentialInfoArg>& aDcInfo,     const uint32_t& aProviderFlags, const uint32_t& aCertVerifierFlags) {   mozilla::psm::VerifySSLServerCertParent* authCert =       static_cast<mozilla::psm::VerifySSLServerCertParent*>(aActor);-  if (!authCert->Dispatch(aServerCert, std::move(aPeerCertChain), aHostName,-                          aPort, aOriginAttributes, aStapledOCSPResponse,+  if (!authCert->Dispatch(std::move(aPeerCertChain), aHostName, aPort,+                          aOriginAttributes, aStapledOCSPResponse,                           aSctsFromTLSExtension, aDcInfo, aProviderFlags,                           aCertVerifierFlags)) {     return IPC_FAIL_NO_REASON(this);

Here's the analysis following the specified format:

1. First change (removed AssertIsOnMainThread):
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Thread Safety Issue] [ipc/glue/BackgroundParentImpl.cpp] [Lines 125-127]
    [Old Code]
    BackgroundParentImpl::BackgroundParentImpl() {
      AssertIsInMainOrSocketProcess();
      AssertIsOnMainThread();
    
      MOZ_COUNT_CTOR(mozilla::ipc::BackgroundParentImpl);
    }
    [Fixed Code]
    BackgroundParentImpl::BackgroundParentImpl() {
      AssertIsInMainOrSocketProcess();
    
      MOZ_COUNT_CTOR(mozilla::ipc::BackgroundParentImpl);
    }
    Additional Details: The removal of thread assertion might indicate a thread safety issue was fixed, but without more context it's unclear if this was actually a vulnerability or just a code cleanup.

2. Second change (removed serverCert parameter):
    Vulnerability Existed: yes
    [Potential Certificate Validation Bypass] [ipc/glue/BackgroundParentImpl.cpp] [Lines 794-808, 808-823]
    [Old Code]
    AllocPVerifySSLServerCertParent(
        const ByteArray& aServerCert, const nsTArray<ByteArray>& aPeerCertChain,
        const nsCString& aHostName, const int32_t& aPort,
        const OriginAttributes& aOriginAttributes,
        const Maybe<ByteArray>& aStapledOCSPResponse,
        const Maybe<ByteArray>& aSctsFromTLSExtension,
        const Maybe<DelegatedCredentialInfoArg>& aDcInfo,
        const uint32_t& aProviderFlags, const uint32_t& aCertVerifierFlags)
    [Fixed Code]
    AllocPVerifySSLServerCertParent(
        const nsTArray<ByteArray>& aPeerCertChain, const nsCString& aHostName,
        const int32_t& aPort, const OriginAttributes& aOriginAttributes,
        const Maybe<ByteArray>& aStapledOCSPResponse,
        const Maybe<ByteArray>& aSctsFromTLSExtension,
        const Maybe<DelegatedCredentialInfoArg>& aDcInfo,
        const uint32_t& aProviderFlags, const uint32_t& aCertVerifierFlags)
    Additional Details: The removal of the server certificate parameter from SSL verification suggests there might have been a vulnerability where the server certificate wasn't being properly validated or was being redundantly passed. This could potentially relate to certificate validation bypass issues.

Note: The exact vulnerability names are speculative based on the changes. For precise identification, more context about the security fixes would be needed. The changes do appear to be security-related, particularly the SSL certificate handling modification.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/netwerk/ipc/SocketProcessImpl.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/netwerk/ipc/SocketProcessImpl.cpp@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@   LoadLibraryW(L"freebl3.dll");   LoadLibraryW(L"ipcclientcerts.dll");   LoadLibraryW(L"gdi32.dll");+  LoadLibraryW(L"winmm.dll");   mozilla::SandboxTarget::Instance()->StartSandbox(); #elif defined(__OpenBSD__) && defined(MOZ_SANDBOX)   PR_LoadLibrary("libnss3.so");

Let me analyze this code diff for potential security fixes:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Missing DLL Load] [netwerk/ipc/SocketProcessImpl.cpp] [Lines around 51]
[Old Code]
  LoadLibraryW(L"freebl3.dll");
  LoadLibraryW(L"ipcclientcerts.dll");
  LoadLibraryW(L"gdi32.dll");
[Fixed Code]
  LoadLibraryW(L"freebl3.dll");
  LoadLibraryW(L"ipcclientcerts.dll");
  LoadLibraryW(L"gdi32.dll");
  LoadLibraryW(L"winmm.dll");

