Shared security patch analysis results
AI Used: DEEPSEEK deepseek-chat--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.shadowOffsetX.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.shadowOffsetX.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); // Test that restore() undoes any modifications var old = ctx.shadowOffsetX;
Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming without any security implications.
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
The changes simply rename the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`, which doesn't affect security. This appears to be a code style/readability improvement rather than a security fix.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-45c.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-45c.xml@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ ]]></style> <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/> <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->- <meta name="flags" content="" /> </head> <body> <div> This should be unstyled. </div>
Analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 8]
[Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="" />
[Fixed Code] (line removed)
Additional Notes:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag with "flags" attribute, which doesn't appear to be security-related
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with this change
- The modification seems to be removing unused/unnecessary metadata rather than addressing a security issue
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsl-1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsl-1.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(120 100.0% 50.0%)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-25]
Old Code:
```
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(120 100.0% 50.0%)';
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
```
Fixed Code:
```
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(120 100.0% 50.0%)';
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
```
The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating its references. There are no security-related changes or vulnerability fixes in this diff. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has changed.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/content/contentAreaUtils.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/content/contentAreaUtils.js@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ }; // Find a URI to use for determining last-downloaded-to directory- let relatedURI = aReferrerInfo ? aReferrerInfo.originalReferrer : sourceURI;+ let relatedURI = aReferrerInfo?.originalReferrer || sourceURI; promiseTargetFile(fpParams, aSkipPrompt, relatedURI) .then(aDialogAccepted => {
Let me analyze the code diff for security fixes. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Null/Undefined Reference] [toolkit/content/contentAreaUtils.js] [Lines 321] [Old Code] let relatedURI = aReferrerInfo ? aReferrerInfo.originalReferrer : sourceURI; [Fixed Code] let relatedURI = aReferrerInfo?.originalReferrer || sourceURI; Additional Details: The change replaces a ternary operator with optional chaining (?.) and logical OR (||). While this isn't a classic security vulnerability, it does improve null/undefined reference safety. The old code could potentially throw an error if aReferrerInfo existed but originalReferrer was undefined, while the new code more safely handles this case by falling back to sourceURI. This could prevent potential crashes or unexpected behavior, though it's not clear if this was exploitable as a security vulnerability. Note: This appears to be more of a defensive programming improvement rather than a direct security fix, but I've included it since it does address potential runtime issues that could have security implications in some contexts.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/components/PrimaryPanes/Sources.css+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/components/PrimaryPanes/Sources.css@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ .sources-list .img.blackBox { mask-size: 13px;- background-color: var(--theme-icon-checked-color);+ background-color: var(--red-40); } /*
Analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Styling Security Issue] [devtools/client/debugger/src/components/PrimaryPanes/Sources.css] [Lines 193-195]
[Old Code]
`.sources-list .img.blackBox {
mask-size: 13px;
background-color: var(--theme-icon-checked-color);
}`
[Fixed Code]
`.sources-list .img.blackBox {
mask-size: 13px;
background-color: var(--red-40);
}`
Additional Notes:
- The change appears to be purely stylistic, switching from a theme variable to a specific color variable
- No obvious security vulnerability is present in either version
- The modification could potentially relate to accessibility or visual consistency rather than security
- CSS changes rarely introduce security vulnerabilities unless they involve URL handling or script injection, which isn't the case here
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.nonfinite.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.nonfinite.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var imgdata = ctx.getImageData(0, 0, 10, 10); assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { ctx.putImageData(imgdata, Infinity, 10); });
Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14]
Old Code:
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
Additional details:
- The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (offscreenCanvas → canvas)
- The test functionality remains the same (testing putImageData with non-finite values)
- No security-relevant changes were made in this diff
- The test continues to verify proper error handling for invalid inputs
This appears to be a refactoring change rather than a security fix. The test's purpose remains to verify that putImageData() throws a TypeError when given non-finite coordinates.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/themes/osx/browser.css+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/themes/osx/browser.css@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ text-shadow: none; }-@media (prefers-color-scheme: dark) {+@media (-moz-content-prefers-color-scheme: dark) { #statuspanel-label { background-color: hsl(240, 1%, 20%); border-color: hsl(240, 1%, 40%);
Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:
Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability] [browser/themes/osx/browser.css] [Lines 468]
[Old Code]
@media (prefers-color-scheme: dark) {
[Fixed Code]
@media (-moz-content-prefers-color-scheme: dark) {
Additional Details:
This appears to be a CSS media query change from using the standard `prefers-color-scheme` to Firefox's proprietary `-moz-content-prefers-color-scheme`. This is not a security fix but rather a browser-specific implementation change for handling dark mode preferences. No security vulnerability is being addressed here.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.crosscanvas.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.crosscanvas.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var promise = new Promise(function(resolve, reject) { var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.fillStyle = pattern; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);- _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+ _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);
Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be variable renaming and consistency improvements rather than security fixes. Here's the analysis:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
Variable Renaming [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.crosscanvas.worker.js] [Lines 13-14, 33]
Old Code:
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency and update all references to it. There are no security implications in this change.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/clap/README.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/clap/README.md@@ -1,542 +1,158 @@-clap-====+<!-- omit in TOC -->+# clap-[](https://crates.io/crates/clap) [](https://crates.io/crates/clap) [](https://github.com/clap-rs/clap/blob/master/LICENSE-MIT) [](https://coveralls.io/github/kbknapp/clap-rs?branch=master) [](https://gitter.im/kbknapp/clap-rs?utm_source=badge&utm_medium=badge&utm_campaign=pr-badge&utm_content=badge)+> **Command Line Argument Parser for Rust**-Linux: [](https://travis-ci.org/clap-rs/clap)-Windows: [](https://ci.appveyor.com/project/kbknapp/clap-rs/branch/master)+[](https://crates.io/crates/clap)+[](https://crates.io/crates/clap)+[](https://github.com/clap-rs/clap/blob/v3.0.10/LICENSE-APACHE)+[](https://github.com/clap-rs/clap/blob/v3.0.10/LICENSE-MIT)+[](https://github.com/clap-rs/clap/actions/workflows/ci.yml?query=branch%3Astaging)+[](https://coveralls.io/github/clap-rs/clap?branch=master)+[](https://github.com/clap-rs/clap/graphs/contributors)-Command Line Argument Parser for Rust+Dual-licensed under [Apache 2.0](LICENSE-APACHE) or [MIT](LICENSE-MIT).-It is a simple-to-use, efficient, and full-featured library for parsing command line arguments and subcommands when writing console/terminal applications.--* [documentation](https://docs.rs/clap/)-* [website](https://clap.rs/)-* [video tutorials](https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLza5oFLQGTl2Z5T8g1pRkIynR3E0_pc7U)--Table of Contents-=================--* [About](#about)-* [FAQ](#faq)-* [Features](#features)-* [Quick Example](#quick-example)-* [Try it!](#try-it)- * [Pre-Built Test](#pre-built-test)- * [BYOB (Build Your Own Binary)](#byob-build-your-own-binary)-* [Usage](#usage)- * [Optional Dependencies / Features](#optional-dependencies--features)- * [Dependencies Tree](#dependencies-tree)- * [More Information](#more-information)- * [Video Tutorials](#video-tutorials)-* [How to Contribute](#how-to-contribute)- * [Compatibility Policy](#compatibility-policy)- * [Minimum Version of Rust](#minimum-version-of-rust)-* [Related Crates](#related-crates)-* [License](#license)-* [Recent Breaking Changes](#recent-breaking-changes)- * [Deprecations](#deprecations)--Created by [gh-md-toc](https://github.com/ekalinin/github-markdown-toc)+1. [About](#about)+2. Tutorial: [Builder API](https://github.com/clap-rs/clap/blob/v3.0.10/examples/tutorial_builder/README.md), [Derive API](https://github.com/clap-rs/clap/blob/v3.0.10/examples/tutorial_derive/README.md)+3. [Examples](https://github.com/clap-rs/clap/blob/v3.0.10/examples/README.md)+4. [API Reference](https://docs.rs/clap)+ - [Derive Reference](https://github.com/clap-rs/clap/blob/v3.0.10/examples/derive_ref/README.md)+ - [Feature Flags](#feature-flags)+5. [CHANGELOG](https://github.com/clap-rs/clap/blob/v3.0.10/CHANGELOG.md)+6. [FAQ](https://github.com/clap-rs/clap/blob/v3.0.10/docs/FAQ.md)+7. [Questions & Discussions](https://github.com/clap-rs/clap/discussions)+8. [Contributing](https://github.com/clap-rs/clap/blob/v3.0.10/CONTRIBUTING.md)+8. [Sponsors](#sponsors) ## About-`clap` is used to parse *and validate* the string of command line arguments provided by a user at runtime. You provide the list of valid possibilities, and `clap` handles the rest. This means you focus on your *applications* functionality, and less on the parsing and validating of arguments.+Create your command-line parser, with all of the bells and whistles, declaratively or procedurally.-`clap` provides many things 'for free' (with no configuration) including the traditional version and help switches (or flags) along with associated messages. If you are using subcommands, `clap` will also auto-generate a `help` subcommand and separate associated help messages.+### Example-Once `clap` parses the user provided string of arguments, it returns the matches along with any applicable values. If the user made an error or typo, `clap` informs them with a friendly message and exits gracefully (or returns a `Result` type and allows you to perform any clean up prior to exit). Because of this, you can make reasonable assumptions in your code about the validity of the arguments prior to your applications main execution.+<!-- Copied from examples/demo.{rs,md} -->+```rust,no_run+use clap::Parser;-## FAQ+/// Simple program to greet a person+#[derive(Parser, Debug)]+#[clap(author, version, about, long_about = None)]+struct Args {+ /// Name of the person to greet+ #[clap(short, long)]+ name: String,-For a full FAQ and more in depth details, see [the wiki page](https://github.com/clap-rs/clap/wiki/FAQ)--### Comparisons--First, let me say that these comparisons are highly subjective, and not meant in a critical or harsh manner. All the argument parsing libraries out there (to include `clap`) have their own strengths and weaknesses. Sometimes it just comes down to personal taste when all other factors are equal. When in doubt, try them all and pick one that you enjoy :) There's plenty of room in the Rust community for multiple implementations!--#### How does `clap` compare to [getopts](https://github.com/rust-lang-nursery/getopts)?--`getopts` is a very basic, fairly minimalist argument parsing library. This isn't a bad thing, sometimes you don't need tons of features, you just want to parse some simple arguments, and have some help text generated for you based on valid arguments you specify. The downside to this approach is that you must manually implement most of the common features (such as checking to display help messages, usage strings, etc.). If you want a highly custom argument parser, and don't mind writing the majority of the functionality yourself, `getopts` is an excellent base.--`getopts` also doesn't allocate much, or at all. This gives it a very small performance boost. Although, as you start implementing additional features, that boost quickly disappears.--Personally, I find many, many uses of `getopts` are manually implementing features that `clap` provides by default. Using `clap` simplifies your codebase allowing you to focus on your application, and not argument parsing.--#### How does `clap` compare to [docopt.rs](https://github.com/docopt/docopt.rs)?--I first want to say I'm a big a fan of BurntSushi's work, the creator of `Docopt.rs`. I aspire to produce the quality of libraries that this man does! When it comes to comparing these two libraries they are very different. `docopt` tasks you with writing a help message, and then it parsers that message for you to determine all valid arguments and their use. Some people LOVE this approach, others do not. If you're willing to write a detailed help message, it's nice that you can stick that in your program and have `docopt` do the rest. On the downside, it's far less flexible.--`docopt` is also excellent at translating arguments into Rust types automatically. There is even a syntax extension which will do all this for you, if you're willing to use a nightly compiler (use of a stable compiler requires you to somewhat manually translate from arguments to Rust types). To use BurntSushi's words, `docopt` is also a sort of black box. You get what you get, and it's hard to tweak implementation or customize the experience for your use case.--Because `docopt` is doing a ton of work to parse your help messages and determine what you were trying to communicate as valid arguments, it's also one of the more heavy weight parsers performance-wise. For most applications this isn't a concern and this isn't to say `docopt` is slow, in fact far from it. This is just something to keep in mind while comparing.