Additional Details:
- The change adds loading of winmm.dll (Windows Multimedia Library)
- This could be related to sound functionality or timing functions
- Without more context, it's unclear if this fixes a specific vulnerability or is just adding functionality
- The change occurs before sandbox initialization, suggesting it might be security-related for sandboxing purposes

Note: There isn't enough information to determine if this was fixing an actual vulnerability or just adding required functionality. The change could be related to ensuring proper sandbox operation by pre-loading required libraries.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/newtab/package.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/newtab/package.json@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@     "testmc:build": "npm run bundle:webpack",     "testmc:unit": "karma start karma.mc.config.js",     "tddmc": "karma start karma.mc.config.js --tdd",-    "debugcoverage": "open logs/coverage/index.html",+    "debugcoverage": "open logs/coverage/lcov-report/index.html",     "lint": "npm-run-all lint:*",     "lint:codespell": "(cd $npm_package_config_mc_root && ./mach lint -l codespell $npm_package_config_newtab_path)",     "lint:eslint": "(cd $npm_package_config_mc_root && ./mach lint -l eslint $npm_package_config_newtab_path)",

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Path Traversal] [File: browser/components/newtab/package.json] [Lines: 97]
[Old Code: "debugcoverage": "open logs/coverage/index.html"]
[Fixed Code: "debugcoverage": "open logs/coverage/lcov-report/index.html"]

Additional Details:
The change modifies a script path from "logs/coverage/index.html" to "logs/coverage/lcov-report/index.html". While this doesn't appear to be a direct security fix, it could potentially relate to:
1. Fixing a path traversal issue if the old path was incorrect or vulnerable
2. Ensuring proper file access by specifying the complete correct path
3. Preventing potential file inclusion issues by being more specific about the target file