--#### All else being equal, what are some reasons to use `clap`? (The Pitch)--`clap` is as fast, and as lightweight as possible while still giving all the features you'd expect from a modern argument parser. In fact, for the amount and type of features `clap` offers it remains about as fast as `getopts`. If you use `clap` when just need some simple arguments parsed, you'll find it's a walk in the park. `clap` also makes it possible to represent extremely complex, and advanced requirements, without too much thought. `clap` aims to be intuitive, easy to use, and fully capable for wide variety use cases and needs.--#### All else being equal, what are some reasons *not* to use `clap`? (The Anti Pitch)--Depending on the style in which you choose to define the valid arguments, `clap` can be very verbose. `clap` also offers so many fine-tuning knobs and dials, that learning everything can seem overwhelming. I strive to keep the simple cases simple, but when turning all those custom dials it can get complex. `clap` is also opinionated about parsing. Even though so much can be tweaked and tuned with `clap` (and I'm adding more all the time), there are still certain features which `clap` implements in specific ways which may be contrary to some users use-cases. Finally, `clap` is "stringly typed" when referring to arguments which can cause typos in code. This particular paper-cut is being actively worked on, and should be gone in v3.x.--## Features--Below are a few of the features which `clap` supports, full descriptions and usage can be found in the [documentation](https://docs.rs/clap/) and [examples/](examples) directory--* **Auto-generated Help, Version, and Usage information**- - Can optionally be fully, or partially overridden if you want a custom help, version, or usage statements-* **Auto-generated completion scripts at compile time (Bash, Zsh, Fish, and PowerShell)**- - Even works through many multiple levels of subcommands- - Works with options which only accept certain values- - Works with subcommand aliases-* **Flags / Switches** (i.e. bool fields)- - Both short and long versions supported (i.e. `-f` and `--flag` respectively)- - Supports combining short versions (i.e. `-fBgoZ` is the same as `-f -B -g -o -Z`)- - Supports multiple occurrences (i.e. `-vvv` or `-v -v -v`)-* **Positional Arguments** (i.e. those which are based off an index from the program name)- - Supports multiple values (i.e. `myprog <file>...` such as `myprog file1.txt file2.txt` being two values for the same "file" argument)- - Supports Specific Value Sets (See below)- - Can set value parameters (such as the minimum number of values, the maximum number of values, or the exact number of values)- - Can set custom validations on values to extend the argument parsing capability to truly custom domains-* **Option Arguments** (i.e. those that take values)- - Both short and long versions supported (i.e. `-o value`, `-ovalue`, `-o=value` and `--option value` or `--option=value` respectively)- - Supports multiple values (i.e. `-o <val1> -o <val2>` or `-o <val1> <val2>`)- - Supports delimited values (i.e. `-o=val1,val2,val3`, can also change the delimiter)- - Supports Specific Value Sets (See below)- - Supports named values so that the usage/help info appears as `-o <FILE> <INTERFACE>` etc. for when you require specific multiple values- - Can set value parameters (such as the minimum number of values, the maximum number of values, or the exact number of values)- - Can set custom validations on values to extend the argument parsing capability to truly custom domains-* **Sub-Commands** (i.e. `git add <file>` where `add` is a sub-command of `git`)- - Support their own sub-arguments, and sub-sub-commands independent of the parent- - Get their own auto-generated Help, Version, and Usage independent of parent-* **Support for building CLIs from YAML** - This keeps your Rust source nice and tidy and makes supporting localized translation very simple!-* **Requirement Rules**: Arguments can define the following types of requirement rules- - Can be required by default- - Can be required only if certain arguments are present- - Can require other arguments to be present- - Can be required only if certain values of other arguments are used-* **Confliction Rules**: Arguments can optionally define the following types of exclusion rules- - Can be disallowed when certain arguments are present- - Can disallow use of other arguments when present-* **Groups**: Arguments can be made part of a group- - Fully compatible with other relational rules (requirements, conflicts, and overrides) which allows things like requiring the use of any arg in a group, or denying the use of an entire group conditionally-* **Specific Value Sets**: Positional or Option Arguments can define a specific set of allowed values (i.e. imagine a `--mode` option which may *only* have one of two values `fast` or `slow` such as `--mode fast` or `--mode slow`)-* **Default Values**- - Also supports conditional default values (i.e. a default which only applies if specific arguments are used, or specific values of those arguments)-* **Automatic Version from Cargo.toml**: `clap` is fully compatible with Rust's `env!()` macro for automatically setting the version of your application to the version in your Cargo.toml. See [09_auto_version example](examples/09_auto_version.rs) for how to do this (Thanks to [jhelwig](https://github.com/jhelwig) for pointing this out)-* **Typed Values**: You can use several convenience macros provided by `clap` to get typed values (i.e. `i32`, `u8`, etc.) from positional or option arguments so long as the type you request implements `std::str::FromStr` See the [12_typed_values example](examples/12_typed_values.rs). You can also use `clap`s `arg_enum!` macro to create an enum with variants that automatically implement `std::str::FromStr`. See [13a_enum_values_automatic example](examples/13a_enum_values_automatic.rs) for details-* **Suggestions**: Suggests corrections when the user enters a typo. For example, if you defined a `--myoption` argument, and the user mistakenly typed `--moyption` (notice `y` and `o` transposed), they would receive a `Did you mean '--myoption'?` error and exit gracefully. This also works for subcommands and flags. (Thanks to [Byron](https://github.com/Byron) for the implementation) (This feature can optionally be disabled, see 'Optional Dependencies / Features')-* **Colorized Errors (Non Windows OS only)**: Error message are printed in in colored text (this feature can optionally be disabled, see 'Optional Dependencies / Features').-* **Global Arguments**: Arguments can optionally be defined once, and be available to all child subcommands. There values will also be propagated up/down throughout all subcommands.-* **Custom Validations**: You can define a function to use as a validator of argument values. Imagine defining a function to validate IP addresses, or fail parsing upon error. This means your application logic can be solely focused on *using* values.-* **POSIX Compatible Conflicts/Overrides** - In POSIX args can be conflicting, but not fail parsing because whichever arg comes *last* "wins" so to speak. This allows things such as aliases (i.e. `alias ls='ls -l'` but then using `ls -C` in your terminal which ends up passing `ls -l -C` as the final arguments. Since `-l` and `-C` aren't compatible, this effectively runs `ls -C` in `clap` if you choose...`clap` also supports hard conflicts that fail parsing). (Thanks to [Vinatorul](https://github.com/Vinatorul)!)-* Supports the Unix `--` meaning, only positional arguments follow--## Quick Example--The following examples show a quick example of some of the very basic functionality of `clap`. For more advanced usage, such as requirements, conflicts, groups, multiple values and occurrences see the [documentation](https://docs.rs/clap/), [examples/](examples) directory of this repository or the [video tutorials](https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLza5oFLQGTl2Z5T8g1pRkIynR3E0_pc7U).-- **NOTE:** All of these examples are functionally the same, but show different styles in which to use `clap`. These different styles are purely a matter of personal preference.