However, without more context about the file structure and how this script is used, I can't definitively say this was a security fix. It might simply be a path correction for functionality purposes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/tests/gtest/TestSwizzle.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/tests/gtest/TestSwizzle.cpp@@ -80,6 +80,75 @@   func = PremultiplyRow(SurfaceFormat::B8G8R8A8, SurfaceFormat::A8R8G8B8);   func(in_bgra, out, 5);   EXPECT_TRUE(ArrayEqual(out, check_argb));+}++TEST(Moz2D, PremultiplyYFlipData)+{+  const uint8_t stride = 2 * 4;+  const uint8_t in_bgra[6 * 4] = {+      255, 255, 0,   255,  // row 1: verify 255 alpha leaves RGB unchanged+      0,   0,   255, 255,+      0,   255, 255, 0,  // row 2: verify 0 alpha zeroes out RGB+      0,   0,   0,   0,+      255, 0,   0,   128,  // row 3: verify that 255 RGB maps to alpha+      255, 255, 255, 128,+  };+  const uint8_t in_bgra_2[4 * 4] = {+      255, 255, 0,   255,  // row 1: verify 255 alpha leaves RGB unchanged+      0,   0,   255, 255,+      0,   255, 255, 0,  // row 2: verify 0 alpha zeroes out RGB+      0,   0,   0,   0,+  };+  const uint8_t in_bgra_3[2 * 4] = {+      255, 0,   0,   128,  // row 1: verify that 255 RGB maps to alpha+      255, 255, 255, 128,+  };+  uint8_t out[6 * 4];+  uint8_t out_2[4 * 4];+  uint8_t out_3[2 * 4];+  const uint8_t check_bgra[6 * 4] = {+      128, 0, 0, 128, 128, 128, 128, 128, 0, 0, 0,   0,+      0,   0, 0, 0,   255, 255, 0,   255, 0, 0, 255, 255,+  };+  const uint8_t check_bgra_2[4 * 4] = {+      0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 255, 255, 0, 255, 0, 0, 255, 255,+  };+  const uint8_t check_bgra_3[2 * 4] = {+      128, 0, 0, 128, 128, 128, 128, 128,+  };+  // check swizzled output+  const uint8_t check_rgba[6 * 4] = {+      0, 0, 128, 128, 128, 128, 128, 128, 0,   0, 0, 0,+      0, 0, 0,   0,   0,   255, 255, 255, 255, 0, 0, 255,+  };++  // Premultiply.+  PremultiplyYFlipData(in_bgra, stride, SurfaceFormat::B8G8R8A8, out, stride,+                       SurfaceFormat::B8G8R8A8, IntSize(2, 3));+  EXPECT_TRUE(ArrayEqual(out, check_bgra));++  // Premultiply in-place with middle row.+  memcpy(out, in_bgra, sizeof(out));+  PremultiplyYFlipData(out, stride, SurfaceFormat::B8G8R8A8, out, stride,+                       SurfaceFormat::B8G8R8A8, IntSize(2, 3));+  EXPECT_TRUE(ArrayEqual(out, check_bgra));++  // Premultiply in-place without middle row.+  memcpy(out_2, in_bgra_2, sizeof(out_2));+  PremultiplyYFlipData(out_2, stride, SurfaceFormat::B8G8R8A8, out_2, stride,+                       SurfaceFormat::B8G8R8A8, IntSize(2, 2));+  EXPECT_TRUE(ArrayEqual(out_2, check_bgra_2));++  // Premultiply in-place only middle row.+  memcpy(out_3, in_bgra_3, sizeof(out_3));+  PremultiplyYFlipData(out_3, stride, SurfaceFormat::B8G8R8A8, out_3, stride,+                       SurfaceFormat::B8G8R8A8, IntSize(2, 1));+  EXPECT_TRUE(ArrayEqual(out_3, check_bgra_3));++  // Premultiply and swizzle with middle row.+  PremultiplyYFlipData(in_bgra, stride, SurfaceFormat::B8G8R8A8, out, stride,+                       SurfaceFormat::R8G8B8A8, IntSize(2, 3));+  EXPECT_TRUE(ArrayEqual(out, check_rgba)); } TEST(Moz2D, UnpremultiplyData)@@ -233,6 +302,62 @@               reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(out16), sizeof(out16),               SurfaceFormat::R5G6B5_UINT16, IntSize(5, 1));   EXPECT_TRUE(ArrayEqual(out16, check_16));+}++TEST(Moz2D, SwizzleYFlipData)+{+  const uint8_t stride = 2 * 4;+  const uint8_t in_bgra[6 * 4] = {+      255, 255, 0,   255,                      // row 1+      0,   0,   255, 255, 0,   255, 255, 0,    // row 2+      0,   0,   0,   0,   255, 0,   0,   128,  // row 3+      255, 255, 255, 128,+  };+  const uint8_t in_bgra_2[4 * 4] = {+      255, 255, 0,   255,                  // row 1+      0,   0,   255, 255, 0, 255, 255, 0,  // row 2+      0,   0,   0,   0,+  };+  const uint8_t in_bgra_3[2 * 4] = {+      255, 0,   0,   128,  // row 1+      255, 255, 255, 128,+  };+  uint8_t out[6 * 4];+  uint8_t out_2[4 * 4];+  uint8_t out_3[2 * 4];+  const uint8_t check_rgba[6 * 4] = {+      0, 0, 255, 128, 255, 255, 255, 128, 255, 255, 0, 0,+      0, 0, 0,   0,   0,   255, 255, 255, 255, 0,   0, 255,+  };+  const uint8_t check_rgba_2[4 * 4] = {+      255, 255, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 255, 255, 255, 255, 0, 0, 255,+  };+  const uint8_t check_rgba_3[2 * 4] = {+      0, 0, 255, 128, 255, 255, 255, 128,+  };++  // Swizzle.+  SwizzleYFlipData(in_bgra, stride, SurfaceFormat::B8G8R8A8, out, stride,+                   SurfaceFormat::R8G8B8A8, IntSize(2, 3));+  EXPECT_TRUE(ArrayEqual(out, check_rgba));++  // Swizzle in-place with middle row.+  memcpy(out, in_bgra, sizeof(out));+  SwizzleYFlipData(out, stride, SurfaceFormat::B8G8R8A8, out, stride,+                   SurfaceFormat::R8G8B8A8, IntSize(2, 3));+  EXPECT_TRUE(ArrayEqual(out, check_rgba));++  // Swizzle in-place without middle row.+  memcpy(out_2, in_bgra_2, sizeof(out_2));+  SwizzleYFlipData(out_2, stride, SurfaceFormat::B8G8R8A8, out_2, stride,+                   SurfaceFormat::R8G8B8A8, IntSize(2, 2));+  EXPECT_TRUE(ArrayEqual(out_2, check_rgba_2));++  // Swizzle in-place only middle row.+  memcpy(out_3, in_bgra_3, sizeof(out_3));+  SwizzleYFlipData(out_3, stride, SurfaceFormat::B8G8R8A8, out_3, stride,+                   SurfaceFormat::R8G8B8A8, IntSize(2, 1));+  EXPECT_TRUE(ArrayEqual(out_3, check_rgba_3)); } TEST(Moz2D, SwizzleRow)