--The first example shows a method using the 'Builder Pattern' which allows more advanced configuration options (not shown in this small example), or even dynamically generating arguments when desired.--```rust-// (Full example with detailed comments in examples/01b_quick_example.rs)-//-// This example demonstrates clap's full 'builder pattern' style of creating arguments which is-// more verbose, but allows easier editing, and at times more advanced options, or the possibility-// to generate arguments dynamically.-extern crate clap;-use clap::{Arg, App, SubCommand};+ /// Number of times to greet+ #[clap(short, long, default_value_t = 1)]+ count: u8,+} fn main() {- let matches = App::new("My Super Program")- .version("1.0")- .author("Kevin K. <[email protected]>")- .about("Does awesome things")- .arg(Arg::with_name("config")- .short("c")- .long("config")- .value_name("FILE")- .help("Sets a custom config file")- .takes_value(true))- .arg(Arg::with_name("INPUT")- .help("Sets the input file to use")- .required(true)- .index(1))- .arg(Arg::with_name("v")- .short("v")- .multiple(true)- .help("Sets the level of verbosity"))- .subcommand(SubCommand::with_name("test")- .about("controls testing features")- .version("1.3")- .author("Someone E. <[email protected]>")- .arg(Arg::with_name("debug")- .short("d")- .help("print debug information verbosely")))- .get_matches();+ let args = Args::parse();- // Gets a value for config if supplied by user, or defaults to "default.conf"- let config = matches.value_of("config").unwrap_or("default.conf");- println!("Value for config: {}", config);-- // Calling .unwrap() is safe here because "INPUT" is required (if "INPUT" wasn't- // required we could have used an 'if let' to conditionally get the value)- println!("Using input file: {}", matches.value_of("INPUT").unwrap());-- // Vary the output based on how many times the user used the "verbose" flag- // (i.e. 'myprog -v -v -v' or 'myprog -vvv' vs 'myprog -v'- match matches.occurrences_of("v") {- 0 => println!("No verbose info"),- 1 => println!("Some verbose info"),- 2 => println!("Tons of verbose info"),- 3 | _ => println!("Don't be crazy"),+ for _ in 0..args.count {+ println!("Hello {}!", args.name) }-- // You can handle information about subcommands by requesting their matches by name- // (as below), requesting just the name used, or both at the same time- if let Some(matches) = matches.subcommand_matches("test") {- if matches.is_present("debug") {- println!("Printing debug info...");- } else {- println!("Printing normally...");- }- }-- // more program logic goes here... } ```+Add this to `Cargo.toml`:+```toml+[dependencies]+clap = { version = "3.0.10", features = ["derive"] }+```+```bash+$ demo --help+clap [..]-One could also optionally declare their CLI in YAML format and keep your Rust source tidy-or support multiple localized translations by having different YAML files for each localization.--First, create the `cli.yml` file to hold your CLI options, but it could be called anything we like:--```yaml-name: myapp-version: "1.0"-author: Kevin K. <[email protected]>-about: Does awesome things-args:- - config:- short: c- long: config- value_name: FILE- help: Sets a custom config file- takes_value: true- - INPUT:- help: Sets the input file to use- required: true- index: 1- - verbose:- short: v- multiple: true- help: Sets the level of verbosity-subcommands:- - test:- about: controls testing features- version: "1.3"- author: Someone E. <[email protected]>- args:- - debug:- short: d- help: print debug information-```--Since this feature requires additional dependencies that not everyone may want, it is *not* compiled in by default and we need to enable a feature flag in Cargo.toml:--Simply change your `clap = "2.34"` to `clap = {version = "2.34", features = ["yaml"]}`.--Finally we create our `main.rs` file just like we would have with the previous two examples:--```rust-// (Full example with detailed comments in examples/17_yaml.rs)-//-// This example demonstrates clap's building from YAML style of creating arguments which is far-// more clean, but takes a very small performance hit compared to the other two methods.-#[macro_use]-extern crate clap;-use clap::App;--fn main() {- // The YAML file is found relative to the current file, similar to how modules are found- let yaml = load_yaml!("cli.yml");- let matches = App::from_yaml(yaml).get_matches();-- // Same as previous examples...-}-```--If you were to compile any of the above programs and run them with the flag `--help` or `-h` (or `help` subcommand, since we defined `test` as a subcommand) the following would be output--```sh-$ myprog --help-My Super Program 1.0-Kevin K. <[email protected]>-Does awesome things+A simple to use, efficient, and full-featured Command Line Argument Parser USAGE:- MyApp [FLAGS] [OPTIONS] <INPUT> [SUBCOMMAND]--FLAGS:- -h, --help Prints help information- -v Sets the level of verbosity- -V, --version Prints version information+ demo[EXE] [OPTIONS] --name <NAME> OPTIONS:- -c, --config <FILE> Sets a custom config file+ -c, --count <COUNT> Number of times to greet [default: 1]+ -h, --help Print help information+ -n, --name <NAME> Name of the person to greet+ -V, --version Print version information+```+*(version number and `.exe` extension on windows replaced by placeholders)*-ARGS:- INPUT The input file to use+### Aspirations-SUBCOMMANDS:- help Prints this message or the help of the given subcommand(s)- test Controls testing features-```+- Out of the box, users get a polished CLI experience+ - Including common argument behavior, help generation, suggested fixes for users, colored output, [shell completions](https://github.com/clap-rs/clap/tree/master/clap_complete), etc+- Flexible enough to port your existing CLI interface+ - However, we won't necessarily streamline support for each use case+- Reasonable parse performance+- Resilient maintainership, including+ - Willing to break compatibility rather than batching up breaking changes in large releases+ - Leverage feature flags to keep to one active branch+ - Being under [WG-CLI](https://github.com/rust-cli/team/) to increase the bus factor+- We follow semver and will wait about 6-9 months between major breaking changes+- We will support the last two minor Rust releases (MSRV, currently 1.54.0)-**NOTE:** You could also run `myapp test --help` or `myapp help test` to see the help message for the `test` subcommand.+While these aspirations can be at odds with fast build times and low binary+size, we will still strive to keep these reasonable for the flexibility you+get. Check out the+[argparse-benchmarks](https://github.com/rust-cli/argparse-benchmarks-rs) for+CLI parsers optimized for other use cases.-There are also two other methods to create CLIs. Which style you choose is largely a matter of personal preference. The two other methods are:+### Related Projects-* Using [usage strings (examples/01a_quick_example.rs)](examples/01a_quick_example.rs) similar to (but not exact) docopt style usage statements. This is far less verbose than the above methods, but incurs a slight runtime penalty.-* Using [a macro (examples/01c_quick_example.rs)](examples/01c_quick_example.rs) which is like a hybrid of the builder and usage string style. It's less verbose, but doesn't incur the runtime penalty of the usage string style. The downside is that it's harder to debug, and more opaque.+- [wild](https://crates.io/crates/wild) for supporting wildcards (`*`) on Windows like you do Linux+- [argfile](https://crates.io/crates/argfile) for loading additional arguments from a file (aka response files)+- [clap_complete](https://crates.io/crates/clap_complete) for shell completion support+- [clap-verbosity-flag](https://crates.io/crates/clap-verbosity-flag)+- [clap-cargo](https://crates.io/crates/clap-cargo)+- [concolor-clap](https://crates.io/crates/concolor-clap)+- [Command-line Apps for Rust](https://rust-cli.github.io/book/index.html) book+- [`trycmd`](https://crates.io/crates/trycmd): Snapshot testing+ - Or for more control, [`assert_cmd`](https://crates.io/crates/assert_cmd) and [`assert_fs`](https://crates.io/crates/assert_fs)-Examples of each method can be found in the [examples/](examples) directory of this repository.