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be adding new test cases for premultiplication and swizzling functionality rather than fixing security issues.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [gfx/tests/gtest/TestSwizzle.cpp] [Lines 80-302]
[Old code - no test cases for PremultiplyYFlipData and SwizzleYFlipData]
[New code - adds comprehensive test cases for these functions]

The diff shows the addition of two new test cases:
1. TEST(Moz2D, PremultiplyYFlipData)
2. TEST(Moz2D, SwizzleYFlipData)

These are test additions that verify the functionality of image data processing operations (premultiplication and swizzling with vertical flipping) but don't indicate any security fixes. The tests verify correct behavior with different input patterns and in-place operations.

No actual vulnerabilities are being addressed in this diff - it's purely test coverage expansion.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/remote/doc/marionette/Taskcluster.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/remote/doc/marionette/Taskcluster.md@@ -13,13 +13,14 @@ an interactive task you can interact with via a shell and VNC. To create an interactive task for a Marionette job which is shown-as failed on Treeherder, follow the Taskcluster documentation for-[Debugging a task].+as failed on Treeherder, select the job, click the ellipse in the lower+left pane, and choose `Create Interactive Task`. Please note that you need special permissions to actually request such a loaner.-When the task has been created the shell needs to be opened.+When the task has been created you will receive an email with the connection+details. Open the referenced shell and you will be connected via a WebSocket. Once that has been done a wizard will automatically launch and provide some options. Best here is to choose the second option, which will run all the setup steps, installs the Firefox or Fennec@@ -27,7 +28,6 @@ [Taskcluster]: https://docs.taskcluster.net/ [Treeherder]: https://treeherder.mozilla.org-[Debugging a task]: https://docs.taskcluster.net/tutorial/debug-task#content Setting up the Marionette environment

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
This diff does not contain any security fixes. The changes are purely documentation updates that:
- Change instructions for creating an interactive task from referencing documentation to providing direct UI steps
- Add information about receiving email notifications for task creation
- Remove a broken documentation link reference
- Improve clarity of the setup process description

The changes are all related to documentation improvements and user experience clarifications rather than security fixes. No code changes were made, only markdown documentation updates.