+## Feature Flags-## Try it!+### Default Features-### Pre-Built Test+* **std**: _Not Currently Used._ Placeholder for supporting `no_std` environments in a backwards compatible manner.+* **color**: Turns on colored error messages.+* **suggestions**: Turns on the `Did you mean '--myoption'?` feature for when users make typos.-To try out the pre-built examples, use the following steps:+#### Optional features-* Clone the repository `$ git clone https://github.com/clap-rs/clap && cd clap-rs/`-* Compile the example `$ cargo build --example <EXAMPLE>`-* Run the help info `$ ./target/debug/examples/<EXAMPLE> --help`-* Play with the arguments!-* You can also do a onetime run via `$ cargo run --example <EXAMPLE> -- [args to example]`+* **derive**: Enables the custom derive (i.e. `#[derive(Parser)]`). Without this you must use one of the other methods of creating a `clap` CLI listed above.+* **cargo**: Turns on macros that read values from `CARGO_*` environment variables.+* **env**: Turns on the usage of environment variables during parsing.+* **regex**: Enables regex validators.+* **unicode**: Turns on support for unicode characters (including emoji) in arguments and help messages.+* **wrap_help**: Turns on the help text wrapping feature, based on the terminal size.-### BYOB (Build Your Own Binary)+#### Experimental features-To test out `clap`'s default auto-generated help/version follow these steps:-* Create a new cargo project `$ cargo new fake --bin && cd fake`-* Add `clap` to your `Cargo.toml`+**Warning:** These may contain breaking changes between minor releases.-```toml-[dependencies]-clap = "2"-```+* **unstable-replace**: Enable [`App::replace`](https://github.com/clap-rs/clap/issues/2836)+* **unstable-multicall**: Enable [`AppSettings::Multicall`](https://github.com/clap-rs/clap/issues/2861)+* **unstable-grouped**: Enable [`ArgMatches::grouped_values_of`](https://github.com/clap-rs/clap/issues/2924)-* Add the following to your `src/main.rs`+## Sponsors-```rust-extern crate clap;-use clap::App;+<!-- omit in TOC -->+### Gold-fn main() {- App::new("fake").version("v1.0-beta").get_matches();-}-```+[](https://opencollective.com/clap)-* Build your program `$ cargo build --release`-* Run with help or version `$ ./target/release/fake --help` or `$ ./target/release/fake --version`+<!-- omit in TOC -->+### Silver-## Usage+[](https://opencollective.com/clap)-For full usage, add `clap` as a dependency in your `Cargo.toml` () to use from crates.io:+<!-- omit in TOC -->+### Bronze-```toml-[dependencies]-clap = "~2.34"-```+[](https://opencollective.com/clap)-(**note**: If you are concerned with supporting a minimum version of Rust that is *older* than the current stable Rust minus 2 stable releases, it's recommended to use the `~major.minor.patch` style versions in your `Cargo.toml` which will only update the patch version automatically. For more information see the [Compatibility Policy](#compatibility-policy))+<!-- omit in TOC -->+### Backer-Then add `extern crate clap;` to your crate root.--Define a list of valid arguments for your program (see the [documentation](https://docs.rs/clap/) or [examples/](examples) directory of this repo)--Then run `cargo build` or `cargo update && cargo build` for your project.--### Optional Dependencies / Features--#### Features enabled by default--* **"suggestions"**: Turns on the `Did you mean '--myoption'?` feature for when users make typos. (builds dependency `strsim`)-* **"color"**: Turns on colored error messages. This feature only works on non-Windows OSs. (builds dependency `ansi-term` only on non-Windows targets)-* **"vec_map"**: Use [`VecMap`](https://crates.io/crates/vec_map) internally instead of a [`BTreeMap`](https://doc.rust-lang.org/stable/std/collections/struct.BTreeMap.html). This feature provides a _slight_ performance improvement. (builds dependency `vec_map`)--To disable these, add this to your `Cargo.toml`:--```toml-[dependencies.clap]-version = "2.34"-default-features = false-```--You can also selectively enable only the features you'd like to include, by adding:--```toml-[dependencies.clap]-version = "2.34"-default-features = false--# Cherry-pick the features you'd like to use-features = [ "suggestions", "color" ]-```--#### Opt-in features--* **"yaml"**: Enables building CLIs from YAML documents. (builds dependency `yaml-rust`)-* **"unstable"**: Enables unstable `clap` features that may change from release to release-* **"wrap_help"**: Turns on the help text wrapping feature, based on the terminal size. (builds dependency `term-size`)--### Dependencies Tree--The following graphic depicts `clap`s dependency graph (generated using [cargo-graph](https://github.com/kbknapp/cargo-graph)).-- * **Dashed** Line: Optional dependency- * **Red** Color: **NOT** included by default (must use cargo `features` to enable)- * **Blue** Color: Dev dependency, only used while developing.----### More Information--You can find complete documentation on the [docs.rs](https://docs.rs/clap/) for this project.--You can also find usage examples in the [examples/](examples) directory of this repo.--#### Video Tutorials--There's also the video tutorial series [Argument Parsing with Rust v2](https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLza5oFLQGTl2Z5T8g1pRkIynR3E0_pc7U).--These videos slowly trickle out as I finish them and currently a work in progress.--## How to Contribute--Details on how to contribute can be found in the [CONTRIBUTING.md](.github/CONTRIBUTING.md) file.--### Compatibility Policy--Because `clap` takes SemVer and compatibility seriously, this is the official policy regarding breaking changes and minimum required versions of Rust.--`clap` will pin the minimum required version of Rust to the CI builds. Bumping the minimum version of Rust is considered a minor breaking change, meaning *at a minimum* the minor version of `clap` will be bumped.--In order to keep from being surprised of breaking changes, it is **highly** recommended to use the `~major.minor.patch` style in your `Cargo.toml` only if you wish to target a version of Rust that is *older* than current stable minus two releases:--```toml-[dependencies]-clap = "~2.34"-```--This will cause *only* the patch version to be updated upon a `cargo update` call, and therefore cannot break due to new features, or bumped minimum versions of Rust.--#### Warning about '~' Dependencies--Using `~` can cause issues in certain circumstances.--From @alexcrichton:--Right now Cargo's version resolution is pretty naive, it's just a brute-force search of the solution space, returning the first resolvable graph. This also means that it currently won't terminate until it proves there is not possible resolvable graph. This leads to situations where workspaces with multiple binaries, for example, have two different dependencies such as:--```toml,no_sync--# In one Cargo.toml-[dependencies]-clap = "~2.34.0"--# In another Cargo.toml-[dependencies]-clap = "2.34.0"-```--This is inherently an unresolvable crate graph in Cargo right now. Cargo requires there's only one major version of a crate, and being in the same workspace these two crates must share a version. This is impossible in this location, though, as these version constraints cannot be met.--#### Minimum Version of Rust--`clap` will officially support current stable Rust, minus two releases, but may work with prior releases as well. For example, current stable Rust at the time of this writing is 1.41.0, meaning `clap` is guaranteed to compile with 1.39.0 and beyond.--At the 1.42.0 stable release, `clap` will be guaranteed to compile with 1.40.0 and beyond, etc.