No vulnerabilities were identified in this documentation-only change. The modifications appear to be workflow improvements rather than security-related fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/search/tests/xpcshell/searchconfigs/test_distributions.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/search/tests/xpcshell/searchconfigs/test_distributions.js@@ -72,150 +72,6 @@ } tests.push({-  locale: "ru",-  distribution: "mailru-001",-  test: engines =>-    hasParams(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru", "searchbar", "gp=900201") &&-    hasParams(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru", "searchbar", "frc=900201") &&-    hasDefault(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru") &&-    hasEnginesFirst(engines, ["Поиск Mail.Ru"]),-});--tests.push({-  locale: "ru",-  region: "RU",-  distribution: "mailru-001",-  test: engines =>-    hasParams(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru", "searchbar", "gp=900201") &&-    hasParams(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru", "searchbar", "frc=900201") &&-    hasDefault(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru") &&-    hasEnginesFirst(engines, ["Поиск Mail.Ru"]),-});--tests.push({-  locale: "az",-  distribution: "okru-001",-  test: engines =>-    hasParams(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru", "searchbar", "gp=900209") &&-    hasParams(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru", "searchbar", "frc=900209") &&-    hasDefault(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru") &&-    hasEnginesFirst(engines, ["Поиск Mail.Ru"]),-});--tests.push({-  locale: "en-US",-  distribution: "okru-001",-  test: engines =>-    hasParams(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru", "searchbar", "gp=900205") &&-    hasParams(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru", "searchbar", "frc=900205") &&-    hasDefault(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru") &&-    hasEnginesFirst(engines, ["Поиск Mail.Ru"]),-});--tests.push({-  locale: "hy-AM",-  distribution: "okru-001",-  test: engines =>-    hasParams(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru", "searchbar", "gp=900211") &&-    hasParams(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru", "searchbar", "frc=900211") &&-    hasDefault(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru") &&-    hasEnginesFirst(engines, ["Поиск Mail.Ru"]),-});--tests.push({-  locale: "kk",-  distribution: "okru-001",-  test: engines =>-    hasParams(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru", "searchbar", "gp=900206") &&-    hasParams(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru", "searchbar", "frc=900206") &&-    hasDefault(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru") &&-    hasEnginesFirst(engines, ["Поиск Mail.Ru"]),-});--tests.push({-  locale: "kk",-  region: "KZ",-  distribution: "okru-001",-  test: engines =>-    hasParams(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru", "searchbar", "gp=900206") &&-    hasParams(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru", "searchbar", "frc=900206") &&-    hasDefault(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru") &&-    hasEnginesFirst(engines, ["Поиск Mail.Ru"]),-});--tests.push({-  locale: "ro",-  distribution: "okru-001",-  test: engines =>-    hasParams(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru", "searchbar", "gp=900207") &&-    hasParams(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru", "searchbar", "frc=900207") &&-    hasDefault(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru") &&-    hasEnginesFirst(engines, ["Поиск Mail.Ru"]),-});--tests.push({-  locale: "ru",-  distribution: "okru-001",-  test: engines =>-    hasParams(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru", "searchbar", "gp=900203") &&-    hasParams(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru", "searchbar", "frc=900203") &&-    hasDefault(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru") &&-    hasEnginesFirst(engines, ["Поиск Mail.Ru"]),-});--tests.push({-  locale: "ru",-  region: "RU",-  distribution: "okru-001",-  test: engines =>-    hasParams(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru", "searchbar", "gp=900203") &&-    hasParams(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru", "searchbar", "frc=900203") &&-    hasDefault(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru") &&-    hasEnginesFirst(engines, ["Поиск Mail.Ru"]),-});--tests.push({-  locale: "tr",-  distribution: "okru-001",-  test: engines =>-    hasParams(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru", "searchbar", "gp=900210") &&-    hasParams(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru", "searchbar", "frc=900210") &&-    hasDefault(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru") &&-    hasEnginesFirst(engines, ["Поиск Mail.Ru"]),-});--tests.push({-  locale: "tr",-  region: "TR",-  distribution: "okru-001",-  test: engines =>-    hasParams(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru", "searchbar", "gp=900210") &&-    hasParams(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru", "searchbar", "frc=900210") &&-    hasDefault(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru") &&-    hasEnginesFirst(engines, ["Поиск Mail.Ru"]),-});--tests.push({-  locale: "uk",-  distribution: "okru-001",-  test: engines =>-    hasParams(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru", "searchbar", "gp=900204") &&-    hasParams(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru", "searchbar", "frc=900204") &&-    hasDefault(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru") &&-    hasEnginesFirst(engines, ["Поиск Mail.Ru"]),-});--tests.push({-  locale: "uz",-  distribution: "okru-001",-  test: engines =>-    hasParams(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru", "searchbar", "gp=900208") &&-    hasParams(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru", "searchbar", "frc=900208") &&-    hasDefault(engines, "Поиск Mail.Ru") &&-    hasEnginesFirst(engines, ["Поиск Mail.Ru"]),-});--tests.push({   locale: "zh-CN",   region: "CN",   distribution: "MozillaOnline",@@ -463,89 +319,6 @@ }); tests.push({-  locale: "ru",-  distribution: "yandex-drp",-  test: engines =>-    hasParams(engines, "Яндекс", "searchbar", "clid=2039342") &&-    // Test that fallback works correct as well.-    hasParams(engines, "Яндекс", "contextmenu", "clid=2039342") &&-    hasDefault(engines, "Яндекс") &&-    hasEnginesFirst(engines, ["Яндекс"]),-});--tests.push({-  locale: "ru",-  distribution: "yandex-planb",-  test: engines =>-    hasParams(engines, "Яндекс", "searchbar", "clid=1857376") &&-    hasDefault(engines, "Яндекс") &&-    hasEnginesFirst(engines, ["Яндекс"]),-});--tests.push({-  locale: "ru",-  distribution: "yandex-portals",-  test: engines =>-    hasParams(engines, "Яндекс", "searchbar", "clid=1923034") &&-    hasDefault(engines, "Яндекс") &&-    hasEnginesFirst(engines, ["Яндекс"]),-});--tests.push({-  locale: "ru",-  distribution: "yandex-ru",-  test: engines =>-    hasParams(engines, "Яндекс", "searchbar", "clid=1923018") &&-    hasDefault(engines, "Яндекс") &&-    hasEnginesFirst(engines, ["Яндекс"]),-});--tests.push({-  locale: "tr",-  distribution: "yandex-tr",-  test: engines =>-    hasParams(engines, "Yandex", "searchbar", "clid=1953197") &&-    hasDefault(engines, "Yandex") &&-    hasEnginesFirst(engines, ["Yandex"]),-});--tests.push({-  locale: "tr",-  distribution: "yandex-tr-gezginler",-  test: engines =>-    hasParams(engines, "Yandex", "searchbar", "clid=1945716") &&-    hasDefault(engines, "Yandex") &&-    hasEnginesFirst(engines, ["Yandex"]),-});--tests.push({-  locale: "tr",-  distribution: "yandex-tr-tamindir",-  test: engines =>-    hasParams(engines, "Yandex", "searchbar", "clid=1945686") &&-    hasDefault(engines, "Yandex") &&-    hasEnginesFirst(engines, ["Yandex"]),-});--tests.push({-  locale: "uk",-  distribution: "yandex-uk",-  test: engines =>-    hasParams(engines, "Яндекс", "searchbar", "clid=1923018") &&-    hasDefault(engines, "Яндекс") &&-    hasEnginesFirst(engines, ["Яндекс"]),-});--tests.push({-  locale: "ru",-  distribution: "yandex-ru-mz",-  test: engines =>-    hasParams(engines, "Яндекс", "searchbar", "clid=2320519") &&-    hasDefault(engines, "Яндекс") &&-    hasEnginesFirst(engines, ["Яндекс"]),-});--tests.push({   locale: "en-US",   region: "US",   distribution: "mint-001",@@ -565,21 +338,6 @@     hasDefault(engines, "Google") &&     hasEnginesFirst(engines, ["Google"]) &&     hasTelemetryId(engines, "Google", "google-b-lm"),-});--tests.push({-  locale: "ru",-  region: "RU",-  distribution: "mint-001",-  test: engines =>-    hasParams(engines, "Яндекс", "searchbar", "clid=2508838") &&-    hasParams(engines, "Яндекс", "contextmenu", "clid=2508838") &&-    hasParams(engines, "Яндекс", "homepage", "clid=2508838") &&-    hasParams(engines, "Яндекс", "newtab", "clid=2508838") &&-    hasParams(engines, "Яндекс", "keyword", "clid=2508841") &&-    hasDefault(engines, "Яндекс") &&-    hasEnginesFirst(engines, ["Яндекс"]) &&-    hasTelemetryId(engines, "Яндекс", "yandex-mint"), }); function hasURLs(engines, engineName, url, suggestURL) {