--Upon bumping the minimum version of Rust (assuming it's within the stable-2 range), it *must* be clearly annotated in the `CHANGELOG.md`--#### Breaking Changes--`clap` takes a similar policy to Rust and will bump the major version number upon breaking changes with only the following exceptions:-- * The breaking change is to fix a security concern- * The breaking change is to be fixing a bug (i.e. relying on a bug as a feature)- * The breaking change is a feature isn't used in the wild, or all users of said feature have given approval *prior* to the change--#### Compatibility with Wasm--A best effort is made to ensure that `clap` will work on projects targeting `wasm32-unknown-unknown`. However there is no dedicated CI build-covering this specific target.--## License--`clap` is licensed under the MIT license. Please read the [LICENSE-MIT](LICENSE-MIT) file in this repository for more information.--## Related Crates--There are several excellent crates which can be used with `clap`, I recommend checking them all out! If you've got a crate that would be a good fit to be used with `clap` open an issue and let me know, I'd love to add it!--* [`structopt`](https://github.com/TeXitoi/structopt) - This crate allows you to define a struct, and build a CLI from it! No more "stringly typed" and it uses `clap` behind the scenes! (*Note*: There is work underway to pull this crate into mainline `clap`).-* [`assert_cli`](https://github.com/assert-rs/assert_cli) - This crate allows you test your CLIs in a very intuitive and functional way!--## Recent Breaking Changes--`clap` follows semantic versioning, so breaking changes should only happen upon major version bumps. The only exception to this rule is breaking changes that happen due to implementation that was deemed to be a bug, security concerns, or it can be reasonably proved to affect no code. For the full details, see [CHANGELOG.md](./CHANGELOG.md).--As of 2.27.0:--* Argument values now take precedence over subcommand names. This only arises by using unrestrained multiple values and subcommands together where the subcommand name can coincide with one of the multiple values. Such as `$ prog <files>... <subcommand>`. The fix is to place restraints on number of values, or disallow the use of `$ prog <prog-args> <subcommand>` structure.--As of 2.0.0 (From 1.x)--* **Fewer lifetimes! Yay!**- * `App<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f>` => `App<'a, 'b>`- * `Arg<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f>` => `Arg<'a, 'b>`- * `ArgMatches<'a, 'b>` => `ArgMatches<'a>`-* **Simply Renamed**- * `App::arg_group` => `App::group`- * `App::arg_groups` => `App::groups`- * `ArgGroup::add` => `ArgGroup::arg`- * `ArgGroup::add_all` => `ArgGroup::args`- * `ClapError` => `Error`- * struct field `ClapError::error_type` => `Error::kind`- * `ClapResult` => `Result`- * `ClapErrorType` => `ErrorKind`-* **Removed Deprecated Functions and Methods**- * `App::subcommands_negate_reqs`- * `App::subcommand_required`- * `App::arg_required_else_help`- * `App::global_version(bool)`- * `App::versionless_subcommands`- * `App::unified_help_messages`- * `App::wait_on_error`- * `App::subcommand_required_else_help`- * `SubCommand::new`- * `App::error_on_no_subcommand`- * `Arg::new`- * `Arg::mutually_excludes`- * `Arg::mutually_excludes_all`- * `Arg::mutually_overrides_with`- * `simple_enum!`-* **Renamed Error Variants**- * `InvalidUnicode` => `InvalidUtf8`- * `InvalidArgument` => `UnknownArgument`-* **Usage Parser**- * Value names can now be specified inline, i.e. `-o, --option <FILE> <FILE2> 'some option which takes two files'`- * **There is now a priority of order to determine the name** - This is perhaps the biggest breaking change. See the documentation for full details. Prior to this change, the value name took precedence. **Ensure your args are using the proper names (i.e. typically the long or short and NOT the value name) throughout the code**-* `ArgMatches::values_of` returns an `Values` now which implements `Iterator` (should not break any code)-* `crate_version!` returns `&'static str` instead of `String`--### Deprecations--Old method names will be left around for several minor version bumps, or one major version bump.--As of 2.27.0:--* **AppSettings::PropagateGlobalValuesDown:** this setting deprecated and is no longer required to propagate values down or up+[](https://opencollective.com/clap)
After analyzing the provided code diff, I can confirm that this is a documentation/README update for the `clap` Rust crate. The changes are purely related to formatting, content organization, and updating examples to reflect newer versions of the library. There are no security-related changes in this diff. Here's the structured response: Vulnerability Existed: no [No security vulnerabilities found] [third_party/rust/clap/README.md] [All lines] [Old README content] [New README content] The changes include: 1. A complete restructuring of the README format 2. Updated version information and badges 3. New example code using derive macros 4. Updated feature flags section 5. Added sponsors section 6. Removed old comparison sections and detailed builder pattern examples Since this is purely documentation and example updates with no code changes that could affect security, there are no vulnerabilities to report. The diff shows a modernization of the documentation to match newer versions of the clap library.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/neqo-http3/src/stream_type_reader.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/neqo-http3/src/stream_type_reader.rs@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ #![allow(clippy::module_name_repetitions)] use crate::control_stream_local::HTTP3_UNI_STREAM_TYPE_CONTROL;-use crate::hframe::H3_FRAME_TYPE_HEADERS;+use crate::frames::H3_FRAME_TYPE_HEADERS; use crate::{CloseType, Error, Http3StreamType, ReceiveOutput, RecvStream, Res, Stream}; use neqo_common::{qtrace, Decoder, IncrementalDecoderUint, Role}; use neqo_qpack::decoder::QPACK_UNI_STREAM_TYPE_DECODER;@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ use test_fixture::{connect, now}; use crate::control_stream_local::HTTP3_UNI_STREAM_TYPE_CONTROL;- use crate::hframe::H3_FRAME_TYPE_HEADERS;+ use crate::frames::H3_FRAME_TYPE_HEADERS; use crate::{CloseType, Error, NewStreamType, ReceiveOutput, RecvStream, Res}; use neqo_common::{Encoder, Role}; use neqo_qpack::decoder::QPACK_UNI_STREAM_TYPE_DECODER;
After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no The changes appear to be a simple refactoring where `hframe` module references were updated to `frames` module. No security vulnerability is apparent in this change. 2. Vulnerability Existed: no Both changes (in the main code and test code) are identical module reference updates. There's no indication of any security fixes in these changes. Additional notes: - The diff shows only import path changes from `hframe` to `frames` - No functional code changes were made - No security-related patterns (like input validation, memory safety, etc.) were modified - This appears to be purely an organizational/structural code change The answer follows the requested format, but in this case no vulnerabilities were found in the provided diff. The changes seem to be part of code reorganization rather than security fixes.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-ui/outline-style-014.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-ui/outline-style-014.html@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ <link rel="help" title="7.3. 'outline-style' property" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-ui/#outline-style"> <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/CSS21/box.html#value-def-border-style"> <link rel="match" href="reference/outline-style-014-ref.html">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="Test checks that the outline style is two solid lines when outline-style set double"> <style> #test {
Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be related to test file cleanup rather than security fixes.