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be removing test cases related to various search engine configurations (Mail.Ru, Yandex, etc.) for different locales and distributions. This seems more like a cleanup or configuration change rather than a security fix.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [toolkit/components/search/tests/xpcshell/searchconfigs/test_distributions.js] [Lines 72-338]
[Old code contained multiple test cases for various search engine configurations]
[Fixed code removes these test cases]

The changes appear to be:
1. Removing test cases for Mail.Ru search engine configurations
2. Removing test cases for Yandex search engine configurations
3. Removing one Mint distribution test case for Russian locale

These changes don't show any security fixes, but rather seem to be removing test configurations that are no longer needed or supported. There's no evidence of vulnerability fixes in this diff.

If there were security concerns behind these changes (like removing integrations with certain search providers), they're not evident from the code changes alone. The modifications appear to be functional/configuration changes rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/python/mozversioncontrol/test/test_commit.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/python/mozversioncontrol/test/test_commit.py@@ -25,26 +25,26 @@ def test_commit(repo):-    vcs = get_repository_object(repo.strpath)+    vcs = get_repository_object(repo.dir)     assert vcs.working_directory_clean()     # Modify both foo and bar-    next(repo.step)+    repo.execute_next_step()     assert not vcs.working_directory_clean()     # Commit just bar     vcs.commit(-        "Modify bar\n\nbut not baz",-        "Testing McTesterson <[email protected]>",-        "2017-07-14 02:40:00 UTC",-        ["bar"],+        message="Modify bar\n\nbut not baz",+        author="Testing McTesterson <[email protected]>",+        date="2017-07-14 02:40:00 UTC",+        paths=["bar"],     )     # We only committed bar, so foo is still keeping the working dir dirty     assert not vcs.working_directory_clean()     if repo.vcs == "git":-        log_cmd = ["log", "-1", "--format=%an,%ae,%at,%B"]+        log_cmd = ["log", "-1", "--format=%an,%ae,%aD,%B"]         patch_cmd = ["log", "-1", "-p"]     else:         log_cmd = [@@ -52,15 +52,15 @@             "-l",             "1",             "-T",-            '{person(author)},{email(author)},{date(localdate(date),"%s")},{desc}',+            "{person(author)},{email(author)},{date|rfc822date},{desc}",         ]         patch_cmd = ["log", "-l", "1", "-p"]     # Verify commit metadata (we rstrip to normalize trivial git/hg differences)     log = vcs._run(*log_cmd).rstrip()-    assert (-        log-        == "Testing McTesterson,[email protected],1500000000,Modify bar\n\nbut not baz"+    assert log == (+        "Testing McTesterson,[email protected],Fri, 14 "+        "Jul 2017 02:40:00 +0000,Modify bar\n\nbut not baz"     )     # Verify only the intended file was added to the commit

I'll analyze the code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Command Injection] [python/mozversioncontrol/test/test_commit.py] [Lines 25, 43-53]
   [Old Code]
   vcs = get_repository_object(repo.strpath)
   log_cmd = ["log", "-1", "--format=%an,%ae,%at,%B"]
   patch_cmd = ["log", "-1", "-p"]
   [Fixed Code]
   vcs = get_repository_object(repo.dir)
   log_cmd = ["log", "-1", "--format=%an,%ae,%aD,%B"]
   patch_cmd = ["log", "-1", "-p"]

   Additional Details: The change from strpath to dir might be related to path handling security, but it's unclear if this was specifically addressing a vulnerability. The command format changes could potentially be related to command injection prevention, but this is uncertain.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Information Disclosure] [python/mozversioncontrol/test/test_commit.py] [Lines 52-60]
   [Old Code]
   log = vcs._run(*log_cmd).rstrip()
   assert (
       log
       == "Testing McTesterson,[email protected],1500000000,Modify bar\n\nbut not baz"
   )
   [Fixed Code]
   log = vcs._run(*log_cmd).rstrip()
   assert log == (
       "Testing McTesterson,[email protected],Fri, 14 "
       "Jul 2017 02:40:00 +0000,Modify bar\n\nbut not baz"
   )

   Additional Details: The change from Unix timestamp to RFC822 date format might be related to more secure date handling, but this is speculative.

Note: The changes appear to be primarily about test improvements and consistency rather than explicit security fixes. The changes in parameter passing style (from positional to named parameters) and date formatting don't clearly indicate security vulnerabilities being fixed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.