Analysis:
1. The diff shows removal of an empty `meta` tag with `flags` attribute
2. No security-related changes are visible in the diff
3. The changes appear to be test file maintenance/cleanup
Answer Format:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerabilities found in this diff. The change appears to be test file maintenance.
The diff shows:
- Removal of an empty `<meta name="flags" content="">` tag
- No other changes to the file
- No security implications from this change
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/utils/url.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/utils/url.js@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this * file, You can obtain one at <http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/>. */-import { memoize } from "lodash"; import { URL as URLParser } from "whatwg-url"; const defaultUrl = {@@ -22,7 +21,12 @@ username: "", };-export const stripQuery = memoize(function stripQueryAndHash(url) {+const stripQueryCache = new Map();+export function stripQuery(url) {+ if (stripQueryCache.has(url)) {+ return stripQueryCache.get(url);+ }+ let queryStart = url.indexOf("?"); let before = url;@@ -40,10 +44,17 @@ before = url.slice(0, queryStart); }- return before + after;-});+ const result = before + after;+ stripQueryCache.set(url, result);+ return result;+}-export const parse = memoize(function parse(url) {+const parseCache = new Map();+export function parse(url) {+ if (parseCache.has(url)) {+ return parseCache.get(url);+ }+ let urlObj; try { urlObj = new URLParser(url);@@ -80,8 +91,10 @@ } urlObj.path = urlObj.pathname + urlObj.search;+ // Cache the result+ parseCache.set(url, urlObj); return urlObj;-});+} export function sameOrigin(firstUrl, secondUrl) { return parse(firstUrl).origin == parse(secondUrl).origin;
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Cache Poisoning] [devtools/client/debugger/src/utils/url.js] [Lines 22-44, 46-91]
[Old Code]
export const stripQuery = memoize(function stripQueryAndHash(url) {
...
});
export const parse = memoize(function parse(url) {
...
});
[Fixed Code]
const stripQueryCache = new Map();
export function stripQuery(url) {
if (stripQueryCache.has(url)) {
return stripQueryCache.get(url);
}
...
const result = before + after;
stripQueryCache.set(url, result);
return result;
}
const parseCache = new Map();
export function parse(url) {
if (parseCache.has(url)) {
return parseCache.get(url);
}
...
parseCache.set(url, urlObj);
return urlObj;
}
Additional Details:
- The change replaces lodash's memoize with manual caching using Map objects
- While not a direct security fix, this could potentially mitigate cache poisoning vulnerabilities by:
1) Making the caching behavior more explicit and controllable
2) Avoiding potential prototype pollution issues that could affect lodash's memoize
3) Providing clearer cache management
- However, without more context about the threat model, this is speculative
- The change appears to be more about maintainability/performance than direct security
2. Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability] [devtools/client/debugger/src/utils/url.js] [Lines 2]
[Old Code]
import { memoize } from "lodash";
[Fixed Code]
(removed line)
Additional Details:
- This is simply a removal of an unused import after refactoring
- No security implications identified
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/src/util/spanned_value.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/src/util/spanned_value.rs@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ use proc_macro2::Span; use std::ops::{Deref, DerefMut};-use syn; use syn::spanned::Spanned;-use {++use crate::{ FromDeriveInput, FromField, FromGenericParam, FromGenerics, FromMeta, FromTypeParam, FromVariant, Result, };@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ /// but the user may not always explicitly set those options in their source code. /// In this case, using `Default::default()` will create an instance which points /// to `Span::call_site()`.-#[derive(Debug, Clone)]+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)] pub struct SpannedValue<T> { value: T, span: Span,@@ -33,6 +33,11 @@ /// Get the source code location referenced by this struct. pub fn span(&self) -> Span { self.span+ }++ /// Apply a mapping function to a reference to the spanned value.+ pub fn map_ref<U>(&self, map_fn: impl FnOnce(&T) -> U) -> SpannedValue<U> {+ SpannedValue::new(map_fn(&self.value), self.span) } }@@ -59,6 +64,12 @@ impl<T> AsRef<T> for SpannedValue<T> { fn as_ref(&self) -> &T { &self.value+ }+}++impl<T> Spanned for SpannedValue<T> {+ fn span(&self) -> Span {+ self.span } }
Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes. 1. Vulnerability Existed: no The changes appear to be functional improvements rather than security fixes. The main changes are: - Added `Copy` trait derivation to `SpannedValue` - Added `map_ref` method for mapping references - Added `Spanned` trait implementation - Reorganized imports 2. Vulnerability Existed: no The changes don't show any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The modifications are: - File: third_party/rust/darling_core/src/util/spanned_value.rs - Lines: Throughout the file - Old Code: Various (as shown in diff) - Fixed Code: Various (as shown in diff) The changes seem to be adding functionality and improving code organization rather than addressing security issues. No specific vulnerabilities are being patched in this diff. Additional notes: - The code appears to be part of a Rust procedural macro helper library - The changes are mostly additive (adding new functionality) - No unsafe code modifications or security-sensitive operations are being modified - The span handling improvements might help with better error reporting but don't appear security-related
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/webusb/usbDevice.https.any.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/webusb/usbDevice.https.any.js@@ -236,10 +236,11 @@ return getFakeDevice().then(({ device }) => { assert_equals(device.configuration, null); return device.open()- .then(() => assertRejectsWithError(- device.selectConfiguration(3), 'NotFoundError',- 'The configuration value provided is not supported by the device.'))- .then(() => device.close());+ .then(+ () => assertRejectsWithError(+ device.selectConfiguration(10), 'NotFoundError',+ 'The configuration value provided is not supported by the device.'))+ .then(() => device.close()); }); }, 'selectConfiguration rejects on invalid configurations');@@ -431,6 +432,30 @@ }); }, 'can select an alternate interface');+usb_test(+ async () => {+ const {device} = await getFakeDevice();+ await device.open();+ await device.selectConfiguration(3);+ await device.claimInterface(2);+ await device.selectAlternateInterface(2, 0);+ await device.close();+ },+ 'can select an alternate interface on a setting with non-sequential ' ++ 'interface number');++usb_test(+ async () => {+ const {device} = await getFakeDevice();+ await device.open();+ await device.selectConfiguration(3);+ await device.claimInterface(0);+ await device.selectAlternateInterface(0, 2);+ await device.close();+ },+ 'can select an alternate interface on a setting with non-sequential ' ++ 'alternative setting value');+ usb_test(() => { return getFakeDevice().then(({ device }) => { return device.open()
Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be test case modifications and additions rather than security patches. Here's my analysis:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
Configuration Test Update [File] [Lines 236-243]
[Old Code]
.then(() => assertRejectsWithError(
device.selectConfiguration(3), 'NotFoundError',
'The configuration value provided is not supported by the device.'))
[Fixed Code]
.then(
() => assertRejectsWithError(
device.selectConfiguration(10), 'NotFoundError',
'The configuration value provided is not supported by the device.'))
2. Vulnerability Existed: no
New Test Cases Added [File] [Lines 432-456]
[Old Code]
(No previous test cases for non-sequential interface numbers)
[Fixed Code]
(Added two new test cases for non-sequential interface numbers and alternative setting values)
The changes consist of:
1. Updating a test case to use configuration value 10 instead of 3 (likely to test a broader range of invalid values)
2. Adding new test cases for handling non-sequential interface numbers and alternative settings
These appear to be test improvements rather than security fixes. No security vulnerabilities are evident in this diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.drawing.style.wordSpacing.measure.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.drawing.style.wordSpacing.measure.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); _assertSame(ctx.letterSpacing, '0px', "ctx.letterSpacing", "'0px'"); _assertSame(ctx.wordSpacing, '0px', "ctx.wordSpacing", "'0px'");
Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18]
Old Code:
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
Additional Details:
The changes in this diff appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes, renaming the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. There are no security-related changes or vulnerabilities being addressed in this modification. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been changed for what appears to be consistency or readability purposes.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/mozglue/tests/TestTimeStampWin.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/mozglue/tests/TestTimeStampWin.cpp@@ -42,8 +42,7 @@ int ChildMain() { // Make sure a process creation timestamp is always not bigger than // the current timestamp.- bool inconsistent = false;- auto t0 = mozilla::TimeStamp::ProcessCreation(&inconsistent);+ auto t0 = mozilla::TimeStamp::ProcessCreation(); auto t1 = mozilla::TimeStamp::Now(); if (t0 > t1) { printf(
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff: Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Logical Error] [mozglue/tests/TestTimeStampWin.cpp] [Lines 42-44] [Old Code] bool inconsistent = false; auto t0 = mozilla::TimeStamp::ProcessCreation(&inconsistent); [Fixed Code] auto t0 = mozilla::TimeStamp::ProcessCreation(); Additional Details: - The change removes the `inconsistent` flag parameter from the `ProcessCreation()` call - While not a classic security vulnerability, this could indicate a fix for potential logical errors or incorrect state tracking - The original code might have been checking for inconsistency between timestamps, but this was removed in favor of simpler timestamp comparison - Without more context about the `ProcessCreation()` implementation, it's hard to determine if this was actually a security issue Note: This doesn't appear to be a classic security vulnerability (like buffer overflow, injection, etc.), but rather a potential logical error fix. The impact would depend on how the `inconsistent` flag was being used elsewhere in the codebase.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.stroke.union.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.stroke.union.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ ctx.moveTo(100, 40); ctx.lineTo(0, 40); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-related modifications.
Here's the analysis following your requested format:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.stroke.union.html] [Lines 17-29]
Old Code:
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
The changes are simply renaming the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` throughout the file, which doesn't appear to address any security issues. The functionality remains identical.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/framework/browser-toolbox/test/helpers-browser-toolbox.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/framework/browser-toolbox/test/helpers-browser-toolbox.js@@ -172,7 +172,13 @@ } }+ let destroyed = false; async function destroy() {+ // No need to do anything if `destroy` was already called.+ if (destroyed) {+ return null;+ }+ const closePromise = process._dbgProcess.wait(); evaluateExpression("gToolbox.destroy()").catch(e => { // Ignore connection close as the toolbox destroy may destroy@@ -194,7 +200,13 @@ ); await client.close();- }+ destroyed = true;+ }++ // When tests involving using this task fail, the spawned Browser Toolbox is not+ // destroyed and might impact the next tests (e.g. pausing the content process before+ // the debugger from the content toolbox does). So make sure to cleanup everything.+ registerCleanupFunction(destroy); return { importFunctions,
Here's the analysis following your requested format:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Resource Leak] [devtools/client/framework/browser-toolbox/test/helpers-browser-toolbox.js] [Lines 172-200]
[Old Code]
async function destroy() {
const closePromise = process._dbgProcess.wait();
evaluateExpression("gToolbox.destroy()").catch(e => {
// Ignore connection close as the toolbox destroy may destroy
// the connection before we get a chance to receive the response.
});
await Promise.race(
[
closePromise,
new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, TEST_TIMEOUT_MS)),
]
);
await client.close();
}
[Fixed Code]
let destroyed = false;
async function destroy() {
// No need to do anything if `destroy` was already called.
if (destroyed) {
return null;
}
const closePromise = process._dbgProcess.wait();
evaluateExpression("gToolbox.destroy()").catch(e => {
// Ignore connection close as the toolbox destroy may destroy
// the connection before we get a chance to receive the response.
});
await Promise.race(
[
closePromise,
new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, TEST_TIMEOUT_MS)),
]
);
await client.close();
destroyed = true;
}
// When tests involving using this task fail, the spawned Browser Toolbox is not
// destroyed and might impact the next tests (e.g. pausing the content process before
// the debugger from the content toolbox does). So make sure to cleanup everything.
registerCleanupFunction(destroy);
Additional Details:
The changes add protection against multiple destroy() calls and ensure cleanup via registerCleanupFunction. While this prevents potential resource leaks during test failures, it's not clear if this was exploitable in production or just a test reliability improvement. The main security concern would be if undestroyed toolboxes could lead to information leakage between tests, but this appears to be test-specific code.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/highlight-z-index-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/highlight-z-index-001.html@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-pseudo-4/#highlight-painting"> <link rel="match" href="highlight-z-index-001-ref.html">- <meta content="" name="flags"> <meta name="assert" content="This test checks that the ::selection pseudo-element must be drawn below a relatively positioned element. In this test, such relatively positioned element is a preceding sibling element."> <style>
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/highlight-z-index-001.html [Lines] 8
[Old Code] <meta content="" name="flags">
[Fixed Code] (removed)
Additional details:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag with name="flags"
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerability patterns are present in this change
- The change doesn't affect any security-related functionality
- The modification is likely for code maintenance or test specification purposes
The change doesn't appear to address any security vulnerability but rather removes an unnecessary or deprecated meta tag from the test file.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.canvas.destination-atop.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.canvas.destination-atop.html@@ -17,11 +17,11 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(offscreenCanvas.width, offscreenCanvas.height);+var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(canvas.width, canvas.height); var ctx2 = offscreenCanvas2.getContext('2d'); var promise = new Promise(function(resolve, reject) { var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'destination-atop'; ctx.drawImage(offscreenCanvas2, 0, 0);- _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 128,255,128,191, "50,25", "128,255,128,191", 5);+ _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 128,255,128,191, "50,25", "128,255,128,191", 5); }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);
Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.canvas.destination-atop.html [Lines] 17-39
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(offscreenCanvas.width, offscreenCanvas.height);
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(canvas.width, canvas.height);
Additional Details:
- The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (offscreenCanvas → canvas) and don't introduce or fix any security vulnerabilities
- The XMLHttpRequest implementation remains unchanged and doesn't show any security issues
- The canvas operations and assertions remain functionally identical
- No security-related patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in either version
The diff shows only refactoring changes with no security implications.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.